

The Cambridge Companion to
HUSSERL

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5 Perception

I. ON THE DESCRIPTION OF PERCEPTION

Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By "description," he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the *Logical Investigations* (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in terms of a new, analytic framework; in particular Husserl lost interest in describing the things and processes in the real world that are the objects of perception and judgement and so too in describing their relations to these acts. His new analytic framework, particularly as it applies to perception, has been thoroughly expounded and discussed in the literature.¹ My aim here is to expound Husserl's first descriptions of perception within the framework of the *Investigations* and to incorporate as far as possible his later descriptive results to the extent that these are separable from his later turn to idealism. I shall therefore be concentrating on the *Investigations* and on the 1907 lectures on *Ding und Raum* (*Thing and Space*) which, in their descriptive parts, are relatively free of the mysteries of Husserl's transcendental and idealist turns.² I shall also refer to the large body of work stimulated by Husserl's early analyses of perception³ which expounds, develops, and criticizes Husserl's early ideas about perception. Together with the analyses of Husserl on which they draw, these early contributions to phenomenology constitute perhaps the most impressive body of work within the phenomenological tradi-

tion. They are, needless to say, almost completely unknown, particularly to phenomenologists.⁴

Early and late Husserl remained convinced of the importance of description, as opposed to explanation, in philosophy. This has not been a fashionable view, but it was shared by Wittgenstein. Each of these Austrian philosophers thought that description was difficult, that what we see is "hard to describe"⁵ and that failure to describe correctly leads to disaster.

Husserl's descriptions of perceptions fall under three headings: what we see, the way we see, and how we see. His central thesis concerning *what we see* is that the primary object of perception is public things, the things we all think we see most of the time, which stand before us *in propria persona* (LI V §11, §14, §2). In this respect Husserl is decidedly a naive realist. But he also wants to claim that this direct, straightforward perception of public things is mediated by what he calls *perceptual content*: we always see what we see in a particular way (LI I §23). A critical realist or representationalist may feel that there is only a verbal difference between Husserl's view and his view that we are aware of perceptual contents and infer to the existence of public objects, or that we see public objects by being aware of private objects. For such a representationalist, the very application to perception of the act-content-object schema is enough to make perception an indirect affair. But if Husserl is right (see section X herein) his endorsement of naive realism marks a decisive break with the critical realisms of Brentano's other students and heirs up to and including the Berlin Gestalt psychologists.

His account of *how we see* amounts to a second major difference between his analysis of perception and that of the other heirs of Brentano as well as most subsequent analyses of perception in the English-speaking world. For perceptual states, Husserl thinks, normally form part of wider psychological and behavioural wholes and only an analysis of the role of perceptual acts within such contexts will allow us to make sense of the perceptions of a subject in motion, of perceptions of dynamic objects and of the connection between perceptual states and the sets appropriate to different types of activity. If Husserl is right, most philosophies of perception have failed to appreciate the importance of dynamic perceptual content.

In Husserl's account of what we perceive, the way we perceive and how we perceive the first is the most important, not simply because

it contains the details of Husserl's naive realism but also because it enjoys a certain logical priority in view of Husserl's adherence to a principle of *indirect classification*. We provide descriptions of the way we see and of how we see via descriptions of what we see; as Meinong puts it, we cannot avoid the "detour via the object."⁶

Husserl's analysis of perception develops a line of thought that can be traced back to Hering,⁷ Stumpf, and Brentano and prepares the way for Gestalt psychology. This approach typically insists on the claim that perception and its objects have a rich structure that is not due to judgement and conceptualization. It is thus opposed to Kantian traditions in philosophy and to traditions in psychology influenced by Helmholtz.

II. TO PERCEIVE IS TO PERCEIVE EITHER SIMPLY OR PROPOSITIONALLY

The now familiar distinction between simple seeing and *seeing that* is clear enough at the level of the grammatical form of perceptual reports. As Husserl puts it: "we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an inkpot, several books' and so on, but also 'I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open' and so on" (LI VI §40). He takes this grammatical distinction to be correlated with four further distinctions which are needed to describe the truth-makers of such reports:

- (i) to see is to see either simply or propositionally;
 - (ii) to see particulars is not to mean, is not to exercise a concept, neither an individual nor a general concept;
 - (iii) to see particulars is not to judge;
 - (iv) to see is to see particulars or states of affairs.
- (iii) concerns the type of act or state to which seeings belong, (i) and (ii) the nature of their contents and (iv) that of their objects.

Husserl calls that aspect of an act that makes it an act of judging *that p* rather than seeing or supposing *that p*, or an act of seeing *a* rather than of imagining *a*, the quality or mode of an act. Modes may be independent of other modes (independent of any other modes or of modes of the same type), as is the case in seeing *a*, seeing *that p*, visually imagining *a*, visually imagining *that p*, supposing *that p* and judging *that p*. Or they may be dependent on other modes, as is the case in

admiring *a*, regretting or desiring *that p*, etc., each of which requires some cognitive basis. Independent modes are either positing – seeing *a*, judging *that p*, referring to *a* in the context of a judging – or non-positing – visually imagining *a*, supposing *that p*. Their contents are either propositionally articulated – seeing or judging *that p* – or non-propositional – seeing *a*, referring to *a* (LI VI §§22–43).

What does Husserl mean by "mean" in (ii), to see particulars is not to mean? He often describes the content of a judging, like that of an act of supposing, as an act of "meaning" (*Bedeutend*, *Meinend*), used as a gerund. Meaning, so understood, is complex, consisting of acts of naming and predicating. This is a somewhat unusual way of using "meaning," which is most often used as a noun (*Bedeutung*). Husserl also uses "meaning" in this second way to describe the types or species instantiated by namings and predicatings and by the propositional wholes they make up. Husserl argues that seeing particulars is not any sort of meaning, neither naming (whether descriptive or not) nor predicating, because of the independent variability of perceptions, on the one hand, and perceptual judgements, on the other hand.

I have just looked out into the garden and now give expression to my perception in the words, "There flies a blackbird!" What is here the act in which my meaning resides? I think we may say . . . that it does not reside in perception, at least not in perception alone . . . [W]e could base quite different statements on the same perception, and thereby unfold quite different senses. I could, e.g., have remarked: "That is black!," "That is a black bird!," "There flies that black bird!," "There it soars!" and so forth. And conversely, the sound of my words and their sense might have remained the same, though my perception varied in a number of ways. Every chance alteration of the perceiver's relative position alters his perception, and different persons, who perceive the same object simultaneously, never have exactly the same perceptions. No such differences are relevant to the meaning of a perceptual statement. (LI VI §4)

To see particulars is not to mean but to see simply, to see propositionally is to see that some state of affairs obtains. "As the sensible object stands to sense-perception so the state of affairs stands . . . to perception of it (*Sachverhaltenswahrnehmung*)" (LI VI §44). In the first case, "the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow,' as soon as our glance falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear present is *straightforward* (*schlicht*)," "simple, immediate" (LI VI §46).

The manner in which we perceive states of affairs, on the other hand, follows, according to Husserl, from the nature of states of affairs. We can distinguish in Husserl's account both a relatively uncontroversial and a controversial strand. Since states of affairs are ideal entities (*LI VI* §47), unlike the temporal individuals they may contain, and since they are complex, they can be grasped in judgments and – since the sense or content of a judgment is complex – they are then given in a conceptually complex way. More controversially, Husserl notoriously thinks there is a type of non-sensory perception of ideal entities such as numbers and states of affairs (*LI VI* §45) distinct from reference to numbers and judgments that states of affairs obtain. Indeed, because of his endeavour to be as systematic as possible, his use of "perception" is often ambiguous as between perception of ideal entities and between perception of temporal entities (and between external and "internal" perception). This is due, in part, to his ambition to defend a thorough-going parallelism between, on the one hand, reference to and perception of temporal particulars such as tables and birds and, on the other hand, between reference to and "perception" of ideal entities. The reader is therefore easily misled (especially since Husserl also thinks that there is yet another parallelism between meaning and perception, between propositions and melodies). In what follows I studiously ignore what Husserl says about non-sensory perception of states of affairs and concentrate on the relatively uncontroversial strands in his account of our grasp of states of affairs. These are his claims that judgments based on simple perceptions of particulars have as their objects states of affairs (*LI VI* §44) and are conceptually mediated. To see that the gold is yellow is to have visually present the gold and its being yellow and to apprehend this "through judging."⁸

Although Husserl rarely stresses that the two positing, non-propositional modes, naming (as part of a judgment, say) and simple seeing, are distinct, this follows from his premisses. Were they not distinct then a simple seeing could be a part of an act of judging, but since simple seeing is not associated with any meaning act it cannot occur in judging. In addition, the essentially non-intuitive nature of judging and of all its parts means that no judgment can include a perception, although a judgment may be based on perceptions in much the same way in which dependent acts such as regret are based on other acts.⁹

Husserl's view that simple seeing and meaning are to be distinguished, is now familiar, thanks to Warnock, Chisholm, Dretske, and Jackson. In particular, Dretske's demonstration of the differences in quantity and quality between perceptually articulated (analogue) information and conceptually vehicled (digital) information has made clear just why judgments and seeings are independently variable.¹⁰

Before attempting to set out Husserl's positive views about the nature of perceptual content we shall look at his account of what we see in accordance with the principle of indirect classification already mentioned. For it is by reference to the complexity of what we see that Husserl describes the complexity of the sensorial and interpretative features of perceptual content.

III. WHAT WE PERCEIVE

The distinction between simple perception of particulars and doxastic perception of states of affairs is no more than the beginning of Husserl's analysis, which advances a number of claims concerning not only the different types of particular we simply see but also the different relations between them.

3.1 *To perceive simply is to perceive particulars*

Things vs. monadic moments. It is tempting to think that simple seeing is just seeing things, and many discussions of the subject content themselves with this case. But the slogans with which Husserl announces his naive realism indicate that his own view is more complicated. We see coloured things (*LI V* §11), trees, houses, but also the events bound up with things such as a flight of birds (*LI I* §23). We hear the barking of the dog (*ibid.*), the singer's song (*LI V* §11), the adagio of the violin, the twittering of the birds (*LI V* §14), the tones of the barrel organ (*LI VI*, Appendix 4). Thus, we simply see not only things, but also what he calls *moments* (*Momente*) or features (*Merkmale*) and determinations (*Bestimmtheiten*). An important sub-class of moments is what have traditionally been called accidents. A moment is a dependent particular, as non-repeatable as is the thing it depends on.¹¹ For obscure Australo-American reasons,

moments are now often called "tropes." Within a nominalist ontology, moments do all the jobs which ideal, repeatable properties are supposed to do. In Husserl's ontology, every moment instantiates an ideal kind or "species," an ideal object or attribute. He also conceives of things as structured wholes consisting of static, monadic moments.

Like other Brentanians, Husserl seems to have become enamoured of moments first of all in the context of perception. And indeed traditional talk of qualities works with one of the traditional Aristotelian determinations of accidents. To say that a primary quality is, but a secondary quality is not "in" a thing is to work with the idea that there is something which is in a thing without being a part of it in the ordinary sense. Similarly, one analysis of secondary qualities makes them out to be relational accidents.

Husserl's moments, as the examples of perceived objects mentioned above show, may be either static or dynamic. Perceived *monadic moments* are introduced in the context of the critical discussion of the British empiricists in the second *Investigation*: "If we are struck by an 'individual' " [i.e., temporal] " 'trait' or moment of an object, by its peculiar colouring, e.g., or by its noble form etc., we pay special attention to this trait, and yet have no general presentation" (LI II §21), and the same is true of perception of a concrete thing. Yet there is a neo-Humean objection to this point, which rejects both moments and ideal properties and allows only things and resemblance relations. Husserl describes it as follows:

Features . . . are not truly immanent in the objects that have them. The distinct mutually inseparable . . . moments of an intuitive content [object], e.g., its colour, form etc., that we think we apprehend as being present in it, are not really in it at all. There is really only one kind of real parts, those which can appear by themselves, in other words the thing's *pieces*. [Moments], of which it is said that they can indeed not be on their own account, (or be so intuited), but that they can be attended to by themselves, are to some extent a mere fiction *cum fundamento in re*. There is neither colour in a coloured thing, nor form in a formed thing, but there are really only circles of resemblance in which the object in question has its place, and certain *habits*.
(LI II §36)

We have already seen what Husserl's objection would have been to the attempt to analyze perception of a redness moment in terms of

subsuming an object under the concept *red*¹² – simple seeing involves neither naming nor predicating. But Husserl objects, too, to the neo-Humean account of perceptual reports. If these attribute only perceptions of things, their pieces and relations of resemblance among things, then, Husserl points out, we will be led to give an Ersatz-semantics for such propositions. In the light of later neo-Humeanisms (Russell, Nicod, Carnap), the following remark is remarkably prescient:

Naturally the expressions "A tone is faint" and "A tone belongs to the set of objects which resemble one another with respect to faintness" are semantically equivalent. But equivalence is not identity. If someone says that talk about faintness of tones could only arise if we had noticed similarities amongst faint tones . . . he may be right. But what has all this to do with what we *mean* by our words?
(Appendix to LI II §39).

Husserl's objection to neo-Humean scepticism about the perceptibility of moments is that this position leads to a regress.

