a) Definitions and international views of drug trafficking as a security issue

      The World Heath Organization defines the term "drug" as any substance with the potential to enhance physical or mental welfare and any chemical agent that alters the biochemical or physiological processes of tissues or organisms.  ¹²  If we consider this definition, there would be nothing wrong with the production, transportation, and distribution of all kind of drugs in the market as well as the generation of profits from these activities. However, the core of a cornucopia of political, social and individual health problems is that the use of certain drugs, such as cocaine and heroin, is terribly harmful for an individual's health and their production, transport, sale, and consumption have been forbidden by law or limited to medical and pharmaceutical uses. ¹³  This last fact has, among other factors, led to the rise of criminal organizations that produce and transport these drugs outside legally sanctioned channels.

      Strictly speaking, it is not the drugs (i.e. heroin or cocaine) that are illicit but their production, sale or use in particular circumstances in a given jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in 1961 establishes a framework for the provision of adequate supplies of drugs such as heroin and cocaine for medical and scientific purposes and of measures to prevent diversion into the illicit market. For this reason, within the scope of this dissertation, the terms "illicit drugs" and "controlled substances" will be used as synonyms.  ¹⁴ 

      The production, trade, and consumption of harmful drugs is not a new international concern; it is an old problem that began with the worldwide spread of opium consumption at the beginning of the 20^th century. Between 1912 and 1988, several worldwide treaties were signed with the goal of controlling the production of the increasing diversity and quantity of harmful drugs. ¹⁵  It was recognized in the framework of the UN that drug production and consumption had became a global health problem and a world order problem in the sense that no state could solve it by itself. In the 1960s and 1970s an international regime was set up in the framework of the UN in order to consolidate most of the earlier international agreements. In 1961, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was drafted with the goal of codifying all existing multilateral drug control treaties, including the cultivation of plants that were grown as raw material for the production of narcotic drugs. ¹⁶  The 1961 Convention also established or maintained certain monopolies for the production of drugs for medical and scientific purposes and introduced guarantees for the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts. ¹⁷ 

      The UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances was passed in 1971, following concern about the harmful effects of hallucinogens such as LSD and mescaline, stimulants such as amphetamines, and sedative-hypnotic drugs such as barbiturates. In view of the wide variety of substances and the risks arising from the abuse of these substances and their addictive properties, the necessary control measures were categorized in four separate "Schedules." These schedules were annexed to the Convention; parties to the Convention are obliged to abide by their restrictions. The World Health Organization (WHO) was designated as the agency responsible for deciding, on a medical basis, if a new substance should be included in the four schedules of illicit drugs. The criteria are:

A. "That the substance has the capacity to produce
- A state of dependence, and
- Central nervous system stimulation or depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor function or thinking or behavior or perception or mood;
B. That there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substance under international control..." ¹⁸ 

      If the issue of illicit drug abuse and illicit traffic is not new, what certainly is new, as put forth in the next section of this chapter, is the incorporation of the illicit drug trade in the mid-80s in the international security agenda and as a national security problem. It is true that the increasing consumption of illicit drugs represents a global problem, but consumption must be distinguished from the production, transportation, and distribution of these drugs and the generation of profits from these activities. The 1961 and 1971 conventions deal with the control of the licit drug trade and their goal is to prevent the diversion of controlled substances into illegal markets. ¹⁹  As the production, transportation, and distribution of illicit drugs became a serious global problem during the 80s, a set of instruments was developed in the UN framework in order to control the expansion of this activity.

"By the early 1970s, then the work begun with the Shanghai conference and the 1912 convention was largely brought to its culmination. The resulting system of estimates, statistics, authorizations, and controls has made diversion from licit international shipments extremely difficult. Legitimate trade has been rather effectively safeguarded, and trafficking for the purposes of drug abuse has been forces into patently illicit channels. The drug problem has nonetheless continued to intensify. An international drug control regime based primarily on controlling the production of and regulations of legal trade in dangerous drugs has proved valuable in safeguarding medical and scientific uses. It has increased the costs and difficulties of illegal trafficking. It also provides a firm basis for further forms of international cooperation. Alone, however, it is completely inadequate to the problem-in large part because of its conceptual narrowness." ²⁰ 

      The issue of illicit drug traffic is briefly addressed in very general terms in articles 34 (Action against the illicit traffic), 36 (Penal Provisions), and 37 (Seizure and confiscation) of the 1961 Convention, and articles 21 (Action against the illicit traffic) and 22 (Penal Provisions) of the 1971 Convention. In so doing, both conventions retain only the general principles stated in the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, the first international treaty to specifically address the issue of drug trafficking and the first to call for the severe punishment of illicit drug traffickers.

      The main goal of the 1936 convention was to establish equally severe penalties in all countries, to determine measures for extradition of traffickers who escaped from one country to another, and to promote the adoption by the parties of central offices for the supervision and coordination of measures to suppress the illicit trade. ²¹  However, for a variety of reasons, this convention was never fully implemented--in fact, it would be possible to say that the convention was "politically dead" since the convention came into force on October 26, 1939. The outbreak of the Second World War interrupted the normal process of ratification and the application of articles concerning international cooperation. Of the forty-two governments that participated in the conference for "the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs", only twenty-six signed the convention and only twenty-two states ratified this document. ²²  As stated by an analyst,

"vingt-deux Etats seulement ont ratifié le texte à la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale et la vingt-et- unième ratification, celle de l'Espagne a été acquise le 5 juin 1970, la vignt-deuxième, celle du Chili, le 21 novembre 1972, soit avec trente-quatre ans de retard. Les Etats-Unis, l'U.R.S.S. et la Grande Bretagne ne l'ont pas ratifé. De fait la convention de 1936 s'est révélée inacceptable pour un grand nombre d'Etats et seuls ses principes généraux ont été retenus dans la convention unique de 1961.La première contient 25 articles consacrés au traffic illicite, la seconde n'en contient que trois." ²³ 

      The development of a universally accepted legal framework that specifically addresses the issue of illicit drug trafficking would have to wait fifty-two more years and the issue would be raised in fact by the upsurge of the cocaine industry in South America. Beginning in the mid 1980s, both the major drug consumer (U.S.) and the major cocaine producers (the South American states, especially the Andean States of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia), have considered this criminal activity as a national security problem.

      In 1986, through a secret directive, President Reagan declared illicit drug traffic a national security issue and authorized the utilization of the armed forces in interdiction and eradication, and also the disruption or organized criminal activities. ²⁴  As reported by an analyst,

"The Third World also threatens American interest in ways that are not usually thought of in terms of security. As evidence by a secret presidential directive in 1986, the massive drug trafficking to the United States (most of which originates in the Third World) has become a national security threat. " ²⁵ 

      The stance was maintained under the Bush administration, which increased military involvement in drug interdiction activities, and, like its predecessor, supported and encouraged the involvement of South American Armed Forces in this type of activity. This view is evident in the following strategy statements put forth during the Bush administration:

"While most international threats are potential, the damage and violence caused by the drug trade are actual and pervasive. Drugs are a major threat to our national security." ²⁶ 

'Traffic in illicit drugs imposes exceptional costs on the economy of the United States, undermines our national values and institutions, and is directly responsible for the destruction and loss of many American lives. The international traffic in illicit drugs constitutes a major threat to our national security and to the security of other nations.' ²⁷ 

      President William Clinton's administration did not change this position. Though the bulk of the effort and budget was directed toward the control of domestic consumption, during that administration, the American government supported interdiction, militarization and eradication as the main component of supply control in South America. ²⁸ 

      Before continuing with the analysis it should be made clear that the author partially agrees with the position of Joseph Romm (who analyzes the non-military aspects of U.S. national security) on the following point: if there is a threat for the United States related to illicit drugs, this threat does not necessarily stem from the traffic of these drugs but from their consumption. ²⁹  Whereas growth in U.S. consumption of South American cocaine (and crack and, more recently, heroin) may pose a threat in the long-term to the integrity of the social fabric of that nation, it is the South American states that bear the brunt of the political, economic, social, environmental and military consequences of drug traffic. This is due to two factors. An obvious one is that drug production in all its stages is localized in South America. The second factor (and this will be fully explained in the rest of this chapter) is that the weak nature of the South American states makes them particularly susceptible to the adverse consequences of the illicit drug industry.

      It is drug consumption, which is generated by internal societal causes in the U.S., and not drug trafficking that poses a direct threat to the U.S. social fabric. Drug trafficking is, of course, part of the problem, but is not the cause of consumption in the U.S. As stated by Romm,

"Domestic drug consumption is a societal ill that is not usefully defined as a national security problem [and here is where we disagree]. International drug trafficking, insofar as it supports terrorism and threatens the stability of nations that Washington considers to be of strategic importance, does fall within the realm of traditional security problems, although is not one of the first rank such as nuclear proliferation or the stability in the Persian Gulf. Such a distinction is particularly justifiable since it appears that efforts to destroy or interdict drug supplies will not significantly affect drug use in this country (either because the efforts fail directly or because alternative supplies replace those that are squelched). Drug trafficking should not be seen as the cause of domestic drug consumption and its concomitant problems and, therefore, it should not be viewed as a significant threat to the nation's [the United States] security." ³⁰ 

      Two years before Reagan's secret directive, some South American countries declared drug trafficking a national security concern as these states were beginning to suffer an increasing political instability derived from cocaine trafficking. The governments of drug producer countries and their neighbors stated their concern in the Quito (1984)and New York (1984)declarations against illicit drug traffic. In both documents this illicit activity is defined as a threat to the state and as a crime against humanity. ³¹ 

"Whereas there is ample evidence that the traffic in narcotic drugs is closely linked to plans and activities aimed at subverting the legal order and social peace in our countries, for the furtherance of ignoble mercenary aims [...] Whereas it has been clearly demonstrated that the traffic in drugs is using means of corrupting the political and administrative structures of producer and consumer countries..." ³² 

"[s]ince it [drug trafficking] seriously affects people's lives, health and welfare, has negative impact on the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of democratic processes in Latin America..." ³³ 

      These declarations are significant because they were formulated without the direct influence of the United States. ³⁴  An international conference in the UN framework was also asked to deal with this problem.

"The special conference should consider declaring drug trafficking to be a crime against humanity, since it seriously affects people's lives, health and welfare, has a negative impact on the economic and social system and poses a danger to the stability of democratic processes in Latin America. " ³⁵ 

      The conference was held in Vienna in 1987. At that international meeting, illicit drug traffic was defined as threat to the stability, security, and sovereignty of the states.

"Aware of its effects on State's economic, social, political and cultural structures, and its threat to their sovereignty and security..." ³⁶ 

      The principal product of this conference was the elaboration of a Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control (CMO), which had a chapter (Chapter III) on policy recommendations for the suppression of drug trafficking. After that conference, the road was paved for the elaboration and signing of a convention on illicit drug traffic. In 1988 the United Nations convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries which led to the adoption by 106 states of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. ³⁷  As a matter of fact, the 1988 Convention attempts to give force to the recommendations of the CMO, which were formulated with the working draft of the Convention in mind. ³⁸  The 1988 Convention also refers to drug trafficking as a national security problem. As stated in its third paragraph, the parties to the Convention recognize,

"[t]he links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of states..." ³⁹ 

      The 1988 Convention is based on the 1961 and 1971 documents mentioned above, and "illicit traffic" is defined in the following terms:

"The production , manufacture ,extraction , preparation. offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961[...]or the 1971 Convention [...] the cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for the purpose of the production of narcotic drugs contrary to the provisions of the 1961 and the 1961 as amended [...]The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated above[...] The manufacture, transport or distribution of equipment, materials or substances [chemical essentials and precursors] knowing that they are to be used in or for the illicit cultivation, production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances; the organization, management or financing of any of the activities enumerated above. " ⁴⁰ 

      The conversion or transfer of property with knowledge that it is derived from any of the offenses mentioned in the preceding paragraph as well as public incitement to these activities, and aiding and abetting the commission of them are considered part of illicit drug trafficking.

      Through the 1990s in almost every UN document referring to the issue of drug trafficking, this activity is referred to as a security problem. Such is the case of the February 1990 Special Session of the General Assembly, whose main product was a Political Declaration and a Global Plan of Action. ⁴¹  This global plan of action was stated in order to coordinate both the reduction of demand in the consumer states and the decrease of illicit drug production. ⁴² 

"The session dealt with tightening legal and practical cooperation among member states. The urgency highlighted by Colombia's mortal struggle with its drug barons..." ⁴³ 

"In the spectrum of international action plans, The Global Programme of Action represents the most comprehensive statement of the action that needs to be taken by individual countries and collectively through the system of international organizations. It provides a framework and guidelines to the international community." ⁴⁴ 

      A new United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the drug problem was celebrated in New York from 8 to 10 June 1998, for the 10th anniversary of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. ⁴⁵  This conference resulted in a Political Declaration and a Resolution to reassess, update, strengthen and follow-up the commitments and strategies adopted in 1990 and set guidelines for the multilateral efforts in the next century. As its predecessor, this political declaration also defines the "drug problem" as

"[a] grave threat to the health and well-being of all mankind, the independence of States, democracy, the stability of nations, the structure of all societies, and the dignity and hope of millions of people and their families." ⁴⁶ 

      At the same time, in resolution S-20/4 the General Assembly recommended a series of international strategies that comprise an "Action plan against illicit manufacture, trafficking and abuse of amphetamine-type stimulants and their precursors," "Measures to promote judicial cooperation" "Countering money laundering," and an "Action plan on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug crops and on alternative development." The principle of shared responsibility on drugs was clearly reflected in the agenda of the UNGASS. The suggested strategies emphasized a balanced approach between supply and demand and the responsibility of the developed world to reduce drug use, control supplies of chemical inputs, and tackle money laundering. The organization and results of the 1998 UNGASS far exceeds the historical period covered by this dissertation and therefore they will not be analyzed here. However a critical review of some of the suggested strategies and approaches will be discussed in the last two chapters of this work, which deal with multilateral drug trafficking control policies.

      The UN conventions have been defined earlier in this chapter as part of an international drug control regime. Although this is not a dissertation on regional or global drug control regimes, for the sake of clarity in the use of terms, it is necessary to briefly define the use of the term "regime" within the context of this dissertation. As stated by Jack Donnelly, who wrote on the issue of the United Nations global drug control regime,

"An international regime exists when states and other relevant international actors, in order to avoid the costs of uncoordinated national action, agree (more or less explicitly) on normative or procedural constraints on their sovereign freedom of action in an issue area -and (at least in part) conform to these norms or procedures. Regime norms may range from binding international standards that are generally accepted to international guidelines that are commended in word but rarely heeded in deed."  ⁴⁷ 

      The strength of a regime depends, according to Donnelly, on the extent of its decision-making powers, that is, the range of activities available to relevant international institutions. In this sense regimes may range from full international decision-making bodies with the power to enforce rules, to procedures that amount to little more than international verbal encouragement of sovereign national action. ⁴⁸  Donnelly then elaborated five types of regimes according to their strength (in ascending order where promotion is the weaker and enforcement is the stronger):

" * Promotion: encouraging national implementation of international norms by such mechanisms as public information activities and the adoption of hortatory resolutions.
* Assistance: providing support for national implementation of international norms, typically through financial or technical assistance.
* Implementation: playing a direct international role in putting regime norms into practice-for example, through systems of international information exchange, policy consultation or coordination, or (unenforceable) international monitoring of national compliance with regime norms into practice -for example, through systems of international information exchange, policy consultation or coordination, or (unenforceable) international monitoring of national compliance with regime norms or recommended policies.
* Enforcement: binding an enforceable international implementation of regime norms in which the principal role of states is to give national force to supranational decisions."

      For completeness I should add a fifth type, declaratory regimes, which involve international norms but have no international decision making powers [actually from a weak to strong order this one should figure at the top of the list]." ⁴⁹ 

      Strictly speaking, whereas the 1961 and 1971 conventions can be considered a strong "implementation regime" for the regulation of only the licit trade of dangerous drugs, the 1988 Convention could be considered to be a weak "declaratory regime" for the control of illicit drug trafficking.

      In fact as stated in its article 4, the central principle of the 1961 Single Convention (and of the 1971 Convention, which is explicitly intended to be implemented in conjunction with the 1961 Convention) is the obligation "to limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade in, use, and possession of drugs." As is very well described by an analyst this regime is,

"[s]upervised by the International Narcotics Control Board [INCB, created by the 1961 Convention]. Each party is required to submit estimates of legitimate (medical and scientific) needs for narcotics in a standardized form. In addition, parties must provide standardized statistical returns on actual annual production or manufacture, consumption, imports, exports, seizures and stocks. Each party is then limited to the estimated amount in its manufacture and net import of drugs. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is given extensive supervisory powers over this system of binding estimates and statistical returns. The board may make estimates for parties or non-parties that fail to report. It may even challenge estimates provided by governments. If the INCB is not satisfied with the performance of any government- whether or not it is party to the convention- it may initiate consultations, call upon that government to adopt remedial measures, bring the problem to the attention of the international community, or even recommend that parties stop trading in drugs with the country in question. Furthermore, if statistical returns reveal that estimated needs have been exceeded, the board may require parties to the convention to halt further exports to that country." ⁵⁰ 

"Il [the INCB] peut demander des explications à un gouvernement. Il gère les mouvements licites de drogues en limitant les cultures, la production, la fabrication et l'usage des drogues aux besoins médicaux. Il peut demander des explications à un gouvernment en cas de violation de la convention et recommander aux États de cesser toute transaction commerciale de drogue avec les pays défaillants. Il ne l'a jamais fait, mais comme dans d'autres domaines, la seule menace d'une telle recommandation consiste un bon moyen de pression. Il peut également proposer une assistance technique et financière aux pays en difficulté dans l'application des conventions" ⁵¹ 

      On the other hand the 1988 Convention is only a "declaratory" regime in the sense that it involves international norms (the Convention itself) but does not establish decision-making powers. Although (as it will be shown later) the United States apparently would like to play this role de facto in the Western Hemisphere, there is not an equivalent of the INCB that can monitor the implementation of the 1988 Convention. States that ratified the 1988 Convention are bound to adopt it as part of their national legislation, however the convention does not establish an international or a supranational body capable of monitoring or enforcing its terms. As noted by Mario Bettati, the 1988 Convention was built upon strict reading of the principle of respecting the territorial integrity of the states and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the states.

"La convention de 1988 a pour objet de doter la communauté internatioanle de moyens répressifs efficaces. Mais il lui fallait aussi respecter l'integrité territoriale des États et le principe de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de ces derniers. C'est donc sur le respect de ces principes que la convention organise la répression, aussi bien dans la phase de déclenchement des poursuites que dans celle de la sanction" ⁵² 

      The declaratory character of the UN illicit drug traffic control regime has been very accurately described by an analyst who said that,

"the norms of the regime are coherent, well developed, and widely commended by state and non-state actors alike. However, implementation of the norm that trafficking must be controlled has remained the responsibility of national and not international actors. In as much as governments are beginning co-operate in the exchange of information on trafficking, the declaratory regime may be evolving into a promotional regime." ⁵³ 

      If we stick to the definitions given above, the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action of 1990 and the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) (which will be fully discussed in chapter VIII), could be defined as part of an assistance and promotional regime since they " encourage[s] the implementation of international norms by mechanisms such as public information activities," and (especially in the case of UNDCP) provide technical and financial support for the implementation of international norms (particularly the implementation of the 1988 Convention).  ⁵⁴  If we examine the 1988 Convention, the Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action, and UNDCP together, we come to the conclusion that from 1991 on (when UNDCP was created), the United Nations illicit drug traffic global control regime has evolved into an assistance regime.

      Let us return to the issue of defining drug trafficking and illicit drugs. Only the effects of illicit trafficking of cocaine will be considered in this dissertation because of the threat that it generated for the security of the South American states, mainly through the development of transnational criminal organizations. To a lesser extent this work also discusses the rise in heroin trafficking because of the slow diversification of the Colombian traffickers in the production of this drug in the last six years, due to a saturation of the North American cocaine market and an increase in the demand of heroin in the U.S. ⁵⁵  As explained by academic and law enforcement analysts,

"Moreover, in recognition of the fact that the U.S. cocaine market is approaching its saturation point, Colombian traffickers developed an alternative source of income heroin production."  ⁵⁶ 

"Over the past several decades the appeal of heroin was largely held in check. Two factors stigmatized heroin and limited its popularity. First, due to the low purity of heroin available at the retail level, the only effective method of administration was through injection, a method that most drugs users found unpalatable. Secondly, an increased awareness of the AIDS virus developed in the 1980s, many drug users chose to abuse cocaine, crack, and most recently, metamphetamine rather than risk contracting the virus through shared heroin needles. Heroin was also pushed from the spotlight of public concern by the emergence of cocaine in the late 1970s and crack cocaine in the mid-1980s. [...] Current estimates of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) place the hardcore heroin user population in the 600,000-800,000 range. The total heroin user population (including those who use heroin for "recreational" purposes) is now estimated at 2 million. Last year alone, there were 141,000 new heroin users, most of who were under the age of twenty-six. [...] Today, the rapid increase in heroin's popularity is being generated in part, by the purity of the supply. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the average purity of heroin at the retail level averaged between 2% and 7%. According to the Domestic Monitor Program, the average purity for retail heroin in 1997 was 38.4% , over 5 times higher than it was just a decade ago. In fact, it is not unusual to find 80% pure heroin in some East Coast cities. At this purity level, heroin can be administered effectively through several methods, including smoking -called 'Chasing the Dragon'- and snorting heroin like cocaine. These methods of ingestion are preferred by first time and causal users who find injecting heroin unglamorous and who want to avoid sharing dirty needles. However, as drug users gain tolerance, addicted snorters and smokers are forced to turn to injection which quickly leads to hard core addiction [....] In 1996, the annual number of heroin-related emergency room mentions increased from 34,000 in 1990 to 70, 500. The Cornell University Hospital reports the number of middle class people requesting treatment for heroin addiction has increased tenfold since 1994." ⁵⁷ 

      In South America, however, production of opium poppy (the raw material) and heroin is localized in Colombia, and has not resulted in the rise of a vertically integrated transnational industry as has happened in the case of cocaine trafficking. ⁵⁸ 

"Today, the U.S. is seeing increased heroin availability from South America and Mexico. According to the 1995 results of DEA's Heroin Signature Program (HSP). South America was, for the first time, the predominant source area for heroin seized in the United States. It accounted for 62% of the total heroin analyzed. Recently released results for 1996 show that heroin produced in Colombia represent 52% of the heroin seized and analyzed in the United States, a significant increase over the market share previously controlled by Colombian traffickers. In the 1980s, while Colombian drug syndicates focused on cocaine trafficking, Southeast Asia heroin dominated the American market. To compensate for their late entry into the heroin trade and to establish themselves in the marketplace, Colombian traffickers provided high quality heroin (80-99% pure) to a fiercely competitive U.S. market. To entice customers further, they offered their product at cut-rate prices.[....] At this time, virtually all the heroin emanating from South America is grown and manufactured in Colombia. Opium poppies are grown in the higher altitudes of the central Andean mountain ranges [...] Since 1994, the Colombian National Police has dismantled 38 heroin laboratories. The CNP has also seized 26 kilograms of heroin/morphine base and 120 kilograms of opium gum from heroin laboratories last year. U.S. estimates placed Colombia's heroin production at approximately 6 metric tons in 1997" ⁵⁹ 

      Opium poppy is mainly grown at high altitudes (between 600 and 3,000 meters) in the departments of Tolima, Huila and Cauca. ⁶⁰  Some opium cultivation has been detected in the Perijá Highlands in the border with Venezuela. ⁶¹  The whole process of production, from the extraction of the opium gum from the poppy to the refinement and transport of heroine, is controlled by criminal groups that belong to the Cali cartel, a criminal coalition based in the Cauca river valley, close to the areas of poppy production. The main heroin trafficking organization is believed to be the North of Valley Cartel, which has become more independent and powerful after the arrest of the main leaders of the Cali coalition in 1995. ⁶²  As explained by two analysts,

"At least four Cali organizations currently refine or distribute heroin. The traffickers finance the cultivation of the opium poppy , disseminate the technology for producing morphine base to the farm level, refine the base into heroin, and distribute the drug though their cocaine sales networks in the United States." ⁶³ 

      In any case, the production of cocaine remains the main activity of the so-called Colombian cartels as well as the Bolivian, Peruvian, and Brazilian traffickers who have developed consolidated markets in the U.S. and Europe. ⁶⁴  The reason this dissertation only focus on these two drugs is that, as noted by an analyst,

"[c]ocaine and heroin [...] are more harmful than marijuana and more widely used than designer drugs. Drug trafficking is a transnational phenomenon. While TDC [transnational drug cartels] are nationally based (as with the Medellín 'Cartel' in Colombia),their operations involve transactions that regularly flow across national boundaries. These include the production, processing, transportation and distribution of drugs, and the laundering of the profits derived from this activity " ⁶⁵ 

      The production of marijuana is also common across South America, but it has not resulted in the same type of criminal organization accompanied by the same corrupting and destabilizing power as the coca/cocaine complex. Moreover, it does not play the same role in shaping the pattern of inter-American relations in terms of the involvement of the United States as an extra-regional actor. As another analyst notes,

"Marijuana traffickers are the least globally organized (even though marijuana is more widely used) which coincidentally, is associated with marijuana's world-wide production geography ('anybody can grow it') and with what looks to be marijuana traffickers relatively reduced power against and threat to societies that have criminalized their work." ⁶⁶ 

      Before analyzing the effects of illicit drug trafficking on the security of the South American region, the main features of both cocaine and heroin should be defined and described. As the coca-cocaine complex is the illegal activity with the most important dimensions in terms of the security of the countries in the region, illicit drug traffic, drug trafficking, and the cocaine industry will be used as synonymous terms here. Heroin trafficking will be considered a "commercial" diversification of cocaine trafficking organizations that respond, as stated before, to a recent rise in the demand for this drug in the United States.

b) Coca and Cocaine (and Crack and Bazuco):

"...I will read a paragraph from a true representative of the national folklore, 'Cuchi' Leguizamón, this paragraph is extracted from a interview made by a Buenos Aires journal: 'We have to clarify that coca chewing is a wise [Northwestern] Argentine tradition and we have to differentiate it from cocaine consumption. Whereas coca leaf is part of the cultural and scientific patrimony of our America, cocaine is a flaw that hurts humankind and therefore must be combated with maximum rigor. [...] How can you compare [coca with cocaine] ? It makes me laugh. It is like calling 'drunk' someone that eats grapes.' " ⁶⁷ 

      Cocaine, or cocaine hydrochloride (CHCL), is a psychoactive alkaloid processed from the leaves of the coca shrub. Coca leaves have been chewed by the Andean population for centuries to help combat hunger and to overcome fatigue and exhaustion caused by the high altitude, as well as for traditional and religious practices. The use of coca is deeply embedded in the culture of the Andean countries. ⁶⁸  The practice is particularly widespread Bolivia and Peru where Indian groups comprise a far larger percentage of the total population than in Colombia. There is no evidence that coca chewing results in the development of tolerance, physiological dependence, or any acute or chronic harmful effects. As pointed out by an analyst,

"The coca leaf has played an important role in the lives of South American Indians for thousands of years. Its use as a masticatory persist today in many parts of the Andes, from northern Colombia, south to Bolivia and Argentina, and in the western part of the Amazon Basin. Coca leaf is used as a mild stimulant and as sustenance for working under harsh environmental conditions by both Indians and mestizos alike. It also serves as a universal and effective household remedy for a wide range of medical complaints. Traditionally, coca also plays a crucial symbolic and religious role in Andean society. The unifying and stabilizing effects of coca chewing on Andean culture contrast markedly with the disruptive and convoluted phenomenon of cocaine use in Western societies [....]The widespread intranasal use of cocaine hydrochloride or smoking of cocaine base produce quite different psychological and pharmacological experiences than the traditional chewing of coca leaves [....] There is no evidence that coca chewing results in tolerance or physiological dependence, or any acute or chronic deleterious effects. [...]Even though cocaine is the principal and most powerful constituent of coca leaves, the complex effects of chewing the leaves cannot be equated with the comparatively straightforward effects of cocaine. Whether in the high Andean Altiplano (high plateau region) or in the Amazonian lowlands, the principal use of coca is for work. Workers will take several breaks during the daily work schedule to rest and chew coca, not unlike the coffee break of Western society. Coca chewers maintain that coca gives them more vigor and strength and assuages feelings of hunger, thirst, cold and fatigue. Coca is chewed by rural people in all kinds of professions that require physical work, especially by farmers, herders and miners in the highlands and by farmers, fishermen and hunters in the lowlands. Coca is especially highly regarded for making long journeys on foot whether in the high Andes or Amazonian forests." ⁶⁹ 

      Leaving the physiological effects of coca aside, it is necessary to understand that in Andean societies, and particularly in Indian communities, this plant plays a cultural role similar to the one played by coffee, tea, or wine in western societies. ⁷⁰  In Andean communities coca plays a central role in marriages, funerals and baptisms. ⁷¹  Coca is also a powerful symbol of ethnic identity as stated by Alejandro Camino:

"This integration of the individual with his [her] family, his community, his [her] culture and his [her] and his [her] sacred [mystical] environment through the use of coca turns this plant into a true symbol of ethnic identity. Using coca leaves is a synonym of participating in the Andean culture [...] its use according to the established [social] rules consecrates the Andean cultural character which differentiates the Indian from the non-Indian..." ⁷² 

      In Argentina, for example, where with the exception of the northwest region (especially the provinces of Jujuy and Salta) there is not a widespread Andean Indian population and culture, coca use is a very strong symbol of local identity of that region vis-à-vis the rest of the country, especially Buenos Aires. Chewing coca is, then, symbolic of being a norteño (northerner) as opposed to the Europeanized and cosmopolitan resident of the capital city. ⁷³ 

      Coca is a perennial shrub with several subspecies. Two loosely related South American species of coca (Erythroxylum coca and Erythoxylum novogranatense) and varieties of these species are the primary sources of cocaine. Coca is cultivated in the Andean countries of South America, generally at an elevation below 2,000 meters. After planting, the bush grows 12 to 18 months before the first crop of leaves can be picked, and 3 to 4 years before full production is reached, when the bush is 3 to 5 feet high. The bush has a short flowering and fruiting period (the plant can be harvested from three to six times per year) and produces for 10 to 25 years depending on the level of care it receives. The potency of coca leaves with respect to cocaine content also depends on the variety of the plant and on the growing site. ⁷⁴  Table 1 below provides information about the main features of the species (and their varieties) of coca grown in South America.

      

Table 1. Species and varieties of coca 75
Species	Varieties	Main features
Erythroxylum coca	E.coca var. coca (Bolivian or Huanuco coca)	* Source of most of the world's cocaine. *Believed to be the ancestral taxon of all cultivated coca. *Cultivated and found in the wild. *Restricted already to narrow zone of moist tropical forest located in the foothills of the Oriental Peruvian and Bolivian Andes. * Little known outside South America.
	E.coca var. Ipadú (Amazonian coca)	* Restricted to western Amazon, and geographically isolated from other coca varieties. * Cultivated for its leaves by a few isolated Indian tribes of Brazil, Peru and Colombia. *Cultivated only, unknown in the wild. * Probably a recent derivative of E. coca var. coca; the two varieties share morphological characteristics.
Erythroxylum novogranatense	E. novogranatense var. novogranatense (Colombian coca)	* Found as a plantation crop only in Colombia, where it is cultivated in drier mountain areas by a few isolated Indian tribes that harvest the leaves for chewing. *Tolerant of diverse ecological conditions. * Figured prominently in world horticultural trades in the early 20th century, and continues to be grown in many tropical countries as an ornamental plant.
	E. novogranatense var.truxillense (Trujillo coca)	* Grows today only in the river valleys of the north coast of Peru and in the arid upper Río Marañon valley. * Leaves are highly prized by chewers for their excellent flavor. * Due to difficulties of extracting and crystallizing pure cocaine, it is a minor contributor to the illicit drug market. *Trujillo coca is used primarily in the manufacture of de-cocainized extracts for soft drink flavoring.

Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region, 1993, pp.28-32

      The main active ingredient of the coca leaf is the alkaloid cocaine, which may be extracted from its leaves by a chemical process. ⁷⁶ 

"Coca leaves on average contain about 1 percent cocaine, but typical values range between 1.02 percent for E.novogranatense var. truxillense, and 0.11 to 0.41 percent for Amazonian coca (E.coca var. ipadu). Average values for E. coca. var. coca and E. novogratatense var. novogranatense are intermediary (0.23 to 0.93 percent). The potency of coca leaves with respect to cocaine content also depends on the plant's growing site. The E. coca var. coca leaves with the greatest cocaine content were found in Chinchao, in Huánuco, Peru, among the highest elevations where coca is grown. Plants grown in the montañas [high jungle region of the Andean slopes and foothills] generally are thought to produce more potent leaves than plants at lower altitudes" ⁷⁷ 

      Cocaine is a powerful central nervous system stimulant used non-medically to produce euphoria or wakefulness; the repeated use of this drug produces dependence. ⁷⁸  As explained by an analyst,

"Unlike heroin, cocaine is not physically addicting. That is, people who cease use do not suffer withdrawal symptoms such as 'the shakes, nausea, and other physical symptoms that occur in heroin addicts when the level of heroin in their bloodstream falls below a threshold level. Despite the fact that cocaine is not physically addictive, it has addictive characteristics. Higher doses of the drug will yield increased mood-altering effects, and thus, while cocaine does not produce physical dependence akin to heroin, the high the drug produces encourages pursuit of more intense intoxication, thereby producing a form of psychological addiction." ⁷⁹ 

      The drug is sold as a white, translucent, crystalline flakes or powder frequently adulterated with various sugars or local anesthetics. The powder (cocaine hydrochloride) is sniffed and produces effects within 1-3 minutes that last for about 30 minutes. Cocaine can be also be ingested orally, often with alcohol, and it is also injected intravenously. ⁸⁰  Another form of consuming cocaine is by "freebasing" it. This process refers to increasing the potency of cocaine by extracting pure cocaine alkaloid (the free base). Cocaine salt is heated together with baking soda and the vapors are inhaled through a water pipe. This form of cocaine consumption is commonly known as "smoking crack."

      Cocaine can induce euphoric excitement and hallucinatory experiences. It creates a feeling of great muscular strength, mental clarity and a sense of being "superpowerful." The effects of the drug rapidly dissipate once the drug enters the body and this usually induces a desire for repeated administration at shorter and shorter intervals, which can turn the life of a user into a constant and expensive search for cocaine. Studies have shown that laboratory animals will time after time select cocaine over their favorite food, until they eventually die of an overdose or starve. ⁸¹  As observed by an analyst,

"Cocaine's addictive potential is in part the result of its effects on the neurochemistry of the brain. Recent laboratory research has established that cocaine acts directly on the so-called reward pathways. These pathways are indirectly activated by pleasurable stimuli from other activities, including eating, drinking, and sex. So powerful is the direct stimulation provided by cocaine that sleep, safety, money, morality, loved ones, responsibility, even survival become largely irrelevant to the cocaine user. In a sense, cocaine 'short circuits' the process by which people normally achieve gratification and security" ⁸² 

      The likelihood that a person will become addicted to cocaine largely depends on the method, frequency, and duration that a person uses the cocaine. Medical studies have demonstrated that cocaine is more addictive when it is smoked.

"The effects of the drug come on very quickly; only 8 to 10 seconds pass before the user experiences the high. The peak concentration of the drug in the brain also occurs more rapidly when smoked, resulting in greater behavioral effects for a shorter period of time. Also contributing to the reinforcing and addiction potential of crack is the fact that the effects of the drug last only 8 to 10 minutes. After the high is over, the crack user feels anxious, depressed, and paranoid. Such a rapid shift between positive and negative effects of the drug make users crave another "hit" of the drug to restore the euphoria they felt just moments before" ⁸³ 

      Another form of abuse is to smoke the coca paste, which is the product of the first step in the process of extracting cocaine from coca leaves. Coca paste contains 50-90 % sulfate and toxic impurities such as kerosene and sulfuric acid. The consumption of coca paste is widespread in South America where it is smoked with tobacco, marijuana or alone. The mix of coca paste and marijuana and/or tobacco is known as bazuco. ⁸⁴ 

      Bazuco is a highly toxic mix that generates a very strong dependency. According to a study of the World Health Organization, most of the coca paste abusers end up being compulsive abusers of the drug. ⁸⁵  As pointed out by an analyst, bazuco abusers,

"[l]ose interest in work, friendships, recreation, sports, sex, family and conjugal relationships. At this point their overriding concern becomes the smoking of coca paste as frequently and intensively as possible." ⁸⁶ 

      The following table describes the sought-after effects and the short and long-term effects of cocaine consumption:

      

Table 2. Pharmacological effects of cocaine abuse
Sought-after effects	* feelings of physical and mental well being, exhilaration, euphoria * increased alertness and energy * postponement of hunger and fatigue
Short-term effects	* loss of appetite * faster breathing, increased heart rate and blood pressure, increased body temperature, sweating * dilation of pupils * bizarre, erratic, sometimes violent behavior * with larger doses: hallucinations, talkativeness, sense of power and superiority, restlessness, hyperirritability, irritability which can lead to panic and paranoid psychosis (disappears if discontinued) * excessive doses may lead to convulsions, seizures, stroke, cerebral hemorrhage or heart failure
Long-term effects	* destruction of tissues in nose if sniffed * respiratory problems if smoked * infectious diseases, abscesses, if injected * disorientation, apathy, confused exhaustion due to lack of sleep * development of tolerance (*) * strong psychological dependence [there is no scientific evidence of physical dependence] (**) * the use of the drug during pregnancy may provoke malformations in the fetus and health problems in the newborn child * with continued use a state similar to paranoid psychosis may develop * after stopping, there usually follows a long period of sleep and then depression; during the crash, death from respiratory failure may occur

Source: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology and Information on Drugs [on-line], available internet, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs/coca-3.htm; E. Paroli, Clinical effects associated with cocaine use, in Bruno Francesco (ed.) Cocaine Today: Its effects on the Individual and Society, Rome, UNICRI, 1991, pp. 73-75 y Gold, M.S. Cocaine (and Crack), in Bruno, op.cit., pp.79-85

      Since the late 1970s, by far the highest consumption in the cocaine/crack market is in the United States. Nevertheless, the number of cocaine users appears to be declining in the United States (which is still, however, cocaine's principal market). ⁸⁷  This decrease may be due to a natural saturation and oversupply of the American market, which was reflected in a decrease in the quality (purity degree) of cocaine. ⁸⁸  To a lesser extent, interdiction measures (interception of shipments, antidrug laws, seizures) may also have contributed to a decrease in the level of consumption.

      As reported by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC),

"The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse for 1992, the latest survey, showed that the number of past-year and past month users of cocaine has decreased significantly since the peak year of 1985. During 1992, nearly 5 million Americans ( 12 years of age and older were reported to have used cocaine in the past year compared to 12.2 million in 1985. Nevertheless frequent or more intense use of cocaine has not shown a statistically significant change during the past several years. Among the 5 million people who used cocaine in the past year, 642.000 used it once a week or more in 1992 compared to 625.000 in 1991 and in 1990..." ⁸⁹ 

"Results for 1995 show that, while cocaine use has declined over the past decade, the rate of use has stabilized at high levels. These rates are driven largely by 'crack' cocaine use, which has reached the saturation point in large urban areas throughout the country" ⁹⁰ 

c) Heroin ⁹¹ 

      Opium, the raw material from the elaboration of heroin, is extracted from the poppy plant (Papaver somniferum) with origins in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The poppy plant can be grown in altitudes ranging from 500 to 2,000 and is very adaptable to temperature changes (frosts). The plant is not indigenous to the South American region, nor does it have any traditional or cultural use there. Colombian drug traffickers imported seeds of the poppy plant in the early 1990s from Southeast Asia. The traffickers distributed the seeds (along with money) to the peasant communities of the Colombian western Andes, who started growing the plant with the sole purpose of extracting opium for heroin production. ⁹²  In that sense, the Colombian traffickers are competing with the ethnic Chinese organized crime, which in the 1980s controlled the traffic of heroin from Southeast Asia towards the United States. ⁹³ 

      The main active ingredient of opium is morphine. This alkaloid can be extracted either from opium or directly from poppy straw. Morphine produces a physical dependence that develops quickly and increases in intensity with increased dosage. When the body's supply of morphine is withheld, withdrawal symptoms occur within a few hours. Moreover, the drug produces a rapid tolerance level, a desensitization that requires increasing dosages to achieve the desired effect. Increased dosages produce a greater physical and psychological dependence, resulting in addiction. Heroin (diacetylmorphine) is obtained from morphine by a simple chemical process. ⁹⁴  Heroin produces a very strong dependency.

      The table below summarizes the main short and long term effects of opioid drugs (opium, morphine and heroin - the latter is up to 10 times more potent than morphine):

      

Table 3. Pharmacological effects of heroin abuse
Sought after effects	* sense of well being by reducing tension, anxiety and depression; euphoria, in large doses
Short-term effects	*sometimes nausea and vomiting * constricted pupils * drowsiness, inability to concentrate, apathy, lessened physical activity * acute overdose can result in death due to respiratory depression
Long-term effects	* rapid development of tolerance and physical and psychological dependence * constipation * menstrual irregularity *infectious diseases, abscesses if injected *damage of structures in nose if sniffed/snorted * respiratory problems, if smoked * decreased appetite leading to malnutrition, weight loss * chronic sedation, apathy leading to self-neglect *abrupt withdrawal results in moderate to severe withdrawal syndrome which is generally comparable to a bout of influenza (with cramps, diarrhea, running nose, tremors, panic, chills, and sweating, etc.)

Source: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology and Information on Drugs [on-line], available internet, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs

      According to a report prepared by ECOSOC´s Commission on Narcotic Drugs, global illicit drug use clearly increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and this upward trend is likely to continue for some time yet. ⁹⁵  This kind of conclusion is based on the observation of various indicators such as emergency room visits, substance abuse related mortality cases, arrests of drug abusers and number of countries reporting rising consumption levels. ⁹⁶  These trends are illustrated by Graphic 1 and table 4 below.

      

Graphic 1. Global development of substance-abuse-related mortality in the early 1990s (officially reported *)

Source: E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking: An Interim Report p.30 and UNDCP, the World Drug Report, p.31

      (*)Because of the lack of adequate reporting in a large number of countries, there is bias towards under representation in those figures. The World Health Organization estimates is 200,000 deaths a year in the drug injecting population (heroin and other opiates are commonly injected and cocaine can also be abused intravenously).

      The United Nations Drug Control Program estimates that heroin is the leading drug responsible for substance abuse related mortality and emergency room episodes.

      

Table 4. Estimated number of drug abusers (annual prevalence)* in the 1990s-WORLD
Drug	Estimated total (million people)	in % of total population
Heroin and other opiate-type substances***	8.0	0.14%
Cocaine **	13.3	0.23%
Cannabis**	141.2	2.45%
Hallucinogens***	25.5	0.44%
Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS)***	30.2	0.52%
Sedative-type substances***	227.4	3.92%
*Annual prevalence means that consumption has taken place at least once within the last twelve months before a survey. **Conservative estimates; results obtained through information from UNDCP's annual reports questionnaires; UNDCP mission reports; UNDCP annual field reports; UNDCP Country Programme Frameworks; data compiled in UNDCP's country profiles; data compiled by WHO; data compiled by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and the United States Department of State, complemented by UNDCP estimates. ***Estimates obtained through extrapolation of average prevalence rates obtained from a sample of countries (replies to UNDCP's annual reports questionnaire) representing, respectively, 21% (ATS; sedative type substances) and 11% (hallucinogens) of the world population. The application of the same methodology to cannabis (sample of countries representing 27% of global population) and cocaine (sample representing 21% of the world population) would increase the total estimate of cannabis users to 180 million and of cocaine users to 30 million. Such high numbers of cannabis consumers -given a frequent bias towards underreporting- is possible; given strong regional differences in the levels of abuse of cocaine, particularly the very low levels in Asia, the estimated total number of cocaine abusers resulting from simple extrapolation, however, is likely to be too high. While estimates for hallucinogens and ATS are reasonable, the extrapolated estimate for sedative-type substances (given the sample of countries providing figures) is likely to be on the high side.

Source: UNDCP, The World Drug Report, p.32

      The largest single consumer in the world is the United States with some 12.8 million-drug abusers (those who have consumed drugs at least once in the last month) out of a total population of 260 million. ⁹⁷  Europe follows in second place. ⁹⁸  Even the reported rise in heroin consumption in the United States since 1992/93 will not change this distribution substantially. The abuse of cocaine (and crack) in the United States is much more common than in Europe, it is the most widely abused illicit plant-based drug after cannabis. ⁹⁹  Heroin abuse seems to be marginally higher in Europe than in the United States. ¹⁰⁰  Since the late 80's cocaine consumption in Europe has grown steadily. ¹⁰¹  This was pointed out by the Declaration of the World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, held in London form 9 to 11 April 1990 which noted that:

"[t]he sharply rising trend in seizures of cocaine by law enforcement authorities, not only in Western European Countries but in may other countries also, which suggest that determined efforts are being made by ruthless criminal organizations to develop new markets for cocaine to add to the continuing problem of heroin and other drugs." ¹⁰² 

      The spread of social consumption of illicit drugs is directly related to a rise in criminal activity in big cities, either because of gang wars for the control areas of distribution or just because drug users literally will do anything to obtain enough drugs to satisfy a habit. In the United States, for example, almost 60 per cent of all federal prisoners in 1992 were drug offenders. Another study found that almost 50 per cent of the total value of theft in 1993 in England and Wales was drug-related.  ¹⁰³ 

      The next session will provide a definition of national security and will explain why and how can drug trafficking became a national security problem.

a) National Security

      The illicit drug trade is part of a market. The core of the problem is that production and trade of the product, as well as the industry behind its supply, is illegal. Therefore, this economic activity is driven by criminal organizations. ¹⁰⁶  In the period under study the industry was vertically integrated and composed of firms, labor, raw materials, and intermediate goods. As it is an illegal market, the firms were transnational criminal organizations such as the so-called Medellín and Cali "cartels," mainly based in Colombia, although from the early and mid 1990s on the Bolivian and Peruvian organizations have managed their own production of cocaine without being subordinated to the Colombian organizations. ¹⁰⁷  At the same time, there are also independent groups in Brazil that receive managerial support and advice from Colombian traffickers. These organizations buy raw material (coca leaf) from the coca growing peasants, hire labor (the Peruvian and Bolivian peasants, chemist, pilots, bodyguards etc.) who participate in the different stages of the cocaine refinement, and provide transportation and security. The criminal organizations also purchase intermediate goods (chemical inputs: acetone, ether, sulfuric and chloride acid, kerosene) used in the production of cocaine clorhydrate (CHCL). There were also intermediary firms (the Bolivian trafficking organizations) who either buy or process the coca paste and base (PCB). The final step was the distribution of cocaine in the big consumer markets (mainly the U.S.), by the Colombian organizations and by local organized crime.

      This industry economics had (and currently has) lethal results for the political stability of the South American democracies and even more so (to a different extent for each particular case) to the survival of the state. As an illegal activity, drug trafficking implies the application of enforcement policies, which in turn generate violence and corruption as the criminal organizations struggle to protect their territories (Colombia), and as the peasants organize themselves against the state in order to protect their source of labor (Bolivia, Peru). Moreover, both workers (Peru) and "entrepreneurs" (Colombia) accept the aid of guerrilla groups or even foreign or national mercenaries (Colombia). The situation is made worse when there is foreign pressure or even military intervention, and when support (the U.S.) is given to the governments of the source countries to enhance interdiction and eradication. As will be shown later, this increases the level of "reactive" violence and contributes to the spread and overlap of the problem to neighboring countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Venezuela).

      In light of these considerations, why can this criminal activity be defined as a matter of national security, particularly in the case South America? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the meaning ascribed to the concept "national security."

      National security will be defined as the situation of freedom from harmful threats to a given state.This includes freedom from military attack or coercion, from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values, which are essential to the quality of life. ¹⁰⁸  In the context of this dissertation the terms "state" and "nation-state" will be used as synonyms. In that sense the concept used here goes beyond the Weberian concept of state, in which the state is defined in politico- institutional terms as a "central government." ¹⁰⁹  Instead of considering the state and society as two separate phenomena,the state is defined here as a complex socio-political sovereign entity that includes a territory, governing institutions, and a population. ¹¹⁰  This conception of state draws on Buzan's definition of states:

"[t]erritorialy defined socio-political entities. They represent human collectivities in which governing institutions and societies are interwoven within a bounded territory [...] this nexus of territory, government and society is what constitutes the state." ¹¹¹ 

      In that sense the definition of state used here resembles the classic legal definition stated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. That is: a permanent population, a defined territory with a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of concluding international relations with other states. ¹¹²  The term "national security" refers then to the security of the state, and more specifically, to the absence of threats to the main attributes of the a state, namely: ¹¹³ 

• The "idea of the state" or the degree of recognition and identification of the population with their state. ¹¹⁴ 
• The physical base of the state (the population and the territory).
• The institutional expression of the state. That is the government and the political regime of a state or, as stated by Barry Buzan,

"the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative and judicial, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate ...." ¹¹⁵ 

• Sovereignty in terms of

"self-government [and] denial of any higher political authority, and the claiming by the state of supreme decision-making authority both within its territory and over its citizens..." ¹¹⁶ 

      A matter of national security implies then a threat to any of these state attributes. These elements can be discussed as objects of security in their own right (they can be threatened individually), and at the same time the interaction between them determines the national security problematique. If one of them is harmed the other three will become more susceptible to threats. A government is necessary in order to grant the security of the population against internal or external threats. If the capacity of the institutional component of the state is constrained by either limited internal or external threats or, even worse, if the institutions of the state collapse because of internal or external threats, the integrity of the population, the territory, and sovereignty of the state will be more susceptible to threat. At the same time, a healthy and productive population as well as a productive territory are necessary in order to grant the economic viability of a state as a whole and to assure that the state will be able to extract resources for the implementation of policies. The interaction between the attributes of the state is represented in Figure 2. ¹¹⁷ 

      

Figure 1. Attributes of the state

      As represented in Figure 3 below, the national security problematique of a state is determined by the interplay between three factors, namely: the security environment of a state, the nature of the state (how vulnerable it is to internal and external threats?), and the existence of latent or manifest internal or external threats.

      

Figure 2. Components of the National Security problematique

      The security environment refers to the pattern of interaction of nation states within an anarchical framework (characterized by the absence of a centralized form of political structure), with special emphasis on their interaction with dominant or hegemonic powers (in terms of their military capabilities and their degree of political influence in the region). For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition also encompasses the interaction of the state with non-state actors across national boundaries. The issue of the security environment can be characterized by the following questions: Which states are your state's neighbors? Are they militarily powerful? Are they politically and socially cohesive? Are they developed? Does your state have any pending conflict with them? Which transnational players operate within and between the borders of your neighbors? Are they also operating within your state? Could they spill over into your country? What kinds of problems have your neighbors that could spill over into the territory of your state? Which national, transnational, and international players can strongly influence the policies adopted by your neighbors and the way transnational actors behave? ¹¹⁸  The issues of the nature of the state and the meaning of threat have to be defined before answering the question of why drug trafficking is a national security problem in South America. These issues will be addressed in the following sections of this chapter.

b) Threat

"There is fright in everything. This means being frightened by the unexpected." ¹¹⁹ 

      Threat is defined as a danger to the attributes of the state; this potential or actual danger means that there exists "an indication of something undesirable coming..." because of an actor or a process that is a "likely cause of harm...." ¹²⁰  This threat can be overt in the sense that real harm is being done, or latent if harm has not yet manifested. Threats can be specific or diffuse depending on what is posing them. Specific threats "have a clear focus and source," that is they are posed by a particular state or non-state actor, object, or policy. ¹²¹  For example: the Medellín Cartel is an identifiable non-state actor as are the Shining Path or the ELN or the FARC guerrilla movements in Peru and Colombia. "Cocaine" or "heroin" or "drugs" are objects that can pose a threat. Militarized enforcement is a policy that can pose a threat to neighboring countries because of its spillover consequences, and illicit drug production as a policy by a corrupt government is also a threat. More clear examples of specific threats are: Germany in the case of France during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals during the Cold War for one another (and for the all the other states of the world). Diffuse threats arise from processes, rather than from a particular actor, object, or policy. ¹²²  As argued by Barry Buzan,

"Thus the spread of communism (or capitalism), nuclear proliferation (both weapons and civil power technology), terrorism, economic depressions and the green house effect are all examples of broad processes which are frequently identified as threats." ¹²³ 

      Drug trafficking, then, is an economic process that can threaten the state to varying degrees, and can reach the proportions of a national security issue. A threat becomes a national security issue depending on the intensity with which the threat operates in relation to the particular vulnerabilities of a given state and also (but not necessarily) according to the beliefs of the policy makers of a state over a given time period. This means that, as will be shown in my case studies (Argentina and Venezuela), the fact that policy makers are not assessing a threat does not necessarily mean that the threat does not exist. Assessment by policy makers is a sufficient--but not necessary--condition for a threat to exist within the framework of this dissertation. The intensity of a threat can be higher or lower depending on several factors: ¹²⁴ 

• its nearness in space;
• its nearness in time;
• the probability that a given latent threat could become an overt threat;
• the weight of its consequences;
• and whether or not the threats are amplified by historical dimensions or circumstances.

      Depending on each particular case, the more intense a threat the more likely it will be defined as a national security issue. According to their intensity, threats can then be typified as low intensity threats, high intensity threats and lethal threats (when they put into question the existence of one or all of the attributes of the state). These attributes are displayed in Table 5 below.

      

Table 5. Typology of threats according to their intensity
	LOW INTENSITY THREATS	HIGH INTENSITY THREATS	LETHAL THREATS
Range (space) (*)	Very Distant	Distant	Close
Range (time) (**)	Distant	Close	Current
Consequences	Low	High	Suppressive
Probability (**)	Low	High	Sure
Historical precedents	Historically neutral	Historically amplified	Historically amplified
(*) Very Distant = located in a country in a non-neighboring country that belongs to the same region; Distant = located in a neighboring country but in an area far away from the border; Close = located in an area near the national border. (**) Depends on the assessment of policy makers when the threats have not taken place yet.

