

*Departement of Philosophy
University of Geneva*

Epistemic Agency

Geneva, April 25-26th 2008




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Conference organized by Pascal Engel, Julien Dutant and Anne Meylan



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EPISTEME
UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

FACULTÉ DES LETTRES
Département de philosophie



**UNIVERSITÉ
DE GENÈVE**

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Friday, april 25th

Plenary sessions	Room B101	
Parallel sessions	Room B101	Room B111
9h00-10h00 Plenary session 1	<i>Chair: Pascal Engel</i>	
	John Greco (St Louis) "Knowledge as Success From Ability" (3)	
breakfast break		
10h10-11h40 Parallel session 1	<i>Chair: Matthew Chrisman</i>	<i>Chair: Trent Dougherty</i>
	Christian W. Bach (HEC Lausanne) "Comments on Interactive Epistemology" (9)	David Hunter (Ryerson) "Belief Revision and Self-Consciousness" (22)
	Anita Konzelmann Ziv (Basel) "Collective Epistemic Agency" (25)	Matthew Boyle (Harvard, Basel) "Making Up Your Mind and The Metaphysics Of Belief" (12)
11h40-12h40 Plenary session 2	<i>Chair: Fabian Dorsch</i>	
	Roger Pouivet (Nancy) "Moral and Epistemic Virtues: a Thomistic Perspective" (5)	
Lunch break		
14h10-15h10 Plenary session 3	<i>Chair: Fabrice Correia</i>	
	Olav Gjelsvik (CSMN, Oslo) "Action, Agency and Knowledge" (2)	
15h10-16h40 Parallel session 2	<i>Chair: Ariel Cecchi</i>	<i>Chair: Martijn Blaauw</i>
	Thomas Crowther (Heythrop College) "Agency and Perception"(18)	Rémi Clot-Goudard (Grenoble) "Practical Knowledge" (17)
	Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh) "Doxastic Oughts" (16)	Trent Dougherty (Rochester) "Against Pragmatic Encroachment" (20)
break		
17h00-18h30 Parallel session 3	<i>Chair: Anne Meylan</i>	<i>Chair: Davide Fassio</i>
	Conor McHugh (Edinburgh) "Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action" (28)	Uwe V. Riss (Karlsruhe) "Knowledge as Rational Capacity to Act" (30)
	Sergi Rosell (València) "Why Doxastic Voluntarism is Wrong" (31)	Benoit Gaultier (Paris 12 / Institut Jean Nicod) "Agency, Context and Knowledge" (23)
18h30-19h30 Plenary session 4	<i>Chair: Pamela Hieronymi</i>	
	Claudine Tiercelin (Institut Universitaire de France, Institut Jean Nicod, Fordham) "Knowledge, Agency and Inquiry" (7)	
dinner at 20h		

Saturday, April 26th

Plenary sessions	Room B101	
Parallel sessions	Room B101	Room B111
9h-10h Plenary session 5	<i>Chair: Pascal Engel</i>	
	Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA) "Two Kinds of Agency" (4)	
break		
10h15-12h30 Parallel session 4	<i>Chair: Julien Dutant</i>	<i>Chair: Olivier Massin</i>
	Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymont) "Evidentialism and Virtuous Agency" (10)	Berislav Marusic (Brandeis) "Epistemic Evasion" (26)
	Martijn Blaauw (Amsterdam) "Knowledge and Cognitive Achievements" (11)	Timothy Chan (East Anglia) "Transparency, Agency and Responsiveness To Reason" (15)
	Rik Peels (Utrecht) "Ignorance as an Excuse Condition for Doxastic Responsibility" (29)	J. Adam Carter (Edinburgh) "Virtue Contrastivism as an Account of Knowledge, Luck and Ability" (14)
Lunch break		
14h-15h Plenary session 6	<i>Chair: Olav Gjelsvik</i>	
	Joëlle Proust (Institut Jean Nicod, EHESS/ENS/CNRS, Paris) "Does metacognition provide an internalist justification to mental agency?" (6)	
15h-16h30 Parallel Session 5	<i>Chair: Sanna Hirvonen</i>	<i>Chair: Adam Carter</i>
	Alberto Masala (Paris 4) "Is Epistemic Normativity a Natural Evaluative Kind?" (27)	Fernando Broncano (Carlos III Madrid) & Jesús Vega (Autonoma Madrid) "Engaged Epistemic Agents" (13)
	Miguel Ángel Fernández (Mexico) "Psychologism in the theory of epistemic evaluation" (21)	Daniel Dohrn (Konstanz) "The Problem of Idealization in Hieronymi's Epistemology" (19)
break		
17h-17h45 Parallel Session 6	<i>Chair: Johannes Stern</i>	<i>Chair: Amanda Garcia</i>
	Guy Axtell (Nevada) "Thickies - An Account of Second Wave Virtue Epistemologies" (8)	Mikkel Gerken (Copenhagen) "Deliberative Warrant and Action" (24)
17h45-18h45 Plenary Session 7	<i>Chair: Claudine Tiercelin</i>	
	Fabian Dorsch (Fribourg) "Rationality and The Limits of Epistemic Agency" (1)	
dinner at 20h		

Numbers are those of the abstracts in the alphabetical list.

Abstracts

Plenary Sessions

Abstracts are listed alphabetically by author's names.

1. Fabian DORSCH (Universities of Fribourg and Geneva)

Rationality and the Limits of Epistemic Agency

The main issue which I will be concerned with is whether – and if, in which sense – events of judging can be instances of agency.

Events of judging are events of producing or sustaining a judgemental thought (and therefore perhaps also a belief), but are contrasted with the preceding events of looking for and gathering evidence. Judgemental episodes of thought (or judgements in short) are again characterised by three features: (a) they are rational in that they responsive to, and justifiable in terms of, reasons; (b) they are linked to truth in so far as they involve a commitment to how things are and ought to occur only if true; and (c) they are conscious mental phenomena (in contrast to beliefs). I will consider each of these features in turn to see whether it can shed light on the initial issue.

In the first part, I will compare the rationality of judgemental thoughts with that of agency. In particular, I will consider three conditions for rational mental phenomena:

- (RC) They are responsive to, and justifiable in terms of, reasons.
- (PC) They are responsive to, and justifiable in terms of, practical reasons.
- (VC) They are responsive to, and justifiable in terms of, practical reasons for (having or performing) themselves.

First, I will argue that (RC) is necessary, but not sufficient, for agency, mainly by highlighting significant differences between practical and epistemic rationality. Hence, although the satisfaction (RC) already may come with some form of control, responsibility or even activity, it should not be taken to suffice for agency – and events of judging cannot be instances of agency in this way. Second, I will consider the case of involuntary events of deciding and suggest that they differ from voluntary actions in that only the latter satisfy (VC), while both satisfy (RC) and (PC). Acknowledging the possibility that events of deciding are instances of agency, I take (PC) to be the mark for agency, and (VC) to be the mark for voluntariness. But even then, events of judging will differ from events of deciding. For I will argue, third, that there are events of judging which satisfy all three conditions, and not merely (RC). Example would be the normal case of forming a judgement about an issue in the light of the evidence available and in response to the intention to draw a conclusion about that issue, or the abnormal (and non-mental) case of deliberately taking a drug with the full knowledge that this is

likely to cause a certain desirable judgemental thought in one's mind. Moreover, these events turn out to be structurally like an event of deliberately kicking a ball with the full knowledge that this is likely to cause the ball to cross the line of the goal. That is, such events of judging should be treated the same as events of scoring goals. From this, I conclude that there can be events of judging that are instances of agency, given that events like scoring a goal are instances of agency.

In the second part, I will focus on what distinguishes active events of judging from certain paradigm cases of agency, such as visualising a tree or raising one's arm. In particular, I will try to specify what it means to say that we cannot form judgements at will. What will be central here is the distinction between straightforward and indirect agency. A deliberate action is straightforward just in case it is performed without (explicit or implicit) reliance on epistemic or merely causal processes as means. Scoring a goal is not straightforward (but instead indirect) because the player makes use of his knowledge of the physics of how balls move around if kicked in certain ways. Similarly, we deliberately act on our intention to form a judgement about a certain issue by relying on epistemic reasons and their rational force to bring about a certain judgemental thought. That is, we actively trigger certain epistemic processes – just as when we try to remember something. Consequently, the events of judging under discussion are instances of indirect (mental) agency – and not instances of judging at will. In contrast, visualising a tree or raising an arm are straightforwardly active because they do not require any instrumental reliance on epistemic or merely causal processes.

The third and final part will deal with the question of why events of judging cannot be instances of straightforward mental agency – of why we cannot form judgements at will. I will consider two answers to this question which make reference to the feature (b) or to the features (a) and (c), respectively.

The first answer claims that their subjection to the truth norm (cf. (b)) means that we cannot actively form judgement without having the aim of truth in mind; that acting on this aim requires making use of genuinely truth-conducive means; and that responding solely to practical, but not to epistemic reasons, is not genuinely truth-conducive. One problem with this approach is, however, that the truth norm cannot establish on its own that some actively produced thought counts as judgemental only if it has been formed with the aim of truth in mind. Furthermore, there cannot be a good reason to accept this requirement since it is false – as, for instance, the drug example above illustrates. And finally, epistemic rationality does not integrate well with practical rationality (cf. above) and, in particular, lacks the postulated instrumental link between epistemic reasons and truth.

The second answer maintains that we phenomenally experience instances of straightforward mental agency as being responses solely to practical reasons (since no epistemic or causal factors are involved as known means), while we phenomenally experience judgemental thoughts as being responses solely to epistemic reasons (even if in fact they are merely caused). But since no mental event can be both kinds of response at the same time, no mental event can have both respective phenomenologies – and can therefore be both an instances of straightforward mental agency and a judgemental thought. I will end with sketching the arguments for the claims about the phenomenal character of mental actions and judgemental episodes and thereby hope to show that the

answer in terms of our phenomenal experience of reasons (cf. (a) and (c)) can perhaps shed some light on why we cannot form judgements at will.

To conclude, events of judging can be instances of agency, but only in the indirect sense in which events like scoring a goal are instances of agency.

2. Olav GJELSVIK (CSMN, University of Oslo)

Action, Agency and Knowledge

Suppose that one basic norm of practical rationality is this (where it is stipulated that when the fact that p matters, then the choice is p -dependent): *Where one's choice is p -dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p .* This is the view of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley.

I shall argue that the correctness of the suggested basic norm of practical rationality should be accounted for by a view of agency. Hawthorne and Stanley attempt no such explanation. In fact, they just note that this norm makes no contact with standard accounts of agency. I will argue that their view would not only benefit from an account of agency, in the sense that it would benefit from the support such an account, but that its correctness should be seen as stemming from an account of agency. I aim to outline an account of agency that accounts for the correctness of this norm. This account makes close contact with Anscombe's account of agency.

References

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John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Action,
Journal of Philosophy 2007.

3. John GRECO (Saint Louis University)

Knowledge as Success from Ability

The main thesis of this paper is that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. This makes knowledge an instance of a more general normative phenomenon—that of achieving something of value through the exercise of one's own abilities. In virtue-theoretic language: knowledge is a kind of success from excellence, or excellent activity.

Part one of the paper clarifies the nature of the thesis. Part Two shows some advantages of the view with regard to answering sceptical worries, diagnosing Gettier problems, and explaining the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Part Three addresses some recent objections to the view, including the charge that it poorly explains testimonial knowledge and innate knowledge.

References

- Craig, Edward, *Knowledge and the State of Nature*. New York: Clarendon Press, 1999.
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Heller, Mark, "The Simple Solution to the Generality Problem," *Nous* 29, 4 (1995): 501-515.

4. Pamela HIERONYMI (University of California, Los Angeles)

Two Kinds of Agency

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject's answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects.

The two forms of agency are rarely distinguished, because the first does not display the most familiar and prominent features of agency, while the second might involve an exercise of the first, at two distinct points. Nonetheless, many complex exercises of agency over our minds are easily seen—I think best seen—as composed of these two, more simple, forms. My hope is that decomposing the complex exercises of agency into these two forms might bring some clarity to the difficult topic of mental agency.

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- Lackey, Jennifer, "Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know," *Synthese* 158 (2007): 345-61.

5. Roger POUVET (Université Nancy 2/LHPS-Archives Poincaré, CNRS)

Moral and Epistemic Virtues: a Thomistic Perspective

"Virtue epistemology" designates an area of recent research in the theory of knowledge. Since Descartes and Hume, epistemologists have mainly tried to determine what justifies our beliefs: what rules we must follow in order to have the right to believe something. Virtue epistemology breaks with this account. It focuses on properties of persons and their epistemic dispositions or virtues. In a virtue-based epistemology, the right question is not "What are the rules we must follow in order to have legitimate beliefs?" but "What kind of person (believer) must I be-what epistemic qualities must I have-in order to have warranted beliefs?" This reinforces the moral aspect of epistemology. In a sense, it even suggests that "epistemic evaluation just *is* a form of moral evaluation" and that "knowledge is at root a moral notion", as Linda Zagzebski has said. But is it true that moral and epistemic virtues are one and the same? I think not. Thomas Aquinas' account of the relation between moral and intellectual virtues is more cautious than Zagzebski's and more plausible too. It can better explain those cases where a bright intellectual seems to be completely devoid of moral scruples and a morally good man a little bit simple intellectually. Even if we are surprised when a great philosopher (or scientist)

appears to be morally (or politically) repugnant (for example, to have been a member of the Nazi party, or given his support to ultra-leftist terrorists), such cases are not rare! If the move from rule-based epistemology to virtue-based epistemology seems to be an exciting perspective, we must be careful not to confuse epistemology with ethics. The "ethics of belief" is perhaps not *properly* ethics, and the Aristotelian and Thomistic distinction between two sorts of virtues seems to be right.

6. Joëlle PROUST (Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS/ENS/CNRS, Paris)

Does metacognition provide an internalist justification to mental agency?