Should anyone wish to declare *all* talk of the intuitive presentation of abstract, objective determinations to be senseless, and to maintain that when we perceive, e.g., the property white, we really only perceive, or otherwise present to ourselves, a resemblance between the appearing object and other perceived or otherwise presented objects, then such a man has involved himself in an infinite regress, since talk of this presented resemblance calls for a corresponding reinterpretation.
(LI II §37).

If the white moment of a thing is reduced to a similarity between it and other things, then the ascertainment of this connection or relation would have to be explained by recourse to a "group of similar similarities such as subsist among" white objects. "The explanatory principle would have to be applied to this further similarity and so on" (*ibid.*).¹³

Colour moments and form moments – shapes, extents, etc. – are the two central categories of perceivable static monadic moments. Two points about them should be borne in mind: their inseparability, which Husserl describes in terms of the obtaining between them of a formal or internal relation of dependence and the fact that the shape-moment of a concrete thing is distinct from the region of space the thing occupies (an external relation). An internal relation is a relation that must hold between its terms, an external relation one that need not always hold between them.

Thus if, as Berkeley and Husserl claim, moments of sensory quality such as colour moments always occur together with extent moments their relation is internal. If a thing need not occupy a given location then occupation is said to be an external relation. The internal relations in the perceptual world on which Husserl concentrates are invariably relations between moments and between their species or types.

The point about the inseparability of quality and extent, together with the claim that this is seen, illustrate the thesis that what is given has a structure that is not imposed by the mind and is not due to conceptualization.

Dynamic moments. The category of dynamic moments – events, processes or episodes – is relatively familiar from contemporary work on perception, perceptual reports and, indeed, the psychology of event perception. The sounds and melodies we hear and the movements we see fall into this category. In particular, perceptual reports employing naked infinitives (“Sam saw Mary jump”) and “how” (“Sam saw how Mary jumped”) are best understood as attributing direct perceptions of events and processes. Since Husserl thinks that to perceive movement is to perceive a continuously changing occupation of places there is an important sense in which, for him, such moments are relational moments. It is to this relatively unfamiliar category that we now turn.¹⁴

Relational Moments. There is a tendency to assume that simple seeing is of things and monadic moments only, whereas to see a relation is to see that two or more particulars stand in the relation. Husserl, however, to whom we owe the very distinction between simple seeing and seeing that, did not make this assumption.

Relational particulars, or “moments of unity” as Husserl calls them, are objects that are founded on two or more other objects, that is objects that cannot exist without these fundamenta (LI III §22). Moments of unity are either *figural moments*, such as melodies and gardens, or they belong to a category of which *spatial contact* is perhaps the clearest example. They are also either temporal or spatial.

The simplest type of figural moment is a group of objects that resemble one another more or less completely, as when we have

“straightforward perceptions of sensuously unified manifolds, series, flights [of birds]” (LI VI §51, III §4). A configuration of triangles is a static figural moment of unity, “a static distribution of objects in the visual field”; but “every sort of movement or qualitative change of particular objects also gives to the whole an immediately noticeable quasi-qualitative character”: a flight of birds is a dynamic figural moment of unity (PdA 208). Husserl had described this category in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. “Experience” testifies to the

existence of quasi-qualitative moments . . . One speaks for example of a line of soldiers, a heap of apples, an avenue of trees, a line of chickens, a flock of birds, a flight of geese, etc. In each of these examples we have a sensory manifold [*Menge*, set] of objects that resemble each other, named according to their type. But this is not all that is thereby expressed – the plural of the common noun would suffice for that – but rather a certain *characteristic nature* [*Beschaffenheit*] of the unified total intuition of the manifold, that can be grasped in one glance and which, in its well-distinguished forms, constitutes the essential part of the meaning of the expressions that introduce plurals, “series, heaps, avenue, flock, flight” etc.

(PdA 203–4; my quotation marks)

In the *Logical Investigations*, he describes a basic feature of the terms of such relational particulars:

Wherever connecting forms can be demonstrated as peculiar moments in intuition, that which is connected is always relatively independent parts, such as the tones in the unity of a melody, colours picked out piecemeal in the unity of a colour pattern, or partial shapes taken out from the unity of a complete shape. (LI III §22)

The ontological difference between the two types of relational particular, figural moments such as melodies and the category to which spatial contact belongs, is that in the former but not the latter case the relational moment *contains* its terms.

We directly see not only groups, but also the relation of spatial contact and other “sensory-relational moments” such as “standing out from” (PdA 207) and the “sensory moment of likeness” (PdA 208, LI III §23 fn., II §37) as well as relations between such moments¹⁵ and positional relations (PdA 206, 207).¹⁶ In general, wherever there is phenomenal discontinuity there are perceived relations.

3.2 (Dis)continuity vs. (in)dependence

The classification of what we perceive has so far been in terms of the distinction between perception of independent and of dependent particulars and, within the latter category, between perception of relational and of monadic particulars, and between perception of static – redness and squareness moments – and dynamic particulars – screamings and hittings. Skew to all of these is the distinction between the visually differentiated and undifferentiated.¹⁷ What is visually differentiated may be independent, a “concretum,” or dependent, e.g., a moment of shape. Husserl seems to have thought that it is one of the functions of the interpretative element in perceptual content (see section V) in perception to determine whether an array of discontinuities is seen as belonging to one thing or two. Another function of interpretation is to bring us to distinguish between the relevant and the irrelevant internal relations exhibited in any given visual array: the moments of sensory likeness, distance and contrast that are relevant to the perceptual project in question.¹⁸

3.3 Perception of states of affairs

A state of affairs is not something that can appear in a sensory fashion even if one or more of the individuals in it is seen (LI V §28). We directly see “sensory or real forms of connection,” but we see *that* “categorical or ideal connections” – that is, formal or topic-neutral connections – obtain between particulars and properties (LI VI §48).

I can see colour, but not *being*-coloured, I can feel smoothness, but not *being*-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something *is* sounding. Being is nothing *in* the object, no part of it, no figure of it, no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an object: as it is no real internal feature, so also it is no external feature, and therefore is not, in the *real* sense, a “feature” at all. For it has nothing to do with the *real* forms of unity which bind objects into more comprehensive objects, tones into harmonies, things into more comprehensive things or arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external world). On these real forms of unity the external features of objects, the right and the left, the high and the low, the loud and the soft

etc., are founded. Among these anything like an “is” is naturally not to be found. (LI VI §43)¹⁹

We directly see “sensorily unified groups, series” such as a flock of birds or a group of dots but we see *that* there is this or that conjunctive or disjunctive entity (LI VI §51). Sensory connection-moments differ from relations such as exemplification, part-whole relations, dependence and other internal relations. The former [*Verknüpfungen*] are material and perceptible, the latter [*Beziehungen*] formal and invisible.

Of spatio-temporal “objects, their constitutive features, their factual connections with other objects, through which more comprehensive objects are created and . . . external features in the part objects,” Husserl says that they “exhaust the possible range of what can be perceived” (LI VI §43). Here “perceived” presumably means perceived directly by the senses without the help of judgement or concepts.

What, then, is the relation between the perceptual judgements reported by “see that” and simple, direct perception of particulars? Husserl correctly notes that one can perceive a monadic moment, such as a smell or a sound, without perceiving the whole it belongs to and so, too, see that a state of affairs obtains without seeing all of its components. Indeed, more generally, it is possible to see that aRb without seeing a , or without seeing b , or without seeing the relational particular, r , that falls under the relational concept. As Jackson puts it, I may see that the petrol tank is empty by looking at the gauge. And I may see Mary’s jump although I see only an extremely small part of Mary.²⁰

Nevertheless it is clear from Husserl’s analyses of verification and abstraction (see sections 7.4 and 10.2 herein) that in the optimal and so fundamental case of fully justified true perceptual belief, he thinks that to see that aRb is to see directly a , b and some r and to judge that aRb on the basis of these direct perceptions.²¹ In such a case, to use one of his favourite expressions, the perceptual judgement is built up on the basis of the different direct perceptions. It would therefore be in the spirit of Husserl’s analysis of the optimal case to say that the subject believes or judges *of* a , b and r , on the basis of perceptions thereof, that aRb . Judgements that aRb which lack this anchoring in direct perception, such as judgements arrived

at via inference or via testimony, would then fall short of this optimal case.

Independently of his analysis of abstraction and verification, Husserl has two further reasons for wanting to relate direct perception of particulars to perception of states of affairs in the ways just described. One of these is epistemological, the other ontological. Ontologically, Husserl seems to have been tempted by a coincidence principle of the sort to be found in Meinong and in logical atomism. An obtaining, positive state of affairs, such as that the square is red, is an ideal entity. But this ideal entity is correlated with an entity that is wholly particular, the square, and "contains" a shape moment and a colour moment. The epistemological consideration is that since direct perception is not normally of simples, the perceived complexity of what we directly see must be allowed for without invoking perception that. This Husserl does by claiming that those parts of what we directly see which are also directly seen are implicitly seen (VI §48). Clearly, too, the "real forms of unity" already described must also be implicitly seen if they are not to be assimilated to the category of correlates of perceptual judgements, to states of affairs such as that *a* has property *P* or contains *b*.

We can now use this account of what we see to introduce Husserl's account of the way we see, of perceptual content. This is, in the first instance, an account of what we may call static content and then of dynamic content. The description of dynamic content is, roughly, a description of the way we see when we move or of the way we perceive dynamic moments and things, or both. We shall look first at static content. Husserl's account has two strands: a description of the sensations we have when we see, and a description of the interpretation of these sensations. I give his account of sensations in section IV, and of interpretation and its relation to sensations in section V.

IV. CONTENT: TO PERCEIVE IS TO HAVE SENSATIONS

The way we see particulars is no less complicated or varied than are the objects we see. The parallelism between Husserl's description of what we see and his description of sensations, between his argument for perceived moments, monadic and relational, and his argument for sensational counterparts to these, is striking and thorough.

Thus, the argument above, that if colour moments are rejected

then the similarity relations between things that are supposed to replace them must be reinvented *ad infinitum*, applies to any attempt to reject sensations of colour. As Husserl points out, if there are no sensations of colour then there can be no "connection and relational contents in the intuition of a whole [*Inbegriff*] with a corresponding form of unity" (LI II §37).

Nevertheless, the roles of sensations and perceived public particulars are radically different. "I do not see colour-sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song" (LI V §11, cf. §14).

To each of the different types of visible particulars described in III, there correspond types of sensations. The description of visual differentiation and continuity given (in §3.2) is actually, Husserl adds, two descriptions: of the complexities of sensations of spatial form and of the spatial traits of physical things (LI III §9). To "the objective moments of unity, which belong to the intentional objects and parts of objects, which in general transcend the experiential sphere" there correspond the *phenomenological* moments of unity, which give unity to the experiences or parts of experiences (the real phenomenological data) (LI III §4).²² Thus, to the different moments of colour in perceived things, there correspond, for example, colour sensations; to the monadic and relational moments of form, there correspond form sensations (LI II §37). And to the way moments hang together in and between what we see, there correspond sensations which are relational. Sensations "form a unique highest genus, which divides into many species" (LI VI §58).

This relation of correspondence between visual sensations and the moments and things they help present is conceived of in a very traditional fashion: there are types of visual sensations which "are in a particular sense analogous to types found amongst properties." Husserl notes the problems associated with the thesis that sensations and qualities in objects are analogous: "we make an equivocal use of the same words to refer to the sensuously apparent determinations of things and to the (re)presenting moments in perception and thus speak of 'colour,' 'smoothness,' 'shape' etc. in the sense of objective properties and in the sense of sensations" (LI II §10).²³

Just as Husserl conceives of the thing seen as made up of moments or abstract parts, so too he conceives of sensations as being real parts (V §2), parts of the content (I §23) of states of perceptual awareness.

A phenomenological moment of unity, such as a sensation of an avenue of trees is a relational moment, it relates sensations of trees, just as sensations corresponding to the colour and form of an individual tree are linked by relational sensations.²⁴

A philosopher who denies the distinction between the visual sensations we have and the objects (moments and things) we see is, Husserl argues, overlooking the phenomenon of perceptual constancy, the "difference between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable indeed necessary shading [*Abschattung*] of the subjective colour sensations." I see the ball as having a uniform red colour, in spite of noticeable variations due to the play of light on it. I do not see it as having one dark red colour here, another light red colour there. Colour-constancy amidst variations of light and shadow is the phenomenon that the colour sensation/colour quality distinction is intended to do justice to.