      The three types above are an adaptation and modification of the classification of threat intensity given by Barry Buzan in his book "People, States and Fear" ¹²⁵ . Buzan constructed only two types (Low Intensity and High Intensity) based on the variables listed above (diffuse/specific, distant/close in time or space, low/high probability, low/high consequences, historically neutral/amplified). There are two main differences from the original idea that served as an inspiration for this classification. First: in this dissertation the specificity of the threat (diffuse/specific threats) is not taken as a variable that determines the intensity of a threat. True, an object or an actor or a policy are always more concrete dangers; however, as this dissertation will show, "diffuse" processes such as drug trafficking (that is, an industry conformed by several players and objects) are not only believed to be a national security issue, but also (with different degrees of intensity) a clear and present national security problem for some of the states in the region. Paradoxically, some of the policies adopted to cope with the threat increase the intensity of it even more.

      Threats can also be typified according to their nature depending on their intensity and their latent or overt status. These dimensions tell us if the threat is or is not already taking place and to what degree or intensity. Six types result from the combination of intensity and status (the order of appearance presupposes an ascending order in terms of their relevance to national security): Remote, Significant, Clear, Clear and Present, Alarming, and Crucial. The way in which these types are obtained is summarized in Table 6 below.

      

Table 6. Type of threats according to their intensity and open/latent status
		STATUS
		OVERT	LATENT
INTENSITY	LOW	Significant	Remote
	HIGH	Clear and present	Clear
	LETHAL	Crucial	Alarming

      For the scope of this dissertation only the four latter types of threat (that is "clear and present," "clear," "crucial," and "alarming") will be considered as national security problems. Drug trafficking has military, political, economic, societal and ecological implications that with different intensity may threaten the South American states. Threats to the state stemming from drug trafficking can be classified then in the following way: military threats, political threats, societal threats, economic threats and ecological threats. ¹²⁶  At the same time each class of threat can be "measured" or "typified" according to the typologies elaborated above. This "typification" of threats stemming from drug trafficking will be made in the chapters concerning the two neighboring-transshipment case studies (Argentina and Venezuela).

      An example of a typification of a threat could be expressed in the following terms:

"The rise in cocaine consumption stemming from the drop in the prices of the drug caused by the rise of cocaine trafficking through the national territory of Argentina is a clear and present societal threat to that country."

      or for example,

"A further loss of the legitimacy of Venezuela's political institutions caused by drug trafficking related corruption is a clear political threat to that country."

      Concrete examples of military, political, economic, societal, and ecological threats will be given in the rest of the dissertation. By now, this chapter provides the reader a descriptive definition of each kind of threat.

      Military threats: Military threats mean the use (or the threat of use) of armed force by another state. They imply an attack or coercion of a state (or group of states) against another state(s). They can also mean the attack or coercion by a state (or a group of states) against non-state actors operating in the territory of another state without the consent of the government of the latter. As stated by Barry Buzan this kind of threat,

"[o]ccupy the traditional heart of national security concerns. Military action can, and usually does, threaten, all the components of the state" ¹²⁷ 

      The illicit drug industry is a non-military problem of security in the sense that it does not involve per se the "use or threat of physical force in inter-state relations...."  ¹²⁸  However the cross border activities of non-state groups involved in drug trafficking activities may catalyze pre-existent territorial disputes into armed conflict between two neighboring states. Also, U.S. attempts to curb drug trafficking overseas through the use of military force might pose a threat to some South American states.

      Some examples of military threats that might be either catalyzed by drug trafficking or by attempts to suppress it are: ¹²⁹ 

• Military intervention by extra-regional powers (especially the U.S.);
• Invasion of territory by foreign military forces;
  • Occupation of territory by foreign military forces;
  • Full scale air, naval, or land battles;
  • Intermittent shelling or clashes;
  • Small scale interception or sinking of ships;
  • Mining of territorial water;
  • Limited air, sea or border skirmishes;
  • Border police acts;
• Imposing blockades;
  • Breaking diplomatic relations;
  • Increasing troop mobilization;
  • Closing borders and blocking free communications;
• Recalling ambassadors for emergency consultations;
  • Warning retaliation for acts;
  • Condemning strongly specific actions or policies (with the threat of the use of military force).

      In the analysis of case studies (chapters V, VII and VIII), the reader will notice that in fact some of these events happened between drug producer countries and their neighboring countries as well as between the United States and drug producer countries. The reader will also notice that some events were provoked or worsened by the drug trafficking activities going on in bordering areas or as an attempt by United States to curtail the flow of drugs towards its territory by the use of military force.

      Political Threats: Political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state. ¹³⁰  This includes all activities that can weaken the effective control of a government over its territory and its citizens as well as the stability and legitimacy of the political regime of a country. Some examples of political threats stemming from drug trafficking are:

• Use of the national territory as a safe-heaven by guerrilla groups that finance their operation through their interaction with drug traffickers and coca-growing peasants.
• Control of the national territory by criminal organizations (based abroad or within the national territory).
• Lack of subordination of the armed forces to the political power caused by drug trafficking related corruption.
• Armed strikes by coca-growing peasants.

      Societal Threats: These kinds of threats are aimed at the integrity of the human resources of a country as well as at the "idea of the state" or the national identity of a country. This concept has been adapted from the definition given by Barry Buzan who refers to societal threats as threats against the national identity and the national culture of a country. ¹³¹  In Buzan's view these kinds of threats are caused above all by massive migration from one geographical/cultural zone to another. ¹³²  For the scope of this work the concept of societal threats will be enlarged to threats to the social fabric of the nation caused by a massive and widespread consumption of harmful illicit drugs. In the case of drug producer, transshipment and neighboring transshipment countries the threat is caused by a sudden availability of the drug stemming from production and increasing transit across their national territories. These are some examples of societal threats that may be caused by drug trafficking:

• Rise of illicit drug consumption and dependency.
• Spread of AIDS and infectious diseases due to intravenous drug use (IDU).
• Rise of drug related violence due to increasing trafficking across the national territory.
• Threat to national identity because of the increase of illegal immigrants and refugees across the border due to drug trafficking-related violence in their countries of origin. A huge inflow of illegal immigrants or refugees could also overwhelm the capacity of the recipient state to provide basic services to its own citizens thus reducing the quality of life of the population.

      Economic Threats: These kinds of threats curtail access to the market that is necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. ¹³³  In this case the list is not long. In terms of economic threats, the basic problem of the South American countries, particularly the Andean countries, is that a large sector of their economy is absorbed by an illegal activity which is basically export-oriented and based on the transformation of an agricultural product: coca. On one hand, this reproduces an already existing pattern of dependency on a single product export. Eventually, a synthetic form of cocaine might be discovered in the U.S. or Europe and an economic collapse might occur. As a matter of fact, this dissertation will show that the "coca-boom" in Bolivia was in part provoked by the collapse of the export oriented mining sector after the international drop of tin prices in the 1980s. On the other hand, the activity is illegal and strongly dependent countries such as Bolivia are subject to strong economic pressures that, following the definition above, may seriously curtail access to markets for legal products. The problem of large sectors of the work force involved in the illicit drug industry is also growing in transshipment countries. The consequences of this economic "cocaine dependency" of countries or areas of a country will be analyzed in further detail later in this work.

      Another threat caused by drug trafficking is the utilization of some South American countries as money laundering centers. The purchase of land at inflated prices has suddenly proliferated in the last ten years. Also the foreign investment in the services sectors of countries such as Chile and Argentina has mushroomed since the early 1990s. This was favored and attracted by the policies of structural adjustment implemented in these countries that have granted economic stability and relatively strong currencies. However, the legal origin of all these investments is not always clear. Lax banking laws in these countries worsened the situation. This phenomenon may be considered a blessing in the short term but can certainly be a curse in the long term. The purchase of real estate at inflated prices (a typical way of laundering money) can generate an unwanted inflationary spiral in the real estate sector. At the same time the uncontrolled influx of foreign currency may generate an undesired devaluation of the local currency, thus threatening the success of anti-inflationary policies due to a sudden abundance of liquid assets. Also, if national banking institutions are suspected of involvement in money laundering operations, the reputation of the country could be damaged, causing legal investment to head to other countries. There is also a relation with political threats due to the corrupting effect of money laundering activities, which may reduce the legitimacy of the recently inaugurated democracies.

      Ecological threats: Ecological threats harm the biosphere, which is the essential support system on which all human enterprises depend. ¹³⁴  Ecological threats stemming from drug trafficking damage the physical base of the state. The production of cocaine involves the use of industrial quantities of chemical inputs such as kerosene, acetone, lime, and sulfuric acid and the waste generated by the process of cocaine distillation is diverted into nearby rivers. This poses a threat to the local ecosystem and, in the long term, to human survival due to the pollution of potable water sources. Also, the extensive and persistent use of land for coca production produces large-scale soil erosion that renders this land unusable for the production of legal crops, not to mention the deforestation of tropical forests, cleared for coca cultivation by coca-growing settlers. The same can be said about the recent phenomenon of opium poppy growing in the high mountain forest regions of Colombia.

      The harmful effect of these different kinds of threats is mutually reinforced. For example, environmental threats may worsen the effect of economic threats, which in turn may worsen the effect of political threats, which at the same time may reduce the capacity of the state to cope with the traditional / military dimension of drug trafficking. The intensity of these threats will grow of course depending on the security environment of each state and on the weakness or strength of their nature.

      How does this classification apply to the case of South America? The cocaine industry does not imply a direct military threat to the state, but in South America as well as in other drug producer regions of the Third World (such as South Asia in the case of heroin industry), it can be a catalyst of latent inter-state conflicts. At the same time the threat of foreign military intervention is always present (the case of Panama--even if it is outside of the region under analysis--is an example).

      South American states are particularly vulnerable to political threats because of their recent history of political instability and military intervention in politics, and because their democracies are in the process of consolidation. ¹³⁵ 

      The ways in which illicit drug traffic affects security in South America varies from country to country. Political threats go from the loss of effective control of part of the national territory (which comes under control of the traffickers) to the corruption of the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers or the violent resistance of the peasant trade unions against the coca-eradication measures. In the case of societal threats, the increase of illicit drug production can lead to a rise in drug consumption in producer and transit countries as prices drop. Another aspect is that enforcement against the drug industry and the violence generated by this illegal activity are likely to generate a wave of refugees and illegal immigrants to neighboring countries, increasing the probability of societal conflict.

      As for economic threats, some South American producer countries (Peru and Bolivia in particular) have a low level of diversification of their economies. The cocaine industry certainly means a threat to their economic security since a big part of the national product depends on an illegal activity. This fact not only prevents further development in other areas (coca and coca paste production is five or six times more profitable for peasants than other crops) but also generates international pressure from developed countries.

      The ecological dimension is not in the short and medium term the most important, but it is worth mentioning because both coca and cocaine production cause a process of deforestation and erosion of the soil and rivers in the producer countries. This phenomenon is worsened by the use of herbicides to eradicate coca fields.

      As this dissertation will show, the South American states have, or in the recent past have had, at least one of the following problems,making them particularly vulnerable to the action of actors involved in the cocaine industry:

• Weak or non-existent presence of the government in large parts of the national territory.
• Already existing high levels of political violence stemming from deep social differences and ethnic divisions or the existence of a closed and restrictive political regime.
• Strong guerrilla movements.
• Major recent changes in the structure of political institutions.
• Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state.
• Danger of U.S. intervention in their internal affairs.
• Dependent and underdeveloped economies without adequate access to the international market.
• Indebted governments tied to austerity plans for the payment of debt services and incapable of extracting economic resources for the modification of the socioeconomic structure.

      As a result of this particular set of characteristics, threats to the political stability and sovereignty (military and political dimensions) are at the core of the security concerns of the South American states. Nevertheless, the societal, economic, and ecological dimensions will also be analyzed in this dissertation work.

      The issue of the weak/strong nature of the state will be conceptually defined and discussed in the following section.

c) The nature of the state

      As argued by Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, it is possible to say that the national security problematique has a "hardware" and a "software" side: ¹³⁶ 

      The "hardware" side comprises traditional security concerns, such as the security dilemma of the military balance of power and the economic capabilities of the states to build and keep a military structure.It concerns military readiness, or what a state needs to confront military threats posed by another state. It also concerns economic power, which is necessary to maintain that military readiness. It refers, then, to military power. ¹³⁷  The "software" side in the context of this dissertation refers to the nature of the state in terms of the following characteristics: sociopolitical cohesion (legitimacy and integration), the policy capacity of the institutional part of the state, the degree of socioeconomic development, and the functional and territorial penetration of the state in the whole of the national territory or "Territorial centralization." ¹³⁸  All these are variables that indicate the weak or strong nature of the state and will determine in the end how threats can affect a state. While the hardware side refers to the military and economic capabilities of the state as a power in an anarchic context, the software side refers to the weak/strong nature of the state in dealing with domestic matters and non-state actors. This thesis will concentrate almost exclusively on the soft side of security because it analyzes how an illicit activity such as drug trafficking can threaten the South American states.

      The definition of the characteristics of the software side of security will be given now in abstract terms. Concrete examples for the case of South America will be given in detail in the following chapter.

      Sociopolitical cohesion will be defined by two dimensions: ¹³⁹ 

• The legitimacy of the "idea of the state" in terms of the identification of the population with its nation state and the acceptance of its central government, as well as the legitimacy of the institutional base of the state (political regime). ¹⁴⁰ 
• Integration in terms of the fragmented/unified character of the society along ethnic, social, or political cleavages.

"[d]omestic class structure, particularly the extent and intensity of disaffection between élites and masses, is an obvious factor in assessing the strength or weakness of a state. When added to the nationality factor [and ethnic one], class divisions suggest the kind of political, threats whether domestically or externally mounted, to which specified states will be particularly sensitive." ¹⁴¹ 

      For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to notice that the vacuum left by the absence of broadly accepted and respected institutions could promote the replacement of the state by codes and practices of criminal groups or insurgent organizations. In that sense the population could follow and obey para-state authorities and legal systems imposed by non-state actors that challenge the state in terms of the use of armed force and the control of territory and population. Also the absence of legitimate and representative institutions could favor and even justify the emergence of insurgent groups that may attempt to change the political system. This could be certainly reinforced under a situation of massive social exclusion and deep social differences. Also a fragmented society along ethnic divisions can be in the absence of strong and unifying political institutions, a cause for civil war and state disintegration.

      Policy Capacity refers to the effective capability of the government of a state to implement policies and extract resources from society (i.e. taxation) with this goal in mind. Capacity in the context of this dissertation will be equated with what Michael Mann calls the "infrastructural power of the state" (as an institution) as opposed to the "dominative or coercive" power of the state. As he argues,

"Infrastructural power [is] the capacity of the [institutional base] of the state to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm." ¹⁴² 

      A strong state, then, is a state that has the capability to extract, penetrate, regulate, and appropriate resources from society. ¹⁴³  This variable is of course strongly linked to the degree of legitimacy held by the state and the obedience of the population to the established government. A state with a weak policy capacity will be less able to implement policies to assure the security of the population and the territory. It will be also less able to reduce weaknesses in all other variables mentioned here.

      It is worth noting that a high degree of corruption will be considered as an indicator of a low policy capacity. ¹⁴⁴  As explained by an analyst, a situation of widespread political corruption weakens the state in the sense that it hinders its capacity to raise taxes (extract resources) and enforce the law. Moreover, corruption hinders the socioeconomic development of a country, leading to a misallocation of resources from government to private hands. ¹⁴⁵ 

      Socioeconomic development is defined in terms of the living standards of the population, the capacity of insertion of the economy in the international market, as well as the characteristics of the productive sectors of the country. A weak socioeconomic development will be associated with both the concepts of underdevelopment and of dependence. Underdevelopment refers to a type of economic system with a predominant primary sector, a high concentration of income, little diversification in its production system, and an external market that far outweighs the internal one. ¹⁴⁶  Dependency refers to a situation in which the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic inside the system. ¹⁴⁷ 

      Weak socioeconomic development will strongly condition the policy capacity of a state in terms of the range of choices it has to solve problems that may cause strong social divisions and political violence. Robert Rothstein for example affirms that,

"The political process is thus heavily influenced by basic resource constraints that narrow the range of choice, no matter what the intention or the ideology." ¹⁴⁸ 

      Barry Buzan also affirms that,

"[w]eak states may find themselves trapped by historical patterns of economic development and political power which leave them underdeveloped and politically penetrated, and therefore unable to muster the economic and political resources necessary to build a stronger state" ¹⁴⁹ 

      Territorial Centrality refers to the degree of monopoly of the armed forces by the government of a state over the whole national territory, as well as its territorial and functional presence and control over the entire territory and population without being matched by non-state groups. As defined by Michael Mann,

"Centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises a monopoly of authoritative binding rule- making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence." ¹⁵⁰ 

      Areas of territory out of the direct control of the government could, of course, favor the rise and establishment of groups that could challenge the authority of the state.

      Finally, we can bring all these elements together: a weak state will be defined in terms of a low sociopolitical cohesion, a low policy capacity, a low territorial centralization and a low socioeconomic development. For instance, states that are weak in the four variables will be weaker than states that have only a low economic development but a high territorial centralization and a high level of sociopolitical cohesion. At the same time there are several ways in which these variables can be combined. For example, a state can be fragmented along ethnic or social lines. Sometimes these two factors coincide. The poorest and more oppressed sectors of society are also part of a separated and dominated ethnic group. In that sense a state divided along both ethnic and social lines will be weaker than a state divided by strong social differences, or one without strong social fragmentation and so on. In a weak state, deficiencies in the software component of security are mutually reinforced (a dependent and underdeveloped state will have, for example, fewer choices in terms of policy capacity). The vulnerability of the state increases and also the variety and number of internal and external threats to the state. Strong powers that are simultaneously strong states will care less about non-military threats than weak states. The latter will have a far more complicated security dilemma in dealing with traditional and non-traditional threats at the same time. In that sense, as Barry Buzan correctly states, several powers that are strong in the hardware side of security can at the same time be weak states in terms of the software side of security. As pointed out by Buzan,

"[w]eak or strong states will refer to the degree of sociopolitical cohesion; weak or strong powers will refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other [...] Strength as a state neither depends on , nor correlates with, power. Weak powers, like Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Singapore, are all strong states, while quite substantial powers, like Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia and Pakistan are all rather weak as states." ¹⁵¹ 

      It is not necessary to look only at the developing world to corroborate this fact; take for instance the case of Russia or Italy, with their fragmented societies in ethnic and/or social terms, and the presence of strong organized groups and armed bands in their territories.

      While the term "power" (weak or strong) will refer to the military and economic capabilities relevant for a military buildup, the term "state" (weak or strong) will be used in terms of the social, political and economic cohesion of the state as well as the degree of efficiency of state institutions.

      Of course , an accurate measurement of the indicators of the variables listed above is very difficult, if not impossible. This dissertation will combine several indicators in order to elaborate two polar types (the weak state and the strong state). States can be closer to one or another pole depending on the number of indicators they accumulate. Table 5 below shows the two polar strong and weak state types. The South American states could be placed on a continuum that ranges from strong to weak states. The indicators listed below could be used as a cumulative index. The more conditions of weakness a state accumulates, the closer it will be to the "weak state" pole. This continuum would not be static; states can move along it depending on the increase or decrease of the variables listed in Table 5. States that are closer to the "weak" pole are more vulnerable to military, economic, political, societal, and ecological threats. As this dissertation will show, the emergence of threats is facilitated by the vulnerability of a given state and, at the same time, these threats can contribute to deepen or even perpetuate the weak nature of a state.

      

Table 7. Nature of the State: Polar Types
	WEAK STATE	STRONG STATE
SOCIOPOLITICAL COHESION	LOW	HIGH
	A-Fragile Political Legitimacy: * Incomplete Nation Building * "Weblike societies" (autonomous communal groups) (*) * Strong loyalties to communal, ethnic and religious groups. * High levels of political violence * Major recent changes in the structure of political institutions * Conspicuous use of force by the state in domestic political life * Conspicuous role of political police in everyday lives of citizens * Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state * High degree of control over the media B- Fragmented Societies: * Presence of contending national identities within the state * Coexistence of several ethnic, religious and linguistic groups within a state * Highly unequal distribution of wealth	A-Strong Political Legitimacy: * Complete Nation Building * Pyramidal societies (recognized central authority) * Common shared loyalty to the nation-state. * Low levels of political violence * Stable and long lasting political institutions * Rare or non existent use of force by the state in domestic political life * Rare or non existent role of political police in everyday life of citizens * Absence of ideological polarization and major political conflict * No control over the media B- Unified Societies: * Coherent national identity and absence of contending national identities within the state * Absence substantial, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences within a state. * Even distribution of wealth
POLICY CAPACITY	LOW	HIGH
	* Rigid Policy Capacity * Inefficient state apparatus * High level of political corruption	* Flexible Policy Capacity * Efficient state apparatus * Low of political corruption
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	LOW	HIGH
	* Low level of industrialization * Low level of per capita income * Low level of productivity * No access to major markets * Dependence on foreign capital flows * Dependence on export earnings * Unequal distribution of incomes	* High level of industrialization * High level of per capita income * High level of productivity *Access to major markets * Local conditions for the reproduction of capital * Large domestic markets * Equality in the distribution of incomes
TERRITORIAL CENTRALITY	LOW	HIGH
	* Weak presence of the state in frontier zones and areas outside the major cities. * Strong non-state organized armed groups	* Strong presence of the state in frontier and areas outside major cities. * Absence of strong non-state organized armed groups
(*) The concept "Weblike societies" is used here to refer to countries where there are autonomous communal groups and authorities which compete with the authority of the state in the sense that there is parallel network of institutions whose legitimacy is stronger than the legitimacy of the state's institutions and symbols. The concept draws on Joel Migdal who describes this kind of situation in the following terms: "The ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable barriers to state predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they have confronted -from the resistance posed by chiefs, landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, za'im, effendis, aghas, caciques, kulaks (for convenience, 'strongmen') through their various social organizations"and also " Weblike societies host a mélange of fairly autonomous social organizations." The term "Weak Societies" is used here as opposed to "Pyramidal Societies" understood as societies in which the central authority of the state is recognized and is not in competition with any other form of authority. 152

      This typology differs substantially from the one elaborated by Michael Handel in his book "Weak States in the International System." ¹⁵³  Handel elaborated two polar types (Weak and Strong) following traditional military and economic variables. What Handel calls "strong" and "weak" states are, in the framework of this dissertation, strong and weak powers. Handel´s typology is then a typology of strong and military powers in the traditional sense.

      Another important comment on the typology is that the closest conceptual image to the "weak state" polar type could be identified with what has been recently denominated as "failed states" or "collapsed states ":

"[a] disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community. Civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation are creating modern debellatios." ¹⁵⁴ 

"State collapse is a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form old or new." ¹⁵⁵ 

"[c]ollapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state [...] as the decision making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not performed and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socioeconomic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed,; it no longer receives support from nor exercises control over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy it has lost the right to rule." ¹⁵⁶ 

      It should be stated neither however that neither was the "weak state" polar type inspired by the two concepts quoted above nor were they used as part of the definition. The images of the "failed" and "collapsed state" seem to the author to be fairly illustrative of a state placed at the weak extreme of the weak/strong continuum.

d) What poses the threat?

" [d]rug trafficking appears to involve: 1) innumerable actors organized into private and public economic networks or systems; 2) a rather well defined division of labor on a multinational basis; 3) a complex set of attitudes , values, and behavioral norms; 4) avenues for laundering the flow of large cash profits; 5) often a high level of violence; 6) a complex set of relationships with governments of various nations that, in one way or another, find themselves related to , and sometimes profiting from , the traffic in drugs. " ¹⁵⁷ 

      In the case of illicit drug traffic, non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations threaten the state. ¹⁵⁸  The threat is not posed by the drug cartels, coca-growing peasants, or the guerrillas as isolated actors but by the whole coca/cocaine complex. The threat stems from a transnational illegal activity that involves political as well as economic dimensions and is driven by powerful non-state actors.

      It is important to understand that the threat to security exists because of several particular vulnerabilities of the nations of South America. Illicit drug traffic stems from several factors: the lack of economic development in the Andean region, the fall in the prices of the exports of these countries, the traditional utilization of coca-leaves in some of these countries, and the vulnerabilities of the countries (Bolivia, Peru and Colombia), which are in the periphery of the main producer countries. As Max Manwaring points out,

"Nonetheless, as important as instability might be in a national or transnational threat environment, it is only a symptom-not the threat itself. Rather, the threat stems from a lack of understanding and/or failure to alleviate the various manifestations of political, economic, and social injustices that are at the root causes of instability. A related threat stems from a lack of understanding and/or failure to deal properly with the conflicts that are the consequences of instability. " ¹⁵⁹ 

      It is possible to argue that, in the case of drug trafficking in South America, the threat to the state stems from a complex non-state actor, the cocaine industry. This criminal activity has several political dimensions. In first place, the "firms" of this industry have control over the entire production of cocaine with the exception of the growth of coca and the retail of the product (United States/Europe/Japan). Further, they have developed a capacity to bribe governmental officials, control areas of national territory, establish sporadic alliances with guerrilla groups, and maintain their own private para-military groups (the paradigmatic example of these characteristics is Colombia).

      At the other extreme of the industry are the coca growers--the peasants--who are organized into strong trade unions (federaciones) and have a high capacity for resistance against governmental attempts to eradicate illegal crops. Another dimension is U.S. pressure over the main producer countries; this contributes to enhancing the enforcement against the traffickers, eradicating illegal crops, and to causing a rising spiral of violence and instability. At the same time, enforcement in one country only provokes the spillover of the problem into neighboring countries in terms of production, transit, or legitimization of illegal profits.

      As this dissertation will demonstrate, approaching the problems with military means only worsens already existing security problems in producer countries and provokes a spillover of some of these problems to neighboring countries. Augusto Varas, a Chilean security analyst warned about the possibility of a worsening security problems because of the utilization of military means for drug trafficking control. Varas stated that,

"The United States perceives narco-traffic and terrorism as the most important issues in the territorial field. From a Latin American perspective, these issues should be handled by police institutions instead of military ones. In order not to repeat errors of previous decades, it should be necessary to emphasize the fact that these problems do not have a military nature [these problems] are produced by local social and economic conditions as well as by the absence of domestic political compromises. To deal with them form a military perspective could be counterproductive, activating the problem instead of providing effective solutions " ¹⁶⁰ 

      Military power is not always fungible from one issue area to another, above all when this issue area is a market and there still exist a strong demand for the product, and an economic incentive for the production of the goods. As correctly stated by Georges Lamazière, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil,

"The fact is , however, that non-military threats by their very nature are more amenable to non-military responses.[...] The so-called 'new global problems' require a cooperative and multilateral approach more than a 'realist', power politics one. As Joseph S. Nye wrote in a recent book, ' if military power could be transferred freely across economic and ecological issues, then different structures would not matter, and the overall hierarchy determined by military strength would accurately predict outcomes in world politics [...]' This complexity and subtlety of the more serious non-military threats to security make them intractable through the use of traditional power resources." ¹⁶¹ 

      Cocaine trafficking became a source of serious concern at the beginning of the 1980s because of a curious coincidence of two factors. On one side, the debt crisis in the South American states led to a fall in the prices of the main export products of the Andean countries such as tin in Bolivia and coffee in Colombia. On the other side, a sudden rise in cocaine consumption occurred in the United Sates (the major peak was 12 million consumers in 1985). This resulted in a "coca/cocaine boom" in the Andean countries. Bolivia and Peru-- where the coca leaves were already produced for traditional consumption--generated an illicit parallel economy based on the production of raw material for cocaine. In certain regions of Colombia, such as Antioquia, where other types of illicit trade and smuggling already existed, the final manufacture and shipping of cocaine developed.

      In the case of Peru and Colombia, this activity, linked with parallel developments such as the emergence of guerrilla movements originated what an analyst has described as a.

"'[f]eudalization' process that imperils the very concept of a centralized nation-state. A number of self-sufficient sectors have emerged, including guerrillas, drug traffickers, corrupt police forces, bandits, the business/elite sector, and the peasantry each of whom manages its own parallel economy of survival as well as its own parallel security. They have all learned to survive if not to thrive in the chaos." ¹⁶² 

      In the case of Bolivia, the problem derives from the involvement of a large part of its peasantry in the production of coca and coca paste. As a matter of fact, this illegal activity contributed to a major component of this country's GNP. This induced growing social instability because the resistance of the highly organized peasants to the eradication of coca fields and to strong international pressure (the U.S.), enhanced social tensions that could degenerate either in the rise of guerrilla movements or civil strife.

      In the rest of South America, illicit drug traffic means a threat because of three factors:

      First, because of the transnational nature of this activity, the groups involved in drug trafficking activities link up with the counterparts abroad. The prospect of a spillover of drug trafficking activities would aggravate already existing political, economic, and social problems in countries that are struggling to consolidate their democracies. ¹⁶³  As the second chapter of this work will explain, since the mid-1980s the clear division of labor delineated above began to disappear. All South American countries, in one way or another, became involved in the cocaine industry and began to suffer different kinds of threats to their national security.

      Second, the routes of transit and production centers shift abroad as enforcement increases in producer countries and transit areas. It is becoming more and more difficult to identify an "Andean Core center" and an immediate periphery. As pointed by Virginia Gamba,

"Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay must cope with alarming situations in neighboring countries that threaten to spill over into their territories. " ¹⁶⁴ 

      Finally, during the Reagan and Bush administrations, the United States (an extra-regional actor) defined drug trafficking as a matter of national security, holding that the rise in cocaine consumption constitutes a threat to that country's social fabric. ¹⁶⁵  As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, the U.S. military approach to the problem worsened the situation in South America, where the illegal drug traffic effects the sovereignty of these states and the effective political control over their own territories.

a) Traditional geopolitical delimitation of South America

      Traditionally South America has been divided into two main groups of states: the Andean countries and the Southern Cone. The first group is formed by Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela. These countries share similar geography, a high percentage of Indian population (in the case of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia), and a particular configuration of historical rivalries and territorial disputes between them (e.g. Ecuador and Peru over their Amazon border and Venezuela and Colombia over their territorial waters in the Caribbean sea). With the exception of Bolivia and Venezuela, they all share a coastline in the Pacific Ocean. The more important indicator of their common identity is that this group demonstrated their joint economic and political will through the signing of the Andean Pact in 1960.

      Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay form the Southern Cone. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have in common a high degree of European immigration as well as a strong middle class and long democratic experiences (albeit with military interruptions). Argentina and Chile have traditionally had geopolitical ambitions over the same areas (the Patagonian Channels and the access to Antarctica). Argentina and Brazil have been traditional rivals since the last century; nevertheless, a process of economic integration and political cooperation has been in progress since the early 1980s, a process that is being accelerated by the consolidation of their democracies. Moreover in 1991, after an Argentine-Brazilian process of integration initiated in 1985, Paraguay, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil agreed to form a Common Market (for the moment the process of integration has resulted in a customs union -MERCOSUR).

      In a previous work I did not include Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana as part of the region because these countries and overseas dominions (in the case of French Guyana) are generally considered part of the Caribbean from both a classical geopolitical point of view and from their role in drug trafficking. ¹⁸⁵  Moreover, neither are these countries are particularly relevant for the region from a traditional regional security perspective nor do they play an important role in drug trafficking activities. ¹⁸⁶ 

      This dissertation will assume the risk of defying existent literature and consider Guyana and Suriname (French Guyana will only be considered for the analysis of its interaction as part of France with Suriname in security terms. I will not go in depth here about the French security concerns in terms of the interest of this state in French Guyana) as an overlapping sub-complex within South America. ¹⁸⁷ 

      Traditionally Guyana and Suriname have been considered as part of the Caribbean because they are geographically isolated from the rest of South America by the Amazon rain forest at the Rondônia mountain chain. In addition, they share a common colonial past with the rest of the Caribbean islands and are culturally attached to the Dutch and British ex-colonies of the Caribbean. Both states perceive themselves as Caribbean countries and participate in the political, economic and security arrangements of the region such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). ¹⁸⁸  At the same time, the United States considers Guyana and Suriname as part of a broad concept of the Caribbean Area. ¹⁸⁹  On the other side there exists a pattern of territorial disputes and security concerns between Guyana and Suriname and other South American states and between Suriname and France (because of the D.O.M of French Guyana).

      Venezuela and Guyana have a territorial dispute over the territory of Essequibo (almost half of Guyana), which Venezuela claims as a province. The situation escalated in 1982 when political pressure from Venezuela increased; there were fears in the region of a possible military solution to the problem following the example of the Argentine landing in the Malvinas/Falklands Islands the same year. ¹⁹⁰  Suriname and Guyana have an old territorial dispute over 9,000 square miles of land in the remote and uninhabited interior area of the "New River Triangle" formed by the Corentyne - Kutari Rivers and the New River. French Guyana and Suriname have a territorial dispute over a remote and uninhabited area of the border, but the most important and serious problem between France and Suriname occurred between 1986 to 1992. During these years the government of Suriname was facing the challenge of two ethnic guerrillas groups (which, at the same time, were fighting one another): the Surinamese Liberation Army (SLA) or Jungle Commando (made up boschnegers, a Dutch term that refers to the descendants of fugitive slaves who inhabit the interior jungle) and the Tucayana guerrillas (Amazon Amerindians who had originally been armed by the government to fight the Jungle Commando). ¹⁹¹  The brutal repression against the boschnegers caused a major influx of refugees into French Guyana and the Jungle Commandos started to use refugee camps in French Guyana as logistical bases and sanctuaries. These cross-border activities of armed groups were seen as a threat to a spatial launching base in Kourou. They were also seen as a threat to the internal political stability in the dominion because of the danger of ethnic conflicts and violent reactions against the influx of refugees (the economy of the dominion is extremely weak and the refugees were perceived as a cause of unemployment by the local population). ¹⁹²  The insurgency finished in 1992 under an agreement signed with the boshnegers, the Tucayana, and the new democratic government (after elections in 1991). The former rebels recognized the government's authority over the entire territory while the government committed to guaranteeing the territorial autonomy of the Tucayanas and boschnegers (and their security from the incursions of the other group). The former guerrillas were also granted the right to serve in the army, to participate in public administration, and to engage in forestry and gold prospecting. ¹⁹³ 

      Because of its evident military and political importance in the region, Brazil has attempted to play the role of mediator in the conflicts between Guyana and Venezuela and Guyana and Suriname. As pointed out by an analyst,

"Brazil, the one country that shares a border with all of these nations (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Suriname) and yet has disputes with none of them, has watched these various conflictual strains with considerable interest [...] One theme in Brazil's geopolitical writing is that, as the United States begins its inevitable decline as a Caribbean power, Brazil must be prepared to fill part of the power vacuum that the United States will leave behind. With typical Brazilian discretion, Brazil's actions with regard to several of these states have begun to fill some of this perceived power vacuum. Thus, Brazil has offered military assistance and arms to both Guyana and Suriname [...] Brazilian military sources have also expressed concern that, if Venezuela does make any military move against Guyana, such a move could involve Venezuelan military incursions into Brazilian territory. For all these reasons, the creation of a Brazilian 'rapid deployment force' and the strengthening of Brazilian garrisons along the northern borders have been interpreted as manifestations of increasing concern." ¹⁹⁴ 

      During the Cold War period there were also Brazilian concerns when the military regime of Desi Bouterse in Suriname allied itself with Cuba and Libya. Brazil saw the possible "cubanization" of Suriname as a clear political threat at that time. ¹⁹⁵ 

      Guyana and Suriname are party to the Amazon Pact and participate actively in the consultation mechanisms established by the pact. ¹⁹⁶  Together with representatives from Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia, members of the governments of Guyana and Suriname participated in 1989 in two ministerial summits (held in Manaus and Quito) that attempted to revitalize the Pact. At the meetings, representatives also attempted to adopt a common position against some international moves to denominate the Amazon rain forest as "common heritage of humankind." All these governments agreed to cooperate to keep the ecological integrity in the region and restate their sovereign rights over the Amazon portion of national territory. In this way, Guyana and Suriname are linked to the other South American states by institutional arrangements and common shared concerns.

      South America is clearly differentiated from Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean as a security complex. South America has a different conflict-cooperation dynamic among members of the region and, more importantly, has a different type of interaction with the United States as the hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. ¹⁹⁷  Mexico, for example, shares its northern border with the superpower and stands apart in the Western Hemisphere because of the special structure of bilateral relations it shares with the United States, in addition to its inter-American and other international relations. Also as noted by G. Pope Atkins,

"Mexico has always been of significant interest to one or another or the world's great powers, but the United States has long been the principal foreign presence in Mexico (and the foreign menace, in the eyes of many Mexicans). As a consequence, the Mexican-U.S. relationship is largely divorced from the greater inter-American arena. Many of the issues are 'North American' in content and closely associated with the domestic concerns in each country; the relationship has been determined primarily by territorial proximity and increasingly integrated economic and social structures." ¹⁹⁸ 

      This differentiated pattern of interaction has become more evident since the recent process of economic integration between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico (the NAFTA agreement).

      Central America and the Caribbean, on the other hand, have been in the U.S. sphere of influence increasingly since the end of the 19th century. The United States is seen as the international policeman in the area. Also, most of the area is part of a U.S. bilateral trading system. Whereas U.S. military intervention in South America is a potential danger, in Central America and the Caribbean it is a current and common historical fact. As explained by a group of analysts,

"Toute la zone composée du Mexique, de l'Amérique centrale et des Caraïbes présente une forte spécificité, par la proximité des Etats Unis, le caractère des conflits qui s'y déroulent, la présence d'un pays appartenant au bloc soviétique [Cuba during the Cold War] , le phénomène d'atomisation surtout propre aux Caraïbes et même l'importance de la couverture médiatique qui lui est accordée. Cette spécificité est encore renforcée par l'évolution récente qui lie de plus en plus l'économie du Méxique a celle du reste de l'Amérique du Nord...." ¹⁹⁹ 

      Since the beginning of the century, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are a first security perimeter of the United States, particularly because of the Panama Canal and the geographical proximity to its territory. Moreover, the Caribbean and Central America still coexist with an "old" aspect of the regional security agenda because of the Cuban regime.  ²⁰⁰  The invasion of Panama in 1989 in the final phase of the Cold War and U.S. efforts to internationally isolate Cuba show that U.S. interventionism in Central America and the Caribbean seem to be a persistent historical trend.

b) Drug trafficking geopolitical delimitation: a deadly international division of labor

      From the point of view of the role of the region in drug production (as well as the pattern of conflict and cooperation between state and non-state actors stemming from this activity), South America is the main cocaine producing area in the world. ²⁰¹ The industry principally comprises three Andean countries: Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. ²⁰²  The first two have a large Indian population, which has grown the coca leaf for traditional uses for centuries. Local traffickers purchase coca paste (the first stage in cocaine production) from the peasants, transform it into coca base (the second stage), and sell it to Colombian organizations who finish the production process and manage transportation as well as the first steps to sell the product in consumption centers (U.S. and Western Europe). All of these groups have a big quota of political power and have a pattern of conflict and cooperation with other non-state actors such as the leftist guerrillas (although this is not the case in Bolivia). Venezuela, Ecuador, the Southern Cone countries, Guyana and Suriname form the periphery of this producer core. All of these states--with the exception of Uruguay, Guyana and Suriname--share long, porous, badly controlled borders, whose conditions can vary from tropical forests to desert, with the main producer countries. Brazil shares its entire Amazonian border with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. Argentina shares a long and porous border with Bolivia and Paraguay. Ecuador is virtually surrounded by Colombia and Peru. Chile shares its northern borders with Peru and Bolivia, and Venezuela shares its western and southern borders with Colombia and Brazilian Amazonia.

      The process of refining coca into cocaine can be divided into three stages. An analyst describes this process in the following way:

"The first [stage] takes place near the fields. Growers gather their crop and place it in maceration pits; large containers made out of plastic sheeting, The dried leaves are mixed with kerosene and potassium carbonate, which separate the alkaloid from the organic matter. After the waste material is removed, the product is mixed with sulfuric acid. This gooey paste is dried into balls [...]: cocaine paste or cocaine sulfate. This initial processing reduces the bulk, cutting down the volume by a factor of 10, and making the product easy to store or transport. The next stage makes cocaine base, a purer cocaine alkaloid without other alkaloids. This process requires more equipment (filters, dryers, centrifuges) and chemicals (alcohol, kerosene, sulfuric acid and potassium permanganate). Traffickers set up their labs or "kitchens" in the middle of the rainforest, with portable diesel power generators, plastic sheeting and elaborate logistical support for supplying the chemicals. Finally, trained chemists turn the cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride (HCL). This stage requires more sophisticated laboratory techniques and industrial volumes of ether or acetone so the semi-processed material can become the crystalline salt necessary for inhaling...." ²⁰³ 

      The division of labor required to transform the raw material (coca) into massive amounts of the final product (cocaine) gave way to a sophisticated and vertically integrated transnational industry. Different stages of cocaine production take place in different countries and the process of production implies the interaction of criminal groups that operate across national boundaries. In this thesis South America will be divided into five types of countries depending on the role they play in the coca-cocaine complex. Each one of these types presents a different security problem. The five types can be labeled as follows: "upstream producer" countries, "downstream producer" countries, "full cycle" countries, transshipment countries, and neighboring transshipment countries. ²⁰⁴ 

      The terms used to define these types of countries are non-standard in the existing literature and in the framework of international organizations that deal with drug trafficking control. Different agencies (national and international) use different types of scales to measure the amount of coca and cocaine produced in each country, and anyway the amounts of production are merely estimates, since completely reliable registers for the production of illicit crops and drugs cannot, by virtue of their illegality, exist. ²⁰⁵  Another important factor is that countries can shift from one type to the other over different periods of time as consumption patterns change and as production relocates as a result of the repression of coca-cocaine production. The same phenomenon is happening in the case of the recent development of a poppy heroin industry in Colombia.

      In defining of these four types of countries three variables are used:

• the estimated production of coca leaves, coca paste, cocaine base and CHCL (cocaine) and the percentage in the GNP of the country;
• the estimated number of workers employed in the coca-cocaine production and the their percentage of the EAP (Economic Active Population); ²⁰⁶  and
• the presence of criminal organizations specialized in the production and traffic of coca paste, cocaine base and CHCL in the national territories of these countries.

      This thesis does not develop an accurate set of indicators to measure each one of these variables, ²⁰⁷  but rather typifies South American countries according to the information given in the existing literature on the subject and the statistics provided by the national and international research and enforcement agencies. ²⁰⁸ 

      Drug trafficking, like any other industry, involves several steps from production to retail. This thesis focuses on the breakdown of this process among different countries, including determining the location of firms (criminal organizations specialized in cocaine traffic), workers (peasants), and where production of raw material (coca bush) occurs. It also examines which part of the conversion process is carried out in each of the countries under study as a variable for distribution between types.

      Upstream producer countries:

      These are the countries where the bulk of the coca leaf production is located. Up to the mid 1990s Peru was the first coca leaf producer followed by Bolivia. In these countries a high percentage of the peasant labor force is engaged in coca production and harvest (growers), transport of leaves to the maceration pits (zepes, or ants in Aymara language) and production of coca paste (stompers). The territories are used then for the production of the first two stages of cocaine production. In general terms, Bolivians and Peruvians manage the production of cocaine base and sell it to the Colombians. This distinction became fuzzy, however, in the late 1980s. First, the increase in the enforcement policies against the traffickers in Colombia during the Betancur and Barco administrations led to a relocation of CHCL laboratories in Bolivia. At the same time, the Bolivian traffickers began to manage their own CHCL production as the Medellín coalition was weakened by enforcement measures taken after the assassination in August 1989 of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán by members of the Medellín "cartel." ²⁰⁹  Second, Europe started to grow in importance as a consumption market. ²¹⁰  Since the mid-1980s there was an increase in cocaine consumption and crack in Western Europe. ²¹¹  At the same time, because of the saturation of the U.S. market for cocaine, the drug trafficking organizations based in South America started to increasingly look to Europe to sell their product. ²¹²  The traffickers were attracted the general prosperity of western Europe, by higher retail prices and by the decision of the European Community to progressively lower internal customs controls. ²¹³  While the Colombian traffickers started to expand to the new market and maintain control over the U.S. market, the Bolivian traffickers concentrated their activities in export operations to Europe . ²¹⁴  Moreover Ecuador and Venezuela became coca producers at the end of the 1980s as the coca eradication campaigns were intensified in Peru and Colombia and as the economic situation in these countries deteriorated with a decrease in oil prices (Venezuela's main export and Ecuador's second export). ²¹⁵  However, these two countries do not produce the same amount of coca leaves as do Bolivia and Peru, nor do they employ as high a percentage of the peasantry. ²¹⁶  In the context of this thesis, these countries will be considered as in the process of shifting from transshipment countries to upstream producer countries.

      Downstream producer countries:

      The paradigm case is Colombia. In this type of country the management of the final stage in the production of cocaine is located with the coca base imported from Bolivia and Peru. Colombia is the largest cocaine producer in the world. As the production of CHCL is capital-intensive the percentage of labor engaged in the coca-cocaine complex is lower than in Peru and Bolivia; moreover coca chewing is not a millenary tradition among the Colombian peasants and Indian tribes. Because of this the production of coca bush is not as widespread as in Bolivia and Peru. As explained in the last chapter, the major criminal organizations, which deal with the final processing and retailing of the product, are located in Colombian territory. Table 8 below illustrates the importance of the coca-cocaine industry in the Andean countries in the early 1990s. It is possible to see that the percentage of workers employed in the coca-cocaine industry in Colombia as compared to the total active economic population is significantly smaller than in the cases of Peru and Bolivia.

      

Table 1. The Coca-Cocaine Economies in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia
	Bolivia	Peru	Colombia
Hectares under cultivation (1990)	50,300	121,300	40,100
Production of coca (1990 metric tons)	116,000	138,000	32,000
Total value added (US $ millions)	659-911	498-1,219	1,127
Value added as percentage of GDP	15.6-20.5	1.5-3.7	2.9
Income remaining in the country (US $ Millions)	179-216	382-942	645
Income as percentage of legal exports	19.4-23.5	14.3-35.4	16.8
Workers employed in coca-cocaine	207,000	165,000-279,000	40,000
Workers as percentage of EAP	6.7-12.0	2.7-4.5	0.4

Source: Painter, James, Bolivia and Coca: A study in dependency, Boulder, Lynne Rienner,1994, p.51

      Transit countries and neighboring transshipment countries:

      Of the four types, the transit countries are the least difficult to define. In fact, this kind of country is defined in Article 1 of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:

"'Transit State' means a State through the territory of which illicit narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and substances in Table I and Table II are being moved, which is neither the place of origin nor the place of ultimate destination thereof. " ²¹⁷ 

      Transit countries function as "pit stops" for traders. A particular state may serve as a base for operations to set up a deal, for aircraft or ship refueling, and for recruitment of personnel required for such activities and protection. Some of these countries also play a major role as financial havens for the legitimization of "drug money" through the banking system, for purchases or investments in commercial and industrial activities, or as suppliers of the chemical inputs required in the production of cocaine. Argentina and Chile play this last role. Suriname is the main South American conduit for the cocaine that penetrates into Europe via the Netherlands. ²¹⁸  Even if there is no evidence of cocaine production in Surinamese territory, because of its geography and the weak presence of the state it could be used as a base for Brazilian or Colombian traffickers operating in the Brazilian Amazon.

      "Neighboring transshipment" countries are those countries that share all the characteristics mentioned above but also share borders with the producer countries. Therefore, these countries have a particular problematique concerning the possibility of spillover of drug trafficking activities to their territories and, consequently, the spillover effects of enforcement against the actors involved in drug trafficking activities in the producer countries.

      Full cycle countries:

      Only Brazil fulfills this type. Full cycle countries refer to those countries where the raw material is produced and completely processed. Another requirement is that these countries have local or foreign criminal organizations that manage all the stages of production (alone or through cooperation among them) and retail of the product. These countries do not depend on the importation of chemicals inputs (Brazil is a major producer of acetone and ether in South America). They also have their own channels for money laundering and their own big centers for the distribution, retail, and consumption of the final product (cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo).Brazil also became the major route of traffic going to Europe. ²¹⁹ 

      As enforcement grew in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia in the early 1980s, traffickers in these three countries moved part of their refinement laboratories to the Brazilian Amazon. ²²⁰  In the case of Colombia the traffickers moved their operations to Brazil also to be out of range of areas controlled by the guerrillas. The Bolivian traffickers started to use Brazil as an alternative route and as a zone for refinement far from the influence of the Colombian traffickers. The Peruvian peasants at the same time moved the growing areas towards the frontier with the Brazilian Amazon to escape from the eradication programs. And the traffickers started to encourage the Amazonian Indians to grow the ipadu (a native variant of the coca bush, which contains a lesser degree of alkaloids and is less productive than the Andean species). Manaus, located in the heart of the Amazon, became a center for the exit of cocaine and the traffic of cocaine paste towards the laboratories in the jungle. ²²¹ 

      Table 2 maps the position of each South American country in relation to the cocaine industry. Table 3 indicates which transshipment (including neighboring) countries play a significant role in the supply of chemical products used in the manufacture of cocaine and those which play a significant role in the legitimization of illegal capitals generated by drug trafficking (money laundering).

      

Table 2. Role of the South American countries in the cocaine industry
Country	Arg	Bol (4)	Bra	Col (2)	Chi	Ec	Gu	Par (1)	Per	Sur	Urg	Ven (3)
Upstream producer		X							X
Downstream producer				X
Full Cycle			X
Neighboring Transshipment	X				X	X		X
Transshipment							X			X	X	X
(1) Paraguay is the major South American producer of marijuana. (2) Colombia is increasingly becoming a producer of opium poppy and heroin. Some experimental small opium plantations have been detected in Ecuador and Peru. (3) Rapidly turning into an upstream producer since the late 1980s. (4) In fact since 1989 can be considered the second world producer of CHCL. Abbreviations: Arg., Argentina; Bol., Bolivia; Bra., Brazil; Col., Colombia; Chi.; Chile; Ec., Ecuador; Gu. Guyana; Par., Paraguay; Per., Peru; Sur., Suriname; Urg., Uruguay; Ve., Venezuela.

      

Table 3. Transit and Neighboring Transshipment Countries. Division of Labor
Country	Argentina	Chile	Ecuador	Guyana	Paraguay	Suriname	Venezuela	Uruguay
Production of chemical inputs	X	X					X
Money Laundering	X	X			X		X	X

      It is worth clarifying that none of these types are static. The role of countries may change depending on changes in the patterns of enforcement and changes in the market like drug consumption patterns. ²²²  Many changes occurred while this dissertation was being written; to explain each in great detail exceeds the timeframe of this work. However it is worth noticing that since the mid-1990s, it is increasingly difficult to talk about pure "downstream," "upstream," "transit," "neighboring transit," or full cycle states. As a result of enforcement in the Andean countries roles are constantly changing. As an example, since 1991 the Peruvian Air Force has been participating in the interception of illegal flights from the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Peruvian Amazon forest to Colombia. This "air bridge" denial strategy provoked a rise in local coca production in Colombia. Since the Colombian traffickers were confronted with rising costs of coca paste from Peru, they started to demand coca and coca paste from the local market. As stated in a recent report,

"The severing of the air link with Colombia is undeniable. But Colombian traffickers have found two solutions. They have greatly increased the production of coca leaves in their own country; and they have forced Peruvian growers to return to river transport (directly to Colombia), or by sea and by land (via Ecuador)." ²²³ 

      The settlers of the Amazon departments of Guaviare, Caquetá, Vaupés, Meta, and Vichada increased the production of coca and coca paste attracted by higher prices. In Caquetá and Guaviare coca and coca paste is produced under the protection of the FARC, which (under coercion) taxes the production. ²²⁴ 

      From 1995 onwards it is possible to say that Colombia occupies the second place in coca production after Peru, followed by Bolivia.

"With 60,000 to 70,000 hectares dedicated to illicit crops, Colombia has become the world's second coca leaf producer over the past two or three years-a ranking previously occupied by Bolivia." ²²⁵ 

      At the same time, and as a consequence of the disruption of the Medellín "cartel" in the early 1990's and the disruption of the Cali cartel in 1995, the local production of cocaine has reportedly been increasing steadily in Bolivia and Peru. ²²⁶ 

      In that sense the difference between upstream and downstream producer countries has become blurred. From 1995 on, for example, Colombia started to suffer some drug trafficking-related violence similar to that in Peru: regions controlled by guerrilla groups that protect coca-growing peasants from eradication teams. ²²⁷  Strictly speaking, if the Brazilian criminal organizations become major players in cocaine production, the distinction between transit and neighboring transit countries would also become blurred because nearly all the South American States share borders with Brazil.

      The security environment in terms the illicit traffic of cocaine is highly hostile in the South American states, because enforcement in one country implies a geographical shift in production across borders as well as a shift of traffic routes. This is quite disturbing considering that the cocaine traffickers develop their own paramilitary forces and their own intelligence networks, have a high corrupting power, and can control a part of the national territory where the state presence is weak. The threat originated in the security environment and stemming from the cocaine industry is enhanced, for both the core producer countries and their periphery, by another phenomenon: the weak nature of their states.

a) Sociopolitical cohesion (Legitimacy and Integration)

      States such as Peru and Bolivia never finished the process of consolidation as nation-states. Peru can be separated into three regions: the coast, the mountains (la sierra) and the jungle (Amazon). In the two last regions, the presence of the central government is almost non-existent and the communal and tribal identities among the Indian population lead to a sometimes-stronger loyalty towards non-state actors such as the mining and coca-grower trade unions. In both countries, ethnic differences in the case of the Indian population are a clear indication of social class. Indians are assimilated into the poorest sector of society. ²²⁹ 

      Ecuador shares similar characteristics in terms of a large and highly organized Indian population but does not share the problematique of being a coca/cocaine producer country. The analysis in this case would be based on speculations of what would happen if the conditions for Ecuador to become a coca-cocaine producer country appear. The country did not suffer the phenomenon of colonization and migration to potential coca producing areas as did Peru and Bolivia, and it is not a coca dependent country like Bolivia. ²³⁰ 

      As stated previously, this problematique is shared and enhanced in Suriname because of the recent process of nation-building and because the state is more deeply divided along religious and ethnic lines. These divisions are evident in the rise of ethnic guerrilla groups such as the Jungle Commando and the Tucayana discussed earlier in this chapter.

