

Jacques Moeschler
Department of linguistics
University of Geneva
2, rue de Candolle, 1211 Geneva 4, Switzerland

Propositional and non-propositional effects in manipulation discourses: the example of Le Pen's TV talk in the French electoral campaign of 2002

Propositional and non-propositional effects in manipulation discourses: the example of Le Pen's TV talk in the French electoral campaign of 2002

Abstract

This paper is about propositional and non-propositional effects in manipulation discourses. We argue that in manipulation discourses, the communicator's aim is to convey some information affecting propositionally and non-propositionally his addressee's mental states. Propositional effects of discourse manipulation are modifications of the set of beliefs entertained, whereas non-propositional effects are here defined as *qualia*. As an appeal to *qualia* is the basic process by which information are conveyed in manipulation discourses, we predict that manipulation discourses do not share the global informative hypothesis constraint defining ordinary discourses. We argue moreover that this property is shared by some pathological discourses, such as schizophrenic.

0. Introduction

Manipulation discourses do not define a set of precise, predictable types of discourse. In this paper, we are not proposing formal and linguistic properties that could help to diagnose manipulation discourses from non-manipulation discourses.

Manipulation occurring within discourses seems nevertheless to exploit specific properties and strategies associated with communication and discourses. What happens in manipulation processes is a specific use of discourse to convey certain types of effects, affecting in some way addressees' beliefs and feelings. So the first claim of this paper is that manipulation discourses convey not only *propositional* effects but mainly *non-propositional* effects. The former property is nevertheless less constrained than in ordinary discourses¹: in manipulation discourses, the global informative hypothesis is not required, that is, accessibility to communicator's global informative intention is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its understanding. We will also argue that logical consistency, either local or global, is not required.

This paper will start with a provisional definition of what *manipulation* is. The aim of this very tentative definition is to clarify a basic property of manipulation discourses: manipulation discourses do not appeal to the standard strategy used in ordinary discourse interpretation, but focus on an appeal to *qualias*. In non-technical words, this means that manipulation discourses use emotion as a basic means to convey propositional effects, if any.

The second point discussed in the paper deals with basic pragmatic properties of ordinary discourse. This section emphasizes the necessity for the addressee to access a *global informative hypothesis*, corresponding to the communicator's global informative intention. The way in which we access global informative hypothesis is the same hypothesis formation/confirmation process used in utterances comprehension. What happens in discourse is simply the addition of a new set of hypotheses to those entertained, explaining why processing discourse as a whole is worth one's while.

The third section will give a practical illustration of how manipulation discourses can use both propositional and non-propositional effects. The corpus is Le Pen's talk on April 21, his first call inviting all French citizen to vote for him in the second round of the 2002 French presidential election. A detailed analysis of his talk will show how general properties of ordinary discourses are ruled out, and how Le Pen succeeds in appealing to emotions.

Finally, the paper will say a little more on non-propositional effects, and ask the question of their status and role in manipulation, that is, the relation between non-propositional effects, i.e. non-

¹ We will often refer to *ordinary discourses*. In ordinary discourses, we claim, the communicator's aims are not to make believe or improve some feelings that could be false or inappropriate in that context. So fiction is for us a typical example of ordinary discourse, with no a priori manipulative intention. Conversation is another example of ordinary discourse. In contrast, advertising is a typical example of manipulation discourse, and so are, in most cases, political discourses.

representational aspects of meaning, and propositional effects, i.e. representational aspects of meanings on the one hand and action on the other one.

1. A first definition of manipulation discourse

Our starting point is a definition of manipulation in communication:

Manipulation in communication

A speaker *S* wants his audience *A* to reach a set of contextual effects affecting propositionally and non-propositionally *A*'s present mental state, in order to make *A* believe that these effects are true (propositional effects) or accurate (non-propositional effects).

In manipulation discourse, *S*'s main intention is thus to change *A*'s cognitive environment, that is, the set of propositions (or assumptions) which are true or inferable for *A*.

The way *A*'s mental environment is changed depends ordinarily on propositional effects. We define propositional effects as Relevance Theory does (Sperber & Wilson 1995), that is, as the addition of new information and the modification of old information. But manipulation discourse allows another type of effects, which I will call *non-propositional*. Non-propositional effects are the experience by the addressee of specific mental states like emotion, fear, hatred, joy, i.e. what philosophers call *qualia*. *Qualia* are, according to the *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, "the felt or phenomenal qualities associated with experiences, such as the feeling of a pain, or the hearing of a sound, or the viewing of a color" (Blackburn 1996, 313)².

