Note(s)

[1]  / In this paper, capability means the ability of a State, organization, or institution to put together the administrative (organizational), industrial, and financial R&D techniques to organize and finalize given systems or components, such as the design, manufacture, and the ability to deploy and operate these systems and components.

[2]  / For some decision-makers, the issue of cost and time seems to be a major motivation to engage in technology transfer agreements and avoid indigenous R&D developments. For example, the main argument in the case of outer space applications is that physical, chemical, and other natural laws, as well as the many different ways of addressing problems deriving therefrom, are well known. One of the main objectives is the lack of adequate financing and time (in terms of years or decades) for the development of a space programme: therefore, technology transfer is seen as an alternative solution.

[3]  / For lengthy discussion of different possible definitions of outer space, see, inter alia, "The Question of the Definition and/or the Delimitation of Outer Space," Official Records of the General Assembly, A/AC.105/C 2/7, 7 May 1970; "The Question of the Definition and/or the Delimitation of Outer Space," Official Records of the General Assembly, A/AC.105/C 2/7, 21 January 1977; "Matters relating to the Definition and/or Delimitation of Outer Space and Outer Space Activities, Bearing in Mind Inter Alia, Questions Related to the Geostationary Orbit," Official Records of the General Assembly, A/AC 105/C.2/L.139, 4 April 1983; Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), "Introduction," I, Problems of Definitions, Where Does Outer Space Begin?, in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, UNIDIR, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991, p. 19; Caesar Voûte, "Boundaries in Space," in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, op. cit.

[4]  / G.C.M. Reijnen and W. De Graaff as quoted in Voûte, op. cit., p. 27.

[5]  / The term artificial satellites (satellites hereafter) refers to active or non-active man-made objects in outer space. It therefore includes man-made space debris, but excludes other objects in outer space such as meteorites.

[6]  / Endo-atmospheric launchers are vehicles designed to boost a payload up to the limits of the atmosphere-- generally considered as altitudes below 100 km. In contrast, exo-atmospheric launchers are vehicles capable of boosting a payload above the altitude of 100 km.

[7]  / Microgravity is the quasi-total absence of weight produced when a spacecraft orbits around the Earth. This phenomenon is created by an equilibrium between the spacecraft's gravitational and centrifugal forces.

[8]  Telecommand signals are commands transmitted to the satellite from the ground through a radiofrequency link.

[9]  A geostationary orbit, also known as a geosynchronous orbit, is an orbit located nearly 36,000 km above the Equator, where a satellite travels at the same speed relative to a point situated on the Equator. Thus, satellites in this orbit appear stationary above a specific point on the Equator.

[10]  Strap-on boosters are small rockets attached to the body of a larger main rocket to increase thrust in the initial (boost) phase of launch.

[11]  Both solid and liquid propellants function as the result of a chemical reaction. See a discussion by Stephen E. Doyle, Civil Space Systems: Implications for International Security, UNIDIR, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994, pp. 43-45. Doyle also refers to experimental sounding rockets in the 1920s that were propelled with liquid fuel engines. Other propellants presently under consideration and development include nuclear and electrical reaction elements.

[12]  Cryogenic propellants are based on liquid oxygen and hydrogen.

[13]  / The apogee is the point in an orbit of an Earth object which is furthest from the Earth. Since BMs do not orbit the Earth, their apogees should be considered to be the point in its trajectory which is furthest from the Earth.

[14]  / For a brief explanation of these different orbits, see a discussion in "Study on the Application of Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space," Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Report by the Secretary-General, A/48/305, 15 October 1993, pp. 17-25; Pierre Lellouche (ed.), Satellite Warfare: A Challenge for the International Community, UNIDIR, New York: United Nations Publication 1987.

[15]  / For general discussions on this view, see, inter alia, Stanislav N. Rodionov, "Dual-Use Satellite Systems: Practical Applications and Strategic Views", Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites, Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), UNIDIR, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. For an account on the military use of satellites in a conflict, see Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War, brochure.

[16]  / For a discussion and references, see "The Role of Outer Space in Nuclear Deterrence," Péricles Gasparini Alves, in Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Prospects in the 1990's, Serge Sur (ed.), UNIDIR, New York: United Nations Publications, 1993, pp. 105-16.

[17]  / For an interesting discussion on this subject, see Stanislav N. Rodionov in "Dual-Use Satellites: Military Applications and Strategic Implications", Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites, op. cit., pp. 119-22.

[18]  / Telemetric data are the values of parameters and status concerning an active flying object (e.g., satellite, space vehicle or missile) which are transmitted to the ground through a radiofrequency link.

[19]  / On the military application of civil satellites, see Ghirardi, Raymond and Fernand Verger, "Géographie des lancements de satellites" Mappe Monde, vol. 2, 1987, pp. 15-21; see also "French Satellite Shows Soviet Northern Fleet Facilities", Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 2, 1987; Isabelle Sourbès and Yves Boyer, "Technical Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space," in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, op. cit., p. 69-81.

[20]  / The resolution determines the size of objects to be detected by an image sensor. The smaller the resolution parameter, the more details will be visible in the image produced by optical systems. The parameters of a resolution are a factor of the distance between the detector and the targeted object (orbit height), different atmospheric turbulence and other factors.

[21]  / See Masashi Matsuo, "Satellite Capabilities of Established Space-Competent States," in Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites, op. cit., pp. 21-30.

[22]  / For a general discussion on the different technologies and techniques used for tracking and monitoring satellites, sounding rockets, space launchers, and ballistic missiles, see "Artificial Satellites and Space Debris: Current Stocks, Orbital Distribution and Monitoring Activities", Paolo Farinella, pp. 91-114, and "Rocket Launches: Current Trends, Growth Prospects and Monitoring Operations", Péricles Gasparini Alves, pp. 115-35, both in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. For a more technical discussion of ground-based, ship- and air-mounted antennae used for tracking satellites, sounding rockets, space launchers, and missiles, see "Space Tracking Systems," John E. Pike, Space Policy Project, Washington, D.C., Federation of American Scientists, 1 December 1993; "Radio Tracking and Monitoring: Implications for CSBMs," Péricles Gasparini Alves and Fernand Alby, pp. 151-87, in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, op. cit.

[23]  / See discussions by Alexandr V. Bagrov, "Optical Earth-to-Space Observations of Artificial Satellites and Space Debris: Monitoring CSBMs," pp. 217-37; Wayne H. Cannon, "The Application of the Technique of Radar/Interferometry to CSBMs in Outer Space," pp. 239-61; and Janet S. Fender, "Laser Systems for Optical Space Observation," pp. 189-215; all in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, op. cit.

[24]  For more detailed studies on this issue, see Doyle, op. cit.; Péricles Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, UNIDIR, New York: United Nations Publication, 1993.

[25]  The term qualified as used here refers to equipment which has been tested, validated, and become operational. In a broader sense, this term should also refer to outer space technologies in general and servicing (training, operations, and follow-up).

[26]  However, in 1947, the Soviets reportedly tested their first rocket, the SS-1a Scunner, which is thought to derive from the German V-2 vehicle. In 1955, the first Soviet medium-range BM, the SS-3 Shyster, is said to have been put in operation. See a discussion and references in Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Noris, and Jeffrey I. Sands, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, Volume IV, Nuclear Weapons Databook, National Resources Defense Council, New York: Harper & Row, Ballinger Division, 1989, pp. 2-19. For a discussion and references on Russian and Soviet research and developments related to rockets and launchers from the 17th century to the 1930s, see Piero Piazzano, "Così un Sogno ha Potuto Mettere le Ali," Airone Spazio, Numero Speciale, nð. 120, Aprile 1991, pp. 16-25; Bhupendra Jasani, Space and International Security, London, Royal United Services Institute, pp. 6-8. On Soviet space activities, see yearly issues of The Soviet Year in Space, Nicholas L. Johnson (ed.), Colorado Springs: Teledyne Brown Engineering (in particular, 1989 and 1990); "Le Grandi Esplorazioni Nel Mondo Sopra de Noi," Airone Spazio, op. cit.; John E. Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, "Military Use of Outer Space," World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, Stockholm International Peace Institute, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 136-141; Atlas de géographie de L'espace, sous la direction de Fernand Verger, Sides-Reclus, 1992.

[27]  See a discussion in Atlas de Géographie de L'Espace, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

[28]  See Cochran, Soviet Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., p. 8. For a more in-depth discussion, see Philips S. Clark, "Converting Soviet Missiles into Russian Space Launchers," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1993, pp. 401-04.

[29]  The Vostok, Molnya, and Soyuz rockets are also reported to have been converted from the SS-6 Sapwood missile. See ibid., p. 403.

[30]  For a discussion and references, see Johnson, op. cit., p. 7-10, and John E. Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, op. cit., p. 140; Atlas de Géographie de L'espace, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

[31]  Reports indicate that the booster would probably deliver its payload at an altitude of about 100 miles, although it could reach a maximum height of about 700 miles. See World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1972, SIPRI, Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm, 1972, p. 8.

[32]  Nevertheless, reports indicate that "...[a]t first the [Proton] rocket was designed not only as a civil LV [Launch Vehicle], but also as a powerful ballistic missile ... [s]oon, however, the assignment changed and during the final state of designing 'Proton' became purely a military launch vehicle". See Anatoly I. Kiseljov, Anatoly K. Nedaivoda, Vladimir Krarrask, et al, "The Launch Vehicle 'Proton': The History of its Creation, Peculiarities of its Structure and Prospects for Development," Space Bulletin, Vol. 1, Nð 4, 1994, pp. 5-7.

[33]  See a discussion in Gasparini Alves, Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

[34]  John Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, op. cit., pp. 136, 141.

[35]  Pankova, Lyudmila V., "The Conversion of the Russian Missile and Space Industry," Space Bulletin, Vol. 1, Nð 2, 1993, pp. 8-10.

[36]  Clark, op. cit., pp. 401-4.

[37]  See Igor I. Velichko, Nikolai A. Obukhov, Georgy G. Sity, et al, "Launch Vehicles Using Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Technologies," Space Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995, pp. 24-26.

[38]  Shtil-1 and Shtil-2 in 1995 and Shtil-3 in 1998.

[39]  See"Israel lance le satellite Ofeq-3," Air & Cosmos/Aviation International, Nð 1514, vendredi, 14 avril 1995, p. 36.

[40]  Clark, op. cit., pp. 401-04.

[41]  Loc. cit.

[42]  See Velichko, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

[43]  In 1955, President Eisenhower attributed national priority to the development of intercontinental and intermediate-ranges BMs. See a brief discussion in Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Noris, and Milton M. Hoeing, US Nuclear Warhead Production, Volume II, Nuclear Weapons Databook, National Resources Defense Council, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987, p. 17. While the DoD was, and continues to be, the pillar for military developments in this field, NASA was created in 1958 as the official agency responsible for directing the development, acquisition, and application of civilian outer space capabilities. See NASA Historical Data Book, Historical Series, vol. 1, National Aeronautics and Space Agency, Washington, D.C., 1988.

[44]  See a brief discussion in Bhupendra Jasani, Space and International Security, op. cit., pp 4-6.

[45]  These include the intermediate range Jupiter (Army/Air Force), Redstone (Army/Navy), Thor (Air Force), and the intercontinental Atlas and Titan. See Damon R. Wells and Daniel E. Hastings, "The US and Japanese Space Programmes: A Comparative Study", Space Policy, vol. 7, No. 3, August 1991, p. 234; Bhupendra Jasani, Space and International Security, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Atlas de Géographie de L'espace, op. cit., p. 80; Roger Stanyard, World Satellite Survey, London, Lloyd's Aviation Department, 1987, pp. 324, 328-29, 352. Redstone, the first American long-range BM, was fielded by the Army in 1958, the same year as the Vanguard. See Cochran, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production, op. cit., p. 17.

[46]  Cochran, U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production, op. cit., p. 18.

[47]  The "Energia-Buran" project was suspended because of its cost and its failure to "... solve any serious scientific or economic problems". See a short discussion in Yuri Dzhemardian, "The Assessment of Russian Space Projects", Space Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1994, pp. 2-3.

[48]  See Michael A. Dornheim, "DC-X Makes Second Flight", Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 September 1993, p. 39; Debra Polsky Werner, "Single-Stage Rocket Effort may not see Pentagon Funds", Defense News, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 20.

[49]  See Mikail Ya. Marov, "The New Challenge for Space Russia", Space Policy, vol. 8, No. 3, August 1992, pp. 269-79.

[50]  Some exceptions should be noted, given that not all of the former Soviet Republics take part in the CIS, although it is generally believed that the Baltic Republics did not possess major space manufacturing capability. Estonia created its own space agency in 1989 and Kazakhstan has reportedly formed a Space Research Agency. Other former Soviet Republics possessing manufacturing capability, such as the Ukraine and Azerbaijan, are also expected to create their own space programmes. See a discussion in "The Role of Outer Space in Nuclear Deterrence", Péricles Gasparini Alves, op. cit., pp. 105-16.

[51]  See a discussion in Marov, op. cit., pp. 269-79.

[52]  The Russian Space Agency and a Commission of Space Expertise, which were created in February 1992 by a special decree of President Boris Yeltsin, are the main institutions for assessing and implementing national space applications.

[53]  See Yuri G. Milov, "The Basic Elements of Russia's Space Program", Space Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1993, pp. 2-7; "The Assessment of Russian Space Projects", op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[54]  The Military Balance: 1993-1994, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brassey's: London, 1993, p. 99.

[55]  John E. Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, op. cit., pp. 139-141.

[56]  The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., p. 99.

[57]  John E. Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, op. cit., p. 140; see also Ustina Markus,"Ukraine's Aerospace Industry", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1996, pp. 52-3.

[58]  The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., p. 99.

[59]  John E. Pike, Sarah Lang and Eric Stambler, loc. cit.

[60]  Wells, op. cit., p. 237.

[61]  For a more detailed discussion of the data in this paragraph, see The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., pp. 20-21; John E. Pike, "Space Tracking Systems", op. cit.; Paolo Farinella, op. cit.

[62]  The Fylingdales Moor radar installation and equipment has been upgraded (as of October 1992) with a three-faced, phased-array antenna capable of tracking objects out to 3,000 miles. Letter to the Author on the Fylingdales Moor Radar Installation and Equipment, United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 28 January 1994.

[63]  Some Chinese space experts have trained and/or worked in the Soviet Union and the USA. For example, Sun Jiadong, a senior aerospace expert, graduated from the Soviet Ruchopsky Air Force Engineering College in 1959 and later became chief designer of mid-range missiles at the Fifth Institute of National Defence. He is also said to have taken part in the development and launching of Chinese remote-sensing and communication satellites. In respect of direct technological assistance, a Chinese-USSR agreement was signed in 1957 whereby the USSR agreed to assist China in the development of rocket technology and two sample Soviet P-2 rockets were reportedly shipped to China. Another expert, Dr Qian Xue-sen, returned to China in the mid-1950s from the USA where he was said to be actively involved in the US Army missile programme. In 1956, Dr Qian made a submission to the central government, entitled Proposal to Establish China's Defence Aviation Industry, after Mao Zedong's call for a major national drive to improve the country's scientific capabilities. It is important to note that Dr Qian is often identified as the father of China's space programme. For a discussion of these events and references, see Yanping Chen, "China's Space Policy: A Historical Review," Space Policy, vol 7, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 116-128; Chen Zhiqiang, "Sun Jiadong Taking About China's Space Technology," Military World, Jan./Feb. 1990, pp. 34-38. See also "Swift Development of China's Missiles and Space Technology: An Interview with Mr Liu Jiyan, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of China", CONMILIT, vol. 3, No. 182, 1992, pp. 45-52, and Stanyard, op. cit., p. 338; Atlas de Géographie de L'espace, op. cit., p. 90; Gordon Pike, "Chinese Launch Services: A User's Guide", Space Policy, vol. 7, No. 2, May 1991, pp. 103-115.

[64]  The first short-to-medium range rocket was launched in March 1963, a middle-range rocket in December 1966, a medium-to-short range surface-to-surface missile in October 1966, and a two-stage medium-long range rocket in January 1970. For a more-detailed account of the development of the Chinese Surface-to-Surface (CSS) missiles, versions 1, 2, and 3, see Gordon Pike, op. cit.