Husserl repeatedly claims that we see objects by virtue of the fact that we have, but do not see, sensations. This thesis involves rejecting an assumption shared by Brentano, Russell, and Moore. For them, the relation between sensing and what is sensed, the sensation, is simply a special case of the act-object relation. Husserl, however, denies this. Sensations, on his account, may belong to intentional experiences, but they are not themselves intentional. Husserl generalises the distinction defended by Stumpf between feelings such as a localised pain, which require no cognitive basis, and emotions such as joy or regret, which do have such a cognitive underpinning, so that it applies to perception. Visual sensations – of redness and of form – and tactile sensations – of roughness and smoothness – differ from acts of seeing and touching in the same way in which a localised pain differs from regret. Perceptual sensations and localised pains are non-intentional. Seeing and regret are intentional. Husserl "identifies sensation and its 'content'," since he "does not recognise sensing acts" (*LI V §15*) (b)).²⁵

Husserl's claim that visual sensations belong to perceptions but, unlike these, have neither contents nor objects, has two important consequences. First, it clears the way for the claim that to perceive is to perceive things. For if, as for Brentano and Russell, to see is to have sensations and the latter necessarily have objects, then seeing becomes a relation whose second term cannot be a material thing. Husserl denies any object to sensing and is thereby able to say that

the object of perception is a public thing. Second, consider the case of someone who wants to reidentify tokens of a certain visual or pain sensation, perhaps because he wants to note their occurrence in his diary. Since for something to be such a sensation is just for someone to have it, and since the occurrence of the sensation involves no mode or content of presentation (it is not an act), the relevant tokens can only be reidentified via the sense of a suitable description.²⁶ Thus, private sensations are reidentifiable only via public senses. As we shall see below, public visible items present themselves from different sides. But mental phenomena are not so given.²⁶

V. CONTENT: TO PERCEIVE IS TO INTERPRET SENSATIONS

Although a world is conceivable in which creatures would have sensations but would not interpret them, such creatures would not, Husserl claims, be capable of perception (*LI I §23*). Husserl's labels for sensations – he calls them "intuitively presentative" or "representative" contents – may easily mislead. By themselves such sensations do not present or represent: it is these sensations "*in their interpretations*" which have the "relation to corresponding objective determinations," which is (re)presentation (*LI VI §22*). By themselves, sensations stand only in relations of causality and similarity – simple or brute, and structural – to objects and their features.

What, then, is it to interpret sensations? An interpreted sensation is a way of seeing, we said. But if to see simply is not to judge or exercise concepts, then it is clear that Husserl cannot explain the difference between two ways in which one object is seen, for example from below and above, along the lines of his explanation of the difference in sense between two descriptions of the same object. The term of art of Frege, Cantor, and Husserl for the sense of an expression, "the way of being given" (*die Art des Gegebenseins*), seems to be taken from the perceptual domain. But the difference between the two ways of referring accomplished with the help of "the evening star" and "the morning star" and the two ways of seeing one and the same star, in the evening and in the morning, is a difference in kind.²⁷ Although Husserl describes the *role* of the non-conceptual interpretation of sensations and the *relation* between interpretation and sensations, he has surprisingly little to say about the *nature* of

such interpretation. The *role* of interpretation is to be the surplus which, when combined with raw sensations, "makes us perceive this or that object, e.g. see this tree, hear this ringing, smell this scent of flowers etc." But this is just to say that interpretation plays the same *rôle* in perception as sense in judgement which, since perceptual content is not conceptual, is not very illuminating.

Husserl's four most informative claims about the roles and nature of interpretation concern the organisation of sensations, the distinction between seeing an object and seeing one of its sides, perceptual constancy and perceptual identification.

5.1 *Interpretation and organisation*

The first of these claims is introduced via discussion of examples of the dawning on us of different interpretations. Husserl mentions (a) the case where we suddenly see a figure as a sign and (b) the case where what is seen as a woman turns out to be a waxwork figure. He also (c) contrasts hearing a word first as a mere sound and then with its meaning.

But these three examples do not tell us what it is to interpret visual sensations in two different visual "ways" (LI V §14, §27). To come to hear or see a word with its meaning is to understand what was previously merely heard or seen. But, as we have seen, to interpret visual or auditory sensations is not to mean. Similarly, to come to take what seemed to be a woman in the Panopticum Waxworks as a waxwork figure representing a lady is to pass from the perceptual mode to a combination of this with the mode of imagination. As Husserl himself puts it, the difference here lies in the act qualities, i.e., modes (LI V §27). In each of these cases, then, the switch of aspect is a switch from the mode of perception to a complex mode that is more than merely perceptual. But what is required is an account of what it is to switch from one way of perceiving to another way of perceiving the same object. There are, doubtless, changes in perceptual interpretation involved in each of Husserl's examples, but he does not describe them. If, for example, "the same tone is at one moment heard close at hand, at another far away" (LI V §14), in what respects have we here more than a difference in sensations? So far we have merely the bare claim:

Different acts can perceive the same object and yet involve quite different sensations . . . The same sensational contents are . . . "taken" now in this

and now in that manner . . . Interpretation itself can never be reduced to an influx of new sensations; it is an act-character, a way of being conscious, of "mindedness." (LI V §14)

Husserl does, however, make two interesting claims about taking sensations in different ways. First, what remains constant across a switch of aspects is not just the visual sensations I have but also the visual properties these present; thus, both when I seem to see a woman and when I come to see what I am looking at as a wax figure, "identically the same phenomenal determinations" are involved (LI V §27). Second, Husserl occasionally hints at a correlation between relational moments of organization in what is seen and the modifications of sensation through which these moments are presented. When "contents are considered in their connections with other contents, as parts knit into wholes," they undergo a modification and differ from the same contents "considered by themselves."

Connections would not connect if they made no difference to what they connected. Certain changes necessarily occur and these are naturally such specific connectednesses as constitute the phenomenological correlatives of what are objectively *relational* properties. Consider, for example, a line set apart, perhaps on a bare white background, and the same line as part of a figure. In the latter case, it *impinges* on other lines, is *touched*, *cut* by them etc. . . . [T]hese are phenomenological characters that help to determine the impression of the appearance of linearity. The same stretch – the same with respect to its internal content – appears ever different according as it enters into this or that phenomenal context, and, if incorporated in a line or surface qualitatively identical with it, melts indistinguishably into this background, losing its phenomenal separateness and independence. (LI VI §9)

The moments or aspects of organisation here called "objectively relational properties" are the counterparts of what, in a perceptual state, is the moment of interpretation. The dependent moments we perceive are "not merely parts but we must also grasp them as parts in a certain manner (that is not mediated by concepts)" (LI III §8). What Husserl deals with under the rubric of what is perceptually salient or outstanding, of what does and does not go together, is what the Berlin Gestalt psychologists came to call visual units. *Touching* and *cutting* are the first items on the list of functional features such as being an end-point, being a centre, etc., which the Gestalt psychologists were to extend considerably. Since to interpret is not to bring under con-

cepts, a change in interpretation is, we may say, in a sense, a sensory change.²⁸ But it is not a sensory change of the same sort as a transition from a redness to an orange sensation. And since sensations alone do not determine which parts of what is seen are grasped "as parts in a certain manner," a level of interpretation in content must, Husserl seems to suggest, be allowed. He also clearly regards aspect switches as bringing to light something that is always present in ordinary perception. Simple seeing is, to use Wittgenstein's expression, continuous aspect perception, that is, interpretation.²⁹

5.2 *Gestalten and the constancy hypothesis*

When Husserl turns to the *relation* between sensations and interpretation, he is somewhat more forthcoming. In simple perception content ("interpretative sense (matter)") and sensations ("representing content") are intimately united, mutually related, and not quite independently variable, although the sensory representative can stay the same while the interpretative sense alters and can vary while the latter remains constant (LI VI §54). He calls the combination of matter and sensation in every perceptual act its "intuitive content" (LI VI §22). Between visual sensations and matter there is "an internal, necessary connection." Since sensations can occur independently of interpretation, the necessary connection alluded to here must refer to the dependence of types of interpretation on types of complexes of sensations. "Only those contents can be intuitive representatives of an object" – but not by themselves, as we have seen –

that resemble it or are like it. Only we are not wholly free to interpret a content as this or that (or in this or that interpretative sense); and the reasons for this are not merely empirical . . . since the content to be interpreted sets limits to us through a certain sphere of similarity and exact likeness . . . The internal nature of the relation does not merely forge a link between *the interpretative matter as a whole* and *the whole content*: it links their parts on each side *piece by piece*. [LI VI §26].

The "homogenous unity of the perceptual sense pervades the total representation [representative content]," it has definite relations to each distinguishable part of the representing content, without seeming to inner reflection to be a composite of distinct partial interpretations (LI VI §55).

Husserl's account of the relation between sensations and interpretation and of interpretation's role as the representation of aspects of organisation will become somewhat clearer if we compare his view with two other accounts and with a common if mistaken criticism of his view. The alternative accounts are the Graz and the Berlin analyses of form (Gestalt) perception; the criticism, inspired by the Berlin analysis, is that Husserl adhered to (a counterpart of) the Constancy Hypothesis.

On the account of Gestalt perception developed by Meinong and his pupils such as Ehrenfels, perception of a complex object is a two-tier mental state corresponding to a two-tier object. The state involves perceptions of the object's parts and features and, built on top of these, a judgement to the effect that these parts stand in certain relations to one another or that they have this or that ideal property. This view embodies two claims: first, a change of aspects is an intellectual change; second, relations, in the final analysis, require independent non-relational terms.

Now Husserl, as we have seen, is definitely a friend of higher-order objects such as states of affairs. But he is not of the opinion that these or any other ideal entities are given in simple perception of what is complex. Nor *a fortiori* does he think that simple seeing of what is complex, unlike seeing that, is a two-tier affair. He conceives of the states of affairs *that the ball is round and white* as built up out of an individual and two ideal attributes. But he distinguishes an ideal state of affairs from the ball together with its particular whiteness and roundness moments.

In sense-perception, the "external" thing appears "in one blow," as soon as our glance falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear present is *straightforward*; it requires no apparatus of founding or founded acts . . . We are not here ignoring the obvious complexity that can be shown to exist in the phenomenological content of the straightforward perceptual act, and particularly in its unitary intention.

Husserl's unpacking of this claim makes use of the two distinctions we have already come across – between dependence and independence, and between phenomenal continuity and discontinuity. The unity of a perception of a complex object, at a time or throughout an interval of time is due to (a) the relations of continuity (fusion) between the partial perceptual acts and (b) to the fact that the percep-

tion is founded on the partial acts that compose it. This foundation relation is not, however, a relation between a supervenient perceptual or intellectual act and a series of underlying perceptual acts. The relation between the perception of a complex object and the partial acts that merge into one another is not like the relation between my regret that *p* and my judgement that *p*. Husserl describes the difference as follows:

In the continuous running on of individual perceptions we continuously perceive the single, selfsame object. Can we now call this continuous perception, since it is built up out of individual perceptions, a perception which is *founded* on them? It is of course founded on them in the sense in which a whole is founded on its parts, not however in the sense here relevant, according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character, grounded in the act-characters that underlie it . . . In the case before us perception is merely, as it were, extended: it allows parts to be broken off from itself which can function as complete, independent perceptions. But the unification of these perceptions into a continuous perception is not the performance of some peculiar act, through which the consciousness of something new is set up.

(*LI VI* §47)³⁰

We have already come across the distinction between foundation with and without containment in our taxonomy of perceptual objects (3.1 above): a flock of birds depends on and contains the individual birds, a hit depends on but does not contain its terms.

The Berlin account of continuous Gestalt perception simply denied the validity of the distinctions central to the Graz analysis: between dependent, ideal higher-order objects and their independent bases, and between the corresponding types of perceptual state. On the Berlin view, to see a Gestalt is not to see an ideal, higher-order entity. Everything that we see is both sensory and dependent. A change of aspect is a sensory change in just the way in which perception of a change of colour is a sensory change. And the Graz view that what is seen is built up from perceptions of independent items is rejected.

Husserl, however, rejects a premiss common to both the Graz and Berlin accounts – their critical realism, as well as claims peculiar to each account. Against the Graz and Berlin views he holds that what we are aware of are public items, not private phenomena. Consider again Husserl's description, quoted above, of perception of a line in different contexts. When the Berlin Gestalt psychologists considered

such examples they drew the conclusion that the perceived line could not be an independent entity, that indeed everything we see is dependent. This was a reasonable conclusion given the critical realism they espoused. If everything one sees is a phenomenal item, then the notion of reidentification of such items makes little sense and no sense can be given to the notion that a phenomenal item is independent. It cannot exist outside the phenomenal context in which it occurs. On Husserl's view the line seen in the two different contexts is the same and in each situation it is independent of the relations it stands in. But it *appears* differently in each case. "A line, which with other lines, founds a configuration, is an independent content," wrote Husserl in 1894 (Husserl 1979, 96). But, says Koffka (1925, 533), although it may seem natural to say that the sides of a right angle are lines, in fact "a line by itself is phenomenally and functionally different" from the side of a right angle. "The latter has . . . an inside and an outside, the former on the other hand, two completely similar sides." Husserl's description above of perception of lines draws attention to facts of just this sort. But because he does not run together the independence-dependence and the discontinuity-continuity distinctions and because of his naive realism, Husserl's account of these facts differs completely from that of Koffka.

On Husserl's view, we can draw no conclusion as to an item's status as an independent or dependent object from the fact that it does or does not appear to be continuous with other objects, or from the fact that it seems or does not seem to fit or go with other objects. Consider two red boxes which are moved together in such a way that each red surface appears to be continuous with the other. It is nevertheless the case that each red box is independent of the other (and that the spatial relation of contact depends on them).³¹ In other words, like the Graz philosophers, Husserl holds fast to the view that relations require independent terms.

Husserl's position, therefore, differs from that of other philosopher-psychologists in the tradition of descriptive psychology brought into being by Brentano. Like Meinong, and unlike Koffka, he thinks that the terms of a perceived relation are independent of it. But unlike both Meinong and Koffka, he thinks that what we see are non-phenomenal, public items.³² Unlike Meinong Husserl thinks that perception of complex objects does not require judgement and conception. Unlike Koffka, he distinguishes between content and object.