Two kinds of metacognitive interventions are needed for any mental action to be rationally performed. One consists in self-probing, ie predicting whether one has the cognitive resources necessary for the mental action to be feasible; the other consists in post-evaluating, ie appreciating whether the completed mental action is successful. Considered as dispositions, these two forms of metacognition are architectural preconditions for mental agency; considered as episodic interventions, they are constitutive parts of every mental action. Metacognition, so understood, seems most compatible with an internalist view on self-knowledge; epistemic feelings seem to confer transparency, subjective authority and immediacy to mental actions. It will be argued, however, that there are strong arguments that speak in favor of an externalist view, in which the environmental features that structure metacognitive evaluations consist in the feedback history for a particular kind of task. On such a view, transparency, authority and immediacy are derived from the dynamic architecture that governs self-knowledge in an essentially opaque, although reliable way.

7. Claudine TIERCELIN (Institut Universitaire de France, Institut Jean Nicod, Fordham)

Knowledge, Agency and Inquiry

Pragmatism has often been presented – in particular by Christopher Hookway – as the view according to which knowledge can nearly be equated with inquiry both as a natural and normative question-answer process which takes one from a state of doubt prompted by a genuine, causal disruption of our commonsensical beliefs, and dispositions to a state of satisfactory belief as a result of a reliable, controlled, criticized, goal directed hence successful, epistemic enterprise. Consequently pragmatism would seem to be more favourable to a conception of epistemology in which knowledge is less defined in a static and standard way as justified true belief than in a dynamic, reliable, successful, agent-based enterprise, resulting from the actions of epistemic agents and consisting in virtuous dispositions explaining how we can be held responsible for our beliefs and our inquiries.

The talk aims at discussing Hookway's pragmatist conception of knowledge **as** inquiry and will offer a

different, though still pragmatist strategy the result of which will be : 1) a definition of inquiry as aiming at knowledge, 2) a conception of knowledge as justified true belief, in the sense of critical, commonsensical and warranted assertions produced by intellectual and sentimental disposition for which 3) the epistemic agent, viewed less as an individual person than as a scientific community of inquirers, should be held both answerable (in so far as his cognitive abilities are less rule-governed than they are fixed by the constraints of the real) and responsible (since even if he cannot control the whole of his epistemic evaluations he should still be able to control and criticize the methods he is using in order to be credited not only as a virtuous inquirer but as knowing and reliable agent).

Parallel Sessions

Abstracts are listed alphabetically by author's names.

8. Guy AXTELL (University of Nevada)

Thickies: An Account of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemologies

In a paper on norms and rationality, our conference host, Pascal Engel, notes that within the domain of normative concepts it is common to distinguish two classes:

evaluative or axiological concepts, such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘desirable’, among which philosophers also distinguish --‘thin’ concepts (‘good’, ‘bad’) and --thick concepts (‘courageous’, ‘coward’); [and] *deontic* concepts, such as ‘right’, ‘ought’, ‘permissible’, ‘forbidden’ (deontic concepts [being] by definition thin)

The distinction between evaluative concepts (which may be either thin or thick), deontic concepts (which are always thin), provides a useful starting point to my talk, since I want to argue that the present ‘wave’ of virtue epistemology is populated by epistemological “thickies.” Much as Jonathan Dancy says we do in ethics, we begin with “three layers”: the non-normative at the bottom, the thick-normative in the middle, and the thin-normative at the top (2004, 84). Evaluations of epistemically responsible actions-in-inquiry and creditably reliable epistemic agency proceeds from what Dancy calls “the thick intermediate layer” of concepts, the layer which includes the intellectual virtues and vices. Thickies are concerned with axiological or value-theoretic questions about what aims guide our intellectual lives, and what kinds of agent evaluation we find most useful for our various theoretic and practical purposes. Epistemological thickies are pushed by these questions of the nature and sources of epistemic value, to find it important to engage empirical research on cognition, and “thick description” of human intellectual habits and dispositions, and the social practices in which norms are embedded.

As time allows, I want not only to sketch but also to articulate some of the philosophical rationale for research interests of epistemological “thickies”. Most especially, I want to make it an aim of the paper is to show the continuities between the research interests associated with second-wave virtue epistemologies, and conceptions of agency and normativity associated with *classical pragmatism*. It seems fitting for a virtue epistemology to look for norms in social practices, and this is where classical pragmatism found it. There are important points of connection between the pragmatist tradition and John Greco’s recent writings on epistemic normativity, and want to highlight those connections. Most specifically, as the pragmatist wants, Greco offers us a way to resituate our normative interests in epistemic agency within a broader and more varied class of social practices. But if our question were which forms of virtue epistemology best cohere with and explicitly incorporate aspects of the classical pragmatic naturalism of Dewey, Peirce, and C.I. Lewis, then we must look to explicitly “inquiry-focused” versions of responsibility, the best-

developed account of which is Chris Hookway’s (Hookway 2006; also Axtell 1993, 1996; Elgin 2008; Olson 2006). So in providing a description and philosophic rationale for the research interests of epistemological thickies I will focus on Hookway’s prescribed shift “from the doxastic paradigm to epistemology-as-inquiry” (2006) in his paper, ‘Epistemology and Inquiry: The Primacy of Practice,’ and then extend the discussion to what he and other inquiry-focused virtue epistemologists draw from the classical pragmatists, and how their accounts of epistemic normativity are further supported in the thought of recent pragmatists like Hilary Putnam and the late Frederick Will.

9. Christian W. BACH (University of Lausanne)

Comments on Interactive Epistemology

In game theory the very recent discipline of interactive epistemology scrutinizes the relationship between knowledge and action of rational game-playing agents. The basic problem addressed is the identification of the players’ choices in any given game relative to various epistemic assumptions. More precisely, it is attempted to characterize existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as to propose novel solution concepts by studying the implications of further epistemic hypotheses. Having been initiated by Aumann (1976), explicitly and precisely articulated notably by Aumann (1999a), (1999b), Battigalli and Bonanno (1999), Binmore and Brandenburger (1988), Board (2004), Brandenburger (1992), (2007), Dekel and Gul (1997) as well as Geanakoplos (1992), there essentially exist three prominent approaches to interactive epistemology in games. While set-based models represent the players’ epistemic states as sets of possible worlds, type-based models encapsulate them in the notion of type. Farther, the logic-based approach represents epistemic states directly by means of logical operators in some syntax furnished with meaning via appropriate Kripke semantics. Independent from the specific game-theoretic context in which it has been originated and is currently developed, interactive epistemology is in fact capable of providing a general framework for practical reasoning of agents on the basis of their knowledge. This recent research program could thus constitute a convenient way to generally think about the relationship between knowledge and action. Therefore the basic building blocks of interactive epistemology are presented as a general theory of practical reasoning and illustrated in the first part of the talk. Then some conceptual observations are raised and discussed in the second part.

First of all, it is claimed that the set-theoretic approach to interactive epistemology faces an ambiguity problem with regards to events. If a given set of possible worlds can represent various events, then interactive reasoning is rendered impossible since different agents might associate distinct events with the same set of worlds. Even if some appropriate non-ambiguity assumption for basic events were explicitly endorsed, ambiguity can fling back when the scope of consideration is extended to include epistemic events. The paradoxical situation seems to emerge that in a set-based approach either ambiguous events are to be admitted or no interactive reasoning be possible. Such an ambiguity problem

does not pop up within the type-based and logic-based models and thus delivers an argument in their favour.

Moreover, a more general problem common to all three approaches to interactive epistemology is their inability to distinguish between reasoning and decision-making. It is therefore argued for an explicit distinction and thus towards an corresponding extended framework. A pleasant consequence would then be the ability to secure freedom of choice in games by making some choice function dependent on a temporally or informationally prior period of reasoning, which could hence be interpreted as the decisions deliberately made by the agents after having thought about the respective problem. Farther, notions of interest in game theory such as reasonability of belief and rationality of choice could be neatly conceptually separated as referring to reasoning and decision-making, respectively.

Finally, the standard definition of common knowledge that goes back to Lewis (1969) is revisited. Intuitively, one might conjecture that common knowledge and the limit of higher-order mutual knowledge should always be equivalent due to the truth axiom of knowledge theory. Yet, taking a rigorous look, Bach and Cabessa (2008) use topological arguments to show that common knowledge needs not to be equal to the limit of higher-order mutual knowledge for infinite state spaces and consequently introduce the epistemic notion of limit knowledge. An interesting path for future work could thus be the exploration of the implications of limit knowledge for play in games. Moreover, since the equivalence holds for finite state space, the result might also be regarded as some kind of confirmation of Savage's (1954) smallworld assumption in the sense of having well-behaved epistemic operators only in finite state spaces which contain smaller worlds than infinite state spaces.

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10. Jason BAEHR (Loyola Marymount University)

Evidentialism and Virtuous Agency

I argue that a plausible version of evidentialism about epistemic justification must incorporate a virtue-relevant background constraint. The evidentialist principle at issue says (roughly) that *a person is justified in believing a given claim p just in case this person's evidence supports p*. I consider two sets of cases which indicate that it is possible to satisfy the evidentialist's condition while failing to have a justified belief. In the first set of cases, the individuals in question have well-supported beliefs, but only because they have failed to inquire about the relevant subjective matter or have inquired in a superficial or shoddy way. In the second set of cases, the individuals are presently ignoring or distorting potential defeaters. After considering several possible ways around the cases, I conclude that a plausible version of evidentialism must incorporate a condition which requires intellectually virtuous agency (thereby ruling out the relevant sort of intellectual laziness, superficial inquiry, dogmatism, narrowmindedness, etc.). The most obvious strategy is to incorporate a condition that makes virtuous agency *necessary* for justification. I explain why this proposal is too strong and why the condition in question should instead be understood as a *precondition* that applies *only* in circumstances in which a believer's agency makes a salient contribution to her "evidential situation." The discussion underscores an important link between traditional epistemology and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology.

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11. Martijn BLAAUW (Amsterdam Free University)

Knowledge and cognitive achievements

According to John Greco, knowledge should be analyzed in terms of 'success through ability'. As such, knowledge is taken to be an *achievement* of a special sort, to wit: a cognitive achievement (call this the 'achievement thesis'). Moreover, since an achievement has final value, knowledge also has final value (call this the 'final value thesis'). In this paper, I will focus on the achievement thesis.

Duncan Pritchard has recently argued against this thesis. He has argued, first, that there are cases of knowledge in which there is no cognitive achievement at all. Consider, for instance, the case due to Jennifer Lackey in which the subject receives knowledge through testimony. In this case, there is knowledge. But since the subject has only received the information in question through the testimony of someone else, one could argue that there is no substantial achievement on the part of the subject. The testifier has done all the hard work. Pritchard has argued, secondly, that there are cases of cognitive achievement even though there is no knowledge. Consider, for instance, the case of Archie the archer. Archie selects the target out of several other targets and hits the bull's eye. Unbeknownst to him, however, the target he choose is the only target that is not a fake target. When he would have aimed at all the other targets, he would have missed due to the fact that a gust of wind would have blown his arrow away from the target. As such, this case is supposed to be analogous to the fake barn case in which the subject has hit the truth due to what Pritchard calls 'environmental luck'.

In this paper, I will defend Greco's analysis of knowledge in terms of 'success through ability' from both these objections. I will argue, against the first objection, that it can be made plausible that there *is* a cognitive achievement in the testimony case. I will argue, against the second objection, that there are crucial disanalogies between the Archie case and the fake barn case that prevent this objection from having much force. I conclude that Greco's analysis of knowledge in terms of 'success through ability' has not been challenged by Pritchard's counterexamples.

12. Matthew BOYLE (Harvard University, Universität Basel)

'Making up Your Mind' and the Metaphysics of Belief

According to a venerable philosophical tradition, the fact that we human beings can *make up* our minds makes for a deep difference between us and other sorts of conscious creatures. A creature that can make up its mind is one that does not just perceive and react instinctively to its perceptions; it can *judge*. It is one that does not just desire things and unthinkingly pursue them; it can *choose*. It is one that does not just habitually associate one thing with another; it can *reason*. These and other familiar philosophical contrasts hang together with the thought that rational creatures are distinguished by their capacity for a special sort of mental agency or self-determination, a capacity which makes their cognition different in principle from the cognition of a nonrational creature.

This way of drawing the distinction between rational and nonrational mentality has a long history, but it is not just of historical interest. It is reaffirmed in important recent work in both practical and theoretical philosophy. Thus, in an influential discussion of why human action is subject to moral requirements, Christine Korsgaard traces this subjection to the following contrast:

A lower animal's attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will... [But] our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, to call them into question... I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance... Shall I act? Is this desire really a *reason* to act? (Korsgaard 1996, p. 93)

And similarly, in widely-discussed series of contributions to the epistemology of perception, John McDowell has argued that a crucial constraint on an account of human perceptual experience derives from the fact that we are creatures that judge on the basis of perception, where

judging, making up our minds what to think, is something for which we are, in principle, responsible—something we freely do, as opposed to something that merely happens in our lives. (McDowell 1998, p. 434)

The common theme of these passages is that a rational intellect is characterized by a special sort of freedom, one that permits it to "distance itself" from the sorts of mental states and events that would directly determine the beliefs and actions of a nonrational creature. Both Korsgaard and McDowell take this point to be connected with the fact that a rational intellect has the power to reflect on its own condition, a power that both call "self-consciousness." For both authors, this conception of rationality has its roots in Kant; but the idea that there is a close connection between reason and freedom is hardly restricted to Kantians. The thought that we must represent rational actions not as the mere outcome of a battle between conflicting impulses but as the product of free choice, and that we must represent rational beliefs not as the mere result of sensory intake but as the product of free judgment, is widespread, and has roots in ordinary intuition.

What, though, does it mean to say that I can "make up my mind"? The phrase seems intended to describe an act, but

what sort of act can this be? Presumably it cannot be an act of the same kind as my intentionally boarding the 10 o'clock train to Budapest. For my ability to make up my mind about what to do is supposed to be a crucial part of what explains my ability to act intentionally: to say that a subject is able to do things intentionally, rather than merely being driven to act by blind impulse, is, on the present view, precisely to say that he is capable of making up his mind in favor of ("choosing," "willing") a course of action. To explain what it is to make up one's mind by appeal to the idea of an intentional action would thus be to explain rational agency by appeal to itself. But if the sort of self-determination involved in making one's mind cannot be explained by appeal to the idea of intentional action, how can we explain it?