      There is one country where the fragmentation of society does not run along ethnic or cultural lines but stems from radical social differences in income and property distribution: Brazil. ²³¹  The idea of nation is strong among the population and there are no strong communal identities (with the exception of a minority of the Amazon Indian communities). However, the lack of access to land and the extreme poverty of the majority of the population are a permanent source of potential and spontaneous societal violence. Moreover, the difference between the black and white populations is not relevant for problems stemming from poverty and disparities, though it is true that the black population suffers from an even greater degree of social exclusion. As explained in the previous chapter, such an absence of ethnic or cultural divisions can be considered less fragmentary than situations in countries that have multiethnic and pluricultural non-integrated societies. Venezuela, and to a lesser extent Argentina, suffer from the same kind of social fragmentation. The relevant problem caused by this fragmentation is the phenomenon of formation of labor hand in the big cities for criminal organizations (not necessarily specialized in drug trafficking activities) that have established linkages with their counterparts in neighboring countries. This is the clear case of the favelas (shantytowns) of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and the shantytowns (barrios) of Caracas. This point will be stressed in the next sections of this chapter.

      Nine countries are in the process of consolidating their democratic regimes after long periods of military dictatorship: Argentina (1983>), Bolivia (1982>), Brazil (1985>), Chile (1989>), Ecuador (1979>), Uruguay (1985>), Peru (1981>), Paraguay (1989>), and Suriname (1991>). For some, such as Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Suriname, a high degree of institutional power and the participation of the armed forces in internal political affairs pose a serious threat for their democracies, as the authoritarian self-coup de main (autogolpe) of President Fujimori in Peru (1992) clearly illustrates.

      The cases of Suriname and Paraguay are explicit in the sense that factions of the armed forces directly involved in drug trafficking activities could easily overthrow a government and change the type of regime if there were attempts to prosecute or dismiss their leaders by the political power.

      A common characteristic of all the South American countries is that their democratic institutions are not fully developed. The only strong and fully legitimate institution is the figure of the elected president. They all share the same pattern of democratic institutionalization known as ' Delegative Democracies," defined by Guillermo O'Donnell as a regime in which

'The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests. The policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of his campaign [...] In this view, other institutions-courts and legislatures, for instance are nuisances that come attached to the domestic and international advantages of being democratically elected president'  ²³² 

      For these reasons, grave cases of corruption caused by illicit drug traffic matters could cause a lack of legitimacy of the political establishment and of the democratic regime. This last fact is particularly disturbing because of the almost endemic problem of corruption in South American societies and political and military elites.  ²³³ 

      Colombia and Peru are the only two South American countries where strong guerrilla movements are still in existence. Both states are facing guerrilla organizations that propose a radical change in the type of society and state or the kind of political regime. This contributes to the worsening of the problems posed by cocaine trafficking.

b) Policy capacity

      In terms of policy capacity it is possible to make a generalization not only for all the South American states but also for the rest of Latin America. No matter what differences exist in the capacity to extract resources from society and apply policies, since 1982 the policy capacity of these states has been strongly affected by the foreign debt crisis. In countries as such Bolivia and Peru, the debt crisis did two things. It accelerated a coca/cocaine boom in response to the increase in consumption in the U.S. by the end of the 1970s. It also reduced even further the capacity of these states to implement economic development and law enforcement policies aimed at arresting traffickers and supporting the legal economy in the face of a rising illegal industry.

      

Table 4. Total Disbursed External Debt (balance by years in millions of dollars)
Country	1980	1985	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Argentina	27162	49326	58473	63 314	62 233	58 413	59123	70600	79455	89719	99701
Bolivia	2340	3294	4043	3492	3768	3582	3784	3777	4216	4523	4366
Brazil	64 000	105 126	113 469	115 096	123 439	123 910	135 949	145 726	148295	159256	178131
Chile	11207	20403	18960	17520	18576	17319	18964	19665	21768	21736	23049
Colombia	6805	14063	17935	17586	17993	17335	17277	18942	21954	25050	28497
Ecuador	4167	8111	10669	11533	12222	12802	12795	13631	14589	13934	14586
Guyana	449	1308	1778	1801	1812	1873	2054	2062	2004	2058	1499
Paraguay	861	1772	2002	2027	1695	1666	1279	1254	1272	1361	1372
Peru	9595	13721	16493	18356	19996	20787	21409	26370	30214	33443	33643
Suriname	Nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	Nd	nd	nd	nd	nd
Uruguay	1165	3551	4239	4313	4472	4141	4136	4293	4959	5193	5367
Venezuela	26963	31238	35876	33812	35528	36000	38447	40836	41160	38460	35277

Source : United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook, various years.

      Between 1982 and 1985, net capital income had exceeded net payment of profits and interest giving rise to a real transfer of resources from the rest of the world to Latin America, of around US $ 15 billion per annum. From the second half of 1982 onward, these flows changed to real transfers from Latin America to the rest of the world, amounting to US $ 30 billion per annum in the four-year period that followed, remaining between US $ 20 and 30 billion per annum during the 1990s. ²³⁴  As explained by an analyst,

"Between 1982 and 1985, the real transfer of resources from Latin America abroad was made possible through an adjustment, by reducing domestic demand, which for the brief period of time in which it had to be made , widely exceeded the extent of the transfer itself [...]The adverse trends caused by the external debt could not but have negative social consequences too. First, the per capita product contracted 85% between 1980 and 1989, with very significant drops of over 20% in Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela [...]On the other hand, very high unemployment rates up to 20% of the working population reappeared, and in some cases appeared for the first time. For Latin America as a whole, unemployment rates increased by 30% between 1980 and 1984. The financial problems of the State led to cutbacks in social spending, which had been disproportionately affected owing to the reduction in tax revenues and to greater interest payments by the State. Thus there was a reduction in the satisfaction of basic education, health care , social security and housing needs..." ²³⁵ 

      This economic crisis acted at once as a cure and a disease. In some ways it contributed to reducing the legitimacy of military governments that were unable to cope with the control of recession and hyperinflation as in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. On the other hand it created a real crisis of governabiltiy in the sense that the new democratic regimes were unable to cope with the increasing demands of their populations nor even provide the most basic social services. ²³⁶  The extreme cases were countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia where the capacity and even the infrastructure of the state were almost already non-existent in some areas. The following tables give some economic indicators that illustrate some of the effects of the foreign debt crisis suffered by the South American states in the early 1980s.

      

Table 5. Growths of per capita gross domestic product, at constant market prices
Country	1980-1985	1985-1990	1980-1990	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Argentina	-2.9	-1.4	-2.1	-1.9	8.5	8.1	4.3	6.1	-6.2	2.2
Bolivia	-3.8	0.1	-1.9	2.3	2.8	-0.8	1.8	2.1	1.3	1.5
Brazil	-1.2	-0.1	-0.7	-6.3	-1.5	-2.6	3.0	4.3	2.5	1.8
Chile	-1.8	4.5	1.3	1.6	5.4	8.7	4.2	2.5	6.5	5.6
Colombia	0.5	2.7	1.6	1.8	-0.4	2.0	3.8	4.1	4.0	0.5
Ecuador	-0.9	-0.8	-0.9	0.8	3.0	1.4	0.3	2.5	0.5	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	-0.5	-1.1	1.3	0.2	1.8	-1.6
Peru	-2.8	-3.8	-3.3	-7.1	0.9	-2.6	4.0	11.9	6.0	0.7
Suriname	Nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd	nd
Uruguay	-4.1	3.1	-0.6	0.1	2.6	7.2	2.7	5.8	-2.9	4.2
Venezuela	-6.4	0.0	-3.2	4.4	7.1	3.6	-1.6	-4.8	1.3	-3.5
Guyana	-4.0	-2.8	-3.4	-5.2	7.3	10.2	7.4	8.4	3.6	2.0

Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook, various years.

      

Table 6. Per capita gross domestic product at constant market prices (Dollars at 1990 prices)
Country	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Argentina	7363.2	2908.8	4345.7	4713.4	5093.4	5312.4	5636.4	5287.5	5401.9
Bolivia	936.3	1105.3	795.7	818.1	811.7	825.9	843.3	854.6	867.4
Brazil	1950.7	1562.5	3145.9	2675.9	2606.4	2684.1	2799.7	2870.7	2921.3
Chile	2030.5	1857.8	2319.6	2443.9	2656.0	2767.8	2836.1	3021.2	3190.4
Colombia	1052.2	1081.4	1235.6	1230.8	1255.5	1303.3	1356.7	1411.4	1417.8
Ecuador	1275.6	1218.0	1041.0	1119.2	1178.3	1302.6	1479.9	1565.4	1627.5
Paraguay	1428.6	1259.4	1247.9	1439.9	1445.3	1500.9	1664.2	1860.3	1936.6
Peru	1192.7	925.1	1675.3	1941.0	1873.3	1769.5	2147.4	2503.5	2524.3
Suriname	2515.7	2602.6	4428.3	5214.2	7082.0	15223.8	1176.5	1265.7	1816.7
Uruguay	3477.6	1568.9	2690.4	3211.2	3765.4	4360.8	5095.2	5607.4	5899.5
Venezuela	3923.7	3615.8	2492.0	2676.8	2955.9	2871.8	2732.7	3542.7	3161.7

Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook, various years.

      

Table 7. Public Sector balance sheet at current prices (as a percentage of the Gross National product)*

Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), América Latina y el Caribe Quince Años Después: De la década perdida a la transformación económica,1980-1985, Santiago de Chile, Fondo de Cultura Económica,1996, p.49

      NNFPS= national non-financial public sector; NFPS: non-financial public sector; HS: without computing the accumulated income generated by privatization (hypothetical situation); CPS: consolidated public sector.

      Moreover, the policies recommended by international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Club of Paris ended the hyper inflationary crisis but did not increase the capacity of the state since they were based on radical cuts in public expenditure. At the same time the extractive capacity of the state (taxes) in all these countries is very weak. As explained by an analyst,

"La crise de l'endettement et les "recommendations" du FMI ont eu pour effet, à des rythmes divers selon le pays, de mettre partout en oeuvre le même type de recettes pour vaincre l'inflation qui rongeait ces pays: diminuton drastique des déficit budgétaires, privatisation des entreprises publiques, abandon de soutiens publics à certaines productions on a donc assisté a un abandon spectaculaire par l'etat des tâches qu'il remplissait traditonellement..." ²³⁷ 

      Colombia stands as a case apart in the fact that it is the only country in the region that did not have a debt crisis. ²³⁸  In fact the country profited from an export boom in both legal and illegal agricultural exports. On the legal side Colombia benefited from a rise in coffee prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However the country also benefited from the rise of marijuana trafficking during the 1970s and from the beginning of the cocaine boom that started to take place in the late 1970s. ²³⁹ 

      According to an analyst, the weakness in the policy capacity of the Colombian state stems from the historical lack of legitimacy of its close, restrictive, and clientelistic political regime. This fact has led people to a lack of respect for the legal system, of the national institutions and also to resort to violence as a way for satisfying social demands. As noted by an analyst,

"Colombia's economic development has a dark side reflected in the country's deep and continuous socioeconomic problems. Indeed, Colombia has experienced a growing institutional crisis in which old political and legal frameworks have become increasingly unable to cope with social conflicts and economic change, and the political regime has suffered an erosion of its legitimacy....The growing erosion of the Colombian regime's legitimacy has caused a growing gap between the legal norms of social, political, and economic behavior, and socially accepted behavior; that is, a gap between the de jure and de facto social norms. This deep institutional crisis has symptomatically manifested itself in several ways such as an extremely high levels of violence, the growth of a large informal economy, widespread rent-seeking and predatory economic behavior and an increasingly weaker and more ineffective state." ²⁴⁰ 

      Colombia, then, presents a paradoxical case. In the rest of South America the debt crisis precipitated in a sense the fall of authoritarian political regimes but also reduced the capacity of the state and made the transition to new democratic regimes difficult. On the other hand, Colombia as an "island" unaffected by the debt crisis could not however transform its economic wealth into development due to the lack of capacity of the state stemming basically from the fact that its type of democratic regime lacked legitimacy. ²⁴¹  As explained by the Colombian economist Francisco Thoumi,

"The growing complexity and size of the state increased in the incentives and payoffs of clientelistic and other rent-seeking behavior in Colombia. Economic policies, laws, and regulations with redistributive implications promoted the growth of rent-seeking organizations that succeeded in getting the government to formulate policies that clearly benefited narrowly defined economic interests. Since many of these policies are perceived by a large proportion of the population as benefiting small groups rather than society at large, breaking the rules and regulations [like paying taxes for example] imposed by the government is considered by most Colombians as a legitimate action, greatly contributing to weakening the state." ²⁴² 

      This lack of state capacity, as cynically (but accurately) analyzed by Thoumi, was not only one of the conditions that allowed the cocaine industry to rise in Colombia, but also restricted the government's ability to effectively deal with the problem.

"[t]he government cannot really try to eliminate the industry through repressive measures or confiscate assets accumulated by those involved in the business, because the state is too weak, the level of violence required is too high, and so much of the industry's capital is invested outside Colombia. Moreover, the large amount of 'clean' hidden capital in Colombia cannot possibly be separated from the 'dirty' capital that the government might like to confiscate." ²⁴³ 

c) Territorial centrality

      In all South American states (with the exception of Chile and Uruguay) there is a weak territorial and functional presence of the state. The governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia have never exercised full control over their national territories. Vast sections of eastern and southeastern Peru, and southern Colombia have always been a political no-man's land. The same can be said of the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Brazilian Amazon regions and practically all the territory of Suriname and Guyana.

      All these states dealt with guerrilla movements during the 1960s and 1970s. ²⁴⁴  Two countries still coexist with insurgent groups: ²⁴⁵  Peru since the early 1980's and Colombia since the 1960's. In Chile and Ecuador, too, there still exist weak leftist urban guerrilla organizations: respectively, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, formed during Pinochet's military dictatorship, and the Alfaro Vive Carajo! Movement, which arose during the mid 1980s. ²⁴⁶  Especially in Peru, Colombia, and Chile (during the military dictatorship), the formation of rightist paramilitary organizations (Colombia) and high levels of state repression and human rights violations characterize the repression of these guerrilla movements. ²⁴⁷ 

      In all of the Southern Cone--but in Argentina in particular the early 1980's--military dictatorships were characterized by massive human rights violations and high levels of repression even if, as in the case of Argentina, the existent guerrilla movements had been crushed by the late 1970's. ²⁴⁸ 

      The strength of guerrilla movements is measured in terms of the nature of the territorial centrality of the state. In this way a guerrilla movement will be considered strong or not depending on the amount of people and territory under its control. The larger this control, the lower the monopoly of authoritative binding rule making, backed by a monopoly on the means of physical violence. This means that in the areas controlled by guerrilla movements, this monopoly will be either disputed by the state or it will be fully exercised by the guerrilla group.

      Bearing these definitions in mind, only the Colombian insurgent movements and Shining Path in Peru will be considered as relevant and strong guerrilla groups. These groups posed a serious threat to the continuity of the political regime in each of the countries mentioned and controlled considerable areas of the Peruvian (Huallaga Valley, Puno, Ayacucho, Apurimac departments, shantytowns of Lima) and Colombian, (the south of the country and the border with Venezuela) territory and population.

      Minor groups which appeared in the early 1980's and were easily crushed by the government--such as Bandera Roja (Venezuela), Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Chile), Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari (Bolivia), Movimiento Todos Por la Patria (Argentina), and Alfaro Vive Carajo (Ecuador)--will not be considered in this thesis as relevant for analysis. ²⁴⁹ 

d) Socioeconomic development

      If we consider the second part of the definition of socioeconomic development given in the first chapter, ²⁵⁰  it is possible to affirm that the South American states are still, to different extents, dependent countries since none of them has fully developed the capacity to generate the complete cycle of accumulation and expansion of capital within their economic systems. Even though countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia have developed diversified economies, large domestic markets, and local industries, they still confront the problem of being in a situation where they do not have the local capacity to enlarge the scale of capital. They are dependent in terms of the creation of new technologies and financial support. As explained by Cristóbal Kay,

"Despite the increasing presence of transnational corporations (TNCs) in Latin America there has been little technological diffusion, which has confirmed dependency theory's critique of TNCs. Government policy has failed to develop an indigenous technological capacity in Latin America and could have acted more decisively to ensure that TNCs made a contribution to this process. Nevertheless Brazil and to some extent Mexico have acquired some competitive technological capacity largely as a consequence of a purposeful industrial policy. But with the new electronics and communications technological revolution the more advanced economies have gained a further competitive advantage over the less developed countries (LDCs). This has further increased the technological dependence of most LDCs." ²⁵¹ 

      Other countries including Suriname, Ecuador, and Bolivia face a more serious problematique since their economies are still based on the production or extraction of a single product subject to international price fluctuations (bauxite in the case of Suriname, bananas and oil for Ecuador and tin and natural gas in the case of Bolivia). This, combined with cultural, climatic, and social factors was, as it will be illustrated later, a determinant fact in the rise of coca/cocaine production in Bolivia to the level of a parallel national illegal economy.

      As far as the first part of the definition of socioeconomic development as "underdevelopment" is concerned, this aspect will be measured using the indicators used by the United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Conference for trade and Development. ²⁵²  In order to measure the level of development of a country, the tables included in the annexes to this work will enable the reader to compare the relative "underdevelopment" of the South American states.These "basic indicators of development" are divided into economic indicators and social indicators as the table below shows. In the absence of a commonly accepted division between economic and social indicators this has been done arbitrarily by the author. ²⁵³  These indicators include at the same time those given in Table 6 of the same chapter. The data for each country is included in a separate annex.

      

Table 8. Basic indicators of development
Economic:	Social:
Population Area Density Total and per capita GDP Annual average growth rates of total and per capita real gross domestic product at market prices GDP by type of expenditure GDP by kind of economic activity Transport Labor Force ( percentage in agriculture, industry and Services) Transport (Merchant Fleet in tons, Commercial vehicles in use, length of railway network, length of road network )	Population Vital statistics ( Urban Population as a percentage of total population, Crude birth rate, Crude death rate, Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births, Life expectancy at birth) Health (Proportion of infants immunized-measles and poliomyelitis- , Percentage of the Population with access to water-rural and urban-, Population per physician) Education and Culture (Illiteracy rate, Enrollment ratios-combined primary and secondary and Third level, Educational expenditure as a percentage of GNP, Number of radio receivers in use)

      The following tables provide a general map of the variables that measure the nature of the South American States (except for socioeconomic development represented in the annex). For the variable "sociopolitical cohesion" only the years immediately preceding the 1980s are considered and not the whole political history of each country.

      

Table 9. Sociopolitical cohesion of South American states
	Ar.	Bol.	Bra.	Col.	Chi.	Ec.	Gu	Par.	Peru	Sur.	Urg.	Ven.
Fragile Political Legitimacy	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Fragmented Societies along income disparities and land access	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Incomplete Nation Building		x	x			x	x		x	x
"Weblike Societies" 254		x				x	x		x	x
Strong loyalties to communal ethnic and religious groups		x				x	x		x	x
High levels of political violence
Conspicuous use of force by the state in domestic political life	1976 1983	x	1967 1985	x	x	x		x	x	x	19731985
Conspicuous role of political police in every day lives of citizens	19761983	1979 1981	19671985		19731989	up to 1979		1954 1989	x	1978 1988 1990 1991	19731985
Major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state	19701983	1964 1970	1968 1972	x	1970 1989				x	1986 1991	1966 1973	1964 1969
Contending national identities within the state		x	X		x	x			x	x
High degree of control over the media	1976 1983	?			1973 1989	up to 1979		up to 1999	x	1979 1988	1973 1985

      

Table 10. Policy Capacity
	Ar.	Bol.	Bra.	Col.	Chi.	Ec.	Gu.	Par.	Per.	Sur.	Urg.	Ven.
Rigid policy capacity	x	x	X	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Inefficient state apparatus	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
High levels of political corruption	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

      

Table 11. Territorial Centrality
	Ar.	Bol.	Bra.	Col.	Chi.	Ec.	Gu.	Par.	Per.	Sur.	Urg.	Ven.
Weak presence of the state in frontier zones and areas outside the major cities	x	x	X	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
Strong non-state organized armed groups other than guerrillas and including them	1970 1983	x	X	x					x	x	1966 1972	1964 1965
Abbreviations and brief description: Ar. Argentina; Bol. Bolivia; Bra. Brazil; Col. Colombia; Chi. Chile; Ec. Ecuador; Gu. Guyana; Par. Paraguay; Per. Peru; Sur. Suriname; Urg. Uruguay; Ven. Venezuela An "x" is used to indicate that a problem is present in a country. Bigger "x"s are used for the more representative cases where the problem poses serious threats against the state. Periods of time indicate the years in which certain vulnerabilities have been present when the vulnerability is not current.

      Because of their security environment and because of the nature of their states, no country in South American can be considered a strong state. As stated in Chapter I using the indicators displayed above, the South American states could be typified on a continuum ranging from strong states to weak states. The indicators could be used as a cumulative index. The more conditions of weakness a state accumulates, the closer it will be to the weak. This continuum is not static; states can move along it depending on the changes in their security environment or increases or decreases in their vulnerabilities.

      A country such as Argentina, for example, evolved from a situation of high levels of political violence characterized by the coexistence of leftist guerrillas and far right paramilitary groups in the 70's and a highly repressive military dictatorship in the late 70's and early 80's (and a military defeat by Great Britain in 1982) to a situation of decreasing levels of political violence, the absence of active guerrilla groups, and a process of democratic consolidation following the transition to democracy in 1983. Venezuela, on the other hand, evolved from a situation of long-lasting economic prosperity and a stable (although restrictive) democratic regime in the 1960s to a situation of political instability and economic crisis in the late 1980s. These aspects will be deeply analyzed in the chapters concerning the country cases. Subsequent sections will illustrate that the Andean states suffered a special combination of political and economic factors at the end of the seventies that led them to be particularly affected by the rise of the cocaine industry in their national territories.

      Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru could be placed close to the 'weak state' pole. The vulnerability of the state fostered the rise of the drug industry, which became a threat to the state. Drug trafficking also deepened the vulnerability of the state intensifying the threat dimensions posed by this illegal industry.

      Peru and Bolivia are both examples of states with a very low sociopolitical cohesion because of their almost permanent political instability and the fact that the Indian population is not fully identified with the state. Neither country has had a stable legitimate regime during their history, whether democratic or authoritarian, until the early 1980's (1980 for Peru and 1981 for Bolivia). To use a strong example, Bolivia has seen more "coups d'état" than years of independent political history.

      Colombia moved from a period of civil war between the two main parties, Liberal and Conservative, (La Violencia 1948-1958) to a restrictive regime characterized by an agreed automatic alternance of both parties and an agreed distribution of all important political positions. This assured the continuity of the political regime from 1958 but created the conditions for the rise of guerrilla groups such as the M-19 that opted for an armed solution since Conservatives and Liberals monopolized the peaceful competition. ²⁵⁵ 

      As stated previously, the problem of political violence has to be added in the case of Peru to the other present indicators of weakness. Groups like Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) , who exploited the historical oppression and exclusion of the Indian masses as a mobilizing factor, were successful in their efforts to further weaken state control.

      In the extreme case of Bolivia, the deep underdevelopment and dependency of the state accentuates even more the inability of the state to cope with simple matters like the payment of public officials' salaries, a problem that is shared with Peru. This factor will also condition the way in which these states are able to determine in an autonomous way the kind of policies to be adopted to control illegal coca and cocaine production, as well as the way in which these policies can be applied. Another important factor is that as these states are fully indebted and have dependent economies, they can easily be influenced by drug control policies of the United States, which traditionally pursues the solution of the internal drug consumption by attempting to eliminate the supply abroad. As it will be explained in the next chapters, the enforcement measures encouraged or even demanded by the United States only worsen the problem.

a) Drug trafficking organizations

      In the period under study, the best-organized and stronger criminal organizations of traffickers in South America were the Colombian and the Bolivian traffickers. Peruvian organizations were fully subordinated to the Colombian traffickers. The Brazilian traffickers supported the Peruvian, Bolivian, and Colombian groups who shifted their operations to the Brazilian Amazon by acting as intermediaries. Their drug activities are generally limited to transportation and retail. Such is the case of the Commando Vermelho (Red Command) in Rio de Janeiro, which transports to supply the Brazilian megalopolis and is also involved in prostitution and illegal gambling. ²⁸⁹ 

      In the case of Colombia, the traffickers were organized in two loosely articulated coalitions of criminal groups centered in the cities of Medellín and Cali. They accounted for 70 to 80 % of Colombian cocaine production. The remaining 20 to 30 % lay mostly in the hands of independent trafficking groups based in Pereira, Bogota and the north coast of Colombia. ²⁹⁰ An informal division of labor existed between the leaders of each organization. In the case of the Medellín coalition, for example,

"Pablo Escobar specialized in security for the organization, Jorge Luis Ochoa and his brothers took responsibility for the distribution networks in Florida and California and Carlos Lehder assumed responsibility for air transportation into the United States."  ²⁹¹ 

      Colombia's cocaine establishment is not monolithic.In the early 1980s a sense of cooperation existed among the major cocaine bosses, but significant disputes began emerging in the middle and latter parts of the decade. These disputes centered on issues such as ideology, economic competition (turf wars), and differences in operating philosophy. A radical-conservative split occurred between Carlos Lehder (violently anti-establishment trafficker) and his colleagues of the Medellín coalition. A more important dispute between the Medellín and Cali coalitions arose largely from economic factors but also reflected differences in tactics. For example, the most significant division involved those who advocated violence (the Rodríguez Gacha-Escobar wing of the Medellín coalition) and traffickers (including some Medellín bosses) who favored a more conciliatory approach toward the authorities. ²⁹²  These coalitions were relatively decentralized and amorphous. These are not bureaucracies in the Weberian sense, but rather coalitions or confederations with fluid boundaries. The coalitions are organized through a complicated system of contracts and subcontracts or "joint ventures" between different organizations. There were differences in the structure of authority of the Medellín and Cali coalitions. As stated by Rensselaer Lee III and Patrick Clawson,

"In Medellín a single kingpin-Pablo Escobar- exercised a vast sway over trafficking operations that, Escobar's mantle of leadership, his access to the means of violence, and his rightness domination of smaller exporters held the coalition together and established its identity. The Cali coalition, by contrast, is a relatively loose association of exporters; no single head or heart drives it." ²⁹³ 

      Because of the absence of a hierarchical and vertical structure within the coalitions, the capture or death of one of its leaders may weaken them but is not enough to disrupt cocaine production and traffic. Moreover, it multiplies the number of players and increases the market share of competing coalitions (as it happened with the Cali coalition after the arrest or death of most of the leaders of the Medellín coalition). As again pointed out by Clawson and Lee III in reference to the death of Pablo Escobar in 1993,

"Part of the old coalition [....] continued to export cocaine as of 1995, but Medellín's overall market share has diminished drastically -to as little as 10 to 20 percent compared to 70 to 80 percent in the late 1980s. Also according to numerous reports, the new leaders have set about mending relations with the Cali cartel. Some organizations crossover from the fractured Medellín group to Cali" might have occurred in the post-Escobar period." ²⁹⁴ 

      Also according to a Drug Enforcement Administration report that refers to the major blow against the Cali "cartel" in 1995,

"The death of Jose Santacruz-Londono[sic] and the arrest or surrender of such major traffickers as Victor Patino[sic], Jose Castrillon Henao and Juan Carlos Ramirez Abadia[sic] (aka 'Chupeta') have disrupted some Cali drug mafia drug trafficking operations. The Cali drug mafia per se, however, has not been dismantled in that Cali drug lord Helmer 'Pacho' Herrera remains at large and the Rodriguez-Orejuela [sic] brothers continue to manage aspects of their trafficking organizations from prison. DEA reporting suggests, however, that a new generation of relatively young North Coast, Northern Valle del Cauca, and Cali traffickers will attempt to exploit any 'power vacuum' created by the arrests of the Cali drug lords. The Henao Montoya brothers, for example, appear to be seeking to increase their power and influence relative to the Cali 'old guard.' One important result of this heightened competition between rival Colombian trafficking groups has been an increase in drug-related violence." ²⁹⁵ 

      As pointed out in the previous chapter, the weakening of the Colombian based coalitions led to a decentralization of the industry and to a proliferation of important players in the sense that Bolivian and, to a lesser extent, Peruvian organizations started producing their own cocaine and establishing their own transport and distribution networks.

      In Bolivia, the illicit drug traffic is not managed by coalitions of criminal organizations but by 20 to 30 organizations (often referred to as "families" due to the fact that most of the businesses are managed by landowner families) with serious conflicts and grievances between them. ²⁹⁶ 

      The common factor between the Colombian and Bolivian criminal organizations is that in both cases the traffickers constitute private fiefs or para-welfare states and para-military organizations. They occupy the political space left by the weak (Colombian and Bolivian) states and win support and legitimacy among the populations by developing infrastructures (roads, electric power, houses, etc.) Government officials are easily bought and, in this way, they are able to secure broad control over much of the national territory. The following quoted statements both give examples of the para-state capabilities of the drug traffickers in terms of welfare policies and firepower:

"The narcos dispensed largesse in villages squires, installing street lighting, erecting clinics and even building a Casa de Cultura with 5,000 books. Rivero, who was a sociable type, gave sumptuous parties and was well liked. In 1989 he was the target of a major night-time assault on Santa Ana by joint DEA and Bolivian police forces, but the whole town, including Rivero's bodyguards rose in armed resistance, prompting a shootout in which four people were killed." ²⁹⁷ 

"Roberto Suarez paved streets and restored churches in Santa Ana and supplied electric generators and water pumps to other small communities in the Beni. He developed a system for supplying medical services by air to villages living in the remotest parts of the region. He reportedly provided scholarships to young Beni residents for technical or college education abroad. Finally, according to a foreign coca expert who regularly visits Bolivia, Roberto Suarez and other traffickers virtually reconstructed a town in northwestern Bolivia (San Buenaventura, in La Paz department), providing roads, a police [!!!] station, a post office and a school, as well as a hotel and a restaurant." ²⁹⁸ 

"Perhaps the archetype of mafia civic leaders is Pablo Escobar [...] Escobar's showpiece project 'Medellín Without Slums', was launched in 1982 to build 2,000 new housing units for poor families in that city. 'Medellín Without Slums', said Medellín Cívico [Escobar´s financed newspaper], would provide a new 'live of noble dignity' for families that had been living in a 'pestilential inferno of garbage'. The project was later scaled back to 1,000 units and only 450 dwellings were actually completed. Escobar's troubles with the law- especially his implication in the death of Lara Bonilla- prevented the full realization of his ambitious plan. [...] Escobar also seemed to have a special interest in sports facilities for the poor. He built, outfitted, and illuminated 80 sport arenas in Medellín and surrounding communities in Antioquía. In another famous project, Escobar and some relatives reportedly built an immense zoological park at 'Napoles -a family estate located near Puerto Triunfo, 180 km from Medellín. The zoo is [was] open to the public, and entry is free of charge." ²⁹⁹ 

"With a gross income of more than $8 billion a year, traffickers can easily afford to stockpile large arsenals of automatic weapons - such as AK 47, Uzis, AR-15 and Galil rifles, and M-16 guns), grenades, rocket launchers, and ground-to-ground rifles. They also may have purchased ground-to -air missiles, but there is no evidence that those missiles have been deployed [ ....] the Medellín Mafia, at least until recently, ran several training schools for paramilitary operatives. Former Israeli Army and British Strategic Air Services (SAS) personnel were hired as instructors..." ³⁰⁰ 

"Traffickers also need transport; they buy Cessna 206s from Santa Cruz or Miami for about $60,000 a piece, removing identity plates to make it more difficult for police to trace them. Others steal planes from remote ranches in Brazil, Peru or Bolivia, confident that owners will not risk their lives by reporting the incident. Weapons, used by bodyguards to defend the labs, are imported through Colombia from the U.S. or Europe. The most common are Israeli made Uzis, Belgian FALs and Russian AK-47s, but U.S.-made assault rifles have also been found. Security is backed up by a complex intelligence network made up of scores of radio operators and looks-outs posted in the jungle and in cities like Santa Cruz and Cochabamba." ³⁰¹ 

      In both cases the traffickers constitute a strong destabilizing political force, not because their goal is to assume the political control of the state or to radically change the political regime or the type of society, but because of the means of coercive violence and corruption that they develop to protect their illegal business from the control of the state. As such, they constitute a major political threat to the state. ³⁰² 

      In Colombia, the pattern of violence in the period under study was by far higher than in Bolivia, where enforcement activities are centered on coca eradication instead of the disruption of criminal organizations. Moreover, as in Peru, in Colombia there is a pattern of interaction between drug trafficking activities and guerrilla movements.

      The important point is that these organizations are transnational and therefore add a transnational dimension to the problem, involving all the countries in the region. The Colombian traffickers establish alliances with their counterparts in Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil; use legal institutions to expand their criminal activities; are involved in corruption activities concerning political officials in other South American; and involve private and national banks in money laundering activities. These organizations purchase land in neighboring countries for use as a base for their traffic operations or simply as an investment to legitimize their illicit profits. They also establish alliances with or directly buy-off authoritarian leaders in order to use their countries as transit and money laundering centers. The case of Paraguay during the Stroessner dictatorship is a paradigm is in this sense. Also, although Panama escapes the regional scope analyzed in this work, the dictatorship of General Noriega can also be taken as an example.

b) The myths of the "narco-guerrilla" connection

      In Peru and Colombia, the security problem caused by the illicit drug traffic is worsened by the existence of guerrilla organizations. Both countries exhibit different patterns of interaction between the guerrillas, the traffickers, and the coca-grower peasants. Before explaining these patterns it is worth clarifying the meaning of the terms 'narco-guerrillas' and 'narco -terrorism'.

      Both terms were used by the Reagan and Bush administrations to refer to an "unholy" alliance between drug traffickers and guerrillas against western interests and South American democracies. However, such an alliance never existed. The relationship between both groups is conflictive and violent, and they only establish sporadic "marriages of convenience" if their interests overlap or when they operate in the same geographic zones.

      The interests of both groups do not coincide: the traffickers pursue only the survival (and expansion) of their business and not the destruction of political institutions (it is a better tactic to corrupt them), while the guerrillas seek a change of political regime and a change in the mode of production of their societies.  ³⁰³  As stated by one analyst,

"[m]ost narcotics traffickers are not natural revolutionaries. They seek to buy into, to manipulate, and sometimes to coerce the political system, but not to change it in a fundamental way. Some of the Mafia's actions -for example, the murders of prominent antidrug crusaders in Colombia- are destabilizing. However, the aim of Mafia violence is creating a secure environment for business operations, not upsetting the political status quo. Given their limited objectives, drug traffickers do not typically engage in terrorism; the do not, for example, target public buildings, military bases, industrial property, or the civilian population at large [...] In general, the stronger and more developed the trafficking organization, the less likely it is to collaborate with guerrillas [...] In Colombia, conflict has been intensified by the cocaine Mafia's purchase of large estates in areas where guerrilla strongholds." ³⁰⁴ 

      The term "guerrilla" is used here to refer to a type of warfare driven by an irregular army or revolutionary group against a regular one. The objective of this combat is not military but political: to destroy the existing institutions by provoking radical social and political changes. "Terrorism" is the use of violence for political ends, driven by political groups. This includes any use of violence for the purpose of causing fear in the general public or in any particular sector. The drug trafficking organizations can participate in bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, and kidnappings to influence the political choices of the government, but these actions are not part of a clear political program. These activities can be defined as narcoterrorism, but the traffickers are not a group with clear and coherent political ends, as are guerrilla organizations. Nevertheless, the fact that they interact and operate in the same zones renders both problems more difficult to solve.

      From an etymological point of view, narcoterrorism (terrorist actions committed by the traffickers against the government) and narcoguerrilla, (a term used to refer to a non-existent alliance between the guerrillas and the traffickers), are terms which refer to two different phenomena.

      In Colombia, the relations between the ten Colombian guerrilla organizations--and more particularly between the two larger ones, FARC and M-19 ³⁰⁵ --and the drug trafficking organizations are very conflictive. This is because the traffickers could be considered a "new rising bourgeoisie." ³⁰⁶  As their economic wealth grew, they came to purchase and manage large extensions of land and cattle and became targets for Colombian guerrillas. In 1981, all the major traffickers agreed to form a paramilitary group named MAS (death to the kidnappers) in order to retaliate against the aggression of guerrilla groups. They received the help of the landowners and the implicit support of the army.

      FARC and M-19, as well as the Army of National Liberation (ELN), finance the purchase of their weapons by taxing traffickers and coca growing peasants with a "revolutionary tax." The revolutionary tax is a mechanism of racketeering, which is broadly used in the zones controlled by the guerrilla groups. But it is only effective against small independent organizations. The big criminal organizations do not need the protection of the guerrillas. They can afford large private armies to effectively retaliate against the extortion of the guerrilla groups.

      This pattern of extortion is used also against the landowners or multinational oil companies. From this point of view, one may speak of "cattle-guerrillas" and "oil-guerrillas." If there are cases of cooperation, they are sporadic and are based on pragmatic calculations. The trafficker Carlos Lehder was suspected to have collaborated with the M-19 group in the capture of the Colombian Supreme Court building in 1985. The army stormed the building, killing not only the guerrilleros but also half of the Supreme Court judges (who were investigating drug trafficking affairs), and started a fire that burned files concerning the extradition of the major drug bosses. But this was an isolated case. With the exception of Lehder, all the kingpins shared a common cause against the guerrillas.

      In Peru, the pattern of interaction is much more complicated. Peru is the leading coca leaf producer in the world, and thousands of Peruvian peasants in the Alto and Bajo Huallaga valleys in the northeast Peruvian Andes are involved in the activity. The latter region and the Peruvian Amazon is virtually divided into red zones (controlled by Sendero Luminoso) and white zones (controlled by the Peruvian traffickers). Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist group, bases its revolutionary strategy on the mobilization of the peasant masses. The coca industry is an invaluable political tool for this revolutionary movement. The pattern of interaction can be summarized in the following way:

1. U.S. pressures the Peruvian government,
2. the Peruvian government uses special units of the police (UMOPAR) and the army to eradicate coca plantations,
3. Sendero intervenes to protect the peasants against the police-army forces,
4. Sendero wins popular support,
5. Sendero members purchase their weapons by taxing the peasants with a "revolutionary fifth" in coca paste (which is in turn sold to the traffickers) or in money,
6. Sendero extorts the traffickers by taxing them and demanding better prices for the peasants.

      As the Peruvian traffickers are weakly organized, most of the time they are compelled to pay the revolutionary taxes and in some cases they cooperate with the guerrillas by sharing information about the police position and movements. But the most important pattern of interaction here is the 'Robin Hood' role played by the guerrillas between the traffickers and the peasants. ³⁰⁷ 

      The Peruvian dilemma is that the cheapest way (as well as the method imposed and financed by the United States) to eliminate the coca production is to eradicate the plantations (manually or with the utilization of herbicides). By doing this, the government enhances the power and popularity of Sendero. The Peruvian army opted to avoid involvement in eradication activities and concentrated their activities on anti-guerrilla operations. Without stronger support from the U.S., unilaterally or through the UNDCP, to develop alternative crops and alternative economic activities for the Peruvian peasants, this dilemma will not be resolved. Since the mid-1980s, enforcement in Peru has become a problem for Brazil because the traffickers switched their activities to the Brazilian Amazon and started to pay the Indians in cash or equipment for the production of the Amazonian variation of coca or ipadu.

c) The peasants

      If there is a country where a real narco-guerrilla could exist, this country is Bolivia. Bolivia has a historical tradition of strong and highly organized trade unions of peasants and miners. Since the beginning of the "coca boom," the coca growing peasants were organized into coca-federations supported by the COB (Trade Union Central Organization).

      The structure of the Chapare coca peasants' trade unions is as such:

      Around 40,000 peasant families are grouped in 600 base organizations (colonias or sindicatos). ³⁰⁸  The sindicatos organize the settlers' activities, including the distribution of land, the maintenance of roads, and the resolution of conflicts between families. 25 to 200 peasant families form these base organizations. ³⁰⁹  These sindicatos are grouped into Trade Union Centrals (Centrales Sindicales). Each Central is composed of a group of 10 to 50 sindicatos. Each Trade Union Central takes care of matters concerning the administration of the land, communal conflicts, roads, education, and sports; women are also represented as a separate group of interest. ³¹⁰  There are 60 centrales that form part of one of the five federations (federaciones) That is, the centrales of different provinces or regions within the Chapare (formed by the provinces of Chapare, Tiraque and Carrasco) are grouped within the federations. The five peasant federations of the Chapare are: The Special Federation of Peasants from the Tropic of Cochabamba (FETCTC); the Special Federation of Colonizers of the Tropical Carrasco (FCCT), The Special Federation of Colonizers of Chimoré (FECCh), the Single Federation of United Centrals (FUCU), and the Special Federation of the Yungas of Chapare (FEYCh). ³¹¹  The FETCTC (23,000 members) and the FCCT (8,300 members) are the two more important in terms of the number of their members. These two federations are also more actively opposed to the eradication of coca without the development of an alternative economy. ³¹²  The FETCTC and the FCCT are members of the National Peasant Confederation (CSTUCB) and the Trade Union Central Organization (COB, Confederación Obrera Boliviana). ³¹³  A coordination committee coordinates the five federations. ³¹⁴  The chart below represents the typical structure of a Chapare peasant federation:

      

Figure 1. Structure of a Chapare peasant trade union federation

Source: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. p.64 (Colony is a synonym of sindicato).

      Most of these peasants do not know the final destination of the coca leaves that are processed into cocaine. What is relevant for them is that coca growing and coca paste production secures a source of revenue higher than any other crop. Moreover, the regions where coca is grown (Yungas and Chapare) lack the infrastructure to channel legal products into the external market. As long as the demand for cocaine still exists the Bolivian peasant will continue to grow coca. This tendency is reinforced by the low degree of diversification within the Bolivian economy. The trade unions provide the essential services for peasants (health, electricity, roads, and housing), thus assuring a high degree of loyalty towards these organizations. A civil war could occur if the government really tried to enforce the eradication of coca plantations. As explained by an analyst,

"Politically, attempts at eradication are explosive in Bolivia. The coca growers are well organized into trade unions affiliated to the COB national labor federation, willing to take on the government if it tries to wipe out their source of livelihood. In 1988 at least 10 people died in union protest against the use of herbicides. Although guerrilla organizations have not sprung up in Bolivia as elsewhere in Latin America, Bolivia is a notoriously unstable political country, and a group such as Sendero Luminoso could well emerge if the Government went to far against the cocaine economy." ³¹⁵ 

      The non-state actors who participate in the cocaine industry and threaten the security of South American producer states are now clearly identified. The next section will show how the intervention and policy of the United States as an extra-regional state actor contributed to worsening the situation and spreading the problem to peripheral countries. This can be defined as a provoked and reinforced "domino effect."

a) Military/Traditional threats

      This type of threat refers to the use of armed force by a state. A military attack can threaten all components of the state. Drug trafficking activities can, in some cases, be the catalyst of military conflicts between states and can also provoke the military intervention of tier states with the goal of combating transnational criminal organizations or insurgent groups linked to drug trafficking activities.

      Military intervention by extra-regional powers (U.S. ):

      There are two countries that can be considered paradigmatic in reference to the threat of foreign intervention by the U.S. in order to reduce the production and supply of cocaine. These countries are Bolivia and Colombia.

      Bolivia set a precedent of intervention by North American troops. This intervention was very unpopular with the Bolivian public and Congress, which declared the action anti-constitutional and asked for the withdrawal of the troops. In 1986, President Paz Estrenssoro asked for the support of U.S. troops for the disruption of laboratories and trafficking organizations (without the authorization of Congress) and thus began an eight-month operation called "Blast Furnace." In July 1986, one hundred and seventy US Army personnel and six Blackhawk helicopters were dispatched to aid the Bolivian police raid laboratories and clandestine airstrips in the Beni and Santa Cruz regions. While the strategy was to wipe out the market for coca leaves, this effect lasted only for some months. The presence of U.S. troops dropped the Paz Estenssoro´s government into political trouble, provoking bitter opposition in Bolivia, not only from the coca grower unions but from the political elite as well. The Congress declared the matter a violation of "national security." ³⁵¹ 

      Potential American military intervention in Colombia was perceived as an overt threat after operation "Just Cause" in December 1989, when the U.S. military intervened in Panama in order to capture its president, General Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted in 1988 under drug trafficking charges by a U.S. court.  ³⁵²  This perception existed because just after the intervention in Panama, the U.S. government deployed a flotilla along the 200-mile Colombian maritime border. The Colombian government denounced this action as a blockade and the U.S. ordered the withdrawal of its ships. ³⁵³  As reported,

"In trying to tone down the impact of an over-enthusiastic description of the USS John F Kennedy's role as a "blockade" Bush officials are now explaining that its intended role was that of plotting patterns of air traffic..." ³⁵⁴ 

      There are also fears of an American invasion of the Colombian island of San Andrés in the Caribbean. ³⁵⁵ 

      Drug trafficking as a catalyst for pre-existing international territorial/border conflicts:

      There is an example that clearly illustrates this type of threat. Colombia and Venezuela have a long-lasting border dispute over the Maracaibo Lake and the Gulf of Venezuela. Drug trafficking has played a role in magnifying the threat of military conflict over this issue. As stated by John Martz,

"With the spread of the narcotics industry, frontier problems shifted from precise demarcations and submarine mineral deposits to issues of guerrilla insurgency, threats to public security and the potential for serious armed conflict." ³⁵⁶ 

      In June 1987, paramilitary (patrulleros) forces at the service of Colombian traffickers attacked a unit of the Venezuela National Guard that was developing eradication operations for coca fields in Sierra de Perijá on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. ³⁵⁷  The border tension produced by these skirmishes helped magnifying a military escalation caused in August 1987 by of the intrusion of a Colombian warship in the disputed sea zone. Both incidents caused Colombia and Venezuela to increment their military presence along the border. ³⁵⁸ 

      Though a war was stopped in 1987 by the diplomatic intervention of the OAS Secretary General and the Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín, these type of clashes have become more frequent since Venezuela became a coca producing country, exacerbating tensions between the two countries. ³⁵⁹ 

b) Political threats

      Political threats harm the capacity of a state to exercise the monopoly of force over the whole national territory. These kinds of threats also include all kinds of activities that may harm the legitimacy of the political regime of a state.

      Control of the national territory by transnational criminal organizations (Gray zones):

      Non-state actors coming from a neighboring state are challenging the sovereign control of the national territory. This case is well represented by Brazil.

      The Brazilian Amazônia has a surface of 1,572,000 square kilometers, covers seven federal states and has a common border of 16,000 kilometers with Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Police surveillance is almost non-existent and the area is scarcely populated (only 8,000,000 inhabitants). Moreover, the Amazon forest has the biggest river system in the world. Coca production (and zones for operation for Colombian and Bolivian traffickers) is located in two main areas: the northeast (Amazonas, Roraima and Pará states) where ipadú is produced and many laboratories are located, and the central region (Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul), where ipadú is also grown and where there is intense activity by Bolivian traffickers. ³⁶⁰  Even if the Brazilian military does not engage in drug interdiction activities, they consider the Amazon as a first geopolitical priority. Since 1985, they have been developing a project of occupation and fortification (the Calha Norte project) of the northern Amazon border, and stopping the incursions of drug traffickers is among the objectives of this project. ³⁶¹  The Brazilian strategic plans also include covering all the Amazon with a radar system in order to monitor and track all air traffic in the area. As explained by a UNDCP field report,

"The Secretary of Strategic Matters, under the Presidency of the Republic, decided to install a surveillance system of the Amazon, in cooperation with the Airforce Ministry, covering the entire Brazilian Amazon region. The vigilance system of 20 linked radar stations, a network of mobile and fixed radio intercepting units and a network of distant satellite censoring. The vigilance system will allow the Brazilian authorities to enhance aviation security in the region, improve the control of national airspace and enforce control of illicit trafficking of drugs and minerals." ³⁶² 

      Parts of the state under the control of locally based criminal organizations (Gray Zones):

      Even if this phenomenon is also present in Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, Colombia is the country where the traffickers have developed the highest capacity for political control over the territory through a pattern of paramilitary violence and bribery. Although this issue will be fully explained in the next chapter, it is worth remarking that the case of Colombia can be differentiated from the other three countries because of the level of violence it provoked. This violence had three origins: the fight between organizations, the fight between the traffickers, and the guerrilla and terrorist actions against the government in response to enforcement measures. In part, this violence began during the Betancur administration (1982-1986), when the government started to enforce the treaty of extradition of traffickers in response to U.S. pressure.

      As noted previously, because the traffickers have control of provincial governors and city mayors, they enjoy popular support and have paramilitary power. Thus, in the Andean countries, traffickers constitute a "state within the state" and pose an overt threat to the capacity of the state to exercise effective political control. ³⁶³ 

      Drug trafficking-related corruption:

"There is infection in everything. Even sleepiness can be infection, and yawning can be infectious. There is even the infection of a time." ³⁶⁴ 

      This threat can be interpreted in two ways. The first can be illustrated by the case of Bolivia. In 1980, traffickers had the power to literally buy a sector of the armed forces and supported a coup d'etat against President Lidia Gueiler Tejada (1979-1980). This coup led to a regime that allowed the traffickers to freely pursue their illegal activities. Moreover, both the president, General Luis García Meza, and his minister of the interior, Col. Luis Arce Gomez, participated overtly in the illicit drug traffic . As explained by one analyst,

"There is also strong evidence to suggest [drug trafficker] Suárez Gómez helped to finance the coup of Gen. Luis García Meza [...] in July 1980, which is widely known as 'the cocaine coup'. One version of events maintains that Suárez Gómez offered García Meza U.S. $1.3 million to launch the coup as traffickers felt more protected by military governments than by elected civilian leaders. His condition was apparently that Colonel Luis Arce Gómez, a relation of Suárez Gómez well known for his connections with the drug business, should be made minister of the interior responsible for antidrug operations."  ³⁶⁵ 

      Also, on June 30 1984, members of the elite Bolivian police antinarcotics unit (UMOPAR) joined army personnel to stage Bolivia's 251^st armed coup, a coup lead by three high-ranking UMOPAR officers who were allegedly involved in drug trafficking. The coup failed due to army opposition (in Bolivia there is a strong rivalry between the police and the army). ³⁶⁶ 

      The case of Bolivia clearly illustrates the worst case of influence and the corrupting power the traffickers possess. Another example of this type of drug trafficking-related corruption is Paraguay, where a large number of political actors and members of the armed forces and security forces are involved not only in drug trafficking but also in all types of smuggling activities. This creates a threat to civilian control over the armed forces and generates rivalries among the different security forces, which can lead to a situation of political instability. In fact, in October 1994 the chief of the Paraguayan Anti-Narcotics Service, General Ramón Rosa Rodríguez, was assassinated by his own aide-de camp. At the moment of his assassination, Rosa Rodríguez was on his way to an official meeting where he was going to present evidence about drug trafficking activities in his country. ³⁶⁷ 

      This may be also the case in Suriname, where former military ruler Lt. Colonel Desi Bouterse still the "strong man" behind the scenes, is reportedly involved in cocaine traffic to The Netherlands and has the capacity to overthrow civilian governments at his will.  ³⁶⁸ 

      The other way this threat can be interpreted is that the financial crises (hyperinflation and austerity programs) faced by all these new democracies led to a decrease in the general wealth of the population and combined with corruption scandals in the executive branch. This could lead to a serious crisis of governability and an institutional crisis that could be used to justify a military revolt. This was the case in Venezuela in 1992. The nationalistic military that attempted a military coup against President Andrés Perez used the involvement of the president in drug trafficking activities as a cause for the revolt (in fact, it was an excuse; the coup was provoked by the popular unrest in the middle of a serious economic crisis, and by the lack of legitimacy of the bipartisan-restrictive Venezuelan system). As reported,

"Ulslar Pietri's [one of the most respected writers in Venezuela] December coup warnings had been dismissed by politicians a all parties as unnecessarily alarmist. This despite the fact that there was evidence of considerable unease among the military over a spate of scandals that revealed links between high ranking officers and the drugs traffic and, and suggested corruption in procurement contracts" ³⁶⁹ 

      Although the coup failed, President Perez was charged with corruption and obliged to resign.

      Linkage between the illicit drug traffic and the guerrilla groups:

      The political impact of fighting the U.S. drug war was further complicated in Peru by the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The coca-rich Sendero Luminoso of Peru effectively controlled Upper Huallaga Valley. The guerrillas portrayed themselves as protectors of the peasant growers, often serving as intermediaries on their behalf with the traffickers. Aggressive narcotics control efforts focused on coca eradication increased the threat posed by the guerrillas by driving peasants into their ranks. Drug trafficking adds to the general decline of internal order, because its interaction with insurgent groups diminishes the ability of government, police, and armed forces to control the Upper Huallaga Valley. Peru illustrates very well the dilemma of incompatibility between the impulse of the United States to utilize the armed forces in counternarcotic operations and the immediate security concerns of drug producer countries. If the military is used to support coca eradication, the peasants side with the insurgents. Also, the use of the armed forces in enforcement operations against drug traffickers generated an almost irreversible corruption within the military ranks. ³⁷⁰ 

      On the other hand, we have the case of Colombia, where the FARC guerrillas control coca and coca paste producing areas such as the Guaviare. As was the case in Peru over the course of a decade, the FARC are able to finance their operations through the "revolutionary tax" over coca growing and coca paste production in the territories they control. In this way the FARC are able to affirm their territorial control and wage their war against the state. ³⁷¹ 

      Risk of military intervention in politics:

      This is a threat faced by all South American democracies if the military are fully employed in counternarcotic activities. The inclusion of the armed forces in counternarcotics operations contributed to the enlargement of their power and prerogatives to worsen a preexistent situation of human rights violations in the Andean countries. As an example, in Peru and Colombia, entire regions like the Upper Huallaga Valley (Peru) have been placed under military control and rule. The indexes of human rights violations by the Colombian and Peruvian Armed Forces are the worst in the hemisphere. For example, the U.S. State Department report on the human rights situation for 1990 determined that some units of the Colombian Army and police had participated in numerous and grave violations of human rights, including summary executions, torture and massacres against leftist politicians, human rights defenders, trade union leaders, and peasants. ³⁷²  The human rights situation in Bolivia was worsened in the last months of 1990. In the Annual Report on Human Rights the US Department of State documented cases of torture and cruelty by units of the police and intelligence service of the army. Some members of the Bolivian government, for example, fear that the corruption of the army due to its participation in the antinarcotics war could became a threat for the democratic stability of the country. ³⁷³  As a high ranking Bolivian official declared:

"When you have a corrupted Police Chief you dismiss him; when you have a corrupted military chief he dismisses you..."  ³⁷⁴ .