[65]  See ibid., p. 6; Chen Zhiqiang, op. cit., pp. 34-38; "Swift Development of China's Missiles and Space Technology: An Interview with Mr Liu Jiyan, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of China", op. cit., pp. 45-52; Yanping Chen, op. cit., pp. 116-128.

[66]  This is known to be partly due to the political tension between China and the USSR in 1960 which affected co-operation in this field. Chinese rocketry is developed under the auspices of the Ministry of Aero-Space Industry (MAI). Other major institutions dealing with space include the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics Industry (MAAI), the Chinese Academy for Space Technology Research (CASTR), and the International Space Science Academy (ISSA). R&D in sounding rockets is the responsibility of the Chinese Academy of Space Technology (CAST), while the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) is in charge of the development of space launchers.

[67]  For a discussion on Chinese rockets, see China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, CALT, Beijing, 1991; Yang Chunfu, "China's LONG MARCH Series Carrier Rockets," Military World, May 1989, pp. 20-25; Gordon Pike, op. cit.; Stanyard, op. cit., pp. 338-41.

[68]  One variation of the CZ series is the FB-1 (Feng Bao or Storm-1) rocket developed in Shanghai from CZ-2 technology and said to have similar characteristics to the CZ-2 rocket. The FB-1 has not achieved the same level of performance as the CZ-2 and is reported to have had many more launch failures. FB-1 rockets had launched six satellites up to September 1988. One of the FB-1's features is that it can launch more than one satellite at a time, as demonstrated in September 1981 when it carried three space physics exploration satellites in the same launch. See Chunfu, op. cit., p. 21.

[69]  Ibid. p. 22, The CZ-4 rocket developed by the Shanghai Astronautical Bureau was designed for the specific purpose of launching satellites to solar-synchronous orbit and Earth synchronous transfer orbits.

[70]  On 7 January 1959, France set up a Space Research Committee, but activity only gained momentum after the creation of the National Centre of Space Studies (CNES) on 1 May 1962. See Les activités spatiales en France: Bilan d'information, Centre national d'études spaciales, Toulouse, juin 1988; Olivier de Saint-Lager, "L'Organisation des activités spatiales françaises: une combinaison dynamique du secteur public et du secteur privé," Annals of Air and Space Law, vol. vi, 1981, pp. 475-87; Jérôme Paolini in "French Military Space Policy and European Cooperation", Space Policy, vol. 4, No. 3, August 1988, pp. 201-210.

[71]  The Diamant rocket inherited various stages, motors, and parts from some of these missiles. For instance, Diamant's second stage originated from the Saphir's second stage (a VE 111 Topaze rocket element) as did Diamant's third stage. For a more detailed discussion, see Philippe Jung, "Histoires extraordinaires: L'établissement d'aerospatiale Cannes", Aéronautique et Astronautique, numéro 1, 1994, pp. 84-95 and Roger Chevalier, "Le trentième anniversaire de Diamant," Aéronautique et Astronautique, numéro 6, 1995, pp. 55-58.

[72]  Paolini, op. cit., p. 207.

[73]  The Hammaguir launch-site in Algeria was shut-down on 1 July 1967 in implementation of the 1962 Evian Agreements.

[74]  John Krige, The Prehistory of ESRO: 1959/1960, European Space Agency, HSR-1, July 1992; J.M. Luton, Space: Open to International Cooperation, European Space Agency, Publications Division, Noordwijk, 1994.

[75]  Outer space and related research in the United Kingdom is funded through the British National Space Centre (BNSC). Formed in 1985, the BNSC acts as a partner between government development and research councils, advises the government on outer space development and opportunities, implements the resulting policies, and provides the focus for British non-military space interest. The BNSC is linked to the Government's Cabinet Office and seven other government entities. It should be noted that one of these entities is the Defence Research Agency of the Ministry of Defence. See BNSC: Activities 1991/92, British National Space Centre, London, 1991. For a debate on UK participation in present and long-term multinational programmes and the role of the BNSC in ESA matters, see, for example, David Green, "UK Space Policy - A Problem of Culture", Space Policy, vol. 3, No. 4, November 1987, pp. 277-279; Raymond Lygo in "The UK's Future in Space", Space Policy, vol. 3, No. 4, November 1987, pp. 281-283; Mark Williamson, "The UK Parliamentary Space Committee", Space Policy, vol. 8, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 159-65; Krige, op. cit.

[76]  Atlas de Géographie de L'espace, op. cit., p. 86. Also see Krige, op. cit., for a discussion of the Black Knight and the Black Night.

[77]  See Bhupendra Jasani, Space and International Security, op. cit., p. 9.

[78]  China has also developed the "M" series of mobile missiles, which are solid propelled and little permeates the literature as to the origins of its technology. See a discussion, for example, in Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, Arlington: System Planning Corporation, 1992, p. 15.

[79]  The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., p. 244.

[80]  See a discussion and references Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 44.

[81]  See, for example, The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., p. 152.

[82]  Ibid., p. 32.

[83]  Ibid., p. 239.

[84]  Different tracking sites are used for launches such as, for example, Kourou, Natal, Ascension, and Libreville for geostationary Kourou-launched operations, or Kourou, Bermuda, Wallops and Prince Albert for heliosynchroneous orbit satellite launches from the same launching centre. However, it does not seem to have been reported that military tracking and telemetry have been used at any of these sites.

[85]  The Military Balance: 1993-1994, op. cit., pp. 32, 239. It should be noted, however, that both the nuclear-powered submarines and the nuclear warheads in these missiles are reported to be of British origin. Trident: Thirty Years of the Polaris Sales Agreement, Chief Strategic Systems Executive, United Kingdom: Crown, May 1993.

[86]  However, for sounding rockets the United Kingdom has used the Woomera launching-site in Australia.

[87]  Japanese space activity is regulated by the Fundamental Policy of Japan's Space Development, formulated in 1978 and revised in 1989. "Fundamental Policy of Japan's Space Development," Space Activity Commission, Tokyo, Japan. For a review of the Japanese programme, see Wells and Hastings, op. cit, pp. 233-256.

[88]  ISAS was set up in 1964 as part of the University of Tokyo, and in 1981 it became a formal entity under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. For a more detailed discussion on its role and activities, see Space in Japan: 1992, Research and Development Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, Keidanren, 1992.

[89]  See "Law Concerning National Space Development Agency of Japan," Statute No. 50 of June 23, 1969; "National Space Development Agency of Japan", NASDA Brochure, Japan, 1991.

[90]  Institute of Space and Astronautical Science Activities, Japan, 1990, p. 22. However, sounding rocket experiments are also conducted by other bodies such as the National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) and the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), both of which have launched sounding rockets - from the Syowa Station and the Ryori Meteorological Rocket Station, respectively. See "Japanese National Report" submitted to the Twenty-First Plenary Meeting of the ICSU Committee on Space Research", Japan, 1990; Institute of Space and Astronautical Science Activities, op. cit., p. 29. However, not all sounding rocket experiments take place in Japan. For example, the Japanese Antarctica Expedition Team (JAET) of the NIPR uses S-310 rockets at the Showa Base in Antarctica, and the S-520 rocket has also been scheduled to be used there. It should be remembered, however, that Japan has been active in space and space-related activities since 1955, when a group of Japanese scientists of the University of Tokyo designed, developed, and launched a solid fuel sounding rocket--the Pencil rocket. See Well, op. cit., p. 234.

[91]  NASDA Brochure, 1991, op. cit., p. 14; Stanyard, op. cit., pp. 334-37.

[92]  NASDA Brochure, p. 15.

[93]  Over 330 rockets have been launched from KSC since its inauguration in 1962, even though ISAS is presently restricted to only two launches per year (January-February and August-September). Other centres operated by ISAS include the Noshiro Testing Centre (NTC) located at Asanai Beach, Noshiro City, where basic research on engines is undertaken; the Usuda Deep Space Centre (UDSC) in Usuda-machi which serves as a deep-space tracking, telemetry and command station; and the Sanriku Balloon Centre (SBC) in Sanriku-cho. Institute of Space and Astronautical Science Activities, op. cit.. Japan also launches sounding rockets from other countries (e.g., the Norwegian Andøya Rochet Range) under special agreements.

[94]  This site has a number of other facilities such as the Takesaki Range for small rockets, the Osaki Range for H-I and H-II launchers, the Masuda Tracking and Data Acquisition Station, the Uchugaoka Radar Station, the Nogi Radar Station, and the H-II launcher lift-off point. The site also conducts test-firing for liquid and solid fuel rocket engines. See NASDA Brochure, 1991, op. cit., pp. 31-34.

[95]  While DARA is now responsible for the overall planning, implementation, and execution of Germany's outer space programmes, other institutions, such as the German Aerospace Research Establishment (DLR) and the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT), undertook several major outer space programmes before DARA came into being.

[96]  Any discussion on the origin of German rocketry research would no doubt refer to the V-1 and V-2 missiles which were launched in the last two years of World War II. However, the fall of the Nazi régime and the dismantling of its rocketry R&D halted the development of what could have led to the creation of space launchers. However, the USA and the USSR reportedly acquired V-1s and V-2s for use in their own missile programmes, and it is believed that the Soviet Scud missile stems from German V-family designs. See a discussion in Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, Arlington: System Planning Corporation, 1992, p. 5.

[97]  Microgravity MAXUS Brochure, Swedish Space Corporation.

[98]  Germany's participants include Deutsche Aerospace (MBB), and Sweden's contribution has included, inter alia, the development of SAAB Space's rocket-guidance control system. See Microgravity MAXUS Brochure, op. cit.

[99]  The Swedish National Space Board (SNSB) is responsible for outer space technology (SNSB), but the actual implementation of Sweden's space programme rests with the Swedish Space Corporation (SSC), a state-owned limited liability company under the Ministry of Industry. ESRANGE, Swedish Space Corporation, Kiruna, 1992.

[100]  ESRANGE, op. cit. The ESRANGE site is also a satellite ground-station. Geographically, it provides access to satellites in various orbits, particularly polar orbit. Sweden has therefore pursued a commercial policy by developing ESRANGE's technical capabilities to include TT&C of scientific and remote-sensing satellites and accommodating national and international TT&C stations. For example, in addition to the site's ability to receive and process satellite data, ESA and NASDA use TT&C stations to operate some of their satellites in the ERS 1 and 2 and JERS-1 in Sweden.

[101]  For a report on Norwegian space activity, see Space Technology and Industries in Norway: 1991, Norwegian Space Centre, June 1991; Space Research in Norway: 1991, Norwegian Space Centre, June 1992.

[102]  Another institution engaged in rocket and related satellite research is the Electronics Division of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE).

[103]  These included the Black Brant, Boosted Arcas, Centaure, Dragon, Honest John/Orion, Petrel, Sidewinder, Skylark, Terrier, and Viper 3A. Norway has sometimes used the ESRANGE launching-site in Sweden.

[104]  See The Italian Space Programme, The Italian Space Agency, Rome, 1987, p. 1.

[105]  Loc. cit.

[106]  The Scout space launcher is now being updated to double its present capabilities, so that satellites may be placed in altitudes up to 1,100 km. See ibid., p. 9.

[107]  For a short review, see Ibid., pp. 2-3; Rossi, op. cit.

[108]  See "A European Success Story," 50th Launch Special, Ariane, European Space Agency, April 1992.

[109]  Atlas de Géographie de L'espace, op. cit., p. 91, 93; The Italian Space Programme, op. cit., p. 7.

[110]  See M. Balduccini, "BPD Hardware Development to Support Low Cost Missions", ESA Round-Table on "Space 2020', European Space Research and Technical Centre, European Space Agency, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 27-29 June 1995.

[111]  ESA was created by the combination of two European institutions dealing with space development matters in the 1960s. See The European Space Agency, European Space Agency, Public Relations Division, Paris, June, 1992; The European Space Agency Annual Report: 1991, European Space Agency, Public Relations Division, Noordwijk, 1991; "A European Success Story," 50th Launch Special, Ariane, European Space Agency, April 1992. In the early 1960s, efforts by six European states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and Australia to develop space launcher capabilities led to the creation of the ELDO in 1964. Later in the decade, the European members of ELDO also carried out satellite programme R&D with four other members of ESRO which had also been created in 1964. ESRO members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See discussions in Krige, op. cit. and Luton, op. cit. Subsequently, the European Space Agency (ESA) was established in July 1973 after an inter-ministerial meeting of the ten ESRO countries. ESA members are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Finland has become an associate member and Canada has signed co-operation agreements.

[112]  "A European Success Story," 50th Launch Special, op. cit.; Stanyard, op. cit., pp. 317-23; Luton, op. cit., pp. 1-10.

[113]  Loc. cit.

[114]  The Ariane programme was approved at the July 1973 meeting which set up the ESA (see The European Space Agency, op. cit., p. 15). For a discussion of this programme and the agreement concerning the development of Ariane signed on September 1973, see Michael G. Bourély, "La production du lanceur Ariane", Annals of Air and Space Law, vol. vi, 1981, pp. 279-314.

[115]  The production of the Ariane space launcher is the responsibility of ARIANESPACE, a private company created in March 1980, in which the French CNES and several European electronic and aerospace companies are shareholders.

[116]  Ibid., p. 16; "A European Success Story," 50th Launch Special, op. cit.; Stanyard, op. cit., pp. 317-23.

[117]  See Space Log: 1957-1991, International Space Year, 1992, TRW, 1992, p. 45.

[118]  All three countries have now terminated their national space-launch programmes.

[119]  For an in-depth discussion of the many different military uses of satellites and early programmes undertaken by the USSR and the USA, as well as other matters, see Paul B. Stares, Space and National Security, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987.

[120]  Depending on the mode of flight (active or duty), Resurs-F1 spacecraft operate for 14 (active) or 11 days (duty). Resurs-F2 spacecraft operate for 30 days in the active mode only. See a discussion in Evgeny L. Lukashevich, "The Space System 'Resurs-F' for the Photographic Survey of the Earth", Space Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1994, pp. 2-44.

[121]  See a discussion in Phillip Clark,"Russia's Latest Spy Satellite", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1996, pp. 71-4.

[122]  See Robert A. McDonald, "CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance", Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol. 61, No. 6, June 1995.

[123]  It goes without saying that NAVSTAR's second data type, nuclear detonation detection using X-ray and optical sensors are not available to civil users. Other military satellites providing data on the civil market are meteorological spacecraft.

[124]  Space Policy, op. cit., p. 362.

[125]  See a discussion in Philips S. Clark, "China's Recoverable Satellite Programme", Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1993, pp. 517-22.

[126]  Author's conversations with Chinese experts.

[127]  Space Policy, op. cit., p. 362,366.

[128]  The French companies Matra and Aerospatiale remain the main contractors in the HELIOS programme. Italy is expected to provide 14.5% of the total investment and Spain 5%. See Sergio A. Rossi, "La Politica Militare Spaziale Europea e l'Italia," Affari Esteri, anno XIX, nð. 76, autunno 1987, pp. 529-30. Germany is expected to join France, Italy and Spain at a future stage. See also Jean-Daniel Levi, "Policy Orientations of Space Agencies of Traditional Space-Competent States: The Case of France", in Evolving Trends in the Dual-Use of Satellites, Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), UNIDIR, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996.

[129]  See Rossi, p. 530; Paolini, op. cit., p. 204; Aubay, op. cit.

[130]  See Ghislain du Chéné, "SYRACUSE: et les programmes futurs de télécomunications", in Colloque Activités Spaciales Militaires, op. cit., pp. 211-18; Les activités spaciales en France: Bilan d'information, op. cit., p. 2; Paolini, op. cit., p. 203; Levi, op. cit.

[131]  Levi, op. cit.

[132]  See Rossi, op. cit., p. 526.

[133]  See Supra, 16. United Kingdom; Pike, op. cit., p. 75.