Although the images of a rational subject "stepping back" and "taking charge" are familiar, their literal significance turns out to be obscure. We are asked what it is for a rational subject to have the power herself to determine what she believes and how she acts, and we answer: it is for her to have the power herself to *decide* which appearances to accept, which impulses to go along with. But this act of deciding must surely be an instance of the very sort of rational self-determination that we wanted to understand.

One reaction to this situation would be to question the traditional association between reason and freedom. But that is not the reaction I aim to recommend. My paper is provoked, on the one hand, by sympathy with the conception of reason expressed by Korsgaard and McDowell, and on the other hand, by dissatisfaction with available explanations of it. My aim is to understand what the power to make up one's mind could be and how it could have the sort of significance that philosophical tradition accords to it. I argue that a variety of popular accounts of what it is to make up one's mind are unsatisfactory and that, perhaps surprisingly, a satisfactory account is possible only if we acknowledge that the power to make up one's mind differentiates our minds from the minds of nonrational creatures in an even more fundamental way than contemporary philosophers typically suppose. Many contemporary philosophers accept what I call *tack-on theories of rationality* – theories on which the power of reason supplies a creature with a special way of arriving at beliefs and actions, but does not make its beliefs and actions themselves different in any fundamental way from those of a nonrational creature. I argue that philosophers who accept this sort of view must also accept a *process conception* of making up one's mind, one on which this phrase designates a temporally-extended process which rational subjects go through on particular occasions. But, I suggest, the process conception implies an unacceptable picture of the kind of agency one exercises in making up one's mind. The upshot is that we must reject the tack-on approach, and consequently must think differently about the nature of rational belief: we must conceive of belief in a rational creature as a fundamentally different kind of condition from anything we might call "belief" in a creature lacking the power to make up its mind.

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13.Fernando BRONCANO (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Jesús VEGA (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

Engaged Epistemic Agents. A constitutive model of epistemic normativity

In this paper, we will present what we will call a *constitutive model* of epistemic normativity. The idea behind the model is that there are certain constitutive facts within the epistemic domain that account for the normative properties in force within it. In the framework of this discussion, we will understand by *constitutive* those features that allow to explain *how epistemic success is achieved*. One of our main contentions will be that the *identification* of the subject with her own epistemic tasks helps to explain how she *engages* herself in the task of knowing and how she becomes epistemically responsible. We will contrast this conception with other alternatives in terms of motivation, and in particular with the idea that motivation, even if valuable, is fundamental in accounting for the epistemic normativity. Our proposal will appeal to a notion of epistemic perspective as the way how the agent is engaged in an epistemic normative task.

We will take the normative issue in epistemology as demanding an explanation for the fact that human beings sometimes act according to the conception they have of themselves as engaged in certain tasks. So then, we are epistemically normative beings insofar as we "act" according to the conception we have of ourselves as engaged in certain epistemic tasks. Two different strands are twisted in the formulation of the problem: the first concerns the normative properties in force within the epistemic domain, that is, those that are compelling within the domain (this strand includes the so-called value problem in epistemology); the second refers to how these valuable properties exert any authority on the knowing agents.

We will tackle the normative issue within the framework of so-called *agent-centered* epistemologies. Agent-centered epistemologies were conceived to answer some difficulties in traditional forms of reliabilism. They seek to define knowledge by appealing to the cognitive character of the agent. Insofar as the agent is constituted by the possession of a set of cognitive virtues, they adopt the form of a virtue epistemology, according to which epistemic *success* is *due* to the agent and depends on *how* he exerts the virtues. There is a sense in which epistemic success is an *achievement* of him; it is attributable to him (Sosa); something he deserves some merit for (Riggs, Zagzebski, Greco). Within this framework, some epistemologists (Zagzebski) sustain that agent's motivations play a fundamental role in solving the normative issue (and the value problem).

(*Motivationalism*) S's acts acquire epistemically normative properties (by which they deserve credit of discredit) if and only if they are successful (in acquiring this property) because S acted moved by appropriate (epistemic) motives.

The idea is that those normative aspects that are characteristic of knowing are accounted by the belief arising from intellectual virtues, whose value derives from the value of the epistemic motivation (desire of knowledge) of the agents.

There are many objections to this kind position:

(1) Motivation does not affect the value of the performance; if the *quality* of a performance (how the subject contributes to the success) does not change depending on the motivation of the agent, then motivation doesn't add any significant value to the *epistemic* achievement.

(2) Although motivationalism could be better suited to explain why we believe moved by reasons, this by itself does not address the normative issue. It is necessary yet to distinguish between the agent acting *because* he is moved by a reason and the success taking place *because* the reasons why the agent acted were appropriate.

(3) There is a plausible alternative to motivationalism in explaining non-accidentality and subjective responsibility in epistemic evaluations. Being responsible, also in epistemic matters, can be a question of being guided by the conception of what we have a reason to do.

(4) A motivation expresses the normative commitments an agent is disposed to take within a certain domain, but as such it accounts neither for the normative force of the commitments nor for the fact that the subject is concerned by this commitment.

We think that a *constitutive model* is better suited to answer the normative issue.

Firstly, we will introduce the structure of our constitutive model: (1) There are some *constitutive facts* that explain which values are substantive or fundamental to the domain. (2) Success in the domain is taken as an *achievement* of the agents. (3) Agents engage in normative tasks by the conception they have of themselves as epistemic agents. (4) As far as they act autonomously, they take a responsible attitude towards their engagement.

We will consider *constitutive* the properties that explain *how success is attained* within the domain. "How success is attained" means: *how the agents attain success*, such that it can be considered their *achievement* within the domain.

- Truth and how truth is attained are valuable because of the constitutive processes in which agents are involved.
- Within the epistemic domain, important constitutive facts are the epistemic virtues understood as stable and reliable dispositions.
- It is constitutive of the epistemic domain "to attain the truth *due to* the competence of the subject".
- The epistemic domain is constituted in so far as our beliefs acquire the property called *aptness* as a property to achieve true beliefs (Sosa).

Secondly, we will defend that normativity has to do with how human beings act according to the conception they have of themselves. It is our contention that human beings become epistemic agents by being able of identifying themselves with the results of their cognitive faculties. An epistemic agent is not a mere bunch of (reliable) faculties. The idea of what an epistemic agent is must answer two different questions: (i) the question of *unity*: an agent needs to possess a cognitive architecture that enables him to bind different cognitive outcomes according to their epistemic properties; (ii) the question of *cognitive autonomy*: a subject is an epistemically autonomous agent when it is able to identify himself with his own productions given that he recognizes their epistemic value.

The agents are sensitive to the epistemic properties when they undertake an epistemic task by taking a perspective on their own cognitive situation. We will end the paper by explaining what we understand by taking a perspective. Two analogies that will outstand the role of attention will help in this task. The agent regards his situation as one in which he needs to engage normatively in order to achieve the task .

In this model, responsibility does not arise from the right motivations of the agent, but from the use of the recognitional capacities that make us aware of the normative claims involved in the task. Responsibility arises from one's noticing to be under the constraints imposed by the task of attaining knowledge.

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14.J. Adam CARTER (University of Edinburgh) Virtue Contrastivism as an Account of Knowledge, Luck and Ability

The topic of this essay will be the central problem facing contemporary virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge: the problem of characterizing what I shall call here the V-connection: the special way in which a knower's having formed a true belief is because of, through or depends on her intellectual virtue or ability. What has been the most glaring difficulty among proponents of these virtue-theoretic accounts (Zagzebski), (Sosa), (Greco) is establishing the role of cognitive ability or virtue so as to illuminate how it both (i) gives rise to the agent's true belief; and (ii) guarantees that the belief will be appropriately safe (couldn't have easily been false).

The purpose of this essay will be two fold: first, to bring critical attention to the most important features of John Greco's (forthcoming) rich and stimulating new approach to this connection, and to make clear why the plausibility of his account is ultimately undermined by his thought that luck is blocked whenever interests and purposes of the relevant context make salient the role of virtue within causal explanations for true beliefs. My second aim will be to argue that a correct account of the opposition between ability and luck must abandon ideas marked by comparative salience, as

well as dependence incompatibilism, in favor of a new approach I call virtue contrastivism. Taking as a starting point that dependence of a true belief on ability opposes luck not rigidly, but by de-

gree, the central idea of virtue contrastivism is that knower's true beliefs will depend on ability more so than on luck, as opposed to ability rather than luck, or ability more saliently than luck. The approach defended here (i) restricts the ways in which knowledge depends on interests, (ii) requires that the V-connection be sensitive to the safety of beliefs, and (iii) preserves the central role of knowledge ascriptions is to flagging good information (Craig) for use in practical reasonings (Hawthorne).

15. Timothy CHAN (University of East Anglia)

Transparency, Agency and Responsiveness to Reason

In what sense, if any, can a person be regarded as an active agent responsible for a belief of hers? Moran observes that in order to see a person as a rational agent at all, philosophers of mind and action need to take account of “the person’s authority to make up his mind and have that actually count for something, count as determining his belief” (2001: 123). Moran argues that first-person authority about one’s belief is a matter of a rational agent’s being, in Hampshire’s (1965: 80) terms, “the responsible author of his beliefs”, and not merely immediate and epistemically privileged access. In Moran’s view, I am an active agent responsible for my belief that *p* if and only if it satisfies the condition of *transparency*:

(Transparency) When asked ‘Do you believe *p*’, I can answer this question by consideration of the reasons in favour of *p* itself. (Moran 2003: 405)

I believe that Moran is right in identifying transparency as the essential condition for agency with respect to belief, and in this paper I argue in its favour by way of addressing two questions. First, what does responsibility for one’s belief that *p* have to do with the way in which one answers the question, ‘Do I believe that *p*?’ Second, can the transparency account provide an answer to the sceptic who rejects any talk of agency and responsibility for belief in the first place, on the ground that belief is, as Bernard Williams (1970) famously observes, not subject to the will?

In answering the first question, concerning the relationship between rational agency and self-knowledge, I will compare the Hampshire-Moran view of transparent belief with Anscombe’s account of non-observational knowledge about intentional action. In her *Intention* (1957) Anscombe suggests it is a distinctive characteristic of intentional action – actions which the agent sees as her own, done for a reason of hers – that the agent is able to know what she is doing without relying on empirical observations. Intentional actions are acts for which a type of Why-questions is appropriate; the answers to such questions would express the agent’s reasons for the action. From the agent’s perspective, deciding what to do is a matter of considering and weighing these reasons for or against taking an action. Suppose that at the conclusion of a process of practical reasoning, the agent decides, “I shall Φ ”. This thought would in the first instance constitute the agent’s intention, but insofar as her practical reasoning is effectively implemented in what she does, it would also be a correct

description of what she is doing. Thus, from the perspective of the acting agent, under favourable circumstances, practical reasons for Φ -ing can also serve as epistemic reasons for thinking that one is Φ -ing. Such reasons enable a rational agent to know what she is doing without relying on empirical observation of her bodily movements. I shall develop an account of the significance of transparent self-knowledge of one’s own belief which mirrors the above account of Anscombe’s on the significance of non-observational knowledge of one’s own action. Epistemic reasons that I have in favour of *p* can serve as epistemic reasons for me to self-attribute the belief that *p*, if and only if I can justifiably regard my belief as rational, i.e. responsive to the appropriate kind of reasons.

Many philosophers would find it problematic to draw the foregoing comparison between belief and epistemic reasons, on the one hand, with action and practical reasons, on the other. Whereas in practical reasoning we make a *decision* about what to do in the light of what Anscombe calls “desirability characterizations”, belief is, as Williams argues, not subject to the will. If responsibility presupposes the possibility of volitional control, then the idea that one can be an agent responsible for one’s belief would seem to be untenable. Alston, for example, has argued against the deontological conception of justification on this basis (Alston 1988). But the idea that responsibility requires control subject to the will is subject to well-known difficulties even in the case of action. I want to apply alternative views of freedom and responsibility, which are justifiable on independent grounds, to make sense of agency and responsibility as applied to belief. For example, Susan Wolf defends what she calls “the Reason View” of freedom (Wolf 1990), according to which to be free is to possess the ability to recognize and respond to reasons. A free belief would thus be one which is held by someone who has the ability to form a belief on the subject matter in question in a justified manner. Developing a closely related view, Pettit and Smith (1996) argue that “[t]o hold a belief ... freely is to hold it in the presence of an ability, should the belief ... be wrong, to get it right”. If to be a free agent is to possess the ability to respond appropriately to reasons, then we can make sense of someone being free in holding some beliefs in just the same manner as we can understand her as acting freely, by considering epistemic and practical reasons respectively. Since transparency, as I have argued, results from one’s ability to respond to epistemic reasons in the formation of one’s beliefs, which is what free belief requires, we can now see why transparency is the mark of free agency with respect to belief.

Moreover, I argue that on the Pettit-Smith view of freedom as “orthonomy” (being governed by the right reasons), the relationship between practical and doxastic agency is much closer than mutually illuminating parallels. The ability to act freely actually *requires* the ability to believe freely; and thus one is in a position to know what one is doing non-observationally only if one is in a position to know what one believes transparently (i.e. in a way which satisfies the condition of Transparency). For actions are justified by beliefs as well as desires, which means that the ability to respond to practical reasons for action must presuppose the ability to respond to epistemic reasons in adopting the premises that go into one’s practical reasoning. Hence, I conclude, free agency in action requires free agency in belief.

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16. Matthew CHRISMAN (University of Edinburgh)

Doxastic Oughts

We sometimes say things of the form ‘S ought to believe that p’. For instance, you ought to believe that you are reading right now and students of geography ought to believe that London is the capital of the UK. These are doxastic oughts.

Philosophers who we may refer to as doxastic involuntarists call the cogency of doxastic oughts into question because of the (apparent?) fact that we do not exercise direct voluntary control over our beliefs (Alston 1988, Plantinga 1993). To illustrate this fact they point out that, when offered a reward for believing this or that proposition, we usually cannot just form the belief in order to collect the reward, which contrasts with ordinary actions, such as raising one’s hand or turning on the lights. It seems, that is, that we cannot believe at will; for, if we could, when the reward was great enough we’d do so in order to collect the reward. And because of this there is something illegitimate about doxastic oughts: they presuppose a control or freedom that we simply do not possess.