How can we now define manipulation discourses? Our hypothesis is that manipulation discourses are those discourses by which such propositional and non-propositional effects are obtained. So, in order for any discourse to be manipulative, it is not sufficient to produce cognitive propositional effects (for instance to change the set of beliefs entertained by the addressee), it necessary that this change comes through a change in his mental states.

This condition seems a very strong one. Indeed it is, but if we compare manipulation discourses to ordinary ones, we will see how and why general constraints on discourse formation are ruled out, which weakens our initial condition.

2. Utterance and discourse interpretation

How do we understand discourses? Our answer has as a starting point a very simple fact: discourses are act of communication, and describing how we understand discourse depends on how we understand acts of verbal communication.

Verbal communication is based on a linguistic code (a natural language), but belongs to a general mode of communication, *ostensive-inferential communication*. In ostensive-inferential communication, the speaker *S* aims his addressee *A* to reach his informative intention by the recognition of his communicative intention. Informative and communicative intentions are defined as follows (Sperber & Wilson 1995):

Informative intention

The informative intention is the intention to inform an audience of something.

Communicative intention

The communicative intention is the intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention.

What characterizes ostensive-inferential communication is the way in which the informative intention can be discovered. The recognition of the speaker's communicative intention by the ad-

² We will use here a large view of *qualia*, including emotions.

addressee is a necessary condition, but not as sufficient one. The reason is that verbal communication is a mixed process, implying both *code* and *inference*. In Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995), it assumed that *code communication* is restricted to linguistic decoding, that is, to syntax and semantics, whereas *inferential communication* relies on the result of the linguistic encoding and decoding and pragmatic enrichment, i.e. disambiguation, attribution of referents and illocutionary force, necessary for the computation of contextual effects. In other words, whereas linguistic interpretation is incomplete and underspecified, inferential interpretation is complete and contextual.

What are now the general conditions for utterances understanding? In order to reach *S*'s informative intention, *A* must not only understand linguistically the sentence uttered, which passes through linguistic decoding, he must moreover access the *correct contextual assumptions* necessary to draw the relevant contextual effects. These assumptions are available through information stored in different memories, that is, long-term memory (encyclopedia), mid-term memory (previous utterances processing) and short-term memory (working memory).

Let's give a very basic example of inferential communication. In (1), the choice of the correct contextual assumption leads to the correct interpretation.

- (1) *Peter*: Would you like some coffee?
Mary: Coffee would keep me awake.

(1) gives rise to two different contextual interpretations, depending on the choice of the contextual assumption. So contextual assumption 1 leads to contextual implication 1, and contextual assumption 2 to contextual implication 2, as shown in (2) and (3):

- (2) Contextual assumption 1: *Mary has to work tonight.*
 Contextual implication 1: *Mary wants some coffee.*
- (3) Contextual assumption 2: *Mary wants to sleep.*
 Contextual implication 2: *Mary doesn't want any coffee.*

The question raised by any inferential approaches of communication is the criterion used in the formation of contextual assumptions. Relevance Theory gives a precise answer to this question: *relevance* is the criterion used by communicators and addressee in communication. So the communicator's aim is to produce a relevant act of ostensive-inferential communication, and the addressee is searching for a relevant interpretation. But what is relevance for an act of communication? The answer given by Relevance Theory is the following: an act of communication is relevant if it has at least one contextual effect. Contextual effects are of three types: (i) the addition of a new information to the set of information entertained by the addressee; (ii) the modification of the degree of confidence with which an old information is entertained; (iii) the eradication of an old information when a contradiction arises.

Relevance is not only a matter of contextual effects. Processing information is costly, because cognitive efforts are required. Some linguistic information are more easily processed than others, because of length, structural complexity, lexical access, and some contextual assumptions are more easily processed than others, because they are more easily accessible, either in long-term, mid-term or short-term memories. So relevance is a balance between cognitive efforts and cognitive effects:

Relevance

- (i) *Ceteris paribus*, the less cognitive efforts the processing of an utterance requires, the more relevant the utterance is;
- (ii) *ceteris paribus*, the more cognitive effects the processing of an utterance produces, the more relevant the utterance is.