      Also as stated by two analysts,

"Involving Latin American armed forces in the drug war threatens traditional concepts of military professionalism in the region. It pushes military men to involve themselves in activities that advocates of democracy prefer to reserve for civilians. Within the rubric of military subordination to civilian authority, the dangers of the drug war as a military mission are obvious. As with military counterinsurgency activities in the 1960s, direct Latin American military involvement in the drug war would involve the military in police tasks that are technically within the civilian domain; it would also blur the line between appropriate and inappropriate domains for military professional actions; it would expand the managerial roles played by the military in society; and it would increase the role military men play in national politics and political decision making..." ³⁷⁵ 

      The threat of an expanded military role to a stable and institutionalized democratic regime is a very important factor if we consider that the stability of the democratic institutions was considered as a core value and part of the "integral security" of South American nations. The concept of "integral security," which includes the political and economic vulnerabilities of these nations, was defined and reaffirmed by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela at the Acapulco Meeting of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political action (Rio Group) in 1987 and at the Third Meeting of that group organized in Ica, Peru in 1989. ³⁷⁶ 

      Risk of civil war:

      Bolivia is another example of how potential threats are exacerbated by pressure from the United States for the eradication of coca fields, considered the cheapest way to reduce supply. Politically, attempts at eradication are explosive in Bolivia. The coca growers are well-organized into trade unions affiliated to the COB national labor federation, and are willing to take on the government if it tries to wipe out their source of income. In 1988, at least 10 people died in union protests against the use of herbicides. Although guerrilla organizations have not appeared in Bolivia as elsewhere in Latin America, Bolivia is a notoriously unstable political country, and a group such as Sendero Luminoso could well emerge if the government were to go too far against the cocaine economy.

c) Economic threats

      Economic threats negatively affect the state's ability to access international markets and to achieve acceptable levels of wealth, development, and power. The Andean countries face the dilemma of having a large underground sector that represents a considerable fraction of their gross national product. This basically turns these countries into "cocaine-dependent" countries, perpetuating a situation of international pressure and obstructing the development of legal economic activities. This problem is particularly serious in the cases of Bolivia and Peru.

      According to some estimates, in 1992 the cocaine industry in Peru generated 1.5 billion dollars. This figure represented 3.4 % of Peru's GNP and 53% of this country's exports. It was also estimated in 1995 that about 10% of the Peruvian labor employed in the agrarian sector and 4% of the total economically active population of Peru worked in drug trafficking activities. ³⁷⁷ 

      According to USAID (United States Agency for International Development) estimates, in 1994 the cocaine industry represented 4% of Bolivia's GNP and was equivalent to 23% of Bolivia's exports. Also, according to the local consulting firm Müller & Associates, about 207.225 people (over a total national population of 8 million) were employed in the different stages of cocaine production and transportation taking place in Bolivia. ³⁷⁸  Under these conditions, a swift and effective blow to the coca economy would have a devastating economic and political impact. The livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of citizens can trigger massive social unrest, thus reinforcing the intensity of political threats stemming from drug trafficking.

      Another economic threat caused by drug trafficking is the utilization of some South American countries as money laundering centers. This is the case of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. These countries were able to stabilize their economies thanks to the application of structural adjustment programs. The economic stability reached by these countries in the 1990s made them attractive to foreign investment. The origin of these incoming funds, however, is not always clear. The situation is seriously aggravated by permissive and lax banking legislation or political and judiciary corruption.

      For countries with weak economies, money laundering can be considered a blessing in the short term. However, this blessing turns into a curse in the long run: the overrating of real estate (a method typically used to integrate illegal money into the legal circuit of the economy) can generate an inflationary spiral in that sector of the economy. At the same time, an unregulated influx of foreign currency (which is the case of the integration of "dirty money" into the economy) can cause a devaluating effect, thus harming the success of anti-inflationary policies.

      Also, the reputation of a country can be seriously harmed if its financial institutions are suspected of being used for money laundering activities. Therefore, legal investments could flow towards foreign financial markets. Of course the corrupting effects of money laundering activities must be considered as far as they concern the impact that widespread corruption can have on the legitimacy of the political institutions of weak states.

d) Societal threats

      For the scope of this dissertation, the concept of "societal threat" refers to the decrease of the quality of the human resources and the integrity of the social fabric of a nation.

      Destruction of the human potential of a nation:

      In all of South America the consumption of cocaine grew as a consequence of the rise in cocaine production and transit. In producer countries, the consumption of "bazuco," a highly toxic mixture of coca pastes, spread among the poor population (a sort of crack for the developing world); at the same time, a decrease in prices due to the constant influx of cocaine through the transit countries provoked a switch from marijuana and inhalants (solvents) to the utilization of adulterated cocaine in their territories. ³⁷⁹  This issue will be further illustrated in the case studies in chapters V and VII.

e) Environmental threats

      Environmental threats jeopardize the integrity of the natural resources of a state and thus the quality of life for its population. Environmental threats also reinforce the effects of economic threats because environmental degradation may decrease the productive viability of the territory of a state.

      Utilization of Herbicides for the eradication of coca fields:

      This is not a threat that stems directly from drug production but from attempts to eliminate illicit crops through the use of herbicides that can harm the environment and the people living in coca producing areas. In Bolivia, for example, the use of herbicides was ruled out by law in 1988 under the argument that the chemical control of coca could seriously harm the environment. In Peru, the use of herbicides was stopped because the company that produced the herbicide (Spike) decided to stop the sale of this product for eradication purposes. The director of the company considered that it could affect the health of the population and contaminate the rivers, thus eliminating not only the coca fields but also legal crops. As stated by Rensselaer Lee III,

"The Bolivian Government more or less has ruled out the spraying option [in was effectively ruled out by law in 1988]. In June 1988, the country's Foreign Minister, Guillermo Bedregal, said, ' Bolivia will not be the guinea pig for experimentation with herbicides that may have adverse effects on other vegetation and to damage to the inhabitants' [...] In Peru, the García administration was at one time receptive to the idea of using herbicides against coca. [...] However, Peru's spraying program suffered a possibly fatal setback in May 1988, when Eli Lilly announced that it would no longer supply tebuthirion (Spike) for the program. [...] A company representative quoted by the Lima daily El Comercio said that Spike 'could cause irreversible harm to flora and fauna and even affect human beings if it is not applied with extreme caution" the Peruvian press reprinted sections of a brochure that Lilly distributed with Spike: the folder warned that the compound could destroy the roots of trees, shrubs and other vegetables and cause vomiting and pulmonary and heart damage in humans [...] Dr. Peter Kurtz of the California Food and Agriculture Department Warned, ' The major danger of tebuthirion is that it eradicates vegetation completely, that is, creates deserts where it is used in sufficient quantity, and that it is very persistent' in soils. Dr. Richard Wiles of the National Academy of Sciences warned of "ecological devastation" form the application of Spike..." ³⁸⁰ 

      Lee also argues that,

"Spraying, however, is not a panacea, even where it does 'work'. The highly touted anti-marijuana program in Colombia, for example, reduced cultivation on traditional growing areas in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the Serrania de Perija, but cultivation simply moved elsewhere. The coca bush, more likely a small tree in parts of the Chapare and the Upper Huallaga Valley, is extremely difficult to kill. A herbicide sufficiently toxic to destroy coca form the air might also damage other corps, harm farm animals or wildlife, and pollute the waterways. No effective and environmentally safe herbicide for use against coca has yet been found...." ³⁸¹ 

      On this particular issue, and in reference to the case of Bolivia, another analyst argues that,

"Coca fields are found very close to the houses where farmers live, thus making it very difficult to use herbicides or defoliants without damaging people and other crops." ³⁸² 

      In Bolivia and Peru the use of herbicides is also a cause of political instability. In Bolivia it could lead to a direct armed confrontation between the growers and the government, and in Peru it is used by Sendero as a political rallying flag. Again, Rensselaer Lee III explains this in the following terms,

"At the end of June [1988], there was a serious incident in Villa Tunari in the Chapare. A mob of several thousand peasants broke into the offices of DIRECO [Coca Reduction Agency][...] Narco-traffickers apparently had circulated reports that DIRECO and DEA were testing herbicides against coca plantations in the Chapare. The peasants said that they where looking for evidence -documents, equipment, chemicals and so on- that would support the rumors [...] The police counterattacked, and in the ensuing battle, as many as 16 people may have lost their lives...." ³⁸³ 

"In Peru and Colombia, concerns about eradication are linked to the government's struggles against left wing guerrilla movements and leftist subversion. Many Peruvian military and political leaders see eradication as generating anti-government feeling in rural areas and playing into the hands of radical leftist groups such as Sendero Luminoso. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, such programs reportedly provoked coca farmers and other disaffected Valley residents into joining or supporting local Sendero forces. A high Justice Ministry official interviewed in April 1986 said that the spraying of Colombia's main coca fields, located in the Llanos and the Amazon Basin, would create serious economic and social problems in these regions . Possible consequences, said the official, would be an increase in violent crime and an expansion of local guerrilla activity..." ³⁸⁴ 

"The spraying approach probably will not be politically acceptable in South America. Governments fear ecological damage form the use of toxic chemicals, and current U.S. debates on the environmental consequences of spraying, which are widely reported in the South American press, have done much to inflame these concerns. However, governments are even more concerned with the social effects- the prospects of massive rural unemployment and (in Colombia and Peru) the aggravation of a festering insurgency problem..." ³⁸⁵ 

      Pollution of potable water sources and the soil:

      The erosion of soil and the contamination of rivers produced by the culture of coca fields and production of coca paste is a threat to the economic viability of Bolivia. The expansion of the coca culture implies geometric deforestation of the Bolivian Amazon; at the same time, the continuous utilization of the slopes of the tropical Andes causes a high erosion of the soil that render this land unusable for legal crops such as coffee or citrus. After the eradication campaigns are over, the peasants leave the fields and migrate to new growth areas, re-starting the cycle of deforestation-erosion. At the same time, the production of coca paste requires the utilization of tons of chemicals that are then dropped into the rivers, and this contaminates the scarce sources of potable water in the region.

      As explained by an analyst,

"[In Peru] deforestation related directly or indirectly to cultivation of the coca leaf has reached a total of 700,000 hectares in the high jungle. This has preceded at a dizzying rate from the time of the coca boom in the mid-1970s. When land is to be used for the cultivation of the coca shrub, the area must be cleared, weeded, and burned for each harvest (two or four times a year), leaving the soil prone to erosion. The fragile ecosystem, heavy rainfall, sandy-clay soils, sloping terrain, deforestation, defoliation and so on are leading to dramatic results: at the rate that the high jungle soils are being destroyed, it will be practically a desert in few decades [...] The chemicals used in the preparation of basic cocaine paste in the so-called pozas (pits) are dumped into the rivers. It is estimated that in 1986 the rivers near the pits received discharges of 57 million liters of kerosene; 32 million liters of sulfuric acid; 16 metric tons of unlaked lime; 3,200 metric tons of carbides; 16.000 metric tons of toilet tissue; 6.400 liters of acetone; and a similar quantity of toluene. These products have caused the extinction of fish crustacean, amphibian, and river bank plants..." ³⁸⁶ 

      A similar situation can be observed in Bolivia where 30,000 metric tons of toxic chemicals are being discharged each year in the rivers of the Chapare and Beni regions. ³⁸⁷  Also as explained by James Painter,

"Before the arrival of the colonists and timber extractors, the Chapare was believed to contain some of Bolivia's tallest, densest, and most diverse forest with more that 1,000 species of trees. These primary forests are apparently still intact on the steep upper slopes, but much of the rest of the lowland Chapare has been converted into secondary forest. Such has been the volume of new migrants to the area that some of the lower part of the upper slopes are now being cultivated, which is bound to cause greater soil erosion." ³⁸⁸ 

a) Assessing the problem: types of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia

      Colombia has traditionally been a violent country. The willingness of the two traditional parties (Conservative and Liberal) to resort to violence as a means of political competition came to an end, after the ten-year civil war period known as La Violencia (1948-1958), with the National Front pact. ³⁹⁷  The result was a closed, restrictive democracy with excluded groups turning to the use of violence as a means of participating in politics. The violence of groups such as the M-19 demanding an opening of the system was complemented by the violence provoked by leftist guerrilla groups such as the FARC and the ELN, who proposed a radical change of the type of society, economy, and political regime. Another problem that contributed to guerrilla organization support in rural areas was the lack of successful agrarian reform policy. According to official estimates, 1.3% of landowners (many of whom are actually drug traffickers who acquired land with the profits generated by the cocaine industry) control 48% of the best lands, whereas 68% of the of landowners (peasants) control only 5.3 % of the most productive land. ³⁹⁸ . This situation, in addition to the rural violence that prevailed in the country during the last 20 years, has displaced a large part of the peasant population to vacant isolated lands. In these areas coca and poppy are the only crops that produce an income level sufficient to sustain the settlements. ³⁹⁹  The violence provoked by the 'green wars' for the control and exploitation of the emerald mines in the central or Boyacá region in the 1960's and early 1970s is also an important factor. ⁴⁰⁰ 

      The development of the cocaine industry in Colombia since the mid-1970s has added new dimensions of violence to the country. Because of the power accumulated by drug trafficking organizations and inter-group alliances created as part of the business, the violence unleashed by the cocaine industry and by enforcement policies against it would surpass the other 'violences." It is possible to talk about several types of violence stemming from the illicit drug industry in Colombia depending on where the violence takes place and on the target of the violence. To begin with, the more the industry grows, the more opponents and external competitors it faces. In order to eliminate the opposition and competitors, drug trafficking organizations makes use of violence. Violence is the result of two factors:

      First, the business is illegal and because of this traffickers have developed their own defense mechanisms against law enforcement agencies and competitors. Second, Colombia is a weak state. The government does not control extensive areas of the country such as the Boyacá, Meta, Guaviare and Magdalena Medio regions. In these areas, landowners, drug traffickers, colonizing peasants (mostly coca-growing peasants), and guerrillas co-exist and state institutions are not fully recognized. Local leadership based on clientelistic relations is stronger and a recognized source of authority. The government does not have a monopoly on violence over the whole territory. There has been a privatization of security in which landowners have developed paramilitary groups against the guerrillas. Emerald traffickers did the same thing to fight the competition and the guerrillas. Drug traffickers have also developed their own defense groups against their rivals in the business, the state, and the guerrillas. ⁴⁰¹ 

      Several authors agree that there exist different stages of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia. ⁴⁰²  Since the early 1980s, with the consolidation of big coalitions of drug trafficking organizations, it is possible to identify several types of drug trafficking-related violence in Colombia, in terms of the protagonists of these violent clashes, their goals, and their victims.  ⁴⁰³ 

      The first type of violence started in 1980 when the drug traffickers began to invest their profits in purchasing large tracts of land in regions such as Meta, Guaviare, Boyacá, Arauca and Guaviare. As a new rising bourgeoisie, they became targets for guerrillas operating in these areas. A clear example of this was the creation of the group "Death to Kidnappers" (Muerte a los secuestradores-MAS-) in 1981 between the Cali and Medellín coalitions in an effort to defend themselves and retaliate against M-19 kidnappings. ⁴⁰⁴ 

      The guerrillas also became an obstacle and even a competitor when the traffickers became powerful enough to have their own defense groups. They no longer relied on the protection of the FARC, who had become their competitors for control of coca fields and coca prices. After the legalization of the M-19 and sectors of the FARC in 1987, the legal political left (Union Patriótica, UP) became an obstacle to the traffickers since it supported a program of agrarian reform. Traffickers and landowners became allies in a campaign against the guerrillas and the political left with the tacit or express support of the army. As reported this type of rural violence continued in the late 1990s. ⁴⁰⁵ 

      A second type of violence refers to the massacres against the colonizing peasants in rural regions. Drug traffickers wage this strategy of terror in alliance with the paramilitary groups of the emerald prospectors, the landowners, and the army to prevent the peasants from supporting or joining the guerrillas and voting for UP candidates. This type of violence increased after the creation of the UP in 1987. ⁴⁰⁶ 

      A third type of violence is internal to the business and is related to turf wars between drug trafficking organizations. A 'war of cartels' started in the mid-1980s after the Medellín coalition attempted to take over the distribution of cocaine in New York, traditionally a Cali controlled port of entry. ⁴⁰⁷  As stated earlier in this dissertation, differences also arose over the overt use of violence against the state, which was not a preferred tool in the case of the Cali coalition.

      A fourth type is the violence against the government as a response to the repression of the illicit business. Such violence may be preemptive or reactive. This dissertation will put more emphasis on the consequences of this type of violence for the spillover effects towards Venezuela. This type of violence started in the early 1980s with the assassination of magistrates, judges, and prosecutors and reached a peak with the assassination of Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in May 1984. His death marked the beginning of a spiral of violence between the Medellín cartel and the government that would end only in 1993. At this stage, the killing machine set in place in 1981 to be used against the guerrillas, Death to the Kidnappers, began to be used in an all-out war against the government and anyone who dared to take a position against the drug trafficking organizations. Death to the Kidnappers became a Medellín cartel 'Death to Everybody' group which received training from Israeli and British (former Special Air Forces -S.A.S -) mercenaries. ⁴⁰⁸ 

      A fifth type is a reactive violence against political personalities (although not necessarily members of the government), journalists, and anti-drug trafficking speakers.

      A sixth type of violence is the so-called 'social cleansing' (grupos de limpieza social) in Medellín and Cali cities. It refers to the killing of people considered as 'undesirable' by the traffickers (such as prostitutes, beggars, drug addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals, and common criminals). This is a common practice in the city of Cali, where gangs of killers (sicarios) at the service of the Cali cartel carry out these executions. The purpose of this violence is to seek support from the rest of the community by restoring "order." ⁴⁰⁹  Table 1 shows these six types of drug trafficking-related violence. These types were elaborated on the basis of the information provided by the Colombian historians Darío Betancourt and Martha García. ⁴¹⁰ 

      

Table 1. Types of drug trafficking related violence and targets of violence
PERPETRATOR:	MOTIVATION:	LOCATION:
		METROPOLITAN AREAS	RURAL AREAS
Drug traffickers	Preemption	PREEMPTIVE URBAN (Victims: Political leaders and candidates, Trade union leaders, Journalists, Judges ,Prosecutors)	PREEMPTIVE RURAL (Victims: Political Left (UP),Peasant population)
Drug traffickers	Reaction	REACTIVE URBAN (Victims: Civilian Military and Law enforcement members of the government)	REACTIVE RURAL (Victims: Guerrillas, Civilian and Military or Law enforcement members of the national or local government )
Drug traffickers	Competition	COMPETITIVE URBAN (Victims: Other drug trafficking groups)	COMPETITIVE RURAL (Victims: Guerrillas , Other drug trafficking groups)
Drug traffickers	Gain support of the police and the local population	PROSELITIST URBAN (Victims: Beggars, prostitutes, thieves, homosexuals)	PROSELITIST RURAL (Victims: Cattle thieves Common criminals)
Guerrilla Groups	Defense of peasants as a base of political support and recruitment and source of economic revenue (revolutionary taxes to coca and coca paste production)	STRATEGIC REVOLUTIONARY URBAN (Victims: Agents of the state, state buildings and property)	STRATEGIC REVOLUTIONARY RURAL (Victims: Armed forces/Police forces/ civilian eradication teams)
Guerrilla Groups	Tactical defense of drug traffickers' production sites in exchange for money and weapons	TACTIC REVOLUTIONARY URBAN (Agents of the state)	TACTIC REVOLUTIONARY RURAL (Police/Armed Forces units)

      This typology is based on the situation in Colombia. However, it could be applied to the rest of South America or even Latin America (for the specific case of Mexico) in terms of existing or latent drug trafficking-related violence. Certain similarities exist in Peru as far as the rural violence in the Upper Huallaga Valley is concerned, and Brazil is probably going in the same direction in terms of the urban drug trafficking-related violence.

      The following indicators can be used in order to identify cases of drug trafficking-related violence and measure the extent of drug trafficking-related violence in a country:

Number of civil judiciary officials (judges, prosecutors, magistrates, auxiliaries, and investigators) killed by drug traffickers' hit men per year. Number of Armed Forces/ Police and other security forces, which are part of drug trafficking paramilitary organizations, discovered per year. Number of armed actions by drug traffickers against the Armed Forces/Police or other security forces patrols or detachments per year. Number of armed actions by drug traffickers against the Armed Forces / Police or other security forces patrols of detachments by guerrilla groups acting on behalf of drug traffickers per year. Number of political candidate assassinations by drug traffickers' hit men per year. Number of state governor assassinations by drug trafficker's hit men per year. Number of political leader assassinations of by drug traffickers' hit men per year. Formation of drug traffickers' paramilitary groups. Mercenary groups or trainers hired by drug trafficking organizations. Number of personal attempts against guerrilla leaders self-adjudicated by drug trafficking organizations. Number of attempts against drug trafficking organizations' bosses perpetrated by rival bosses. Amount of property or equipment belonging to drug trafficking criminal organizations claimed by rival bosses. Number of civilian government coca eradication teams attacked by guerrilla groups per year. Number of Police/Armed Forces units participating in eradication activities attacked by guerrilla groups per year.

      Some of these indicators are used in the at the end of this Chapter where statistical tables are displayed in order to show the parallel and concomitant evolution between militarized enforcement and drug trafficking-related violence. More types inspired from the case of Bolivia are elaborated in Chapter VI, which analyzes the consequences of militarized enforcement in this other coca and cocaine producer country. These types will complement the typology developed above. ⁴¹¹ 

b) Manifestation of drug trafficking related violence in Colombia

      How it is possible to observe Colombian reality through the types of drug trafficking-related violence developed above? Darío Betancourt and Martha García identified four manifestations of drug trafficking-related violence or 'drug wars' between the drug traffickers (especially the Medellín cartel) and the Colombian government (that is, the "institutional component" of the state). Betancourt and García classified these episodes of violence according to the motives, scenarios and goals of the players resorting to violence. ⁴¹²  These manifestations of drug trafficking-related violence occurred simultaneously since the early 1980s, the period when the cocaine industry became consolidated and integrated not only in Colombia, but also in the Andean Region. The increasing pressure of the U.S. government over the Colombian government also had an influence on the level of enforcement and subsequent spiral of violence. Table 2 below categorizes four "drug wars" developed by Betancourt and García along the types developed in the previous section of this chapter.

      

Table 2. Colombia's drug wars
	War of the drug traffickers against the Colombian criminal justice:	War between drug traffickers turned into landowners against the Colombian political left and the guerrillas :	War between a the drug traffickers and a sector of the traditional political elite:	War between the cartels:
PARTICIPANTS	Drug Traffickers, judges and police.	Unión Patriótica (political branch of the FARC) and the paramilitary groups.	Medellín cartel and the New Liberalism	Medellín cartel and Cali cartel
MOTIVES	Retaliation of the traffickers against enforcement of the law (including but not reduced to the extradition) against ordinary crimes or insidious crimes related to drug trafficking.	Armed clashes with the FARC because of their revolutionary tax on coca and anti communist crusade.	Reaction of the government against the infiltration of the Party by Members of the Medellín cartel. Reaction of the Medellín cartel against the application of the extradition treaty.	Attempt of the Pablo Escobar to take over the New York cocaine market. Disagreement between the Cali and Medellín cartel over the use of frontal violence against the government.
VICTIMS	7 Magistrates, 41 Judges, and more than 200 judiciary investigators and assistants.	UP Presidential Candidate Jaime Pardo Leal, 840 activists of the UP, journalists and political leaders supportive of the opening of the system towards the left. Thousands of peasants and their families.	Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (Ministry of Justice), Guillermo Cano (President of the newspaper 'El Espectador," Enrique Parejo (Governor of Antioquia), Luis Carlos Galán (presidential candidate for the New Liberal Party)	Innocent people victim of the bomb attempts and shootings. Lieutenants of the Organizations and members of the families of the leaders.
TYPE OF VIOLENCE	REACTIVE	REACTIVE AND COMPETITIVE	REACTIVE AND PREEMPTIVE	COMPETITIVE

Source of data: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp. 253-301

      Like in a Garcia Marquez' novel, all these types of drug trafficking-related violence occur simultaneously, an absurd combination in which enemies fight each other but can at the same time cooperate against a common worse enemy on a different front. For example, the police combated the cartels a the same time as the army supported the cartel's paramilitary groups in their fight against the guerrillas. ⁴¹³  Or the guerrillas occasionally gave protection to the cartels in exchange for weapons and money.

      As stated above, this chapter will concentrate on the consequences of the utilization of militarized enforcement as the Colombian government's main strategy to control the expansion of the illicit drugs industry.

      Section B of this chapter will focus on the 'drug wars' between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian government (the judicial system and the Colombian political elite as described in the table above). The effects of other types of drug trafficking-related violence--such as the rural violence against the guerrillas and the political left, or the 'drug war' of the cartels against the political left--will also be analyzed as a secondary variable insofar as it created an exodus of displaced peasants to Venezuela.

      The enforcement policies of the Colombian government were motivated, in part, by American pressure. In large part, they also came about as a reaction against the Medellín cartel's attempt to penetrate the political system, as well as a reaction to the campaign of political terror or 'narco-terrorism' unchained by the coalition led by Escobar. The militarization of the police and the utilization of the armed forces in particular were a response to American pressure, motivated by the fact that the major part of American assistance to Colombia was military equipment and training. As argued by one analyst,

"What Colombia wanted was the means to crush this arrogant display of criminal power. In addition to an adequate supply of police and military hardware. Colombia also asked for $ 19 million to install security systems to protect its judicial system, a clear sight that the government perceives the problem as a civilian one. That aid arrived , however in the form of $65 million worth of military equipment - cargo planes, A-37 subsonic jets, helicopters, assault boats, jeeps, trucks, and communications equipment- and presented a problem since much of this military equipment is not entirely useful for the Colombian national police, which conducts 85 to 90 percent of the antinarcotics operations [it should be stated however that National police is a highly militarized corps which functions under the Ministry of Defense]."  ⁴¹⁴ 

      Militarized enforcement, especially the use of the armed forces, was also a natural reaction of the Colombian state against the increasing armed power and violence of the Medellín cartel.

a) The beginning of militarized enforcement against drug trafficking: President Julio César Turbay Ayala's administration (1978-1982)

      In this period, cocaine trafficking is not identified yet as the dominant illegal activity in Colombia. At the beginning of President Turbay Ayalas´ term, the main concern was the production and trafficking of marijuana. Cocaine trafficking was identified only as another form of organized smuggling. This is the period of consolidation of the cocaine trafficking coalitions. By 1980, the Cali and Medellín coalitions formed a real cartel in the economic sense: they pooled together for transportation and production of the drug, and for the protection of the business with an agreement to keeping prices as high as possible.

      In this period it is possible to say that enforcement against drug trafficking was above all a response to U.S. pressure. During the mid and late 1970s drug trafficking was not perceived as a threat to the state, that is to say that it was not perceived as a national security issue. As stated by Juan Tokatlián,

"Clearly, in the 1970s the Colombian system did not see itself seriously threatened by (1) the political-institutional reach of the marijuana business; (2) its negative effect on national security; nor (3) the financial consequences of its production and trade. Thus, Colombia did not accentuate unilaterally, repressive measures in its attempts to control and eradicate this traffic." ⁴¹⁶ 

      Moreover, the government welcomed the money generated by both marijuana and the incipient cocaine trafficking. As explained by Francisco Thoumi, in 1975 the Colombian Central Bank relaxed the requirements to prove that real exports of services had occurred before purchasing the foreign exchange (generally US dollars) generated by them. This mechanism, know as the "sinister window" (ventanilla siniestra), continued during Turbay Ayala's administration. ⁴¹⁷ 

      In this period there were several proposals, especially from then-president of the National Association of Financial Institutions (Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras-ANIF-), Ernesto Samper Pizano, to legalize the industry considered as a trade for the country. ⁴¹⁸ 

      Enforcement against drug trafficking was directed against the production of marijuana and was related to two factors. First, President Turbay Ayala feared that this activity could potentially corrupt the structure of his political party, as well as that of the state institutions. Second, the Carter administration exerted significant pressure. In fact, the U.S. Department of State indicated that Turbay Ayala could have links with the marijuana trafficking rings through members of his family. There were also U.S. spy flights in Colombian territorial waters set up to detect and capture marijuana shipments.

      As explained by Thoumi,

"In the United States there were widespread rumors that the marijuana industry had infiltrated the highest government levels, the [Carter] administration had begun 'Operation Stopgap' in which spy planes were used to locate and intercept marijuana boats, and President Jimmy Carter himself increased pressure on the Colombian government to become more active. Domestically, Turbay realized that the size of the marijuana industry was too corruptive, and that it could threaten his control over the government." ⁴¹⁹ 

      In order to prove the Colombian commitment against drug trafficking and to eliminate any suspicion of his alleged personal involvement, President Turbay started an aggressive campaign of marijuana eradication and disruption of the Atlantic Coast trafficking rings.  ⁴²⁰ 

      As stated in Chapter I, because of the characteristics of marijuana production, the traffickers of this drug did not form sophisticated and articulated coalitions that led to a vertically articulated illicit industry. Their ability to resist the state was not significant. Moreover, marijuana plants are relatively easy to eradicate with defoliants and herbicides. ⁴²¹  The campaign was very aggressive and consisted of the use of the aerial spray of gliphosate, a potent herbicide. The armed forces were also involved in the destruction of plantations and the arrest of traffickers. But the use of the military was a response timed to the pressures of the Carter administration. Even if the U.S. did not directly request it, the military was used by Turbay to show his strong commitment to the eradication of marijuana. ⁴²² 

      The armed forces were used in a single operation called "Fulminant" (Operación Fulminante) that started in November 1978. The military resisted participating in marijuana eradication arguing that their main function was to combat guerrilla groups. They were also afraid of the possible corrupting effects of involvement in counter drug activities. ⁴²³  As a matter of fact, cases of corruption and frequent clashes with the peasants delayed the eradication operations and began to undermine the image of the armed forces. Moreover, the eradication operations distracted a large number of troops from combating the increasing threat of guerrilla groups and from dissuading an external attack. These factors led to the termination of Operation Fulminant in March 1980. Since then, the Colombian armed forces have been reluctant to directly intervene in enforcement operations against drug trafficking activities. ⁴²⁴ 

      By the end of the Turbay administration, marijuana was no longer an issue for Colombia, partly because the eradication campaign was very successful. Also, the traffickers soon discovered that one kilo of cocaine (the new drug in demand in the U.S.) was as profitable as a shipload of marijuana. Also, a new variant of marijuana called sinsemilla began to be cultivated in California, Alabama, and Appalachia--thus reducing the demand for imported marijuana. ⁴²⁵ 

      In September 1979, an extradition treaty was signed between the Turbay Ayala administration and the United States government. The purpose of the treaty was the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the United States. Both the Colombian and the U.S. Congresses approved the treaty in March 1981. It became valid in April 1982, five months before the end of Turbay's presidential term. In order that social conflict not increase during the presidential campaign then in progress, the United States did not request any extradition, and Turbay did not have to extradite anyone. ⁴²⁶ 

      The extradition treaty was the result of the concern of the U.S. government over the growing cocaine seizures from Colombia and growing cocaine consumption in the United States. This preoccupation is reflected in hearings such as "Cocaine: A Major Issue of the Seventies" partially quoted below.

"As chairman of the special task force on cocaine - and my name is Tennyson Guyer- recent developments concerning the state of cocaine have come to my attention which call for decisive and immediate action. The availability, abuse, and popularity of cocaine in the United States has reached pandemic proportions with 19 metric tons illegally entering the United States in 1978. This is a drug which, for the most part, has been ignored and its increased use in our society has caught us unprepared to cope effectively with this menace....Its [of cocaine] popularity has spread vastly, and during the last several years it has become the drug of choice of millions of Americans. The National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that almost 10 million Americans have used cocaine, including 1 million under the age of 18. No longer it its use restricted to the so-called elite of society. Businessmen use it to get going in the morning, as do housewives, stockbrokers, and college students. Children indulge in it, and entertainers use it to keep going. Since cocaine is a powerful stimulant with a high potential for abuse, it is our responsibility to see that its availability is minimized and that its use not be taken lightly." ⁴²⁷ 

      As will be shown later, the use of the extradition treaty as the main tool for future administrations would be the key that would liberate all the demons from the spiral of violence between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian government. During this period, Colombia did not register a high degree of drug trafficking-related violence against the state. However, it is important to note that Pablo Escobar issued personal vendettas against every judge, witness or policeman who attempted to prosecute or arrest him. ⁴²⁸ 

      It is worth noting here that, from 1978 to 1982, there was an increasing militarization of the Colombian government drug law enforcement structures. As a matter of fact, since the early 1970s the agency responsible for enforcement activities against drug trafficking was the Administrative Security Department (DAS), a civilian intelligence body that works under the direct authority of the president. Because of cases of corruption, the responsibility over the enforcement against drug trafficking was transferred in early 1978 to the Judiciary Police, a civilian police agency under the General Prosecutor of the Republic. ⁴²⁹  In July 1980, after Fulminant Operation was over, the United States and Colombia signed a counter drug cooperation agreement that established that the United States government would,

"pay costs, in the amount of $13,225,000 for supplying and maintaining helicopters, patrol vessels, fixed radar equipment, transport vehicles, and fuel, which will be used exclusively for interdicting drug traffic, for training personnel with respect to the interdiction of drug traffic." ⁴³⁰ 

      In order to implement this agreement, in 1981 the Colombian government created the National Antinarcotics Directorate (NAD).This directorate functions within the structure of the Colombian National Police (CNP), which is in turn directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. Since its creation the NAD has been the main agency in charge of enforcement operations against drug trafficking. This force has suffered a constant process of militarization in terms of its doctrine and equipment. ⁴³¹ 

b) Knocking at hell's door. President Belisario Betancur Cuartas administration (1982-1986)

      By 1982 the flood of cocaine to the United States by the Colombian cartels was alarming. Law enforcement officials where astonished by the amount of seizures in ports of entry especially Florida and New York. As stated by an analyst,

"In 1981 authorities [in Florida] seized 3.5 million pounds of marijuana and 2,508 pounds of cocaine, two-thirds of all national seizures[...].Drug trafficking made homicide a common event in South Florida. The number of murders in Miami had skyrocketed, going from 349 in 1979 to 569 in 1980 to 621 in 1981, with about 40 percent of the murders related to drugs. So many people were being murdered in Miami that the mortuaries could not handle all the corpses, forcing the Dade Country Medical Examiner's Office to use refrigerated trucks to accommodate the overflow." ⁴³² 

      By this time, the Cali and Medellín coalition become a cartel, pooling agreements for production, transportation, and distribution. They also had very effective machinery for reprisals against the armed political left (the MAS mentioned earlier). This cartel would last until 1986 when the saturation of the U.S. market provoked a fierce and violent competition between the Cali and Medellín coalitions for the sale of their cocaine shipments. This division was also provoked by deep differences in the way of conducting the business. ⁴³³  As explained by Clawson and Lee,

"Yet this political and economic cooperation had begun to fade in the mid-1980s, in part due to market saturation in the United States. Port-of-entry U.S. cocaine prices declined almost 40 percent between January 1982 to January 1985 and more than 70 percent from January 1982 to 1989. Ruthless competition for external sales took place within Colombia's drug underworld. In a particularly egregious example, Medellín kingpin Pablo Escobar Gaviria and José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha took advantage of Gilberto Rodríguez´s [Cali kingpin] sojourn in a Spanish prison to penetrate the cocaine market in New York City, traditionally a Cali preserve. Important philosophical differences also divided the Colombian cocaine establishment. Medellín traffickers had personal political ambitions, harbored deep resentments against the Colombian elite and favored the use of violence as a political tool. By contrast, the group of traffickers based in Cali (and more broadly in Valle del Cauca department) preferred to advance their objectives through bribery and manipulations rather than through bullets and car bombs." ⁴³⁴ 

      Immediately after President Betancur took over in August 1982, the Reagan administration began an intense policy of persuasion and pressure aimed at the application of the extradition treaty. However, because of his strong feelings about Colombian sovereignty, President Betancur was reluctant to implement the treaty during the first two years of his government. ⁴³⁵  This chapter will argue that during this presidential period government enforcement against the cocaine industry (including the application of the extradition treaty) was motivated more by internal factors rather than bilateral issues between Colombia and the United States.

      By the early 1980s, the Colombian political class could no longer ignore the economic and paramilitary power of the drug traffickers. Several factors overlapped in this period that would lead to the beginning of a bloody spiral of violence between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian government. This escalation of terror by the Medellín cartel came to an end in December 1993 with the death of Pablo Escobar.

      In first place, as stated before, the Colombian political class had tolerated and even legally incorporated the illicit money generated by drug trafficking. However, since 1982, drug traffickers were perceived as a threat because they tried to penetrate the Colombian political system. A new social class claimed its right to share the political power with the traditional political elite. This was perceived as a threat to the monopoly of the traditional political class on political power as well as to the integrity of the traditional parties and Colombian institutions because of the possibility for subordination of political decisions to the interests of powerful criminal groups. ⁴³⁶  In fact, in March 1982, Pablo Escobar was elected as the replacement representative of Jairo Ortega Ramirez for the political movement Liberal Alternative (Alternativa Liberal). ⁴³⁷  Moreover, Escobar had already gained popularity in Medellín through the creation in 1982 of the local movement Civismo en Marcha (Civism on the Move) and his foundation Medellín sin Tugurios (Medellín Without Slums). Through both political organizations Escobar sought to gain electoral support and a social base of support among the low-income sectors of Medellín, which in fact would provide him with support in terms of information, recruitment base for his hit-men and employees, hiding places, etc. With the fortune gained from cocaine trafficking, Escobar built soccer stadiums, housing, and health centers. As explained earlier in the dissertation, Escobar filled the vacuum left by the weak capacity of the Colombian state.

      Another trafficker, Carlos Lehder, had created a political party the Movimiento Latino Nacional (National Latin Movement-MLN-). As explained by Rensselaer Lee III,

'The party's ideology combined populist and fascist themes (opposition to communism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and Zionism); it aims included nationalization of banks, transport, and the assets of multinationals ; and the end to 'foreign intervention' in Colombian life; the abrogation of the extradition treaty; and the creation of a united Latin American army to safeguard Latin sovereignty, culture and frontiers. The MNL for a time maintained its own newspaper, Quindío Libre, which circulated in Major Colombia Cities. The Party had limited electoral successes -winning approximately 12 percent of the vote in the regional elections in Quindío in March 1984. By 1986, however, the MNL's future had ebbed. Most of its followers had rejoined the traditional political parties or had affiliated themselves with the leftist Union Patriótica (Patriotic Union). Lehder himself, although a fugitive from justice, was the MNL candidate for the Colombian Senate from Quindío in the March 1986 congressional elections; he lost overwhelmingly' ⁴³⁸ 

      The Colombian government would react against this growing competitive criminal political force. A leader in this crusade against drug traffickers, (especially and almost exclusively the Medellín) cartel was Betancur's Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. A Liberal himself, he was concerned about party penetration by members of the Medellín cartel. Also, as the rest of the Colombian political class, Bonilla feared the formation of a political force that could represent the interest of the drug traffickers. Lara Bonilla was a strong supporter of the utilization of the Extradition Treaty to control the expansion of the cocaine industry in Colombia and he had the will to implement it. ⁴³⁹  He would lead the first campaign of enforcement against the drug cartels.

      A second factor that precipitated the spiral of violence was a campaign of intimidation against members of the judiciary and other government officials investigating drug trafficking activities and flagrant crimes, including massacres of peasants perpetrated or supported by the traffickers. Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was persistently harassed and threatened by the traffickers since the moment he took office in 1983. Death threats were part of his daily life and the traffickers tapped his home and office phones. ⁴⁴⁰  This threat to use of violence was also a preemptive move to prevent the application of the Extradition Treaty, a policy that became evident in 1983 after Betancur took office. ⁴⁴¹ 

      The traffickers preemptively threatened the use of violence against the state as a tactic of intimidation. They also tried to penetrate the Colombian party system in order to gain political power.

      The state made a second move in the escalation of violence through a campaign of aggressive interdiction against drug traffickers. The first big government intervention was the discovery, capture, and destruction in March 1984 of a huge complex of cocaine processing laboratories on the banks of the Yari river in the department of Caquetá. ⁴⁴²  The larger complex was known as 'Tranquilandia." Lara Bonilla was responsible for authorizing and politically directing the National Police operations. The result was a retaliatory campaign leading to the assassination of government officials and journalists. The reactive violence started with the assassination of Lara Bonilla on April 30, 1984. This unleashed a campaign of harsher enforcement by the government.

      The traffickers attempted to set a truce through secret negotiations with the government. However, the negotiations were leaked to the press (presumably by the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá), and they were strongly opposed in public opinion and by the political parties. ⁴⁴³  The government was left no alternative but to resort to enforcement operations against the Medellín Cartel. ⁴⁴⁴  Clawson and Lee describe this episode in the following terms,

"The traffickers communicated the [...] offer to the government in successive meetings with former President Alonso Lopez Michelsen and with Colombian attorney general Carlos Jiménez Gómez in May 1984. Lopez happened to be in Panama then as an observer for that country's president election [...] At the first meeting, in the Hotel Marriott in Panama City, Pablo Escobar and Jorge Ochoa told Lopez that they represented 100 top Colombian mafiosi [...] The traffickers said they were ready to ´dismantle everything' and repatriate money in Swiss bank accounts provided that the government discontinued extradition and agreed not to confiscate their wealth. (According to one disputed version, the traffickers also offered to pay off Colombia's 10$ billion national debt). Lopez communicated the offer directly to Colombia's president Belisario Betancur, who has just initiated a peace dialogue with the country's guerrilla groups. Betancur found the traffickers' plan intriguing and authorized his attorney general to travel to Panama to contact Escobar and his colleagues. The traffickers gave Jiménez a long written document addressed directly to President Betancur in which they proposed to eliminate once and forever any drug trafficking in our country' and asked the president to 'consider the possibility of our reinstatement in Colombian society in the near future'[...] Referring to prosecution in Colombia, the traffickers denied responsibility for the murder of Lara Bonilla and affirmed their support for the Colombia's democratic and republican system of government. In a 'Suggestions' section at the end of the document, the traffickers requested revisions in the extradition treaty, an exemption for crimes committed before the revision and the right to appeal extradition decisions to the Colombian Supreme Court [...] Nothing ever came out of the trafficker's initiative, in part because of the overwhelmingly negative reaction of Colombia's political establishment. Leaders from every political party -liberals, new liberals, and conservatives- almost unanimously expressed open and categorical opposition to a dialogue with drug traffickers. Carlos Holguín Sardi, the conservative president of the Colombian Senate, summarized the view of the majority when he observed, '[Negotiations] where criminal law is concerned...would mean the total disintegration of our legal and other institutions'." ⁴⁴⁵ 

      According to Clawson and Lee III, Carlos Jiménez Gomez (one of the negotiators of the Colombian government) had informally communicated the substance of the drug kingpins' offer to the U.S. embassy in Colombia, and the Reagan administration strongly objected to an agreement with the traffickers. Besides domestic pressure, U.S. pressure would have then also motivated Betancur to stop the negotiations and to deny that they had ever taken place. ⁴⁴⁶ 

      As stated before, government enforcement activities during this period were motivated more by a reaction against the violence unchained by the drug traffickers and their overt attempts to penetrate the political system than by the pressure exercised by the U.S. government. As a matter of fact, President Betancur's reticent attitude towards the application of the Extradition Treaty changed after the assassination of Lara Bonilla. For example, right after Lara Bonilla´s murder, the government authorized the extradition of Carlos Lehder. Extradition became a main enforcement tool. ⁴⁴⁷  The Betancur administration also engaged the armed forces, in particular the army, in counter-drug activities. Since 1983, joint activities with the National Police and separate army operations were carried out for the destruction of production sites and the eradication of coca plantations. The involvement of the armed forces would become more evident after the assassination of Lara Bonilla. This participation took on operative and juridical dimensions: the armed forces would participate in counter-drug operations and the military justice would intervene in the prosecution of drug trafficking related crimes. ⁴⁴⁸  The tables and figures below illustrate some of the results of the enforcement operations against drug trafficking during this period.

      

Table 3. Seizure of Illicit Drugs 1983-1986 (in kilograms)
Type of drug	1983	1984	1985	1986
Cocaine	2,082	19,582	4,240	3,039
Cocaine base	--------	9,448	3,700	4,070
Coca leaves	--------	41,583	151,671	163,000
Bazuco	--------	785	605	481
Marijuana	3,537,387	4,301,262	1,021,045	846,000

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997.

      

Table 4. Captured presumed drug traffickers 1981-1986
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
National	105	430	665	5,250	11,981	3,659
Foreign	-------	-------	--------	-------	--------	40

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      

Graphic 1. Destroyed laboratories 1981-1986

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      

Table 5. Goods and elements seized during enforcement operations 1982-1986 (in units)
Units	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Weapons	621	308	1,517	337	39
Radios	-----	--------	241	120	46
Vehicles	107	155	520	228	185
Ships and boats	30	9	20	24	5
Planes	8	13	64	33	21
Portative power plants	------	-------	52	26	25
Scales	------	--------	60	389	133
Ammunition			35,588	9,698	6,615
Grenades	-------	-------		9	6
Dynamite (kilos)	-------	-------	84	----------	--------

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      Parallel to this spiral of violence between the government and the traffickers, the war between the traffickers continued (especially Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and his alliance with the landowners and sectors of the army) against the UP and the guerrillas. As reported by Human Rights Watch,

"Political violence in Colombia took a dramatic turn on December 3, 1981, when a helicopter flying over the city of Cali dropped leaflets announcing the formation of a new group, Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a los secuestradores, MAS) [...] In the Middle Magdalena region, where people with land or business faced increased demands for so-called 'war taxes' , supplies and food from the FARC, and were plagued by kidnapping for ransom the MAS model represented a violent, yet effective means for fighting back. The Bárbula Battalion, in Santander´s Puerto Boyacá, and the town's military mayor, Capt. Oscar de Jesús Echandía, adopted the MAS model. In 1982, Echandía convened a meeting of local people, including local Liberal and Conservative party leaders, businessmen, ranchers, and representatives from the Texas Petroleum Company. They found that their goal went far beyond protecting the population from guerrilla demands. They wanted to 'cleanse' (limpiar) the region of subversives. To do so, they agreed to gather guns, clothing, food, and a fund to pay young men to fight. Money came from businessmen and ranchers, while the military committed tactical support [...] Before ending the meeting they chose a name for their new group: MAS, the same used by drug traffickers [...] by 1983, MAS was taking part in joint operations without the army. At the time , local peasants reported numerous cases of troops accompanied by MAS members carrying out extrajudicial excecutions and destroying farms[...]
[In 1983] MAS set up a public entity to carry out civic improvements and aid peasants who joined their fight: the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Middle Magdalena (Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio, ACDEGAM). Likes the military's own counterinsurgency strategy, ACDEGAM operated in two levels: public statements against communism and in favor of a legalization of so-called 'self-defense' groups paired with covert attacks, assassinations, and death threats through MAS in league with the military. [...] By 1985, ACDEGAM had powerful new members: drug traffickers who bought land in the Middle Magdalena. The financial support of king pins dramatically improved the quantity and quality of the groups weapons, intelligence-gathering ability, and rage of action" ⁴⁴⁹ 

      Paramilitary squads massacred at least 5,300 peasants during this period, particularly in the Magdalena Medio Region where Rodriguez Gacha had purchased enormous extensions of land. ⁴⁵⁰  This violence will be also considered since it provoked the displacement of Colombian peasants to Venezuela. ⁴⁵¹ 

      The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence carried out by drug traffickers during this period.

Deadly escalation 1983-1985:

December 1983 Creation of the peasant self -defense (autodefensas) groups finances and armed by the landowners of the Magdalena Medio region against the FARC. This self defense groups are supported by the "Bárbula" Army Battalion based in Puerto Boyacá. April 30 1984 Rodrigo Lara Bonilla is assassinated. January-April 1985 The self-defense groups of the Magdalena Medio eradicate the FARC from the area and consolidate as stable armed groups in the area. June 1985 First contacts and talks conversations between the autodefensas and the drug traffickers. August 1985 the autodefensas start patrolling and protecting coca producing plots and cocaine producing laboratories in the Magdalena Medio and Yarí lowland areas. November 6 and 7 , 1985. Assassination of 15 Justices of the Supreme Court and the Council of State, during the occupation of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 Guerrilla group , with the trouble (alleged) support of drug traffickers.

      Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp. 236-300 and Office of the President of the Republic, The Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia, Bogotá, November 1989, 69pp.

c) Colombia's ordeal: President Virgilio Barco administration (1986-1990)

      This is the period of greater escalation between the Medellín cartel and the Colombian government. Drug trafficking-related violence stemmed from the utilization of the Extradition Treaty as the main repressive tool of the government. A group known as 'The Extraditables' was created under the leadership of Pablo Escobar. The traffickers also intensified their campaign of terrorism against the state.

      President Barco considered drug trafficking to be a national security problem and his point of view was that all the available resources of the state had to be used in order to cope with this threat. In Barco´s view, drug trafficking was threatening the survival of democratic institutions and public liberties. ⁴⁵² As explained by a group of Colombian analysts,

"[w]hereas traditionally drug trafficking was considered to be a particularly violent problem of delinquency, the Barco administration defined it as a foremost problem of national security. This implied [in its view] that the commitment of the armed forces in the repression of drug trafficking had to be enhanced." ⁴⁵³ 

      Although at the beginning of the Barco administration the National Police and the DAS had the lead in counterdrug activities, the Colombian president enhanced the participation of the armed forces in interdiction activities in remote areas. The table below shows the evolution of casualties provoked by drug traffickers to the Colombian armed forces and national police during the Barco administration.

      

Table 6. Casualties in the Armed Forces and the National Police provoked by drug trafficking organizations
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Killed	328	383	408	473	295
Injured	548	666	673	670	464

Source: Office of the President of the Republic, The Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia, Bogotá, November 1989. (Data for 1989 is incomplete, due to the change of presidential administration in August of that year.)

      The increase in participation of the armed forces in counterdrug operations was particularly evident during 1988 and 1989. ⁴⁵⁴  Further militarization during that period was due to two factors: First, the recently inaugurated Bush administration was applying pressure for a stronger involvement of the Colombian military in enforcement operations against drug trafficking. Secondly, stronger involvement of the armed forces formed part of the offensive against the Medellín cartel provoked by the assassination of Galán. ⁴⁵⁵ 

      The assassination of Galán was a preemptive move by the Medellín cartel. Galán was not killed because of policies he had applied, but because of policies he would implement in the future. Galán was the favorite candidate for the 1989 elections. He was young, dynamic, and a friend of Lara Bonilla; he favored of the use of the Extradition Treaty as a means to combat criminal organizations. ⁴⁵⁶  Paradoxically, his death would create a contrary effect from that intended. After his murder, governmental enforcement was harsher than ever. The process would lead to a crackdown on the organization. The government retaliated by destroying laboratories and seizing property and assets belonging to the heads of the Medellín cartel. On December 15, 1989 Rodriguez Gacha was killed during a joint arrest operation of the CNP and the DAS. The tables and figures below illustrate some of the results of the enforcement operations against drug trafficking during this period.

      

Table 7. Illegal Crops Eradication 1985-1990 (in hectares)
Crop	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Coca	1,334	870	572	230	641	760
Marihuana	124	149	371	918	132	36
Opium poppy	-----	5	-----	------	-------	------

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      

Table 8. Seizure of Illicit Drugs 1987-1989 (in kilograms)
Type of drug	1987	1988	1989	1990
Cocaine	8,326	18,701	30,633	44,962
Cocaine base	6,712	3,897	6,726	5,786
Coca leaves	188,689	97,360	202,973	533,694
Bazuco	279	537	524	394
Marijuana	128,850	922,858	707,617	653,322

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997.

      

Table 9. Captured presumed drug traffickers 1987-1986
	1987	1988	1989	1990
National	4,653	4,898	3,574	2,678
Foreign	39	31	33	7

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      

Graphic 2. Destroyed laboratories 1987-1990

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      

Table 10. Goods and elements seized during enforcement operations 1987-1990 (in units)
Units	1987	1988	1989	1990
Weapons	358	758	986	887
Radios	61	206	376	307
Vehicles	187	348	494	311
Ships and boats	40	29	38	35
Planes	20	57	50	36
Portative power plants	22	55	105	74
Scales	177	261	300	214
Ammunition	12,572	46,321	40,728	132,620
Grenades	6	41	45	205
Dynamite	------------------	------------------	----------------	25,428

Source: Republic of Colombia, Ministry of Justice and Law, National Drug Directorate, 1997

      The position of the cartels was clear: terrorism would not cease unless extradition stopped. For this the treaty would have to be declared unconstitutional. The victims would naturally be the magistrates of the Supreme Court who had the last word on this matter. During this period, the violence of the traffickers against the political class was particularly high. The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by drug traffickers during this period.