[134]  It should be noted, however, that Graphs I.2, 3, and 4 should not be regarded as illustrating the overall activity of these two countries. For example, American satellites generally have a longer life-span than their Soviet counterparts, thus requiring fewer launches, and satellites which provide recoverable material (such as films) have to be lunched more frequently to maintain the same or similar levels of coverage provided by more-sophisticated systems which send their data either to Earth-stations or to other relay satellites.

[135]  The building, operation, and utilization of the international space station is a co-operative venture grouping the USA, Russia, Europe, Canada, and Japan. For a description of the programme and the distribution of tasks among the co-operating partners, see European Participation in the International Space Station: Facts and Arguments, European Space Agency, Directorate of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity, Document No. MSM-PI/8041, Paris, 17 February 1995; also see Yuri I. Zaitsev, "From the 'Soyuz-Apollo' Program to an International Space Station", Space Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995, pp. 2-4.

[136]  / National Space Plan (Argentina), Unpublished version, Letter to the Author, June 1995.

[137]  / See a discussion by Jorge Sahade, "Ciencia Espacial En Argentina", National Commission of Space Activities, Argentina, 1991; see also Decree No. 1164, "El Poder Ejectivo Nacional", Buenos Aires, Argentina, 28 January 1960.

[138]  / National Space Plan (Argentina), op. cit.

[139]  / Ibid.

[140]  / For a detailed discussion of the CONDOR programme, see Scott D. Tollefson, "El Condor Pasa: The Demise of Argentina's Ballistic Missile Program", in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 255-77.

[141]  / Unlike its predecessor, CONAE does not function under military auspices but as a civilian entity coming directly and exclusively under the authority of the Presidency. In addition, the Commission is the only national body responsible for defining and executing the Argentinian space programme. Nevertheless, CONAE's Directory is composed of representatives from seven ministries, including the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. (See Decree No. 995, 28 May 1991 and Law No. 24.061, Article 23.)

[142]  / National Space Program: 1995-2006, Presidencia de la Nacion, Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, Buenos Aires, November 1994; also see Mario G. Sciola, "The Argentine National Space Plan", in Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites, op. cit., pp. 125-130.

[143]  / This is further discussed by Reiner Pungs, A Industria de Armaments e A Politica Externa Brasileira, University of Brasilia, Brasilia, June 1989, pp. 77-84 (unpublished thesis). The GOCNAE is a commission reporting to the Presidency of the Republic. See also Activities of the Institute for Space Research, Secretaria Especial da Ciência e Tecnologia, Instituto de Pesquisas Espaciais, São José do Campos, São Paulo, Brazil.

[144]  / See AVIBRAS AEROESPACIAL Brochure, AVIBRAS: São José dos Campos; "Brazilian Space Program," Centro Técnico Aeroespacial, Instituto de Atividades Espaciais Brochure, Ministry of Aeronautics, Department of Research and Development, São José dos Campos; "Brazilian Space Program: Sounding Rockets and Satellite Launcher Vehicle", Aerospace Technical Centre, Ministry of Aeronautics, São José dos Campos; VLS - Veículo Lançador de Satélite, Brochure, Centro Técnico Aeroespacial, Ministry of Aeronautics, Department of Research and Development, São José dos Campos.

[145]  / "Brazilian Space Program", op. cit., pp. 2-7.

[146]  / After several years of technical studies, the MECB programme was launched in 1979 and officially endorsed in 1981. See A. B. Carleial, The MECB Satellite Program, Instituto National de Pesquisas Espaciais, São José dos Campos, paper presented at the VI Simpósio Nipo-Brasiliero of Science and Technology, 10-12 August 1988. At the outset, the programme was coordinated by the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE), an inter-ministerial commission reporting to the Joint-Armed Forces Ministry (EMFA). The MECB programme involves both the Ministry of Aeronautics and the Secretary of Science and Technology. Its objective is to furnish Brazil with the three main pillars of outer space exploration: launch vehicles, launch sites, and satellite manufacturing capabilities, and to promote "...the development of a small satellite launcher rocket and two types of experimental satellites for low Earth orbit applications". See Satélite de Coleta de Dados (SCD1) - Data Collecting Satellite, Instituto National de Pesquisas Espaciais, São José dos Campos, June 1991, p. 2. See also Carleial, op. cit. The Ministry of Aeronautics is responsible for developing the launcher portion of the MECB.

[147]  / See Lei Nð 8.854, República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, D.F., Brazil, 10 February 1994; Decreto Nð 11.3ZZ, 20 de Dezembro de 1994, República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, D.F., Brazil, 1994; National Policy for the Development of Space Activities, República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, D.F., Brazil, 1995. Refer also to As Atividates Espaciais Brasileiras: Contexto Atual e Perspectivas Para o Futuro, Agência Espacial Brasileira, Departamento de Planejamento e Coordenação, Brasilia, D.F., Brasil, 14 de Novembro de 1994. After a transitional period following the creation of the Brazilian Space Agency, a Presidential degree dissolved the COBAE (Decreto Nð 1292.3ZZ, 21 Outubro de 1994, República Federativa do Brasil, Brasília, D.F., Brazil, 1994).

[148]  / Ibid., pp. 4-7.

[149]  / For a discussion on these developments, see As Atividades Espaciais Brasileiras: Contexto Atual e Perspectivas Para o Futuro, op. cit., pp. 15-17.

[150]  / For an account of the Israeli space programme, see The Israel Space Agency, Ministry of Science and Technology, Tel Aviv, 1990; Advancing Into Space: Space Technologies Directorate, Israel Aircraft Industry, MBT Systems and Space Technology, MESH PRO, June 1991; John Simpson, Philip Acton and Simon Crowe, "The Israeli Satellite Launch: Capabilities, intentions and implications", Space Policy, vol. 5, No. 2, May 1989, pp. 117-128.

[151]  / See Simpson, op. cit., p. 118. Jericho I has been described as being a conventional and chemical chargeable payload missile having a maximum range or 500 km with a launch weight of 4,500 kg. See discussions in Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 16; Duncan Lennox (ed), Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 1991; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 235-253; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Satellite Capabilities of Emerging Space-Competent States", in Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites, op. cit, pp. 31-56.

[152]  / See Simpson, op. cit., p. 118, who, however, notes that subsequent versions of Jericho used guidance systems adapted from US Lance short-range ballistic missiles. For references, see footnote 4. Little is known about the real range and payload capacity of Jericho II, although it has been suggested that it can carry 750 kg to a range of 500-750 km. However, other sources believe that Jericho II has a conventional or nuclear-capable warhead capable of carrying a 1,000 kg payload with a range of 1,500 km. See Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 16; Lennox (ed), Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, op. cit.

[153]  / See a short discussion and references in Steinberg, "Satellite Capabilities of Emerging Space-Competent States", in op. cit..

[154]  / Nevertheless, the present institutional structure for Indian outer space activity is more recent since two institutions were set up in 1972. One, the Indian Space Commission, was formed to establish a space policy (in association with the Ministry of State) while the other, the Indian Department of Space (DOS) was created to co-ordinate and implement the Indian space programme. However, DOS is not concerned with space applications, and space activities are undertaken by other bodies, principally the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), and the National Natural Resources Management System (NNRMS). DOS functions directly under the Prime Minister, who has a Minister of Space to assist him in running the programme. See, inter alia, India in Space, April-June 1994, Indian Space Research Organization, Bangalore, India.

[155]  / For a more detailed discussion, see 1991-92 Annual Report, Government of India, Department of Space, Institute of Space Research Organization, Bangalore, 1992.

[156]  / The RH-560 was originally reported to be capable of carrying 100 kg to an altitude of 350 km and subsequently 90 kg to 300 km altitude.

[157]  / Trivandrum houses two major centres - the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC) and the Liquid Propulsion Space Centre (LPSC). VSSC is responsible for the overall design and production of the ASLV, PSLV, GSLV vehicles while LPSC's main job is to produce liquid rocket motors and stages for these vehicles.

[158]  / "ASLV-D4 Launch Successful", India in Space, April-June 1994, Indian Space Research Organization, p. 2.

[159]  / India in Space, Brochure, Bangalore: Indian Space Research Organization Publication and Public Relations Unit, February 1995.

[160]  / Ibid.

[161]  / See 1991-92 Annual Report, Government of India, Department of Space, Institute of Space Research Organization, op. cit., p. 42.

[162]  / "PSLV-D2 Launch Successful," India in Space, October-December 1994, Indian Space Research Organization, p. 3.

[163]  / Ibid., pp. 2-8.

[164]  / Ibid., p. 44. India will also produce cryogenic propellant at its Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (LPSC) at Valiamala near Thiruvananthapuram.

[165]  / There have been two major changes to Pakistan's space institutions since 1961. One was the replacement of the Committee in 1981 by the semi-autonomous Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). The other was the creation of the Space Research Council (SRC) and its subordinate body, the Executive Committee of the Space Research Council (ECSRC). While SRC is responsible for developing guidelines and supervising Pakistan's space programme, it is SUPARCO that ensures the application of space and space-related programmes. See An Introduction to SUPARCO, Public Relations Office, Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, October 1988, p. 52; Salim Mehmud, "Pakistan's Space Programme", Space Policy, vol. 5, No. 8, August 1989, pp. 217-225; Cameron Binkely, "Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Development: The Sword of Islam?", in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 75-97.

[166]  / For a more detailed discussion, see Sikandar Zaman, "Three Decades of Space Science and Technology in Pakistan", in Space Technology and Its Significance to Pakistan, Seminar Proceedings, 27 September, 1994, Lahore, Pakistan, Saqib Sadiq (ed.), Public Relations Division, SUPARCO, 1994, pp. 9-15.

[167]  / Zaman, op. cit., p. 9.

[168]  / An Introduction to SUPARCO, op. cit., p. 36.

[169]  / Ibid., pp. 13-16; Zaman, op. cit., p. 9.

[170]  / Zaman, op. cit., p. 9.

[171]  / See "CLBI: The Barreira do Inferno Sounding Rocket Range", and "CLA: The Alcântara Launch Centre", Workshop on the Brazilian Space Program, 13 December 1994, Washington, D.C., pp. 47-53

[172]  / For a discussion and references, see Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1991, Stockholm International Peace Institute, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 327-328; Robert Shuey, "Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime", Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the 1990s, Brauch, Hans Günter, Henny J. Van Der Graaf, John Grin, Wim A. Smit (eds.), Vu University Press, Amsterdam 1992, p. 182; "Argentina develops Condor solidpropellant rocket", Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 1985, p. 61; Tollefson, "El Condor Pasa: The Demise of Argentina's Ballistic Missile Program", op. cit., pp. 255-77.

[173]  / Nathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina Battles Its Air Force Over Plan to Develop Missile", New York Times, 13 May 1991, pp. A1, A7.

[174]  / National Space Program: 1995-2006, op. cit., p. 11.

[175]  / Loc. cit.

[176]  / See, for example, Jürgen Scheffran, "Dual-Use of Missile and Space Technologies", in Götz Neuneck and Otfried Ischebeck (eds.), Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Arms Control, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 65-68; Péricles Gasparini Alves, "Brazilian Missile and Rocket Production and Export", in The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 99-127.

[177]  / See Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation", World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1990, SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 377. (The lack of funding and suspension of the SS-300 project was confirmed by AVIBRAS in a letter to Aaron Karp.)

[178]  / See Dilip Bobb and Amarnath K. Menon, "Chariot of Fire", India Today, June 15, 1989, pp. 28-32; Timothy V. McCarthy, "India: Emerging Missile Power", in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.), The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 201-33 pp.; Jürgen Scheffran, "Dual-Use of Missile and Space Technologies", op. cit., pp. 63-65; Shireen M. Mazari, "Missile Development in India and Pakistan: Impact on Regional Stability", in Götz Neuneck and Otfried Ischebeck (eds.), Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Arms Control, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993, pp. 257-63.

[179]  / Bobb, op. cit., p. 29.

[180]  / Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Completes Agni-III Launch", Defense News, 28 February-26 March, 1994, p. 20.

[181]  / See "Asia's Missile Race Hots Up", Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 February 1994, p. 20; Raghuvanshi, "India Completes Agni-III Launch", op. cit., p. 20.

[182]  / See Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Prithvi Gives India Non-Nuclear Punch", Defense News, 7-13 March 1994, p. 12; McCarthy, "India: Emerging Missile Power", op. cit., pp. 205-210.

[183]  / "Tensions are on Rise after India Missile Test: Skirmishes Reported with Pakistan Forces over Rocket Attack", The International Herald Tribune, Monday, 29 January 1996, pp. 1, 7.

[184]  / For a technical discussion of Pakistan's missile parameters and the French sounding rockets, see S. Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Programme", unpublished, 1992; also see David Lenox, James Strategic Weapons System, 3 March 1990; and the yearly reports on "Ballistic Missile Proliferation" by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research; Cameron Binkely, "Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Development: The Sword of Islam?", op. cit., pp. 75-97.

[185]  / Some analysts believe that the Hatf 2 and 3 both derive from the Chinese M-9 and M-11 BMs, although reports indicate that there is little resemblance. See a brief discussion in "Asia's Missile Race Hots Up", op. cit., p. 20.

[186]  / Ibid., p. 2. Among the critical raw materials cited are polymers, ammonium perchlorate, aluminium powder, guidance technology (gyros), re-entry technology (ablatives and refractory materials for forming and shaping).

[187]  / Israel has reportedly supplied Jericho 2B-type missile assistance to South Africa, but some sources suggest that the transfer was actually Jericho I technology (see Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 16; Lennox (ed.), Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, op. cit. However, the assertion that Israel has in fact supplied South Africa with such technology is highly contested by some experts - a discussion in Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," op. cit., pp. 240-43 refers.

[188]  / Ibid., p. 339-40; Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 16.

[189]  / Apparently, the Al Aabed is derived from the Al Abbas which may itself have been derived from the Al Hussein missile which, in turn, is believed to have been a development of the Soviet Scud B BM. It is said to have been designed as a two-state liquid-propelled missile with a 2000-km range carrying a 750-kg warhead. See Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 16.

[190]  / Official Records of the United Nations, United Nations Security Council, R/687, 3 April 1991.

[191]  / National Space Plan (Argentina), op. cit.; National Space Program: 1995-2006, op. cit.

[192]  / CONAE directs and executes the project. This involves the design, construction and integration of the space platform; providing Argentinian instruments; operating the ground station; and publicizing the scientific data. The Argentinian Institute of Astronomy and Space Physics is responsible, in general, for the construction of Argentinian scientific devices. For its part, NASA provided some scientific instruments, launched the SAC-B, and was responsible for its command, control and tracking during the launching phase. The American devices was constructed by Pennsylvania State University and NASA. See SAC-B: Satélite de Aplicaciones Científicas, CONAE, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1993; Sahade, op. cit.

[193]  / National Space Plan (Argentina), op. cit.; National Space Program: 1995-2006, op. cit.

[194]  / Ibid.. SAC-C and D are application and scientific satellites. The former is under development and the latter in the definition stage. SAC-E has not yet been defined.

[195]  / Loc. cit.

[196]  / The INPE, which functions under the auspices of the civilian Secretary of Science and Technology, undertook satellite R&D for the MECB programme until the creation of the Brazilian Space Agency. See Satélite de Coleta de Dados (SCD1) - Data Collecting Satellite, op. cit.; "Interview with Marcio Barbosa", Director-General of the Brazilian Institute for Space Research, August 1990; Carleial, op. cit. INPE has kept this function in the new structure.

[197]  / Although the MECB programme is basically an indigenous initiative, several multinational and foreign industrial partners and co-operating agencies such as the ESA, French Aerospaciale and CNES, Deutsche Aerospace, the NEC (of Brazil), and Eagle Picher have been involved.

[198]  / Including meteorological, oceanographic, atmospheric, and chemical data.

[199]  / See Satélite de Coleta de Dados (SCD1) - Data Collecting Satellite, op. cit., p. 7.

[200]  / See a discussion in China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite - CBERS, Brochure, Instituto de Pesquisas Espaciais: São José dos Campos; Barbosa, op. cit., p. 3. Brazil is reportedly responsible for developing different parts of these satellites such as structure sub-systems, power supply, communications, on-board computers, and systems for electrical tests (Activities of the Institute for Space Research, loc. cit.).