Philosophers who we may refer to as epistemic deontologists typically try to rebut this argument and support the cogency of doxastic oughts in one of two ways. First, they argue that we do have a sort of doxastic control or freedom, despite our inability to believe at will (Steup 2000, Ryan 2003). Second, they appeal to other cases where it appears that ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’ and attempt to model an account of doxastic oughts on these cases (Kornblith 2001, Feldman 2003).

In this paper, I argue that neither way of defending the cogency of doxastic oughts has been completely successful against the involuntarist’s challenge. However, I think doxastic oughts clearly are cogent. So, I propose a new way to understand them.

The key distinction is between what Sellars (1969) called ‘rules of action’ and ‘rules of criticism’, or ought-to-dos and ought-to-bes. In Sellars’ view and in mine, the former presuppose that the subject to which they apply has the conceptual capacity and control of action necessary to follow the rules, while the latter do not presuppose this. Indeed, the subject of an ought-to-be can be an inanimate object as in ‘The clock ought to be disposed to strike on the quarter-hour’, which clearly doesn’t presuppose that its subject has direct voluntary control over how it is disposed to strike. My core thesis in this paper is that we should treat doxastic oughts as a species of ought-to-bes, where, although the subject is usually an agent, agency over the belief is not presupposed in making the ought-statement.

It is common in deontic logic to treat all oughts as ought-to-bes in the sense that we can translate any ought-statement into a statement of the form ‘It ought to be the case that p’ and then treat ‘ought’ as a unary operator on a

proposition. My view does not depend on this reduction of ought-to-dos to ought-to-bes; it merely depends on the existence of ought-to-bes. Sidgwick suggested that there are some merely ‘political’ ought-to-bes, by which he meant ought-statements about the general desirability of some state of affairs that do not imply that any particular agent has an obligation to do something to bring about this state of affairs. I think some doxastic oughts may be merely political oughts, but not all of them are. So in the end of my paper, I explore some options for understanding the conceptual/logical connections between doxastic oughts conceived as ought-to-bes and what particular agents have obligations to do.

The key, in my view, to avoiding the challenge from doxastic involuntarism is, in addition to conceiving of doxastic oughts as ought-to-bes, appreciating the fact that they often imply an obligation on someone other than the subject of the doxastic ought. For example, that students of geography ought to believe that London is the capital of the UK implies that teachers of geography ought to teach them this fact.

By insisting on this distinction between ought-to-dos and ought-to-bes, I think we open up space for a conception of epistemic rules as rules of criticism deriving from our epistemic ideals and interestingly related to interpersonal rules of action that can serve as the basis of a broader social epistemology.

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17. Rémi CLOT-GOUDARD (PLC, Grenoble II)

Practical Knowledge

My main concern here will be with the kind of knowledge we have of the world around us *qua* agents.

We, as agents, usually know what we do. For instance, I know that I am now writing, even if I'm not looking at my hands. What is interesting in that sort of knowledge is that it exhibits as a peculiar feature that we don't apparently need to call on any kind of observation to acquire it, although its object is an event in the world (e.g. my writing). But it should be remarked that my judgment that I am writing could be wrong (e.g. if there wasn't any paper under my pen or if the keyboard wasn't properly plugged to my computer) : it is not therefore infallible. How should we account for the possibility of such a knowledge ?

It may be tempting to say that what we actually know without observation is what we intend to do (or more exactly our intention to X), whereas our action and the modifications it causes in the world cannot be known but by means of perception. This response could be named, following Falvey [2000], the *two-factor thesis* (see for instance Adams and Mele [1989], but it could be actually tracked back to Descartes).

In her major work *Intention*, the British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe has tried to show why we shouldn't follow that path and promoted a distinction between two kinds of knowledge. I would like to put forwards her analysis.

Anscombe's argument, constructed as an inquiry into the functioning of the concepts of *intention* and *intentional action* following the grammatical method of analysis elaborated by Wittgenstein, begins with the thesis that an agent is conscious of her action under some but not all descriptions. An action may be described in various ways, but an agent is not aware of all the ways her action may be described. Thus if someone were asked : « Why are you X-ing ? », she might answer : « Oh, I didn't know I was X-ing » ; and there, the question « Why ? » couldn't receive any answer under the description X-ing. This has led Anscombe to insist on the necessity to admit that there is, besides the traditional concept of knowledge (which is a *contemplative* or *speculative* one), a second kind which is *practical knowledge*. This expression should not be meant first to refer to the knowledge an agent has of what is good or bad, or what is compulsory or forbidden from a moral point of view. But as to Anscombe, practical knowledge must be understood first as the knowledge an agent has of her own action. It is akin to the knowledge one has of the position of one's limbs, which is acquired *without observation*.

Anscombe's point is precisely to reject the picture of the two-factor thesis because it denies the peculiarity of practical knowledge by likening it to contemplative knowledge and by separating the intention and the action. The difference between those two kinds of knowledge is made clear by the consideration of the kinds of error they are related to. In contemplative knowledge the mind tries to adjust itself to the way the world is ; when I believe that there are fruits in the fridge when there are not, the error is in my belief, not in the world. But when I intend to buy some apples at the market and buy some pears instead, the error is in my action, not in my intention. Practical knowledge may be classified as a kind of knowledge because it gives rise to the possibility of error ; but it differs from the theoretical or speculative knowledge because its onus of match is from the world to the mind.

The concept of practical knowledge is intertwined with the concept of practical reasoning, that is the sort of reasoning by which one determines what one has to do, given one's purpose. Following this time what she takes to be Aristotle's lessons, Anscombe rejects conceptions of practical reasoning which construe it as a theoretical reasoning that establishes its conclusion. It is defeasible in the sense that the conjunction of new premisses may induce a new conclusion. Practical reasoning is precisely the means by which an agent comes to know what she will do and therefore what she is doing in the actual circumstances, given what she is aiming at.

The main interest of Anscombe's analysis is that it provides us with a rigorous attempt to delineate the peculiar features of the sort of knowledge someone must have of one's action to count as a genuine agent.

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18. Thomas CROWTHER (Heythrop College, University of London)

Agency and Perception

Recent discussion of the nature and role of the senses in analytical philosophy of mind and epistemology has tended to focus on the categories of 'perception' or 'perceptual experience', and the relations between notions of perception, phenomenal character, intentional content, and the objects of perception. A fact that has been relatively neglected in much of the recent literature, though, is that perception and perceptual experience may involve exercises of agency. As well as merely perceiving something one may be watching it, looking at it, or listening to it.

In this short paper I articulate and offer preliminary defence of a view about the relation of agency to perception in some core cases of perceptual activity; a view that places a connection between perceptual agency and perceptual knowledge centre stage.

In the first part of the paper I use discussion offered by Gilbert Ryle (1949) to arrive at a basic distinction between perceptual activities that are forms of ‘perceptual search’ and those activities that involve ‘perceptual monitoring’. I distinguish these kinds of perceptual activity in terms of their different relations to perception, and, by drawing on the influential discussion offered by Zeno Vendler (1957), in terms of the different ways that these goings on occupy time.

This focuses a problem about the relation between perception and agency in the case of processes of perceptual monitoring. What is the relation of an activity like watching to perception, or seeing an object? Discussion here must negotiate what Brian O’Shaughnessy (1992) and (2000) has called “The Antitheticality Puzzle”. If one (for example) watches an object, then one must see it. But to watch something cannot just be to see it. For to watch something is to engage in something agentially or actively. Perceiving something, however, is not something that an agent can do (where “do” is understood as involving the exercise of agency). It is something that happens to, or in, an agent. I shall make a suggestion about how this puzzle is to be resolved.

In the third part of the paper, I draw on the idea that the nature of a perceptual activity like watching an object can be understood in terms of the ‘constitutive aim’ of such an activity; what such a process is supposed to do in the life of a rational agent, and what constitutes the success or failure of a stretch of such process. I propose that the constitutive aim of a process like watching must be understood in terms of the role that such a process plays in making perceptual knowledge available to the rational subject. I offer some clarifications and developments of this idea, as well as making some additional brief suggestions about the further explanatory work that the conception of perceptual activity sketched here may enable us to do.

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19. Daniel DOHRN (Universität Konstanz)

The Problem of Idealization in Pamela Hieronymi’s Epistemology

The Psychology of Epistemic Processes

Belief as normative and as a mental fact: Hieronymi defines belief that p with respect to its normative relationship to evaluative control in light of constitutive reasons taken to bear on whether p. But since everyday criteria of ascribing belief are independent of this normative requirement, it is questionable to what extent belief actually is sensitive to evaluative control.

Belief as agency: Hieronymi describes belief formation as a distinctive kind of agency due to its being subject to evaluative control. The question is how this predominantly

normative criterion squares with the intuitive distinction of actively forming belief by attentive effort and non-active formation of belief by unattentive processing of information.

Epistemology in the Twilight Zone

Internalism about constitutive reasons: Hieronymi describes constitutive reasons for or against p as reasons *one takes* to bear on whether p. Since belief acquisition aims at truth, such *subjectively constitutive reasons* must somehow square with *objectively constitutive reasons* which as a matter of fact bear on whether p. It is discussed how to deal in Hieronymi’s framework of evaluative control with this normative requirement.

The Twilight Zone I, extrinsic and constitutive reasons: While in Hieronymi’s model the distinction between extrinsic and constitutive reasons is clear-cut, sometimes, especially when immediate factors of belief formation like affective valuations come into play, the distinction may turn out to be inscrutable. It is to be discussed in how far the sharp distinction between evaluative and managerial control can nevertheless be upheld.

The Twilight Zone II, epistemic managerial and evaluative control: In order to suitably delimit epistemic agency and its normative consequences, it seems appropriate to enrich Hieronymi’s model by the distinction between on the one hand *extrinsic manipulative or managerial control* and on the other hand *epistemic managerial control* (for example control over what is attended to, which research strategies are pursued). Whereas the former is open to reasons extrinsic to genuinely epistemic projects, the latter is confined to reasons constitutive of such projects (of settling the question whether p).

Epistemic responsibility: Hieronymi characterizes epistemic responsibility by the requirements of evaluative control. But arguably a more comprehensive notion of epistemic responsibility is needed. The really intriguing questions of epistemic responsibility arise not in the field of evaluative but of epistemic managerial control.

Voluntariness: Hieronymi argues against voluntariness of belief formation that evaluative control is not voluntary. However, a further notion of voluntariness is epistemologically relevant: Decisions within the field of epistemic managerial control may be voluntary. Sometimes, when evaluative and epistemic managerial control cannot be kept apart, even Hieronymi’s contention that evaluative control is involuntary may be questioned.

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20. Trent Dougherty (University of Rochester)

Against Pragmatic Encroachment

Traditionally, the epistemic status of a true belief—in particular its status as knowledge—has been construed to

depend solely on truth-related features such as evidence or causal origin. However, recently many philosophers have suggested that whether someone knows—or, alternatively, whether an ascription of knowledge is correct—depends on non-truth-related features of true beliefs.

Specifically, these philosophers—call them practicalists—suggest that whether one knows depends on whether one can perform certain acts based on the target beliefs such as asserting it, acting upon it, or employing it as a premise in practical reasoning. This thesis is motivated by the following kind of case. Hannah decides to go by the grocery store before depositing a check because it's on the way to the bank and the last several times she's been to the bank it has been open until five o'clock. Suppose this fact sufficient for Hannah to know that the bank is open until five o'clock. Now suppose that as she draws closer to the store she has the thought that banks sometimes change their hours and many banks are now closing at 4:30. She realizes it's too risky to stop by the store, she is no longer secure in her belief that the bank will be open until five o'clock. She no longer knows whether or not the bank is open until five o'clock.

To explain this sudden loss of knowledge practicalists advert to one or more norms whose essential form is that if we know p we can assert that p or act on p or use p as a premise in practical reasoning. Since Hannah can no longer rationally act on the belief that the bank stays open until five o'clock, the story goes, she no longer knows that it is so.

I propose several reasons for resisting pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. First, I deny that such cases as those above have the intuitive appeal usually claimed for them. There are pragmatic explanations of the alleged behavior adverted to. This defense charges that the practicalist has in fact overlooked an important pragmatic feature of the situation. Second, I claim that there is *prima facie* reason to keep epistemic matters and practical matters separate. Thus, if we have a natural way to resist pragmatic encroachment we should opt for it. The main proposal is that we already possess a perfectly good tool with which to treat such cases—standard decision theory.

Frequently, agents weigh the relative risks of alternative choices. Decision theory models how epistemic factors and practical interests come together to determine when one can act rationally. In ordinary situations we can act on our beliefs, for we tend (to try) not to believe things unless they are well enough justified to act upon. Yet it is precisely in high-stakes cases that extraordinary justification would be required to act on a belief. Even if a demolition coordinator has enough justification for the proposition that everyone is out of the building to know that proposition, even an amount of doubt consistent with knowledge could be enough to make acting on that knowledge too risky. Sometimes, near certainty is required to assert or act. Thus, if fallibilism about knowledge is true, then there will always be high-stakes cases of unactionable knowledge.

A key part of undercutting the claim that agents lose knowledge when they can no longer act on it is the fact that there are explanations of the hesitancy to claim or ascribe knowledge which arise from the nature of humans as epistemic agents. Specifically, human epistemic agents have the ability to form higher-order judgements about their beliefs and have interests other than pure epistemic interests. These facts combine to undercut the claim of practicalists in the following way. One non-epistemic interest (from a purist standpoint) is not to be caught making false claims or acting

irrationally, on insufficient grounds. As a result, when we judge that our strength of epistemic position is vulnerable enough—in a particular context—to expose us to more risk than we are comfortable of being mistaken—in acting or asserting—we “hedge” our assertions or ascriptions, i.e. we do not make them even though we have object level epistemic justification to do so.