Deadly escalation 1986-August 1990:

July 16, 1986, Leticia (Amazonas). Assassination of the journalist Roberto Camacho Prada, a correspondent of the newspaper 'El Espectador." July 17, 1986, Bogota, Assassination of Judge Hernando Baquero Borda. September 1, 1986 Assassination of Pedro Nel Jiménez Obando, UP's Senator. September, 17,1986, Cali. Assassination of Raul Echavarria Barrientos, assistant director of 'Occidente," a daily newspaper. October 22, 1986, Bogota, Attempted assassination of Judge Gustavo Zuluaga Serna. November 17, 1986 Assassination of Col. Jaime Ramírez Gómez, chief of the Narcotics Division of the National Police. December 10, 1986, Bogota. Assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Jose Agustin Ramos Rodriguez, distinguished officer of the Valle Police Department, very active against delinquency. December 17, 1986 Assassination of Guillermo Cano, director of the journal El Espectador. 1985-1989 Period of further organization, consolidation and training of the autodefensas (turn into fully organized paramilitary groups) by contracted Israeli, British and South African mercenaries. October 1987 Bomb in the Ministry of Defense. October 7, 1987 Massacre of peasants in Puerto Boyacá. October 14 1987 Assassination of Jaime Pardo Leal, presidential candidate by UP. November, 24 1987, Medellín, Abortive Kidnapping of Juan Gomez Martinez, Director of the Newspaper El Colombiano and elected mayor of Medellín. December 17, 1988, Budapest (Hungary), Attempt on former Minister of Justice and then Ambassador of Colombia in Hungary, Dr. Enrique Parejo Gonzalez. January 1988, Five former members of the armed forces allegedly paid by the Cali cartel are assassinated by the Medellín cartel. January 13, 1988, 700 kilos of dynamite explode in front of the "Mónaco" building in Medellín owed by Pablo Escobar and also the residence of his family. Escalation of violence between the Cali and the Medellín cartels. January 18, 1988, Kidnapping of Andrés Pastrana, son of the former president Miguel Pastrana Borrero, and Conservative candidate for the office of mayor of Bogotá (and current president of Colombia). January 25, 1988, Kidnapping and assassination of the General Prosecutor of the Nation, Carlos Mauro Hoyos. By coincidence during the failed attempt to free Hoyos, Dr. Andrés Pastrana is localized and released. February 18, 1988, a pharmacy of the Cali cartel owed commercial chain "La Rebaja" is burned in Medellín. From that moment on there were forty bomb attempts against "La Rebaja" locals and ten bomb attempts against the Colombian Radio Group owed by the Rodríguez Orejuela Family. April 3, 1988, 38 peasants are killed in La Mejor Esquina (Córdoba Department); allegedly they were giving support to the guerrillas. April 11, 1988, 12 fishermen and banana workers are killed in Punta Coquitos (Turbo, Urabá) July 3, 1988 , 16 peasants are killed in El Castillo (Meta). They were accused of supporting the UP. January 16, 1989, 12 judges that were investigating massive killings are murdered in La Rochela (Santander). February 4, 1989, 5 people are murdered in Santa Rosa del Cabal (Risaralda). February 27, 1989, Assassination of Teófilo Forero, member of the Central Committee of the Colombian Communist Party. March 29, 1989, Murder of the 'El Espectador' Journalist, Dr. Hector Giraldo Galvis. March 30, 1989 , In El Dorado airport of Bogotá is assassinated José Antequera, Secretary General of the Communist Youth and member of the UP. In the same attempt is wounded Ernesto Samper Pizano (presidential pre-candidate for the Liberal Party and president from 1994 to 1998). May 30, 1989, Bomb attempt against Brig. General Miguel Alfredo Maza, Director of the Security Department (DAS). July 4, 1989, Assassination in Medellín of Antonio Roldán, Governor of Antioquía. July 28,Medellín, Assassination of Public Order Judge Maria Helena Diaz Perez. June-August 1989, Escalation of murders of judges, magistrates, peasants and members of UP. August 16,1989, Assassination of Doctor Carlos Valencia Garcia, Magistrate. August 18, 1989 Assassination of Col. Valdemar Franklin Quintero, chief of the Metropolitan Police and assassination of Luis Carlos Galán S., presidential candidate for the New Liberal Party. August 23, 1989, the Medellín cartel declares a "total war" against the state. August 18-October 1, 1989, Eighty five dynamite attempts in Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Bogotá against banks, financial corporations, electoral campaign offices of the Liberal and Conservative parties, hotels and restaurants, newspaper offices, commercial centers etc. September, 2, 1989, Bogota, car-bomb attack on the building of the newspaper ' El Espectador." September 11, 1989, Medellín , Assassination of Doctor Pablo Pelaez Gonzalez, former Mayor of Medellín. October 16, 1989 Bucaramanga. Attack against the newspaper 'Vanguardia Liberal," 2 dead and 7 people injured. October 17, 1989, Medellín. Assassination of Doctor Jose Hector Jiménez Rodriguez, Magistrate of the Penal Superior Tribunal of Medellín. November 1, 1989, Assassination of the Magistrate of the Penal Superior Tribunal, Ms. Mariela Espinosa Arango. November, 27, 1989, Soacha, Bogota, Avianca flight bombed, 107 dead. December 6, 1989, DAS building explosion, 63 dead , 600 injured. December 19, 1989. Kidnapping of the son of the Secretary of the Presidency and 18 more people among them members of the family of President Barco. March 29, 1990, Chigorodó (Urabá), five peasants are assassinated. Massacres in Trujillo. May 1990, the rural violence provokes massive displacement of peasants in Sucre. May 27 1990, Presidential elections. The generalized violence and terror provokes the highest rate of abstentions in the last 50 years (68%). May-July 1990, Bombs in Medellín against military and police transport units. July 15, 1990, new massacres against peasants in Urabá and Córdoba. July 28, 1990, the government announces that up to that date there had been 517 bomb attempts and in only six months 11,000 people had been murdered.

      Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit, pp. 236-300 and Office of the President of the Republic, The Fight Against the Drug Traffic in Colombia, pp.12-16.

      This period also registered a large number of massacres in rural areas. As reported by Human Rights Watch,

"The year 1988 proved a crucial one. The Center for Investigation and Popular Education [CINEP], a human rights group recorded 108 massacres that year [...], the worst of the decade. Not only wee paramilitaries increasingly active in the regions where their members were based; with the active coordination and support of the military, paramilitaries where also sent across country to kill supposed guerrilla collaborators." ⁴⁵⁷ 

      The main reason for this was that, since its institutionalization as a political party, the UP began winning support in the rural zones. These areas overlapped with the property of traffickers-turned-landowners who perceived the party as a threat since the main political flag of the UP was agrarian reform. Traffickers such as Rodríguez Gacha joined forces with the landowners and the army to counter the advance of the left by terrorizing the peasants to prevent them from supporting UP and guerrillas.  ⁴⁵⁸  They formed an anti-Communist political party called Movimiento de Restauración Nacional (MORENA) -Movement of National Restoration- whose main goal was to stop the expansion of the left. Paramilitary groups were trained by Israeli Defense Forces and ex-SAS mercenaries. ⁴⁵⁹ 

      The following tables and figures present general statistics of violence elaborated by the Council for Reconciliation, Normalization and Rehabilitation (Consejería para la Reconciliacíon, Normalization and Rehabilitation) of the Presidency of Colombia during 1988 and the first semester of 1989. ⁴⁶⁰  Notice that the figures displayed are not necessarily related to drug trafficking related violence as defined in this dissertation. However, violent acts registered under the category "private justice groups, drug trafficking organizations (narcotráfico), and organized crime (delincuencia organizada) can be assimilated to drug trafficking-related violence. Notice also the tables and figures below display official indicators and categories used by the Colombian government.

      

Graphic 3. Armed actions that took place in 1988 (by responsible groups)

      "Armed actions" refers to the following acts: ambushes, armed encounters, terrorist acts, armed assaults to villages, towns and private and official entities, attacks to installations, road robberies and armed harassment.

      

Graphic 4. 1988- Murder and kidnapping of civilians and public official/political leaders (by responsible group)

      "Public officials and political leaders (dirigentes y funcionarios)" refer to the following categories: Prosecutors, congressmen, national political leaders, departmental political leaders, mayors, members of local government assemblies, local political leaders, political candidates, trade union leaders, popular leaders, political militant and activists, police inspectors.

      

Graphic 5. Armed actions that took place in the first semester of 1989 (by responsible group)

      

Graphic 6. First Semester of 1989- Murder and kidnapping of civilians and public official/political leaders (by responsible group)

      "Public officials and political leaders (dirigentes y funcionarios)" refer to the following categories: Prosecutors, congressmen, national political leaders, departmental political leaders, mayors, members of local government assemblies, local political leaders, political candidates, trade union leaders, popular leaders, political militant and activists, police inspectors.

d) Escobar's phyrric victory: César Gaviria administration (1990-1994)

      President Gaviria would follow a different approach to stop the spiral of violence and terror unchained by the Medellín cartel. On one hand, the president continued with the enforcement against the traffickers but, at the same time, opened negotiations with them. In his effort to de-escalate violence, president Gaviria give the bulk of responsibility on counterdrug activities to the judiciary power and the police. The army was involved in counterdrug operations but their efforts were kept to a minimum; moreover, the army was allowed to concentrate on counterinsurgency operations as a their main task. ⁴⁶¹ 

      On the other hand, in September 1990 the president offered a negotiated surrender, in exchange for their surrender to the Colombian authorities. Surrendered traffickers would be tried in Colombian courts and imprisoned in Colombia. ⁴⁶²  Also, in June 1991 a Constitutional Assembly that had been elected in December 1990 in order to reform the Colombian Constitution declared the Extradition Treaty unconstitutional. ⁴⁶³  The ban of the Extradition Treaty was a result of a combined campaign of lobby and terror implemented by the Medellín's traffickers. ⁴⁶⁴ 

      Eventually, the war between the Medellín cartel and the government would end up in a Phyrric victory for the traffickers. The traffickers had imposed their will on the extradition issue. In exchange, the Medellín kingpins stopped the wave of violence and surrendered to be prosecuted and jailed in Colombian prisons. However, the coalition had been disbanded. As stated before, Rodriguez Gacha was killed during a police raid in December 1989. By February 1991, the Ochoa Vasquez Brothers and Pablo Escobar had surrendered voluntarily. Most of their goods, laboratories, airstrips, and land had been destroyed or confiscated. In a desperate attempt to avoid imprisonment in a military unit and a trial, Escobar escaped from prison in July of 1992, and started a new campaign of terror against the state and his rivals. ⁴⁶⁵  The Bloque de Búsqueda, (Search Block, a special elite unit formed by 600 members of the CNP and the army) localized and killed him in December 1993. Escobar's demise was the result of constant and tacitly combined harassment from his rivals (allegedly the Cali cartel sponsored the hit group Los PEPES ) and the Colombian police. ⁴⁶⁶  His death marked the end of the Medellín coalition as well as an end of the spiral of violence between the traffickers and the state. The Cali cartel would, however, benefit from the demise of their rivals. As explained earlier in this dissertation, the Cali traffickers were less prone to direct armed confrontation with the state and preferred corruption as a tactic to secure the business. In this way, they were able to maintain a low profile during the all-out war between the government and the Medellín cartel. The Cali coalition would dominate cocaine exports in the first half of the 1990s. ⁴⁶⁷ 

      The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by drug traffickers during this period.

Deadly escalation August 1990-1993:

August 30, 1990, kidnapping of Diana Turbay Quintero, director of the Hoy x Hoy magazine, partner of the Criptón T.V. news program and daughter of former president Julio César Turbay Ayala. September 1990, the "Extraditables" clamed responsibility for the kidnapping of Diana Turbay and her news team and announce that they will only release her if they receive a similar treatment to the one granted to the M-19 and EPL (that is open negotiations and truce with the government). Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela (heads of the Cali cartel) announce that as a preventive measure against the Medellín cartel they have formed their own intelligence network. October 30 and November 1990, kidnapping of Maruja Pachón de Villamizar sister in law of Luis Carlos Galán. January 25, 1991, during a police operation Diana Turbay Quintero is killed while the police attempted to release her. March 1991, indiscriminate killings in Cali and murder of Cali traffickers. March, 7, 1991 , the police identify 11 of 31 bodies that were found floating in the Cauca river. Allegedly drug traffickers operating in the Norte de Valle department (members of the Cali coalition) killed this people. March 19, 1992, the Cali police deactivates a bomb of 50 kilos placed near a soccer stadium. July 21, 1992 ,Pablo Escobar escapes from prison. In 1993 the organization of Pablo Escobar carried out 6 terrorist attempts in Bogotá with a total of 64 dead and 276 wounded. A similar campaign of terror took place in Medellín. February 28, 1993,a house belonging to a boss of the Medellín cartel is burned by Los Pepes. March 5, 1993, a lawyer of the Medellín cartel is murdered by Los Pepes. Four other lawyers are threatened. January-March 1993, several installations of the Medellín cartel are attacked by Los Pepes. December 2, 1993, the Colombian security forces kill Pablo Escobar.

      Sources: Betancourt and García, op.cit, pp. 277-300 and CINEP, La verdad del '93 : paz, derechos humanos y violencia, Bogotá, Cinep, 1994.

      Rural violence between guerrillas and paramilitary groups did not stop during this period and, paradoxically, the paramilitary groups financed by the traffickers would still have the support of the Colombian military. As reported by the Human Rights Watch,

"Law enforcement investigators identify three groups engaged in violence there [the northern part of the Middle Magdalena region]: the FARC and ELN; a handful of ranching families and drug traffickers who have organized paramilitary groups; and the military. Although violence has a long history here, the most recent increase dates from the early 1990s, as the military-paramilitary alliance based in Puerto Boyacá and Puerto Berrío began to push north in pursuit of suspected 'subversives'. By 1993 when, Mobile Brigade 2 was active in that area, human rights groups were flooded with reports of serious human rights abuses [...] In a letter to the Public Ombudsman (Defensoría) in Bogotá, the regional ombudsman identified a group calling itself the "Peasant Self-Defense Group" (Autodefensas Campesinas) as responsible for the July 30, 1994 massacre of six people. He reported that despite abundant evidence, Gen. Ricardo Cienfuentes, commander of the Fifth Brigade and the officer responsible for the area, claimed 'not to be aware of self-defense groups in the area'. At the same time civil authorities described themselves as 'overwhelmed' with reports of such groups." ⁴⁶⁸ 

      

Table 11. Goods seized because of drug trafficking crimes 1982-1995
Units	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Weapons	324	523	867	538	608
Radios	113	226	226	185	153
Vehicles	115	327	465	358	459
Ships	44	26	39	47	52
Planes	27	37	27	30	80
Portative power plants	58	63	47	47	113
Scales	190	231	251	276	427
Ammunition	24611	19192	63960	17192	33741
Grenades	100	20	260	6	31
Dinnertime (kilos)	233	2111	3653	14	11

Source: República de Colombia, Ministro de Justicia y del Derecho, Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 1997

      

Table 12. Eradication of Illicit crops (hectares)
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Coca	459	944	846	4904	25402
Marijuana	7	100	138	14	36
Poppy	1497	12864	9821	5314	5074

Source: Colombia, Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 1997

a) A brief introduction to Venezuela

      As explained in the second chapter, the strength of a state is not a static condition. States move along a continuum depending on changes in their sociopolitical cohesion, policy capacity, socioeconomic development, and territorial centrality. Venezuela, as this chapter will show, clearly reflects this back and forth movement along the continuum.

      What is today Venezuela was part of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Nueva Granada, comprised of the current territories of Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela. The country became effectively independent from Spanish rule in 1821 after a long period of military campaigns (1810-1821) led by Venezuela's national hero El Libertador Simón Bolívar. For eight years, Venezuela was part of the Republic of Gran Colombia's federation (formed by Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela), which was part of Bolívar's project for a united independent Hispanic America. However Venezuelan nationalism, politically and economically centered in Caracas, prevailed and in 1829 one of Bolívar's lieutenants, José Antonio Páez led Venezuela in its separation from Gran Colombia. ⁴⁶⁹ 

      During the first hundred years of its independence, Venezuela was a prototypical--almost stereotypical--Latin American society, with an agrarian economy, an elitist social and economic structure, and a tradition of military rule. ⁴⁷⁰  As explained by an analyst,

"Until 1935 Venezuelan history was characterized by long periods of authoritarian rule, including the regimes of José Antonio Páez (1830-46 and 1861-63), Antonio Guzmán Blanco (1870-88) and Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-35), alternating with shorter periods of more democratic instability. The legacy was still an apparent combination of respect for authority and an insistent democratic rhetoric."  ⁴⁷¹ 

      Things started to change with the discovery of oil reserves during the regime of caudillo Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). A more educated and politically aware middle class developed in the wake of expanding oil production. Representatives of this class, the so-called Generation of 1928, led the protest movements that eventually brought democracy to Venezuela in the 1940s and 1950s. ⁴⁷²  As noted by an analyst,

"The dominant figures in the 20th century Venezuelan political history were Rómulo Betancourt, founder of the social democrat Democratic Action (Acción Democrática-AD) party and Dr. Rafael Caldera Rodríguez, founder of the christian democrat Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente -COPEI). Their democratic convictions were derived from early experiences of opposition to Gómez, with both parties emerging from the middle class student movement. From 1945 to 1948 (known as the 'Trienio', or three-year period) Betancourt was provisional President under a revolutionary seven-member junta, which had overthrown another dictator, Isaías Medina Angarita" ⁴⁷³ 

      The Trienio experience, mentioned in the quote above, was frustrated in 1948 by another military coup led by General Marcos Perez Giménez, who was later ousted by a civil-military movement in 1958. Since the ousting of military dictator Marcos Perez Jiménez, the country has had a presidential democratic regime characterized by the dominance of two highly disciplined centrist political parties: Democratic Action (Acción Democrática-AD), which adheres to a social democratic line; and its opposition, the Social Christian Party (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente-COPEI). However, since the late 1980s, a combination of economic constrains and widespread corruption have progressively provoked the de-legitimization of the two-party system, and third parties have started to challenge the dominance of AD and COPEI. Other relevant parties (in terms of representation) are: Convergencia Nacional (electoral coalition of 17 political parties founded in 1993); Causa Radical -Causa R-( center-left party formed in 1970 but only politically significant since 1988); Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS- (democratic socialist party founded in 1971 by dissidents of the Communist party). The country is politically organized as a federal republic and administratively divided into twenty states and two federal territories (Amazonas and a federal dependency consisting of seventy-two islands). ⁴⁷⁴ 

      Venezuela can be defined as a "petro-state," a type-state that an analyst has defined in the following terms,

"Oil is not different from gold in one respect. When minerals are the key source of wealth for a state, these mining revenues alter the framework for decision-making. They affect not only the actual policy environment of officials but also other basic aspects of the state such as the autonomy of goal formation, the types of public institutions adopted, the prospects for building other extractive capabilities, and the locus of authority. The manner in which a state earns a living influences its own patterns of institutionalization. In petro-states, oil provoked changes in state capacity are the 'intervening variable'; they shape policy preferences..." ⁴⁷⁵ 

      As shown in the figure below, oil is the main component of the Venezuelan economy as well as the main source of income for the Venezuelan institutional component of the state.

      

Graphic 1. Oil industry as a share Venezuela's exports; State public revenues, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Source: CIA Fact Book 1997 [On-Line], available internet http://www.cia.gov.

      Oil has generated a rentier state. Political elites have benefited from oil profits. Redistribution of oil revenues and pacts based on the redistribution of these profits has been the key to the stability of the Venezuelan long lasting "pacted democracy" or democracia pactada. As explained by Terry Lynn Karl, this particular type of democracy established in Venezuela was settled,

"through elite bargains and compromises during the transition from authoritarian rule. They [pacted democracies] ensure their survival by selectively meeting demands while limiting the scope of representation in order to reassure traditional dominant classes that their vital interests will be respected. Because they usually promote regime practices that are simultaneously top- down, inclusive yet preemptive, and restrictive, they may bolster the patterns of the petro-state by establishing formal institutions and informal norms that limit contestation and by restricting the policy agenda and the autonomous organizational capacity of mass actors [....] In the most telling example, the two major political parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, sought to keep the barriers to power especially high and to guard their role as the principal means of access to the state by sacrificing their programs and becoming machines for extracting rents from the public arena. Together these factors encouraged the persistence of a development trajectory fueled solely by the expenditure of petrodollars" ⁴⁷⁶ 

      The failed experience of the Trienio had been marked by the predominance of the AD and by a lack of political compromise with other political forces. This precipitated the fall of democracy in 1948. ⁴⁷⁷ 

      Based on the Trienio experience, in 1958, the two major political forces agreed prior to the elections to uphold the Constitution and to direct political conflict into institutional channels. This pact known as the Pact of Punto Fijo was also designed to marginalize the left (the Communist Party was excluded from the Pact) by channeling all patronage through the AD and the COPEI and by incorporating popular organizations into the two party system. ⁴⁷⁸ 

"This document [the Pact of Punto Fijo] guaranteed that all parties would respect the electoral process and share power in a manner commensurate with the voting results. In addition, the parities promised to maintain a 'prolonged political truce' that would depersonalize debate as well as ensure consultation among the parties. This truce, although not involving explicit quotas of power, required the formation of coalitions and an equitable distribution of the benefits from the state. Regardless of who won the elections, each party was guaranteed some share of the political and economic pie through access to state jobs and contracts, a partitioning of the ministries, and a complicated spoils system ensuring the political survival of all signatories." ⁴⁷⁹ 

      Complementing the Pact of Punto Fijo was another pact that concerned social and economic issues, The Declaración de Principios y Programa Mínimo de Gobierno (Declaration of Principles and Minimum Program of Government), by which,

"All parties agreed to support oil-led development, broad state jurisdiction in matters of production and social welfare, and high protection for and subsidies to local industry. To reassure oil companies, the Minimum Program ruled out the expropriation or the socialization of property; although it proposed agrarian reform, it promised agrarian reform, it promised that changes in land tenure would be based on the principle of compensation[...] The Pact of Punto Fijo and the Minimum Program were complemented by basic agreements between workers and employers and between organized interests and parties [...]capitalists and organized labor pledged, in the Worker-Employment Accord, 'harmonious collaboration' through the establishment of commissions with equal labor and capital representation They also agreed to widespread social spending; new legislation regarding health, education, and social security; and strict adherence to collective bargains and the Labor Law. In order to further minimize conflict, the leaders of the political parties created a unified labor confederation based on the proportional representation of all parties." ⁴⁸⁰ 

      As noted by Karl, the emerging regime could be characterized as: inclusive, since pacts covered every sector of society and everyone could also vote in open elections; preemptive, because it sought to eliminate conflict between political and economic sectors; and restrictive, because political competition was limited and monopolized by the center (that is, AD and COPEI). ⁴⁸¹  The system worked because it was oiled by ... oil money. However, as this chapter will show later, to quote Charles De Gaulle, these pacts "like roses and young girls lasted while they lasted." ⁴⁸² 

      Oil profits also disguised the huge Venezuelan social disparities. Corruption and resource mismanagement were easily hidden when oil generated huge revenues but all these advantages disappeared as soon as oil prices dropped in the early 1980s and the effects of an irresponsibly contracted foreign debt started to be felt.

      The absence of oil money revealed the mismanagement of resources due to corrupt policies, and the incapacity of the state to extract resources and implement policies directed to satisfy the needs of the population. This led to a loss of legitimacy not only of the pacted democracy but also of the traditional political parties and their leaders.

      This section will concentrate on the situation of Venezuela since the late 1970s, in an attempt to understand the situation of the country as the cocaine industry arose. This section is also an attempt to understand why the spillover effects of enforcement against drug trafficking in Colombia and drug trafficking-related violence from Colombia became a national security problem to Venezuela. Weak states, no matter which of their components is weak, are vulnerable. As we will see, Venezuela moved towards the "weak state" polar type from the end of the 1970s, thus becoming vulnerable to the illicit drug industry.

b) Sociopolitical cohesion

      Venezuelan society is not fragmented along linguistic or ethnic lines. Indigenous groups are a minority, sparsely distributed in the Amazon territories and the Guajira Peninsula. They represent less than 1% of the population. For the scope of this dissertation, the Guajiro tribe (or waiús) is particularly interesting. These people live in the Guajira Peninsula on the border between Venezuela and Colombia. They do not necessarily identify with the Colombian and Venezuelan state and have traditionally lived from smuggling activities between the two countries. This is due above all to the depression of the traditional rural activities in this area since the Venezuelan oil boom in the 1950s. Even if this group has never been completely integrated into the nation-state, they are not a source of conflict or disintegration of the Venezuelan state. They do not have secessionist aspirations and they have gradually incorporated the Spanish language, the Catholic religion, and a way of life similar to the rest of the population. ⁴⁸³  Venezuela can, however, be considered a fragmented society along the lines of welfare and social conditions. As shown in the tables below, Venezuelan society registers huge disparities in terms of the distribution of welfare and living conditions.

      

Table 1. Poor Households, by Urban and Rural Areas (percentage)
Year	Urban	Rural	Total
1970	26	62	40
1980	25	54	35
1986	30	53	37
1990	36	56	41
1994	34	55	39

Sources: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile, ECLAC, 1997.

      

Table 2. Indigent Households by Urban and Rural Areas (percentage)
Year	Urban	Rural	Total
1970	10	34	19
1980	9	28	15
1986	11	30	17
1990	13	33	18
1994	12	33	17

Sources: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996 edition.

      

Table 3. Venezuela and income distribution
	1981	1987	1989	1990	1994(*)
DECILE 1	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.5
DECILE 2	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.3	---
DECILE 3	2.7	3.1	2.7	3.3	---
DECILE 4	3.6	3.6	3.9	4.0	---
DECILE 5	5.0	5.1	4.9	5.1	---
DECILE 6	6.0	6.5	6.2	6.7	---
DECILE 7	8.6	8.6	8.2	7.6	---
DECILE 8	11.4	11.7	10.8	10.9	---
DECILE 9	15.9	17.4	15.6	17.2	---
DECILE 10	43.7	40.6	44.3	41.8	31.4
(*) In urban households

Sources: Márquez, Gustavo (compiler), Gasto Público y Distribución del Ingreso en Venezuela, Caracas, Ediciones IESA, 1993. and ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000 edition.

      The potentially destabilizing effects of these inequalities could be reduced in the time of the oil boom era when Venezuela prospered, especially during the oil crisis in the 1970s when Venezuela as a member of OPEC adhered to the unilateral rise of oil prices. As stated by an analyst,

"Socially, Venezuelans benefited to a significant degree from the oil boom years of the 1970s. Per capita income became the highest in Latin America, literacy rates climbed, and the standard of living rose for many Venezuelans. Beneath the bright veneer, however, nagging problems festered. Poverty persisted for many. Even for many in the middle class, the prevailing system provided an artificial and impermanent brand of prosperity. The bloated government bureaucracy and heavily protected domestic industries provided employment, but they also strained the resources of a nation heavily dependent on the export of a single volatile commodity. When the bill for years of wasteful spending came due in the 1980s and 1990s, many Venezuelans began to experience a kind of personal privation from which they had previously considered themselves immune." ⁴⁸⁴ 

      Redistribution and social policies were made possible by the enormous benefits flowing from oil. However, a combination of a continuous drop in oil prices since 1983, economic mismanagement, and a rise of the foreign debt led to the implementation of harsh economic adjustment policies in the late 1980s. As explained by Terry Lynn Karl,

"[o]il prices started downward in 1983, and then plunged dramatically from $27.99 to $13.08 a barrel between 1985 and 1986. Relieved only by a quick rise during the Iran-Iraq War in 1990, prices showed no real prospect of recovering to the previous high level. The decline in oil prices was the most visible expression of a major new challenge confronting Venezuela: the demise of the rentier model of accumulation that had been the basis of its economic prosperity and political stability for thirty years. Thus even when oil prices and government income plunged, government behavior did not change: public expenditures and investment outlays did not go down [...] Instead, in a pattern reminiscent of that in Spain in the sixteenth century, public spending stayed high and foreign debt replaced mineral rents as the preferred mechanism for smoothing over budget deficits, institutional disarray and political tensions [...] Most striking in the period covering the administrations of COPEI´s Luis Herrera Campíns (1979-1983) and AD´s Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1988) are the persistent efforts of governments, regardless of party affiliation, to appease immediate interests and postpone the profound policy changes that sooner or later had to be made. Although throughout the 1980s distortions of all kinds were accumulating at an alarming rate, the response to this deteriorating situation was at best, partial reforms, half measures, and perpetual debt renegotiations." ⁴⁸⁵ 

"As [President] Pérez assumed office in 1989 amidst promises of sustained recovery and expectations of prosperity, the economy collapsed. Price controls and artificially repressed inflation, somehow held in check during the elections, produced a burgeoning black market, rationing, and the most sever shortages in Venezuelan history. Foreign reserves plunged by half, and the current account deficit reached a whooping $5.8 million. The budget deficit, which had stood at 3 percent of GDP in 1985, shot up to 9 percent of GDP. As real wages plunged, real per capita income barely equaled what it had been in 1973. By 1989, the number of households living below the poverty line had increased tenfold since 1981[...] Completely hemmed in by the country's desperate fiscal situation, Pérez embraced neoliberal economic reforms. Immediately following the elections, he entered into direct negotiations with the IMF, and in February 1989, with virtually no warning to the public [...] abruptly announced a package of painful market-oriented reforms"  ⁴⁸⁶ 

      With the end of oil prosperity, the gap between the 'have' and 'have not' became increasingly evident, and social violence erupted in the form of popular uprisings (occurred in February 1989) and popular support for military coup attempts (as in February and November, 1992). ⁴⁸⁷  As explained by an analyst,

"The [February 1989] riots in began in response to government austerity measures that included a jump of almost 100 percent in domestic gasoline prices and 30 percent increase in public transportation fares. In less than a week of rioting and looting, some 300 Venezuelans died and some 1,800 were wounded. The army reinforced police forces in the capital and elsewhere in order to restore order. The riots, which were marked by widespread looting, apparently expressed the frustration of the Venezuelan urban poor with their lack of economic progress. The disturbances had been preceded by a week of student demonstrations, some of which had resulted in violence." ⁴⁸⁸ 

      Another analyst also expressed that the social explosion of 1989 and the coups of 1992,

"[c]onstitute 'moments' in the Venezuelan national conscience. According to this line of reasoning, the 1980s destroyed the populist promise of prosperity. CAP´s [Carlos Andrés Pérez's] attempts to reconstruct this promise in neoliberal terms were perceived as a failure in light of increased corruption and violence. The progressive erosion of Venezuelans' quality of life led to a loss of credibility in government and a crisis of legitimacy to which the Bolivarian Movement (MB2000) [the group of officers that staged the coup attempt] responded" ⁴⁸⁹ 

      Another aspect to be considered is the fragile legitimacy of the Venezuelan political regime. Personal dictatorships or 'caudillo' rule and brief democratic experiences interrupted by military coups characterize the history of Venezuela as an independent nation throughout the 19^th century and the first half of the 20^th. This situation was overcome in 1958 through the institutionalization of a 'pacted democracy' between the two major parties, ADECO and COPEI . These parties agreed to renounce the use of violence as a means of increasing political competitiveness. The political left was marginalized from the pact and popular organizations such as the trade unions where coopted into the pact as part of the political parties. The main corporate sectors also participated in the pact. The result was a pact in which each party agreed to maintain a common political plan, to avoid the polarization of policies, and to distribute political posts equally between the two parties.

      AD and COPEI have dominated political representation since 1958 without opening the alternative to third options. They regularly alternated in the presidency power from 1958 to 1989, when for the first time an AD candidate, Carlos Andres Perez, replaced another AD president, Jaime Lusinchi.

      The key to the legitimacy of the Venezuelan democracy was the legitimacy of the parties. Regime and party system became synonyms. Although this rigid bipartisanism excluded third parties, the legitimacy of the system was possible thanks to enormous resources at the disposal of the state from oil revenues. As long as there was enough oil income to distribute among the signatories of the pact, including trade unions and industry, the system remained legitimate. When the revenues ran out and the two parties could no longer satisfy societal demands, both the traditional parties and the regime lost legitimacy. As stated by an analyst in a study published in the aftermath of Pérez´s resignation under charges of corruption,

"Venezuelans perceive crises of multiple dimensions: Confidence has been lost in the political, economic, legal and social systems. Moreover, it does not appear that there is a widespread belief that a democratically elected government will resolve these crises. The perceptions of one informant are typical and revealing: ´ We Venezuelans have very little confidence in any of our institutions. Party pacts are dominated by elites, leaders are corrupt, the courts are devoid of justice and judges can be bought. The police are incompetent, the military is fractionalized, the educational system is subversive, the news media are coopted, corporations are exploitative, public administration operates on patronage and is inefficient. Palanca [leverage] rules!' These beliefs question performance on all levels and lead to crisis of legitimacy itself" ⁴⁹⁰ 

      Since Venezuela is an oil-rentier state, the government did not have the capacity to extract resources from alternative sources in to meet the demands and expectations of society. The fragile political legitimacy of the restrictive political regime is linked to the great disparities of the Venezuelan society and the endemic and ever-present tradition of corruption in the Venezuelan political system. ⁴⁹¹  Both corruption and poverty did combine to increase the lack the regime legitimacy. In periods of austerity, adjustment, and economic crisis such as the post-bonanza Venezuela of the 1980s, corruption become obvious. This situation is well explained by Walter Little and Antonio Herrera who argued that,

"Beginning with the debt crisis of 1982 and deepening after 1985, the easy calculus that conflicting interests could be reconciled non-antagonistically began to be eroded. As it did, so the salience of political corruption began to rise. One does not have to be a cynic to accept that if the 'feelgood factor' is sufficiently widespread in society, then political corruption is unlikely to be high on the agenda. No one in Venezuela has argued that corruption is new. Indeed, most observers would accept that it reached unparalleled heights following the oil bonanza of 1974. Yet since even those who did not benefit to any real degree could at least hope that they (or their children) might benefit in the future, the question of corruption had little resonance. Venezuela was hardly alone in its myopic belief that the good times would never end. Progressively throughout the 1980s the structural weaknesses of the Venezuelan economy began to impinge on employment, growth and real consumption levels. Corruption began to emerge as an issue within the political class, but not so far as the general public was concerned [...] Things did, however change abruptly in early 1989 when Pérez´s IMF-approved stabilization plans led to mass rioting in Caracas and the death of hundred protestors [...] From then on the question 'where has all the money gone?' began to be posed more and more insistently. It culminated in mid-1993 when Pérez was obliged to resign amid charges of having misappropriated $17 million from a secret account. The money, it is alleged, was used for both personal and political purposes." ⁴⁹² 

      Political corruption, whether or not it was linked to drug trafficking, contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the regime. It also gave the military an excuse to intervene in politics in 1992 after a period of 34 years of political 'abstention."

"The conspirancy´s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, seemingly struck some resonant national chords with his postcapitulation statements condemning the corruption and indifference of the governments. Some of the residents of Caraca´s ranchos, or slums, expressed sympathy with the rebellious soldiers. Some members of the middle class echoed those sentiments. Just as the population at large resented perceived corruption among the government leadership and the bureaucracy, so too did military personnel harbor bitterness toward those at the top." ⁴⁹³ 

c) Policy capacity

      The policy capacity of the Venezuelan state is directly linked to the dependence of the national economy on the extraction and refining of oil. Because oil revenues have always been extremely high, successive governments have never had to explore alternative sources of revenue. Policy implementation is subject to the revenue generated by oil production and by the taxation of oil companies. As noted by an analyst,

"In dramatic contrast to the other countries in the Western Hemisphere, which received [in the late 1970s at the time of the oil boom] an average of 14.75 percent of their tax revenues from corporate income taxes, or to all developing countries which averaged 16.53 percent, a full 70.3 percent of Venezuela's taxes were derived from corporate income taxes (essentially from the oil industry). This arrangement permitted Venezuelans to pay strikingly less individual income tax, domestic tax on goods and services, and tax imports than the majority of citizens in the Americas, where for example the percentage of taxes raised from domestic taxes on goods and services alone was five times higher. Equally as remarkable, Venezuela's percentage of tax revenues raised from individual income taxes was less than half of other developing countries. But petroleum revenues, which freed Venezuelans from normal tax burdens from their entire modern history, also served as the excuse for repeated postponements of the tax issue and eroded an alternative tax base." ⁴⁹⁴ 

      Once this source of revenue shrinks, as occurred in the 1980s, the easiest way for the government to maintain the same levels of public expenditure and to keep the budget balanced was to ask for foreign loans. This led Venezuela to have the third highest foreign debt in Latin America and one of the highest debt services as part of its GDP. ⁴⁹⁵ 

      The drop in oil prices and increase in foreign debt significantly reduced the capacity of the Venezuelan government to implement policies aimed at improving the standard of living for the population and maintain control over the national territory.

      Because of the oil boom, in the past the Venezuelan political elite did not care to develop a permanent trained bureaucracy to effectively collect taxes and administrate the state. ⁴⁹⁶  This worsened the situation when the economy took a downturn. The weak capacity of the state aggravated problems concerning weak territorial control and the weak legitimacy of the regime. Without resources, border patrol is more difficult, as is assuring a strong presence of security forces in border or unpopulated areas. It also became more difficult to improve living standards and health conditions among the population. Under these conditions, drug trafficking and consumption were more likely to increase.

      The government's inability to deal with everyday problems contributed to a loss of legitimacy and weakened confidence in the traditional parties and hence, the regime. The problem was made worse by the prevalent political corruption. ⁴⁹⁷ 

      Widespread corruption in the Venezuelan political system reduced the capacity of the government to administer justice and enforce the law, and created opportunities for a situation of connivance between government institutions and drug trafficking organizations. ⁴⁹⁸  Moreover, as explained before, the legitimacy of political institutions is also hindered by cases of corruption such as the "RECADI (Régimen de Cambio de Dinero-Currency Exchange Office-) affair" that eventually caused Perez´s fall in 1993. ⁴⁹⁹ 

"The president stands accused of misusing 250 million bolívars, converted through RECADI into US$ 17.2 million at a preferential rate in 1989. Attorney General Ramón Escovar Salóm stated that 'there is strong evidence' that CAP diverted the money to purposes other than national security. In an action of unprecedented in Venezuelan history, the Supreme Court decided (by a vote of nine to six) on May 20 1993, that the president should be brought to trial. The next day presidential immunity was suspended by the opposition-controlled, forty-nine-member Senate. Thus, CAP was indicted to stand trial as an ordinary citizen. His entire cabinet (the seventeen-member Council of Ministers) offered their resignation [...]. Pérez then resigned, despite his repeated vows to finish his term of office.[...] Some observers view the situation as an example of lowering tolerance for corrupt civilian leadership and a triumph for the functioning of democratic institutions, while others see the demise of Pérez as a golpe seco (nonmilitary coup) that will do little to improve socioeconomic conditions in Venezuela." ⁵⁰⁰ 

      The election of Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela in December 1998 is illustrative here. At the forefront of the failed coups of 1992, Chávez later became leader of the independent movement Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and candidate of the electoral coalition Polo Patriótico. His election to the presidency seems to confirm the delegitimization of the traditional parties and the end of the "pacted democracy" (although the end was already near when Rafael Caldera -former COPEI president from 1968-1973- was elected president as leader of an ad-hoc independent electoral coalition, the Convergencia). It is worth remembering, however, that in the aftermath of the coup of 1992,

"[i]n his surrender speech just before noon, Chávez emerged as a charismatic figure whose defiance of an increasingly unpopular regime generated widespread debate about alternative directions for Venezuela." ⁵⁰¹ 

      At the time of this writing, it is still too early to determine if these new directions will be more democratic (in terms of participation and representation) or more authoritarian.

d) Socioeconomic development

      Venezuela may have been a rich state with high rates of growth, but it was not, and still is not, developed. In relative terms it is not developed according to the basic indicators of development given in chapter III. It is not developed because the economy is oil-dependent. Until the 1970s, foreign corporations owned or managed oil extraction and refining companies.. The state virtually lived on the royalties and on taxes collected from these corporations. During the first administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), the companies were nationalized, but this did not result in the utilization of oil revenues for a state-driven diversification of the economy. Since the 1920s (when the first oil pits began to be exploited), the economy relied more and more on oil export surplus and gradually began to import all its food products. During the 1980s, for example, Venezuela imported 40% of its food needs. This proportion was, however, reduced to 20% in the 1990s, thanks to the implementation of protectionist policies that stimulated investment and management strategies in the agricultural sector. With the exception of the development of heavy industry in the petrochemical and iron/steel and aluminum sector, Venezuela has not developed the conditions necessary for the regeneration of capital within the country. The economy is extremely dependent on exports and extremely open. ⁵⁰² 

      When oil prices began to fall in 1983, the growth of the economy, employment rates, and the standards of living of the population were seriously affected. High rates of unemployment and reductions in the public sector, mainly linked to the oil industry, provoked a rise in the underground (informal) economy. This issue was very well analyzed by Scott MacDonald, who argued that Venezuela become part of the illegal cocaine trade as a consequence of "the shift in the country's economic fortunes," among other factors. In the late 1980s, MacDonald noticed that,

"In the 1970s, when oil prices were high, Venezuela's economy boomed; employment was almost at full capacity, per capita income increased, and the middle class expanded. The country's wealth relative to the middle class expanded. The economy , however, was hurt by the downturn in oil prices in 1982 the growth rate in GDP was -5.6 percent, followed by - 1.4 percent in 1984. Although the GDP rate was positive in 1985, it was an anemic 0.4 percent. Venezuela was forced, like most of its neighbors, to reschedule its external debt and accept austerity measures. One confidential study estimated that low income families in 1987 spent up to 60 percent of their budgets on food and that , with higher prices (from rising inflation during the year), the quality of their diets deteriorated. This situation helped increase nutritional deficiencies and health problems that had been a rarity in Venezuela. Housing also suffered: at least half of the population now lives in shantytowns in and around urban centers and in substandard rural housing. This, when oil prices fell, the economy contracted, and with that, the population suffered the price of adjustment [...] unemployment rose well above 10 percent. The trend in unemployment was particularly worrisome compared with the almost full employment of the 1970s. In addition, the erosion of the formal economy occurred in tandem with the expansion of the informal or underground economy. Although the informal sector included a wide range of activities such as street vendors and home repair handymen, it also included unemployed pilots who became cocaine traffickers." ⁵⁰³ 

      The deterioration of the Venezuelan economy as a result of unfavorable oil prices is shown in the following graphics and tables:

      

Graphic 2. Value of petroleum exports (constant 1985 prices, billions of Bolívares )

Source: Karl ,Terry Lynn, The Paradox of Plenty, p.258 (the rise in the value of oil exports in 1990 can be explained by the grow in prices due to the Gulf War.

      

Graphic 3. Real rate of growth of petroleum exports (percentage)

Source: Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.268

      

Table 5. Rate of unemployment
1967	5.0*
1968	3.7*
1969	5.9*
1970	7.8**
1975	6.32
1976	4.57
1978	4.19
1979	5.45
1980	5.59
1981	5.94
1982	7.37
1983	10.50
1984	13.08
1985	11.94
1986	10.05
1987	8.16
1988	6.54
1989	9.14
1990	9.57
1991	10.1**
1992	8.1**
1993	6.8**
1994	8.9**
1995	10.9**
1997	13
*over 24 years old **Open urban unemployment

Sources: Banco Central de Venezuela / Valecillos Héctor, Estadísticas Socio-Laborales de Venezuela: Series Históricas 1936-1990, Caracas, El Banco, 1993; ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years; CIA Fact Book 1997 [On-Line], available internet http://www.cia.gov.

      

Graphic 4. Population employed in the informal sector as % of the total

Source: Banco Central de Venezuela / Valecillos Héctor, Estadísticas Socio-Laborales de Venezuela: Series Históricas 1936-1990, Caracas, El Banco, 1993.

      Weak societal development aggravated the weak political capacity of the state. More foreign debt services, fewer resources, and the lack of export income due to a non-diversified economy conspire against the possibility of obtaining state revenue to solve urgent social problems. Another aspect that could be considered a weakness of the social component of the socioeconomic development of the state is the pre-existence of widespread patterns of marijuana consumption as well as networks for the traffic of marijuana from Colombia and production in Venezuelan territory for consumption in Venezuela. ⁵⁰⁴  Widespread use of marijuana (a cheaper and more accessible drug) might have influenced the shift to cocaine when the transit through the country increased and the prices for the drug dropped. The local criminal groups adapted the distribution patterns and routes to the new drug.  ⁵⁰⁵ 

e) Territorial centrality

      In terms of territorial centrality in Venezuela, the figures speak for themselves. About 75 % of the population lives in only 20% of the national territory, mainly in the northern areas (Caracas and the surrounding areas) and the Maracaibo lowlands. The north of the country remains the social and economic heartland of the country. ⁵⁰⁶ 

      Venezuela shares a 2,050 km border with Colombia, most of which are jungle, savannas and highlands. ⁵⁰⁷  The border is porous and virtually unpatrolled in some areas such as the Amazonas territory in the south of the country.

      Particularly in the border states--Apure, Táchira and Zulia--all kinds of smuggling (mainly food products, cigarettes and cattle from Colombia) activities have existed since colonial times. Drug trafficking is simply a more sophisticated kind of smuggling that has adopted the same routes and is particularly active in the area of Guajira where the local population, the Guajiro tribe, has historically carried out smuggling activities between Colombia and Venezuela as part as the local economy in the area. ⁵⁰⁸ 

      Vast expanses such as the Federal territory of Amazonas and the State of Apure, both bordering Colombia, are virtually unpopulated. The situation is the same for the Delta Amacuro Territory and the state of Bolívar. The Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación (National Guard) is a 24,000-member force in charge of (among other functions of internal security) counter drug activities. ⁵⁰⁹  The National Guard is present throughout the territory. However, as shown by the maps displayed in the annexes of this dissertation, the number of detachments ( the detachment is the basic unit of the National Guard and corresponds in size to an army battalion -500 men-) is not enough to patrol the long borders and cover the vast and scarcely populated territories such as the states of Amazonas, Bolívar, and Apure. ⁵¹⁰  This vacuum creates an opportunity on which drug traffickers and guerrilla groups capitalized.

      All the Venezuelan states bordering with Colombia (the states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and the Federal Territory of Amazonas) are in contact with Colombian departments where guerillas and traffickers operate virtually unhindered. Another aspect of concern is that, since the late 60s, Venezuela has been a haven for exiled members of the Sicilian Mafia. Groups like the Cuntrera-Caruana clan established their operations in Venezuela in the 1970s as part of the heroin traffic from Europe to the United States. The Cuntrera-Caruana families established a trafficking circuit connecting Sicily, Canada, and Montreal. At the time, the idea was to introduce heroin coming from Turkey and South East Asia to the United States, via Venezuela from the south and Canada from the north. ⁵¹¹  As noted by an analyst,

"La branche vénézuélienne a organisé la livraison d´heroïne aux Etats-Unis par tonnes -trois par na- en 1982, soit la moitié de la quantité totale introduite sur le territoire, selon le FBI. Elle traite près des deux tiers de la cocaïne qui traverse le Vénézuela, ou blanchit l´argent qui provient du trafic; à présent, quatre-vingts pour cent de la cocaïne qui sort de Colombie transite par le Vénézuela. Elle blanchit les narcodollars tant pour les Colombiens que pour les Siciliens." ⁵¹² 

      The mafiosi got into the new business of cocaine when the drug began to turn profits following the rise in consumption in the USA and Europe. The expansion of the cocaine business has been possible because of another Venezuelan weakness: widespread corruption. Italian organized crime survived in Venezuela with the protection and 'blind eye' of the Venezuelan authorities. ⁵¹³ 

      There are no local insurgent groups operating in Venezuela. Nevertheless, cross-border operations by Colombian guerrillas are an everyday fact. ⁵¹⁴  In particular, the FARC group is linked to drug trafficking activities in that they obtain 'protection' money from peasants and traffickers in the bordering Colombian states. Because of the lack of state presence, such incursions are frequent.

a) Traditional/Military threats

      Clear and Present:

      Colombia and Venezuela are a clear examples of how the spillover of drug trafficking activities and cross-border activities of non-state armed groups linked to drug trafficking activities can contribute to the worsening of preexistent military threats created by territorial disputes and competition over natural resources. The example posed in Chapter III clearly illustrates this situation. In 1987, an attack on a Venezuelan national guard detachment by an armed group allegedly at the service of Colombian traffickers overlapped with a military crisis over the territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela, almost sparking a confrontation.

"Responding to escalated violence related to the drug trade, the Venezuelan government sent national guard troops to search and destroy the clandestine marijuana and coca plantations in the Sierra de Perija. In May 1987, a 32-acre drug plantation was discovered and destroyed. In July a 23-member Venezuelan national guard patrol was attacked by Colombians, leaving 18 dead soldiers. General Marcial Rojas Agüero, the head of the National Guard's intelligence division, identified the attackers as 'narco-guerrillas of Colombia's Ejército de Liberación Nacional(ELN). The attack on the patrol was believed to be in retaliation for the destruction of the plantation. A year-end 1987, the Venezuelan armed forces became more active in confronting both the guerrillas and narcotraficantes. In December 20 ELN members were captured and on January 17, 1988, 17 were killed on the Venezuelan side of the border. These violent events along the frontier helped revive the border claims issue-which was, however not the intention." ⁵¹⁵ 

      Since the 1980s, as enforcement increased in Colombia, coca plantations (along with the FARC fighting fronts), and cocaine production moved towards the Venezuelan border, and skirmishes between units of the National Guard, the Venezuelan Armed forces and traffickers or guerrilla groups based in Colombia became an everyday event. ⁵¹⁶  Kidnappings and attacks on Venezuelan landowners by guerrilla or drug trafficker groups are also part of the problem. ⁵¹⁷  This situation is illustrated by the graphic below.

      

Graphic 5. Extortive kidnappings perpetrated in Venezuelan bordering states by Colombian guerrillas and other armed groups (bordering states)

Source: Col. (Army) Oswaldo D. Quijada, La violencia en Colombia y sus repercusiones en zonas limítrofes con Venezuela (Táchira, Zulia y Apure), May, 1994, IAEDEN, Caracas, annexes.

      In response, the Venezuelan National Guards have carried out cross-border operations, generating a permanent source of tension between the two nations. As noted by an analyst,

"Venezuelans generally have tended to view Colombia as a violent and unstable country whose problems and people washed over the border into more peaceful and prosperous Venezuela. News of attacks on border posts, kidnappings of wealthy Venezuelan ranchers by Colombian guerrillas, and drug seizures during transshipment have reinforced this conception." ⁵¹⁸ 

      This situation has worsened since coca and coca paste production increased in Colombia due to the increase in interdiction efforts Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley. From the beginning of the 90s, Colombia has gradually become the second largest coca producer in the world. At the same time, all cocaine processing is carried out in this country. Production of coca and coca paste is carried out by peasants on the Colombian border departments of Vichada, Vaupes, and Arauca under the protection of the FARC. The ELN group operates in the bordering departments of Norte de Santander and Cesar and La Guajira where the main traffic routes are located.

      Since 1988 (after the crisis of 1987), the two countries agreed on the need to avoid a new military crisis over the cross-border activities of drug traffickers and guerrillas. ⁵¹⁹  As noted by an analyst,

"Both governments moved to reduce tensions and held a meeting on January 21 [1988]. At that meeting it was agreed that the two countries would strengthen their respective border forces. The two governments also agreed to improve intelligence cooperation to reduce guerrilla activities and drug trading. In addition President Lusinchi sent a message of solidarity to the Colombian people in their struggle against the narcotraficantes and guerrillas" ⁵²⁰ 

      Between 1989 and 1991, a series of treaties were signed in order to regulate bilateral cooperation on border issues, including drug trafficking. ⁵²¹  A very complete and comprehensive set of binational rules of procedure for border security issues was elaborated in 1996 to facilitate cooperation between the Venezuelan National Guard and Colombian National Police, as well as between both countries' armed forces. ⁵²² After the crisis in 1987, the cross border activities of non-state actors have not been likely to cause a war between the two countries, nevertheless they were still a source of diplomatic tension during the 1990s. ⁵²³  An article published in The Economist reported in the following terms a very illustrative example of this border tension,

"When the Venezuelan government announced on March 15^th that it was sending 5,000 troops to the lawless 2,200 kilometer [...] border it shares with Colombia, and that four border states had been decreed a 'theatre of operations' eyebrows were raised. When Colombia then dispatched 6,000 men to its side of the border and placed them on a 'state of alert', many more eyebrows went up. Was this to become another Latin American war like that between Ecuador and Peru? The sudden alarm has been followed by well-publicized visits of both countrie´s presidents to the rambling frontier. Venezuela's 80 year old Rafael Caldera went south to meet reinforcements at the remote Carabobo outpost on the Meta river where , on February 26^th, Colombian guerrillas had killed eight Venezuelan marines, reportedly mutilating the victims' bodies. Carabobo, he said, was the last straw. Two days later, Colombia's Ernesto Samper was at the northern end of the border, checking on the welfare of 1,200 illegal but well established Colombian immigrants deported from Venezuela in the previous week. These peasants farmers say they were threatened and their crops burnt; Venezuelan officials say the crops at issue were poppies, for heroin, and that the farmers were guerrilla collaborators [...] The two governments had agreed on deportations. But Venezuela abruptly brought the date forward. Colombians reckon the expulsions were a response to the Carabobo killings. [...] But war is in fact unlikely. Mr. Samper has proposed a joint force to patrol the border area; better this, he says, than accepting pursuit across the frontier.[...] Many of Colombia's' guerrillas by now have been squeezed to its far-flung corners. For Venezuela, that has meant murder, kidnappings of cattle ranchers, common crime and, more recently, reports of guerrilla recruitment of Venezuelans.[...] Another irritant is the cross-border flow of cocaine, lots of it, en route from Colombia's coca plantations and laboratories [...] Venezuela's own drug consumption and drug related crime have soared in recent years." ⁵²⁴ 

b) Political threats

      Clear and Present threats:

      - Corruption of government officials:

      Because of its endemic and historical problem of political corruption and lack of control, Venezuela has become vulnerable to cases of corruption related to drug trafficking activities at high-ranking levels. This problem, in addition to other serious administrative scandals involving President Perez and his close collaborators, has harmed the legitimacy of the Venezuelan party system and the democratic regime. In February and November 1992, Perez's government suffered two coup attempts carried out by mid-rank army officers. The main reason for the attempted coup was the corruption of the political class and the discontent caused by the corruption of high-ranking officers of the armed forces, particularly cases of corruption linked to, or direct participation in, drug trafficking activities. In fact, corruption in the high-rank cadres of the armed forces and the political parties is widespread and has seriously contributed to undermining the legitimacy of traditional parties that are incapable of solving the economic crisis and carrying out effective austerity measures. As explained by an analyst,

"Another dimension of the cocaine trade was its apparent penetration of political parties in Venezuela, as reflected in the 1988 election campaigns. The two major presidential candidates, the ADN´s Carlos Andrés Pérez and Copei´s (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente) Eduardo Fernández, were locked in a 'dirty war' over allegations that their respective campaigns were financed by narcotraficante money. The original allegations were made by a leading Socialist politician. José Vicente Rangel, who provided a list of names of those involved. According to those allegations and others, an Italian Cuban smuggling organization was assisting Pérez´s campaign, while an Italian-Canadian group was aiding Fernández. Both Venezuelan political parties found these charges embarrassing and strongly denied such involvement. ADN and Copei lost little time, however, in accusing each other of guilt. Pérez case was especially delicate. The former president and candidate admitted to knowing Manuel Noriega as well as Colombian horse-breeder Fabio Ochoa, but he denied ties to the elder Ochoa, but he denied any ties to the elder Ochoa´s three sons, who were accused of belonging to the Medellín cartel." ⁵²⁵ 

      Some cases of drug trafficking-related cases of corruption in the period under study are outlined below:

      

Table 6. Drug trafficking related cased of corruption (1978-1994)
Political Parties :	Armed Forces and security forces:
1987- Representative Hermocrates Castillo, arrested for drug trafficking; protected by his political immunity. 1988- Presidential candidate for COPEI, Eduardo Fernandez. Allegedly received funding for his campaign from the Cuntrera-Caruana Clan. 1988-President Candidate Carlos Andres Perez accused of receiving payoffs from the Ochoa family of Medellín cartel after interceding for the extradition of Jorge Luis Ochoa from Spain to Colombia, where he was liberated. 1991- Adolfo Ramirez Torres, high-ranking director of AD, former governor of the Federal District (Caracas), and former vice-minister of the Interior. Arrested for drug trafficking to the United States. Lead a transnational organization. 1992-1993-Release of reports that confirmed that President Pérez received money from the BCCI bank (linked in worldwide money laundering activities) for his political campaign.	1983-Ex-Navy Officer Lisardo Marquez Perez involved in cocaine trafficking. One of the leaders of the local drug trafficking organization known as the "Táchira cartel." He was arrested in November 1984. 1983- General (Army) Italo del Valle Alliegro Ex-Minister of Defense and ex- Commander of the Táchira Military Garrison, allegedly facilitated Marquez' activities and was involved in drug trafficking activities in Marquez' organization. Fugitive. 1985-General (Army)Pedro Maria Paz Paredes, former head of the Army Martial Court. Arrested leading an organization of cocaine trafficking towards the United States. 1992-General (Army) Alexis Ramon Sanchez Paz, former head of the Intelligence Direction of the Army, arrested by the DEA for involvement in drug trafficking for the 'Táchira Cartel." 1992- General (National Guard)Ramon Beningno Guillén Dávila, Director of the Conterdrug Division of the National Guard arrested together with a group of national guard officers. Allegedly used his position to divert captured cocaine towards the United States.