As the definition of relevance states it, relevance is not only a property of *communication*, but also of *cognition*. Relevance Theory explains how relevance is achieved by two principles, the cognitive and the communicative principles of relevance (Wilson & Sperber to appear):

The cognitive principle of relevance

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.

The communicative principle of relevance

Every ostensive stimulus (utterance) conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

So, a utterance is optimally relevant to an audience if and only if it is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort and if it is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker's abilities and preferences.

So far, I have recalled some basic properties of utterance interpretation. What about discourses? Do discourses need any specific interpretation mechanism? My answer is that discourses do not imply such mechanisms, and that the general picture given for utterance interpretation applies for discourses interpretation (see Reboul & Moeschler 1997, 1998). Here are the main arguments. First, discourses are relevant in as much they have contextual effects and minimize cognitive efforts. Second, discourses are composed of utterances and for this reason discourse interpretation implies the ability to access the speaker's informative intention *via* the recognition of his communication intention. Nevertheless, there is one major difference between utterance interpretation and discourse interpretation: intentions assigned to discourse interpretation are *global*. This has a major consequence: a discourse is understood in as much the speaker's global informative intention is accessed.

We can now state two general principles of Discourse Pragmatics (Reboul & Moeschler 1997, 1998):

General principles of Discourse Pragmatics

- (i) The easier it is to construct the global informative intention of a given discourse, the more coherent the discourse is (accessibility parameter).
- (ii) The richer the global intention of a given discourse is, the more coherent this discourse is (complexity parameter).

The prediction is thus that ordinary discourses vary in our judgments of coherence relative to the accessibility and the complexity parameters of the global informative intention. In other words, coherence is not a central property of discourses, but an effect of interpretation processes.

The relevance of this definition can be given *a contrario*. In pathological discourses, there is generally a real difficulty in accessing the global informative intention: schizophrenic discourses are locally consistent, but lack global informative intentions, which is generally explained by difficulties in discourse self-monitoring (Frith 1992). What about manipulation discourses?

Our main thesis is the following: in manipulation discourses, the accessibility of any global informative intention is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for their comprehension. There are three reasons for this: (i) their propositional effects are local, and not global; (ii) they lack global consistency; (iii) their main effects are non-propositional. The next section will illustrate these properties.

3. An example of manipulation discourse: Le Pen's call on April 21 2002

Here is Le Pen's TV broadcasted talk on April 21's night at the end of the first round of the 2002 French presidential election.

- (4) (...) N'ayez pas peur. Rentrez dans l'espérance. L'événement, c'est le 5 mai. N'ayez pas peur de rêver, vous les petits, les sans-grade, les exclus. Ne vous laissez pas enfermer dans les vieilles divisions de la gauche et de la droite. Vous, qui avez supporté depuis vingt ans toutes les erreurs et les malversations de la gauche et de la droite. Vous, les mineurs, les métallos, les ouvrières et les ouvriers de toutes ces industries ruinées par l'euro-mondialisme de Maastricht. Vous, les agriculteurs aux retraites de misère et acculés à la ruine et à la disparition. Vous, qui êtes les premières victimes de l'insécurité, dans les banlieues, les villes et les villages. J'appelle les françaises et les français, quelles que soient leur race, leur religion ou leur condition sociale, à se rallier à cette chance historique de redressement national.

Sachez que, homme du peuple, je serai toujours du côté de ceux qui souffrent, parce que j'ai connu le froid, la faim, la pauvreté. Je veux reconstruire la cohérence de notre grand peuple français, l'unité de la République, l'indépendance de la France, notre patrie, rétablir la sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national et libérer nos compatriotes du fiscalisme et de la bureaucratie.

Je salue fraternellement tous mes compatriotes français, qu'ils se soient abstenus ou qu'ils aient votés pour d'autres candidats. Je les appelle à ne pas se laisser manipuler par les vieux trucs des politiciens qui veulent conserver leur petite boutique.

Je suis socialement à gauche, économiquement à droite et plus que jamais, nationalement de France.

Mais surtout, je suis un homme libre, un patriote qui n'a qu'une ambition: la France et les français. (...)