Since there is a presumption for keeping the practical and the epistemic separate, and we have a well worked-out way for explaining the role of practical interests in rational action, we should resist pragmatic encroachment. Thus standard canons of rationality supplant the knowledge norms urged by practicalists. This simple proposal is threatened by the suggestion that the knowledge norms are of a different kind than standard canons of rationality, that they impose a different kind of obligation. They are said to be “constitutive” norms. I rebut this claim. It is doubtful that there are such norms, and it is doubtful that if there are they would play an especially significant role in guiding knowledge ascriptions or other behaviors. Constitutive norms can be interpreted strongly or weakly. On the strong view an act can't count as an assertion or a belief if it does not follow its norm. This is implausible and removes the normative force of norms, for if they are not followed there is nothing to judge. On the weak view they are just one kind of concern among others, along with epistemic norms, and prudential norms. In this case, they are too weak to trump epistemic norms.

Finally, there are two ways in which practicalists wrongly assign unit probability to propositions. I develop a probabilistic conception of epistemic probability which avoids one mistake, and the other is avoided by devices already discovered by Richard Jeffrey in his probability kinematics. They stem from the fallibility of human knowledge.

21. Miguel Ángel FERNÁNDEZ (Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)

Psychologism in the theory of epistemic evaluation

Performances of an agent's cognitive faculties can be valuable for a number of different reasons; a lot of theorising in epistemology assumes that cognitive performances may possess a kind of value which is *distinctively epistemic*, it is a central task of a theory of epistemic evaluation to explain what that kind of value consists in and how it comes about. An orthodox approach to these questions, that following Goldman (2001) might be termed ‘veritistic’, holds that the kind of distinctively epistemic value in question accrues to cognitive performances in virtue of a special relation that they bear to the ultimate epistemic goal of true belief. It has been proposed in recent literature that the ‘special relation’ in question here is to be understood as a psychological state of the cognitive agent, like an intention, a desire or a motive to attain true belief.

This paper criticises such psychologistic accounts of distinctively epistemic value, it focuses on Zagzebski's theory,¹ on which being motivated by what she calls “the love of truth” is the psychological state that explains the epistemic

1 As developed in Zagzebski 2003a and 2003b.

value of various sorts of cognitive performances. First, I show how the psychologistic theory makes wrong predictions concerning standard evaluative practice, it predicts that one would assign different epistemic value to the cognitive performances of various agents, when one actually wouldn't make such differential assessments. This would seem to force the defender of the theory to be revisionist with respect to well-entrenched aspects of standard practice; but such a revisionist position is hard to defend. Secondly, I test the psychologistic theory by its capacity to handle the 'value problem', i.e. the problem of explaining the superiority in *epistemic* value of knowing over merely believing truly, a test that, arguably, any adequate theory of epistemic evaluation must pass. I argue that the psychologistic theory fails this test. The theory aims to explain the superiority of knowing using as explanans the idea that the motive of love of truth is valuable not only because true belief is intrinsically valuable, but also because of the relational place that such a motive occupies in a constellation of motives that are constitutive of a good life, most of which motives are *not epistemic* in nature. I argue that there is a mismatch between the *kind* of value present in the posited explanans and the *kind* of value present in the explanandum, and hence the resulting explanation is not intelligible.

In developing both criticisms of the psychologistic theory I make use of what I call a Principle of Authority of Standard Evaluative Practice: When a putative source of epistemic value is identified we have to ask what reason we have to conceptualise it as epistemic. If there's an operative taxonomy in standard practice that conceptualises the putative source of value in admittedly non-epistemic terms, and no taxonomy that conceptualises it in epistemic terms, then we have a *prima facie* principled reason *not* to conceptualise it as epistemic. That reason is *principled* because it derives from general patterns implicit in standard evaluative practice, but it's *prima facie* because it can be defeated by an argument for a different conceptualisation. The predictions and explanations of the psychologistic theory are at odds with standard evaluative practice, and then the burden is on its advocate to show why the evaluative taxonomies of standard practice are mistaken; she fails to discharge her burden.

I conclude by suggesting a diagnosis of why the psychologistic theory of epistemic evaluation goes wrong. I suggest that the theory conflates the aspects of the motivational profile of an agent that *lead her to adopt* a certain method or practice, which is epistemically good, with that which *makes* such a method or practice epistemically good. The motivation to adopt a certain epistemic practice is not what makes it epistemically good, the practice is epistemically good (or bad) independently of the motivational profile of the agent that adopts it. I suggest that this mistake of the psychologistic theorist is attributable to the fact that she wants to explain the epistemic value of cognitive performances on the model of the moral value of actions. In particular, she assumes that there is an epistemic analogue to the fact that actions can obtain moral value from the motivational profile of the agent; but this is wrong: unlike the moral case, in the epistemic case the motivational origins for adopting a practice aren't part of what makes it an epistemically good (or bad) practice. In this particular respect epistemic agency is substantially different from moral agency.

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22. David HUNTER (Ryerson University)

Belief Revision and Self-Consciousness

Mental agency concerns an agent's control over and responsibility for her own mental states and processes. Mental autonomy requires not just being responsible for one's conception of the world; it also requires being responsible for changes in one's conception too. In this way, responsible belief revision is fundamental to mental agency. But the role of belief revision is even deeper than this: belief revision is fundamental to the *constitution* of the mental self, and not just to its autonomy. For belief revision is the ground of the kind of self-consciousness that is essential to the self. In this paper, I develop and defend these claims by discussing some of the lessons contained in Anscombe's classic but obscure work, *Intention*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)

Elizabeth Anscombe introduced three startling ideas. First, she claimed that intentionally doing something requires believing that one is doing it. Second, she claimed that an agent's beliefs about her own intentional actions are not based on observation, testimony or inference. Together, these ideas capture her view that what she called "practical knowledge"—knowledge of one's own intentional actions—manifests a special kind of self-consciousness. Her third idea, really a complaint, was that the significance of these ideas is obscured by what she called an "incorrigibly contemplative conception of belief." Unfortunately, she did not develop (or even really sketch) an alternative conception of belief, one that would help us to understand these lessons. In this paper, I will suggest that at least part of the story involves the way an agent's beliefs about her own intentional actions are revised.

I start, in section one, by clarifying Anscombe's idea that doing something intentionally requires believing that one is doing it. The idea is not that believing that one is doing something is *sufficient* to make it an intentional action, for one can believe truly that one is digesting lunch without that digestion being an action, let alone an intentional one. Nor is the idea that beliefs about one's actions are infallible or incorrigible. One can be mistaken in believing that one is doing something, and one's beliefs about one's own actions can be corrected through observation, testimony and inference. Nor is the idea the causal one that such beliefs are among the events that caused the action. Rather, Anscombe's idea is that in cases where one is intentionally doing something, one's belief that one is doing it is part of what makes it the case that one is doing it. Beliefs about one's own actions are, in this sense, constitutive. This idea is clearest in cases of actions that are impossible in the absence of such belief. In clarifying and defending this idea, I discuss apparent counter-examples and—following a recent paper by Kieran Setiya—argue that her idea is true of basic intentional actions. (Setiya, K., "Practical

Knowledge,” forthcoming *Ethics*) But this idea raises a deep philosophical problem: how are we to understand the nature of this kind of self-consciousness and how does it play that constitutive role?

In section two, I consider the traditional approach to understanding this self-consciousness. The traditional view sees it as a matter of self-*identification*, as a matter of locating oneself among the many agents in one’s conception of the world. This self-identification is viewed as necessary to prevent or overcome a possible error or uncertainty about which agent I am. Self-consciousness, on this view, is grounded in a special kind of self-reference in thought or judgment, one that is immune to error or uncertainty through mis-identification. In this section, I argue that this traditional account of self-consciousness is flawed. It is implausible because it over-intellectualizes the conceptual resources needed for this kind of self-consciousness. It is inadequate (even on its own terms) since the self-reference it proposes could not possibly overcome the imagined uncertainty. Finally, since it assumes that an agent could be doing something intentionally and yet be uncertain or mistaken as to whether she is the one doing it, it cannot help us to understand Anscombe’s idea that self-consciousness is constitutive of intentional action.

In section three, I develop an alternative account of self-consciousness, one that sees it as grounded in belief-revision. Anscombe’s second idea (which I do not defend in this paper) is that an agent’s beliefs about her own intentional actions are not based on observation, testimony or inference. This means that *revisions* to her beliefs about her own actions need also not be grounded in observation, testimony or inference. By contrast, revisions to her beliefs about the actions of others *must be* grounded in evidence from these sources. I argue that this fact about how an agent’s beliefs about her own actions are revisable constitutes a way of keeping track of herself: she is the agent (some of) whose changing activities are registered in her beliefs without reliance on observation, testimony or inference. This is, I argue, enough self-consciousness to ground Anscombe’s ideas about practical knowledge, and it does it without reliance on any special forms of reference. (In passing, I contrast my view with Sebastian Rödl’s recent attempt to ground self-consciousness in theoretical and practical reasoning, which, I argue, over-intellectualizes self-consciousness. (*Self-Consciousness*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007))

In the final section, I argue that while self-consciousness grounded in belief-revision is not sufficient for mental autonomy, it is necessary for being a believer. Having a perspective on the world requires being disposed to revise beliefs about oneself in this special way. Once this is seen, Anscombe’s first idea—that an agent’s beliefs about what she is doing are partly constitutive of her intentional activity—can be better understood. Rather than merely keeping track of her activities, the revisions in question help to create them. In this respect, belief is not merely contemplative: it is practical.

23. Benoit GAULTIER (Institut Jean Nicod, Université Paris 12)

Agency, Context and Knowledge

According to John Greco, knowledge is true belief for which the agent whose belief it is deserves credit, a cognitive success due to his abilities or intellectual virtues. Therefore, an agent can’t be attributed knowledge unless his true belief results from his *agency* and not from good luck or external circumstances beyond any control: his abilities have to be sufficiently important and salient in the explanation of belief acquisition. Now, Greco claims that we have to determine one agent’s causal responsibility for any of his beliefs exactly in the same way that we assess his responsibility for any of his acts: such an assessment can only be done in relation to a certain explanatory context constituted by certain interests and purposes in virtue of which some things must be viewed as background factors, constitutive of the environment in which one’s agent’s cognitive dispositions are supposed to work, rather than as explanatory factors supposedly required by the explanation of belief acquisition.

1) In the first part of my talk, I will 1) analyze a number of objections that may be raised against the view that the truth-value of doxastic responsibility claims – hence, following Greco, of knowledge attributions – vary contextually and 2) bring out some radical consequences of such objections. In particular, I will present and answer Pritchard’s objections according to which Greco’s proposal to define knowledge exclusively in terms of cognitive faculties and epistemic virtues is unable to explain why, in the case of Bernie and his barn-façades, it is impossible to consider that he knows that he is facing a barn because, unbeknownst to him, he is facing the only real barn of the country. From this analysis, it should appear that Pritchard’s arguments in favor of a definition of knowledge in terms of *safety* rather than of epistemic abilities rest on a quite sketchy metaphysics of dispositions (or laws).

2) In the second part of my talk, I will wonder why some dispositions should be credited to the agent, hence, why such an agent should be held doxastically responsible for the belief whose acquisition it explains, and why we should conclude from this that, if such was not the case, we should not attribute knowledge to him. If one follows Greco’s view that, in the case of a crime, the truth-value of causal (hence, moral) responsibility claims varies according to the various points of view one has (for instance: the point of view of the judge, or of the social service agencies or of the psychologists), it seems that we have to conclude that there is no philosophical problem of free will unless we consider that one individual’s responsibility for his actions can and must be treated quite independently of any context and of the practical factors that define such actions. If we apply such a consequence of Greco’s position to the question of the scope of our epistemic agency (and so, of our knowledge), some parallels may be drawn with the position defended by Michael Williams in *Unnatural Doubts* – that is to say, the view that the skeptic can deprive us of any knowledge only because he pretends to place himself apart from any context of inquiry and from the methodological presuppositions that are operative in it.

3) In the third part of my talk, I shall explore some benefits of such an analysis, as they have been recently outlined by C. Hookway, namely that the skeptical problem of

the possibility of knowledge may probably be viewed as a mere version of the problem of the freedom of the will.: According to Hookway, the skeptic to whom the epistemologist has to reply doesn't necessarily pose a threat to knowledge: the activity of inquiry doesn't need a proof of the possibility of knowing to take place serenely but requires that we, as inquirers, should have confidence in our ability to investigate. The skeptic tries to weaken such a confidence in our ability to exercise our critical self-control on our beliefs which constitutes a necessary condition of the activity of inquiry. The task of the epistemologist is thus to show that such a rational self-control which is required to lead our investigations in a responsible way is possible in spite of the skeptic's attempt to convince us that we are prisoners of a cognitive functioning that, in a way, takes place within us albeit without us.

4) As a conclusion, I shall draw some consequences of my analysis of Greco's position and question what can be called Hookway's tasks-disjunction thesis according to which we have to distinguish between the task of demonstrating the possibility of knowledge and justification and the task of providing us confidence in our ability to investigate. To say that epistemology tries to "describe and explain our practice of epistemic evaluation, to investigate how far our epistemic goals are appropriate and how far our evaluative practice enables us to achieve our epistemic ends" doesn't necessarily involve that epistemology is *not* a theory of knowledge or justification that tries "to explain what knowledge and justified belief are and to investigate how far we are able to possess states of knowledge and justified belief". Indeed, when Hookway suggests that, even if both tasks are related or identical, "this is an epistemological *conclusion*" rather than something from which, as inquirers, we start, it is possible to answer that this is exactly what Greco's position entitles us to conclude and that if it is actually correct to say that knowledge attributions are based on what is attributed to the epistemic agency of believers, such an identity is well and truly what we, as inquirers, *do* start from and what we, as epistemologists, *should* start from.

24. Mikkel GERKEN (University of Copenhagen)

Deliberative Warrant and Action

1. Introduction. In this paper, I explore the contours of a fairly traditional "warranted belief approach" to action and practical deliberation. I do so by comparing a version of such an approach to a competing "knowledge account of action" forwarded by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). I argue that the warranted belief approach looks promising in comparison. However, Hawthorne and Stanley have provided a number of cases which they argue favor the knowledge approach over the warranted belief approach. I address some of these cases for a twofold purpose: First, addressing the cases will illuminate the warranted belief approach. Second, it will motivate it over the competing knowledge account.