Source: Azocar Alcala, Gustavo Enrique, Los Barones de la Droga: La Historia del Narcotráfico en Venezuela, Caracas, Alfadil Ediciones, 1994, pp. 11-43 and 51-81

      The list is longer, but the most representative case involves members of the Cuntrera-Caruana Clan, a group of the Sicilian Mafia which, as explained earlier in this chapter, operated in Venezuela for twenty-two years without interference from the Venezuelan authorities. This 'Italian connection' is particularly concerning since members of the Italian mafia established alliances with the Cali and Medellín cartels (and their current heirs) for the transport of drugs through Venezuelan territory to Europe. Members of the Sicilian mafia have purchased large cattle ranches near the border with Colombia in order to disguise their activities under a legal mask and to use the land as bases for their operations. ⁵²⁶  The drug is hidden in cattle trucks in order to be trafficked out of the country. Colombian traffickers followed this pattern of territorial penetration. In this way criminal organizations are not only controlling territory but they are also penetrating the Venezuelan economy. As explained by an analyst,

"Plusieurs associés optèrent pour le commerce du bétail, décision à la fois stratégique et rentable. Très souvent la cocaïne quitte la région en contrebande cachée dans le ventre des vaches, dans leur peau ou dans les camions de bétail qui franchisent la frontiere; le bétail, en effet, sent plus fort que la drogue (En 1987, selon le directeur du committé anti-stupéfiants du parlement vénézuelien, quinze tonnes de cocaïne quittèrent le Vénézuela a bord de tels camions). En 1971, John Gambino prit, avec sa femme et son cousin Erasmus, la direction d´un élevage de bétail dans l´Etat de Barinas près de la frontière colombienne. La même année, Chichiteddu Greco et Nick Rizzuto s´associèrent avec Gaspare Cuntrera pour monter une enorme entreprise de bétail, Ganadería Río Zapa, toujours dans l´Etat de Barinas. Antonio Napoli acquis lui aussi un grand ranch, spécialisé dans l´élevage, anisi que plusieurs fabriques de lait en poudre. En l´espace d´une décennie, les investissements du groupe Cuntrera-Caruana au Vénézuela atteignirent la somme de quatre milliards de bolivars: soit, à l´époque, un milliard de dollars." ⁵²⁷ 

      Even if the their arrest was requested by Italian and Canadian authorities, the heads of the clan managed to obtain Venezuelan citizenship and established their operations in the country at the beginning of the 1970s. As a cover (and as a way to expand their business), they shifted into the legal sector. The clan headed a huge holding called 'Aceros Prensados' (comprised of industries, hotels, service companies, transportation, construction, and real estate businesses) with transnational connections. ⁵²⁸  It was in September 1992, following strong American pressure (the U.S. government threatened to kidnap the Cuntrera brothers and try them in a U.S. court), that three important leaders of the clan--Paolo, Pasquale, and Gaspare Cuntrera--were deported to Italy. Before this, they were able to remain in Venezuela under the protection of Venezuelan authorities. ⁵²⁹  The rest of the organization (comprised by the Caruana part of the Clan), however, including the clan's companies, bank accounts, and money laundering networks remained in place and still operate in Venezuela. ⁵³⁰ 

      Significant threats:

      - Control of the national territory by criminal organizations and non-state armed groups:

      Colombian coca growing peasants and traffickers have moved their operations to the border with Venezuela and within Venezuela. Since the mid-80s, coca fields have been detected in the Perijá Highlands in the state of Zulia. As stated by an analyst,

"In 1984, the drug trade's tempo increased following the crackdown in Colombia [after the assassination of Lara Bonilla]. Venezuela, with its long and porous border was, an ideal new launching point for cocaine and marijuana. And it became a major source for such production inputs as ether and acetone, which came under government controls in Colombia."  ⁵³¹ 

      Also, as reported at the time by the UN´s International Drug Control Board and law enforcement sources,

"The discovery of large coca plantations by the Venezuela National Guard in April, 1984 and March, 1985, constitutes another significant and new element in the development of drug-related activities in this small South American Country. The second coca plantation was found in a remote area of the mountainous Perija region, 100 kilometers west of Maracaibo and close to the Colombian border. These are believed to be the first such incidents of this kind." ⁵³² 

"An extensive strip of coca cultivation was discovered in the middle [sic], and in the Venezuelan portion of a mountain range on the border with Colombia." ⁵³³ 

      According to U.S. official sources, some coca processing may have taken place in the Perijá area. ⁵³⁴  More recently poppy fields have been discovered in that area. According to an official Venezuela report, poppy plantations have been detected in the Perijá area since 1994. ⁵³⁵  As reported by Venezuelan authorities,

"According to investigations carried out by the Law Enforcement Agencies, the Colombian cartels have brought to our country growers trained by Burmese peasant farmers from the so-called Asian Gold Triangle (name given to the geographical area made up by the territories of Burma, Laos and Thailand)." ⁵³⁶ 

      This latter fact may be an indication that, in the future, the production of heroin could also expand from Colombia towards Venezuela. ⁵³⁷  As explained before in this dissertation, the production of heroin has been growing in Colombia since the early 1990s as a response to increase in demand in the U.S..

      There is evidence of a spillover of cocaine production towards Venezuela. According to the United Nations Drug Control Programme, cocaine laboratories have been detected in the territory of Amazonas and the states of Apure, Táchira, Guarico, Barinas, and Bolívar.  ⁵³⁸  Also, as reported by a U.S. law enforcement agency,

"Unsubstantiated reporting indicates that the Colombian drug mafias are moving drug processing operations to Venezuela. The availability of essential chemicals in Venezuela, a shared border with an expanse an isolated and undeveloped areas in those Venezuelan states bordering Colombia, and a developed economic and financial system are all conditions that would lure traffickers to Venezuela [...] Drugs (primarily cocaine and increasingly, heroin) are shipped overland from Colombia to Venezuela through a number of border crossing points. Multiton quantities of cocaine transit and are stored temporarily in Venezuela on a monthly basis. Large shipments of cocaine are concealed in containers of legitimate cargo and are transshipped to the United States and Europe by air cargo and ocean vessels.[...] The Colombian drug mafia operates in Venezuela pervading Venezuela's financial and commercial sectors and undermining law enforcement efforts. Once drug shipments reach Venezuela, Colombians rely on Venezuelan criminal groups to arrange transportation to U.S. and European markets. The Cúcuta group, a border trafficking organization, consists of Venezuelan and Colombians who provide cross-border transportation. The group also has formed its own distribution networks in Venezuela, the United States, and Europe. The Guajira trafficking organization-claiming turf in the Venezuelan State of Zulia- controls the key transshipment ports of Maracaibo and Punto Fijo. They also oversee the cultivation of cannabis, coca, and opium poppy, and handle the transshipment of drugs from the Guajira Peninsula. Additionally, Italian organized crime, comprised of Sicilian born capos (bosses) who have married into Venezuelan families and have acquired Venezuelan citizenship, is present in Venezuela. These capos traffic in marijuana, cocaine, and heroin for distribution to U.S. and European markets. They also work in concert with the Colombian drug mafias to launder illicit profits." ⁵³⁹ 

      This confirms the fact that because of harsher and sustained enforcement measures in Colombia, the traffickers can take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Venezuelan state in terms of low territorial centrality, low policy capacity (expressed above all in terms of corruption), and low socioeconomic development and can expand their cocaine refinement operations in Venezuela. As reported in the mid 1980s by a law enforcement agency,

"In November 1984, Venezuelan authorities dismantled two cocaine refining laboratories in the western part of the country, seizing approximately 400,000 litres of acetone and ether and 500 kilograms of cocaine base. Both laboratories were situated in the state of Táchira, near the Venezuelan/Colombian border. The first facility was located in a produce packing plant, leading drug enforcement authorities to believe that refined cocaine was hidden inside shipments of produce. In the second instance, the majority of the laboratory equipment had been destroyed in an attempt to remove the evidence of an illegal operation. Various pieces of equipment, including dryers and filters, were found together with quantities of precursor chemicals at both laboratory sites." ⁵⁴⁰ 

"Several factors account for Venezuela's recent shift from essentially a transshipment area for Colombian cocaine and marihuana to a more active role in terms of cultivation and processing. Its geographic location and unprotected border with Colombia, a major source country, facilitate drug trafficking activities. This frontier area is sparsely populated and the wilderness is conductive to unhampered illegal activities [....] Colombia's more stringent drug laws and renewed enforcement have put definite pressures on surrounding countries such as Venezuela. The deteriorating economy, high unemployment rate and inflation are conditions that make Venezuela vulnerable to drug traffickers and may serve as incentives to increased drug-related activities [...] [a]bandoned facilities and supplies were found in 1985 which indicated multi-ton capacities for refining cocaine" ⁵⁴¹ 

      The case quoted above led the Venezuelan authorities to identify and partially dismantle a local drug trafficking organization identified as the "Táchira cartel," which allegedly worked in association with the Cali cartel for the transshipment of cocaine produced in Colombia. ⁵⁴²  Members of the Táchira cartel actually owned the estate where the laboratories and the chemical inputs were found.  ⁵⁴³ 

      No substantiated reporting about other cases of discovery of large facilities for the production of cocaine by Colombian organizations in Venezuelan territory were found during this research. However, a growing number of estates located along bordering areas were being purchased with Colombian capital of doubtful origin. ⁵⁴⁴  As reported by Venezuelan authorities,

"The Cuerpo Técnico de Policía Judicial (Technical Branch of the Judiciary Police), CTPJ, through investigations carried out in the Subordinate Registries of the States of Barinas, Portuguesa, Apure, Amazonas, Táchira and Zulia, has been able to detect the purchase of Venezuelan farms with Colombian capital. Likewise, illegal bands connected with drug trafficking and with the Colombian guerrilla are urging Venezuelan cattle breeders to sell their properties. Kidnappings, according to investigations by Venezuelan law enforcement agencies, are connected with this situation, which is made evident through the colorful events that take place daily on our border, such as: abductions, 'tolls', use of the national logistics (roads, airplanes, vehicles) for personal purposes." ⁵⁴⁵ 

      We have seen before in this chapter that large estates have been also purchased by members of Italian criminal organizations with the purpose of legitimizing illegal capital and to have bases of support for cocaine trafficking. With the same purpose in mind, Colombian traffickers would be expanding their operations to Venezuela though the purchase of land. The table below gives information provided by Venezuelan law enforcement sources about the tracts of land purchased with Colombian capital in the border area.

      

Table 7. Venezuelan Farms purchased with Colombian capital
State/ Municipality	Name of the Farm	Hectares	Price (in Bolívares)
Barinas/Obispo	La Venganza	1,000	Bs. 70 million
Barinas /Obispo	La Pastora	746	Bs. 14 million
Barinas/Obispo	Irurteña	475	Bs. 8 million
Barinas/Barinas	Palmitas Diamante	7Ha. and 107 meters	Bs. 116, 581.35
Barinas/Pedraza	Agropecuaria Las Lomas	628	Bs.600,000
Barinas/Barinas	Los Manatinales (Grano de Oro)	97	Exchanged with vehicle and apartment
Barinas/Zamora	Hato Las Maracas	2,521	Bs. 10 million
Portuguesa/Ospino	Agropecuaria El Brillante	1,000	Bs.64 million
Portuguesa/Ospino	Agropecuaria Caleros, S.A	626	Bs. 30 million
Tachira	Los Laureles Los Compadres Los Manantiales Los Higuerones Las Coloradas El Remanso Santa Ana	Extension not specified. Bought in Bulk	Bs. 40 million

Source: CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, Caracas, February 1997,p. 37

      As a consequence of increasing enforcement measures in Colombia, the Colombian paramilitary groups and guerrilla groups that are linked to drug trafficking activities (FARC) also use the Venezuelan border areas as sanctuary. ⁵⁴⁶  The territorial penetration of drug traffickers and guerrillas has been qualified as a "low intensity threat" because as non-state actors they do not appear to have generated the capacity to match the power of the Venezuelan law enforcement and armed forces. The Venezuelan National Guard and Judiciary Police have been able to effectively disband drug trafficking organizations and rebuff guerrilla incursions. ⁵⁴⁷  The traffickers have not developed the power and capacity to match the state and do not control parts of the country as has happened in Colombia and Brazil (in the case of the organized crime in Rio de Janeiro, for example). Nevertheless, because of the impossibility of sealing the borders, controlling all commercial traffic between Colombia and Venezuela, and the lack of a state presence in large areas such as the Amazon Territory, cocaine production has grown over the years and is unlikely to decrease. This trend is also exacerbated by widespread government corruption. The case of the Cuntrera-Caruana clan could indicate that the Venezuelan state has voluntarily adopted an attitude of "tacit connivance" vis-a-vis organized crime. Phil Williams has defined this attitude as a situation in which

"[t]he state lacks the power to confront organised crime and acknowledges that there are real benefits -to the economy, to society, or to the state officials themselves- in the operations of organised crime in and from the country. In this case, government policy tends to be limited to denunciations of criminal activities which are primarily symbolic but help to disguise the operational passivity of law enforcement." ⁵⁴⁸ 

      We have seen, in fact, that acting on their own or as front men for the Sicilian and Italian-American mafia, the Cuntrera-Caruana clan made considerable investments in the industrial, agrarian, and services sector. This might have contributed to the "blind eye" policy adopted by the successive Venezuelan governments during twenty years. Venezuelan academic Rosa del Olmo shared the same suspicions about a possible connivance between the government and transnational criminal organizations. She referred to the case of the recently arrested boss of the Northern Valley cartel, Pastor Parafán. This Colombian drug trafficker was arrested in Venezuela and then extradited to the United States in April 1997. Dr. Del Olmo, who had been closely following the case, suspects that there was collaboration between Venezuelan officials and Parafán because "he had spent too much time operating in Venezuela" without being bothered by the authorities. ⁵⁴⁹  This "tacit connivance" would be voluntary because, as stated before, criminal organizations do not have the capacity to match the law enforcement agencies of the Venezuelan state. When the government came under U.S. pressure, it was capable of arresting and deporting the Cuntrera brothers without fearing a retaliatory escalation of violence.

      There is also the problem of the increasing inflow of Colombian peasants fleeing police repression, as well as paramilitary and guerrilla violence. Refugees are perceived in military and law enforcement circles as a possible base of support for Colombian guerrilla groups and drug trafficking organizations, mostly because the majority of these refugees settle down in border areas like Zulia and Táchira. ⁵⁵⁰ 

c) Economic threats

      Clear and present threats:

"I came here because there was no other solution [no había más remedio]. The guerrillas killed one of my brothers. Some times they use to pass by the patio and they usually bought a chicken. How could I say 'no'? Because of that the police accused me of collaborating with the ones who killed my brother. Then the paramilitaries arrived and I had to leave. This was two years ago, and I arrived to Venezuela a year ago. I had almost six month in this finca [ranch]. If everything goes fine I will bring my family who is in Cúcuta..." ⁵⁵¹ 

      - Uncontrolled influx of refugees from Colombia and worsening of the illegal immigrations situation:

      Venezuela has traditionally been a magnet for immigrants from Colombia. This trend was especially prevalent during the oil boom of the 1970s. Most Colombians were illegal immigrants (indocutmentados), who did not have adequate documentation and permits to work in Venezuela. They were thus subject to exploitation in terms of lower salaries and work hours. As pointed out by an analyst,

"These indocumentados suffered exploitation and discrimination; many Venezuelans considered them criminal elements. In reality, most crossed the border simply in search of better economic conditions. Most of them, farm or urban laborers, came in response to the lure of salaries several times as high as those prevailing in Colombia. Others were seasonal workers; about 15,000 reportedly entered each year to work as field hands during the harvest season. Still others entered to take jobs on farms or in factories for a longer time, but with the intention of eventually returning home. Most did stay, however, particularly in the northwestern states of Táchira and Zulia, where most of the border crossing took place. Some eventually migrated farther into the country to Maracaibo and Caracas. Maracaibo hosted the largest urban concentration of Colombian indocumentados, who found work in the construction, petroleum and other industries." ⁵⁵² 

      This was not considered a major problem until the oil crisis. When the economy started to slow down in the early 80s, there was a reaction by Venezuelan trade unions and the press in general against the indocumentados problem. ⁵⁵³  In the early 1990s it was estimated that there were around 500,000 to 1,000,000 Colombian illegal immigrants in Venezuela. ⁵⁵⁴  Other estimates raise this figure to 2,000,000. ⁵⁵⁵  In a situation of high rates of unemployment and recession, Venezuelans perceive this strong foreign presence as unfair competition and as a threat to their jobs. As explained by an analyst,

"After long years of this continuing flow of illegals -customarily estimated at more than 250,000- Venezuelan public opinion was strongly adamant. Respondents were given three choices: (1) closing the border and deporting the illegals; (2) closing the border but ignoring the indocumentados already present; (3) opening the border to all [...] Nationally, nearly two thirds [63%] preferred the first and toughest option; a bare 6% chose the third option -opening the borders." ⁵⁵⁶ 

      The enormous presence of illegal immigrants harms the state's ability to administer the economic crisis. Since the 1980s it has been argued--by Venezuelan authorities, academic analysts, and the media--that the influx of illegal migrants contributed to increasing the deficit in the provision of public services (such as health and housing), and has worsened the problem of unemployment. ⁵⁵⁷ 

      Although there was a marked slowdown in the Venezuelan economy at the beginning of the 1980s, the presence of Colombians in Venezuela did not decrease. ⁵⁵⁸  Because of the extreme violence caused by the combination of drug trafficking and insurgency in rural areas, thousands of Colombians kept crossing the Venezuelan border, this time as refugees. ⁵⁵⁹  Since the end of the Venezuelan oil boom, it is estimated that part of this movement is due to people looking for safety and not economic progress, above all because the income in Colombia has been higher than the average Venezuelan income since the beginning of the crisis. ⁵⁶⁰ 

      Already in 1988, the Venezuelan military warned about the imminent threat of an influx of refugees from Colombia due to the situation of violence related to drug trafficking and insurgency in that country. This could have created a "potentially explosive and subversive situation" in bordering areas. ⁵⁶¹  In some zones, for example, the Colombian migrant peasants outnumbered Venezuelans by 15 to 1. ⁵⁶²  This concern was also shared by Venezuelan authorities in 1994. ⁵⁶³  It was estimated that between 1994 and 1998 approximately 20,000 people arrived to Venezuela as a direct consequence of the violence in Colombia. ⁵⁶⁴  On the other hand, it is estimated that there is a movement of 250,000 Colombians in and out of Venezuela every year. ⁵⁶⁵  This represents, however, just two percent of the one million internally displaced people in Colombia as a consequence of the drug trafficking and insurgency related violence. ⁵⁶⁶  Venezuelan military authorities estimate that bordering states could face a humanitarian crisis at any moment if massive waves of refugees start arriving from Colombia. ⁵⁶⁷ 

      - Money Laundering and distortions in the economy:

      Venezuela has a weak judicial system and a banking system with established international connections but few controls and a sophisticated business environment. It is a neighbor of Colombia and, as explained before, the Italian organized crime is well established in Venezuelan territory. As the Cuntrera Caruana case demonstrates, authorities usually do not ask too many questions. It is almost logical that the Colombian traffickers would chose Venezuela as a money-laundering haven. In fact, Venezuela has served this purpose since the beginning of the 1980s. ⁵⁶⁸  As reported,

"Due to its proximity to Colombia and the size and sophistication of its financial markets. Venezuela has become a major drug money laundering center. Most Money laundering occurs through exchange houses, commercial banks, the stock market, casinos, and real estate transactions and is primarily linked to Colombia-based cocaine trafficking organizations. While drug proceeds are controlled by Colombian or other third country nationals, the money laundering networks primarily are Venezuelan-run. Laundering transactions generally involve the exchange of U.S. dollars for Colombian pesos or Venezuelan bolívares . Additional intelligence suggest that money laundering occurs through false invoicing of export and import transactions and the growing contraband trade." ⁵⁶⁹ 

      Venezuela does not have tight banking regulations concerning the amount of money that can be wired out of the country or deposited in bank accounts is the exchange of foreign currency regulated. As recognized by Venezuelan authorities,

"[t]here are still sensible weaknesses in the evaluation of the policy against capital legitimation. For instance, the regulation of detection procedures, the setting up of action procedures and the training programs are left at the will of the regulated bodies, even though they are the exclusive responsibility of authorities. This is happening to the extent that the official organizations for the control of the financial system are unable to give a version of the evolution of the problem in recent years. Neither a Strategic Information System nor alert indicators to monitor the problem and feed the design of policies exists [...] According to a preliminary balance, the prevention and control mechanisms show poor results and, in some cases, they are practically nonexistent, which is a clear breach of the law. This conclusion stands both for the Financial System Institutions, given the results of inspections of the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF), and for the regulating organizations themselves. This situation to be even worse as concerns the control of legitimation manners other than the banking business, such as the stock market, the real estate market, money exchange offices, etc. "Know your customer" is a correct approach, but it has been limited, because of the lack of specific and accurate regulations on the one hand, and on the other, because to some extent this focus has been adopted by some banks as a mere formality to comply with the Law. As far as regulations are concerned, this approach has been limited to exhortations to make the best efforts to get to know the customer. Save a few exceptions, the initiatives of banks have not been serious efforts either, beyond the manuals and brochures that repeat what is set forth in the Law." ⁵⁷⁰ 

      It could be argued that Venezuela is not only a transshipment state, but is also a 'service state' in the sense that it facilitates the movement and protection of illegal financial assets. As defined by Phil Williams, service states

"[a]re those states with particular sectors-usually the financial sector-which are structured and operated in ways that enable TCOs [transnational criminal organizations] to further their activities, especially the movement and protection of their financial assets. ⁵⁷¹ 

      Also as reported by Venezuelan authorities,

"In the case of Venezuela, there is a series of factors which, in recent years, have contributed to increase the risk of drug related capital legitimation, namely:
*High exposure to contagion and movement effects from Colombia.
*High levels of informal economy and associated use of cash.
*High tax evasion.
*Structural changes in the patterns of cash use in recent years, as consequence of wrong economic policies [...] and of the Venezuelan financial crisis itself.
*Lack of effective monitoring over short-term foreign capital flows.
*Absence of a national system of corporate accounting registry (Central Balance Office).
*Growth of organized criminal activities (car theft, kidnapping, etc.)" ⁵⁷² 

      But is not only the banking system that is used to legitimize illegal money; as explained before, large amounts of land have been purchased by Colombian and Italian members of criminal organizations. These estates and also real estate properties are usually in big cities and most of the time are purchased at double of the real price in order to obtain a quick legal benefit. ⁵⁷³  This has produced distortions in the Venezuelan economy by generating inflation in the real estate sector. ⁵⁷⁴  As explained by Venezuelan authorities,

"[r]eal estate purchase and sale and the construction industry are also used as a capital legitimation means [...] This is the balance estate purchase and sale movements through the notary's offices and registries of all states of the country. According to this balance, the money flow for these operations was of the order of 12 billion dollars in 1996. This is about 20% of the GDP. Two closely linked problems have been detected here. Because of the lack of controls and of loops in the Law, the true values of the real estate were not declared. Partners, privately, may pay the true value. But they come to an agreement with notary publics and registers and declare an estimated value in the documents. The estimated value is always lower than the real value: it is declared in this way to evade taxes. A group that is negotiating may find it cheaper to suborn a notary with 10,000 dollars rather than paying 20,000 dollars in taxes. Therefore, the real amount of the real estate transactions might be twice as much. And in that invisible segment there is another problem: that might be an area suitable for money laundering [...] It is said that when illicit money enters the construction and real estate market, the demand and prices rocket in an unrestrained way.
In Venezuela we have observed some worrying signs in the real estate sector.
- Prices of real estate have gone up.
- There are luxury constructions that are being quoted in dollars.
- There are rents of real estate that are being quoted in dollars.
- This real estate is beyond the purchasing power of common Venezuelans, because common Venezuelans do not have plenty of dollars.
[...] The construction market has recently show signs of recovery. This is partially due to public works carried out by the central government or the regional governments. Many of these works also count on international financing, from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, through agreements signed with the approval of the IMF.[...] But there is something that we at the NAC [National Anti-Drug Commission or CONACUID] are going to analyze: construction has traditionally been an activity with an elevated level bank indebtedness. A certain boom of the commercial construction with no bank financing attracts our attention. Where does the money of those investors come from? Why don't they need bank loans? All these signs seem more than enough to suspect money laundering operations." ⁵⁷⁵ 

      The gambling industry is also used to launder money and the proliferation of casinos and illegal betting circuits is a recent boom in Venezuela. The amount of illegal money in circulation through the Venezuelan banking system alone is estimated at 5 billion dollars per year and the total amount of illegal money recycled in Venezuela is estimated at 21 billion dollars per year. ⁵⁷⁶ 

      According to an official document of the Venezuelan government, the inflow of illegal money harms the national economy in the sense that it causes,

"* Inorganic (sic) increase of the monetary mass
* Inflation of costs and demand
* Distortion of national accounts
* General income of prices in goods and services
* Shifting from private investment to real estate and construction sectors
* Presence of a parallel market for the purchase and sale of foreign currencies
* Increase in the availability of monetary liquidity
* Promotion of various illegal activities as formal job
* Promotion of corruption
*International bad image of the country." ⁵⁷⁷ 

      All these facts occurred in a period when the government was struggling to reduce inflation by reducing the monetary mass, balance the budget and the national accounts, and promote legal foreign investment.

      Significant threats:

      - Development of a strong illegal economy that could become dominant especially in border areas:

      As stated before, the Venezuelan economy is largely dominated by the oil extraction and refinement sector. This situation is illustrated by the graphics below. Although this activity is capital intensive and does not employ at large part of the population, the oil industry allowed the state to develop a large public sector that created employment in government owned companies and dependencies.

      

Graphic 6. Employment by sector

Source: Seyler, Daniel, The Economy, in Haggerty, Richard (ed.), op.cit., and p. 87

      Since the 1930s, the Venezuelan economy became progressively oil-oriented, and by the 1950s and 60s the economy relied on the surplus of oil exports for the imports of almost all its food. Because oil was plentiful and heavily relied upon, the development of other sectors was not encouraged and the regions traditionally linked to agricultural activities and to intense trade with Colombia began to decay. Economic recession became a common fact in the bordering agricultural departments of Zulia, Tachira, and Apure. The country is still importing food products with oil income.  ⁵⁷⁸  The economic crisis caused by the drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the debt crisis, and the structural adjustment policies carried out since 1989 worsened the situation in the bordering regions of Zulia, Táchira, Apure, and the country as a whole. ⁵⁷⁹  Because of its proximity to Colombia and the patterns of both legal and illegal trade in the area, the states of Táchira, Zulia, and Apure became particularly affected by the spillover activities from Colombia resulting from the increase in enforcement activities carried out since the mid 1980's in that country. ⁵⁸⁰  Cocaine production sites, storage sites of chemical inputs (Tachira and Apure) and coca plantations (Zulia in the Perija Highlands), have been found in that border area since 1983/84. ⁵⁸¹ Allegedly, there is also intense trafficking and production in the territory of Amazonas, the latter of which has been detected. ⁵⁸² 

      As a consequence, in these areas drug trafficking has became an alternative to unemployment and economic recession. This is in part demonstrated by the rising rates of arrests for drug traffic in bordering states such as Tachira and Zulia vis-à-vis higher rates of arrests for possession in the Federal District (where consumption and distribution is higher). ⁵⁸³  Some Venezuelan landowners and members of the industrial sector have seen an opportunity to increase their revenue through association with Colombian and Italian criminal organizations. This has provoked a rise of sophisticated trafficking organizations. ⁵⁸⁴ 

      The illegal sector in Venezuela is not as important as in the Andean countries and, as mentioned before in this chapter, the Venezuelan security forces have been effective in countering the drug trafficking criminal organizations. However, the situation is not likely to improve if the Venezuelan economy is not diversified and if the conditions to attract private investment in the legal sector are not created.

      The charts below show how the rate of people arrested for drug trafficking and drug possession have risen since the mid-1980s. The charts also show an increase in the arrest of Venezuelan nationals abroad. This gives an idea of an increase in the number of people that turn to drug trafficking as an economic outlet. They also show figures of eradication of illicit crops in Venezuelan territory. The sudden decrease in marijuana seizures could be explained by two factors: the shift by Colombian drug traffickers from marijuana trafficking to cocaine trafficking in the 1980s (already explained in Chapter IV of this dissertation), and the probability that with the coca/cocaine boom in Colombia and the increase of cocaine trafficking through Venezuela, the law enforcement forces might have focused their attention in coca eradication and cocaine seizures. The decrease in coca and opium eradicated hectares for 1996 might be due to the fact that statistics for this period did not cover the entire year at the moment of publication by the CNA in early 1997. In any case, the fact that there has been some opium eradication in Venezuelan territory shows that there might be also a spillover effect of heroin production towards this country as a result of enforcement efforts in Colombia.

      

Graphic 7. Venezuelans arrested abroad for drug trafficking

Source: CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela's Plan Against Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, , p. 24

      

Graphic 8. Arrest for possession and traffic Min of justice and Judiciary Police

Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de Venezuela, Comisión Nacional Contra el Uso Ilícito de las Drogas (CONACUID), Aproximación Diagnóstica del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en Venezuela, Caracas, January, 1993, annexes (pages not numbered) and Organization of American States, Excecutive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), CICAD, Statistical Summary 1997, Washington D.C., General Secretariat of the OAS, p.113

      

Graphic 9. Venezuela, eradication of illicit crops in the Perijá highlands (in hectares)

Source: Col. (National Guard) Dávila Flores, Alfonso, La Transnacional de las Drogas y su Incidencia en la Seguridad y la Defensa de Venezuela, Dissertation, Caracas,IAEDEN, May 1989, pp.47-48 and CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela's Plan Against Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, p.19

      

Graphic 10. Eradication of Marijuana in the Perijá highlands (hectares)

Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de Venezuela, Comisión Nacional Contra el Uso Ilícito de las Drogas (CONACUID), Aproximación Diagnóstica del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en Venezuela, Caracas, January, 1993, annexes (pages not numbered) and Organization of American States, Excecutive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), CICAD, Statistical Summary 1997, Washington D.C., General Secretariat of the OAS, p.113

      

Graphic 11. Eradication of opium poppy in Perijá Highlands (hectares)

Source: CONACUID ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela's Plan Against Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimation, p.19

d) Societal threats

      Clear and present threats:

      As shown in the table below, increasing since the first big cocaine seizure in September 1983: ⁵⁸⁵ 

      

Table 8. Venezuela, illicit drugs seizures in kilos
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Marijuana (*)	34,619.7	3,345.1	1,703	2,472	996	2,455	8,717.7	3,243.8	526	9,989	13,685
Cocaine	378,9	862,5	366	735	2,704	2,661	1,107,9	1,852.2	1,705	5,596	5,844
Bazuco	--	--	230	1,110	550	1,656	1,411.6	1,852.2	1,161	1,438	806
Heroin	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	13	15	81

Sources: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de la República, CONACUID, Aproximación Diagnóstica del Problema del Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas en Venezuela, annexes, Caracas, 1993 and Venezuela, Ministry of Justice, Judiciary Police, 1997.

      (*) The sudden decrease in marijuana seizures might be explained by three factors: the growing importance in neighboring Colombia of cocaine trafficking vis-a-vis marijuana trafficking, the focus of attention of Venezuelan law enforcement on the growing problem of cocaine trafficking, the change in consumption preferences from marijuana to cocaine/bazuco in Venezuela.

      This increasing trafficking through Venezuela was motivated by the following factors:

• The policy of interdiction in the Caribbean by the Reagan administration, that led the traffickers to look for alternative trafficking routes towards the U.S.
• The increase of inspections in air and surface cargo coming from Colombia.
• The pattern of enforcement in Colombia that led the traffickers to move their operations closer to the Venezuelan border.
• The connection of the Italian organized crime in Venezuela that facilitated cocaine trafficking towards the U.S. and Europe.
• The rise of Europe as a new consumption market and the high level of trade between Venezuela with Europe.
• Venezuela's vulnerabilities in terms of corruption, socioeconomic development and territorial centrality.

      The annual traffic through Venezuela is estimated to be about 100 to 200 metric tons per year. ⁵⁸⁶  The increase in cocaine traffic has produced a drop in the retail price of the drug, and has produced a diffusion of consumption. Even if statistics concerning consumption are lacking, all the consulted reports affirm that, from the marijuana era in the 1970s, Venezuela passed into an era of cocaine--and its cheaper variant bazuco (coca paste and tobacco)-- consumption.

      An indirect indicator of consumption is the pattern of seizure. As shown in the table below, the seizures of bazuco and crack have risen significantly. These cocaine variants are not trafficked for retailing in Europe and the U.S.; rather, they are sold and consumed in Venezuela. Thus this shows that consumption is growing in Venezuela. In the long term this poses a threat to the integrity of the social fabric of Venezuela. As a secondary issue, a recent study has demonstrated the relationship between cocaine and bazuco consumption and violent crime. The study shows that most of the people treated from wounds (including self inflicted injuries) in emergency rooms in Caracas are either cocaine or bazuco consumers.  ⁵⁸⁷ 

      

Graphic 12. Venezuela, drug seizures, 1996 (in kilograms)

Source: C.N.A, Venezuela: Anti-Drug Territory, A Commitment to life, p.18

e) Ecological threats

      Significant threats:

      - Deforestation produced by the spillover of illegal crops and pollution of river basins due to cocaine production in the bordering country:

      The main concern in Venezuela in terms of the negative ecological consequences of drug trafficking is the deforestation caused by coca, marijuana, and poppy cultivation in the Perijá Highlands. ⁵⁸⁸  This area is a national park and, in theory, not open to exploitation. However, coca and poppy are cultivated on a small scale in the Perijá region as Venezuela does not has a peasant class that could produce coca or poppy on a large scale. Plantations seem to be the product of sporadic shifts in production from Colombia to Venezuela depending on the intensity of enforcement. Members of the Guajiro (or waiús) tribe also cultivate coca and marijuana as a way to assure their subsistence. Nevertheless, the main activity of the waiús seems to be smuggling of drugs, and not cultivation and processing.

      As a conjecture, it is possible that there is some degree of contamination of rivers because cocaine is produced near Colombian rivers such as the Guaviare, Meta, Vichada, Inirida, and Guainia that form part of the Orinoco system. It is known that chemical inputs such as kerosene, gas oil, sulfuric acid and lime are dumped in the Colombian and Venezuelan sides. In the long term these rivers are very likely to have problems of water pollution and destruction of the animal and vegetable life.

a) Assessing the problem: underlying conditions for the rise of the coca-cocaine industry in Bolivia and types of drug trafficking-related violence

      There is an image of Bolivia as a peaceful country vis-à-vis other drug producing South American countries plagued with problems of political violence, such as Colombia(analyzed in chapter IV). This image has led to the use of Bolivia since the mid-1980s as a sort of experimental field for the application of militarized drug control policies. The rationale behind this is that since there are no active strong guerrilla groups in Bolivia, it would be easier to carry out aggressive interdiction and eradication campaigns with the support of the armed forces or UMOPAR, the counter drug battalion of the Bolivian National Police. As stated by one analyst,

"Official introduction of the Bolivian military into the drug war has been not only a self-defeating anti-narcotics policy but, as numerous experts have already argued, this 'institutionalised' militarisation has created real dangers to human rights and democracy in the coup-ridden Andean Nation. Moreover, militarisation could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, realising worst-case scenarios of violent Bolivian narco-guerrillas and narco-terrorists, as existed in Colombia. Experts have blithely assumed that Bolivia is different; unlike Peru or Colombia, it currently lacks the violence of drug mafias, guerrilla insurgencies and paramilitary death squads. However, Bolivia provides opportunities for counternarcotics and counterinsurgency strategies to foster extensive peasant violence and popular terrorist or guerrilla insurgencies where none has previously existed...." ⁶¹⁷ 

      This image is clearly a myth. In terms of drug trafficking-related violence, Bolivia is a sleeping volcano with sudden eruptions. Throughout its history Bolivia has been marked by the absence of clearly defined political institutions, which has led to violent political practices. Violence has been used to access political power in the form of coup d'etat; a short civil war in 1948, and an armed revolution in 1952, which opened the political participation to the oppressed peasant and mining workers' sectors and a massive program of land reform was carried out. Violence has been used as a means to keep political power and to provoke political change. Moreover, after the populist revolution of 1952, peasant and workers' militias have been formed and then used by several governments to counter the army or to pit against one another. On several occasions during the 1960s and early 1970s, both the civil and military sectors have used peasant militias in other to crush miner strikes. ⁶¹⁸  The following quotes clearly illustrate this situation,

"The first MNR administration of President Paz Estenssoro [1952-1956], while encouraging the mobilization of peasant unions and militias, also feared their potential independence and created mechanisms to control peasant autonomy. Since the army was reorganized, Siles Suazo, the second MNR president, used peasant militias against angry miners. In March 1959, some 800 armed peasants defended the government against a miners strike in the highland city of Oruro. On the other hand, the military put down violent peasant unrest in 1957,1959 and 1960.[...] Unfortunately for the peasant sector, the military institution had no reciprocal compunction. With the infamous Massacre of Tolata in January 1974, under the presidency of General Banzer, the military ruthlessly repressed peasant protests over the low, officially controlled prices" ⁶¹⁹ 

"Plus qu'un pays de guerrillas, la Bolivie a surtout été le pays de prédilection des pronunciamientos et des soulèvements populaires d'un jour. On en compte 180 dans son histoire bicentenaire, c'est a dire un governement tous les neuf mois[...] La révolution de 1952 amène le MNR au pouvoir. Paz Estenssoro réalise d'importantes réformes: nationalisation des mines et création de COMIBOL [national owned mines] réforme agraire, création des milices de paysans et d'ouvriers. Ainsi donc la Bolivie connaît des tempêtes brèves mais violentes, mais pas de mouvement de guerrilla" ⁶²⁰ 

      This is to show that in the apparently "peaceful" Bolivia there is already a tradition of armed peasant mobilization and political violence. With the upsurge of the coca-cocaine problem in the 1980s, this tradition of peasant mobilization can turn into a situation characterized by radical grassroot armed peasant resistance. However instead of being created from the top, coca-growing trade unions were created from the bottom in order to resist the militarized enforcement policies.

      One difference with Colombia is that instead of a protracted situation of civil war in Bolivia, highs of violence are followed by periods of relative social peace. Another difference with Colombia is that Bolivia never developed the conditions for the rise of guerrilla movements with the capacity to match the power of the state.

      It is also a myth to consider Bolivia as a peaceful country in terms of the violence generated by the cocaine industry vis-à-vis Colombia. Bolivia does not have a history of protracted escalation of violence between drug "cartels," as in Colombia, nor does Bolivia have the same type of interaction between local or foreign guerrilla groups and the cocaine industry. However, as shown in Chapter II, it is important to note that between 1980 and 1981, the interest of the Bolivian military and the drug traffickers colluded to carry out a coup d'etat and organized a military regime whose members participated in the cocaine trade. Moreover the military junta based its power on paramilitary groups at the service of drug trafficking organizations. As in the case of the political violence, this experience on a limited time-frame. It is not likely to be repeated because of the resistance of the armed forces to get involved in these kinds of activities, and because Bolivia is heavily dependent on outside countries. Therefore, international pressure, as in the past, would not allow such a regime to subsist. This to say that the fact that drug trafficking-related violence happened only once for a short period of time does not necessarily mean that Bolivia is a "peaceful" country. The potential for drug trafficking-related violence exists not only in terms of possible vertical violence between the government and drug trafficking organizations but, as will be shown, between the government and the very well organized coca-growing peasant unions. This problem will be analyzed in detail in the following sections of this chapter.

      What is certainly absent in Bolivia is the protracted "war of drugs" dynamics we have seen in Colombia. Drug trafficking-related violence manifests itself in "highs" followed by "lows" of activity. In the case of Bolivia it is possible to add six additional types of violence to the drug trafficking-related violence typology developed in chapter IV: four on the downstream side of the industry (the traffickers), and two on the upstream side of the industry (the coca growing peasants).

      As illustrated in Chapter III, on two occasions, violence was used against elected civilian governments by a faction of the military allied with drug traffickers (1980), and by corrupted members of the police against President Siles Suazo (1984). One manifestation of violence resulted in a coup d'etat and the establishment of a "narcocracy" (1980-1981); the other resulted in a failed coup and the temporary kidnapping of president Siles Suazo by UMOPAR officers investigated for corruption.

      When an "objective convergence of interests" exists between right-wing putchist military officers and drug traffickers, and when the resulting coup is beneficial for this group, one may speak of a "political power-seeking preemptive violence." ⁶²¹  In fact, part of the traffickers' support of García Meza's clique was a preemptive movement against possible enforcement measures to control the steadily growing cocaine business in Bolivia. ⁶²²  In the case of the UMOPAR, on the other hand, this was a preemptive coup in which the main group was composed of corrupted police officers attempting to avoid judiciary measures against them. This type will be called "inner system corruption related violence." Corrupted police officials can exert violence against other agents of the state carrying out counter drug activities. These are, in my view, extreme cases of drug trafficking-related violence and represent the apotheosis of political threats to the state stemming from the cocaine industry. True, Bolivia is less violent than Colombia if one were to look at the number of people killed in drug trafficking-related acts, but it cannot by any means be considered a "peaceful" country.

      Violence in Bolivia is related to the upstream side of the cocaine industry (the coca growing peasants) since this country is labor-intensive and linked to the industry as a coca and coca paste center. Other types of drug trafficking-related violence emerged once Bolivia began to occupy an important place as a cocaine producer country. The table below displays the six drug trafficking-related violence types to be added to the typology elaborated in Chapter IV.

      

Table 1. Drug trafficking related violence in upstream producer countries
PERPETRATOR:	MOTIVATION:	METROPOLITAN AREAS:	RURAL AREAS:
Drug traffickers & Military officers	Seize political power	Political power seeking urban (victims: political leaders and candidates , trade union leaders, journalists, judges, prosecutors)	Political power seeking rural (victims: peasant leaders, peasant population)
Corrupted police or military personnel	Preemptive	Inner system corruption related urban violence (victims: political leaders and members of the three powers of the state)	Inner system corruption related rural violence (victims: fellow police officers, military personnel, judges and prosecutors, political leaders)
Coca growing peasants	Preemptive	Upstream preemptive urban (victims: agents of the state,"cooperative" peasants	Upstream preemptive rural (victims: agents of the state, "cooperative" peasants)
Coca growing peasants	Reaction/defense of coca fields	Upstream reactive urban (victims: agents of the state, "cooperative" peasants)	Upstream reactive rural (victims: agents of the state, "cooperative" peasants)

      The indicators listed below can be used in order to identify cases of drug trafficking- related violence and measure the extent of trafficking in an "upstream" or labor intensive drug producer country. Although these indicators are not accurately measured in this work, it is possible to identify them in the analysis presented in the next sections of this chapter.

• Armed attacks against police/military patrols or eradication teams by armed coca growing peasants or guerrilla groups.
• Roadblocks by armed coca-growing peasants.
• Attacks against police/military patrols by paramilitary groups at the service of drug traffickers.
• Assassinations of political candidates and leaders by drug traffickers.
• Assassinations of coca growing trade union leaders by drug traffickers.
• Organization of peasant self-defense groups (grupos de autodefensa).
• Organization of paramilitary groups at the service of drug traffickers.
• Kidnappings of relatives of drug trafficking bosses (claimed by rival drug traffickers).
• Attempts against drug trafficking bosses and cocaine processing facilities (claimed by rival drug traffickers)

      As stated earlier in this chapter, Bolivia did not suffer the kind of protracted drug trafficking-related violence that we have seen in Colombia. Moreover, more than a spiral of violence in Bolivia, we have a succession of high levels of violence provoked by enforcement policies followed by a de-escalation brought about by a step back of the government faced with the threat of violence from the coca growing peasants or the traffickers. Bolivia is faced with a non-outlet dilemma: A large part of its population is involved in coca growing and coca paste production. This population is organized into trade unions or federations. Under North American pressure, a big component of law enforcement is oriented to coca-eradication. The result is a vicious circle of law enforcement and peasant reactive and preemptive violence which begun in the mid-1980s.

      When Bolivia became a cocaine producer country in the early 90s there were some cases of reactive violence from the drug traffickers. This time the government preemptively moved à la Cesar Gaviria in Colombia with a policy of voluntary surrender in exchange for imprisonment in Bolivia. With this move the government expected to avoid a new dimension of violence marked by a war between the state and the traffickers as had happened in Colombia.

      The figure below shows the population employed in the different stages of cocaine production in Bolivia as well as some comparative figures on the coca growing sector and the legal economy. These figures give an idea of the labor-intensive nature of the cocaine industry in Bolivia as well as the importance of the illegal economy in that country.

      

Figure 1. Bolivia: Population employed in coca and cocaine production

Source: Sistema Educativo Antidrogas y de Movilización (SEAMOS), Datos y Cifras: Selección de Cuadros Estadísticos de los Temas Hoja de Coca, Narcotráfico, Uso Indebido de Drogas, Desarrollo Alternativo, Niños y Juventud. Dossier Hemerográfico, La Paz, SEAMOS, Centro de Información, 1996,p.16

      The next sections of this chapter analyze the evolution of drug trafficking control policies from 1982 to 1997. The dissertation analyzes this period under because it overlaps with the coca-cocaine boom in Bolivia following a rise in demand in the U.S. in the late 1970s. Also in this period, a series of problems in the legal side of the Bolivian economy led a massive migration of unemployed peasants to the Chapare region to work in the coca-cocaine industry. These cojunctural "push factors" of the coca-cocaine boom included a sustained drought in 1983-1984 in central and southern parts of the country (the drought was produced by the "El Niño" sea stream) and the virtual collapse of the economy due to the drop in tin prices. ⁶²³  As explained by The Economist,

"The glittering years came to an abrupt halt in October 1985, when the London Metal Exchange halved the price of tin almost overnight. The 22-nation International Tin Council announced that it was bankrupt and could no longer support the price for buying-in excess stock in the market. From $8,000 per tonne, the price fell to $3,400 by May 1986. The consequences for Bolivian miners were grim. Bolivian tin was, and is, expensive to produce. The state mining company, Comibol, sacked 16,000 of its 27,000 workers in a year. [...] the number at work has inexorably shrunk to under 2,000, as one mine after another has closed [...] After the shrinkage of the industry in the mid-1980s, many of the miners left their highland homes, encouraged by government resettlement programmes, to become farmers in the tropical Chapare lowlands, east of the Andes. Many of them have since switched from food crops to the more profitable coca, to supply South America's burgeoning cocaine business. But now, having seen their old industry closed under their feet, they find the government, under pressure from the United States, eager to close their new one too." ⁶²⁴ 

      These conditions were aggravated by a series of economic adjustment policies implemented since 1986 to address the economic crisis. The neoliberal strategies to reduce the public sector further aggravated the growing problem of unemployment. ⁶²⁵  As explained by two analysts,

"In the early to mid 1980s, with the tin metals and natural gas markets in a precipitous decline, its economy [Bolivian] virtually collapsed with the GNP failing 20 percent and per capita income declining 30 percent, as 20 percent and per capita income declining 30 percent, as 20 thousand tin miners were laid off in late 1985 due to the closing down of state run mines. Unemployment doubled to 20 percent of Bolivia's 1.7 million person labor force. Exports fell some 25 percent between 1984 and 1985 and inflation literally spiraled out of control [...]" ⁶²⁶ 

"The boom in the demand from abroad for cocaine coincided with Bolivia's worst economic slump in the century, caused essentially by government mismanagement but compounded by falling commodity prices and growing debt service payments. The crisis started in the early 1980s and was hardly resolved by the beginning of the next decade." ⁶²⁷ 

      Because of its non diversified economy and its dependency on foreign aid, Bolivia is more is prone to bend to U.S. pressure to elaborate and implement drug control policies. Bolivia is a very good example of an underdeveloped and dependent country. The socio-economic development of Bolivia is extremely low. As shown in the table below, together with Paraguay, Peru, and Haiti, Bolivia is one of the poorest countries not only in South America, but also in Latin America and the Caribbean.

      

Table 2. Comparative Indices of Human Development (1994)
	Bolivia	Paraguay	Peru	Haiti
Per Capita GNP U.S.$ (1991)	217.0	3,240.0	3,110.0	925.0
Life Expectancy at Birth	60.5	67.2	63.6	56.0
Adult Literacy Rate	79.3	90.8	86.2	55.0
Public Expenditure in Education as a % of GDP	2.4	1.0	3.5	1.8
Infant Mortality Rate (per thousand born alive)	86.0	47.0	77.0	87.0
Total Population with access to water (1988-91)	52.0	36.0	56.0	39.0

Source: UNDP-Human Development Report 1994, quoted in UNDCP, La Paz Bolivia, Update 1994 Annual Country Report, p.2

      At the same time, its key economic sectors in the economy (primarily mining and hydrocarbons) are severely affected by the continuous deterioration of the terms of trade mainly due to price collapses of minerals, including tin and natural gas. The weak socioeconomic development aggravates the state's inability to extract resources and apply policies. ⁶²⁸  This makes Bolivia very vulnerable to external pressure when it comes to defining and implementing its drug control policies. Since the early 1980s, successive Bolivian governments have been trapped in a vicious cycle that can be illustrated in the following way (these steps follow chronological evolution):

1. The U.S. government pressures for immediate results in terms of coca eradication;
2. The Bolivian government opts for forced eradication;
3. The coca growing peasants organize themselves and put up resistance;
4. The government promises alternative development programs (with U.S. aid) and offers an amount of money (usually $2,000 to $2,500) per hectare eradicated; ⁶²⁹ 
5. The U.S. government conditionally provides economic aid for alternative development programs upon fulfillment of eradication goals, and when the eradication goals are not fulfilled the support is withdrawn;
6. The coca growing peasants receive the $2,000/$2,500, and in the absence of access to potential markets for alternative products and the existence of commercial barriers they use the money and emigrate to other areas in order to restart coca production;
7. Taking U.S. advice, the Bolivian government opts for a change of strategy and increases actions against cocaine production installations;
8. The peasants occupied in coca paste production react violently against the government in order to defend their source of employment (and subsistence) and indirectly the traffickers gain support from the peasantry; ⁶³⁰ 
9. The latter factor is aggravated by the U.S. pressure for the intervention of the Bolivian Army in interdiction and eradication activities;
10. The coca-growing peasants threaten armed resistance in order to prevent the entry of the army in the Chapare region. ⁶³¹ 

      This cycle is also reinforced by sporadic government failures to pay the promised $2,000/$2,500 dollars for eradicated areas or the lack of fulfillment of alternative development plans. This aggravates the unwillingness of the peasants to eradicate voluntarily, and the government attempts forced eradication. This situation causes and still is causing a series of clashes between the peasants and police and military units in the Chapare, the Beni, and the Bolivian East (Oriente Boliviano).