*Jean-Marie Le Pen, Sunday 21 April 2002, 21h55,
transcript from Le Monde, Tuesday 23 April 2002, page 3*

- (4') Don't be afraid. Come back to hope. The event will be May 5. Don't be afraid of dreaming, you the lowest ones, the excluded. Don't let yourselves jailed in the old divisions between the left and the right. You, who endured for twenty years all the errors and embezzlements of the left and the right. You, miners, ironworkers, workers of all industries destroyed by Maastricht's euro-world internationalism. You farmers with miserable retreats and pushed to ruin and disappearing. You, who are the first victims of insecurity in the suburbs, cities and villages. I'm calling Frenchwomen and Frenchmen whatever their race, religion or social condition to join this historical opportunity of national recovery.

Note that, a man of the people, I'll always be on the side of those who suffer, because I have known coldness, hunger and poverty. I want to rebuild the cohesion of our great French people, the unity of the Republic, the independence of France, our country, restore security on the whole national territory and set our compatriots free from 'fiscalism' and bureaucracy.

I greet all my French compatriots as a brother, whether they abstained or voted for other candidates. I ask them not let themselves be manipulated by the old gadgets of politicians who want to preserve their small offices.

I am socially a liberal, economically a conservative and more than ever, nationally a Frenchman.

But over anything else, I am a free man, a patriot who has as his only ambition: France and the French people.

I would like to begin my comments on this discourse by some basic questions:

- (i) Does this discourse allow the construction of any global informative hypothesis?
- (ii) Is this discourse consistent?
- (iii) What are its main effects? Are they propositional and/or non-propositional?

In order to answer these questions, I need to recall what basic properties of *global hypotheses* are:

1. They are, like local hypotheses, the result of a hypothesis formation-confirmation process.
2. These hypotheses are non-demonstrative, that is, they are cancelable.
3. They are constructed on the basis of *local hypotheses* processed previously (mid-term memory), *encyclopedic knowledge* (long-term memory), and the *cognitive environment mutual* to *S* and *A* (short-term memory).

The question is now whether any global informative hypothesis is accessible during the processing of Le Pen's discourse? Before answering this question, I would like to stress the fact that some *local* hypotheses are inferable from the utterances composing Le Pen's discourse:

- (5) Lower class citizens are invited to vote for Le Pen.
- (6) Every French citizen is invited to vote for Le Pen.
- (7) Le Pen wants to rebuild France.
- (8) Any citizen having voted for another candidate or having not voted is invited to vote for Le Pen.
- (9) Le Pen is altogether a lefty, a conservative and a nationalist.
- (10) Le Pen is a free man.

Are all these hypotheses subsumed by any *global* hypothesis? Let's recall our proposal for coherence judgment:

The global informative hypothesis (GIH) constraint

A discourse is coherent relative to the accessibility and the complexity of its global hypothesis:

- (i) The more accessible GIH is, the more coherent the discourse is.
- (ii) The more complex GIH is, the more coherent the discourse is.

In Le Pen's discourse, one global informative hypothesis is accessible ('*Vote for Le Pen*'), but this hypothesis is trivially implicated by the situation of communication (easily accessible) and lacks complexity. The result of this is a discourse locally coherent and consistent, but with little global coherence.

Can we draw any conclusion from this analysis? Even if any generalization about manipulation discourses is abusive, let's try to make a new hypothesis about manipulation discourses and logical consistency. First, let me note that what we call logical consistency is not a normative constraint on a type of discourse³, but is required by any information processing device ('*avoid contradiction*'). In Le Pen's discourse, there is one inconsistent utterance, given in (11):

- (11) Je suis socialement à gauche, économiquement à droite et plus que jamais, nationalement de France.
'*I am socially a liberal, economically a conservative and more than ever, nationally a Frenchman.*'

What does this utterance mean? Is it consistent? It is inconsistent because it leads to different contradictory statements, given in (12)-(14):

- (12) Le Pen is a liberal (from *I am socially a liberal*).
- (13) Le Pen is a conservative (from *I am economically a conservative*).
- (14) Le Pen is a nationalist (from *I am more than ever, nationally a Frenchman*).

³ See Banfield (1982) for a tentative definition of fiction based on a logical constraint of consistency. See Reboul (1992), Moeschler & Reboul (1994) and Reboul & Moeschler (1998) for counter-arguments.

Even if these propositional effects are restricted to specific domains (social politics, economical politics, and European politics), they are contradictory to each other, i.e. not compatible altogether. In France at least, to be a liberal implies to support an economic policies based on the redistribution of wealth and not on individual profit, and to agree with ‘more Europe’ in national political life.