I conclude on a methodological note by discussing whether knowledge or warrant should be regarded as conceptually prior in an account of action and practical deliberation. The exploration is organized as follows:

In § 2: I sketch an account according to which deliberative warrant, rather than knowledge, is a necessary condition on rational use of a belief as a premise in practical reasoning. I consider a number of the cases that Hawthorne and Stanley take to motivate the knowledge account and argue that they also motivate the warrant account.

In § 3: I defuse some of the case-based considerations that Hawthorne and Stanley offer against the warrant approach. Moreover, I develop versions of the cases that motivate the warrant approach *as opposed to* the knowledge account.

In § 4: I argue against one of Hawthorne and Stanley's attempts to save the knowledge account from the objections noted in § 3.

In § 5: I conclude with some brief methodological remarks regarding the conceptual priority of warrant and knowledge. I propose that knowledge plays a significant role, that of a *default benchmark*, within a warrant-approach to action and practical reasoning.

2. Towards a deliberative warrant account. One traditional approach to the epistemic aspect of practical rationality involves the idea that the degree or kind of warrant required for practical rationality may vary with practical context. In some practical contexts, very strong warrant is required. In others, less will do. While this idea has often been taken for granted, it has rarely been articulated. Consequently, I will elaborate a bit upon the traditional approach. I will not attempt to provide anything like a theory of the epistemic dimension of practical rationality. I will merely provide a rough, schematic outline of the traditional account in order to argue that it measures up well against the competing knowledge-account. Here is a very first stab at what I will label the Deliberative Warrant² Account (DWA):

(DWA) *S may use her belief that p as a premise in practical reasoning or as a reason for acting in the deliberative context, DC, (if and) only if S's action/reasoning is at least partly based on warrant for believing that p is adequate relative to DC.*³

The 'may' occurring in (DWA) is epistemic. (DWA) does not address overall practical rationality but only the epistemic dimension thereof. For example, the conclusion of someone's epistemically impeccable practical reasoning could be that she should do something nasty, brutish or nutty. In such a case, it might be said that she may *not*, from the perspective of *overall* rationality, use the premise-belief in the reasoning in question. For it may be that she should not, from the perspective of overall rationality, engage in that line of reasoning. So, (DWA) speaks, at best, to the *epistemic* conditions under which a belief may serve as a premise in practical deliberation or as a reason for action. It does not purport to address the non-epistemic aspects of practical rationality.⁴

The left-to-right direction (DWA) is parenthetical. This is in order to indicate that deliberatively adequate warrant for a belief in p may not be sufficient for epistemically rational use

2 I use 'warrant' as the genus under which internalist and externalist species, 'justification' and 'entitlement', fall (Burge 2003). Hawthorne and Stanley use 'justification' roughly as I use 'warrant.'

3 (DWA) provides an analogous account of rational action and practical reasoning. However, there are a number of important disanalogies that I will ignore for the present purposes.

4 I set aside cases in which p is used in reasoning that amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum*. This use may be rational although the reasoner has no warrant for believing that p. Such cases are also counter-examples to knowledge accounts.

of p as a premise in practical reasoning. Whether contextually adequate deliberative warrant is sufficient depends on further specification of the notions occurring in (DWA). The notion of deliberative warrant and that of deliberative context stand in dire need of specification. As does the circumstances in which the 'adequacy relation' holds between them. During the course of the exploration, I'll note some important features of deliberative warrant and deliberative contexts. But the characterizations of these notions will be too imprecise to ground a verdict as to the left-to-right direction of (DWA). Moreover, the appropriate "basing relation" between S 's warrant and the psychological basis for her action/reasoning must be specified before anything approximating a sufficient condition can be articulated. Thus the parenthesis.

Given these qualifications, (DWA) may be regarded as a first-stab articulation of a traditional approach to the epistemic aspect of action and practical reasoning. In the wake of the 'knowledge first' program in epistemology launched by Williamson (Williamson 2000), such a traditional approach has been challenged. Among the recent challengers are Hawthorne and Stanley (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). They argue for an 'Action-Knowledge Principle' and a 'Reason-Knowledge Principle' in favor of various traditional approaches, such as (DWA):

The Action-Knowledge Principle

Treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that p .

The Reason-Knowledge Principle

Where one's choice is p -dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p .

I begin my defense of (DWA) by arguing that it may account for some of the interesting cases that Hawthorne and Stanley provide.

25. Anita KONZELMANN ZIV (University of Basel)

Collective Epistemic Agency: Virtue and the Spice of Vice

In this paper I shall investigate the question of whether and how Virtue Epistemology can be extended to collective epistemic agents. A starting point is a claim made by Christopher Hookway in his paper 'How to be a Virtue Epistemologist' (2003). There, Hookway sets up the following twofold thesis (189):

1. Communities also possess genuine (epistemic) virtues (e.g. facilitating debate and regulating the progress of investigations);
2. Vices in individual inquirers can be virtues when possessed by members of a team.

The first claim raises questions as to how the virtues of individuals and those of groups are related. Given the overall influence of epistemic communities on individual learning and belief processing, a key question concerns the primacy of explanation: do an individual agent's epistemic virtues of, say, open-mindedness and active listening depend on the collective virtue of a good 'discussion culture' in the individual's social environment? Or rather is the collective virtue explained as a

function of individual agents' aggregated virtues? In philosophy, similar questions have been treated with regard to the interdependencies of collective and individual intentions and beliefs. Results of these discussions might be successfully applied to questions of virtues as well. One of the least contested claims in this respect is that group attitudes can differ significantly from the individual attitudes of members or supporters of the group. While a group G in circumstances C may declare the belief that p , individual members of G in C might express doubt in p or even belief that $\neg p$. According to some philosophers, the degree of non-conformity between collective and individual belief can amount to 1, i.e. none of its members individually hold the belief of group G . Such accounts usually consider the group belief as a purely normative entity, rising from the deontic normativity of a "joint commitment" to believe that p "as a body".⁵

Hookway's second thesis seems to deviate from this normative picture of the collective attitude. Here, the common epistemic virtue of, say, a research team rather appears as a sort of lucky distribution of the virtues and vices of individual team members. Hookway states: "A research team may benefit from having some members who are dogmatic, and unwilling to take on board new possibilities, while others are much more ready to take seriously seemingly wild speculations."⁶ These remarks suggest that, given a certain amount of epistemic vice in team members, the team might be epistemically even more virtuous than if all the members were merely virtuous. In view of collective agency, epistemic vice seems to be a sort of spice, which, as ingredient of common epistemic activity, improves its quality. It is difficult, however, to account for this feature of collective traits in terms of the deontic normativity of "joint commitment". We hardly could "jointly commit to be virtuous as a body", planning at the same time to be vicious in order to live up to our joint commitment. Nevertheless, Hookway's thesis conveys some intuitively plausible idea that seems stronger than merely context sensitivity of character traits. In order to assess the problem of how to integrate individual vice into collective virtue, I propose to investigate a weaker version of the thesis. The weaker version I have in mind assumes that individual vice does not necessarily impair collective virtue, but that collective virtue has the force to absorb individual vice. Providing an account for this claim will result mainly in an explanation of the value of common knowledge and consensus for general epistemological concerns. This result, in turn, emphasizes the advantage of aretaic over deontic normativity with regard to collective properties.

I try to assess the integration problem of individual vice and collective virtue by means of Keith Lehrer's consensus theory, which is modelled in terms of aggregating individual and social preferences. Lehrer explains aggregation as the product of a valuable (allocation) to be distributed and a weight of competence that is mutually conceded to one another (the latter factor seems formally close to John Greco's credit account of knowledge⁷). In a process of consensus approaching, aggregation is iterated so that each individual's allocations become continually "encumbered" with those of the others. Lehrer claims that, consequently, "the distinction between the communal allocation and the individual allocations vanishes in magic of mathematics".⁸ I do not know to what extent this confidence is justified. Yet, the model bears

5 Gilbert, 1987.
 6 Hookway 2003, 189.
 7 Greco 2003
 8 Lehrer 2001, *Ibid.*, 115

similarities to Michael Bratman's account of sharedness in terms of a web of "meshing" individual states that "take in" the others' states as constituents of their content. Both these models do not presuppose deontic normativity for collective states to obtain. This is an advantage for an account of a 'winning' distribution of aretaic properties: neither sheer luck nor the 'ought' of a "joint commitment" to display uniform collective virtues can explain how epistemic vice integrates beneficially in epistemic group virtue.

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26. Berislav MARUŠIĆ (Brandeis University)

Epistemic Evasion

Consider the following line of reasoning: “I decided to quit smoking. However, statistics show that people who make such decisions have a substantial chance of failing to uphold them. Hence there is a substantial chance that I will smoke again. Hence I should believe that I quite likely will smoke again, and I should not throw away my cigarettes.” This line of reasoning is an example of epistemic evasion. It strikes us as in some way normatively deficient. However it is difficult to explain what is wrong with it, if it is based on good epistemic reasons—if statistics really do show that people who decide to quit smoking often fail to uphold their decisions.

My aim in this paper is to examine the phenomenon of evasion from a distinctly epistemological perspective—one of,

one might say, epistemic psychology. Firstly, I define the phenomenon of epistemic evasion and distinguish it from non-evasive changes of mind. Secondly, I argue that epistemic evasion is normatively deficient, because it undermines our first-personal authority. My central contention is that even though in certain cases there are good epistemic reasons for us to believe something, and even though we can recognize them as such, *we ought not to believe it*, at pains of engaging in epistemic evasion. If we engage in epistemic evasion, we undermine our first-personal authority and ultimately cripple our epistemic agency. In conclusion, I suggest that my account of epistemic evasion promises a new solution to the Preface Paradox.

I define epistemic evasion as follows, assuming throughout a graded notion of belief: S's belief in $\sim p$ is evasive iff S believes $\sim p$ for reason R, and R is partly constituted by the fact that S decided p or believes p . In the initial example, my reason for believing that I will smoke again is partly constituted by the fact that I decided to quit, since that fact makes the statistics about failed attempts at upholding decisions to quit directly relevant to the question whether I will smoke again. In contrast, one's change of mind is non-evasive iff one's reasons for believing $\sim p$ are independent of one's deciding that p or believing that p . For example, I might reason non-evasively as follows: “I decided to go to the movies. However, I have an important meeting in the morning. Hence I should stay home.” This line of reasoning is not evasive, because my reason for staying home is independent of my decision to go to the movies. My definition of evasion implies that the epistemic quality of reasons does not determine whether a line of reasoning is a case of evasion: One can evade a decision for good or bad reasons, just as one can change one's mind for good or bad reasons.

If the normative deficiency of epistemic evasion is not due to the quality of the epistemic reasons, then why do we think of it as, in some sense, wrong? I argue that the normative deficiency isn't a practical matter: It's not just that we are better off not holding an evasive belief. It's not just that, in the initial example, I am better off not believing that I will quite likely smoke again, if I have really decided to quit. Rather, evasive beliefs undermine our first-personal authority and thereby the conditions for the possibility of epistemic agency. Building on Richard Moran's account of authority, I argue that in forming our evasive beliefs, we reflect on our evaded decisions or beliefs as empirical facts about ourselves, and thereby fail to maintain responsibility for those decisions or beliefs. Here is Moran's crucial observation:

In thinking about my own mental life and habits, I may acknowledge that I am one person in the world among others; but I am also the person whose thought about himself makes a constituting difference to the moral and psychological facts themselves. Therefore, the first-person position makes demands with respect to the responsibility for the facts about the mental life in question, demands that do not apply to the apprehension of the lives of others who happen *not* to be me. (2001, 161-162)

When we engage in epistemic evasion, we violate the demands of the first-person position in so far as we fail to play a constitutive role in our evaded decisions or beliefs. This leads me to conclude that even though in certain cases there are good epistemic reasons for us to believe something, and even though we can recognize them as such, *we ought not to*

believe it, at pains of engaging in epistemic evasion. The normative force of the ‘ought’ is that of first-personal authority.

It might seem that my proposal violates evidentialism, since it implies that there are cases in which we ought to disrespect the evidence. However, my proposal is compatible with moderate evidentialism, which leaves open the possibility that evidential norms are overruled by other norms—in this case those of first-personal authority. I argue, *contra* Jonathan Adler (2002, 51), that moderate evidentialism does not make the relation between belief and evidence contingent.

In the concluding section of the paper, I consider the Preface Paradox in epistemology as a case study for my account of evasion. First I argue that the Preface Paradox arises even within a framework of graded beliefs, such as that defended by David Christensen (2004). I then suggest that even proponents of graded beliefs could accept the solution to the paradox that my account promises: An author’s preface belief is normatively deficient, because it is evasive—despite the fact that it is based on good epistemic reasons, which the author recognizes as such. An author ought not to hold the preface belief, because in doing so she undermines the results of her research. Ultimately she thus cripples her epistemic agency as an empirical scientist.

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27. Alberto MASALA (University of Sorbonne Paris 4)

Is Epistemic Normativity a “Natural Evaluative Kind”? Virtuous Meta-Cognitive Integration and the Constitution of the Epistemic Realm.

Natural evaluative kinds

What are the norms of proper liquid management? While several ideas come to mind (efficient storage, manipulation without spilling over), it ultimately depends on what you want the liquid for: the point could be efficient storage, fast dispersion in the environment, avoiding any contact or maximizing the most widespread and homogeneous contact with the body. The norms of excellent liquid management do not constitute what I call a “natural normative kind”. A set of norms is a natural normative kind if it (1) has a justifiable *prima facie* authority over the practices or processes it purports to regulate and (2) is distinctive: it does not trivially result from the application to the practices of whatever other relevant normative demand. I call the question as to whether a set of norms is a natural evaluative kind “distinctiveness problem”.

