A Bellman's Equation for the Study of Income Smoothing

Richard T. Boylan and Bente Villadsen
Olin School of Business, Washington University
Villadsen@simon.wustl.edu

Abstract

Some authors (e.g., [Dye1988], [Trueman and Titman1988]) distinguish between ``earnings management" and ``income smoothing." The former occurs when the manager reports a number different from ``actual" earnings to shareholders without facing intertemporal restrictions on the discretionary amount that she reports. In contrast, income smoothing requires the reported earnings figure to ``add up" to the actual earnings figure over a period of time. Among the methods typically used to smoothe income are:
  1. early/late write down of inventory
  2. estimates of bad debt expense and write down hereof
  3. the application of the revenue recognition method (under, for example, the completed contract method it is easy to delay recognizing revenue by leaving a minor part of the project unfinished until the next fiscal year).

The model allows the manager to recognize a fraction of next period's income in this period (i.e., ask the customers to pay in advance for deliveries in January and recognize revenue on a cash basis) and to postpone the recognition of some income items (for example, bill the customers in January for shipments made in December and recognize revenue on a cash basis). For companies that produce to order it is not unreasonable to assume the company knows next period's revenue when periods are relatively short. Defense contractors, for example, know relatively well what next quarter's revenue will be. Hence the model describes income smoothing rather than earnings management.

In order to solve the model numerically, the validity of the Bellman's equation is shown. (The difficulty consists of keeping the state space small, so that the Bellman's equation can be computed numerically. Otherwise, one could simply set the state space equal to the set all possible histories, and then the Bellman's equation would immidiately follow. An added advantage of looking at stationary strategies for a ``small'' state space is that it restricts the principal and agent to simpler strategies.) The fact that the principal does not observe income smoothing, but forms beliefs over the variables not observed, complicates the proof.

Trueman and Titman [Trueman and Titman1988] model income smoothing in a similar fashion in a model of adverse selection (without any moral hazard). In their model there are only two periods, so smoothing only occurs in period 1 while period 2 is used to ``add up" accounts. Also, in their model, next period's output, tex2html_wrap_inline62 , is not revealed before next period, but its (unconditional) expectation is and that is the figure that Trueman and Titman [Trueman and Titman1988] use. Further, they require that the manager (weakly) overreports if realized income is below its expected value and underreports if the realized income is above its expected value. Our model does not put such restrictions on the income report.

In proving the results, we used techniques that we saw in other papers. The idea of using the agent's continuation value as a state variable came from [Spear and Srivastava1987]. The idea of using self-generating sets (as defined in [Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti1990]) in this context came from [Wang1993]. The idea of using the principal's beliefs in the state variable came from [Rhenius1974].

Section 2 lays out the principal-agent model. Section 3 describe a recursive principal-agent model. The theorem at the end of the Section 3 states the equivalence of these models. The appendix containts the proof of the theorem.

References

Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti1990
Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stachetti, 1990. `Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring', Econometrica 58, 1041-1063.

Dye1988
Dye, R. A., 1988. `Earnings management in an overlapping generations model', Journal of Accounting Research 26, 195-235.

Rhenius1974
Rhenius, D., 1974. `Incomplete information in markovian decision models', Annals of Statistics 2, 1327-1334.

Sorin1992
Sorin, S., 1992. `Repeated games with complete information', In R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 1, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 71-107.

Spear and Srivastava1987
Spear, S. E. and S. Srivastava, 1987. `On repeated moral hazard with discounting', Review of Economic Studies 54, 599-617.

Trueman and Titman1988
Trueman, B. and S. Titman, 1988. `An explanation for accounting income smoothing', Journal of Accounting Research 26, 127-139.

Wang1993
Wang, C., 1993. `Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model', Mimeo, University of Iowa.

Whitt1978
Whitt, W., 1978. `Approximations of dynamic programs', Mathematics of Operations Research 3, 231-243.


Society of Computational Economics
Second International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance
Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 June 1996