[201]  / China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite - CBERS, op. cit.; Activities of the Institute for Space Research, op. cit., p. 9.

[202]  / As Atividades Espaciais Brasileiras: Contexto Atual e Perspectivas Para o Futuro, op. cit.

[203]  / Other areas also include mechanical actuators (reaction wheels), liquid bi-propellant propulsive systems, ionic propulsion, radiation sensors, silicon micro-sensors, microwave systems for Earth observation, space communication and network, materials for space application, structural dynamics, generation of intense radiation (microwaves), heat pipes and thermal insulators for spacecraft. See Activities of the Institute for Space Research, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[204]  / The main commitments of the "Amazonia Program" are the provision of environmental monitoring, data surveillance, processing, and correlation of environmental data, and the investigation of the effect of modification of the ecosystem. See Amazonia Program, Instituto National de Pesquisas Espaciais, São José do Campos, Brasil.

[205]  / As Atividates Espaciais Brasileiras: Contexto Atual e Perspectivas Para o Futuro, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

[206]  / "ECCO: A Satellite Constellation for the Equatorial Belt", João Mello da Silva and Reynaldo Arcirio de Oliveira, Workshop on the Brazilian Space Program, 13 December 1994, Washington, D.C., pp. 38-44.

[207]  / The Israel Space Agency, op. cit., p. 1; Advancing Into Space: Space Technologies Directorate, op. cit.

[208]  / Brinkley, J., "Israel Puts a Satellite into Orbit a Day after Threat by Iraqis", New York Times, 4 April 1990.

[209]  / "Israel lance le satellite OFEQ-3', op. cit., p. 36.

[210]  / See loc. cit.

[211]  / See An Introduction to SUPARCO, op. cit., pp.16-47.

[212]  / See Space Research in Pakistan: 1992 and 1993, op. cit., p. 27. BADR-B will be built in phases and the "Phase-A Study Contract" involves assistance from foreign agencies and institutions.

[213]  / Ibid., p. 30.

[214]  / Loc. cit.; SUPARCO Satellite Ground Station: Islamabad, Brochure, Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, SUPARCO Public Relations office, June 1989; Space Research in Pakistan: 1992 and 1993, op. cit., pp. 16-26

[215]  / The ISRO Satellite Centre (ISAC) and ISRO Tracking Network (ISTRAC) at Bangalore are the two major institutions responsible for the design, construction, tracking, and mission management of Indian satellites.

[216]  / 1991-92 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 46.

[217]  / India's policy is to develop a multipurpose space system, consisting of a single satellite architecture with a variety of sensors and sub-systems. Indian multipurpose satellites are therefore designed for communications, direct broadcasting, and meteorology.

[218]  / See, for example, UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons, London: Security Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, January 1994; Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. Mulls Nukes to Counter Chemical, Biological Attack", Defense News, 14-20 March 1994, p. 7.

[219]  / The United Kingdom is reported to have signed a "Tomahawks Foreign Military Sales" Agreement with the United States on October 1995. The first delivery of Tomahawks to the U.K. too place on December 1997, which was first tested with live warhead on November 1998. The British Tomahawk weapon system was declared operational on December 1998. See United States Tomahawk Cruise Missile Program", Department of the Navy, Department of Defence, http:/www.peocu.Js.mil.pao/tomafacts.html, 8/3/99,

[220]  / For discussion and references, see, inter alia, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit.; The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1994; India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?, Chris Smith, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1994; The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds), Boulder: Westview Press, 1994; Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Arms Control, Götz Neuneck and Otfried Ischebeck (eds), Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993; Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Janne E Nolan, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1991.

[221]  / BM development may be pursued in different ways - e.g., via dedicated missile programmes, or through a combination of space-related and BM technologies and personnel. In view of the diversity of this type of R&D, the present discussion will not be limited to an analysis of developments which are arguably related only to outer space and related technologies. For this reason, the discussion may often address developments in and by countries which are known BM technology possessors and for whom space-launching capability is itself a product of BM technology.

[222]  / In addition to these two States, Iraq is a confirmed CW possessor but its CW capability has been limited by the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 687. See R/687, op. cit.

[223]  / For short discussions of Indo-Pakistani relations since Partition and the conflicts in 1947, 1965, and 1971, see Chris Smith, op. cit., pp. 8-29, 85-93 and Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

[224]  / See Raghuvanshi "Prithvi gives India Non-Nuclear Punch", op. cit., p. 12.

[225]  / For a more detailed discussion of Indian-Pakistani security perceptions, military strategic depth, and BMs, see Chris Smith, op. cit., pp. 13-29; Nolan, "Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World", op. cit., pp. 86-91; McCarthy, "India: Emerging Missile Power," op. cit., pp. 205-210; Binkely, "Pakistan's Ballistic Missile Development: The Sword of Islam?", op. cit., pp. 84-88; Mazari, "Missile Development in India and Pakistan: Impact on Regional Stability", op. cit., pp. 257-63.

[226]  / See Raghuvanshi, op. cit., p. 12.

[227]  / It should be noted that the Agni missile has been presented as technology demonstration only, although few experts believe this delivery vehicle will not be produced for the Indian Armed forces.

[228]  / For a brief discussion on Indian plans for increased preparedness on its northern border with China, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Regional Strife may Spur Spending Rise in India," Defense News, 17-23 January 1994, p. 12. On the Indo-Chinese border problem, see Chris Smith, op. cit., pp. 74-79.

[229]  / Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 21.

[230]  / Certain sources indicate a 130-km range with a 400-kg payload; see, for example, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, op. cit., p. 87.

[231]  / Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 21; The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, op. cit., p. 87.

[232]  / "Pentagon's Counter-Proliferation Initiative", Daily Bulletin, March 14, 1994, p. 3.

[233]  / Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 13; see also "Update of Ballistic Missile Proliferation", Arms Control Reporter, September 1991; Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, op. cit., pp. 92; Peter Hayes, "The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade", in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds) The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp 130-36.

[234]  / Naokai Usui, "Japan Continues Inquiry of Korean Tech Transfers", Defense News, 24-30 January 1994, p. 26, 28. Republic of Korea official documentation speaks of "... a new surface-to-surface missile (the Rodong-1) with a range of 1,000 km". See Defense White Paper: 1993-1994, The Ministry of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1994, p. 68.

[235]  / According to the specialized literature, experts are divided on the DPRK missile programmes. Some argue that a missile with the same characteristics as those of the No Dong-2 (a liquid fuel rocket with a 2,000-km range carrying a 1,000-kg payload) called Taepo Dong-1 is being developed. Others argue that No Dong-2 and Taepo Dong-1 are the one and same rocket. See, for example, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, op. cit., p. 86.

[236]  / Loc. cit.

[237]  / Ironically, some reports indicate that the DPRK's surface-to-surface Nodong-1 tactical BM may have benefited from the transfer of Japanese electric wave frequency analysers which can be used for missile targeting. Other reports say that "Japan is a possible source of DPRK's dual-use nuclear equipment, since 22% of Japan's $350-million exports to [that country] involve 'machinery'". For conflicting views on these issues, see discussions in Usui, "Japan Continues Inquiry of Korean Tech Transfers," op. cit., p. 26, 28; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 6 January 1994, pp. 8-9; Teresa Watanabe, Los Angeles Times, 16 December 1993, p. A 6.

[238]  / Nolan, loc. cit. The NHK missile is thought to have derived from the American Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile; Peter Hayes, "The Two Koreas and the International Missile Trade", op. cit., pp. 136-47.

[239]  / Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 21; The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, op. cit., p. 86.

[240]  / The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1994, vol. 1, No. 3, loc. cit.

[241]  / See Raghuvanshi, "Prithvi Gives India Non-Nuclear Punch", op. cit., p. 12.

[242]  / Loc. cit.

[243]  / "Asia's Missile Race Hots Up", op. cit., p. 20.

[244]  / Raghuvanshi, "India Plans to Market Akash Missile Abroad", op. cit., p. 10.

[245]  / "Asia's Missile Race Hots Up", op. cit., p. 20.

[246]  / It should be noted that, in the nuclear field, India is perhaps the most advanced EmSC, since it not only has an important nuclear programme, but also exports nuclear reactors and related technology.

[247]  / See Edward A. Gargan, New York Times, 10/21/93, p. A 9.

[248]  / However, several high-ranking DPRK officials have affirmed that North Korea has no ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. On the DPRK's nuclear programme, see Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, pp. 74-79; U.S.-Korea Review, September 1993, p. 3; International Herald Tribune, 14 October 1993; Wall Street Journal, 19, November 1993, p. A16; Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 6 January, 1994, pp. 8-9.

[249]  / Renewal of the NPT on an indefinite basis was achieved at the end of Conference but without a vote.

[250]  / Philip Finnegan and Barbara Opall, "Experts: Joint Effort Can Halt Chinese Missile Sales", Defence News, August 30-September 5, 1993, p. 4, 29; Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 15.

[251]  / Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Plans to Market Akash Missile Abroad," Defence News, 31 January-6 February, 1994, p. 10. The Akash missile is reportedly a relatively small mobile system (weighing 660 kg with a 25-km range), capable of engaging multiple targets and of being guided with up to four batteries of three missiles each.

[252]  / Few believe that Iraqi declarations on their BM arsenal are accurate and some observers indicate that there might be as many as 800 Scuds hidden underground in the country. (See, for example, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., p. 36.) In this context, the American deployment of Patriot missile batteries in Kuwait in October 1995, after the concentration of Iraq troops near the border, is indicative of the perception of missile threat which still exists even following the work done by UNSCOM on BM destruction.

[253]  / Some sources call the FROG-7 an artillery rockets, but it is clearly a BM. The Ababil-100 is an Iraqi-developed solid-propelled BM with an expected range of 130 km carrying a 150-kg payload.

[254]  / Iraqi missile ranges were believed to be: 300 and 650 km (Scuds), 650 km (Al Hussein), 900 km (Al Abbas), and 2,000 km (Al Aabed). However, Al Aabed missiles were not expected to be operational until 1995.

[255]  / The Nonproliferation Review: 1994, op. cit., p. 85.

[256]  / Reportedly, Iran possesses over 200 Scud B and over 100 Scud C. See loc cit.

[257]  / The Nonproliferation Review, op. cit., p. 87.

[258]  / Refer, for example, to a discussion in Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missile in the Third World, op. cit., pp. 77-79.

[259]  / The Vector is believed to be the Egyptian version of the cancelled Argentinean Condor-II missile.

[260]  / The Nonproliferation Review, op. cit., p. 85; Tollefson, "El Condor Pasa: The Demise of Argentina's Ballistic Missile Program", op. cit., p. 259.

[261]  / See Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, op. cit., pp. 19-20 and The Nonproliferation Review, op. cit., p. 86.

[262]  / For a discussion on possible Syrian BM deployment in the Golans and space imagery of probable Scud sites, see Andrew Duncan in "A Syrian-Israeli Peace Treaty", Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1996, pp. 87-90.

[263]  / A particular feature of Shavit launches is that they are made westward to avoid any accident in Arab air space or on the ground, or any other incident that could be mistaken as a military attack should the launcher be directed eastward. This orientation is an additional technical constraint on the vehicle's performance and fuel consumption. Since the Earth spins from west to east, Shavit vehicles launched to the west do not benefit from the so-called slingshot effect, because they are launched against the gravitational pull of the Earth. See Simpson, op. cit., p. 120, who discusses other technical requirements to enable Shavit launchers to leave the Earth's gravitational force and enter outer space. See also Simpson's footnotes 15, 17, and 18 and Atlas de Géographie de l'espace, op. cit., p. 93. For an interesting discussion on the legal implications of potential Israeli spacecraft accidents, see Bruce A. Hurwitz, "Israel and the Law of Outer Space", Israel Law Review, vol. 22, No. 4, Summer-Autumn 1988, pp. 457-466.

[264]  / While the ARROW missile is designed to engage incoming ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, it is also believed that it may have some limited exo-atmospheric interceptor technology; Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," op. cit., p. 236.

[265]  / For example, 122 mm rockets, 155 mm artillery shells, R400 bombs, 250 and 500-gauge bombs.

[266]  / "Sixth Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission," United Nations Security Council, S/26910, 21 December 1993, pp. 21-22.

[267]  / The Nonproliferation Review, op. cit., pp. 84-87.

[268]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, September 1995, pp. 3-2, 3-3.

[269]  / There has been considerable criticism of PATRIOT's ability to counter Scud missiles. However, several technical and human factors are said to be involved (see, for example, 'DPSs Detected Fatal Scud Attack', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 April 1994, p. 32), which has led to a call for the missile's performance, particularly its operating equipment, to be overhauled.

[270]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 1-2; for a description of BMD developments, see also 'Prepared Testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee', 27 June 1995, Lt.-Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, USA, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization', Department of Defense, 1995; 'Prepared Statement of Lt.-Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, USA, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to the House National Security Committee, 4 April 1995', Defense Issues, No. 37, vol. 10, 1995.

[271]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 3-1. See also Ballistic Missile Defense Program, DoD Briefing by William J. Perry, Paul G. Kaminski, Thomas S Moorman et al., United States Department of Defense, 16 February 1996.

[272]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 2-1.

[273]  / Ibid., p. 3-10.

[274]  / Ballistic Missile Defense Program Review, by Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Department of Defense, United States, 21 February 1995. Also see 1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, Ballistic Missile Defence Organization, September 1997.

[275]  / See, for example, 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit, p. 1-2. A third priority is not a defence system in itself, but ways and means to deploy TBM countermeasures, use submunitions of BM warheads, and to draw conclusions from operational experience with TMD systems. See also David Trachtenberg, 'Proliferation Requires Active U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense,' Defense News, vol. 8, No. 33, 23-29, 1993, pp. 23, 35.

[276]  /1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p.1-2.

[277]  /Ibid, p.2-3.

[278]  / Passive Defence is used in DoD literature to describe early-warning or other launch detection capabilities.

[279]  / Active Defence is used in DoD literature to describe an in-flight interception.

[280]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit.; pp. 2-37, 4-3, 4-4; see also a discussion in Barbara Starr, 'Winning the 'Scud' Wars,' Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 February 1994, p. 40.

[281]  / Directed energy sources for contemplated boost-phase interception have involved Chemical Laser (CL) systems. Loc. cit.

[282]  / Reportedly, sensor platforms and attack aircraft could include AWACS, RC-135, Rivet Joint, RC-135 Cobra Ball, U2s, F-15s, Joint STARS, and/or the Boeing 747. Loc. cit.

[283]  / In addition to R&D on endo-atmospheric interceptors, exo-atmospheric defence systems have also been considered. This is the case of the Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP), which was expected to be developed on a modified Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM). Loc. cit.

[284]  / See Barbara Opall, 'DoD-Air Force Scud-Buster Plan Joins Fray,' Defense News, 7-13 February 1994, p. 6.

[285]  / See Opall, op. cit., p. 14; and also 'Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)', Fact Sheet, BMDO, pp. 95-104.

[286]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; pp. 2-26.

[287]  / TMD-GBR = Theater Missile Defence-Ground-based Radar; AWACS = Airborne Warning and Control System; GPS = Global Positioning System.

[288]  / "THAAD Successes Spur Faster Missile Defence Development", Douglas J. Gillert, American Forces Press Services, Defense LINK, Department of Defence, p.1.

[289]  / "First U.S. Army THAAD Unit Formed", Thaad Team, Department of Defence, 1995.

[290]  / Loc. c.it.

[291]  / Two of these improvements - the Quick Reaction Programme (QRP) and the Guidance Enhancement Missile (GEM) - resulted from lessons learned during the Desert Storm campaign. See 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; pp. 2-14, 2-21; see also David Hughes, 'BMDO Under Pressure to Set TMD Priorities', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 January 1994, p. 49.

[292]  / 'PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)', Fact Sheet, BMDO, 95-002.

[293]  / See, for example, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Brochure, Ballistic Missile Defense, Department of Defense, United States, July 1995.