So, some propositional effects are contradictory with one another. What about non-propositional effects? Recall that our main hypothesis on manipulation discourses is that propositional effects, if any, are obtained through non-propositional affects. The last part of the analysis will focus on the non-propositional effects conveyed by Le Pen’s discourse.


4. Propositional and non-propositional effects

Some lexical words in Le Pen’s discourse are directly linked to *qualia*, that is, “the felt or phenomenal qualities associated with experiences such as the feeling of a pain, or the hearing of a sound or the viewing of a color” (Blackburn 1996, 313). Another more intuitive way of defining *qualia* is given in a Joe Cocker tune, *Simple Things* (*Greatest Hits*, 1998, EMI):

- (15) The simple things like happiness, joy, and love in my life
 (...) The best things in life are the simple things.

Like Joe Cocker, the philosopher Daniel Dennett claims “qualia are what makes life worth living” (Dennett 1991). Picture 1, taken from a paper by Anne Reboul (2002), gives an iconic representation of the relation between *qualia* and life experience:

Picture 1: Qualia and life experience (© Anne Reboul)



What are Le Pen’s discourse main non-propositional effects? In Le Pen’s discourse, *qualia* are appealed to through linguistic expressions, more precisely *qualia* lexicon and *qualia* phrases, given in (16) and (17):

- (16) *Qualia* lexicon
- | | |
|-----------|----------|
| peur | ‘fear’ |
| espérance | ‘hope’ |
| rêver | ‘dream’ |
| supporter | ‘suffer’ |
| misère | ‘misery’ |
| ruine | ‘ruin’ |

insécurité ‘*insecurity*’

(17) *Qualia* phrases

n’ayez pas peur ‘*don’t be afraid*’
 rentrez dans l’espérance ‘*come back to hope*’
 n’ayez pas peur de rêver ‘*don’t be afraid of dreaming*’

What are the main implications of the use of *qualia* expressions in this discourse? Their main effect is not propositional, i.e. there is no state of affairs or representations of states of affairs accessible throughout these expressions. In other words, their effects are mainly emotional and they are supposed to create new mental states involving feelings, emotions, and not mental representations of situations. This explains why they do not need to be consistent with one another. So, Le Pen’s utterance in (11), though propositionally inconsistent, is relevant enough to create non-propositional effects. These non-propositional effects are the necessary inputs of any possible propositional effect, for instance, the beliefs given in (12)-(14).

At the beginning of this paper, I proposed to define manipulation discourses by three properties: (i) their lack of a global informative hypothesis; (ii) their lack of logical consistency; and (iii) the mainly non-propositional aspects of their cognitive effects. The question I would like to answer now is the possible convergence of these properties.

A possible answer is a positive one, because they all require a particular mental disposition, at the basis of totalitarian discourses, that is, the appeal to emotions as a cognitive mode, the appeal to a better future, the appeal to any non-consistent local inferred meaning, and, last but not least, the appeal to the communicator’s confidence. Now, we can easily show that all of these properties are shared by Le Pen’s discourse: he is appealing to emotion, to a better future, he does not care about consistency, and he is asking for French citizens’ confidence. In short, Le Pen’s discourse is not only a manipulation discourse it also resembles totalitarian discourses.

5. Conclusion

The last question I would like to ask, as a conclusion, is whether these properties are specific to manipulation discourses. Now, my answer will be a negative one. In fact, some of these properties are shared by other discourses, like pathological ones, namely the lack of global intention, the local and global inconsistency. But I would like to risk a parallel between manipulation discourses and religious ones, which impose believing in events, facts, concepts against material and rational evidences. Here is a very enlightening analysis by a cognitivist anthropologist of religions, Pascal Boyer:

“Men are not believers because they hide their critical capability and take extraordinary assertions as true; they hide their critical capability because some extraordinary assertions have become obvious.” (Boyer 2001: 36, translation’s mine).

Do manipulation discourses make obvious certain extraordinary assertions? Certainly, and Le Pen’s discourse, like a lot of others, is full of extraordinary assertions.

For a long time, political analysts took for granted the mysterious adhesion to political extraordinary assertions. Now the mystery becomes a problem. This problem can be summed up by the following questions: Do communicative and cognitive properties of manipulation discourses explain their social and political effects? Are political and social events caused by manipulation discourses? The simple things we can state here as tentative answers is that first to have social and political effects, manipulation discourses must first have non-propositional and propositional effects, and second manipulation discourses cause changes in an addressee’s beliefs. Action, if it occurs, is simply a consequence of these beliefs.