The criticism of Husserl that he falls foul of the constancy hypothesis goes back to Scheler³³ and has been made many times since. But it is either unfounded or impossibly vague. The constancy hypothesis is the thesis that there is a constant correlation between stimuli and sensations. Apparent exceptions to the hypothesis were often dealt with by introducing auxiliary hypotheses such as the existence of unnoticed sensations, of unnoticed judgements about sensations, or the influence of past experience. Both the hypothesis and the auxiliary hypotheses were the subject of a famous attack by Köhler in 1913.³⁴ Husserl suggests that what was to be called the Constancy Hypothesis, whether true or false, with or without any auxiliary hypotheses, was irrelevant to his analysis:

What is most emphasised in the doctrine of "apperception" is generally the fact that sameness of stimulus [*Reiz*] does not always involve sameness of sensational content; what the stimulus really provokes is said to be overlaid by features stemming from the actualisations of dispositions left behind them by previous experience. Such notions are, however, inadequate, and, above all, phenomenologically irrelevant. (LI V §14)

No thesis about the relation between stimuli and sensations can have consequences for a descriptive thesis about the relation between interpretation and sensations. In what sense, then, is Husserl supposed to accept the constancy hypothesis? Consider Koffka, who rejects a distinction between sensations and interpretation like that of Husserl and assumes that the sensations we have are what we see, and makes the following claim about aspect-switches:

Lines that at first lay unconnected side by side, because they were parts of different Gestalten, because they belonged to the ornamental foliage, to a gable, etc., suddenly spring together to form a face and so look quite different. To assert that here . . . nothing changed in the sensations is an assertion that is based not on observation but on the constancy hypothesis.

(Koffka 1925, 533)³⁵

Now the view here criticized is indeed held by Husserl. As we have seen, he thinks that in such a case the sensations do not change (although the perceptual content does). Holenstein calls the view criticized the intellectualist version of the constancy hypothesis,³⁶ distinguishing it from the empiricist version which, as we have seen, is rejected by Husserl. The latter, unlike the former, makes a claim about relations between stimuli and sensations. What error, interest-

ingly similar to the empiricist version of the constancy hypothesis, is Husserl supposed to have been guilty of? Perhaps the criticism is simply that perceptual content does not display two levels, sensations and interpretation. But Husserl's critics provide no argument for this. Perhaps they have in mind the following view of perception which does indeed deserve to be described as an intellectualist version of the constancy hypothesis. On this view sensations are simple and qualitative and display no structure. Structure is introduced by interpretation or judgement. But this is not Husserl's view. As we have seen, sensations, according to Husserl, are of qualities and of spatial forms. It is by virtue of this that they belong to fields. The creatures imagined by Husserl who enjoy only visual sensations but no interpretative content would enjoy structured sensations in fields. It would be with them as though they were aware of rich arrays of qualitative discontinuities and coloured expanses. They would simply lack representations of what were called above aspects of organisation, of experiences as of tables and chairs.

Husserl's claim that perceptual acts have sensational parts or properties that are irreducible to the parts of properties of interpretative matter and can remain constant while the latter vary was one that he held on to throughout different writings. It was regularly criticised by phenomenologists and psychologists influenced by descriptive psychology. It resembles in some respects Anglo-Saxon sense-data theories, which have likewise been the object of much criticism. But this resemblance is merely superficial in view of Husserl's claim that we do not see sensations and his views about their complex organisation. Husserl himself, however, occasionally had doubts about his account of sensations.³⁷

VI. INTERPRETATION, CONSTANCY, AND PROFILES

6.1 Constancy phenomena

We noted previously that Husserl used the phenomenon of colour constancy – not to be confused with the constancy hypothesis – to justify his distinction between sensations and the qualities and things they represent. The phenomena of colour, shape, size, form, and thing constancy play another role in his account. The interpretative stratum in perceptual content has not only the role of represent-

ing what we called aspects of organisation (see 5.1) but also that of representing colours, shapes, sizes, etc., as constant moments or features, of representing things as constant things in spite of widespread variation in the sensory level of content. The distinction "between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable indeed necessary shading [*Abschattung*] of the subjective colour sensations," is matched by a number of other three-way distinctions between varying sensations, representation as of some constant feature and the objective feature itself. The difference between constant forms and colours, on the one hand, and the continuously varying sensations thereof, on the other hand, is "a difference repeated in all sorts of objective properties and the complexes of sensations that correspond to them." "What is true of the individual determinations" of particulars, Husserl continues, "carries over to concrete wholes."³⁸

The word "*Abschattung*," often translated as shading or adumbration, refers in the first instance to the way one and the same colour appears in a certain context, in a certain light, etc. It seems likely that Husserl was influenced here by Hering's distinction between the way we see colours and colours themselves, and his generalisation of this as a distinction between "*Sehdinge*" and things.³⁹ For Husserl, too, generalises from the case of colours and subsumes under the term "adumbration" not just the way colours shadow themselves forth, but also the way a shape appears or is shadowed forth. There is a difference . . . that we sought to cover by our talk of perceptual adumbration, a difference that does not concern . . . sensuous stuff, its internal character, but means . . . the interpretative character of the act. (LI VI §37)

Perception is invariably perception via "adumbrations of colour, perspectival foreshortenings." An adumbration is a sensation that is interpreted as being as of some constant feature, or a complex of sensations that is interpreted as being of some constant thing.

6.2 To perceive a particular is for a profile to appear

To observe a three-dimensional object is, in another sense of "observe," to observe only one or some of its sides. I see an object via one adumbration of its form, but I may see two sides of it at once. Husserl sometimes uses the term "side" to refer to the single profile

presented via one adumbration⁴⁰ as when he talks of the "one-sidedness" (DR §16) of perception. When I look at a house, three features of my perception can be distinguished: my perception of the side that faces me, my awareness of the other sides of the house, the whole perception of the house. Husserl calls the appearance of the side that faces me a "genuine appearance," for it is based on the sensations that correspond to the moments of colour and form making up this side; and he calls the awareness of the other sides "non-genuine" or "inauthentic," meaning thereby that this awareness is not based on any sensation. Each of these two aspects is inseparable from the other, just as my entire perception of the house must contain appearances belonging to these two categories (DR §16, §24).

Three ways of construing these distinctions are rejected. First is the temptation to say that I *expect* the house to have sides that are currently invisible. The mode of expectation is future-directed and so cannot explain that feature of my present perception that is my awareness of the sides of the house with which I am not presented. There are certainly, as we shall see, relations of indication and motivation between my present perception and possible future perceptions, but these are much more primitive than expectations – though they may of course ground such expectations, which are more important in the case of dynamic perception than in the case of static perception (LI VI §10).

A second temptation, one to which Moore succumbs in his elegant application of Russell's theory of descriptions to perception, is to introduce the notion of judgement into the analysis of the one-sidedness of perception. On Moore's account, for me to see the house is for me to judge that there is exactly one house of which this side is a part.⁴¹ Now the difference between such an account and that of Husserl is not merely that for him to see is not to judge, but a consequence of this point. On Husserl's account my perceptual relation to the house is like the relation between my use of a proper name and its bearer (on Husserl's account of this relation): it is not mediated by any general concept or presentation. And the same is true of the two types of perceptual awareness that constitute the entire perception: my relation to this side of the house and my relation to that invisible side. My perception of the house is a single perception with at least two single partial acts (DR §18).

Third, the way in which the hidden sides of the house and its

constituent features are "given" is not that of imagination, although imagination may well combine with perception. Husserl's argument for this point is a simple one. Since imagination in the simplest case is a modification of or parasitic on perceptual experience, to imagine (visually) a house is to have an experience which itself displays the two aspects which are a "full" and an "empty" imaginative presentation of a house. But it would be absurd to say that the "empty" imaginative presentation of the far side of the house is a phantasy presentation within the original act of imagination (*DR* §18).

Unfortunately Husserl does not characterise positively the awareness in perception of the invisible side of the house. What is clear is that, unlike Meinong, he does not wish to introduce a supervenient act of imagination into perception, either to explain perception of visual organisation or to explain awareness of what is currently invisible. On Husserl's view, then, perception is entirely direct and necessarily incomplete.⁴² Once again interpretation is introduced in a black box fashion. It is what turns visual sensations into a part of a unified perceptual awareness of a three-dimensional object by orchestrating the combination of genuine and non-genuine awareness of its sides.

6.3 *To perceive is to identify*

Variations at the level of sensations may be caused by movement of the subject or of the object or both. Husserl's full account of the role of interpretation in such cases will emerge when we consider his account of dynamic content. On that account static perception turns out to be a mere abstraction from dynamic perception. But in order to present a further role played by interpretation we shall assume that dynamic perception is built up out of static perception.

Interpretation is responsible for the fact that one and the same object continues to be perceived as the same although the sensations the subject has vary, perhaps because he is walking round the object. The very different sensations I may have while looking at the same object are interpreted "in the same sense." What I see with the help of one set of sensations is apparently identical to what I see with the help of a quite different set (*LI* V §14). Where we have such an apparent identity over time, we have coincidence

of matter. But, Husserl adds, such apparent identities should not be confused with judgements of identity: to perceive is to identify, to perform an identification, but not to mean any identity (*LI* VI §§8, 25, 47). When two perceptual senses or matters or interpretations overlap or coincide ("*übereinstimmen*," "*sich decken*"), then an identification has been performed. The role and nature of interpretation in such identifications can only be understood by turning to the dynamics of perception.

Husserl never discusses explicitly the relations between the four roles of interpretation distinguished so far: to be responsible for awareness of aspects of organisation, for perceptual constancy, for the orchestration of our awareness of three-dimensional objects and for the performance of identification. It is worth noting that in each case perceptual content turns out to have the property of transposability, that is, of being a whole which remains constant in spite of variation among its parts. Transposability is the property of *Gestalten* such as melodies, actions, and substances that was noted by Ehrenfels when he launched Gestalt psychology. Thus we may say that, on Husserl's view, perceptual content has the same type of structure as that enjoyed by its objects.

VII. DYNAMIC CONTENT: HOW TO PERCEIVE

We are now familiar with the two strata, sensory and interpretative, that make up perceptual content. But the type of content that has been described so far is static content. And this is, on Husserl's view, a mere abstraction from dynamic content. Failure to realize that this is the case is largely responsible for the tendency to conceive of the coloured shapes we are presented with as two-dimensional private entities. Thanks to the work of J. J. Gibson and G. Evans (and indeed of Merleau-Ponty), this point is now becoming as familiar as it was to Husserl and his pupils around 1907.

Husserl's account of dynamic content – that is, of the content of the perceptual states of a subject who is either looking at moving objects or is moving with respect to the objects he is looking at or both – contains (7.1) an analysis of the relation between static and dynamic perception and (7.2) a detailed description of the ways visual and kinaesthetic sensations cooperate to make perception possible.

7.1 *The connection between static and dynamic content*

Consider a possible world containing creatures whose capacities for general thoughts resemble ours, but whose sensory capacities are limited in the following way: they are always immobile when they perceive and they never perceive objects as being in motion. In other words, although the objects they perceive retain their identity over time, two perceptions of two qualitatively identical sides of one object and two perceptions of two sides of two different objects would be, as far as their sensory input is concerned, four of a kind. Such creatures would be incapable of "dynamic thoughts" if such thoughts are taken to be thoughts that cannot occur without dynamic content, for example demonstrative thoughts about objects in movement. Thus, even their conceptual capacities would differ from ours – they would lack singular, perception-based thoughts.⁴³ The difference between their perceptual experiences and ours would be that the identity over time of objects would not be "given" to them, they would not have our identificational capacities, would not be able to keep track of objects over time⁴⁴ in spite of occasional occlusions, etc. Their perceptions would be only "one-sided and singular"; ours are also "many-sided and diverse" (DR §42). Only if a "continuous transition from one perception to the other is guaranteed is . . . identity given. . . . [A]n identical-unchanged spatial body can only certify itself ("*ausweisen*") as such in a kinetic perceptual series that continuously yields appearances of its different sides" (DR §44).

The continuous transition from one appearance to the next of the same object is not itself any sort of judgement of identity. Rather, such transitions are the basis of perceptual judgements of identity.⁴⁵ Continuous perceptual tracking of an object involves variations in sensory input but, Husserl stresses, there is no necessary discontinuity at the levels of mode and content.⁴⁶ Similarly, increasing perceptual specification and determination of the way an object looks is not any sort of conceptual specification or determination but an analogue thereof (DR §29).

It is important to distinguish two senses of "dynamic," or of what Husserl, talking of dynamic thoughts, calls the "dynamic unity between expression and expressed intuition" (LI VI §8): (a) both static and dynamic perceptual contents, "unchanged" and "changed" per-

ceptions (DR §42), can precede or accompany perceptual judgements in the unity of the "temporal Gestalt" (LI VI §8) of verification; (b) but when the sense of a perceptual judgement is not only verified by an ongoing perception but is also individuated by the latter, as in the case of a demonstrative thought,⁴⁷ then the temporal Gestalt is much *stronger* than in (a). Then the "dynamic coincidence between meaning and intuition" (ibid.) is not merely verification over time but the perceptual determination of sense over time. The assertion "That is a blackbird" is verified by the perception of a blackbird as a blackbird; the linguistic singular term it contains, "that," is incomplete without perception of the blackbird and does not refer without this. The ambiguity between (a) and (b) carries over to such favourite expressions of Husserl as "experience of transition", "dynamic fulfilment or cognition."