      Compared to other the South American countries, Bolivia can be considered as the paradigmatic case of a weak state. To the low socioeconomic development and the lack of policy capacity must be added a weak nature in all the characteristics of the attributes of the state as defined in Chapter II. Bolivia is a country with a very weak sociopolitical cohesion. Bolivia has a highly unstable political history. The country has have more coups d'etat than years of independence. Until 1952, the history of Bolivia is a succession of personalistic military dictatorships and oligarchic restrictive democratic governments that excluded the participation of an oppressed and exploited Indian majority. In 1952 the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), opened political participation to the peasant masses and carried out significant land reforms. Political participation came in the form of clientelistic relationships with MNR bosses and peasant militias created from above and miner trade unions. In Bolivia, the institutionalization of the MNR as an hegemonic party, much like the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) in Mexico, was frustrated by a new wave of military coups that ended in 1982. Since then, Bolivia's path to democracy has been considered a process of consolidation. However, even if the democratic mechanisms for elections and exercise of power are respected, the Indian population, which constitutes 60% of the population along three main ethnic groups (Quechua, Aymara and Guaraní), continue to be socially and politically excluded.  ⁶³² 

      Most of the Indian population hardly speaks any Spanish. They communicate in either Aymara or Quechua. State institutions are not fully recognized in zones like Chapare, the Beni, Pando, and the Oriente (near the Brazilian border in the east). On a visit to Bolivia I was surprised by the fact that during the week of national independence day (August 6), it is compulsory for people to display the Bolivian colors; not doing so is punishable by a fine. During my visit to the Chapare, every farm flew the Bolivian flag and the majority of the people did so because they where afraid of getting una multa de la Alcaldía ( a fine from the Mayor's Office). In my view, this "compulsory patriotism" shows how far Bolivia is from achieving its consolidation as a nation state. People do not necessarily identify with the state simply because the state is not present. For a long time this was the case in the Chapare. But the situation is improving now thanks to infrastructure work done by USAID and UNDCP that allow state institutions (schools, police, and health systems) settle in the area. It is still the case in huge areas such as the Beni and Pando, as well as areas of the Santa Cruz department where state institutions are still a very vague concept for the people living there. This vacuum led to a situation in which plantation owners and cattle ranchers replaced the role of the state in providing basic services. Most of the Beni and Santa Cruz ranchers later became part of the cocaine bourgeoisie in the early 1980s. This has led to a situation in which organized crime replaces the state and controls a portion of the territory, thus hindering the territorial centrality of the state. The situation is different in the coca growing area of Chapare in the Department of Cochabamba. In this region the cocaleros, or coca-growing peasants, are highly organized into federations of sindicatos (trade unions). The basic unit of the federación (federation) is the sindicato. The sindicato organizes the settling of a colony or peasant community, provides basic services, and even administers local justice through a system of corregidores. These trade unions compete with the government as a source of authority. In the absence of legitimate institutions and a broadly accepted "idea of the state," it not surprising that the coca growing peasants see the enforcement policies of the Bolivian state as hostile acts coming from an hostile external actor. The government is not perceived as the proper actor, present in order to insure law and order; rather it is seen as a strange player subordinated to foreign interests (U.S.) whose role is to destroy the peasants' means of survival.

      All these factors have contributed to the rise of a coca-cocaine complex in Bolivia and are at the source of reactive violence to militarized enforcement policies.

      As stated before, this chapter will analyze the evolution of the militarization of drug control policies in the Bolivian democratic period from 1982-1997. This period was chosen because the cojunctural push factors of the coca-cocaine boom all came together at the beginning of this period. It is really difficult to speak of drug control policies (this does not mean that there was not a veneer of drug control policies in order to keep the U.S. content) from 1971 to 1982 because the military rulers of Bolivia were either directly or indirectly related to the drug trade. However, the period from 1971-82 will be studied as the prolegomenon of all the events that took place after that period. Moreover, as the next sections will show, even if the military rulers were direct participants in the drug trade, this activity provoked a certain degree of violence that eventually came to threaten the military institution and the integrity of the state as itself. On the other hand the period 1995-1997, that is the second half of the Sanchez de Lozada presidency, will be studied as an epilogue to the militarization of drug trafficking control policies. This is because my study concerning Argentina as a neighbor country of Bolivia ends in 1995, with the end President Menem's first administration.

a) The Banzerato (1971-1978)

"He may be a son of a bitch but he is our son of a bitch." ⁶³³ 

"Although Bolivia has had over 200 military coups, the combination of government violence and the drug entanglement of top political officials may be traced to Hugo Banzer's dictatorship from 1971 to 1978, the period in which the cocaine business in Bolivia took off [...]The Banzer's regime cruelty and its close connection with cocaine pale by comparison with General García-Meza's dictatorship." ⁶³⁴ 

      It is no secret that the incipient cocaine industry in Bolivia grew in the early 1970s thanks to the blind eye and alleged active complicity of General Hugo Banzer Suarez. Possible participation by Banzer in the expansion of the drug trade is unclear, and according to experts on that period there is not enough evidence to prove or disprove it conclusively. ⁶³⁵  However, there have been some cases of drug trafficking involving either relatives or close friends of the president. As analyzed by James Dunkerley,

"There were further, more tangible signs of trouble at the top [...] [in 1975] Edwin Tapia Frontanilla, Banzer's private secretary, was arrested at Montreal airport with a consignment of cocaine. In the same operation Luis 'Chito' Valle, Banzer's son-in-law and the Bolivian consul in Montreal as well as a student at McGill University, was found in possession of the drug and discreetly asked to leave the country; two other Bolivian diplomats were condemned to five-year sentences. The fact that Banzer's wife Yolanda had recently traveled on an unscheduled flight from Santa Cruz in an airforce jet to visit her son in law in Canada did little to distance the presidential family from such unsavory matters. A further member of the family, Guillermo 'Willy' Banzer Abastaflor, Hugo Banzer's nephew, was later arrested in Florida for cocaine trafficking [...] In the final weeks of his rule Banzer appointed his cousin Guillermo Banzer Ojopi as consul in Miami, but his designation was met with a leak from the DEA that Banzer Ojopi was involved in the cocaine trade" ⁶³⁶ 

      Just like his democratic counterparts in Colombia during the same period, the Bolivian dictator preferred to adopt a posture of "nothing is going on here." As prices for traditional tropical products (mainly cotton) were falling, the General preferred to look the other way and allow the "narcodollars" flow into the Bolivian economy. As long as the drug industry did not challenge his power, everything was all right.

      At the beginning of the 1970s, cocaine consumption was not a big issue in the U.S. (heroin was the main drug addiction problem at the time), and illegal activities in Bolivia were also overlooked. A right wing general surrounded by a team of "Chicago-School" liberal economists was considered a good barrier against the "communist threat" in Latin America. Further, Banzer had overthrown a nationalist and populist general (General Juan José Torres, President of Bolivia 1970-1971) who, in the eyes of Washington, was turning too much to the left. ⁶³⁷ 

      Several factors came together at the time of the rise of an incipient cocaine industry in the area of Chapare (department of Cochabamba) and the department of Santa Cruz: A consumer market, labor, raw material, entrepreneurial class, and capital all came together in the mid-1970s.

      Growing cocaine consumption in the United States provided the consumer market. As stated earlier, the cocaine alarm in the U.S. would finally be sounded by the end of the decade. There is a hypothesis that suggests that the cocaine consumption habit was imported and spread to the U.S. by the Peace Corps working in rural areas in the Chapare. Allegedly, some of the Peace Corps members began experimenting with cottage cocaine processing in the late 60s and once back to the U.S. not only continued to demand the product but also contributed to the drug's popularization. ⁶³⁸  Similar arguments about this "Peace Corps effect" have been elaborated in the case of the popularization of Colombian marijuana in the 1960s. ⁶³⁹  It has also been argued that heroin consumption in the 1960s and 1970s was boosted as consequence of the return of soldiers that had acquired the habit in Vietnam. ⁶⁴⁰ 

      Labor was provided by a stable flow of immigrants to the Tropic of Cochabamba and more specifically to the Chapare region. Migration from the altiplano (Highlands) to the Chapare had been promoted by the MNR government in the 1950s as a part of the agrarian reform. For geopolitical reasons (settlement population of empty areas), the colonization of the Chapare and the Oriente was promoted in the 1960s by civilian and military governments. However, promised plans to build infrastructure and outlets to markets for legal crops never materialized. Moreover, the soil conditions in the Chapare were not ideal for the production of legal products such as sugar, rice, or corn but proved excellent for the production of coca. Settlers brought with them the habit of accullico (coca chewing), and the local production of coca began to grow. Until the 1950s the production of coca was centered in the Yungas area north of La Paz. The coca leaves from the Yungas produced for local traditional consumption have a sweeter taste and a lower concentration of alkaloid. The kind of coca produced in Chapare has a bitter taste and a higher concentration of cocaine alkaloid. As explained by one analyst,

"...Chapare coca, variously known as 'Vandiola', 'Misión' or 'Cochala', has large, thick bitter-tasting leaves, it is considered very inferior for chewing when compared to he small-leafed, sweet Yungas coca, but since costs of production are much lower (it is merely sown in furrows, like maize, with note of the elaborate terracing used in the Yungas), it is cheaper and thus finds a market (often mixed with Yungas coca) among the poverty-stricken peasantry of the southern Altiplano. It is also ideally suited for the elaboration of cocaine; any old coca, discolored, aged, or evil tasting, can be trodden for cocaine, whereas chewing coca generally has to be of much higher quality." ⁶⁴¹ 

      The conditions necessary for increasing the production of coca were present: labor and the ideal raw material. What was lacking was a demand from an entrepreneurial class that would process the coca. This came in the mid-1970s. Banzer's coup had been supported and financed by the landowning class of Santa Cruz. ⁶⁴²  Banzer himself and his family were from this class and very much indebted to it. Aware of how vulnerable an economy of tin and hydrocarbons actually was, General Banzer sought to develop the export of tropical crops from the area of Santa Cruz. The product chosen for this purpose was cotton. Banzer provided financial incentives and support to the camba landowners in order for them to be able to compete internationally in the cotton market. ⁶⁴³  Unfortunately, the whole commercial maneuver was based on price speculation.While prices rose in 1972 and 1973, they suddenly dropped in 1975. Now all the ingredients were finally ready and in place: a growing demand for cocaine in the U.S, cheap labor in the Chapare, capital and loans from the government and an entrepreneurial class ready to exploit these factors. As explained by two analysts,

"[t]he real expansion [of the coca-cocaine industry] began with the collapse of cotton in 1975/6 and was the result of a number of exploratory studies sponsored by the Banzer regime in close alliance with the over-financed but under-productive members of the Asociación de Productores de Algodón (ADEPA), centered in Santa Cruz. It is inconceivable that some degree of high level planning did not take place since, for example, sulfuric acid [produced by military industries] was needed in quantities that required a major commercial operation and some state assistance. Early sufficient numbers of tightly-knit cruceño agro-industrial elite have subsequently took off after July 1980 [....] almost all sources of information identify the Banco Agrícola as key component in the rise of cocaine" ⁶⁴⁴ 

"Coupled with business mismanagement, the subsequent loss of international markets drove the industry into bankruptcy, which pushed the wealthy Santa Cruz cotton producers into looking for a more lucrative enterprise. The enterprise of choice was cocaine hydrochloride, which required immediate development organization of coca cultivation in the Chapare [...] Thus, the cocaine boom was spawned through the use of primarily Kolla labor in coca production." ⁶⁴⁵ 

      When the cotton prices fell, the camba bourgeoisie turned to the processing of coca. Cocaine became the new alternative agro-industrial activity. Even if Banzer was aware of this, credit kept flowing from the government for the development of this illegal industry. ⁶⁴⁶  To the above production factors we must add yet another factor that was decisive for the cocaine boom in Bolivia. Once an illegal industry exists, it must be somehow protected from law enforcement. Banzer's government had encouraged the formation of paramilitary squads that would be in charge of the dirty work (assassination of opposition leaders, intimidation, and torture). These paramilitary groups were increasingly hired and utilized by the camba narcoburgeoisie in order to intimidate and discipline labor hands in the Chapare and to protect their business in turf wars with the increasingly influential Colombian buyers. As explained by Waltraud Queiser Morales,

"Especially since the 1971 Banzer coup, paramilitary organizations, composed of adherents of the different military factions, gunmen for the drug gangs, and neo-Nazi militants-somewhat like the "death squads" in Brazil and later Argentina- terrorized opponents of the military regime." ⁶⁴⁷ 

      All the ingredients for a potentially explosive cocktail were in place. Only the lightning of a match was needed for a "narcocracy" to arise. This would not materialize, however, under Banzer who was ousted in 1978 under strong domestic and international pressure. As explained in a historical analysis,

'The 'economic miracle' turned out to be a myth, the production of petroleum declined sharply, and Comibol [the state owned tin prospecting company] produced a loss, despite high mineral prices, because it was subsidizing other state agencies. Cotton production also declined when world prices fell. The stability of the Banzer regime was superficial because the military remained divided by personal rivalry, ideological differences, and a generational gap. Growing civilian opposition was centered in the labor sector, despite the renewed military occupation of the mines. Radical students and the progressive sector of the Roman Catholic Church became spokespersons for the oppressed groups; the peasants also criticized the government. External factions contributed to the weakening of the Banzer regime as well. The negotiation with Chile for an outlet to the sea had raised hopes in 1974. When an agreement between Banzer and General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte failed because of the opposition of Chilean nationalist, Banzer's position was weakened. After Jimmy Carter assumed the United States Presidency in 1976, the United States pressured Banzer to hold elections. In 1977, with opposition from civilian groups and the military mounting and pressure from the United States increasing, Banzer announced a presidential election for 1980, hoping to remain in control, but labor unrest and hostility to his regime forced him to set the date for 1978. However, General Juan Pereda Absún, Banzer's handpicked candidate, carried out a coup in July 1978 after the National Electoral Court annulled the elections because of widespread fraud by Pereda´s supporters [...]General Pereda did not call for elections, despite his promise to do so, and he was overthrown in a bloodless coup in November 1978 by General David Padilla Arancibia (1978-79), who was supported by the younger institutionalist faction of the military. He saw the main role of the military as the defense of the country rather than political intervention and announced elections for 1979 without naming an official government candidate." ⁶⁴⁸ 

b) Narco-Generals (1980-1982) prolegomena to the Bolivia's cocaine quagmire

"What has happened in Bolivia is that of the two options on the table in he neighboring country the one that was formally correct was the assumption of power by an elected government, but for us this represented a high level of risk due to the possibility of diffusion of ideas contrary to our way of life. We have viewed the other option-the establishment of a military government-with much more sympathy because we don't want in South America what Cuba is for Central America." ⁶⁴⁹ 

      Bolivia has a multi-party system and usually none of the competing presidential candidates is able to reach a majority in an election. This was once again the case in August 1979. Following procedure, the Bolivian Congress appointed the then-president of the Senate, Walter Guevara Arce, as interim president, and new elections were set up for June 1980. Guevara Arce was however ousted in November 1979 in a bloody coup under right-wing Colonel Alberto Natush Busch. Natush, then stepped down after just two weeks because of intense civilian opposition and only limited military support, as well as United States diplomatic action to prevent recognition of the Natush government. Another interim president was then appointed by the Congress: Lidia Gueiler Tejada (1979-80), head of the Chamber of Deputies and a veteran MNR politician. ⁶⁵⁰  In 1980 Gueiler presided over elections in which the parties of the left gained a clear majority of the vote. Hernán Siles Suazo (a leading figure of the 1952 Revolution) with his coalition, the Democratic and Popular Union (Unidad Democrática y Popular), got 38% of the votes and it seemed certain that the Congress would name him president on August 6, 1980. In order to prevent the return of Siles Suazo on July 17, 1980 there was a coup d'etat orchestrated by General Luis García Meza. ⁶⁵¹  But, as explained in Chapter III of this dissertation, there were other reasons for this coup. The military takeover was financed and supported by the then-consolidating Santa Cruz narcoburgeoisie who were afraid of a return to democracy and a possible counter-narcotic campaign. In fact, Lidia Gueiler had already taken some steps favorable to an enforcement campaign against the expansion of drug trafficking activities. As explained by Scott McDonald,

"In the aftermath of Banzer's downfall in 1978, the country drifted: two general elections were held, five presidents held office and four coups, one a failure and three successful, were conducted. During one of the civilian administrations [the administration of President Gueiler] a brief antinarcotics campaign was carried out by police chief Jorge Selum. This was not appreciated by Bolivia´s narcotrafictantes, who were also wary of ongoing United States pressure to curtail the drug trade. Bolivia´s leading drug baron in the 1980s was Roberto Suarez Gomez [...] Suarez called a meeting of Bolivia´s major drug dealers at Club Bavaria in Santa Cruz in the early 1980s. These included Irwin Gasser, Jorge Naller, and Klaus Barbie. With contacts in the armed forces, such as Colonel Luis Arcé [sic] Gomez (a relative of Suarez's), the barons were able to contact the army commander in Santa Cruz, General Hugo Echeverra. Through his 'good offices' a meeting with General Luis García Meza, the supreme army commander, was arranged for a paltry sum of $800,000. At the meeting with García Meza, the Suarez-led dealers offered the general a bribe of $1,300,000 to lead the coup. There was an additional promise of the vast profits that would be made after the coup in a García Meza-led Bolivia. An additional part of the pact was that Arcé [sic], already involved in drug trading with Colonel Roberto Salomon, was to be given the position of Minister of the Interior which handled antinarcotics affairs." ⁶⁵² 

      A "delinquent dictatorship," characterized by a symbiotic relationship between a corrupted sector of the armed forces and the cocaine organized crime, was born. ⁶⁵³  The coup was particularly violent and was marked by a numerous disappearances. As explained by Waltraud Queiser Morales,

"Between 1979 and 1982, the military and paramilitary forces committed atrocities that ranked Bolivia among the major human rights offenders in the hemisphere. During García Meza's rule, according to an official government spokesman, there were at least 2,500 political prisoners; the mines were bombed and 900 people were killed..." ⁶⁵⁴ 

      It was also characterized by an increasing privatization of violence. The paramilitary groups at the service of both the Minister of the Interior Col. Arce Gomez (nicknamed "the Minister of Cocaine") and the Santa Cruz organized crime familias became increasingly powerful, and eventually threatened to match the power of the armed forces. This created dissent within the armed forces and eventually precipitated the fall of García Meza's narcocracy. Needless to say, international pressure (mainly from the Reagan administration) and diplomatic isolation played a major role in the fall of García Meza's regime.

      The paramilitary became a threat even to an authoritarian regime because a private sector, the traffickers, had feudalized the use of violence and controlled part of the territory in Bolivia. Some sectors of the armed forces could not tolerate this competition, which they perceived as a threat to the authority of the state or territorial centrality. ⁶⁵⁵  As stated by one analyst,

"Paramilitary forces which had existed under previous governments from the MNR on through Banzer , had become a power unto themselves, threatening even to members of the military" ⁶⁵⁶ 

      Of special concern to the armed forces was the growing power and territorial control that these paramilitary forces were gaining in the department of Santa Cruz. ⁶⁵⁷  Moreover, besides the process of territorial feudalization, there was a parallel process of political feudalization within the structure of the government. The Minister of the Interior, Col. Arce Gomez (who was also the link between the cocaine mafia and the government) had a joint venture with the traffickers for command of this parallel paramilitary structure, which was headed and formed in part by foreign mercenaries known as Los Novios de la Muerte. Some of the members of this group were Italian neo-fascist terrorists as well as former SS officers such as Klaus Barbie, who was an advisor of the Bolivian government and the contact between the government and the mercenaries. ⁶⁵⁸  This organization adopted the name Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES)-Special Security Service.. As stated by James Dunkerley,

"He [Klaus Barbie] provided a useful contact with other old nazis, such as Joachim Stellfeld, a former employee at the Kamaradenwerk organization who died in mysterious circumstances late in 1980, as well as established foreign mercenaries: the notorious Jean 'Black Jack' Sharamme, who had made his mark in the Congo, Albert Van Ingelgom, formerly a senior official at the Auschwitz concentration camp, Roger Van Zande and his son , who worked with the SES and was know as 'El Tigre' for his skill in extracting information by physical means. A younger group contained men like Joachim Fiebelkorn, Stefano delle Chiaie and Pier Luigi Pagliai, who had records of neo-fascist attachments, were linked to a number of terrorist operations in Europe (including the Bologna railway station bombing) and exhibited a special interest in cocaine trade." ⁶⁵⁹ 

      García Meza was overthrown by another coup d'etat in 1981. His regime had lasted only one year but had allowed the rise and consolidation of the Bolivian cocaine industry. If the alliance with the paramilitary groups was functional at one point, by the end it had become not only a nuisance but also a threat to the military establishment. There existed a hard-line anticommunist sector of the armed forces which, as far as human rights violations were concerned, was just as guilty as the paramilitary. However, they started to become hostile to the transformation of the dictatorship into a political fiefdom controlled by García Meza, Arce Gomez, and the Santa Cruz mafia. ⁶⁶⁰  As explained by one analyst,

"Much of this discontent was caused by the intemperate activities and vociferous proclamations of Arce, who ran the regime virtually single-handed in its first months and whose independent and overbearing paramilitary forces antagonised many sectors of the officer corps." ⁶⁶¹ 

      This growing power of the paramilitary groups also started to create concerns in bordering countries that had supported García Meza's coups in either tacit (as was the case with Brazil's military regime) or overt (as was the case with Argentina's military junta) ways. For example,

"[i]n May 1981, the Brazilian police captured half a dozen of Arce's mercenaries operating well over the border replete with nazi insignia, heavy weapons and a goodly quantity of cocaine, Colonel David Fernández, head of the DNSP (Dirección Nacional de Sustancias Peligrosas-National Directorate of Dangerous Substances) publicly supported all the charges made against those arrested" ⁶⁶² 

      A high-ranking Argentine civilian official confirmed to me that, in fact, at the time there was a rising concern in a sector of the Argentine Armed Forces about the growing political power that the drug traffickers were gaining in Bolivia. There was also concern regarding the extent of cocaine problem in that country. Moreover, this source stated that at the time, he was briefed by the Argentine Army about the disquieting situation in Bolivia and about certain concerns that members of the Bolivian Army had transmitted to their Argentine counterparts. ⁶⁶³  These concerns referred to the growing territorial control that the traffickers and its paramilitary groups were gaining in the Chapare and Beni regions. The Argentine Army Major Staff was particularly concerned about the possibility of a spillover of cocaine production and commercialization to Argentina. ⁶⁶⁴  The Argentine Military Junta apparently felt that the "Frankenstein Monster" they had helped to create in Bolivia was getting out of control. ⁶⁶⁵ 

      During this infamous Bolivian delinquent dictatorship, the Santa Cruz-based criminal organization was able to achieve a modest gain in the U.S. market with Miami as a port of entry for their cocaine. Later on, the Bolivians would lose this position to Colombians, who were at once more aggressive and better positioned in both geographical and logistical terms, and would manage to get vertically integrated in the transnational industry as coca paste and base producers. ⁶⁶⁶ 

      

Table 3. Cultivated surface and coca production in Bolivia 1963-1990
Year	Surface (hectares)	Yield (kilograms per hectare)	Production (metric tones)
1963	3,000	1,600	4,800
1964	3,100	1,600	4,960
1965	3,187	1,725	5,497
1966	3,189	1,623	5,175
1967	3,980	1,623	6,459
1968	2,600	1,623	4,219
1969	2,600	1,615	4,199
1970	4,450	1,348	5,998
1971	5,430	1,252	6,798
1972	6,140	1,302	7,994
1973	7,160	1,313	9,401
1974	7,900	1,380	10,902
1975	11,285	1,380	15,573
1976	12,000	1,380	16,560
1977	12,000	1,400	16,800
1978	18,860	1,400	26,404
1979	20,833	1,400	29,166
1980	22,788	1,400	31,903
1981	28,308	1,400	39,631
1982	35,269	1,400	49,376
1983	44,661	1,400	62,525
1984	56,867	1,400	79,613
1985	64,542	1,400	90,358
1986	70,905	1,400	99,267
1987	81,637	1,400	114,291
1988	84,801	1,400	118,721
1989	88,365	1,400	123,711
1990	91,937	1,400	128,711

Source: Maca of. de Est. Econ. y Estad. 1976; Bolivia en Cifras, 1980- , INE in SEAMOS, Dossier Hemerográfico, Datos y Cifras, p. 40

      

Table 4. Illicit Production of coca paste in Bolivia (in metric tons)
Year	Coca production (mt)	(-20% losses) balance	(-10,000mt of illicit consumption) Excess production	(100:1) Coca Paste
1979/80	25,750	20,600	10,600	106
1980/81	33,555	26,844	16,844	168.4
1981/82	47,490	37,992	27,992	279.9
1982/83	59,927	47,941.6	37,941.6	379.4
1983/84	108,000	86,400	76,400	764
1984/85	158,600	126,880	116,880	1,168.8
1985/86	120,422	96,337.6	86,337.6	863.4
1986/87	132,463	105,970.4	95,970,4	1059.7

Source: Direco-Sudesal-RVP in Seamos op.cit., p.128

      Drug control policies during García Meza's regime were a charade set up to respond to the pressures exerted by the Reagan administration (the same can be said about the situation during Banzer's regime). As a matter of fact, the term "drug control policy," generally used to refer to enforcement policies, ceased to be an oxymoron, given that the military regime through Col. Arce Gomez, nicknamed the "Minister of Coca," had part of the drug trafficking under his control.

      Early in 1981, García Meza imposed a state monopoly on the purchase of coca leaves from the growers (Supreme Decree N° 16,168). Coca was to be sold by peasants to Centros de Acopio (storage centers) and the government would commercialize it for traditional use. Also a Consejo Nacional de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (National Council for the Fight Against Narcotics Trafficking-CNLCN-) was created in order to supervise a National Directorate of Dangerous Substances. However, as explained by James Dunkerley,

"[t]here is little evidence to suggest that real progress was made. In the first place, the organs of control were hopelessly unprepared of their own and their sole means of tracking air traffic in Chapare was one VHF radar with a range of only ten kilometers. There were no resources to match the unofficial price for leaf and insufficient manpower to cover the major cities, let alone the countryside. More importantly still, there was no political will to make a campaign work, purge a notoriously corrupt institution, or oblige other parts of the state apparatus to collaborate. Thus, while the CNLCN issued a great deal of propaganda, prepared detailed studies, and made occasional raids in which small producers were captured, the trade continued virtually as before." ⁶⁶⁷ 

      However, coca paste and cocaine and coca leaves from the Centros de Acopio mysteriously disappeared to re-enter the illegal traffic . Allegedly coca paste was processed by conscripts within the Centros de Acopio and then sold to the traffickers. ⁶⁶⁸  As described by one analyst,

"Pictures of soldiers stomping coca leaves and of army lorries carrying heaps of basic paste during General García-Meza's cocaine dictatorship still circulate among politicians, trade union leaders and students and hamper the army's legitimacy in the contemporary move to establish democracy." ⁶⁶⁹ 

      Because of the internal dissent over the growing paramilitary power of the traffickers and above all due to the international isolation of Bolivia as well as the economic pressure and total lack of support from the Reagan administration, economic and military aid from the U.S. was cut. ⁶⁷⁰  The EEC countries adopted the same attitude. Bolivia had become an international pariah.

      García Meza tried to manage this situation by beginning a noisy campaign against drug trafficking and sacking Col. Arce Gomez as Minister of the Interior in March 1981. Under military pressure, he himself resigned and delegated power to one of the members of his clique, Gen. Celso Torrelio. But this was not enough. In the midst of a palace coup, in July 1982, Torrelio was forced to resign. He was replaced by a new junta headed by Gen. Guido Vildoso who, in view of mounting external and internal pressure, started preparing the way for a return to democratic rule and began to fire paramilitary squad members from official positions. Arce Gomez and García Meza prudently flew away to Argentina. ⁶⁷¹  A veneer of higher commitment to counter drug activities could be observed during the brief period of Gen. Vildoso. It is quite possible that Vildoso, as the head of a military that was opposed to the narco-contamination of the army, used law enforcement as a way to eliminate the threat that the paramilitary represented to the territorial centrality of the state. As explained by Dunkerley,

"[t]he president [García Meza] now under pressure from both the military and civilian participants in the trade, could not decide if the armed forces or the police would take overall charge of the operation. On 19 May he decided that the military would withdraw from all involvement, but 48 hours later he reversed this decision." ⁶⁷² 

"The shift to formal cooperation with the DEA [the DEA offices in Bolivia had been closed during García Meza's government] was evident over the last months of 1981 and early 1982; it was effectively sealed in 1982 when the U.S. embassy formally approved the CNLCN's plan to destroy coca plantations within a matter of six months [!!!]. This realignment followed the fall of García Meza and Arce Gómez and corresponded to the need of the Torrelio government to reach a rapprochement with Washington in order to tend to the state of bankruptcy that prevailed in the formal economy." ⁶⁷³ 

      In September 1982, before the democratic transition (October 1982), the government made public a Five-Year Plan, the Plan Quinquenal, (which been approved in May 1982) for the eradication of coca in Bolivia. Because of the resistance by the coca-growing peasants, and due to the chaotic economic situation that the next civilian president inherited, this plan would remain "frozen." The internal competition within the armed forces and finally the switch between General Torrelio and General Vildoso also stalled implementation of the Plan Quinquenal. ⁶⁷⁴ 

      Even if this policy was little more than a charade, it was already possible to witness a reactive violence on the part of the coca growing peasants against militarized drug control policies in this early period. Some authors claim that, at this early stage, peasant violence against the Centros de Acopio was "remotely controlled" by the traffickers who would encourage the assaults against the storage centers in order to force a free market for coca. ⁶⁷⁵  However, other sources characterize these attacks as spontaneous reactions of the cocaleros, as a preemptive movement against the implementation of the Five Year Plan, and a reaction to the abuses of the police and military groups present in the Chapare region. ⁶⁷⁶  In any case, during this period the cocaleros where already organized into trade unions and had an organizational structure that allowed them to coordinate attacks. These assaults on storage centers caused the death of seven policemen. Days before stepping down as president, Gen. Vildoso warned that the coca producing areas had become a 'no man's land'. ⁶⁷⁷  The Centros de Acopio were finally abandoned as a policy during the first year of democratic government (President Siles Suazo 1982-1985). A very noisy eradication campaign using the combined forces of the police and the armed forces in the Yapacaní region (between the Cochabamba and Santa Cruz departments) also provoked clashes between angry peasants and government forces. The main reason for the violent peasant reaction was the fact that the parcels were sprayed with a very toxic chemical known as 2-4-D which, like the infamous Agent Orange used in the Vietnam War, contains triclofenoxiatic, a very potent poison. ⁶⁷⁸  As explained by one analyst,

"By almost every account, 'Operation Yapacaní' was a disaster. First, it did not work. The peasants simply cut the leaves and the tops of their coca bushes before the spray could kill the entire plant, so little coca was actually destroyed. Second, the operation precipitated a major political outcry. Predictably, the coca lobby -the COB, the CSUTB, and the regional growers' federations- condemned the action." ⁶⁷⁹ 

      These early examples of militarized enforcement attempts to disrupt the coca-cocaine complex in Bolivia and the consequent violence stemming from them would only be a prolegomenon to a repetitive cycle that continues to this day.

c) Bolivia's War on Drugs

"Such then, are the politics of coca control in Bolivia. The prognosis is for continuing U. S. pressure on Bolivia to make headway in eradication and for continuing confrontations between the Bolivian government and the coca lobby. With or without a coca law, the Bolivian government clearly does not possess the power to eradicate coca plantations. Furthermore, coca and cocaine are deeply ingrained in the economic, social and political life of the country. Barring a U.S. military occupation of Bolivia and the sterilization of all plant life in the Yungas and the Chapare, Bolivia's status as a major coca producer is unlikely to change for many years." ⁶⁸⁰ 

"On ira pendre notre linge sur la ligne Siegfried." ⁶⁸¹ 

      The two quotations above clearly describe the drug control policies and law enforcement against the cocaine industry in Bolivia. The first one is a crude joke with a large amount of truth. Bolivia's war on drug is not funny but tragically comic. Mistakes are repeated over and over again with increasingly worse consequences. Violence between the government and the peasants escalates with both parties being fully aware that any threats (i.e. full militarization of coca eradication or forced displacement of people out of the Chapare) will not be carried out. This is the comic part: everyone plays a role, knowing that the play will repeat itself over and over again. The tragic part is that, in repeating the play, people die and political instability grows to the edge of breakdown. The play repeats itself, reaching a higher point of escalation each time. Whether or not the second quotation will became a self-fulfilling prophecy is a disquieting thought.

      With the exception of a U.S. blockade, a U.S. multilateral intervention, or a multilateral military intervention, all levels of militarization delineated in Chapter I have been reached in Bolivia. The escalation in the level of militarization of enforcement does not follow a chronological order nor is it sequential. Instead, it is possible to observe escalations followed by de-escalations in the level of enforcement against the cocaine industry. While escalation is a response to U.S. diplomatic pressure, de-escalation is a response to organized peasant resistance (and ensuing violence) as well as the threat of reactive violence from traffickers. When it comes to enforcing drug control laws and applying enforcement policies, the successive democratic Bolivian administrations have taken two steps forward and one step back. ⁶⁸² 

      This vicious circle is reinforced by the fact that Bolivia is a coca growing country, and the backbone of the policies suggested by the United States is the eradication of illegal coca. Interdiction is then considered as a complement to eradication. Alternative development support from the U.S. (United States Agency for Development, USAID) has been subordinated to the reach of coca eradication programs. The result of this is a myriad of pressures from international and national actors on the Bolivian government.

      If we consider the definition of national security given in Chapter I, as well as the examples of threats stemming from the illegal drug industry in South America (Chapter III), it is clear that drug trafficking is a clear and present national security problem for Bolivia. Not only did the drug traffickers and their military allies stage a coup and implemented "narcocracy" in 1980, but the paramilitary capabilities and territorial control of the traffickers became a threat to the territorial centrality of the state even during a military regime. This threat to the sovereign power of the state would become part of the everyday reality for the forthcoming civilian governments. As illustrated earlier in Chapter III, in 1984 a group of corrupt officers from the paramilitary police counter drug unit UMOPAR staged a coup against President Siles Suazo. All the threats that drug trafficking could pose to the Bolivian state have been aggravated by the militarized drug control approach imposed by the U.S.. As explained by one analyst,

"A Latin American, particularly Bolivian, perspective of the effects on national security related to the drug question should bring two points back into the debate: a strong military approach to the drug problem would 1) alter the social balance of power that is the foundation of the hard-won democracy of the region and 2) clearly call into question the sovereignty of the states." ⁶⁸³ 

d) When all the evils came together: President Hernán Siles Suazo's administration (1982-1985)

"Crushing requires a crushing mood." ⁶⁸⁴ 

"[t]he best thing we can do with this little country is cutting off the cash flow. If they want food they better start cutting the coca bushes. Bolivia is a bad investment for the United States. This country has a single problem: it is ruled by criminals:" ⁶⁸⁵ 

"Drug production, processing and traffic, through corruption and terrorism, threatened state security, and institutional stability of the countries concerned [produced]." ⁶⁸⁶ 

      The Bolivian Congress elected Hernán Siles Suazo president in October 1982. A populist leader and one of the main actors in the 1952 revolution, Siles Suazo was an experienced politician. However, the task in front of him was titanic. Never before was a Bolivian president subjected to such a crossfire situation. On one side Siles Suazo had to manage a hyperinflation crisis while satisfying the demands of powerful social actors such as the COB (Bolivian Labor's Confederation-the coca growing trade union-). On the other side, the United States through its ambassador Edwin Corr (who had been posted in Peru and is a specialist in drug control and low intensity conflict), pressured Siles Suazo to adopt drastic measures to curb the cocaine traffic. The U.S. still had in their minds the image of the delinquent dictatorship of García Meza and wanted to avoid a new "drug trafficking control charade." The U.S. officials probably underestimated the good will of President Siles, whose drug control policies were highly constrained by the chaotic economic situation, the opposition of the coca growing trade unions, and the corruption that undermined the efficacy of law enforcement agencies. ⁶⁸⁷  As explained by Jaime Malamud Goti,

"The scope and complexity of the Bolivian economy were the principal reasons why Siles did not initially give in to U.S. pressure. As a man of vast political experience, and as the first popularly elected president in the country in eighteen years, Siles considered a major repressive campaign against the drug business to be a dangerous approach." ⁶⁸⁸ 

      According to Eduardo Gamarra, three factors diverted government attention from the drug problem and hindered its ability to curb drug trafficking: ⁶⁸⁹ 

1. As in the rest of Latin America, Bolivia was suffering the effects of the foreign debt crisis. Payments of the debt services were delayed and the government was suffering from a chronic trade deficit. At the same time, the monetary and financial international institutions were pressuring for the adoption of harsh austerity plans. This hindered even more the capacity of the Bolivian state to carry out an effective counter narcotics program.
2. The president did not have a majority in the Congress. Siles' center-left coalition was matched by a Congress controlled by Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN, led by General Banzer) and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, led by Víctor Paz Estrenssoro). Under these circumstances all Sile´s initiatives were blocked.
3. As stated before, 1985 was the year of the fall in tin prices. To this must be added an annual inflation of 26,000%. During Siles Suazo's administration the coca-cocaine industry virtually replaced tin prospecting as the countries country's main export sector.

      U.S. pressure focused mainly on the total eradication of coca plantations and the adoption of legislation that would declare coca growing illegal. In August 1983, Bolivia signed eight agreements -four related to drug control programs and four related to USAID alternative development programs-which made U.S. assistance for eradication and interdiction conditional upon the realization of these two goals. The package included 30 million dollars for enforcement programs and 50 million dollars for development assistance. However due to the difficulties mentioned above and to violent peasant resistance there was little progress in the fulfillment of the terms of the agreements. As a consequence, the promised economic assistance never materialized. As illustrated in the following chronology, several cases of preemptive and reactive violence from the peasants can be observed in this period.

      Episodes of upstream reactive and preemptive violence:

April 1983-Bolivia's Confederation of Peasant Workers called a national strike in reaction to an U.S. Bolivian communiqué announcing a coca-reduction plan. The strike blocked highways and stopped the supply of food and other necessities to major cities. March 1984- 2,000 Chapare farmers arrived in Cochabamba in 50 trucks to protest the signings of the agreement and paraded around the city, chanting 'down with Edwin Corr [the U.S. Ambassador], 'down with democracy' and other anti-U.S. and anti-Bolivian slogans. Farmers also tried to take over the local offices of the National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances (DNSP) the superordinate agency for the antidrug police 1984-Bolivian coca growers sealed off the city of Cochabamba on two occasions: once to protest a planned military-police invasion of the Chapare and other to demand the lifting of a government ban on marketing coca leaves.

      Source: LeeIII, The White Labyrinth, pp. 62 and 68 and "Bolivian Government Agrees to 'Coca Pact' "Latin American Weekly Report, August 10, 1984, WR-84-31, last page.

      Coca growing peasants also continued in their assaults on the centros the acopio which where finally dissolved by new narcotics legislation decreed by the president. As stated by one analyst,

"When Siles assumed office and there was a political shift toward guarantees for civil liberties, effective peasant resistance on the unpopular wholesale centers surfaced immediately. Peasant Union activists occupied local wholesale facilities in the Chapare and eventually destroyed them with dynamite. The next major peasant public protests aimed at official marketing control were road blockades during 1984." ⁶⁹⁰ 

      A proliferation of legislation and new organs of enforcement were created. However, in the absence of economic resources and because of the social pressure from the peasants, none of these laws were effectively enforced nor could the new organs fulfill their assigned tasks. A repetitive paradox would then start its cycle: the U.S. expected Bolivia to manage its economic crisis and have a successful transition to democracy while at the same time pressuring for a drug control policy that had highly destabilizing effects for the country.

      Under U.S. pressure, in August the Bolivian government agreed to eradicate 4,000 hectares of coca. The eradication task would be carried out by two newly created state technical offices. The DIRECO (Dirección Regional de la Coca) is a civilian agency founded in 1983 under the jurisdiction of the Agrarian and Peasants Ministry (today it is under the Secretary of Social Defense from the Ministry of Government). Eradication was carried out by a new paramilitary specialized police unit, UMOPAR (Mobile Unit of Rural Patrolling), commonly know as Leopards. The UMOPAR was devised to enforce drugs laws in the jungle, in particular cocaine manufacturing and trafficking.  ⁶⁹¹  The 580 Leopardos are chosen from among the most able police officers to receive special training by U.S. military (special operations) and U.S. law enforcement personnel.

      The first level of the militarization of enforcement had been reached: militarization of the police. The entire police corps also started a process of militarization that involved the adoption of typically military features, such as major staff and military training. ⁶⁹²  Enforcement would gradually become more and more "americanized" with the DEA choosing the targets and operations for UMOPAR. ⁶⁹³  As explained by one analyst,

"From the start, the mode of operation of these anti-narcotics units has been militarised. Although these forces remain independent of the command structures of the regular national police and the Bolivian armed forces, they have been directly responsive to the U.S. Embassy (Anti-Narcotics Section, NAS) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)." ⁶⁹⁴ 

      UMOPAR would prove to be a double-edged sword. As shown before, on June 1984 a group of UMOPAR and high-ranking army officers under investigation for alleged involvement in drug trafficking staged a "narco-coup." The coup involved the kidnapping of President Siles Suazo. Siles was freed only after negotiations with U.S. Ambassador Corr. The coup failed because of the absence of support from the rest of the army. This was a clear case of inner system corruption-related violence. If a paramilitary police counter-drug unit can become corrupted and stage a coup d'etat, it is not difficult to imagine the consequences of the full involvement of the armed services to law enforcement activities.

      In order to show Bolivian commitment to drug control, Siles Suazo went even further: on July 31, 1984 (Supreme Decree Nº 20,372), he declared the Chapare a military zone and ordered the police and armed forces to impose the authority of the state in the area. The operation failed, first because the operation had been previously announced and the important traffickers fled the area, and second because the police and the army found strong peasant resistance. As reported,

"The Bolivian government is under pressure from the U.S. administration to step up its efforts to reduce cocaine production. [...]The threat of an aid cut-off has put the government in an unenviable position: it will have to comply with the U.S. government's demand (if its wants more aid) and at the same time strike a deal with peasants whose livelihood depends on coca cultivation." ⁶⁹⁵ 

      Also as explained by one analyst,

"The immediate reaction to the decree was another demonstration of peasant power. Peasants from the Chapare and the Cochabamba Valley blockaded the city of Cochabamba and cut the main highway with the Chapare. In the first week of August, the government and campesino leaders conducted some hard bargaining. a complex deal finally was struck: the government promised not to destroy Chapare farmers' coca crops and not to interfere in the commercialization of coca [...] In October 1984 the government banned shipments of coca leaves from the Chapare and stepped up efforts to control the circulation of leaves within the region. The stage was set of a new confrontation with the Bolivian government. In early November , campesinos again sealed off Cochabamba and blocked the Chapare highway, demanding the "free sale of coca" and end to the military occupation. The coca growers won a partial victory: The government lifted controls on transporting coca leaves, and the military left the Chapare later that month." ⁶⁹⁶ 

      Considering the chaotic state of the Bolivian economy at that time, the country was more vulnerable than ever to U.S. pressure. This episode clearly illustrates the cycle described above in this chapter: American pressure --> Bolivian militarized enforcement --> peasant reactive/ preemptive violence --> government steps back and --> over and over again...

      One of the final acts by Siles Suazo concerning the drug issue was the enactment of very strict--but inapplicable (under the circumstances described above)--drug legislation. In May 1985, the president enacted the Legal Regime of Controlled Substances (Presidential Decree Nº 20,811), which established that the National Directorate for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking would delimitate zones for traditional (and thus legal) coca growing within the regions of Yungas (La Paz) and Chapare (Cochabamba). Parcels outside these traditional zones would be declared illegal and would be voluntarily or forcibly destroyed (art.39). The decree fixed a period of 90 days for voluntary eradication of the coca bushes. After the expiration of this period, plants could be forcibly destroyed. The law forbade the use of herbicides for eradication. This legal instrument also abolished the infamous Centros de Acopio and established a system of public markets for commercialization of coca for traditional uses (chewing, tea, religious and medicinal uses). This law also forbade transactions outside these markets. ⁶⁹⁷ 

      Siles was, at once, unable to cope with the economic crisis, subject to strong U.S. pressure over the drug issue, and incapable of reaching a substantial agreement with the labor sector, the opposition parties and the international financial institutions. He called for elections one year before the end of his presidential mandate. Political scientists have elegantly named this type of situation a "crisis of governability." Siles' premature departure was prompted by a drug corruption scandal involving one of his close collaborators and best friend. In August 1984, news from a meeting held in 1983 between the powerful "King of Cocaine," Roberto Suarez, and Siles Suazos' narcotics control adviser, Rafael Otazo, was leaked to the press. During the meeting, Suarez suggested paying the Bolivian foreign debt in exchange for government non-intervention in his affairs. ⁶⁹⁸  This revelation provoked a "Bolivian Watergate" that forced Siles to resignation. ⁶⁹⁹ 

e) Escalating the war on drugs: President Víctor Paz Estenssoro's administration (1985-1989)

"(A) up to 50 percent of the aggregate amount of such assistance allocated for Bolivia may be provided at any time after the president certifies to the Congress that Bolivia has engaged in narcotics interdiction operations that have significantly disrupted the illicit coca industry in Bolivia or has cooperated with the United States in such operations and; (B) the remaining amount of such assistance may be provided at any time after the President Certifies to the Congress that Bolivia has either met in calendar year 1986 the eradication targets for the calendar year 1985 [...] or has entered into an agreement for the United States for implementing that plan for 1987 and beyond (including numerical eradication targets) and is making progress toward the plan's objectives including substantial eradication of illicit coca crops and effective use of United States assistance...." ⁷⁰⁰ 

"(1) CONDITIONS ON CERTIFICATION-For fiscal year 1989, the President may make a certification with respect to Bolivia [...] only if the Government of Bolivia A) has entered into narcotics cooperation with the United States [...] B) has fully achieved the eradication targets contained in the agreement; and C) has begun a program of forced eradication of illicit coca cultivation if the targets for voluntary eradication are not being met or are not continued..." ⁷⁰¹ 

      Elections were held in July 1985 and, as usual in Bolivia none of the candidates won a definite majority. The issue was then solved by the Congress and Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR) narrowly defeated Gen. Banzer (ADN). Paz Estenssoro learned from Siles mistakes. His motto was "government with authority, and without anarchy" ⁷⁰² . Paz Estenssoro formalized a governability with the right (ADN) in the Congress known as "Pact for Democracy" and at the same time by decree (Decree Law Nº 21,060) adopted a draconian economic anti-inflationary austerity plan know as "New Economic Policy" (NEP). As usually in Latin America the public sector was reduced and inflation was controlled but unemployment grew. Growing unemployment in Bolivia, since the late 1970s, is a synonym of more hand labor for the cocaine industry. The fall of the tin prices in late 1985 did not help.

      With a majority in the Congress and a solid alliance with the private sector, Paz Estenssoro did not hesitate in applying his motto: "democracy with authority." At the beginning of his administration a state of siege was declared to counter general strikes against the NEP. Two hundred leaders were arrested and exiled to Beni detention centers. Martial law was decreed for nineteen days. Labor had been disciplined but only on the legal side of the economy. Paz Estenssoro did not hesitate to use force against miner's strikes. He would adopt the same attitude towards the coca growing federations but this time the results would be different. An escalation of militarized enforcement would be followed by an escalation of peasant resistance. Faced with very powerful organizations that controlled extensive territorial areas like the Chapare, Paz Estenssoro was forced to deescalate enforcement and eventually negotiate with the peasants. The president was willing to curb cocaine trafficking but not at the price of a civil war with peasants in the Chapare. Once again, Bolivian social and economic reality was stronger than U.S. pressure.

      Several factors contributed to an increase of pressure on Bolivia and an ensuing escalation of militarized enforcement in this country:

1. The fact that President Reagan declared, in secret directive Nº 221, that drug trafficking was a threat to U.S. national security encouraged more active participation of U.S and local armed forces in counter-drug activities in the Andean countries. ⁷⁰³  As explained by one analyst,
   "In Washington, President Reagan formally declared that drug trafficking constituted a national security threat to the U.S. and issued his National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 on 11 April 1986 to that effect. As such, U.S. military participation was to be guided by three principles: 1. Host governments had to invite U. S. forces; 2.U.S. civilian agencies (DOS and DEA) were to coordinate the effort of U.S. force; and 3. U.S. forces were to be limited to support functions." ⁷⁰⁴ 
2. The elaboration through 1987 and final signature in 1988 of the UN Illicit Drug Control International Regime, also called the 1988 UN Convention, already mentioned in the first chapter. ⁷⁰⁵ 
3. The enactment of the previously mentioned Anti-Drug acts of 1986 and 1988 in the United States, which regulated the certification procedure as a means to politically pressure the Bolivian Government. ⁷⁰⁶ 

      Paz Estenssoro had the will to carry out policies prescribed by the U.S.. He could also act more freely at home since the hyperinflationary crisis was coming under control and the "Pact of Democracy" would grant him more capacity for securing congressional approval (that not always would be necessarily requested by the president).

      Siles Suazo reached the point of temporarily declaring the Chapare a military zone and mobilizing all the armed services against the coca-cocaine industry, but Paz Estenssoro took militarization one step further. President Paz Estenssoro agreed on the mobilization of a joint U.S. (military) and Bolivian (UMOPAR) force as part of a strategy that would became the backbone of Bolivian-U.S. cooperation: combining aggressive interdiction with coca eradication. The idea was that aggressive interdiction would provoke a glut in coca production, forcing prices down. As the coca paste and cocaine base were disrupted, the demand for coca would go down (traffickers would be too busy trying to escape law enforcement), and peasants would be forced to shift to other products. While the plan may sound logical, once again reality in Bolivia thwarted efforts.

      The result of this idea would be a joint Bolivian-U.S. enforcement operation in the Beni, the Chapare, and Santa Cruz regions coded "Blast Furnace" as mentioned in Chapter III. The operation was not only unsuccessful in achieving its goals, but would also temporarily put the Paz Estenssoro administration into a period of political hot water since the president had invited the U.S. troops without warning the Congress. Blast Furnace had very negative effects in the sense that it caused concentrated drug production to spread all over the Beni and Santa Cruz departments (in smaller portable laboratories). After the operation, traffickers started to delegate coca paste production to the peasants to shift the main target of law enforcement away from themselves. As explained by one analyst,

"From April 26 to May 6 of that year, Leopardos and U.S. military forces were deployed in joint maneuvers in the departments of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba in preparation of the joint U.S-Bolivian Operation Blast Furnace, and after six months of planning, the operation was launched on July 18, 1986. The legitimacy of the U.S. intervention was formally grounded by the Reagan administration in a request from the Bolivian executive branch and the Lara Bonilla Treaty, an agreement that was only ratified by the Bolivian Congress in May 1990, four years after Operation Blast Furnace took place. [...] 160 U.S. military troops and UMOPAR units were transported into the Beni, the Chapare, and Santa Cruz on six U.S. Black Hawk helicopters, and an airlift was set up between La Paz and Trinidad where the operation's headquarters were installed.