[294]  / 'Navy Area Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Program', Fact Sheet, BMDO, 95-003.

[295]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; pp. 2-24.

[296]  / 'Navy Theatre-Wide Ballistic Missile Defense Program', Fact Sheet, BMDO, 95-001.

[297]  / 'Prepared Statement of Lieut.-Gen. Malcolm R. O'Neill, USA, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to the House National Security Committee, 4 April 1995', op. cit., p. 3.

[298]  / David A. Fulghum, 'Scud Hunting May Drop Under 10-Minute Mark', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 February 1994, p. 90.

[299]  / See Barbara Opall in 'Strategic Accord Inhibits Advances in TMD Programs', Defense News, vol. 8, No. 39, October 4-10, 1993, pp. 1, 14 and 'DoD Studies Larger Role for Sea-Based Missile Defenses', Defense News, 11-17 October 1993, p. 12.

[300]  / The argument in favour of testing is usually based on the need to field emerging TMD technology. Other reasons include the testing of the joint TMD doctrine, which involves BM interception from a warship, assisted by satellite and airborne surveillance aircraft. See, for example, Robert Holzer, 'U.S. Atlantic Command To Test TMD Joint Operations', Defense News, 14-20 March 1994, pp. 28, 30.

[301]  / There seems to be much disagreement between the different Armed Forces on the budget priorities to be assigned to individual Services and their respective programmes. An example is the alleged lack of "...rapid progress on a ballistic missile defense because the Army has dominated the [BMD] budget with terminal defense systems including [PATRIOT, MEADS/Corps SAM and THAAD]". See this and other quotations in David A. Fulghum, "Pentagon Orders Missile Defence Review", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 September 1995, p. 20.

[302]  / See a discussion in Philip Finnegan, 'Supporters Blast Missile Defense Budget Cuts', Defense News, 13-19 September 1993, p. 6.

[303]  / James Hackett, 'Employ UAVs in Scud Hunt", Defense News, 30 August - 5 September 1993, p. 19.

[304]  / For a discussion on reactions to Israel's participation in SDI, see inter alia Sheldon Teitelbaum, 'Israel and Star Wars: The Shape of Things to Come', New Outlook, vol. 28, No. 5/6, May/June 1985. pp. 59-62.

[305]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit.; p. 5-5; 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, Ballistic Missile Defence Organization, July 1994, p. 7-2. No specific figures seem to have been published in reports for subsequent years.

[306]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit.; p. 7-7, A-17-19. Other programmes include the ARROW Deplorability Project, the Israeli Test Bed, the Israeli System Engineering and Integration Project, the Israeli Boost Phase Intercept System Study, and the Israeli Co-operative Research and Development project.

[307]  / 1990 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Washington, D.C., May 1990, pp. 4.11-12.

[308]  / David Hughes, "ARROW 2 First Flight Termed a Success", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 August 1995, p. 59.

[309]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 4-4.

[310]  / 1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., pp. B-18-19.

[311]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 7-6. For a discussion on the United Kingdom's adhesion to SDI research, see Trevor Taylor in 'SDI--The British Response', in Star Wars and European Defence, edited by Hans Günter Brauch, Houndmills: Macmillian Press, 1987, pp. 129-149; and, by the same author, 'Britain's Response to the Strategic Defence Initiative', International Affairs, vol. 62, No. 2, Spring 1986, pp. 217-230.

[312]  / 1990 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, op. cit., p. B-3; 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 7-3.

[313]  / Ballistic Missile Defence, Brochure, British Aerospace Defence Dynamics, Stevenage, England.

[314]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 4-10.

[315]  / BMD: Ballistic Missile Defence, Brochure, British Aerospace Defence Dynamics, Stevenage, England; Charles Miller, 'British Weigh Missile Defense Plan: Fear Ballistic Weapons Could Threaten Shores in 10 Years", Defense News, 21-27 February 1994, p. 38. The Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, established in 1993, has also compared the two countries' approaches to major security issues, including anti-missile defenses. See UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons, op. cit. See also a summary of discussions in Notes on Security and Arms Control: 1994, No. 2, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, February 1994.

[316]  / BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit.; 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 7-2.

[317]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit, pp. B-3, B-5.

[318]  / Extended Air Defence (EAD) is a defence system that aims to counter any air-breathing threat whether it is an aircraft, cruise missile, or ballistic missile.

[319]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 5-4.

[320]  / Livre Blanc sur la Défense: 1994, La Documentation Française, Paris, 1994, p. 27. See also 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit; p. 7-2.

[321]  / Livre Blanc sur la Défense: 1994, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

[322]  / Ibid., p. 112.

[323]  /See, for example, Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "U.S.-Russia to Share Missile Warning Data", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 April 1994, pp. 24-25.

[324]  / DoD News Briefing, Paul G. Kaminski, Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology et. al., Department of Defense, United States, 21 February, 1995; 'Statement of Intent Signed for Air Defense System", News Release, 21 February 1995.

[325]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 7-7.

[326]  / Ibid., p. B-3; copies of these agreements, which were supposed to be kept secret, were reproduced in the Kölner Express of 18 April 1986; see also Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 10/212, 23 April 1986, pp. 16258ff-270. For a study of the general provisions of the US/German agreement on SDI research and exchange of letters between the two Governments, see Le traité germano-américain sur l'IDS, Bruxelles: GRIP, No. 103, November 1986, while for a review of German participation in SDI research and the sharing of technological surge generated therefrom, as well as German influence in arms control and disarmament, see 'The SDI Agreement between Bonn and Washington: Review of the First Four Years,' by B. W. Kubbing in Space Policy, August 1990, pp. 231-47; 'Star Wars Controversy in West Germany,' by Thomas Risse-Kappen in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 43, No. 6, July/August 1987, pp. 50-52.

[327]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 5-5.

[328]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 7-7.

[329]  / See, for example, Jane Boulden, 'Phase I of the Strategic Defense Initiative: Current Issues, Arms Control and Canadian National Security,' Issue Brief, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, No. 12, August 1990; Marci McDonald, 'Canada's Role in Rebirth of Star Wars', The Toronto Star, Wednesday, 13 October 1993, p. A 17.

[330]  / '1990 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defence Initiative,' Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, op. cit., p. B-3.

[331]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 5-7

[332]  / 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 7-3.

[333]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 7-2.

[334]  / '1990 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defence Initiative,' Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, op. cit., p. B.

[335]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 5-7; 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 7-3.

[336]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 4-6.

[337]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 7-9.

[338]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 5-5

[339]  / Loc. cit

[340]  / 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, op. cit., p. 7-3.

[341]  / For example, see a discussion by David Martin, "Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence," NATO Review, May 1996, pp. 32-35; also see "NATO's Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Facts and Way Ahead," Press Release, (95)124, 29 November 1995; "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7th-8th November 1991; "Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation," Issued by the Head of States and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7th-8th November 1991.

[342]  / Gregory L. Schutle, "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role," NATO Review, Nð 4, 4 July 1995, p. 7.

[343]  / Schutle, "Responding to Proliferation: NATO's Role," op. cit., p. 2.

[344]  / Martin, "Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence," op. cit, p. 33.

[345]  / Ibid., p. 32.

[346]  / At time of writing, SHAPE's study entitled 'Draft Military Operational Requirement' dealing with BMD is under revision. See 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 7-3; Martin, "Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence," op. cit., p. 34.

[347]  / Martin, "Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence," op. cit., p. 34.

[348]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 7-3.

[349]  / Martin, "Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence," op. cit., p. 34.

[350]  / 'Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence', Report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session, Second Part, Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1339, 6 November 1992.

[351]  / 'Anti-Missile Defence for Europe: Symposium', Rome, 20-21 April 1993, Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of Western European Union, Spring 1993.

[352]  / "Anti-Missile Defence for Europe: Guidelines Drawn from the Symposium", Report submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Thirty-Ninth Ordinary Session, First Part, Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1363, 1993, p. 2.

[353]  / 'U.S., Russia Consult on Global Protection System,' op. cit.

[354]  / Craig Covault, 'Russia Seeks Joint Space Test to Build Military Cooperation,' Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March 1992, pp. 18-19.

[355]  / Lenorovitz, "U.S. Russia to Share Missile Warning Data," op. cit., p. 24.

[356]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. 7-9.

[357]  / Loc. cit., p. A-3 Also see 1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. B-5.

[358]  / 1994 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. A-11.

[359]  / Loc. cit., p. 7-3; 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. A-6. Also see 1997 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. B-5.

[360]  /1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit., p. A-11.

[361]  / See Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Japanese Participation in Research in the Strategic Defence Initiative, Tokyo, July 22, 1987; for a discussion of Japan's policy on SDI, see Peggy L. Falkenheim in 'Japan and Arms Control: Tokyo's Response to SDI and INF,' Aurora Papers, No. 6, Ontario: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987; Elpidio R. Sta. Romana, 'Japan, SDI and the Pacific,' Foreign Relations, pp. 105-123.

[362]  / On advanced dual-purpose Japanese technology (e.g., computer, electro-optics, and lasers having applications in the SDI), see Emura Yoshiro, 'What Technology Does the U.S. Want?,' in Japan Quarterly, July-September, 1986, pp. 238-43. On the involvement of Japanese industry in the SDI fact-finding mission and its participation in SDI research, see 'The Politics of Participating,' by Takase Shoji, in Japan Quarterly, July-September, 1986, pp. 244-51; for an opinion on the USA's persuasion of Japan to join SDI research and the potential long-term implications, see D. Petrov, 'Japan and Space Militarization Plans,' International Affairs, June, 1986, pp. 56-64.

[363]  / 1992 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 5-5.

[364]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 7-9.

[365]  / Among other surface-to-air missiles, Japan produces the Launching Station, Engagement Control Station, Information and Control Centre, Radar Set, and the PATRIOT missile. See Nagoya Guidance and Propulsion Systems Works, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, LTD., Komaki-City, Japan, pp. 2, 5-6.

[366]  / 'Mobile DPS Station to Improve Detection of Korean Missiles', Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 April 1994, pp. 32-33.

[367]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit; p. 7-1, 7-9.

[368]  / Other changes also include the upgrading of ground-based BM early-warning and satellite tracking radars. For detailed references, see U.S. Cost of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties, Congress of the United States Budget Office, Washington, D.C., September 1990, pp. 46, 65-66; The Military Balance: 1992-1993, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Brassy's, 1992, pp. 18-19; Frank R. Cleminson and Péricles Gasparini Alves, "Space Weapon Verification: A Brief Appraisal," in Verification of Disarmament or Limitation of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, Proposals, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1992, United Nations publication, pp. 177-206.

[369]  / Ibid., p. 4.

[370]  / Loc. cit.

[371]  / "Spies in the Sky for Hire", Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 September 1994, p. 33.

[372]  / See Rossi, op. cit., pp. 529-30.

[373]  / Rossi, op. cit., p. 529; De Seeding, P., "Defence Minister Says No to French Radar Spy Satellite," Space News, 12 March 1990. Quoted in Pike, op. cit., p. 75.

[374]  / See a discussion in "France Advances Space-Based Systems," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 July 1992.

[375]  / Pike lists Japan's Superbird/BS2X satellite under its "Military Satellites Launched in 1990' table, indicating that Superbird carried a military X-band transponder. In addition, other reports indicate that Japan would be studying the development of an imaging intelligence satellite capability. See Pike, op. cit., p. 75, and "Japan plans satellite," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 Sep. 1989, quoted in Pike.

[376]  / See, for instance, "New Uses For GPS Challenge Pentagon", Lisa Burgess and Neil Munro, Defence News, November 29-December 5, 1993, pp. 8, 10; "Airline Industry Chiefs Push Greater GPS Civilian Control", Lisa Burgess, Defence News, November 29-December 5, 1993, p. 10; "Agreement Boots Access of Civilian Navigators to Network", Ben Iannotta, Defence News, January 17-23, 1994, p. 22.

[377]  / Marketing Service, SPOT Image, CNES, 1990.

[378]  / The United States is reportedly developing at least three classified video surveillance systems and some testing in the battlefield has already been carried-out during its intervention in Somalia. See a brief discussion in "U.S. Eyes Battlefield Television Surveillance,", Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, Defence News, November 29-December 5, 1993, pp. 3, 27.

[379]  / See Neil Munro, "U.S. Army Stresses C2 Advantage: Service Pits Force XXI Against Navy, AF Plans," Defence News, 14-20 March 1994, pp. 3, 37.

[380]  / For a generic explanation of the use of this technology in the civil sector, see Massimo Barbieri, "New Services for Welfare: Assessment of Candidate Services which Have Potential to Improve the Quality of Life, Mainly Based on Broadband Satellite Link,"ESA Round-Table on "Space 2020', European Space Research and Technical Centre, European Space Agency, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 27-29 June 1995.

[381]  / See "U.S. May Use TV to Mold Opinion in Global Hot Spots", Neil Munro, Defence News, January 17-23, 1994, p. 7.

[382]  / "U.S. Concern Intensifies as Fleet Heightens Nuclear Deterrent Role", Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, Defence News, February 28-March 6, 1994, pp. 4, 29; "U.S. Experts Disagree on Veracity of Claims by Moscow's Scientists," Neil Munro, Defence News, February 28-March 6, 1994, pp. 4, 29.

[383]  / On the military application of civil satellites, see Ghirardi, Raymond and Fernand Verger. "Géographie des lancements de satellites." Mappe Monde, vol. 2, 1987, pp. 15-21; See also "French Satellite Shows Soviet Northern Fleet Facilities", Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 2, 1987; Isabelle Sourbès and Yves Boyer, "Technical Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space," in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, Op. cit., p. 69-81.

[384]  / SOYUZKARTA imagery is taken from the former Soviet space station and Kosmos, Resurs, Okean, and Almaz satellites. See Earth Observation Data Processing and Interpretation Services: Analysis of the Sector and the Conditions for Its Development, op. cit., p. 5.

[385]  / Sovinformsputnik's "dominant" shareholder was reportedly at one point the Central Specialized Design Bureau, which is the parent organization of KB Proton. See "Spies in the Sky for Hire", op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[386]  / Ibid., p. 33.

[387]  / See a discussion in loc. cit.

[388]  / WorldMap is reported as being "...Russia's primary non-military remote sensing acquisition and processing organization." Loc. cit.

[389]  / Planeta images are therefore produced by scanner mode and not photo processing. This speeds-up access time to the data but is reported to have a number of other technical shortcomings.

[390]  / See a discussion in "Remote Sensing From Commercial Satellites and Aircraft: A Review of Current and Future Capabilities," Michael Vannoni, in Conference on Peaceful Uses of Commercial Satellite Imagery in the Middle East, 31 August-3 September, 1998, UNIDIR, Geneva, Unpublished.

[391]  / "Administration Sets Policy on Landsat Continuity," LANDSAT DATA USERS NOTES, Earth Observation Satellite Company, vol. 7, nð. 1, Spring 1992, p. 4.

[392]  / See a discussion in infra, a. New Dedicated/Non-Dedicated Military-Use Satellites.

[393]  / "OrbView Imaging Performance," OrbimageTM, Global Imaging Information, Brochure, 950121.17; "OrbView-1 Capabilities," OrbimageTM, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Brochure, 1995; "Remote Sensing From Commercial Satellites and Aircraft: A Review of Current and Future Capabilities," Vannoni, op. cit.

[394]  / "Radarsat Launch: A Success!", Waves, ISTS, Volume 7, Issue 6, December 1995.

[395]  / For discussions see Christian Sallaberger, "Research and Development Trends in the Canadian Space Program," ESA Round-Table on "Space 2020', European Space Research and Technical Centre, European Space Agency, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 27-29 June 1995; External Affairs and International Trade, The PAXSAT Concept: The Application of SpaceBased Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification, Ottawa, External Affairs and International Trade, 1987, Verification Brochures.

[396]  / "IRS-1C launched," Press Release, ISRO-DOS Publications & Public Relations Unit, Bangalore, No. PPR:D:125:95, 28 December 1995.