What is the connection between Husserl's account of static perceptual content and his account of dynamic perceptual content? I suggested above that on his account static perceptual content was an abstraction from dynamic content. It suffices to introduce here a principle to which Husserl was much attached to see why he arrived at this conclusion. The principle is that all distinctions have their roots in perceptual experience. Now we have seen that all static perceptual content, indeed all perceptual content, is characterised by two distinct but complementary aspects: the "full" awareness of the side of the object facing me, mediated by the sensations I have that correspond to its constituent features, and the "empty" awareness of its far side(s). What is the origin of this distinction?

It comes to light in every transition from what was an empty awareness of the far side of an object to a "full" perception thereof and correlatively from what was a "full" perception to an "empty" perception. That is to say, in every dynamic perception. If this is the case one might predict that creatures to whom dynamic perception is foreign would have perceptual experience as of sides of objects and not of objects (even though what they see is the side of an object). And that their philosophy of perception would tend to make of these sides private phenomenal entities intervening between the subject and public things (cf. DR §17). And indeed those philosophers – critical realists or representationalists – who have notoriously been unable to see that we see things have indeed tended to ignore dynamic perception.

7.2 *Kinaesthetic sensations and motivation*

There is another reason for thinking that static perception is a mere abstraction from dynamic perception. Not only is my awareness of the side of the house facing me normally accompanied by a perception of it as having other sides, but it is also felt to point forward to a determinate range of possible continuations and verifications.⁴⁸ This relation of "pointing to" or indication belongs to the family of relations Husserl calls *motivation*. Closely related to purely perceptual motivation is a better known species of the same genus, the criterial relationship between perceptions and judgements or between judgements. Husserl takes such relations to be more than merely contingent and less than narrowly logical⁴⁹ or necessary. They are not, he says, causal or probabilistic. But then in virtue of what do the "interpretative components" in a perceptual state "point beyond" the side of the object facing me?

Husserl's answer, developed at length in *Thing and Space*⁵⁰, is that creatures with visual organs, but endowed with no active powers, would be incapable of perception of things and processes. To be endowed with active powers is to be capable of intentional and sub-intentional movement, it is to be the bearer of actual and possible kinaesthetic and postural sensations, to have information about the positions and movements of one's body. The interpretative components in perception point beyond the present moment because of the connection between perception and the actual and possible states of my body. We must therefore determine what these states are and what sort of connection obtains between them on Husserl's account.

Kinaesthetic and postural sensations resemble visual sensations in that we *have* them and thereby achieve contact with objects, houses, and our own bodies and body-parts. They also resemble visual sensations in belonging to "systems" or "spaces." The different types of kinaesthetic space correspond to the different independent "movement systems," those of one eye, of both eyes, of the head, of the upper part of the body, etc., which do not normally flow continuously one into another. Just as visual sensation-fields are always completely filled, so too kinaesthetic and postural sensations fill the space of our body-image, although they do not display themselves in a graduated fashion and have only an indeterminate localisation due to localised sensations.⁵¹

One major difference between visual and kinaesthetic sensations concerns the ways they form continuous unities.

The kinaesthetic sensations form continuous systems of many dimensions, yet in such a way that, like tone sensations, they form continuous unities only as series, whereby a linear manifold singled out from the total manifold of kinaesthetic sensations coincides with the continuous unity of the preempirical temporal series in the manner of a continuum that fills [it].

By a "preempirical temporal series," Husserl means our awareness of time (so called "immanent" time). "A kinaesthetic manifold"

can only acquire continuous unity as a linear manifold by filling a temporal interval. Since only a continuous linear manifold can function in such a way as to fill time, a many-dimensional system of kinaesthetic sensations cannot achieve a closed temporal unity.⁵²

The contrast between the serial unity of kinaesthetic sensations and the simultaneous unity of visual sensations in a visual field⁵³ has its origins in the fact that, unlike visual sensations, kinaesthetic sensations do not present the objects we see, do not belong to the "projection" of a thing, although we could not perceive such objects without them (*DR* §§45–46). They represent neither moments of quality nor moments of extension.⁵⁴ Visual sensations stand in a less direct relation to their objects than bodily sensations to their objects,⁵⁵ because visual sensations present their objects only with the help of visual interpretations or contents which can vary while their object remains constant. But, as we have seen, no such interpretation is needed for my awareness of the pain in my foot or, we may now add, its movement.⁵⁶ In particular, my kinaesthetic sensations do not advise me of, or indicate to me, the movement of my foot. They are just my awareness of my foot's movement "from the inside." As Husserl points out (*DR* §47), such information can found judgements (conceptual interpretations), but then the singular parts of such judgements cannot fail to refer.

Kinaesthetic sensations collaborate with visual sensations. The latter include not merely the sensations of quality and extent in the two-dimensional visual field⁵⁷ that we found in our description of static perceptual content. They may also be sensations of displacement, which Husserl also calls "pre-empirical," "pre-spatial," or

"quasi"-displacement. Similarly, he talks of quasi-rotation, quasi-contraction, and quasi-expansion.⁵⁸

The two types of sensation are said to collaborate in the following way. They are essential to every perception, but their relation to each other is not that of reciprocal inseparability or dependence – as in the case of quality and extension – but rather the relation of "*functional*" dependence. Kinaesthetic sensations "have no essential connection to visual sensations; they are connected with these functionally" (DR §49).

Thus, to take one of the simplest cases described by Husserl, in monocular vision, if we abstract from rollings of the eye in question, there is a rough correspondence between positions in the visual field and position sensations of the eye; to every visual line along which the glance of the eye passes there corresponds a continuous kinaesthetic series "which differs sensorially (*empfindungsmässig*) from every other such series."⁵⁹

Husserl's claim that kinaesthetic sensations and visual sensations are linked in a merely functional manner is based on the following assumptions. My kinaesthetic and postural state at a given time does not indicate or point to any particular way of appearing, or visual picture, of a thing. "Every [kinaesthetic] sensation, K, is compatible with every visual picture."⁶⁰ And quite different kinaesthetic series can "stand in for one another vicariously."⁶¹ What is achieved by a certain movement of the head may be achieved by a movement of the upper part of the body" (DR §83). And finally, although each visual appearance in an extended dynamic look points forward, this is not true of the kinaesthetic sensations that correspond to these appearances (DR §51).

The unity of wholes of kinaesthetic sensations and visual perception only emerges at the level of entire sensory-motor series or sequences consisting of series of each type. A whole series of kinaesthetic circumstances (*Umstände*) corresponds to a determinate series of visual appearances. It is within my power to ensure that I have no visual appearances, but what is not subject to my will is that if I allow a kinaesthetic series to continue, then a determinate series of appearances will be the result.⁶² Ordered kinaesthetic series *motivate* (indicate, are criteria for) the continuations of ordered series of appearances. Series of appearances form

more or less complicated types; any kinaesthetic series belongs to one of many "unified, familiar possibilities" (DR §52, §55, §61).

Consider again the example of an avenue of trees. Instead of simply describing how a group of trees, *a, b, c, d, e*, is perceived at a moment, we can now consider the way the avenue of trees appears when mediated by dynamic content. As we move along the avenue, the sequence of kinaesthetic circumstances motivates the appearance of *b, c, d, e, f*, containing the appearance of the new tree *f*, then of *c, d, e, f, g*, etc. "To the determinate kinaesthetic series belongs the . . . determinate continuous series of changes of the fillings of one and the same field of places by these and those distributions of visual pictures or appearances." At any given moment the unified interpretative character of the perceptual state brings to the corresponding kinaesthetic state, as a result of association, a certain direction in which this state can continue or persist. This is, Husserl adds, more than a mere tendency. His descriptive capacities exhausted, he writes:

From every series of appearances in certain kinaesthetic circumstances there radiate living intentions that are fulfilled from phase to phase. . . . It belongs to the stable course of motivation that at the absolute place position where *a* was, *b'* presents itself . . . , that in its turn is identified with the *b* that had just occupied another position, that the representational series displace themselves in this way. The determinacy of the spatial order and of the order of visibility and of the relevant order of what actually becomes visible belong essentially together. And the being of object parts that are not currently perceived points to possible and indeed motivated ordered series of documenting perceptions and of the representing contents they contain, that bring about connections between not perceived and currently perceived parts. (DR §62)

The internal, phenomenologically immediate connections between perception and action, between the spaces of perceptual input and of behavioural output are, then, analysed by Husserl (as by Evans) as indirect transitions involving kinaesthetic information and body images. Sensory information involving information about orientation properties is linked to behavioural routes via "kinaesthetic paths."⁶³ This type of account contrasts sharply with that of Gestalt psychologists such as Koffka for whom ideo-motor transitions are completely direct.⁶⁴

7.3 *Interpretation, action, and public objects*

How does Husserl's account of the motivational connections between our awareness of our actions from the inside and goings on in our private two-dimensional visual fields help us understand the claim that dynamic perceptual content represents public objects in public space as public objects in public space?

The step from visual fields to visual spaces – from a representation as of a two-dimensional field to representation as of an objective three-dimensional space – is not a step which a perceiving subject normally takes. Rather, in Husserl's view, the former is an aspect of or abstraction from the latter, which is the type of perceptual state we normally enjoy. Certain types of movement, together with the types of kinaesthetic and visual information these are correlated with, are responsible for the fact that this is our normal perceptual condition.

Two of the most important types of movement are moving towards or away from an object (distancing) and moving around it (orbiting).⁶⁵ Distancing correlates with quasi-expansions and quasi-contractions in the visual field.⁶⁶ These may be uniform or non-uniform and may concern the whole field or only a part of it (DR §67).

"The multiform system of [quasi-] expansions makes possible a new dimension, that makes a thing out of a [visual] picture, space out of the oculomotor field" (DR §67). For "expansion is a principle of selection and unification that marks out certain of the manifold delimitations in the oculomotor field as belonging to the unity of a thing." The "different ways in which expansion . . . is distributed over the different segments of the oculomotor field . . . lend determinacy to our grasp of things" (DR §71). Activities of distancing, when reversed, yield a reversal of the just-experienced series of quasi-expansions, quasi-contractions, and quasi-coverings, and so motivate (are cues for) awareness as of a thing occupying a fixed position.⁶⁷ Similarly, quasi-nonuniform expansion and quasi-covering indicate (are cues for) awareness of things as being at different distances from the perceiver.

Distance from the subject, that is depth, is a relation between an object I see and the "origo" or zero-point of my visual space, whereas the distance between two objects is "genuinely perceived."⁶⁸ Husserl takes items in the visual field to have absolute monadic position

features. "To every distinguishable concrete sensational element corresponds its position, its here. And this here is a moment belonging to it that grounds relations of distance."⁶⁹ He thinks that there is a level of analysis of perception at which a one-dimensional continuum of absolute depth moments can be discerned, a continuum which together with the two-dimensional field, on which it is founded, forms a double-continuum. These depth moments, just like positions in the two-dimensional field, ground relations of distance (DR §49). In what sense, Husserl asks, do such depth moments represent relations of depth between public things and me (*ibid.*)?

As Drummond suggests, the gist of his answer is that the activity of distancing, together with the quasi-expansion and quasi-covering it is bound up with, "reveal that the relation of depth is *relative* to the position of the percipient, thereby introducing the relationships of 'nearer to' and 'further from.' " They uncover "a new dimension, not within the visual field but within the perceptual experience, a dimension which indicates that the position of the object relative to the perceiver is not reducible to the position of an appearance in the percipient's visual field."⁷⁰

The activity of orbiting an object motivates determinate series of appearances in which we find not quasi-occlusion but quasi-replacements and quasi-turnings. It is through cyclical appearances, what O'Shaughnessy calls "looks in the round," that we see public objects as enclosed items in empty space.⁷¹

Husserl's descriptions of the different varieties of distancing and orbiting, of the different determinate patterns of appearances they generate, and of the combinations between these constitute his contribution to a criteriological account of perception. A complete description of this sort would, he thinks, bring out how movement contributes to the make up of the interpretative level of perceptual content and to all the roles he attributes to the latter. In particular, movement "constitutes" orientation space in which I am aware of things and myself as occupying positions in public space: "all spatiality . . . comes to givenness in movement, in the movement of the object itself and in the movement of the 'ego' with the change of orientation this brings with it" (DR §44).⁷²

The continuity of the different ways in which we keep track of objects has so far been explained in terms of the connections between sequences of appearances and kinaesthetic sensations and in

terms of forward-looking and lateral, informational links. But kinaesthetic sensations and the basic acts or bodily movements with which these are connected (as part to whole) belong to larger behavioural units bound up with interests and dispositions that colour and steer these units.