Operation Blast Furnace did not succeed. No major drug dealer was arrested, and large laboratories were found dismantled. The operating forces had to make do with destroying coca paste pits, which can be dug in a few hours. Military experts attribute the failure of what has been properly labeled as the "Americanization" of enforcement to three factors. First, leaked data concerning the operation aroused the resistance of local politicians and members of the Congress in particular. [...] Second, easy identification of the aircraft employed in the campaign enabled the traffickers to anticipate the move, and third, different conceptions of how to carry out the mission led to rifts among U.S forces, the DEA, and the Bolivian UMOPAR." ⁷⁰⁷ 

      As coca prices went down, peasants would start producing coca paste on their own in order to get higher profits. ⁷⁰⁸  As a matter of fact, in 1991 a new trend in coca leaf transformation was detected: coca growers in the Chapare were skipping the process of coca paste production by converting coca leaf directly into coca base in small-scale maceration pits. The cocaine base is dissolved in a sulfuric acid solution, known as agua rica, for storage and production. ⁷⁰⁹ 

      Blast Furnace also provoked a massive demonstration in Cochabamba and La Paz. While the peasants did not use force, they showed their disagreement with the interference of U.S. troops in the country. ⁷¹⁰ 

      While the Blast Furnace operation was being carried out, a confused episode of violence in Huanchaca near Santa Cruz would show that in Bolivia drug traffickers could eventually become as violent as their Colombian counterparts if their interests were seriously threatened. This was the first case of reactive violence by the drug traffickers. Ironically, the biggest cocaine processing laboratory ever discovered in Bolivia until that moment was found not by the personnel participating in Blast Furnace but by a very popular leading botanist, Noel Kempff-Mercado during a research expedition. In September 1986, Kempff-Mercado and two other scientists had the bad luck of landing with their small plane near a cocaine processing laboratory at Huanchaca in the north of the Santa Cruz Department. The thugs guarding the laboratory unmercifully shot Kempff-Mercado and the scientists. The pilot survived to tell the story. ⁷¹¹  The incident generated major political repercussions as the population of Santa Cruz conducted protest marches against the drug traffickers. There are indications that both the Bolivian and the U.S. law enforcement knew of the existence of this laboratory. However, it had not been identified for a possible attack by personnel participating in Blast Furnace nor were Kempff-Mercado and his team warned by the Bolivian authorities about the danger of landing in the area. As explained by one analyst,

"Although the minister of the interior, the UMOPAR, and the DEA had also been informed that an armed gang was protecting the cocaine hydrochloride laboratory, no action was taken to thwart the illegal activity in Huanchaca or even to prevent the broadly announced tour of Kempff-Mercado." ⁷¹² 

      Other authors go as far to suggest that Huanchanca's laboratory might have been part of the drug trafficking network covered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to finance the "Contras" in Nicaragua. ⁷¹³  As stated by two analysts,

"The Bolivian and Spanish press, for example, gave considerable attention to reports that a notorious cocaine factory near Bolivia's border with Brazil was financing the Nicaraguan resistance. The story received a remarkable boost when the son of Bolivian drug lord Roberto Suarez charged that the factory was actually controlled by the DEA and challenged Bolivian authorities to let journalists see for themselves." ⁷¹⁴ 

      All these suspicious circumstances led to a congressional investigation, which sparked escalation "à la colombienne" of drug traffickers' reactive violence with death threats and the assassination of one of the members of the congressional investigative committee. This confirms the previous statement about Bolivia being a dormant volcano as far as drug trafficking-related violence is concerned. When the "drôle the guerre" becomes a "guerre serieuse" the dangers of a "Colombianization" of Bolivia are more than obvious. As stated by one analyst,

"Bolivian drug interests surrounding the Huanchaca affair stretched beyond the jungle of northern Santa Cruz. Active members of the congressional investigative committee received death threats to deter them from pursuing the investigation further, and shortly after the committee's report had been submitted, Congressman Salazar, perhaps the foremost conductor of probe, was assassinated in his hometown of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. It is presumed that Salazar, shot down in front of his home by two men on a passing motorcycle in the Colombian style, had documents that entangled high officials of the Paz-Estenssoro administration in the Huanchaca laboratories. But unlike Colombia and Peru, violence of this kind is unusual in urban Bolivia today, and the Huanchaca case remains one of the darkest incidents in the contemporary story of the drug war in Bolivia." ⁷¹⁵ 

      Immediately after the end of the Blast Furnace operation, the Bolivian government approved a very aggressive plan to curb the trafficking in Bolivia. The plan was called "Plan Trienal de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico"(Three Years Plan for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking). It had the very ambitious (if not ludicrous) goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares of illegal coca by 1990, including half of the production in Yungas of La Paz (a region where coca is grown for traditional purposes). ⁷¹⁶  The plan is important because it carefully diagnoses the causes and consequences of the coca-cocaine problem in Bolivia, and clearly defines drug trafficking as a threat to "the stability of all the institutions in the country," "the very consolidation of the National State," and "the well-being of the population." ⁷¹⁷  The goals or the plan were:

1. Eradicate the excedentary [not for traditional use] coca plantations in Bolivia.
2. Economically compensate the destruction of coca in order to minimize its social and economic impact.
3. Preserve the economic and political sovereignty of the National State against the penetration of drug trafficking.
4. Recover the morality and values of society.
5. Protect the Bolivian Society from the political, economic, social, and moral effects of drug trafficking. ⁷¹⁸ 

      The plan was divided into two parts:

      A development part included voluntary eradication with economic compensation ($2,000 per eradicated hectare) and a plan for post-eradication alternative economic development. An enforcement part included the forcible eradication of all the illegal parcels that remained after the voluntary eradication of coca. For this the government would use the "direct participation of all government institutions especially the Armed Forces and the Police." ⁷¹⁹ 

      These were very noble and surely well-intentioned goals. However, because of an absence of national resources, the U.S. quid pro quo policy concerning aid, and above all because of corruption concerning the management of funds, economic compensation in many cases never come, would come late, or would come without other economic alternatives. ⁷²⁰  The peasants would then take the $2,000 and go somewhere else to plant new coca or to Argentina as migrants. ⁷²¹ 

      The Three-Year Plan led to a new wave of peasant reactive and primitive violence that would be only aggravated by the forthcoming policies. As reported,

"Former ministers Fernando Barthelemy (interior) and Edil Sandoval (rural affairs)-the main architects of the drugs plan but sacked at end-February -as a result of U.S. pressure they, say- [in fact Barthelemy was under investigation because of the Huanchaca incidents and would be fired under suspicions of covering information about the laboratory] blame the U.S. for pushing for a coca eradication plan which would entail the use of force. This policy, they warn, would lead to clashes between police and peasants, given both the traditional role coca plays in society and its importance in the cocaine trade. The Bolivian labor confederation (COB) has declared 'a state of emergency' against the three-year plan and has called on peasants to block the roads in protest." ⁷²² 

      As soon as the plan was presented in early 1987, and as a preemptive movement against the application of the eradication part of the Three-Year Plan, the peasants started a series of mobilizations and roadblocks that would end in clashes with the army. As reported,

"Peasants have begun protesting against the government's decision to begin the U.S.-backed three-year coca eradication programme in July. The result so far: roads barricaded, some deaths (five in all, say peasants) and promises of more unrest unless the government agrees to change the plan. [...] Thousands of peasants in Bolivia's coca-growing regions were blocking highways in eastern provinces of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and the low -lying areas of northern La Paz province, preventing the transport of the supply of food and other goods into the towns. They promised to take their protests to other parts of the country" ⁷²³ 

      Paz Estenssoro had not hesitated in mobilizing the army against the miner strikes and in the beginning would adopt the same attitude towards the peasants. On May 26, 1987 the cocaleros started to block all the main highways connected to the city of Cochabamba. More than 10,000 people participated in the blockades. ⁷²⁴  The peasants were also protesting against the draft of the Controlled Substances Law (Ley de Substancias Controladas) that had been approved by the Congress on March 31, 1987. ⁷²⁵  The main demands were a reformulation of the Three-Year Plan and the participation of peasant delegates in the elaboration of a new policy. As far as the draft law is concerned, the issue at stake was that coca and coca production were declared illegal. Peasants requested a special law for the regulation of production and commercialization of coca that would not be included in a general law for the repression of drug trafficking activities. In their view, only cocaine production and traffic should be declared illegal. ⁷²⁶  On May 28 the government mobilized the army to break the blockade. In the ensuing meleé at least five people died (including an army conscript) and were several detained and wounded. This episode came to be known "Parotani Massacre," and led to an opening of negotiations between the peasants and the government that came to an end in June 1987 with the following agreement: ⁷²⁷ 

• Agrarian reconversion would be implemented simultaneously with broad development programs in the area.
• All concerned economic sectors (including of course the coca growing peasants' trade unions) would be involved in the planning and execution of alternative development projects.
• Coca parcels would be voluntarily eradicated through a mutually agreed Integral Plan for Development and Substitution (Plan Integral de Desarrollo y Substitución -PIDYS).
• Bolivia would insist upon an international commitment for a reduction in the goal demand and the financial support for agrarian reconversion in Bolivia.
• The peasant organizations (federations) would intervene in the elaboration of a global diagnostic to ensure adequate participation in the projects.
• In legal terminology, coca would not appear as a narcotic drug. The traditional and ritual use of coca would be considered.
• The government would investigate all goods and fortunes of dubious origin.
• The government would assure the security of the settlers in the Isiboro-Sécure area (a national park located within the Chapare the area is a zone of recent colonization). ⁷²⁸ 

      The peasants won a partial victory when the PYDIS, a mutually convened development program, replaced the Plan Trienal, which was discarded. The PYDIS would be also included in the final version of the law (Bolivian Law Nº 1008) approved by the Bolivian Congress in July 1988, which provided that alternative development would, by law, be one of the methods used to curb drug trafficking in Bolivia. However, the law would clearly distinguish between legal coca for ritual and traditional uses and coca "inter-criminis" for cocaine production. The law would clearly indicate geographic areas for traditional production, excentary production subject to voluntary eradication and complementary development activities (PIDYS), and illegal areas subject to forcible non-compensated eradication. James Painter describes this law in the following terms:

"As promulgated in July 22, 1988, the law's 155 articles provided the following:
*a traditional zone of coca production in two provinces of the Yungas (article 9);
* the establishment of 12,000 hectares of licit cultivation as that required to meet traditional demands (article 29);
a transitional zone of excess production subject to annual reduction figures of 5,000 hectares initially, and up to 8,000 hectares ultimately, in the Chapare [Although it was not spelled in out in the law, the total amount to be reduced over a ten-year period was 35,000 hectares . New coca plantings were also banned in the Chapare.(arts. 16 and 17 [and 31] ) Farmers growing coca in the recent expansion area of the Yapacaní in the Santa Cruz department were given one year of grace to reduce their plantings, during which they would be compensated and eligible for credit];
* that the meeting of these targets be conditional on the availability of financial resources from national budget and on the disbursement of sufficient technical and financial cooperation from multilateral and bilateral sources, which must be directed to alternative development (article 10);
*an illegal zone , in which coca cultivation is prohibited, comprising all territory outside the and transitional areas. Existing cultivation will be subject to forced eradication without compensation (article 11);
* a specific prohibition against the use of chemicals, herbicides, biological agents, and defoliants for the reduction or eradication of coca. Only manual and mechanical methods will be used (article 18);
*that all substitution of coca will be planned in a gradual and progressive manner, at the same time as the execution of programs and plans of sustained socioeconomic development in the transitional zones (article 22)." ⁷²⁹ 

      Nicely presented plans for total coca eradication in ridiculous time frameworks continuously crashed against Bolivian socio-economic reality. The peasants' gains in emphasizing alternative development as a way to reduce the scope of coca growing would crash against U.S. (and typically western) impatience for immediate results. Under U.S. pressure for the fulfillment of eradication quotas, the emphasis would be put on the repressive side of law Nº 1008. And so it has been since February 1987, when the Paz Estenssoro administration signed a bilateral agreement that resulted in even greater Bolivian reliance on U.S. assistance. ⁷³⁰  This treaty would fix the parameters of U.S -Bolivian relations in the years to come. The agreement came into force on August 13, 1987 and is renewed annually through the exchange of diplomatic notes, with annexes. ⁷³¹  At the time of the signing, Bolivia agreed to: carry out an effective interdiction program, set up mechanisms to eradicate coca, fight drug trafficking, and enact a law banning cultivation of all coca used in the manufacture of cocaine. ⁷³² 

      Law Nº 1008 was only part of the fulfillment of these terms. The treaty would give way not only to an escalation in militarized enforcement, but also to increasing U.S. military and DEA presence in Bolivia. In fact DEA agents in the field would also receive military training in the U.S. and would participate (nominally as observers)wearing military fatigues in UMOPAR interdiction operatives. As explained by one analyst,

"On April 10, 1987 the DEA initiated Operation Snowcap in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. A multifaceted program to combat drug trafficking, Snow cap ran for eight years in Bolivia and focused on setting up programs to suppress the drug trade and training Bolivians to run them. As part of operation Snowcap, the DEA planned and oversaw the execution of major paramilitary-style operations to suppress drug laboratories. These operations were carried out in conjunction with the UMOPAR. The main targets were paste laboratories in the Chapare and refined cocaine laboratories hidden away in more remote areas of the country like the Beni and the departments of Santa Cruz and Pando. These operations were modeled on Operation Blast Furnace[...] which relied on small aircraft and UH-6 helicopters to carry UMOPAR units to suspected laboratory sites and DEA aircraft to monitor and coordinate activities on the ground." ⁷³³ 

"The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has continued to provide support for counternarcotics operations in the region since the end of Operation Blast Furnace in 1986, with special attention to the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets), based in Panama, were first brought into Bolivia in 1987 and 1988 to give paramilitary training to UMOPAR. Mobile training teams conducted five-week intensive courses in small unit tactics, map reading, jungle survival and communications. By 1988 the U.S. was running six courses a year involving 60 to 80 UMOPAR each[....]In 1989, SOUTHCOM formed the first Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs), combining personnel from the different branches of the armed forces, with the stated information of improving intelligence support for counterdrug operations [...]The official functions of the TAT's are to : *Analyze intelligence to determine drug trafficking trends; *Identify drug trafficking organizations; *Identify counterdrug targets such as laboratories; *Support tactical operations; *Provide imagery support for counterdrug ground operations; and *Provide target identification and location for counterdrug air operations." ⁷³⁴ 

      On July 24, 1987 the Paz Estenssoro administration reorganized the drug law enforcement bureaucracy. By decree Nº 21,666, President Estenssoro created the Special Force for the Fight Against Narcotrafficking (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico-FELNC-). ⁷³⁵  Actually the creation of such a force was part of the commitments agreed by Bolivia in the 1987 U.S.-Bolivia Agreement on Narcotics Drugs. In article IV of its Annex II the treaty established that,

"A.INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. For the development of the Three-Year Plan for the struggle against narcotics trafficking (interdiction program and development program), a specialized organization will be created by the Government of Bolivia to direct and coordinate the fight against narcotics trafficking in its different aspects.
2. To carry out its responsibilities, this specialized organization will be provided with the required material, financial and human resources, as well as adequate incentives for the personnel assigned to it.
3. Personnel of this organization responsible for the interdiction program will be rigorously selected and will be assigned for a minimum period of two years." ⁷³⁶ 

      The FELCN incorporated personnel from the Bolivian National Police (BNP) for investigative tasks and UMOPAR for operative purposes (interdiction operations and support for forced eradication), receiving logistical support from special units of the Navy (Blue Devils) and the Air Force (Red Devils). ⁷³⁷  Accommodating the army to drug law enforcement activities has proven to be more difficult because of the historic role of the army in Bolivia in the initiation of coups and repression of peasant and other grass roots organizations. Moreover the Bolivian Constitution explicitly prohibits the military from playing a domestic law enforcement role and the commanders of the army resisted becoming directly involved in counternarcotics operations alleging risks of corruption. This was a clear and present fear considering the past experience of the narco-dictatorship of García Meza. The army had no permanent involvement in enforcement activities until April 1990. ⁷³⁸ An exception to this rule was joint military and police operations in 1982 (Yapacaní episode) and the temporary militarization of Chapare in 1984 by Siles Suazo, but the experience was considered negative since at that time key officers of the Manchego Rangers Regiment had been bought off by drug traffickers. ⁷³⁹  Also the joint participation of army and UMOPAR forces had created a great deal of tension and animosity that many wanted to avoid.

      Violence escalated again while Law Nº 1008 was being discussed in the Bolivian Congress and would escalate even more when the government attempted to enforce it. Reactive violence from the peasants was aggravated by the everyday abuses and human rights violations committed by the UMOPAR forces, with charges ranging from rape to petty stealing, robbery, and destruction of private property. ⁷⁴⁰ 

      One of the most dramatic cases of upstream violence was the incident known as the "Massacre of Villa Tunari." In late June 1988, while Law Nº 1008 was being discussed in the Congress, some 5,000 coca planters of the Chapare region forcibly occupied a post of UMOPAR and the DIRECO offices in Villa Tunari. The peasants were trying to reach DIRECO offices near an UMOPAR outpost to verify rumors about DIRECO experiments with herbicides for the eradication of coca. Peasant rage was aggravated by the fact that, until mid-1988, engineers from DIRECO utilized herbicides in spite of the government's reiterated pledge that chemicals would never be used in coca removal. ⁷⁴¹  Police mounted a counterattack and in the ensuing battle seven peasants and one policeman were killed (three peasants were shot, and the others were drowned in the Chapare River). ⁷⁴²  In July 1988 a multisector investigative commission formed by opposition congressmen, trade union leaders, the Catholic Church, and the media concluded that in fact the peasants had started to occupy the DIRECO post by jumping over the fence, however the clash allegedly started when one of the DIRECO officials shot and killed a peasant. ⁷⁴³  What followed was a massive occupation of the DIRECO post by the peasants, which was repelled by the gunfire of UMOPAR personnel and, allegedly, of DEA personnel. ⁷⁴⁴  This bloody incident became a symbol (the victims became martyrs), and a peasant victory since the use of herbicides as an eradication method was later ruled out by Law Nº 1008. ⁷⁴⁵  As described by one analyst,

"The 4,000 peasants who participated in the attack were organized by Julio Rocha, a top union leader accused by Paz-Estenssoro officials of having close connections with the traffickers. Whether the growers were driven by cocaine organizations or were spontaneously pursuing their own interests, the turmoil demonstrates that they would not surrender their coca crops without staunch resistance. The peasants were soon evicted from the UMOPAR barracks, but active hostilities ceased only when the government promised to limit its original eradication plan." ⁷⁴⁶ 

      Simultaneously, the militarized interdiction campaign implemented within the framework of Operation Snowcap generated episodes of reactive violence from the drug traffickers and the peasants employed in the transformation of coca-paste (downstream reactive violence). These interdiction attempts also brought about corruption-related violence, that is violence between (allegedly) Bolivian military personnel and UMOPAR/DEA personnel. One of these incidents, probably the more significant during this period, is described below;

"In mid-1988, UMOPAR agents and their DEA advisers were transported by helicopter to Santa Ana de Yacuma in the northern Beni where the notorious trafficker Jorge Roca (Techo de Paja) had been spotted. Helicopters transporting the UMOPAR agents attempted to land on a plot adjacent to the village but were forced to take off immediately when they were literally surrounded by hostile peasants who bombarded the agents with a hail of stones[...] Then the Undersecretary of the interior, Guillermo Perez-Beltrán, ordered a second attempt, and it was launched on June 23 1989[...] This time the UMOPAR agents and their DEA advisers landed a few miles away from Santa Ana, but they could not avoid drawing fire from traffickers operating in the area as soon as they went into the village looking for Rivero-Villavicencio [another kingpin]. The UMOPAR fired back, shooting down two of its antagonists and arresting Fernando Roca-Ali, a half brother of Techo de Paja. In the middle of the shoot out, the traffickers distributed arms among the villagers to repel the police raid. At that point, personnel from a naval base a few kilometers north of the village approached the location, and they, too opened fire on the UMOPAR personnel, intensifying an expanding shoot-out. A confusing battle between Leopardos and a combination of naval forces, traffickers, and villagers ensued, and when two villagers were killed by the UMOPAR, all of the villagers engaged in the scuffle[...] The toll of this UMOPAR raid was four dead and several people wounded.[...] The outnumbered Leopardos retreated to find shelter at the naval outpost from which they had earlier been attacked [!]" ⁷⁴⁷ 

      Both episodes, the massacre of Villa Tunari and the "battle" of Santa Ana de Yacuma, showed that in first place Bolivia is a relatively peaceful country compared to Colombia and Peru but potential for escalation is strong. Second, areas such as the Pando and the Beni are comprised of scattered drug trafficking fiefdoms. The Bolivian state may be able to bother or harass traffickers with these kinds of operations but this does not mean that it is able to exercise its territorial sovereignty over these areas. Third, fully involving the Bolivian armed forces in enforcement operations against drug trafficking only worsens an already existent problem of corruption. One must be really naive to believe the explanation of the Naval Commander at Santa Ana, who alleged that he was resisting an invading force. ⁷⁴⁸  But in some ways, the naval officer was right [!!!], since UMOPAR was invading Techo de Paja's fiefdom in the name of the Bolivian state....

      Other versions of this story hold that some peasants were executed by UMOPAR and that the naval forces defended them, or that the commanding naval officer was protecting the drug trade, or both. The episode remains very confusing. ⁷⁴⁹  Other authors support the idea of the existence of a joint venture between the Bolivian Navy and drug traffickers that had been called the "Puerto Villaroel" cartel operating in the Beni region. As a matter of fact, in October 1988, eight high-ranking naval officers were dismissed by the High Naval Command as a way to "encourager les autres." ⁷⁵⁰ 

      In spite of his strong commitment to curbing the cocaine industry and all his noisy counter-drug campaigns, Paz Estenssoro proved to be a besieged president. He was besieged at once by American pressure, by the power of the coca-growing federations, by the territorial control of the traffickers, and by the corruption within the state. At the end of his term his coca-eradication goals were far from being accomplished, and the flow of coca base out of Bolivia increased as well as that of cocaine. After the strengthening of enforcement in Colombia in 1985, members of the Medellín Cartel had begun to produce more and more cocaine in Bolivian territory and Bolivian traffickers opened up a new path to a growing market: Europe.

      A weak state had been matched again by an illegal industry and the problem had been made worse by U.S. pressure for immediate results without consideration of the long-term development strategy that would be necessary to reduce the coca-growing problem in Bolivia. The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by coca growing peasants during this period:

      Some episodes of drug trafficking related peasant (upstream) reactive and preemptive violence:

January 1986- 17,000 coca growers surrounded 245 "Leopards" (UMOPAR policemen) near the Chapare town of Ivirgarzama isolating the detachment for five days. July 1987- Coca growing peasants block reads going to Cochabamba as a protest against the application of the Three-Year Plan. In clashes with the army, five peasants and a soldiers die. June 1988- Seven peasants and one policeman killed while the police was rallying the forcible occupation by peasants of DIRECO´s offices in Villa Tunari. Peasants were protesting against the utilization of herbicides for eradication purposes. January 1989- The coca-growing leader Evo Morales questioned DEA and UMOPAR actions to "forcefully" eradicate coca plantations in the semitropical plateau of Chapare. The peasant leader said that peasants would organize to defend their rights and to retaliate if they were attacked by DEA and UMOPAR personnel.

      Sources: Lee, The White Labyrinth p. 62; Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87-22, June 11, 1987, p.2 and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) report, FBIS-LAT-90-012, p.45

f) Ambiguous "war on drugs games" and preemptive de-escalation: President Jaime Paz Zamora's administration (1989-1993)  ⁷⁵¹ 

"The problem is presented incorrectly because many may start to believe that U.S. dominance in the country is reduced to its military presence. The important thing is not whether the U.S. stays or leaves ,but that they come when they feel like and is even worse [sic]. As long as the U.S. does not realise that narcotrafficking has to be fought without affecting the economic interests of the peasants and the Bolivian people, these kinds of operations will not be successful [...] Unless there is a programme of fair compensation that encourages farmers to plant, say, coffee instead of coca, the population will not support these measures" ⁷⁵² 

"1.Requirements for the Bolivian Armed Forces.
a. Bolivian Army.
-Equip and train two light infantry battalions for counternarcotics operations.
-Equip and train an engineers battalion for Civic Action.
-Equip and train a transport battalion.
-Equip and train a supplies and services battalion."  ⁷⁵³ 

      Social Democrat Jaime Paz Zamora (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario-MIR-) was elected president in May 1989 by Congress with the support of his former rival Hugo Banzer (ADN) and took power on August 6. In return for its support, the ADN was given important positions in a government coalition of 'national unity', under a 'Patriotic Accord'. Although the MIR gained the presidency by means of the pact, the ADN controlled the vice-presidency and ten of the eighteen cabinet slots, including the critical Finance and Planning Ministries, which determined economic policy. In addition, former General Banzer, who had twice sacrificed the opportunity of regaining the presidency, was delegated undefined powers behind the throne as head of a bipartisan council for "political decisions." Strange couple.  ⁷⁵⁴ 

      The neoliberal policy of the previous government would be maintained and deepened in the style of "democracy with authority." The state of siege was to be used as a tool to overcome public sector labor strikes against austerity and privatization plans. This is to say that the situation of growing unemployment (with stability, of course) did not help in countering the continuous shift of people to the underground side of the national economy, meaning cocaine. ⁷⁵⁵ 

      Paz Zamora's drug control policy would be more than ambiguous. ⁷⁵⁶  Following a position he had sustained before being elected president, he would ask for increased responsibility in demand-reduction efforts in consumer countries, and more support for alternative rural development programs in international forums and meetings (as the Cartagena Summit in 1990 and San Antonio Summit in 1992). He sustained that this was the way to counterbalance the coca-cocaine economy. His motto since the beginning of his administration was "coca for development"(coca por desarrollo). He would also try to break the bilateral "diplomacy of coca" with the United States by trying to create more European interest in the matter and by attracting help from European governments for alternative development plans. He also enacted a repentance decree, following the example of Gaviria in Colombia, in order to prevent the initiation of an escalation of violence with the drug traffickers.  ⁷⁵⁷  The decree was enacted in late July 1991 and gave the traffickers a period of 120 days after that date to turn themselves in along with their laboratories in exchange for a guarantee of non-extradition.

      It is true that thanks to that decree (Supreme Decree Nº 22,881), most of the "most wanted" traffickers turned themselves in. It is also true that the sentences they received were too lenient (five years in prison), and that not only were these traffickers able to run their business from prison but had also designated successors that would keep running the business during their forced "holidays." ⁷⁵⁸  U.S. law enforcement agents affirm that in fact the surrender of the traffickers was caused by a successful operation against Santa Ana de Yacuma from March to June 1991 (Operation Safe Haven). ⁷⁵⁹  (By this they meant that, this time, UMOPAR troops and DEA agents were at least able to safely land in the town and search for the traffickers and make arrests.) In my view both the improvement of law enforcement operations (after a period of trial and error) and the opportunity of going to prison in a "friendly" environment contributed to this massive surrendering.

      On the other side, Paz Zamora had to face the predominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, growing U.S. pressure after the George Bush's Andean Initiative (which as we have seen included further militarization as a main component). He also had to deal with the fulfillment of the goals outlined previous (in the U.S.-Bolivia Agreement and its Annexes I and II) and recent (in Annex III and revision of Annexes I and II ) agreements, as well as the application of the Law Nº 1008.  ⁷⁶⁰  This ambiguity led to a series of confusing and erroneous signals being sent to every internal and external player, which in turn brought about new ups and downs in drug trafficking-related violence as well as an increase in U.S. pressure, thus reinforcing the cycle. ⁷⁶¹ 

      For the reasons explained at the beginning of this chapter Bolivia would became an experimental field for policies stemming from President Bush's Andean Initiative. As shown in the previous section, the image of Bolivia as a relatively peaceful country proved to be wrong. Paradoxically (as almost everything in the "war on drugs"), the U.S. would keep insisting on further militarization of enforcement. As explained by one analyst,

"Primarily because of the absence of guerrilla groups and few visible violent drug lords, Bolivia became a critical player in the implementation of the strategy. U.S. aid nearly doubled, a multi-agency task force consolidated its activities throughout Bolivia and the U.S. mission became the second largest in Latin America." ⁷⁶² 

      The importance given to Bolivia in the framework of the application of the Andean Initiative would also be marked by the designation of Robert Gelbard as ambassador to that country. As former Secretary for Latin American Affairs with the U.S. Department of State, Gelbard was the highest State Department official ever to serve in La Paz (and probably in Latin America). Gelbard would prove to be a very active and intrusive player in the implementation of Bolivian drug control policies. ⁷⁶³ 

      Gelbard would go so far as to suggest the highest level of militarization defined in this dissertation. That is: the establishment of a multinational or regional strike force that may have included an U.S. military contingent. This proposal was made in the U.S. and never made public in Bolivia. As stated by one analyst,

"While this proposal was never made public in Bolivia, it was discussed in great detail in the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and finally in a meeting between U.S. state department and Bolivian government officials." ⁷⁶⁴ 

      Facts demonstrate that these suggestions did not prosper, most likely because of Latin American opposition. ⁷⁶⁵  The forceful eradication (with no compensation to farmers) stipulated in Law Nº 1008 began in 1991, mainly as a result of fierce pressure from the U.S. government to stop new coca from being planted in the Chapare (Article 31 of law 1008). ⁷⁶⁶  By that time, it was evident that most peasants were taking the $2,000 in compensation and moving deeper in the jungle in order to plant more coca. This was becoming increasingly irritating to the U.S. government. ⁷⁶⁷  The beginning of forced eradication against newly-planted coca and coca in illegal areas led to a new high in reactive violence from the peasants. By 1988 the system of peasant self-defense (grupos de autodefensa) formed by the local sindicatos had reached a high level of organization and effectiveness. ⁷⁶⁸  These self-defense groups would put physical obstacles in the road (tranqueras) in order to make access for UMOPAR vehicles more difficult and positioned groups of sentinels to warn the rest of the community (comunidad) when escorted DIRECO teams were arriving by exploding dynamite. This would lead from a peaceful blockade of roads to the stoning of the approaching eradication team. For example,

"As a result of U.S. pressure, some DIRECO eradication teams went out accompanied by UMOPAR forces, which led to some nasty clashes and a general rise in the level of tension in the Chapare. From January to August 1991. DIRECO forcibly eradicated over 500 hectares of 'illegal coca' that they said had been planted since the passing of Law 1008. The coca farmers often denied it, which further exacerbated the tension. In the worst incident, in August, one peasant was killed and several wounded after armed farmers confronted UMOPAR." ⁷⁶⁹ 

"On August 22, a communiqué from the ministry of information confirmed that a coca grower died of gunshot wounds. According to the communiqué, UMOPAR troops fired a round as they attempted to defend DIRECO officials who had initiated the forceful eradication of coca in the Chapare. The communiqué claimed that campesinos destroyed nine trucks and that UMOPAR fired off a warning round which unfortunately struck the campesino." ⁷⁷⁰ 

      Faced to a new escalation of violence, DIRECO accorded a truce with the growers in September 1991 and agreed not to use UMOPAR in forced eradication exercises. Farmers continued to voluntarily eradicate significant amounts of coca in late 1991 and early 1992 only to take the money and move to replant in new areas. ⁷⁷¹  One may ask not only "who is cheating on whom?" but also "who is mocking whom here"? ⁷⁷²  Paz Zamora promised alternative development as the bulwark of his policy (and the U.S. recognized the need for it in the Cartagena Summit) but was forced to increase eradication under U.S. pressure. The U.S. government recognized that alternative development was necessary but only after eradication goals had been achieved. Paz Zamora could not fulfill eradication goals without risking a civil war with the peasants.

      The other cause of a growing preventive threat of peasant violence was the so-called "militarization" of enforcement in Bolivia. The issue at stake after the multilateral Cartagena Summit was the full involvement of the armed forces in the Andean countries for counterdrug activities. As shown in this chapter, the enforcement had already been militarized to a lesser extent in Bolivia. However, the fact that the army could get involved in enforcement activities against drug trafficking provoked a reaction from the peasants who rightly perceived themselves as the easier and more identifiable target for military operations.

      In May 1990, after some hesitation, Paz Zamora signed Annex III to the 1987 U.S.-Bolivia Narcotics Control Agreement. The treaty (quoted at the beginning of this section) dramatically expanded the participation of the Bolivian military, particularly the army, in drug law enforcement activities in exchange for increased military aid from the United States. The most conflictive point of the agreement was that two infantry battalions would be trained by U.S. instructors and equipped specifically for antidrug activities.

      It is very likely that Paz Zamora signed Annex III with the goals of maintaining the inflow of alternative development funds from the U.S. and of avoiding retaliation from that country. However the credibility of the President vis à vis the peasants was further damaged by this move. In fact Paz Zamora's dream of coca por desarrollo ("coca for development") clashed from the beginning with the reality of U.S. predominance in the region. And even if he was able to attract some funds from Western Europe for specific and localized development programs, reality would also show him that the Monroe Doctrine was alive and kicking in terms of the drugs issue as well. As explained by one analyst,

"One minister explained that the Bolivian economy was so dependent on bilateral aid from the United States, and on multilateral aid from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (where the United States exerts a huge influence), that it was virtually impossible to resist the pressure." ⁷⁷³ 

      As soon as news of the treaty leaked to the Bolivian press, the opposition and influential sectors--such as the Catholic Church, the COB, and most of the major newspapers and leading academics (as well as some warnings from the armed forces about the inconvenience of the policy)--started to bombard the president with criticism concerning his decision. The president came under fire for bowing to U.S. pressure but also because of the (absolutely justified) fear that involving the army in counter-narcotic operations would awake the devils of drug trafficking-related corruption in the military.

      The reaction of the coca-growing peasants was quick, and came in the form of threats of direct confrontation with the state. For example in July, August, November 1990,

"[c]ampesino unions carried out road blockades and strikes, announced the establishment of armed campesino defense committees, and called on campesinos in general to dodge compulsory military service." ⁷⁷⁴ 

      However under growing U.S. pressure and encouraged by the congressional support that the "Patriotic Accord" granted him, Paz Zamora continued with the fulfillment of Annex III terms. Finally, in mid-March 1991 it was again leaked to the press that U.S. Army advisors would be sent to train 500 members of the "Manchego Battalion" at the Montero military base (the same base where, in the 1960s, the same regiment had been trained to fight against Che Guevara's guerrillas). After Congressional final approval, on April 5 the advisors and ninety tons of ammunition for the army were being unloaded from an U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy at La Paz Airport.

      This again provoked fierce opposition from the peasants that would, this time, be successfully repressed by the government. It indicated, however, the potential of confrontation with the government if the policy of involving of the army continued. Finally, because of increasing internal political pressure and apparently because of an U.S. fear that this would end up in forcible eradication, further army involvement was stopped in 1992. As explained by two analysts,

"One new element was that the country's main left-wing party, the MBL (Movimiento de Bolivia Libre), started legal proceedings against three ministers for violating the constitution by not securing the approval of the congress before signing the May 1990 agreement.[...] It [also] seemed that U.S. officials were fed up with the political costs of the policy, with the reluctance of the army to carry out operations, and with the lack of results." ⁷⁷⁵ 

"The timing of the congressional inquiry into foreign policy matters coincided with another congressional investigation into the sale of military real state (land) by members of the cabinet to a retired officer without proper authorization from the legislative body. The political fallout was tremendous: the Minister of Defense the commanders of each branch of the armed forces, and the commander-in-chief were all forced to resign. Once again, the image of the armed forces was tarnished by the corrupt actions of a few officers and their civilian co-conspirators. For all practical purposes this was the final straw that determined the army's withdrawal from the drug war." ⁷⁷⁶ 

      In fact, the only interdiction operation (Operation "Definite Notice") involving the Manchego regiment would take place in October 1991 in a remote east area of Santa Cruz (very far away from the Chapare). The operation brought scant results (again apparently due to a leak of information that allowed the traffickers to flee before the arrival of the troops). ⁷⁷⁷ 

      This attempt to further involve the armed forces in drug law enforcement operations had another effect. It contributed to increase the rivalry between the army and UMOPAR and it enhanced cases of inner-system violence related to drug trafficking. As explained by Jaime Malamud Goti,

"The stress on drug enforcement in Bolivia has led to contradictory outcomes. In spite of the importance given by U.S.-Bolivian officials to enforcement, the special body created to carry out the task, the UMOPAR, is under equipped because of interference from rival Bolivian military officers, some of whom believe that the Leopardos are totally corrupt and that, having sold their loyalty to the U.S. Embassy, they cannot be differentiated from the DEA. The commander of the Barrientos Battalion, Colonel Rodriguez, while getting his troops ready for the war on drugs, stated in May 1990 that the task of the military should be to first terminate the UMOPAR and then carry out the assignment against drug manufacturers and dealers." ⁷⁷⁸ 

      This very eloquent veiled threat would materialize during 1990 and 1991 under very dubious circumstances. Violence increased due to institutional hegemonic competition over the war on drugs, or corruption, or both combined. According to an account by one analyst,

"The army's declared animosity against the UMOPAR and the DEA proved to be serious[...] Officers from the Barrientos regiment, which is situated on the road from the town of Cochabamba to the Chapare, arrested three DEA agents on the grounds that the men were not carrying adequate personal credentials[...] On May 7 [1990] a group of young army officers attacked four UMOPAR agents near their barracks in Villa Tunari. After suffering threats and provocations from a dozen troopers from the Barrientos regiment at a canteen near Villa Tunari, three of the UMOPAR agents managed to escape. The fourth, however, a corporal named Pedro Mariani, was caught by his tormentors [....] There [Barrientos barracks] he was almost beaten to death[...] In May 1990, the second in command of the UMOPAR Chapare outpost at Chimoré was Major Ramiro Ortega, and through an internal memorandum, he reported another perplexing incident to the commander of the Bolivian special forces, General Añez. The memorandum said that on May 10, at 10 A.M. , 'army personnel opened fire on our helicopters to deter them from flying over their encampment. To avoid a confrontation, we immediately flew away'[...] Also in May 10, a bloody occurrence in the Chapare village of Insinuta raised suspicions of further army aggression against the UMOPAR. A hand grenade thrown at a UMOPAR officer sitting at a bar killed the agent and four civilians, including a four-year old, and also wounded several bystanders.[...] UMOPAR officers and regular-policemen conducting the investigation grew increasingly suspicious that the military stationed in the Chapare had been behind the event, as examination of the grenade shrapnel indicated that the explosive was of the type that only the army has access too." ⁷⁷⁹ 

      Was it institutional rivalry for taking over command of the war on drugs? Was the violence linked to army corruption? Or both? Most likely the latter is the answer. It must be kept in mind that, as shown earlier in this chapter, corruption in the Manchego regiment had deterred President Paz Estenssoro from utilizing the army in counternarcotics operations. But most important, these kinds of episodes resemble the kind of violence between a corrupt military involved in enforcement operations and a probably no less-corrupt special police force in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley.  ⁷⁸⁰  The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence carried out by coca growing peasants during this period:

      Some episodes of drug trafficking related peasants (upstream) reactive and preemptive violence:

September 1989- "Speaking to the media they [the coca growing peasants] reported that despite instructions issued by the interior minister to UMOPAR and promises that violence would be avoided, peasant settlers have again been subject to violent actions. In view of this, the peasants say they will block the main Cochabamba-Santa Cruz Road." April 1991-"The Single Trade Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers warned that military maneuvers in coca-producing zones may provoke confrontations between coca planters and army personnel."

      Sources: FBIS-LAT-89-183, p.24 and FBIS-LAT-91-084, p.25

g) "More of the same": President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada's administration (1993-1997)

      Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada had been the architect of President Paz Estenssoro's New Economic Policy. Lozada made a pragmatic electoral alliance with the Aymaran leader of the indigenist Movimiento Revolucionario Túpaj Katari de Liberación (MRTKL), and Mr. Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, who ran as vice president. By doing so, he obtained the decisive support of Indian voters. The economic policy would be the same: adjustment. Again, the government mobilized the army to suppress miner strikes as well as unions from public services and again the MNR government would show high resolve in curbing drug trafficking through forcible eradication. The period of Sanchez de Lozada's presidency could be defined as the years of higher preemptive and reactive peasant drug trafficking-related violence and no results...

      Sanchez de Lozada carried out a major reform not only in the drug control sector but also in all the structure of the government ministries, which were reduced from 17 to 10. The Ministry of Agriculture and Interior were merged into the Ministry of Home Office (Ministerio de Gobierno). This means that, through the Secretaría de Defensa Social (Social Defense Secretary, an inter ministerial council), all drug control policies would be considered in the Home Office area. In 1996 Sanchez de Lozada also reformed the FELNC, formally introducing the Navy ("Blue Devils" force) the Airforce ("Red Devils") force and the Army ("Green Devils" force) for logistical support (mainly transportation for UMOPAR). ⁷⁸¹  Also a Policía Ecológica (Ecological Police) was created in order to work with DIRECO in the eradication of coca. ⁷⁸²  They wear sand-colored uniforms to distinguish them from the Leopardos, and are armed with machetes. However when peasant resistance is really strong, UMOPAR intervenes.

      At the beginning of his administration, Sanchez de Lozada tried to enforce Law Nº 1008 by forcibly eradicating illegal coca. The result was an escalation of violence throughout the year 1994. As an analyst explains,

"As the government stepped up antinarcotic efforts in early 1994, conflict soon erupted. Violence broke out in the Chapare in February 1994 forcing the government to abandon its eradication program. More unrest followed in June 1994 with the start of Operation New Dawn ⁷⁸³  a major counternarcotics offensive in the Chapare. In September thousands of coca growers arrived on La Paz to protest the government's eradication policies." ⁷⁸⁴ 

      According to the sources consulted for this dissertation no there was (at least officially) no direct involvement of the Bolivian Army or U.S. forces in enforcement activities against drug trafficking during Sanchez de Lozada's' administration. ⁷⁸⁵  However, in March 1996, the army inaugurated a new training center in the Chapare using an existing agricultural research facility at Santa Rosa. The opening of this base in the Chapare has generated a great deal of concern about the perceived "militarization" of the Chapare. These fears have been fueled by recent reports of soldiers participating directly in eradication operations. ⁷⁸⁶ 

      It is worth remarking that the Andean Strategy came to an end in 1994 (it was a five year strategy). However, the Clinton administration kept insisting on the involvement of South American armed forces in enforcement against drug trafficking. As explained by one analyst,

"Apart from greater emphasis on source country efforts, the Clinton administration basically continued the policies mapped out by President Bush in the Andean Initiative. Taking on Republican critics who have tried to portray "soft on drugs," Clinton has stepped-up strong-arm tactics with Andean leaders." ⁷⁸⁷ 

      The situation worsened in mid-November 1994 when the president presented a very original but very radical plan for curbing drug trafficking in the Chapare. The plan was called Opción Cero (Option Zero) and caused the highest levels of violence of the period under analysis in this chapter. Option Zero was described in the following terms by one analyst,

"In exchange for two to three billion dollars of international economic aid, the state would agree to "buy out" all peasant land holdings in the Chapare. After compensating them for their lands, crops, and investments on their landholdings, the state would then resettle all of the tens of thousands of peasant households to other parts of the country, regardless of whether they cultivated coca or not. Resettlement was to proceed principally in Santa Cruz and the eastern (Chaco) segments of the Departments of Tarija and Chuquisaca. There the new arrivals and their families would be provided land grants by the state and they would be supplied with capital and technical assistance that would allow them to establish new and viable economies. Furthermore, all Chapare lands formerly claimed by the peasantry would revert back to state control , and the region would somehow be sealed off to future peasant settlement. Finally, unfettered by clamorous and troublesome peasants, the state would then have a free hand to transform the Chapare (with an area of over 24,000 square kilometers) into either an enormous national park, that would supposedly form the basis of a thriving tourist industry, or convert the entire region into a powerful investment pole for private business interest." ⁷⁸⁸ 

      This seemed an excellent idea that would certainly solve not only the drug problem but also all of Bolivia's economic troubles. President Sanchez de Lozada forgot one small detail: What if the peasants do not want to leave? Well, they did not want to leave.

      Faced with violent peasant resistance, Option Zero was abandoned. ⁷⁸⁹  Even if Sanchez de Lozada had promised to de-narcotize the bilateral relations with the United States, reality proved that "he who has the gold makes the rules." As a matter of fact, the Clinton administration did not want to de-narcotize relations with Bolivia. After the failure of Option Zero, Sanchez de Lozada's drug control policy would be completely erratic and subordinated to U.S. threat of de-certification .The result was a succession of attempts at forcible eradication that ended up in clashes between very well armed self-defense groups. Peasant violence was provoked by a return of the army to interdiction operations this time in the Chapare in 1994. ⁷⁹⁰  As reported by one analyst,

"Faced with such wild opposition, the government, in a major publicity campaign reiterated that Opción Cero was simply a plan in the "study" stage and that international agencies had simply asked to provide funds to study its feasibility [...].Such statements were often repeated between December 1994 and January 1995." ⁷⁹¹ 

      Sanchez de Lozada's erratic policy was merely a response to American pressure and to the peasant responses, provoking continuous ups and downs of violence in the Chapare region, which lasted until the last year of his administration. By the time this author visited the region, General Banzer had won the elections, had assumed the presidency and was already talking about total militarization of Chapare. The situation was one of calm between two summer storms. The chronology below illustrates the reactive and preemptive spiral of violence by coca growing peasants during this period:

      Some episodes of drug trafficking related upstream reactive and preemptive violence:

February 1994-Some 15,000 coca growers staged a demonstration on February 25-26 at Chapare, Cochabamba Department, protesting against the compulsory eradication of their plantations, which have bee occupied by forces of UMOPAR. In clashes on February 26, 18 coca growers were injured and 78 arrested. March 1994- In a conflict in the Entre Ríos zone (Chapare) more than 2,600 campesinos surrounded DIRECO agents. One campesino was and 20 were wounded killed in the confrontations. November 1994- Talks between the government and coca growers break down. Evo Morales, declared that local self-defense groups would resist any forcible eradication. On November 15 some 2,000 anti-riot police were deployed in the village of Sinahota (Chapare region) and in clashes with 5,000 coca producers a young girl was killed. April 1995-In statements to a local radio station coca growers´ leader Evo Morales insisted on warning that violence could surface if the government insists on eradicating coca plantations by force. President Sanchez de Lozada declared a 90-day state of siege to quell weeks of civil unrest. Some 70,000 public school teachers were on strike and campesinos (peasants) set up roadblocks. Violent clashes between police and coca producers took place in the central Chapare region, and mining and manufacturing districts were at standstill. July 1995-On July 19, the government announced a 90-day extension of the state of siege introduced in April, giving as its reasons: unrest, illegal planting of coca by coca growers opposed to U.S.-sponsored eradication of coca, and the instability generated by different social sectors opposed to government economic policy. Protest escalated during the week beginning July 10 as coca growers resisted an invasion by UMOPAR troops who began destroying coca leaf cultivation in the Isiboro-Secure national park. At least three campesinos were reported to have been killed or to have disappeared and some 30 injured on July 15 following violent clashes with troops and the police. On July 19-20, some 300 campesinos and workers were arrested in Chapare as UMOPAR personnel broke up roadblocks and campesino marches. August 1995- A 22-year old peasant was killed in the Carrasco region in August 8 when local people clashed with members of the anti-drugs taskforce, UMOPAR. A similar clash between local people and a UMOPAR squad in the Isiboro Secure National Park on August 18 resulted in another civilian death. February 1997-UMOPAR and Ecological police stepped up forced eradication. The coca grower federations announced the reactivation of self-defense committees to resist forced eradication efforts. In retaliation of forced eradication in Senda 5 and Senda 6 (rural paths) in Ivirgarzama, local residents attacked the DIRECO office burning four DIRECO vehicles and computers inside the office. Violence escalated as the police responded with tear gas and rubber pellets.

      Sources: Keesing´s News Digest for February 1994, p.3959; Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug Trafficking Update for November 1995, p.40819; FBIS, Translated Text from TELAM-SIN Buenos Aires TELAM, April 3, 1995; Keesing´s News Digest for April 1995, p.40499; Keesing´s News Digest for July 1995, p.4060; Keesing´s News Digest for August 1995, p.40676; and Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.pp.35 and 36.

h) A brief thought on Bolivia's ephemeral guerrillas

"La Bolivie est, avec le Guatemala, le seul pays d'Amérique latine où la population indienne est majoritaire. Les Indiens, principalement des Quechas, des Aymaras et des Guaranis, représenteraient en effet quelque 60% de la population. Cette majorité démographique se transforme cependant en minorité sociale et politique, les élites étant essentiellement constituées par la population créole et métisse" ⁷⁹² 

"The Shining Path however does not count on the support of Bolivians peasants, particularly coca growers. A peasant from Corioco, a coca grower's village three hours north from La Paz said "Yes, we grow coca but we do not want guerrillas"
Isn't there subversion here?
"We have heard of subversion, but it will not obtain support here" said the peasant, who is the head of one of the 300,000 families that, legally or illegally grows coca for a living.
What would you do if subversives arrived here?
"Nothing, we would only cooperate with our Army to break off with Shining Path members." the peasant said.
What would you do afterwards?
"We would work to help Bolivia overcome underdevelopment" he added.
If the Bolivian terrorist group's propaganda is not accepted among coca growers, it is still less probable that the Shining Path's propaganda is." ⁷⁹³ 

      Historically, guerrilla movements in Bolivia did not have popular support. The foquist groups of the late 1960s proved to be disastrous (particularly to Ernesto "Che" Guevara himself, who was killed in Bolivia in 1967) because of the almost complete lack of support from the local populations. At that time, the ELN (National Liberation Army) was quickly and easily crushed by the military. ⁷⁹⁴ 

      In the late 1980s early 1990s three small guerrilla groups (Comisión Nestor Paz Zamora-CNPZ- appeared October 1990 and was dismantled late 1990; Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Zárate Wilka-FALZW- appeared in mid-1988 and was dismantled 1989; and Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari-EGTK- appeared during the summer of 1991 and was dismantled and allegedly dormant by 1992) were active in Bolivia. Again, because of the lack of popular support and lack of internal organization they where easily suppressed by successive Bolivian governments. The three groups were characterized by a radical anti-U.S. position and at least one of them, the CNPZ, received support from the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) of Peru. In the particular case of the EGTK the Marxist-Trotskyst ideology is combined with radical (Aymara) Indigenist reivindications. ⁷⁹⁵ 

      In my view, because of the Bolivian historical tradition of strong grassroots organizations, there is no danger of a "Peruanization" of Bolivia. That is, a guerrilla group is not likely to emerge in the Chapare region in order to defend the peasants from the Bolivian government. Such a group would not have peasant support (as Shining Path had in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru) because of the strong political power and high degree of organization of coca growing peasant trade union federations. Not only are the federations capable of defending coca-growing peasants' interests, but they also provide self-defense groups (grupos de autodefensa campesina) in order to resist forceful eradication. Moreover, there are no proven links between coca growing peasants or drug traffickers and guerrillas. ⁷⁹⁶  However the very idea that a "narco-guerrilla" could emerge in Bolivia was disquieting for Bolivian government authorities, particularly during Paz Zamora's administration. ⁷⁹⁷  Furthermore, there were reports that both Shining Path and MRTA were using the inhospitable north of Bolivia (but also clinics and hospitals in La Paz) as a safe haven and would also try to expand their operations to that country. ⁷⁹⁸  As a matter of fact in December 1989, the Peruvian Naval attaché was killed in La Paz, allegedly by a Shining Path cell. ⁷⁹⁹  However, due to the recent military defeat of both movements it is very unlikely that they will try to expand operations to Bolivia. Moreover, the Shining Path has a "revolution in one country" strategy, and it is very unlikely that they would try to expand after taking over political power in Peru (this is no longer even a possibility, however, because of the progressive dismantling of the movement after the capture of Guzmán in 1992). ⁸⁰⁰  And again, they would likely follow the same fate of Guevara's foquistas in the late 1960s because of the absence of local support.

      It is important to point out that the FALZW, the CNPZ, and the EGTK tried to exploit public resentment towards the U.S. role in counternarcotic efforts. Even if they were not important threats to the Bolivian state, these guerrilla groups can be considered indicators of the political violence caused by the increasing U.S. military presence in Bolivia in support of militarized enforcement.

i) Transformations in the Bolivian cocaine industry

      There are two factors that provoked a change in the pattern of drug trafficking in Bolivia. They are related to the pattern of enforcement in Colombia, which provoked a spillover of activities towards other countries. Enforcement in Colombia also weakened the Colombian traffickers, particularly the Medellín coalition. This resulted in a greater autonomy of the Bolivian traffickers, which started to sell their production in a growing and profitable new market: Western Europe. This transformation would have consequences for Argentina. With a fluid trade with Europe, scarcely patrolled borders, and an excellent road infrastructure, Argentina would become (together with Brazil) a preferential transit route for drug traffickers based in Bolivia. These changes occurred simultaneously at the end of the 1980s and contributed to an increase in the intensity of the threats to the Argentine security in terms of the illicit drug traffic.

      In first place, there was a shift of Colombian traffickers operations towards Bolivian territory and the rise in the autonomy and power of the Bolivian traffickers. ⁸⁰¹  The rise in enforcement against Colombian drug trafficking organizations (especially against the Medellín coalition) by the Betancur (particularly after the assassination of Minister Lara Bonilla), and the Barco and Gaviria administrations (after the assassination of Galán), coupled with the increase in interception activities by U.S. law enforcement agencies--and the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean and Mexican routes to the United States--brought about two new developments. They were:

1. a shift of Colombian coalitions towards the Bolivian territory ( in economic terms, a flow of capital in the industry or an intra-industry capital flow); and
2. an increase in the independence and power of Bolivian organizations after the Colombians were weakened and the Medellín coalition lost cohesion and spread into independent groups following the arrest or death of their main leaders. ⁸⁰²  As explained by two analysts,

"the Bolivians were no longer willing to be poorly paid suppliers of coca paste or base while their Colombian counterparts, who refined it into hydrochloride, raked in the profits. They decided to increase their profits by doing all the refining themselves. They set up their own hydrochloride laboratories, and left past making to peasants in the Chapare. The mark-ups are dramatic: by selling paste, a trafficker gets only $250 a kilo. With base he can earn six or seven times that amount. With hydrochloride, the profits are even greater, selling at between $1600 and $2,500 a kilo[...]The crackdown on drug mafias in Colombia in 1989 and 1990 speeded up the trend. Bolivian traffickers found they had no-one to buy their partly processed cocaine which was rapidly stockpiling and going, moudly in the humid jungle heat. They were forced to refine it themselves and to find other nationalities to distribute it. By 1990 [...] Bolivia exported an estimated 250-300 tons , making it the world second largest producer of market-ready cocaine..."

"In the early 1980s however, Bolivians - and Colombians working in Bolivia- slowly started to manufacture more and more of the base in to the final product HCL. U.S. officials estimate that by 1990 as much as one third of Bolivian coca paste-or between 150 and 200 tones of cocaine-was being processed into HCL within Bolivia. U. S. officials were adamant that Bolivia had become the world's second largest producer after Colombia [...]Colombians were also reported to be facing a production glut in the mid-1980s, which encouraged some of them to move part of their operations to Bolivia, where costs were cheaper, operations at times safer, and the supply of coca paste more assured. As a result, more Colombians started to work in Bolivia on the final processing stages. At the same time, there was evidence that Bolivian traffickers were attempting to diversify their markets and, to a limited extent, bypass the Colombians. While it was still true that the United States remained the main destination for Bolivian cocaine, new and more lucrative markets, particularly in Europe and the Pacific Rim countries ( mainly Japan) were opening up via new routes through Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay or Brazil." ⁸⁰³ 

      

Table 5. Bolivia and Cocaine production 804
CHCL (metric tones)	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Produced ( with Bolivian paste)	73	83	110	261	205
Converted in Bolivia	--	29	39	91	72

Source: Painter, "Bolivia and Coca," p. 46

      A second factor that contributed to modifying the role of Bolivia in the cocaine industry chain was the change in worldwide consumption patterns. A shift in the main transit routes occurred for two reasons: North American markets at the end of the 1980s were saturated and an increase ( at higher prices) in the demand for cocaine/crack in Western Europe with Spain as the main point of entry. In this scheme, Argentina became a main and preferential route for the Bolivian traffickers to Spain and the rest of Western Europe. ⁸⁰⁵  As explained by one analyst, between 1989 and 1990,

"[ t]he amount of cocaine confiscated in Europe more than doubled, from 6 to 14 tones. Given that police estimate they seize a maximum or 10 per cent of the total, that means that in 1990 Europe was awash at least 140 tones [...] South American drug barons have seen their outlets to North America squeezed by law enforcement and oversupply, and are looking for new markets [...] Bolivian and Peruvian traffickers are also exporting directly to Europe.' We are no longer seeing as much of the north-south movements', says Raymond Kendall, Interpol's executive director. 'Traffickers are switching from Caribbean routes to new ones through Brazil's Amazon waterways and Argentina through Africa and Europe's major ports'. One U.S. drug enforcement official calculates that as much as 40 per cent or world cocaine supply goes to Europe, compared to 60 percent of world cocaine to the U.S. [...]Although the risks and costs of getting cocaine to Europe are greater, the prices make it worldwide. A kilo, which fetches $ 12,000 to $ 15,000 in Miami can fetch three to four times that in Europe." ⁸⁰⁶ 

      

Table 6. Cocaine seizures in Europe 1991-1993
	Spain	Netherlands	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	United Kingdom	Portugal
1991	7,574	1,653	698	690	964	734	1,024	994
1992	4,454	3,180	1,000	1,625	1,332	1,377	2,534	1893
1993	5,351	3,720	2,891	1,715	1,095	1,089	768	218

Source: POLICÍA NACIONAL, SERVICIO CENTRAL DE ESTUPEFACIENTES, Análisis Actual del Tráfico de Estupefacientes y Sustancias Psicotrópicas, Madrid, March 1995.

      

Table 7. Cocaine Seizures in Europe 1973-1988 (kilos)
1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
23	20	45	47	59	155	149	240	259	398	1,026	891	913	1,482	2,391	5,321

Source: Revue Internationale de la Police Criminelle (INTERPOL) May-June 1989.

      

Table 8. Cocaine Seizures in Europe 1989-1991 (kilos)
1989	1990	1991
8078	16032	16874

Source: MAGE, Tristan, Les Nouvelles routes du trafic de la drogue dans l'espace de Schengen et dans le monde. Vol.I, Paris, T. Mage, 1994., p. 68