[397]  / See "EOSAT Co., US, Starts Receiving Indian Remote Sensing Satellite Data," India in Space, April-June 1994, Indian Space Research Organization, pp. 14-16.

[398]  / "Remote Sensing From Commercial Satellites and Aircraft: A Review of Current and Future Capabilities," Vannoni, op. cit.

[399]  In this context Detection means the ability to detect the presence of an unknown feature in an image. Mere detection requires only the order of 1 to 4 pixels. Recognition is the ability to recognise the presence of a particular feature in an image when in possession of an a priori description of the feature being sought. Depending on the complexity of the feature, recognition requires the order of 9 to 16 pixels. Identification is the ability to recognize the presence of a particular feature in an image in the absence of an a priori description of the feature being sought. Depending on the complexity of the feature, identification requires the order of 36 to 49 pixels. Description is defined as the ability to establish a detailed description of a feature in an image. Depending on the complexity of the feature, description requires of the order of several hundred pixels.

[400]  For a discussion of commonly accepted parameters involving detection, recognition, identification, and description of military assets, see "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency", Report of the Secretary-General, Department of Disarmament Affairs, Study Series, No. 9, New York: United Nations Publication, 1983, p. 30.

[401]  For a discussion on imagery resolution requirements, see for example, Masashi Matsuo, "Satellite Capabilities of Traditional Space-Competent States," and Claude Jung, "Verification of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements," both in Evolving Trends in the Dual-Use of Satellites, Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), UNIDIR, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996.

[402]  The author is indebted to Colonel Claude Jung and to SPOT IMAGE for their kind assistance. The responsibility of the statements in this document are the author's alone.

[403]  See a debate in "Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-resolution Imaging Satellites", by Gerald Steinberg, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 37, February, 1998.

[404]  / Treaty on the European Union, Disposition Concerning a Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article J.4 and the Declarations I and II Concerning the Western European Union; also see Horst Holthoff, "Regional Organizations: The Experience of the Western European Union", Evolving Trends in the Dual-Use of Satellites, Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), UNIDIR, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995.

[405]  / The WEU Satellite Centre was created on 27th June 1991 by a decision of the Council of Ministers at Vianden, Luxembourg. It has been created as a WEU subsidiary body and is placed under the authority of the WEU Council. On December 1992, the WEU signed an agreement with Spain, which provided a site and installations for the Centre at the Torrejón Air Base in Torrejón de Ardoz. ("Western European Union Satellite Centre," Letter to the Author, May 1995.)

[406]  / Holthoff, op. cit.

[407]  / Loc. cit.

[408]  / "Western European Union Satellite Centre," Letter to the Author, op. cit.

[409]  / The WEU has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with France, Italy, and Spain to obtain imagery from the Hèlios satellite.

[410]  / WEU members are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

[411]  / WEU Associate Members are: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey; WEU Observers: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden; Associate Partners: Bulgaria,, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.

[412]  / See for example, discussion on systems architecture, production schedules, and cost in A European Space-Based Observation System, Colloquy, San Augustin, Gran Canaria, 24th-25th March 1995, Assembly of Western European Union, 1995, 87 pp.; Towards a European Space-Based Observation System, Assembly of Western European Union, Fortieth Ordinary Session, Document 1454, 2 May 1995; Verification: A Future European Satellite Agency, Western European Union, Paris, WEU Assembly, Document 1159, 3 November 1988.

[413]  / ECOSAT is an independent European non-profit organization founded in 1990. Its main task is to promote the creation of a European Satellite Monitoring Agency dedicated to, among other objectives, the monitoring of regional crisis, the verification of arms control agreements, and the environment.

[414]  / See "Towards a European Satellite Monitoring Agency"?, EUCOSAT Symposium, 22-23 June 1993, Paris, Paris- Le Senat, 1993; Proposal for A European Space Based Monitoring System, EUCOSAT, Paris, June 1994.

[415]  / The ACRS Working Group is one of the five multilateral groups meeting to address issues of the peace process in the Middle-East. ACRS countries are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. Other participating countries and organizations are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, the European Union Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, United Nations, the United States, Yemen, and a Palestinian delegation.

[416]  / "Regional Co-operation for Satellite Imagery" (RECOSI), Proposal by the French Delegation, ACRS Working Group Meeting, Helsinki, May-June 1995.

[417]  / Loc. cit.

[418]  / Loc. cit.

[419]  See "ORBIMAGETM Receives U.S. Government Approval of Saudi Arabian Imagery Sale," News Release, ORBIMAGE, Dulles, VA, 5 June 1995.

[420]  Given the difficulty of testing and assessing the effects of nuclear test in outer space, a CTBT agreement would probably not constitute exhaustive techniques and procedures for detection of non-compliance in that environment. For discussions, see for instance, Lars-Erik G. De Geer, "Atmospheric Radionuclide Monitoring," in Monitoring A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, NATO Advanced Study Institute: Alvor, Algarve, Portugal, January 23-February 2, 1995; H. W. Haak, "Infrasound Monitoring Systems," and David J. Simons, "Atmospheric Methods for Nuclear Test Monitoring," both in Monitoring A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

[421]  See, for example, J. J. Zucca, C. Carrigan, P. Goldstein et al, "Signatures of Testing: On-Site Inspection Techniques," in Monitoring A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, NATO Advanced Study Institute: Alvor, Algarve, Portugal, January 23-February 2, 1995.

[422]  Refer to "Rolling Text of the Treaty", in "Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations," Conference on Disarmament, CD/1364, Appendix, pp. 27-140, September 1995, pp. 97-8.

[423]  For an interesting discussion, see Bhupendra Jasani in Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study, UNIDIR, Research Paper n . 32, New York: United Nations Publications Office, 1994; Laurence Nardon in Test Ban Verification Matters; Satellite Detection, Verification Technology Information Centre, No. 7, November 1994. For study of a nuclear test sites using satellite imagery, see Vipin Gupta, "Locating Nuclear Explosions at the Chinese Test Site near Lop Nor, Science & Global Security, Volume 5, pp. 205-244, 1995; Vipin Gupta and Donald Rich, Locating the Ground Zero of China's First Nuclear Explosive Test on 16 October 1964, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-JC-121908, Reprint, 9 November 1995; Johnny Skorve and John Kristen Skogan, "The NUPI Satellite Study of the Northern Under-Ground Nuclear Test Area on Novaya Zemlya," Research Report, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, N 164, December 1992.

[424]  See CD/1364, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

[425]  See Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR), Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kjeller, Norway.

[426]  For a discussion, see for instance a collection of papers in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, Péricles Gasparini Alves (Ed.), op. cit.

[427]  With these data, it is straightforward to compute the instantaneous position and velocity vectors of the spacecraft, and then to predict or reconstruct the future or past orbit. Of course, such a prediction/reconstruction of the orbit would be valid only over a time span in which the spacecraft moves freely under the influence of the Earth's gravity and the other perturbing forces, with no active manoeuvre being carried out. Thus the information should be updated, either after each manoeuvre or at fixed intervals of time. The detailed provisions about this updating process may depend on the type of spacecraft, its function, and different confidentiality or security considerations, as discussed below. See "Applying CSBMs to the Outer Space Environment," Péricles Gasparini Alves, in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring," op. cit., pp. 272-75.

[428]  The French contingent has used the Euteltracks system that provides services via EUTELSAT satellites, while the Norwegian contingent has had accessed to the FleetSAT system that provides INMARSAT C satellite services.

[429]  Request for Proposal: United Nations Thin Route Network, UN Thin Route Telecommunication Services Working Group, New York: United Nations, January 1995.

[430]  Ibid. The Thin Route network would provide "...a small antenna to a remote field office offering several voice/data/fax, channels for communications to another field office, a regional office, or headquarters." A number of "flyway" transportable antennas of about 1.8 m would be provided within this system.

[431]  / The author would like to thank Col. (Ret.) Leonard John Otten III, KESTREL Corporation, New Mexico, USA, for his kind remarks to the first draft of this Chapter.

[432]  / See a discussion of the revolution of satellite imagery software in Craig Covault, "Low-Cost Info Technology Energizes Space Data Market,' Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 April 1994, p. 70.

[433]  / Other more moderate estimates were made by the U.S. Government, which assessed "...the growing international market for remote sensing, which already accounts for nearly $400 million worldwide [in 1994] and is expected to to grow to more than $2 billion by the turn of the century." However, the view was also expressed that "[¨i]ncluding the market for images incorporating demographic or technical data with digital

maps, or geographic information systems, the market for spacebased imagery could be up to $15 billion by the year 2000." See "Statement by The Press Secretary," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., 10 March 1994.

[434]  / Craig Covault, "USAF Eyes Advanced Russian Military Reconnaissance Imagery,' Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 April 1994, p. 53.

[435]  / It must be said here, however, that there are still some question of how successful the commercial LIGHTSAT will be in the communication area. Some experts reserve their comments for a later period when more information will be available on their performance. They argue that, today, large spacecraft in the geosynchronous orbit carry the bulk of communication and are commercially very successful. The placement into low orbit of many small satellites creates problems of frequency allocations over the Earth, numbers of assets and a huge investment requirement, as well as controls imposed by countries where the satellite may be used for portable phone (thus bypassing the tariffs the country in question normally imposes), concerns about security of data link, and the cost of services.

[436]  / The commercial failure of IRIDIUM does not necessary implies that such a satellite constellation is not conceivable in the future.

[437]  / Some experts argue, however, that many of the items that are now being used in new satellites are much more expensive than what they are replacing. In addition, the fact that satellites have today a much longer lifetime than its predecessors reduces overall cost but may prevent emerging technologies from being introduced since there may not be a need for a replacement asset. In any event, it is also argued that it is also argued that it is not sure that the cost for the one off or few of a kind satellites are really decreasing due to the high percentage of the cost being associated with parts and qualification. With the continued emphasis of no failures, it remains very expensive to build parts, check them, and provide all the documentation and review to be sure there are no mistakes. Leonard John Otten III, Letter to the author.

[438]  / Leonard John Otten III has explained this difference by stating that the hardening of military satellites differs from commercial space assets since, while both types of satellites are hard to the normal occurring radiation found in space, military satellites are hardened to withstand the radiation that would be emitted by a nuclear burst in space. He continues by arguing that a nuclear burst is significantly greater than the natural background and that there exists figures which suggest that a space nuclear burst would virtually destroy all commercial hardened satellites. Letter to the author.

[439]  / Levi, op. cit.

[440]  / See a discussion in Michael A. Dornheim, "Rocket Technology Prevails Over politics," Aviation Week &Space Technology, 14 August 1995, pp. 52-53.

[441]  / Boeing Commercial Space Company of the United States acts as integrator of the Sea Launch project, producing the payload fairing and interface hardware, developing the Home Port facility, and providing spacecraft integration and overall mission operations. KB Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash in Ukraine produces the twostage Zenit launch vehicle and provides operations support to Zenit processing and launch operations. RSC Energia of Russia contributes the design and manufacture of the Block DMSL upper stage and is responsible for Sea Launch vehicle integration, launch operations, and range services. Kvaerner Maritime a.s of Norway is responsible for the design and construction of the Assembly & Command Ship and the modification of the Launch Platform. In addition, Kvaerner integrates the marine elements of Sea Launch and performs marine operations. Source: Sea Launch Home Page, www.boeing.com.

[442]  / See a detailed discussion in Pierre Langereux, "Un petit launceur Franco-Italien," Air & COSMO/Aviation International, Nð 1452/53, Quinzainedu 20 Decémbre 93 au 2 Janvier 1994, pp. 30-31.

[443]  / One example is the new American Taurus launch vehicle which uses a Pegasus mounted on top of a MX missile as the first state. See Michael A. Dornheim, "Taurus Inaugurates New Launcher Class," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 March 1994, p. 26.

[444]  / Leonard John Otten III, Letter to the author.

[445]  / The author is thankful to Leonard John Otten III for his kind comments.

[446]  / Sekigawa and Michael Mecham, "Japan Delays H2 launches, Finishes HOPE Test Vehicle," Aviation Week &Space Technology, 21 Agust 1995, p. 22.

[447]  / See "Atomic Energy Act of 1954', Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Congressional research Service, Library of Congress, 103d Congress, 2d Session, S. Prt. 103-111, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1995.

[448]  / Ibid., Chapter 1, "Declaration, Findings, and Purpose", Section 1, a.

[449]  / Ibid., Section 2, a.

[450]  / Ibid., Chapter 9, "Military Application of Atomic Energy", Section 91, "Authority".

[451]  /Ibid., Purpose, e.

[452]  / Ibid., Chapter 6, "Special Nuclear Material", Section 54, "Foreign Distribution of Spacial Nuclear Material", b.

[453]  / Ibid., Section 57, "Prohibition", a.

[454]  / Ibid., "Prohibition", b.

[455]  / Ibid., In the curse of 1999, ACDA was dissolved and its functions were integrated into the work of the Department of State.

[456]  / Ibid., Section 128, "Additional Export Criterion and Procedures", a. (1).

[457]  / Ibid., Section 129, "Conduct Resulting in Termination of Nuclear Exports", (1).

[458]  / Refer to "Foreign Assistance Act of 1961', (P.L. 87-195), Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, op. cit., pp. 277-78.

[459]  / Ibid., p. 278.

[460]  / See "Talbott to Emphasize Non-Proliferation in India, Pakistan", Daily Bulletin, Number 58, 28 March 1994, p. 2

[461]  / Loc. cit.

[462]  / "Export-Import Bank Act of 1945', Public Law 95-143, 26 October 1977, in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., pp. 296-97.

[463]  / Loc. cit. Exception can be made if the President determines otherwise in the interest of the United States, although final approval would have to follow a set of Congressional procedures.

[464]  / International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Public Law 95-118, 3 October 1977, Title VII, Human Rights, Section 701., (b), (3), in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., p. 295. The six financial institutions are: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.

[465]  / "The Non-Proliferation Act of 1978', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., pp. 298-99.

[466]  / "The Non-Proliferation Act of 1978', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., p. 304.

[467]  / "Export of Nuclear Material', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., p. 315.

[468]  / "Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and China', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., p. 321. Paragraph (2) of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 stipulates that no cooperation shall be undertaken until "...the President has approved and authorized the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation, and has made a determination in writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute and unreasonable risk to the common defense and security ...". "Atomic Energy Act of 1954," Public Law 703, 30 August 1954.

[469]  / "Interpreting the Pressler Amendment: Commercial Military Sales to Pakistan", Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102-859, 30 July 1992, US Government Printing House, Washington, D.C., 1992, p.1.

[470]  / Ibid., p. 5.

[471]  / Ibid., p.2.

[472]  / Ibid., p.4. Statement of Senator Alan Cranston.

[473]  / 'China, Pakistan Possibly in Violation of MTCR', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 25, 1993, pp. 2-3.

[474]  / See 'MTCR-related Sanctions Against China, Pakistan', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 26, 1993, pp. 1-2; 'U.S. Says MTCR Controls Apply to Chinese M-11 Missile', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 27, 1993, pp. 2-3.

[475]  / Ibid., 'MTCR-related Sanctions Against China, Pakistan', pp. 1-2. Reports also indicate that the ban on Chinese entities also included '...a number of its Defense Ministry's subunits and subsidiaries'.

[476]  / See an extract in "Interpreting the Pressler Amendment: Commercial Military Sales to Pakistan", op. cit., p. 12. Emphasis in original.

[477]  / Loc. cit.

[478]  / "Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 27, 1993.

[479]  /"Liberalization of Export Controls Announced", Daily Bulletin, Number 61, 31 March 1994, p. 8.

[480]  / "Address by the President to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", op. cit.

[481]  / "National Defence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1994', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., pp. 325-26.

[482]  / Ibid.

[483]  / Loc. cit.

[484]  / Loc. cit.

[485]  / Ibidi, p.327.

[486]  / Ibid., pp. 327-28.

[487]  / Ibid., p. 329.

[488]  / Ibid., p. 330.

[489]  / Ibidi., 331.

[490]  / 'Pentagon's Counter-Proliferation Initiative,' op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[491]  / Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs, Office of the Department of Defence, Washington, D, C., May 1994, pp. 3-4.