7.4 *To perceive is to perceive more or less well – optimality, sets, and determinacy*

At §36 of *Thing and Space*, on "Optimal Givenness and Direction of Interest," Husserl describes a feature of perception that has increasingly come to interest psychologists and cognitive scientists. His starting point is the distinction between inadequate and adequate perception, which he takes to be fundamental for psychology (Appendix, 7, to LI VI). The phrase "perceptions of things" refers to

determinations [of these things], to maximal points or domains, hence in each case to an appearance or narrowly delimited domain of appearances, in which when it is actualised, the relevant determination counts as "completely" given. (DR 126)

The optimal or normal perspective on a thing varies with the interests of the subject. But given such interests, there is an internal relation between the appearances of the thing which is their different distances from the relevant optimal appearance. These relations are of a quite different type than simple distance relations between positions in the visual field or in colour space. They are internal axiological relations: the appearance of this object in this light from here is better than the way it looks from over there. These internal relations announce themselves, Husserl claims, in any given section of a series of appearances as a part of the subject's background awareness and they vary with his interests. "The natural interest in a flower is not that of the botanist."⁷³

Leyendecker's elegant development of Husserl's account of the connection between optimality and interest introduces into the philosophy of perception a phenomenon and a term of art for it that had been introduced into psychology by G. E. Mueller and von Kries, "*Einstellung*"⁷⁴ or set. A set is a higher-order unity of modes, tendencies, and dispositions which is often the function of determinate types of interest and attention. As Leyendecker points out, those visual fea-

tures of things that we take in and the aspects under which we see them are a function of our set and its connection to automatised and non-automatised behaviour. The set peculiar to purely perceptual observation is very different from those appropriate to looking, ordering, searching for, counting, collecting, or working with objects. These again are different from an aesthetic set. These different sets "make it possible to overlook everything that does not correspond to them." Sets may help to make us aspect-blind for what we would see in other sets. Sets may be more or less basic. Some practical sets can be changed at will, especially if not already automatised. Others are connected "with a certain way of life, a certain milieu."⁷⁵

Sets function like sieves, selecting certain aspects and discarding others. This feature of perceptual content is to be distinguished from the different determinate ways in which perceptual content is essentially vague and indefinite. Under this heading, Husserl refers not to the equally essential vagueness of sensory properties – as opposed to mathematical idealisations thereof⁷⁶ – but to the fact that the series of possible future perceptions that is indicated by a current perception of, say, one side of a thing, leave open a range of different possible fulfilments. It is a determinate feature of this perceptual content that it refers indeterminately to a range of possible completions: "Perception essentially contains indeterminables, but it contains them as determinables" (*Ideas* II, 222).⁷⁷ Two sorts of possible completion can be distinguished – "motivated" and "empty" possibilities. It is emptily possible for the desk I am writing on and whose top alone is visible to turn out to have thirty legs; the possibility of the desk having four legs is motivated. One criterion for distinguishing between the two is the occurrence of perceptual surprises. But it does not follow from this that where there are no perceptual surprises, perception is accompanied by feelings of familiarity.

Different possible perceptual series are "prescribed in a law-like way" by any given perception⁷⁸:

When, e.g., a familiar melody begins, it stirs up definite intentions which find their fulfilment in the melody's gradual unfolding . . . The regularities governing melody as such, determine intentions . . . which find or can find their fulfilments. (LI VI §10)

Husserl distinguishes this sort of forward-looking information, which is determined both by sets and by behaviour, from the lateral

background information that forms the horizon or Jamesian "fringe" of every perception. The simplest type of background is the perceived background of a thing against which it is seen. But Husserl also describes many other types of background ranging from my awareness that the table I am looking at is in a room in a house in a city to background beliefs.⁷⁹

VIII. INTERPRETATION WITHOUT CONCEPTS

The interpretative aspect of perceptual content, then, has a large number of jobs to perform: it is responsible for the organisation which supervenes on the sensations of quality and extent in the subject's two-dimensional visual field; it is responsible for the unity in any perceptual state between awareness of what is in front of me and of what is not; it is the locus of the properties of orientation and distance which determine how what I see seems oriented; it is the locus of the degree of determinacy of the way I see; it points beyond itself to further possible perceptual states, particularly to optimal perceptual states; and it points sideways; it is responsible for our being able to keep track of an object. "The interpretation of a thing as at such a distance, so oriented, so coloured, etc." is, in its turn, due to the motivating force of kinaesthetic sensations and the structures of the spaces to which they belong.⁸⁰ And these, in their turn, are a function of our interests, dispositions, and sets.

One (neo-Kantian) reaction to such a description is that it overburdens non-conceptual interpretation. Surely concepts must do some of these jobs, the objection goes. Another, Husserl's, is that it shows how inadequate is any simple act-content-object schema. Content exhibits many more levels and peculiarities than one might at first think. Against the common conviction that many of these levels are concept- or theory-laden, and more generally against ratiomorphic theories of perception, Husserl would object that these often rest on a failure to take seriously the distinction between episodes and dispositions. It is as true that many types of perceptual content can only be enjoyed by creatures that master certain concepts as it is that many types of content can be enjoyed only by creatures with certain needs and interests. But perception does not necessarily involve any exercise of these concepts.

Husserl, in fact, goes some way towards meeting neo-Kantian worries. Although perception is by its very nature an aconceptual affair, it is of course, as a matter of fact, shot through with conceptual episodes. Not just because perception combines with concept involving modes, not just because many visual pictures can only be enjoyed by those possessing a mastery of this or that family of concepts, but also because continuous aspect perception is often a matter of wordless subsumption of what is seen under concepts, particularly in cases of recognition. At *LI VI §15*, Husserl describes cases of wordless recognition of something as a drill, as an ancient inscription, of a person as the adjutant of the Emperor. To see *a* and recognise it as an *n* is for an act of meaning to "extend over" and beyond what is directly perceived. We may therefore distinguish between conceptual and non-conceptual seeing as, each of which may be either continuous or sudden, as in an aspect-switch. "There is an essential difference between 'interpretation' that is sensory and that which is thought involving" (*LI II §26*). To see something as a part of something else, as going with this rather than that "but not via concepts" is an example of the former (*LI III §8*).⁸¹

With neo-Kantian temptations in mind, Husserl modifies Kant's slogan when he writes that sensory experience alone is blind. For Husserl, but not for Kant, what removes the handicap is non-conceptual interpretation (*LI VI §57*).

IX. WHAT WE PERCEIVE: TO PERCEIVE A PENNY IS TO PERCEIVE A COLOURED SHAPE AND ITS BEHAVIOUR

Our account of what we see in Section III was mainly an account of what we see in virtue of static content. In the light of the description of dynamic content, we can now flesh out our account of what we see by considering the case where one or both of a perceiver and the object of his perception move (or change). The independent "concreta" we see in virtue of static content, together with their constitutive moments of form and colour, are not to be identified with things and their moments unless such static content is understood to be a mere abstraction from actual or possible dynamic content. "More belongs to the unity of a thing than an isolated concretum."⁸² The unity of a thing is due to the fact that it exemplifies some of the

different ideally possible continuous transitions from one concretum to another of the same form. These transitions, involving both change and persistence, are governed by relations of causal dependence.⁸³ In the absence of movement, the distinction between a visual concretum (which Husserl was later to call an "empty phantom") and a thing is not part of what is visually differentiated. Only such moments as colour and form, being metallic, or roughness are differentiated in static perception, not such moments as heaviness, elasticity, and being magnetic. Indeed, even in some cases of movement of the object, the distinction between phantom and thing may not show itself visually. For this distinction to become apparent, it is necessary for there to be a relation between my perceptual interpretation, on the one hand, and interactions between the thing and its circumstances on the other hand. In particular, the thing appears to me as one and the same thing to the extent that I am presented with its *functional dependence* on parts of the visual scene. Continuous variation in a thing's surroundings leads to continuous variation in the visual concretum, and unchange in the circumstances, the limit case of change, is accompanied by unchange in the visual concreta. Above we saw that variations in colour sensations could present one and the same colour moment; in the present context, Husserl points out that it is perception of the correlation between different levels of illumination, for example, and the different appearances of a coloured surface that allow one and the same colour to appear. Unfortunately, Husserl fails to give an account of the relation between perception of light and of colour.⁸⁴ He does, however, accept that to be acquainted with such correlations is to directly see causal relations. This provides yet another case where Husserl resists the temptation to introduce judgements about relations such as causality into perception.⁸⁵ However, in his descriptions of our awareness of different "if-then" or "because-so" connections in perception, in which the objective forms of a thing "announce" themselves, Husserl has some difficulty in avoiding the claim that this awareness of conditional or dispositional causal properties of things is propositional.⁸⁶

Husserl's account of the relation between that moment of a thing which is its shaped extent and other sensory qualities labours to bring out the primacy of the former. Husserl fails to bring out the source of this primacy although he erects on it a new distinction between primary and secondary qualities. As he points out, sensible

qualities stand in an asymmetrical relation to extent: the former cover or fill the latter. Husserl fails to uncover the source of this asymmetry because he does not wish to give up the view that extent and sensory quality are reciprocally dependent and because he fails to distinguish between type and token dependence. Once this distinction is made it becomes possible to reformulate his point about the primacy of extension as follows. Consider a particular brownness moment of a penny. It token depends on the extent moment of the penny. If the latter is modified, the brownness moment gives way to a numerically distinct although qualitatively identical brownness moment. The original extent moment is, however, token independent of the brownness moment that covers it; it could be covered by a quite different colour moment.⁸⁷

By the time Husserl came to investigate in detail the relations between the visual information we acquire from visual concreta at a moment and from material things endowed with the causal properties which remain invisible without the help of dynamic content he had lost interest in the questions that trouble any realist. One such question is the following.

We may distinguish, in the light of the foregoing, between those properties of an object "whose types are in a particular sense analogous to types found amongst sensations" (LI VI Appendix 5, cf. LI I §23) and those properties of an object of which this is not true. Since determinate form and colour sensations correspond to the array of colour and form properties, these sensory properties belong to the first category. In the second category, we find some of the material, causal properties of things that are "announced" or "indicated" in and through perception of the thing's behavior. But there will also belong to this second category such properties as being a mountain. Suppose I see, via a suitably optimal appearance, a complicated array of spatial and qualitative moments which is Mont Blanc with all its snowfields. What does the copula mean here?

Perhaps the simplest answer available to the naive realist is that the "is" here is the "is" of identity. But as Dretske points out, such identities are very peculiar ones, as are their expression in identity statements containing at least one demonstrative.⁸⁸ It is variously qualified shaped things, or more simply, qualified shapes that are identical with mountains and tables. But the identity is identity at a time, or alternatively, identity between a qualified shape at a time

and a mountain. And in, e.g., "That brown ellipse = Maria's penny" or "That grey triangle = Mont Blanc," the demonstrative functions referentially.

A more complicated case comes into view if we reintroduce the claim already discussed that we can see such relational particulars as spatial contact. One particular contact moment will be identical with a kiss, another with a slap, and so on (cf. *EU* §34). Consider two senses of the noun "flight." In one sense, a flight is "a group of similar creatures or objects flying through the air together." When Sam simply perceives a group of characteristically shaped specks moving in a certain characteristic way, he simply perceives a flight of birds – and this independently of his exercising the concept of *flight* or of *bird*. In a second sense of the word, a flight is "an act or instance of fleeing." If Sam simply perceives a certain animate shape in movement, he simply sees Mary flee.

It is essential to such an account that what we see are shaped things rather than things with their shapes, where the latter are conceived of as abstract properties. The category of shaped things and moving things figures prominently in Brentano's ontology (and even occurs in Aristotle's ontology, sporadically, and in his account of perception). But not in Husserl's ontology, with one exception. When Husserl describes the different strata of visual information he employs a three-way distinction between what he calls *res temporalis*, *res extensa*, and *res materialis* (*Ideas* II §15, I §149). These belong to the category of entities that the account above requires. Husserl uses this stratification in his account of the way non-materially qualified things (mountains) depend on sensorially and materially qualified things (coloured things) which depend on extended things (shaped things) which depend on temporal things. Because he thinks these strata stand in relations of dependence to one another, Husserl is committed to the view that they are distinct.

X. THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK: SPACES AND INTERNAL RELATIONS

10.1 Spaces, disjunctivism, and internal relations

Husserl's description of perception, its object and their relations, employs an analytic framework which he applies in all his contribu-

tions to descriptive psychology and to ontology. It is a framework which assumes the existence of internal relations. The two main sorts of internal relations employed are *dependence* ("Abhängigkeit") and *distance* ("Abstand") relations.⁸⁹ Dependence is understood modally by Husserl: for *a* to depend on *b* is for *a* to be such that it cannot exist or occur without *b*. He often also understands dependence as relative to wholes. Thus, his analysis of the different abstract parts or aspects of perceptual content is a componential analysis. The copula in the headings to sections IV and V above is the copula of constitution. Distance relations such as orderings among qualities in an *n*-dimensional space⁹⁰ presuppose dependence relations: if two qualities stand in the internal relation of greater or lesser similarity then they jointly depend on, cannot exist without, this relation.⁹¹ We have come across many examples of such internal relations: the different types of similarity relations between perceptual content and its object,⁹² relations in orientation space and in the different sensory fields, relations among forms and qualities.⁹³ The relation between the two moments of belonging to the foreground and belonging to the background is an internal relation, unlike the corresponding relation between objects. The ordering of more or less optimal appearances of objects, like those among more or less optimal instances of a type of object, and, more generally, among more or less abnormal cases of a kind are also examples of distance relations. And, as we have seen, Husserl distinguishes between (a) dependence relations between aspects of content and between aspects of what is seen, (b) functional dependence relations between the structures of kinaesthetic space and ordered perceptual sequences, and (c) causal dependence relations. Two central internal relations remain to be considered: the "intentional" relation between perception and its object and the relations between perception and judgement (and, hence, assertion) called verification, falsification, fit, and conflict.