References

- Banfield, Ann. (1982). *Unspeakable Sentences. Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Boyer, Pascal. 2001. *Et l'homme créa les dieux. Comment expliquer la religion*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Blackburn, Simon. 1996. *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dennett, Daniel. 1991. *Consciousness Explained*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Frith, Christopher D. 1992. *The Cognitive Neurophysiology of Schizophrenia*. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Moeschler, Jacques & Reboul, Anne. 1994. *Dictionnaire encyclopédique de pragmatique*. Paris: Seuil.
- Reboul, Anne. 1992. *Rhétorique et stylistique de la fiction*. Nancy, Presses Universitaires de Nancy.
- Reboul, Anne. 2002. Does the hard problem of consciousness flounder in the gap between logical and natural possibility?. *Tucson International Conference on Consciousness*, April 2002, poster session.
- Reboul, Anne & Moeschler, Jacques, 1997. Reduction and contextualization in pragmatics and discourse analysis. In: Eckart Rolf (ed.), *Pragmatik. Implikaturen und Sprechakten. Linguistische Berichte Sonderheft 8*. 283-295.
- Reboul, Anne & Moeschler, Jacques. 1998. *Pragmatique du discours. De l'interprétation de l'énoncé à l'interprétation du discours*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre. 1995. *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd edition.
- Wilson, Deirdre & Sperber, Dan. To appear. Relevance theory. In: G. Ward & Larry Horn (eds). *Handbook of Pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell.


Annex

I give here the four pages of Le Pen's propaganda for the second round of the 2002 French presidential election. This document has been sent to each French citizen registered for voting. This document focuses on utterance (11) (front page) analyzed in the paper. It offers a manuscript text from Le Pen and a photograph of his wife Jany Le Pen (page 2), a modified version of his talk on April 21 (page 3), and an informal photograph of Le Pen, without glasses and suits, showing a strong resemblance with the famous French TV anchorman Guy Lux (page 4).



FRANCE
REDISCOVERED

*'I am socially a liberal,
economically a conservative
and more than ever,
nationally a Frenchman!'*




Frenchwomen, Frenchmen, my dear compatriots,

To you who voted for me on April 21, I can only say I am grateful. To the others, I say that we can meet and travel together in the Republic and for France".

"My husband is the most honest man I know. Tolerant and generous, I always saw him taking care more of others than of himself. He is the quiet strength France needs."⁴

⁴ The expression *force tranquille* is borrowed from François Mitterrand's slogan during his 1988 electoral campaign.



vote for me, the only candidate who can change the state of things.

Don't let yourselves be manipulated by medias or politicians.

I've never hidden the truth from you, even when truth was not nice to hear. I always respected my commitments and I'll go on in the same way tomorrow.

I have a single ambition: France and the French people.



I had a dream for each of you. The dream of a rediscovered France in which it would again be good to live. Don't be afraid of dreaming, you, the lowest ones, you the excluded, you the young, you the victims of the System, you whose voice is not heard.

Don't let you be trapped by the old division between the left and the right. For twenty years, you have born all the politicians' mistakes and embezzlements. For twenty years, they have been lying to you about insecurity, unemployment, immigration, about Europe and the rest.

You, workers of all industries ruined by Maastricht's Europe. You, artisans, shopkeepers and entrepreneurs persecuted by the tax department. You, officials and policemen, flouted by a State you are eager to defend.

You, farmers and fishermen with miserable retreats, condemned to misery and extinction.

You, parents who tremble for your children, even in school.

You, who now are afraid to go out at night in the street.

You, retired people who have difficulties making both ends.

You, Frenchwomen and Frenchmen, whatever your race, your religion or your social condition, I ask you to give France this historical chance it has to rise again at last.

A man of the people, I will always be with those who suffer.

Fatherless because of the war, I have known coldness,

hunger, poverty. I have been a manual worker then a manager. As a young MP, I fought in Algeria, with the conscripts called up for national service.

I want to bring back pride and cohesion to our great French nation. France may and must become the center of a French speaking economic, social, cultural and political world of four hundred millions of men.

Dear Compatriots, if you didn't vote or if you voted for another candidate, for the second round, don't abstain and

I am presenting myself with my head high and my hands clean.

I have always resisted adversity.

I will always be there to defend you.

I am a free, honest man in love with my country.