[492]  / Ibid., p. 3.

[493]  / Loc. cit. The Committee is formed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[494]  / Ibid., p. 332.

[495]  / Ibidi., p. 334.

[496]  / Ibid., p. 335.

[497]  / Loc. cit.

[498]  / Ibidi., p. 338.

[499]  / Ibid., p.339.

[500]  / Loc. cit.

[501]  / Loc. c.it. See for example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1738), for a statutory definition of the term 'missile' to mean 'a category I system as defined in the MTCR Annex, and any other unmanned delivery system of similar capability, as well as the specially designed production facilities for these systems'.

[502]  / "Foreign Relations Authorization Act', in Nuclear Proliferation FactBook, op. cit., p. 348.

[503]  / Ibid., p. 354.

[504]  / Loc. cit.

[505]  / Ibid., p. 358.

[506]  / Loc. cit.

[507]  / 'Expansion of Foreign Policy Controls: Missile Technology Destinations,' Rules and Regulations, Federal Register, vol. 57, nð. 118, 16 June 1992, p. 26774.

[508]  / For a discussion, see "Presentation by Rustam Safaraliev, Ministry of Economics, Russian Federation," US-NIS Dialogue on Nonproliferation Export Controls Conference, 15-17 June 1993, Airlie House Round Up: A Survey of National Export Control Systems in the NIS, Airlie, Virginia, 1993.

[509]  / 'On the Definition of the Law on the Control of the Export from the Russia Federation of Equipment, Materials, Technologies Used in the Development of Rocket-based Weapons.' Decree of the Council of Minister-Government of the Russian Federation, 27 January, 1993 and Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 11 January 1993, Russian News, Rossiiskie Vesti, n. 51 (220).

[510]  / Russian Federation Space Activities Act, Russian Parliament Building, Moscow, 20 August 1993.

[511]  / Ibid., Article 3.

[512]  / Ibid., Article 4.

[513]  / Loc. cit.

[514]  / Ibid., Article 7.

[515]  / Loc. cit.

[516]  / Refer to "Presentation by Victor Pasko, Committee for External Economic Regulations, Belarus," US-NIS Dialogue on Nonproliferation Export Controls Conference, 15-17 June 1993, Airlie House Round Up: A Survey of National Export Control Systems in the NIS, Airlie, Virginia, 1993.

[517]  / Loc. cit.

[518]  / Loc. cit.

[519]  / "Presentation by Saule Nurgaliyevna, Ministry of Finance, Kazakhstan," US-NIS Dialogue on Nonproliferation Export Controls Conference, 15-17 June 1993, Airlie House Round Up: A Survey of National Export Control Systems in the NIS, Airlie, Virginia, 1993.

[520]  / For a short discussion, see "Presentation by Kubanychbek Zhumaliev, State Committee for Science and New Technology, Kyrgystan," US-NIS Dialogue on Nonproliferation Export Controls Conference, 15-17 June 1993, Airlie House Round Up: A Survey of National Export Control Systems in the NIS, Airlie, Virginia, 1993.

[521]  / Loc. cit.

[522]  / Loc. cit.

[523]  / See "Presentation by Oleski Petrik, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and Anatoly Scherba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs," US-NIS Dialogue on Nonproliferation Export Controls Conference, 15-17 June 1993, Airlie House Round Up: A Survey of National Export Control Systems in the NIS, Airlie, Virginia, 1993.

[524]  / Loc. cit.

[525]  / See "Rules Concerning Information and Data," Council, European Space Agency, ESA/C(89)95, rev.1, Paris, 21 December 1989.

[526]  / Ibid.

[527]  / Loc cit.

[528]  / For example, see discussions in ; European Defence Technology in Transition: Issues for the UK, A Credit Network Study, Philip Gummett and Josephine Anne Stein, Science Policy Support Group, London, September 1994, pp. 16-17.

[529]  / See "Décret-loi du 18 avril 1939 fixant le régime des matériels de guerre, armes et munitions," Journal officiel, 13 juin 1939 et rectificatifs au Journal officiel des 17 juin, 14 et 19 juillet 1939, Matériels de guerre, armes et munitions, Journal officiel de la République Française, no. 1074, pp. 1-13; "Décret n. 55-965 du 16 juillet 1995, portant réorganisation de la commission interministérielle pour l'étude des exportations de matériels de guerre," Journal officiel du 21 juillet 1995 et rectificatif au Journal officiel du 4 août 1995, Journal officiel de la République Française, no. 1074, pp. 169-71.

[530]  / "Arrêté du 20 novembre 1991 fixant la liste des matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés soumis à une procédure spéciale d'exportation,"Journal officiel, 22 novembre 1991, Matériels de Guerre, armes et munitions, Journal officiel de la République Française, no. 1074, pp. 177-187; "Arrêté du 9 mai 1997 modifiant l'arrêté du 20 novembre 1991 fixant la liste des matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés soumis à une procédure spéciale d'exportation,"Journal officiel, 16 mai 1997, Matériels de Guerre, armes et munitions, Journal officiel de la République Française, Brochure no. 1074, supplément no.4, 16 mai 1997, pp. 2-4

[531]  / See for example, Report by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Tightening of Export Controls for Goods with Civilian and Military Applications (Dual-Use Goods), Nr. 318, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Press and Public Relations Office, Bonn, 1992.

[532]  / Ibid. p. 5.

[533]  / Ibid., p. 4.

[534]  / For a lengthier discussion, see Espen Gullikstad, 'Finland,' Arms Export Regulations, Ian Anthony (ed.), Oxford University Press: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1991, p. 61.

[535]  / See Espen Gullikstad, 'Sweden,' Arms Export Regulations, op. cit., pp. 147-55.

[536]  / See Loi fédérale sur le contrôle des biens utilisables à des fins civiles et militaires et des biens militaires spécifiques, 13 décembre 1996, Article 1.

[537]  / Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 2.

[538]  / Ibid., Article 2, paragraph 3.

[539]  / Ibid., Article 3.

[540]  / Ibid., Article 4.

[541]  / Ibid., Article 5.

[542]  / Ibid., Article 6.

[543]  / Ibid., Articles 14 to 18.

[544]  / Ibid., Article 8.

[545]  / See Ordonnance sur l'exportation, limportation et le transit de biens utilisable à des fins civiles et militaires et des biens militaires spécifiques, 25 Juin 1997, Article 1.

[546]  / Ibid., Article 1.

[547]  / Ibid., Article 6.

[548]  / Ibid., Article 18.

[549]  / Ibid., Annex 2.

[550]  / Loc. cit.

[551]  / Decree-Law No 436/91, Directorate-General for Politic-Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991.

[552]  / Decree-Law No 436/91, op. cit., Articles 1 and 2.

[553]  / This Committee comprises of representatives from the Ministries of Trade and Tourism, Defence, Finance, International Administration, Foreign Affairs, and Industry and Energy.

[554]  / Decree-Law No 436/91, op. cit., Article 4.

[555]  / Ibid., Article 8.

[556]  / Ibid., Article 14.

[557]  / Loc. cit.

[558]  / Declaration of Intention by Argentina to Become a Member of the MTCR, Decree Nð. 603, Buenos Aires, 9 April 1992.

[559]  / Ibid, Also see Decree Nð. 1907, 14 July, 1985.

[560]  / Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship, and the Ministry of Economy and Public Work and Services.

[561]  / Declaration of Intention by Argentina to Become a Member of the MTCR, op. cit., Article 5.

[562]  / Ibid., Articles 7-8.

[563]  / Ibid., Article 6.

[564]  / Ibid., Article 12.

[565]  / See supra, MTCR

[566]  / Ibid., Annex A, Introduction.

[567]  / Declaration of Intention by Argentina to Become a Member of the MTCR, op. cit., Article 15. Italics added

[568]  / Ibid., Article 20.

[569]  / Decree Nð. 1291 M 152, Buenos Aires, 24 Jun 1993.

[570]  / As used in the IAEA Statute, "[t]he term 'special fissionable material' means plutonium 239; uranium 233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term 'special fissionable material' does not include source material." See IAEA Statute, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria.

[571]  / Decree Nð. 1291 M 152, op. cit., See Annex C, "General Criteria for the Technology Transfer".

[572]  / loc. cit.

[573]  / Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, 5 October 1988, Chapter II, Article 21, VI, p. 31. For a discussion, see 'Brazilian Missile and Rocket production and Export", op. cit.

[574]  / Decreto No. 24 602 - De 6 de Julho de 1934, Regulamento para a Fiscalização de Produtos Controlados, Ministério do Exército, Estado-Maior do Exército, 1 edição, 1965.

[575]  / Ibid., pp. 121-24. Present regulations require detailed reporting of an exporting company's production capacity to the Ministry of the Army, including: the total number of buildings, personnel, equipments, location, product formulas of a secret character, storage capability, and all other aspects of production such as transport and commerce.

[576]  / Federal Decree No. 55 649. See Chapter XIV, Article 132 (production authorization) and Chapter III, Article 11 (export authorization) of R-105. However, Article 132, parágrafo único, excludes the authorization for exports by the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Aeronautics.

[577]  / This is controlled by requesting a certificate from the importing country in which the sale of the controlled product is acknowledged - see Article 133.

[578]  / See Chapter XIX, Articles 157-65, R-105, pp. 59-73.

[579]  / See 'Dispõe Sobre as Operações Relativas à Importação e Exportação de Bens de Emprego Bélico, de Uso Duplo e de Uso na Area Nuclear e de Serviços Diretamente Vinculados,' Projecto de Lei Nð 2.530, de 1992, Câmara dos Deputados. Also see, Diário Official, 10 de Fevereiro de 1992. For a detailed discussion of this draft law, see 'Brazilian Missile and Rocket production and Export", op. cit.

[580]  / See 'Dispõe Sobre a Exportação de Bens de Sensíveis e de Serviços Diretamente Vinculados,' Projecto de Lei Nð 7.19, de 1995, Câmara dos Deputados. Also see, Diário Official, n 248. 30 de Dezembro de 1995.

[581]  / Refer to The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, No. 22 of 1992, 7 August 1992.

[582]  / See Export and Import Policy, 1 April 1992-31 March 1997, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, Mach 1994.

[583]  / Ibid., pp. 79-83.

[584]  / For a discussion of Israeli export practices, see Gerald Steingerg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation", in The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier's Network, op. cit., pp. 235-53.

[585]  / Defence and Exports Control, Ministry of Defence, Government of Israel, February, 1995.

[586]  / Ibid., p. 5.

[587]  / Ibid., pp. 2, 6.

[588]  / The law is very detailed on this point and defines negotiation as comprising "...any commercial contact towards transaction with foreign potential customer which include introduction of a defence article or know-how, marketing efforts, presentation of documents, signing contract, mediation, consulting, etc... See Ibid., p. 6.

[589]  / Loc. cit.

[590]  / Loc. cit.

[591]  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[592]  See a discussion in Ian Anthony, 'The Co-ordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls,' Arms Export Regulations, op. cit., p. 209.

[593]  Ibid., pp. 207-8.

[594]  NACC is at time of writing a 35 member council regrouping the 16 NATO countries, members of the former Warsaw Pact, members of the CIS, and three Baltic states. The Council's work plan focuses on consultations and co-operation on, inter alia, regional security issues such as security planning, arms control, and conversion of military to civil production. See 'NACC Expand to 35 Member States in Brussels,' Daily Bulletin, Nð. 46, 11 March 1992, p. 1.

[595]  For instance, the various civil programme contracts already passed and in negotiations between major space companies in the west and their Russian counterpart, or the adaptation of western technologies onto Soviet-built fighter aircraft.

[596]  "Reforming Export Controls", Lynn E. Davis, White House Statement-Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 11 April 1994, Vol. 5, No. 15, p. 204.

[597]  'Commerce Department Lifts Export Controls on Some Computers', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 27, 1993, pp. 4-5.

[598]  This has been argued to be the case with respect to the issue of computers. On 1 April 1994, the United States liberalized licensing requirements on the export of a number of items, including computers that operate up to 1,000 MTOPS to civilian end-uses, except to the PDRK. (See "Export Controls Reform", Dee Dee Myers, White House Statement-Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 11 April 1994, Vol. 5, No. 15, pp. 205-6.) Other COCOM member States that do not produce such computers did not necessarily have any benefit in such liberalization.

[599]  The issue of computer decontrol is still a case in point, where initially the United States had supported, while European COCOM members seem to have supported telecommunication decontrol. 'Commerce Department Lifts Export Controls on Some Computers', op. cit., pp. 4-5.

[600]  Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs, op. cit., p. 3.

[601]  "Liberalization of Export Controls Announced", op. cit., p. 9; "1995 Arms Control Accomplishments and Replacing COCOM", Thomas E. McNamara, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1995, U.S., Department of State Dispatch, 16 October, 1995, Vol. 6, No. 42, pp. 752-4.

[602]  'Western Nations Agree to Phase out COCOM', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, November 18, 1993, p. 8.

[603]  See "Reforming Export Controls", op. cit., p. 204; also see a discussion in Sergei Zamyatin, "The Role of Export Controls in Addressing Proliferation Concerns", in Illicit Traffic of Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies, Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, (eds.), UNIDIR, United Nation Publications, Geneva, 1998, pp.171-176

[604]  "Wassenaar Arrangement on Arms Export Controls", Fact Sheet, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 17 July 1996.

[605]  Refer to The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies, Wassenaar Arrangement, Vienna, Austria.

[606]  "Wassenaar Arrangement on Arms Export Controls", Fact Sheet,, op. cit.; also see loc. cit.

[607]  "Threat Control Through Arms Control", Annual Report to Congress, 1996, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington D.C., 1997, p. 69.

[608]  The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies, op. cit.

[609]  Loc. cit.

[610]  Loc. cit.

[611]  Loc. cit.

[612]  See, for example, "The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role", Fritz W. Schmidt, The NonProliferation Review, Fall 1994, Vol. 2, number 1.

[613]  Loc. cit.

[614]  Seven significant amendments to the "Trigger List" took place between 1994 and 1997, see a discussion in Loc. cit.

[615]  Treat Control Trough Arms Control, op. cit., p. 74.

[616]  Loc. cit.

[617]  For a detailed discussion, see "The Nuclear Suppliers Group," Tadeusz Strulak, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1993, pp. 2-10.

[618]  Ibid., p. 3.

[619]  See a list of these goods published in Dunbar Lockwood and Jon Brook Wolfsthal, 'Nuclear Weapon Development and Proliferation, SIPRI Yearbook 1993, op. cit., pp. 242-43; "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1992," Press Statement, Warsaw, Poland, 3 April, 1992.

[620]  '28 Countries Further Restrict Exports of Nuclear Goods', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, April 2, 1993, p. 9. Some exceptional cases of transfer without "full safeguards" would be accepted, for example, with respect to "...items essential for the safe operation of existing facilities ... provided that safeguards are applied to these facilities". See "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1992," op. cit.

[621]  This has been reportedly the case with Argentina, Brazil and South Korea. See a discussion in 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Beyond the Persian Gulf War and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union', by Harald Müller, SIPRI Yearbook 1992, op. cit., p. 94.

[622]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1992," op. cit.

[623]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1993," Press Statement, Lucerne, Switzerland, 1 April 1993.

[624]  Strulak sustains that "[w]ith the Point-of-Contact and a Chairman of its own, as well as a separate international arrangement for admitting members, the dual-use export control regime forms a distinct and 'autonomous' part of the NSG". See Strulak, op. cit., p. 8.

[625]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1992," op. cit.

[626]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1993," op. cit. "(2) Known as full-scope safeguards." Emphasis added. Also see '28 Countries Further Restrict Exports of Nuclear Goods', op. cit., p. 9.

[627]  See statements in "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1994', Press Statement, Madrid, Spain, 12-14 April, 1994;"Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1995', Press Statement, Helsinki, Finland, 5-7 April, 1995.

[628]  See "Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology: Nuclear Transfers," IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part1, October 1995; See "Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology: Nuclear-related Dual-use Transfers," IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part2, October 1995.