What sort of internal relation obtains between perceptual content and its object? Husserl's account of this relation is merely a special case of the account he gives of the relation between acts and their objects in general. It is brief and obscure. But it represents his answer to the thesis of his representationalist critic which was mentioned in Section 1: to allow perceptual content and objects together with the possibility of perceptual error is incompatible with the view that we directly see things, their states, and events.

It will be useful to locate his account with respect to two well-known rival accounts of the content-object relation, disjunctivism and conjunctivism. On the conjunctivist account of content, perceptual content is entirely independent of what is the case in the subject's environment. The very same type of perceptual content can be tokened in the context of veridical perception, of perceptual illusion and hallucination. The difference between these cases is explained by the presence or absence of some appropriate causal relation between object and content. On such a view, veridical perception of an *n* as an *n* and a hallucination of an *n* are said to *have something in common*. On a disjunctivist account, there is no such highest common factor – perceptual content is given by a disjunction. Thus, its looking to Sam as though something is a horse amounts to one of two things. Either a horse perceptually manifests itself to him as a horse, or he enjoys a mere appearance as of a horse.⁹⁴ Perceptual seemings are either veridical perceptions under the right aspect or hallucinations.

Many passages suggest that Husserl held fast to the common factor account. Indeed, at *Ideas* §49 he gives a well-known statement of a view that Reiner called "methodical solipsism,"⁹⁵ and that has since been called "methodological solipsism": no real being is essential for the being of consciousness. And in the *Investigations* Husserl often seems to be making the same point. The existence or non-existence of the object is "irrelevant to the true nature of the perceptual experience" (*LI V* §14). The distinction between normal or veridical perception, on the one hand, and illusion and hallucination, on the other hand, "do not affect the inner, descriptive . . . character of perception" (*LI V* §2).

Husserl wants to assert both that if "nothing is there, then there is nothing to see" and that there are perceptual illusions and hallucinations, and yet deny that we ever see merely phenomenal intermediaries.⁹⁶ His brief attempt to meet these requirements is to be found at *LI V* §11 and in the Appendix thereto. At §11, he sketches an account of content attribution, emphasising that the fact that a content occurs is independent of whether or not it has an object, and rejecting all attempts to introduce intermediate mental objects. He suggests that the right way to describe a perceptual seeming is with the help of hyphenated descriptions: Sam sees-Cologne-Cathedral, sees-a-horse. In the Appendix, he nevertheless defends the claim that there is an internal relation between content and object:

The intentional object of a presentation is the same as its real and in certain cases external object . . . it is absurd [*widersinnig*, i.e., contradictory] to distinguish between them. The transcendent object would not even be the object of this presentation, were it not its intentional object. And this is of course a merely analytic proposition . . . [That] [t]he object is "a merely intentional object" does not of course mean: it exists, but only in the *intentio* . . . ; rather, it means: the intention, the subject's meaning an object with this or that property exists, but not the object.

This passage suggests that his view is not straightforwardly conjunctivist. To begin with, the analytic connection Husserl has in mind is clearly distinguished by him, as by disjunctivists, from the bipolarity of propositional content.⁹⁷ Bipolarity, the claim that a proposition can be true and can be false, involves no reference to any mental state. The disjunctivist analysis of perception refers to different types of mental mode and content.

But now what is the "analytic" connection between a perceptual report and its object, between perception and its object? Husserl's use of a counterfactual in the passage quoted⁹⁸ should perhaps be taken to mean that if a certain perceptual content occurs and a certain object exists – each of these claims is contingent – then a certain internal relation must obtain between them. What relation? The question is easier to answer in the perceptual case than in others. First of all, the internal relations of similarity, structural and otherwise, which have already been mentioned, suggest themselves. But these relations by themselves are not enough. And Husserl's view in the passage quoted may well involve denying that content and object are independent. A Husserlian disjunctivist claim might be put as follows: to enjoy a perceptual presentation is either to have an intentional object or to have a merely intentional object. Here, to have an intentional object is just to have a transcendent object in virtue of a content, and to have a "merely" intentional object is not to be aware of some mental object but to enjoy only a certain type of content, to be in a certain state.

In favour of such an interpretation is the fact that on Husserl's general account of relational moments every such moment stands in an internal relation to its terms. If Sam sees and hugs Maria, then a particular hug depends on Sam and Maria and a particular perceptual episode depends on Sam and Maria. This does not, of course, commit Husserl to the view that the two states of affairs, Sam hugging and

seeing Maria, are anything other than contingent. The two terms are independent of each other and of all huggings and seeings.

Notice, finally, that the passages where Husserl seems to adopt the highest common factor idiom are best explained in terms of two of his favourite distinctions. What is common to veridical perception of a horse as a horse and hallucination of a horse is not any separable "piece" of content but rather a moment or inseparable aspect thereof.⁹⁹ What sort of moment? Each of the disjuncts proposed by the disjunctivist entails the proposition of which the disjunction is supposed to be the analysis. Just as to be red is to be coloured, so too, for something to be a veridical perception of a horse as a horse is for it to also be a perceptual seeming. But "also" here means more than mere conjunction, just as the way in which something is red and also coloured differs from the way in which it is red and also accelerating.

Husserl calls the relation between redness and being coloured the relation of logical parthood. If we say that the relation between either of our two disjuncts to the proposition being analysed is that of logical parthood, two questions immediately arise. Like red and blue in a two-colour world, the two disjuncts we have been considering are mutually exclusive, but unlike them these disjuncts stand in the following internal relation to one another: perceptual hallucinations are parasitic on veridical perceptions. But what does this mean? At the very least, that the former are abnormal variations on the latter.¹⁰⁰

A second distinction of Husserl which throws light on his use of the highest common factor idiom is that between normal and "modified" uses of language (between using a name and mentioning it, for example). If – as *LI V §11* suggests – the proper description of a perceptual seeming is hyphenated, can any account be given of the semantic connection between the internal structure of this description and that of the two disjuncts? On many accounts of hyphenated descriptions the answer would be negative. But on Husserl's account of semantic, syntactic, and psychological "modification," the result of modification and its basis are said to "have something in common."¹⁰¹

Disjunctivism may plausibly be held to be implied by a certain view about object-dependent content. On this view, there just are no determinate types of psychological episodes such that some tokens of a type are dependent only on subjects and others on both subjects

and objects in the world (such that some are monadic moments and others relational moments). Now although such a claim, indeed even the more general claim about determinate types of episode of any sort, would be in the spirit of Husserl's strongly Aristotelian conviction that everything in time does come in determinate kinds, it is not a claim he ever makes.¹⁰²

But the approach to perception and the mind he came to adopt after 1907 (the second analytic framework mentioned in Section 1 above) can usefully be understood as embracing the view that it is possible to draw a clean line between what is ideal or non-temporal in perception of objects and what is not. The project then becomes that of describing the former. Unfortunately, so single-minded was Husserl in the pursuit of his new project that he never returned to the questions thrown up by this brief passage on the nature of the intentional relation in the *Logical Investigations*.

There is, however, good reason for thinking that Husserl's later project is incompatible with the object-dependence of content. In the *Logical Investigations* he assumed that psychological episodes such as perceivings are in time. As he came increasingly to be impressed by the claim that purely psychological episodes are not in any sense reidentifiable, he came to the conclusion that such episodes are not in time (but only in "immanent time"). The next step was to deny that there could be any internal relation between what is not in time and what is in time, e.g., between my perception as of a man and some concrete man.

10.2 The perception-assertion link: Non-propositional justification

We saw in section IX what a Husserlian account of direct veridical perception looks like, in Section 10.1 what the nature of the link between perceptual content and object might be. Veridical perception is a necessary condition for what Husserl calls perceptual knowledge (verification or confirmation) – the subject of the sixth *Investigation*.¹⁰³ A second condition is that direct perceptual reports be justified by perception. Since perception is not concept-involving, this amounts to the claim that what justifies a perceptual judgement is not any sort of judgement. This claim flatly contradicts the popular assumption that both terms of the relation of justification be

propositions or sentences, an assumption shared by Davidson and many others who have taken the linguistic turn.¹⁰⁴ The two main pressures leading Husserl to embrace his alternative view are, first, his central claim that to see is not to believe and secondly his conviction that concepts do not come from nowhere but have origins, in other words, that a theory of meaning must contain a theory of abstraction, of concept-formation, and learning.

For a judgement to be perceptually verified, then, it must not only be true, but the objects named and quantified over by the judgement must be perceived. But an object can be perceived in a way that falls short of the ideal of perceptual justification. I can see a duck although my perceptual content is that of a rabbit. I can see Mary's leap into the air although my perceptual content is as of a fall. These merely veridical perceptions make true but do not justify the relevant indirect perceptual reports. In other words, the fullest sort of perceptual justification of a judgement of the form *aRb* will involve not only perception of *a*, *b*, and some static or dynamic relational moment *r* but also perception of these under the appropriate aspects, appearances or contents.

As the references to ideal justification indicate, this account takes seriously the idea that perceptual justification, like perceptual acquaintance, comes in degrees.¹⁰⁵ Thus, my judgement that Mary is embracing Sam will be verified by my veridical perception of Mary, Sam, and the embrace under the right aspects. But it will be more fully verified by a perceptual circuit of Mary and Sam, by a look in the round.¹⁰⁶ At the other extreme, we have the sort of case already mentioned above in Section 3.3 where some or even all of the constituents of the truth-maker of the judgement are not seen or are seen under the wrong aspects and where what is seen is merely closely linked to the relevant truth-maker – as when I judge that the petrol tank is empty on the basis of my perception of the gauge. In between these extremes are a variety of cases of partial confirmation and disconfirmation.¹⁰⁷

Husserl repeatedly stresses that the relation between perceptual content and assertion is an internal one. Is it identical with the relation of motivation or indication? An indication, cue, or criterion "prescribes" a range of possible continuations or objects. But Husserl also says that when an indication is given in a determinate context it indicates just one object or state of affairs. Similarly, the sense of a

word embraces or comprehends an ideally fixed manifold of possible perceptions (*LI VI §7*). Husserl also says that the relation between what indicates and what is indicated is less than the internal relation of dependence (*LI I §§1–7*). He certainly conceives of episodes of verification as higher-order activities founded on, and linking, perceptions and assertions (*LI VI §9*). But since particular perceptions and assertions are mutually independent of one another, like an indicator and what it indicates, this does not answer our question. His view seems to be that certain types of perceptual content and certain types of propositional sense are such that when they are tokened, then necessarily a relation of justification, of counting as evidence for, holds between them.¹⁰⁸

Veridical perception is a necessary condition for perceptual knowledge of spatio-temporal items. But are there any constraints at all on the type of appearance under which the object of such a perception must appear for the perception to be veridical?¹⁰⁹ An extreme minimalist view would be that visual differentiation of an item guarantees perception of it. Husserl never considers our question. But in the light of his emphasis on the importance of actual and possible perceptual integration,¹¹⁰ it seems likely that he would have wanted to impose stronger conditions than that suggested by the extreme view. In this connection, Leyendecker considers a problem that was to be much discussed by later writers. Suppose that what is visually differentiated for me is a small red point against a green background, and suppose it "is" my house. To say "My house is not small", we have seen, is no objection to the claim "That small point is my house"; the description functions referentially. This point about perceptual reports fits the extreme view about the condition to be met by veridical perception. But there is nevertheless, Leyendecker suggests, a reason for rejecting the claim that, in this case, what I see is my house: my perceptual awareness of the small red point involves no "empty" awareness of the other side of my house, as does the perception I have of it when I move closer.¹¹¹

Husserl's silence about the relation between the veridicality of perception and perceptual content is a function of a more thoroughgoing reticence. Although he provides a defence of the nature of the distinction between the way we see and what we see he says relatively little about what falls under which heading. He clearly thinks that properties of orientation are ways objects are seen.¹¹² But he

rarely takes a stand on the validity of the traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities, on the claim that redness, for example, is the way an object is seen or would be seen, rather than a monadic moment of it. He suggests that his distinction between sensations and the features in and of things that they help present is independent of the position one adopts about the ontological status of secondary qualities:

We may be led by certain reasons to distinguish appearing determinations into merely phenomenal and genuine ones, perhaps in the sense of the traditional distinction between secondary and primary qualities. [But] the subjectivity of secondary qualities can never amount to the absurd assertion that they are real constituents of phenomena. The appearing objects of external intuition are *meant* unities, not "ideas" or complexes of ideas in the Lockean sense of these terms. (LI II §10)

This suggests that, even if colour moments are really "subjective" or mind-dependent, nevertheless they are not identical with sensations and are perceived as being monadic moments of things. But Husserl here considers only two possible views about their actual status, that they are constituents of content or genuinely mind-independent. He overlooks the view that colours are (actual or dispositional) relational moments. Behind his suggestion that, whatever they are, they are not identical with sensations, there is an idea sketched in passing in *Thing and Space* and later. In this work Husserl develops some ideas to be set out by (his occasional student) Katz in his classic work on colours. Like Hering and Katz, Husserl was aware of the fact that philosophers and psychologists systematically underestimate the variety of colours. In addition to the familiar surface colours, Katz distinguished spectral film colours (on which too many philosophies of perception relied), and space colours of different types. Husserl conceives of the relation between "genuine" optimal surface colours and all other colours as a case of the relation between an object of perception and ways these are seen. Thus, he adopts Katz's term for colours other than surface-colours, "the modes of appearance of colours." Of course, a friend of the traditional distinctions between primary and secondary qualities will reply that this distinction between genuine colours and other colours is a distinction *within* perceptual content rather than between perceptual content and its object.¹¹³

10.3 Applications

Husserl employs his analysis of perception in a number of different areas, many of which have only been mentioned here. It is developed in his analysis of the perception of other living beings and their psychological states.¹¹⁴ It is essential to his analysis of the way proper names, indexical and demonstrative expressions connect us to the world. On his two-tier account of these terms, they have a sense but a sense which, in the simplest case, must be completed by perceptual acquaintance, the function of which is to fix the reference of these terms. This sense is simple and non-descriptive; the acquaintance it relies on, unlike Russellian acquaintance, is a relation to public objects.¹¹⁵ His account of what he calls "direct" naming and reference may therefore be thought to escape many of the objections levelled at some better-known theories of reference.

