The Dynamics of Deficit

Paul Klein
Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University
KleinP@iies.su.se

Abstract

Macroeconomists have been interested in dynamic games at least since Kydland (1975) and especially since Kydland and Prescott (1977). So far, however, the focus has been on qualitative results. Certainly, research on dynamic games has not achieved the quantitative precision of the equilibrium business cycle literature that began with Kydland and Prescott (1982) and which still thrives. Ambler and Paquet (1996) is an all too rare exception.

No doubt part of the reason why the solution and simulation of dynamic games between the government and the private sector is not yet standard practice among students of business cycles is that there is no standard algorithm available which (at least approximately) solves models of this kind. Ambler and Paquet (1995) is the first attempt to present such an algorithm. The algorithm presented in this paper is an extension of Ambler and Paquet.

The present paper, extends the results of Ambler and Paquet (1995) mainly by allowing for government-issued securities with unknown price processes. It also shows how to apply Gaussian exponential control theory as suggested by Hansen  and Sargent  (1995) in order to make the decision rules risk sensitive.

The game between the government and the private sector is modelled as follows. Time is modelled as discrete, so that tex2html_wrap_inline39 and the number of periods is assumed to be infinite. At the beginning of each period t, the government takes its actions. Having observed these actions, all (atomistic) private agents (who are qualitatively identical) take their actions simultaneously.

The solution concept employed is subgame perfect Markov equilibrium. Subgame perfection is guranteed by requiring the strategies of all agents to satisfy a Bellman equation in each period and state of the world. The qualification `Markov' is a refinement concept advocated by, among others, Maskin and Tirole (1988). The point of using this refinement is to avoid folk-theorem style results and get a unique equilibrium. For more philosophical arguments in favour of the Markov refinement, see Maskin and Tirole (1995). In the present context, Markov equilibrium means that the equilibrium strategies can be represented as feedback rules of the form tex2html_wrap_inline43 where tex2html_wrap_inline45 is a vector of decision variables and tex2html_wrap_inline47 is a vector of state variables of the same dimension in each period. Indeed, because of the infinite time horizon, the equilibrium strategies are time invariant, so that we may write tex2html_wrap_inline49 Finally, because all the problems involved are linear-quadratic, the equilibrium strategies are linear, so that we may write tex2html_wrap_inline51 . Similarly, asset prices can be written tex2html_wrap_inline53 .

Especially when asset pricing is involved, the certainty equivalence property of linear-quadratic control is embarrassing. In particular, it means that all risk premia are identically zero. In order to deal with this, I show how to apply discounted linear exponential quadratic Gaussian control, as developed by Hansen and Sargent (1995).

Having presented the algorithm, I discuss practical problems that might and do arise in implementation, focussing especially on a specific model with endogenous taxes and government spending.

References

1
Ambler and Paquet, 1996. `Fiscal Spending Shocks, Endogenous Government Spending, and Real Business Cycles', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20(1-3), 237-256.

2
Ambler and Paquet, 1995. `Recursive Methods for Computing Equilibria of General Equilibrium Dynamic Stackelberg Games', mimeo, Université de Québec à Montréal.

3
Hansen and Sargent, 1995. `Discounted Linear Exponential Quadratic Gaussian Control', IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 40, 968-971.

4
Maskin and Tirole, 1995. `Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I:\ Observable Actions', mimeo, Harvard University.

5
Maskin and Tirole, 1988. `A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs', Econometrica 56(3), 549-569.

6
Kydland, 1975. `Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games', International Economic Review 16(2), 321-335.

7
Kydland and Prescott, 1977. `Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economy 85(3), 473-491.

8
Kydland and Prescott, 1982. `Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations', Econometrica 50, 1345-1371.


Society of Computational Economics
Second International Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance
Geneva, Switzerland, 26-28 June 1996