[629]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Working Group on Transparency: Discussion Points," Nuclear Suppliers Group, 1996.

[630]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1996', Press Statement, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 25-26 April, 1996.

[631]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Working Group on Transparency: Discussion Points," op. cit.

[632]  "Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting: 1997', Press Statement, Ottawa, Canada, 8-9 May, 1997.

[633]  See "The Origins and Function of the Australia Group", Brief Paper, Australia Embassy, Washington, D.C., 05, March 1989; also see "Current Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacturing of Chemical and Biological Weapons", Australia Group Document, AG/Dec92/Press/Chair/8, December 1992.

[634]  See "The Origins and Function of the Australia Group", op. cit.

[635]  "Australia Group", Fact Sheet, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 12 April 1996.

[636]  See "The Origins and Function of the Australia Group", op. cit.

[637]  'Agreement Reached on Biological Weapons Export Controls', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, December 17, 1992, pp. 11-12; 'Biological Weapons Export Control Lists Agreed', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, June 14, 1993, pp. 10-11.

[638]  "Australia Group Meeting," Press Release,"AG/Dec92/Press/Chair/9, Australian Embassy, Paris, 7-10 December 1992.

[639]  "Australia Group Meeting," Press Release," Australian Embassy, Paris, 28 July 1993.

[640]  See "The Origins and Function of the Australia Group", op. cit.; "Australia Group Meeting on Chemical Weapons", Australia News Release, Australian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 6 April 1991.

[641]  "Statement made on Behalf of the 'Australia Group' by the Representative of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament," Conference on Disarmament, CD/1164, 7 August 1992, p. 2.

[642]  "Current Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacturing of Chemical and Biological Weapons", op. cit. "Australia Group Meeting", AG/Dec92/Press/Chair/9, op. cit.

[643]  "Australia Group Meeting", AG/Dec92/Press/Chair/9, op. cit.

[644]  "Current Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacturing of Chemical and Biological Weapons", op. cit.

[645]  "Australia Group", Fact Sheet, 12 April 1996, op. cit.

[646]  See a discussion in Louise Hand, "Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Chemical Agents: Prospects and Strategies", in Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda, Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone (eds), UNIDIR, United Nations Publications, Geneva, 1998.

[647]  "Missile Technology Control Regime held Plenary Meeting in Tokyo", Press Release, Tokyo, 6 November 1997. Also see "Missile Technology Control Regime: Questions and Answers," Peace and Disarmament News, March 1998, pp. 15-16.

[648]  See a discussion in Jürgen Scheffran and Aaron Karp, 'The National Interpretation of the Missile Technology Control Regime - The US and German Experience, Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology: Lessons form the past and challenges for the 1990s, Brauch, Hans Günter, Henny J. Van Der Graaf, John Grin, Wim A. Smit (eds.), Vu University Press, Amsterdam 1992, pp. 235-251.

[649]  Quoted in 'MTCR Targets Biological, Chemical-Capable Missiles', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, January 8, 1993, pp. 6-7; also see "Missile Technology Control Regime Meets in Switzerland", Press Release, Interlaken, 3 December 1993.

[650]  '23 Countries Move Further to Control Missile Exports', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, March 15, 1993, pp. 9-10.

[651]  See a discussion in Ian Anthony, 'The Missile Technology Control Regime,' Arms Export and Regulations, op. cit., p. 220; Arms Control: U.S. Efforts to Control the Transfer of Nuclear-Capable Missile Technology, Report to the Honourable Dennis DeConcini, U.S. Senate, United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., June 1990.

[652]  "Threat Control Through Arms Control," Annual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 34.

[653]  "23 Countries Move Further to Control Missile Exports', op. cit., p. 10.

[654]  'U.S. Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, July 19, 1993, pp. 6-7.

[655]  "Missile Technology Control Regime: An Information Paper", Press Release, Tokyo, 6 November 1997.

[656]  'MTCR-related Sanctions Against China, Pakistan', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 26, 1993, p. 2; "Joint United Sates-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation", Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, October 1994.

[657]  "Joint United Sates-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation", op. cit.

[658]  Ibid.; "Threat Control Through Arms Control," op.cit, p. 34.

[659]  The sanctions in question are described as referring to Category II, requiring "...the denial for two years of new export licences for MTCR Annex items, and the denial of U.S. Government contracts relating to MTCR Annex items..." See "Joint United Sates-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation", op. cit.

[660]  Loc.cit.

[661]  Loc. cit.; emphasis added. The U.S. understands this concept of inherent capability as including "... any missile that has the inherent capability to be modified to meet the MTCR thresholds is also under the control of the regime". See "The U.S. and China: Curbing Missile and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation", U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 17 October 1994, Vol. 5. No. 42, p. 701.

[662]  'U.S. Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines', op. cit.,pp. 6-7.

[663]  'U.S.-Russian Talks on Cooperation in Space, Energy Open', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, September 2, 1993, p. 5; 'U.S.-Russian Sign Agreements on Space and Energy', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, September 3, 1993, p. 5; 'Agreement with Russia on MTCR, Space, Energy Discussed', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, September 7, 1993, pp. 3-4.

[664]  '25 Countries Agree on Direct Missile Proliferation Diplomacy', Daily Bulletin, United States Mission, Geneva, December 7, 1993, p. 5; "Missile Technology Control Regime Meets in Switzerland", op.cit.

[665]  "Missile Technology Control Regime holds Plenary Meeting in Edinburgh", Press Release, Edinburgh, 10 October 1996.

[666]  Loc. cit.;"Missile Technology Control Regime: An Information Paper", op. cit.

[667]  "Missile Technology Control Regime held Plenary Meeting in Tokyo", op. cit.; "Missile Technology Control Regime: An Information Paper", op. cit.

[668]  "President George Bush Middle East Arms Control Initiative," Fact Sheet, the White House Press Secretary, 29 May, 1991.

[669]  Ibid.

[670]  "Communique Issued Following the Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfers and Nonproliferation," Paris 89 July 1991, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1103, 19 August 1991.

[671]  "G7 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Nonproliferation," The London Economic Summit 1991, Mmuniquéee, London, 16 July 1991.

[672]  Ibid. Emphasis added.

[673]  "Communique Issued Following The Meeting of The Five: Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers," Communiquée, London 18 October 1991.

[674]  "Transparency in armaments," "Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly," GA/RES 46/36 L, 9 December 1991.

[675]  Note that the definition of missile included in the UN Register is much stricter than the one on the UNSCOM's mandate, where missiles in the Register are considered to be "...guided rocket, ballistic or cruise missile capable of delivering a payload to a range of at least 25 kilometres, or a vehicle, apparatus or device designed or modified for launching such munitions," and not 150 km as the case of the UNSCOM's mandate.

[676]  "Communique Issued Following The Meeting of The Five: Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction," Communiquée, Washington, 29 May 1992.

[677]  For a discussion and references, see Agnès Courades Allebeck, 'The European Community: From the EC to the European Union', Arms Industry Limited, op. cit., pp. 191-213.

[678]  "Declaration of Non-proliferation and Arms Exports", EC Council Decisions on Non-proliferation and Arms Exports, Europe, No. 5524 (Special edition), 30 June, 1991.

[679]  Refer to infra, c. The European Space Agency, the European Union, and National Laws in this Chapter.

[680]  "Decision by the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation", FSC Journal, No. 24, November 1993. Also see "OSCE Seminar on Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfer", FSC Journal, No. 110, Point No. 5, 26, April 1995 and "Follow-up to the Seminar on Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfer", 117th Plenary Meeting, FSC Journal, No. 121, Point No. 5, paragraph 1.

[681]  "Alliance policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,", NATO Press Release, M-NAC-1(94)45, 9 June, 1994.

[682]  Ibid.; also see "North Atlantic Council Session of Defence Ministers," Press Communique, M-NAC-D-2(97), 149, Brussels, 2 December, 1997.

[683]  "The Denver Summit of the Eight," Communiquée, June 22, 1997.

[684]  For example, Savita Pante argues that the MTCR was actually not the cause of delays or termination of several BMs acquisition and development programmes in several countries. Instead, a number of other factors have been responsible for such programme problems, such as lack of finances, late arrival of the MTCR, lack of a wider MTCR membership, indigenous development, and others. See "MTCR and the Third World: Impact Assessment," Strategic Analysis, October 1993, pp. 838-50.

[685]  "Press Statement", Prime Minister's Office, New Delhi, 11 May 1998.

[686]  "Letter Dated 1 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the Text of a Statement Made by the Foreign Secretary on 30 May 1998 Following Pakistan's Nuclear Test That Day," Conference on Disarmament, CD/1519, 2 June 1998, p. 2.

[687]  "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of India Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the Text of the Paper Laid on the Table of both the Houses of Parliament of India Entitled 'Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy'," Conference on Disarmament, CD/1524, 2 June 1998, p. 5.

[688]  Quoted in "Statement of the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament", Permanent Mission of Pakistan, Geneva, 14 May 1998, p. 6.

[689]  See "PERM5 Joint Communique on India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis," Geneva, 4 June 1998.

[690]  "Press Statement", Prime Minister's Office, New Delhi, 11 May 1998.

[691]  "Letter dated 2 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the Text of Remarks Made by President Clinton on 28 and 30 May Concerning Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Testing, as well as the Text of a presidential Determination Regarding the Imposition of Sanctions on Pakistan," Conference on Disarmament, CD/1522, 2 June 1998, p. 2.

[692]  "Press Statement", News-Letter, Permanent Mission of India, Geneva, 5 June 1998, p. 1.

[693]  See, for example, discussions in "Interview with Marcio Barbosa," Director-General of the Brazilian Institute for Space Research, August 1990; Tollefson, op. cit., pp. 462-66; Rik Turner. "Brazil Says Missile Technology Controls Hamper Launch Industry," Defense News, 4, No. 30, 24 July 1989, p. 18.

[694]  "Interview with Marcio Barbosa," Director-General of the Brazilian Institute for Space Research, op. cit., p.5.

[695]  See, for example, Anthony, 'The Missile Technology Control Regime," Arms Export Regulations, 1991, op. cit., pp. 226-27; Tollefson, Brazilian Arms Transfers, 1991, op. cit., pp. 95-96; Bailey, "Can Missile Proliferation be Reversed?," Orbis, Winter 1991, pp.6-7.

[696]  For more details see Michael Wines, "U.S. Approves Export of Rocket Parts to Brazil Despite Link to Iraq," The New York Times, 7 September 1990, p. A8; Alan Friedman, "Iraq may Gain from US Exports to Brazil," Financial Times, 8--9 September, 1990, p.2; Andrew Lawler, "Brazil Chafes at Missile Curbs," Space News, Vol.2, No. 35, October 14--20, 1991, p. 1,20; Karp, op. cit., p.329.

[697]  Refer to Wines, op. cit., p. A8.

[698]  See Lawler, op. cit., p.1.

[699]  Loc. cit.

[700]  See a more detailed discussion in "dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites", by Gerald Steinberg, op. cit.

[701]  Ibid.

[702]  See"U.S. Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines," Daily Bulletin, 19 July, 1993, pp. 6-7.

[703]  Reported in Statesman, (New Delhi) 15 May, 1992 and Economic Times, (New Delhi), 18 May, 1992, quoted in "Effects of the Missile Technology Control regime and Multilateral politics of North-South Technology Transfer", Ravinder Pal Singh, Strategic Analysis, July 1992, p.300.

[704]  "U.S. Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines," op. cit., pp. 6-7; "U.S. Russia Discussed Rocket Engines for India," Daily Bulletin, 7 December, 1993, p. 8; also see a more detailed comment of American/Russian space cooperation in "Missile Technology Control Regime: An Extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime", K.D. Kapur, Foreign Affairs reports, Vol. XLII, Nos. 11 & 12, November-December 1993, p. 17-19.

[705]  "U.S. Russia Agree on MTCR Guidelines," op. cit, pp. 6-7.

[706]  See a discussion in "The Place of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in International Space Law, José Monserrat Filho, Space Policy, Vol 10, No. 3, August 1994; Monserrat Filho refers the reader to Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 july 1993, p. 27, and 6 September 1993, p. 22.

[707]  See "Boeing Fined Under Law on U.S. Secrets," International Herald Tribune, 2 October 1998, p. 2.

[708]  / See a discussion in "The Place of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in International Space Law," José Monserrat Filho, op. cit., pp. 223-29.

[709]  / See infra, Part III.

[710]  / 'General and Complete Disarmament,' Official Records of the General Assembly, A/RES/46/36, 3 January 1992, p. 19.

[711]  / See a detailed discussion in Monserrat Filho, op. cit., pp. 223-28.

[712]  / See a non-paper presented by the French Delegation to the Working Group of the PAROS Committee, March 1993. For more details on this proposal, see "CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Tracking: A General Overview of Existing Proposals," Laurence Beau, pp. 59-72; "Radar Tacking and Monitoring: Implications for CSBMs," Péricles Gasparini Alves and Fernand Alby, pp. 151-188; both in Building Confidence in Outer Space Activities: CSBMs and Earth-to-Space Monitoring, op. cit.

[713]  / See "Incentive Measures with Regard to the GCS Participating States Renouncing the Possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version; "Welcome Address by the Deputy Foreign Minister Russia, Mr G. Mamedov," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version; "Concept of the Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version.

[714]  / See a discussion in "The Missile Launch Transparency Regime as a Component of the GCS Concept," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version. Also see "Survey of Proposals on Issues of Control in the Missile Field, Put forward by Various States," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version and "Security Assurances for the GCS Participating States Renouncing the possession of Missile Delivery Systems for Weapons of Mass Destruction," International Meeting of GCS Experts, Moscow, 16 March 2000, unpublished version.

[715]  / See "Concept of the Global Control System for Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology," op. cit.

[716]  / Loc. cit.

[717]  / See "Russian-United States Memorandum of Agreement on Establishment of a Joint Centre for Early Warning Systems Data Exchange and Missile Launch Notifications," Public Papers of the President, 4 June 2000.

[718]  / "Russia-United States Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability," Public Papers of the President, 21 June 2000.

[719]  / See "Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly," A/55/33 A, December 2000.

[720]  / 1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defence, op. cit.

[721]  / Aabha Dixit, 'U.S. Should Extend Partnership for Peace to India, Pakistan,' Defense News, 28 February-6 March, 1994, p. 19.

[722]  / See, "For India, Disarmament or Equal Security", Jaswant Singh, International Herald Tribune, 5 August 1998.

[723]  / Ibid.

[724]  / Loc. cit.

[725]  / A number of States have argued these points, see for example "Statement by India to the Conference on Disarmament," Conference on Disarmament, CD/, 6 August 1998.

[726]  / See a discussion in UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons, op. cit.

[727]  / See, for example, a call to convene such an agreement in "Final Document: XII Non-Allied Movement Summit," Durbin, 29 August - 3 September, 1998, para. 119.

[728]  / 'U.S. Awaiting Inspection of Chinese Vessel', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 24, 1993, p. 5; 'U.S. to Advice Saudis Inspecting Chinese Ship', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, August 27, 1993, p. 3; 'U.S. Had Credible Reports About Chemicals on Chinese Ship', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, September 8, 1993, p. 2.

[729]  / 'Inspection of Chinese Ship in Saudi Port', Daily Bulletin, Geneva, United States Mission, September 3, 1993, p. 4; 'U.S. Had Credible Reports About Chemicals on Chinese Ship', op. cit., p. 2.

[730]  / "Decision on the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 1 of the Agenda entitled 'Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament'", Conference on Disarmament, CD/1547, 12 August 1998.

[731]  / For a more detailed description of this approach, see "Responses to Violations of Arms Control Agreements", Josef Goldblat and Péricles Gasparini Alves, op. cit., pp. 281-86

[732]  / Refer to A/CONF. 184/PC/L.1, p. 5.

[733]  / Ibid., p. 4.

[734]  / Ibid., p. 6.

[735]  / "Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly," A/51/123, 13 December 1996.

[736]  / "Final Document," Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, 1978, United Nations Publication, DPI/6708, February 1981, p. 10.