Some comments on these constraints are in order. The latter shows what is wrong with general liquid management: it is plausibly under the authority of whatever independent

normative demand is relevant for the liquid-involving task at hand. The first constraint is necessary because it would be very easy to devise a distinctive set of norms for any practice: it suffices to arbitrarily invent them. But then one would have a hard time showing why the practice is under the *prima facie* authority of those norms. If one tried to impose the idea that liquids in general are never to be dispersed in the environment, it would be difficult to show that it is always the case. *Prima facie* authority is what should be proved, not sheer normative force in the actual context of choice: chess playing has standards of excellence that constitute a natural normative kind, but it could be perfectly reasonable to play badly on purpose if it suited more important goals (e.g. a spy on mission).

Is epistemic normativity a natural evaluative kind?

In much philosophical thinking and ordinary thought, epistemic reasons and norms are treated as a distinctive normative domain with a clear identity. Could it be the case that belief-forming processes (BFPs) are like liquid management? I argue that the problem has never been given enough attention and is far more serious than it is commonly thought, especially from a naturalistic perspective. One example of clear formulation is Zagzebsky’s claim on the unity of intellectual and practical virtues. Zagzebsky (1996) maintains that there are general standards of character excellence: distinguishing between moral and epistemic character does not cut the reality at its joints. But in general evidence pointing to a lack of distinctiveness for epistemic norms is easily misinterpreted as pertaining to much more popular problems such as epistemic value pluralism, relativism, epistemic contextualism, specification of general values in determinate contexts or non epistemic bias in epistemic practices. For example, why different parts of social cognition, such as theory of mind, theory of character, thinking about stereotypes and various social predictive heuristics could not follow different agendas? It could be (say) important to be accurate in face recognition, mainly pragmatically efficacious in trait attribution, having a very epistemically risky strategy for certain types of situations and not for others.

Evidence of this kind of normative heterogeneity is usually considered to be compatible with the existence of a distinctive epistemic normative realm. Several strategies are open. It could be a problem of *specification*: the normative heterogeneity would be apparent, an informative theory could show that the implementation of the same relevant cognitive goal implies to the two (superficially) different attitudes in the two contexts. It could be a problem of *specialization*: in a pluralist scenario different cognitive processes or situations can be responsive to different epistemic goals (e.g. creativity makes available new ideas for long term collective inquiry; face recognition must be reliable). There could be *contextualist effects* involved: the variation of contextual standards for the same overall goals could explain the apparent normative heterogeneity. There can be overall justified *non-epistemic bias*: the understandable interference of some practical or aesthetic desires (e.g. it could be all-thing-considered understandable to prioritize reputation management over accuracy in a public speech). Or one could always resort to simple *relativism*: epistemic normativity would be different for different epistemic communities (or even individuals).

Addressing specific cases of epistemic heterogeneity, I argue that these strategies are either unconvincing or beg the question against the distinctiveness problem. For example, calling a reputation-management bias in social cognition “non-epistemic” without giving a convincing independent account of epistemic normativity is just begging the question. Or take the plausible idea that human beings need a lot of significant reliable true beliefs in every domain of their life (Kornblith 2004). The idea can not justify *prima facie* authority on every BFP (the way excellent football playing standards have *prima facie* authority on every aspect of football playing): why trait attribution should be under the authority of the goal of reliable true belief forming, if human beings have more pressing reputation management needs in this context (even if significant reliable true beliefs are decisive in many other situations)?

The confusion is dangerous because these problems have different consequences in practice: if either relativism or pluralism is true epistemology should study respectively each one of several epistemic norm sets or the plural dimensions of the single one. If epistemic normativity is not a natural normative kind we should concentrate on general normative demands relevant for BFPs. This is not just a re-conceptualisation of old problems: imagine what it would be like to study liquid management trying to find one or several ultimate goals, or the management practices every single community should be committed to.

Entrenched meta-cognitive policies constitute the epistemic normative realm

Should we accept this kind of normative fragmentation? I propose to explore a possible reaction inspired by recent attention to meta-cognition in the virtue epistemology literature. Virtue has recently been defined as excellent meta-cognitive control of object level belief forming processes. This also connects with a central claim of John Greco – who thinks that virtues are reliable processes well integrated in the cognitive system – since meta-cognitive control is supposed to spell out this notion of integration (Lepock 2007). In a certain sense, lower level BFPs are under the authority of meta-cognitive dispositions. In the medium-long term and in cases of conflict, specific (possibly) heterogeneous cognitive practices must be regulated and orchestrated.

Having a policy means making choices and setting priorities. I argue that the existence of meta-cognitive mid-long term management virtues *creates* or *constitutes* epistemic normativity as a natural evaluative kind. While there is not a conceptual connection between the notion of meta-cognition and the idea of a coherent policy (think of an extremely situational style of government, based on improvisation), I argue that human beings have a plausible interest in meta-cognitive policies coherent enough to grant at least the existence of a pluralist epistemic realm. This is because BFPs (at least in the long term, in reflexive contexts and in case of conflict) interact holistically and so demand a strong form of coordination: a highly interacting set of elements demand a stronger coordination than a low-interacting one. Not only do epistemic virtues regulate cognitive life, they are responsible for the very existence of the epistemic normative realm.

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28. Conor McHUGH (Edinburgh University)

Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action

Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of *action*. This view seems to be in tension with the apparent fact that judging is not voluntary. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of *non-voluntary* action. An action can be *non-voluntary* without being *involuntary*.

The paper is in four sections.

Judging and action

The first section of the paper clarifies what I mean by ‘judgment’, and presents a *prima facie* case that judging is an action.

‘Judgment’ refers to a type of conscious episode in thought, with a propositional content represented as true, involving the acceptance, by the thinker, of that propositional content as true. I argue that the episode of judgment must be distinguished from the *inquiry* that often precedes it. Inquiry is the activity of trying to ascertain what is the case; it can consist in acts such as observing, trying to remember, deliberating, evaluating evidence, and so on.

The *prima facie* case that judging is an action is that it possesses eight features, each of which is characteristic of action:

- In judging, a thinker aims at the truth, in this sense: it is *constitutive* of an episode’s being a judgment that it is *motivated* by considerations that strike the thinker as *truth-conducive*.
- Judging is the sort of thing that there can be reasons for and against doing.
- Judging can be something that a thinker ought to do.
- Judging is paradigmatically done *for* reasons.
- A thinker is *responsible* for her judgments.
- Judgments *commit* a thinker to acting and judging in certain ways in the future.
- Judging involves an active phenomenology.
- Our first-personal knowledge about our own episodes of judging is similar to our knowledge about our own basic bodily actions.

Each of these features is easily made sense of if judging is an action; its having them would be *prima facie* puzzling if judging were not an action. While believing has some of the features and is not itself an action, that is unsurprising given that belief is constitutively connected to judgment.

Voluntarism and involuntarism

The second section argues that both voluntarism and involuntarism about judgment are unsatisfactory.

Voluntarism is the view that judging is voluntary in the same sense that a basic bodily action, such as arm-raising, is voluntary. Involuntarism is the view that judging is not an action at all, but an involuntary occurrence. On this latter view, while certain actions—including, but not limited to, those actions constitutive of inquiry—can cause one to make a particular judgment, the episode of judging is not itself an action.

Against voluntarism: firstly, one can't judge that *p* simply because one wants to, or because one takes it to be what one has most overall reason to do; and secondly, if one considers whether *p*, and it strikes one as clearly the case that *p*, then it requires a special act of will *not* to judge that *p*, rather than requiring an act of will *to* judge that *p*. In both respects, judging contrasts with arm-raising.

On the other hand, the considerations of the first section of the paper mitigate against involuntarism.

Non-voluntary action

The third section of the paper suggests that judging is a *non-voluntary* action—it is neither voluntary nor involuntary.

An example of an involuntary occurrence would be: falling over because one is pushed. Judging differs from falling over in two important respects.

Firstly, a thinker can refrain from judging that *p* even when her inquiry yields the verdict that *p*. It is always open to a thinker to *reopen a question*. This is something a thinker can do voluntarily, for epistemic or non-epistemic reasons.

Secondly, the authority of reasons over judgments is not the same as the authority of pushings over fallings-over. In judging, the thinker's will is not *overpowered*, or *bypassed*. The will is not a potential source of motivation, separate from the thinker's reasons, but somehow impotent. In judging, the will is in harmony with perceived truth-conducive reasons.

This, I argue, is not a limitation on the will. Rather, it is a constitutive fact about judging. It is not that a thinker *cannot* take account of truth-conducive reasons. It is that, if she does so, she is not judging. I suggest that this fact is illuminated by the connection between judgment and inquiry: to inquire is not to answer the question whether to believe *p*, but to answer the world-directed question whether *p*.

In sum, judging is a genuine action—goal-directed, rationally motivated (not compelled), will-involving, and allowing that the agent could have done otherwise—and therefore not involuntary; but at the same time it is not voluntary. It is a non-voluntary action.

Objections and replies

The final section of the paper deals with objections to my view.

Objection 1. It is not true that judging aims at truth. For, people can try to bring it about that they make false judgments.

I reply that cases where people deliberately set out to mislead themselves are not cases in which, *in judging*, they are not aiming at the truth. Rather, they are cases in which people arrange for their inquiry to be prejudiced in some way, so that they will come to see the truth-conducive considerations as favouring a certain verdict, and so will judge accordingly. That is why one can bring about a false judgment only in an indirect way. While non-truth-conducive considerations can

influence judgment, they cannot be, from the thinker's perspective, what ultimately motivate a judgment.

Objection 2. Thinking a thought is never an action, because thought-contents aren't selected—they simply occur to one.

I reply: even on a demanding conception of what it is for something to be an action, it doesn't follow, from the fact that one doesn't select which contents to entertain, that judging a content is not an action.

29. Rik PEELS (University of Utrecht)

Ignorance as Excuse Condition for Doxastic Responsibility

In our days it is often assumed by epistemologists that from time to time we hold each other responsible for what we believe, disbelieve, and suspend judgment on, that is, that we hold each other at least sometimes doxastically responsible, and this seems basically right to me. Now, it is a widely shared view, starting with Aristotle, that there are at least two excuse conditions for being responsible for something: ignorance and force. This seems to apply not only to actions, but also to our doxastic attitudes. More precisely, it seems to be the case that we hold human agents responsible for their doxastic attitudes toward certain propositions, unless those doxastic attitudes are due to non-culpable ignorance or, in some sense of the word, to force. In this lecture I would like to focus on the former, that is, on propositional ignorance as excuse condition for doxastic responsibility. I will try to answer the question of when some epistemic agent's ignorance can count as an excuse condition for being accountable for a particular doxastic attitude of hers. I attempt to answer this question by (1) offering a careful analysis of propositional ignorance, (2) specifying, next to some other conditions, the relation that needs to obtain between an instance of ignorance and some doxastic attitude in order for the latter to be excused, and (3) commenting on two deontological expressions, viz. 'being non-culpably ignorant' and 'S should believe that...' that occur in my definition.

First, I argue that not-knowing that *p* is not identical to being ignorant of *p*. I argue that there are just five important ways of failing to know that *p*: (a) having some doxastic attitude toward the false proposition *p*, (b) disbelieving the true proposition *p*, (c) suspending judgment on the true proposition *p*, (d) never having entertained the true proposition *p*, and (e) truly believing that *p* without warrant (where warrant is that (sufficient of) which bridges the gap between true belief and knowledge). As it turns out, however, in all cases of (a) and (e) and in some instances of (d) we would not be willing to say that the epistemic agent in question is ignorant of *p*. Problems concerning (a) might be resolved by rephrasing the former position as follows: being ignorant concerning the truth value of *p* is identical to failing to know whether *p*. Problems concerning (d) might be met by offering an (exceptional) account of belief on which one can know that certain propositions are true without ever having considered them. Problems concerning (e), however, cannot be sufficiently met. Contrary to what one might expect, therefore, ignorance is not identical to lack of knowledge. I close this section by defending the following dispositional account of ignorance: some cognitive subject *S* is ignorant of some

proposition p iff (i) p is true and (ii) if S were to consider p, S would disbelieve p or suspend judgment on p.

Second, I argue that the following conditions have to be met in order for some person S's ignorance of some (conjunctive) proposition q to count as an excuse condition for being responsible for her belief that p (where I take belief as paradigmatic for the other two doxastic attitudes): (i) S believes that p, (ii) q, a proposition different from p, is true, (iii) q entails $\sim p$, implies $\sim p$, or renders $\sim p$ sufficiently probable, (iv) S is non-culpably ignorant of (ii), and (v) there is no other proposition r such that (v-a) S should believe that r and (v-b) S should believe that r entails $\sim p$, implies $\sim p$, or renders $\sim p$ sufficiently probable. I go on to specify this account by explaining 'renders $\sim p$ sufficiently probable' and by discussing the complication that, sometimes, q on itself does not, say, entail $\sim p$, but only in conjunction with other propositions that S holds to be true (and that S, therefore, is not ignorant of).

Third, I offer some further thoughts on the two deontological terms that occur in my account of ignorance as excuse condition for belief: 'being non-culpably ignorant' and 'S should believe that...'. As concerns the first, for instance, one might say that some person S is non-culpably ignorant of p if she has fulfilled all of her epistemic duties in the epistemic process in which she remained ignorant of p. This does not seem to be correct, though: one need not have fulfilled *all* of one's epistemic duties, but only those duties that are relevantly related to p. This gives rise the question of what it means for some epistemic duty to be relevantly related to some proposition. Therefore, I try to answer to some extent the question of what it means for some cognitive subject's epistemic duties to be relevantly related to her doxastic attitude or lack of attitude toward some proposition.

30. Uwe V. Riss (Karlsruhe)

Knowledge as Rational Capacity to Act

For a while now philosophers have increased their attention to the relation between knowledge and action. Acting on a pragmatist line of thought this contribution expresses this relation in the following way:

Claim. Knowledge describes the rational capacity to succeed in related actions.

Our concept of rational capacities mainly follows Kern (2006). The investigation starts from Kern's approach and relates it to a more explicit concept of action. On the basis of this concept we argue that the distinction between practical and propositional knowledge becomes rather fuzzy.

Fundamental Concepts.

This paragraph describes the concept of action that is applied throughout the investigation. By **action** we always mean intentional action that is essentially characterized by the fact that (1) it aims at a specific goal set by the agent, (2) is based on an agent's action plan how to achieve this goal, and (3) is accompanied by activities of the agent to realize this plan (see e.g. Mele and Moser, 1994). Whether the goal is achieved or not decides whether the action counts as success or failure, respectively.

In particular we can distinguish three kinds of actions that fulfil this characterization of action: (*subjective*) mental

actions, which take place in the agent's mind only, e.g., mental arithmetic - the action success depends on the acceptance of the result by the agent; (*intersubjective*) communicative actions, which aims at recognition of an opinion in a discourse - the action success depends on the acceptance of the opinion by the communication partners; (*objective*) practical actions, which consists in interactions of the agents with their environment (beside communication) - the action success depends on the accordance of the action plan and result.

A **capacity** is a general ability that (in principle) various agents can actualize in a number of similar acts. Thus, a capacity describes the common element of the class of (potentially infinite) similar acts. A **rational capacity** is a capacity that an agent intentionally actualizes; thereby the respective act becomes an action. The rational capacity refers to the agent's controlled and stable ability to repeatedly actualize this capacity in successful actions. Nevertheless the possession of a rational capacity does not guarantee successful action (Kern 2006) even if the value of knowledge clearly consists in increased success of action.

Practical and Propositional Knowledge.

The distinction between practical and propositional knowledge can already found in (Ryle 1949) and there has been a long debate on the primacy of the one or the other. It is argued that:

Claim: Agents actualize practical and propositional knowledge in all three kinds of actions.

For example, the knowledge that (p) " $2 + 2 = 4$ " can be actualized (*subjectively*) by mental arithmetic, (*intersubjectively*) in an answer-response-dialogue between student and teacher, and (*objectively*) by dealing with a machine that requires 4 francs while the agent inserts two 2-franc coins. However, also practical knowledge can be applied in all three kinds. For example, a bobsledder who mentally steers through a bobsled run (*subjective*), a mathematician who tries to explain how to find certain proof to her students (*intersubjective*), and a car driver who goes by car (*objective*).

Relation to the Standard Analysis of Knowledge.

For an explanation of propositional knowledge it is essential to explain the standard analysis that sees knowledge as (a kind of) justified true belief (JTB). For a subject who knows that p it is not obvious which actions she is required to succeed in - the same also holds for practical knowledge. However, we will reject a subject's claim to know that p if she is unable to conduct at least a minimal set of such actions apart from uttering that p. Justification is one (at least minimal) way to show this. Belief refers to the subject's attitude to apply this knowledge. Truth refers to a precondition of action success.

An objection might be that the presented view is suitable for propositions such as (p), i.e., law-like propositions, but not for knowledge about singular events such as Susan knows that (q) "it was 6 pm when I called her". Prima facie it seems that Susan's knowledge that q describes a *result* of her capacity to read her watch and not a proper capacity. However, Susan (and others) can actualize this capacity again and again, e.g., in the next week she can still say that she knows that I called her at 6 pm. This shows that her knowing that q describes a rational capacity. The situation changes if Susan realizes that her watch broke before I called her. Then she can no longer (sincerely) claim that q, i.e., apply q in action.

However, what happens if Susan loses her watch later and never realizes her mistake? In this case Susan is still able

to claim (that she knows) that q but this is not an actualization of a capacity since it can always get caught in contradiction to other facts, e.g., when I tell her that my own watch showed 7 pm. Even if it never discovered that the watch broke, this only shows that we can repeatedly act successfully in the same way without possessing a corresponding capacity. The central difference to actualizations of rational capacities is the larger stability of the latter. In particular this shows that a knowledge claim (regarded as an action) can be successful although there is no corresponding capacity.

Gettier cases are a valuable touchstone for concepts of knowledge. What happens if Susan's watch broke at 6 am in the morning? The answer is similar to the previous; Susan's knowledge claim is not stable as a precondition for a capacity, even if it is a justified true belief. Another rather general objection against knowledge as rational capacity might be that we know that specific propositions are true or how to execute specific actions even if we have never tried them before. Hawley (2003) gave the example of a life-jacket that we have never put on but nevertheless we know how to do so. However, this only shows that capacities are complex so that they can overlap and intertwine. Thus, we can put on life-jackets because we possess the rational capacities to put on ordinary jackets, rucksacks etc.

The vague relation between knowledge and actions points at the normative character of rational capacities. The agent always bears the responsibility to decide whether her experience is sufficient to actualize a capacity in a given situation. This also concerns the possible consequences. Taking the responsibility for an action in a situation is part of the actualization of rational capacities. This also becomes important when we regard knowledge claims in different settings such as in the lottery case discussed by Hawthorne (2004).

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31. Sergi ROSELL (Universitat de València)

Why doxastic voluntarism is wrong

1. I discuss doxastic voluntarism – the claim according to which it is *possible* (in certain situations) to believe *at will*; that is, to decide to believe and thereby be immediately and directly believing, independently of evidence. In particular, the voluntarist that I wish to deal with restricts the scope of cases to these:

(DV) In cases in which there is the same evidence in favour and against p and not- p , the subject can *decide to believe* that p or that not- p (and not just suspend judgment).

However, the discussion has also been put in terms of reasons. In this formulation, the voluntarist claim is that the

subject can *decide to believe* in virtue of non-epistemic reasons. I will take "evidence", "evidential states", and "epistemic reasons" as interchangeable.

Contrarily, anti-voluntarism (the position I will argue for) claims that:

(AV) A subject S *can* believe no more and no less than what is permitted by her actual evidential states (epistemic reasons).

(AV) implies that one cannot *believe at will* or *decide to believe*, granted that for deciding to believe, in the relevant sense, is necessary that one can come to believe either p or not- p , regardless of the evidence or epistemic reasons for it.

2. I begin by focussing on a recent defence of DV in Ginet (2001). Ginet proposes several cases, which have a lot in common with William James' *genuine option scenarios*, in which the subject putatively *decides* to believe. For example, the case of someone who, being more than 50 miles away from home and not remembering having locked the front door, decides to believe that he did it. According to Ginet, in such a case S decided to believe a certain proposition p ; and S did this *in* deciding to act, or not to act, in a certain way. In particular, " S counts on its being the case that p is to adopt a dismissive or complacent attitude toward the possibility of losing what one has staked on p because of its turning out that not- p , an attitude that a mere gambler on p does not adopt." (65)

I will call this kind of voluntarism *pragmatic voluntarism*. That is, the sort of voluntarism that restricts the possibility of voluntarist belief-acquisition to cases of practical necessity. In all those cases, the agent needs to take a decision in order to act, being inaction not a realist alternative. It seems to me, this is the most powerful motivation for voluntarism.

3. But Ginet's claim that in deciding to act or not to act in a certain way S decided to believe is unjustified. The only thing that S 's act justifies us to infer is that S took p as if true, and for taking p as if true is not necessary that S believes p . Indeed, we ordinarily take propositional contents as plausible assumptions or suppositions that can support intentions and plans for (actual or possible) action; though not becoming a belief for that very fact. In particular, I will make use here of the notion of "acceptance" (there are different formulations in the literature; I elaborate mainly on Cohen 1992; see also Stalnaker 1984, Bratman 1992, and Engel 1998). What S did by deciding to act in a certain way is to accept that p . The crucial features of this notion for our question are its voluntary nature and the plurality of reasons that can guide it. Acceptance is pragmatically oriented in the sense that, even being insufficient the evidence to believe that p , on the whole it can be more rational (for a subject S , in a situation s and a time t) to accept that p than not to do it, in virtue of practical reasons. Intentions for action do not need be based on beliefs, but merely on accepted contents, and we can *accept* a propositional content regardless of its insufficient evidential support.

4. However, the voluntarist will surely mistrust this distinction. In particular, most pragmatists will dispute it as over-intellectualistic, artificial or *ad hoc*, and detached from our folk action-oriented notion of belief, viz. a disposition to act. Moreover, voluntarism seems to be favoured both by some ordinary ways of talking about belief favour voluntarism, and by epistemological conceptualization. However, there are important arguments against the very idea of believing at will, and thus (indirectly) in favour of a distinction of the previous kind.

Especially, as Williams (1973) famously argued, if we could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it whether it was true or not, we would be unable to taking it seriously as a belief, as something that represents reality. Belief *aims at truth*, or *purports to represent reality*. Yet this argument needs some clarification. Of course, the idea is that it is impossible to acquire a belief independently of *holding it true or not* (no doubt, we acquire beliefs that are not true). More fundamentally, I will defend that Williams' argument should not be interpreted as saying that one cannot acquire a belief without caring at all whether true or not, in the sense of *having a desire* (or a disposition to desire) *that it be true*. Indeed, in Ginet's examples S has the desire that *p* were true, that is what makes her believe that *p*. In my view, that sort of desire is neither necessary nor sufficient to believe.

5. In order to reinforce the previous idea I will consider its relation to Moore's Paradox, as well as to the idea of *transparency* (Evans 1982, Moran 2001). But the point has rather to be specified as a constitutive or conceptual claim about belief, about believing that *p* and whether *p*. When someone acknowledges some epistemic reasons or evidence as showing that *p*, by that same acknowledgment she immediately believes that *p*. I find useful to highlight the analogy between believing and understanding. You do not decide to understand, as you do not decide to believe. As there are different ways of acquiring a belief, there are different ways of coming to understand. You can set up differently various pieces of knowledge about a certain topic, and then, in a particular arrangement, grasp or come to understand something. This coming to understand is immediate; it is not in your hand not to understand or to understand something different. That is the same for belief.

6. It is worth noting that to a large extent my proposal agrees with Hieronymi's (2006). But, in my view, she goes too far in the idea of the involuntariness of some of our attitudes. Particularly, she argues for the notion of "commitment-constituted attitudes," according to which propositional attitudes such as belief and intention are involuntary so far as we acquire them in response to constitutive reasons, reasons that bear on whether *p* or *F*. However, there is a fundamental difference between the non-voluntariness of belief and that of intention or acceptance. For believing, we cannot take into

account all reasons we have. Reasons for believing are a subclass of the total class of reasons a person has, whereas no kind of reasons is in principle barred to be taken into account regarding intention and acceptance, all sort of reasons are potentially reasons to intend or accept. The non-voluntary character of intention (and acceptance), in the sense Hieronymi maintains, could be conceptually true, but trivial; whereas the non-voluntariness of belief is true and substantive. Reason: *belief aims at truth*.

This qualifies as a defense of acceptance (and intention) as fundamentally voluntary, and as a reply to the pragmatist charge of the *ad hoc* nature of the belief/acceptance distinction.


7. To sum up, in *genuine option scenarios* the subject is in a situation in which he desires or wants to believe that *p*, but her evidential states or epistemic reasons are insufficient to *p*, do not support *p* more than not-*p*. My suggestion is that the subjects do not immediately acquire a belief, but a future-directed policy. It is simply a case of acceptance, an attitude that, no doubt, can in time end up in a belief, though not necessarily. That it is possible to acquire a belief indirectly (by means of carrying out intermediate intentional actions) at will is relatively uncontroversial; the only requisite is that, at the end, one believes that *p* because one thinks that *p* is the case.

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Map

a restaurant (Dorian) and a café here



Parc des Bastions
restaurant, bar

Hotel Bel'Espérance
1 rue de la Vallée

Philosophy Dpt
2 rue de Candolle

Uni Bastions

Le Remords
restaurant, bar

to Café Gally
42 bvd Saint-Georges

TAXI STOP

Saint-Jean
restaurant

Uni Dufour (1st
John Greco lecture)

Mike Wong II
chinese fast food

Coup de cœur
restaurant, bar

Boccaccio
restaurant

Rond-Point
de Plainpalais
Trams 12, 13
14, 15, 17

Café du Rond Point
restaurant, bar

Hotel Comédie
12 rue de Carouge

to Café du Marché
16 av. Henri Dumant

ATM

Hotel Le Prince
16 rue des Voisins

Carrouge

Restaurants and other practical information

Conference dinners

Friday, 8 pm. Trattoria Boccaccio, 45 bd Georges-Favon. Tel 0041+22 329 45 22.

Saturday, 8 pm. Café Gally, 42 bd Saint-Georges. Tel 0041+22 321 00 35.

Other restaurants

L'Echalotte, 7 rue des Rois, 0041+22 320 59 99.

Café du Marché, 16 avenue Henri Dunant, 0041+22 320 85 46.

Café-Restaurant du Rond-Point, 2 rond-point de Plainpalais, 0041+22 320 47 95.

Café Unibar, within the Uni Bastions building (coffee, sandwiches).

Restaurant Coup de Coeur, 7 rue du Conseil-Général.

Café Le Saint Jean, 4 rue du Vieux-Billard, 0041+22 328 34 44.

Restaurant du Parc des Bastions, 1 promenade des Bastions (kiosk within the Parc), 0041+22 310 86 66.

Café-restaurant Le Dorian, 1 place René Payot, 0041+22 328 25 36.

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Closest cash dispenser from the University (all standard credit cards):

Banque Cantonale de Genève, rue de Carouge 22. See ATM on the Map.

Airport banking services. UBS cash dispensers, American Express change: arrival lobby.

Wi-Fi Access

From the conference rooms you should have access to two networks:

- ville-de-geneve: open and free access, provided by the city.
- UNIGE: university network, password restricted. Use one of the following logins:
 - login DUTANT passw KQTJTAAC
 - login KELLER passw GOTTLÖB

Transportation

If you stay at an hotel in Geneva, they have to provide you with a free day pass for all public transportation, do not forget to ask for it.

The conference site is close to the « Rond-Point de Plainpalais » or « Plainpalais » bus and tram stop. From there you can take trams 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 as well as other buses. From the entrance of the university park (« Parc des Bastions », tram and bus stop « Place Neuve ») you can take tram 12 to Rive and buses 3 and 5. All bus and tram stops provide directions and tram/bus info – notably reliable timetables.

Taxis are rather expensive: some phone numbers 0041+223314133, 0041+223202202, 0041+223202020 and 0041+794496147. The first of these also does "taxibus", the taxi service that goes to the airport very early in the morning (< 5 am), when public transport is idle. The last one has 5 places. Some taxis are usually waiting at the place du Cirque (see the map).

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