It is essential to his account of how sentences containing such expressions are verified, in particular to his account of the role of non-propositional justification. This account is used to show what the relation is between truth, understood realistically, and verifiability. This, in its turn, is essential to his account of abstraction, of the origin of concepts in our responses to what we see, an account on which such concepts turn out to be response dependent.¹¹⁶ It is crucial, too, in his account of the "perception" of "ideal objects."

It is at the basis of his account of imagination. Sensory imagination stands in the internal relation of modification to perception. To visually imagine a child is to make-believedly see a child. Similarly, to suppose that *p* is to make-believedly judge that *p*, to imagine drowning, is among other things, to make-believedly have the "internal perceptions" of a drowning person. Thus, Husserl's analyses of judgement, perception, and imagination turn out to be systematically interconnected.¹¹⁷ And of the three, it is perception that is basic.

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NOTES

- 1 Føllesdal 1969, 1974; Küng 1972, 1973; McIntyre and Smith 1971, 1975; Smith and McIntyre 1982; Smith, D. W. 1989.
- 2 Like Husserl in these two works, I shall concentrate largely on visual perception. For an excellent account and criticism of Husserl on the perception of sounds, see Casati 1989.
- 3 Cf. four monographs by students of Husserl in Göttingen, David Katz's *Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben* (1911), Heinrich Hoffmann's *Untersuchungen über den Empfindungsbegriff* (1913), Wilhelm Schapp's *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* (1910), and Herbert Leyendecker's *Zur Phänomenologie der Täuschungen*; Max Scheler's "Über Selbsttäuschungen" (1911) and *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* (1926), Paul Linke's *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre* (1918), Oskar Becker's *Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen* (1923) and Roman Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931). Cf. also Stein 1917; Becker 1930; Conrad-Martius 1916, 1929; Reyher 1926; Landgrebe 1954. Husserl's analyses also influenced parts of Gestalt psychology. Indeed, Husserl anticipated an entire tradition of work on criteria and constancy – Katz 1911, Bühler, Heider 1926, Brunswik 1934. On the connections between Husserl's early philosophy of perception and psychology, cf. Spiegelberg 1972. Schapp's monograph anticipates, and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenologies of perception and behaviour complete, the decline of the tradition within the philosophy of perception which starts with Brentano and his pupils.
- 4 An ancestor of this paper, "Husserl und die Phänomenologie in Göttingen," was presented in Göttingen in 1987, as part of the series *Die Philosophie in Göttingen*. I am grateful to the many philosophers there and, later, in Italy who provided useful comments.
- 5 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks* §208; Husserl, from an unpublished manuscript, quoted in Rang 1990, 176; cf. also *DR* §44. This difficulty is they also thought, connected with the unnaturalness of their approaches to philosophy (cf. Mulligan 1993a).
- 6 "Umweg über den Gegenstand," *Meinong*, "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung . . .", *GA* II, 385; cf. Husserl, *LI* Vol. II, Part 1, §3.
- 7 Cf. Casati 1995.
- 8 *LI* VI §44. Husserl here introduces a wide concept of judgement comprehending not only "the meaning-intentions belonging to statements" but also "the fulfilments that fit them completely," that is, both sensory and non-sensory perceptions. Using this wide concept of judging, he then asserts that "being can only be apprehended through judging." Husserl's

pupil Reinach calls non-sensory perception based on sensory perception "apprehension" ("*Erkennen*," cognition): "If I discern from afar the approach of a cyclist then speaking purely descriptively this is an apprehension, even if it should be the case that in reality it is not a cyclist at all who is approaching but rather, say, a cow" (Reinach 1982 375). Reinach also points out that apprehension is a punctual act, like judgement, whereas such perceptual presentations as looking at something have duration (Reinach 1982 344, 322). When Husserl talks of visual perception he normally has in mind not punctual seeing but observing, looking at and scrutinising. Thus, perception of horses, colours always "consists in a straightforward looking at the object (*Hinblicken auf*)" (LI VI §58). In "visual perception" "I see a thing, e.g., this box . . . I continue to see one and the same box . . ." (LI V §14). He occasionally discusses the relations between such punctual events as hearing and seeing and the processes of listening and looking or observing on which they are based (Cf. Hua X, 225, 456, 21).

- 9 Cf. LI V §§27, 29, 34, 38, 40, 41. Husserl's views may be contrasted with those of four unlikely bed-fellows: Searle (*Intentionality*) and Quine (*The Pursuit of Truth*), for whom perception is always propositional; Brentano, for whom to see is always to judge; and Fodor for whom seeing is not doxastic but has a sentence-like content. However, since Brentano's analysis of judgement is non-propositional, seeing, on his account, is not seeing that. Husserl often contradicts his thesis that simple seeing involves no meaning (*Meinen*), e.g., at LI I §23 and his thesis that to see is not to judge or believe (since these attitudes require propositionally articulated contents), e.g., at LI V §§27, 38. In later texts his habit of describing all positing modes as modes of belief (often using the English word) becomes more pronounced (cf., e.g., DR §43). Perhaps this is a result of the tendency to logicise all psychological phenomena that marks his turn to idealism. Perhaps it is a result of the increasing carelessness that accompanied this turn. Husserl is not even consistently clear in LI that seeing is not meaning, thus he occasionally talks of our signitively intending the far side of an object we are looking at. This is criticised at DR §18. On the move away from the view that to see is to believe within the Meinong school, cf. Stucchi 1995.
- 10 Dretske 1969, 1981; Warnock 1955; Jackson 1977.
- 11 Husserl mentions accidents at, e.g., at Hua X, Appendix XI, 125. It should be borne in mind that when he describes moments as "abstract," he means that they are dependent, not that they are ideal. On moments, cf. Smith and Mulligan 1982.
- 12 The failure to distinguish between seeing a redness moment and applying a concept of redness is, Husserl thinks, a symptom of a wider failure:

"In the theory of abstraction since Locke, the problem of *abstraction in the sense of an emphatic pointing to 'abstract contents'* [moments] has been mixed up with the problem of *abstraction in the sense of concept-formation*" (LI II §40).

- 13 Husserl also argues for ideal species on the basis of a regress argument at LI II §3. Unfortunately he does not explain what the relation between the two arguments is. Cf. Russell 1959, 96–97.
- 14 On direct perception of changes, see Leyendecker 1913, 137.
- 15 Cf. Goldmeier 1972. On sensational grouping properties cf. Peacocke 1983, 24–26.
- 16 "[S]ensory connections [*sinnliche Verknüpfungen*] are moments . . . as when in the intuition of a comprehensive whole, *W*, the contact of *A* and *B* is sensorily given . . . In the sensible whole, the parts *A* and *B* are brought together by the sensorily connecting moment of contact" (LI VI §48).
- 17 On discontinuities as topological singularities see Becker 1923, 34ff., Petitot 1994.
- 18 "Discontinuity . . . relates to specifically differing moments in so far as they are '*spread out with common boundaries*' over a continuously varying spatial or temporal moment. It is *at* a spatial or temporal boundary that one visual quality, e.g., leaps over into another. In our continuous progress from spatial part to spatial part there is at the same time no continuous progress in the covering quality: in one place at least the neighbouring qualities are finitely (and not too minutely) distant . . . [N]ot merely qualities, e.g., colours, achieve separation, but whole concreta set bounds to one another, the visual field is split up into parts. The colour-distance in such a context of "covering" (without which there can be no talk of discontinuity) also wins separation for the moments bound up with it, the covered spatial parts of our example. These could not otherwise be free from fusion. Spatiality necessarily varies continuously. A piece of such variation can only become separately noticeable . . . when a discontinuity is provided by the covering moment, and the whole concretum which corresponds to it has thus been separated" (LI III §9).
- 19 For an interesting suggestion that, in a certain sense, perception involves formal or categorial concepts, see LI VI §58.
- 20 LI VI §47; cf. Linke 1929, 280, Dretske 1969, Chap. IV, Jackson 1977, 159–67.
- 21 Husserl's distinction between the way names name objects and the way predicates "*hinweisen auf*" (LI III §2, cf. VI §10) may be an attempt to describe the implicit quantification over monadic and relational moments that judgements contain.

- 22 "The abundant multiplicity of sense-qualities, of sensible [*empfindbare*] forms is at the disposal of straightforward sensuous intuition for purposes of representation" (LI VI §55). On the distinction between sensations and qualities, see LI II §36, §41, V §2.
- 23 LI VI, Appendix 5; cf. LI I §23; cf. "The fulness of the presentation . . . is the sum-total of determinations [*Bestimmtheiten*] pertaining to the presentation itself, through which it analogically gives presence to its object" (LI VI §21). Sensations represent "through similarity" (LI VI §37). At DR §16 Husserl mentions that he uses "similarity" in a sense that is "not quite natural"; cf. DR §17, Hua X §1. Nevertheless, he remained attached to the thesis without ever explaining just what it is supposed to involve. His use of expressions such as "in a particular sense analogous" and "generically allied but not identical" (LI I §23) suggest perhaps that he had in mind not the ordinary notion of similarity understood as the possession by two objects of the same property but a type of similarity described by Mill and Stumpf which might be called *brute similarity* and which does not involve any common property. Thus, a hue of redness may be more similar to a second than a third even though this cannot be explained in terms of the first and second hues having more properties in common than the first and the third. Then the claim would be that there is a relation of brute similarity between red sensations and the quality of redness although it is not the case that both the sensation and the object are red. Perhaps he had in mind some much weaker thesis, e.g., that the concept of redness figures essentially in an identifying description of the sensory state of one who sees, in optimal circumstances, something that is red. Tugendhat and Holenstein suggest that after the *Investigations* Husserl gave up the claim that there is a relation of similarity between sensation and quality (*Ideas* I §41, §81; Tugendhat 1970, 75f. Holenstein 1972, 97). But Husserl's points in *Ideas* I to the effect that there is no non-trivial genus to which both sensations and qualities belong had already been made in the *Investigations*.
- 24 A mode of analysis that is more familiar than that preferred by Husserl would have us talk, instead, of the "primed properties" of perceptual acts or experiences rather than of the independent and dependent parts of such experiences (cf. Peacocke 1983 20f., 52f.). We may, if we want, talk of an experience which is red', round', etc. But how, in the language of primed properties, should we express the relation between the sensation of a configuration and the sensations of dots that make it up? Between an experience that is configured' and the experiences that are dot-shaped'? We are obliged to introduce a part-whole relation between the experience that is configured' and those of its parts that are dot-shaped'.

- But then we have just the relational and non-relational moments of sensation described by Husserl.
- 25 This difference of opinion between Husserl, on the one hand, and Brentano, Russell, and Moore on the other hand is a consequence of the fact that for Husserl, the act-object schema is incomplete without the dimension of content. The category of content was rejected at times by both Moore and Russell. Thus, in 1918 Moore describes and rejects the view that we have visual sensations that mediate perception but that these sensations are not seen. (Moore 1918 in Moore 1922, 232.) But Frege, in the same year ("The Thought"), argues that we have but do not see sensations. Cf. also Moore's (1910) review of a primer on Husserl's philosophy of mind; Ryle's distinction in the *The Concept of Mind* between sensation and observation; Frege's *Grundlagen* §26.
- 26 LI VI Appendix, 8. On Husserl and Wittgenstein on the reidentifiability of mental items, cf. Mulligan 1993a.
- 27 In the second edition of the *Investigations* and later, Husserl's awareness that "interpretation" [*Deutung*] might wrongly be taken to involve a reference to conceptual interpretation led him to use instead of "*Deutung*" such terms as "*Auffassung*" (grasp) and "*Apperzeption*" (apperception). (See Rang 1990, 210. Rang describes in great detail Husserl's relation to and criticisms of Helmholtz's account of perception as the interpretation of signs. He seems, however, to underestimate the importance of Husserl's view that to see is not to judge.) To grasp is not to infer since it involves no concepts (Hua XIII, 50).
- 28 Cf. "If I see an incomplete pattern, e.g., in this carpet partially covered over by furniture, the piece I see seems clothed with intentions pointing to further completions – we feel as if the lines and coloured shapes 'go on' in the sense of what we see" (LI VI §10). Thus, whenever such intentions are frustrated, or whenever a switch from one interpretation to another occurs the discontinuity involved is felt. Cf. Köhler 1947, Chap. 5; Goldmeier 1972; B. Smith 1988, §10.
- 29 Cf. Schapp 1910, 98. When Husserl uses idioms such as "perceiving as," he normally has in mind the interpretation of sensations. But Schapp and other descriptive psychologists talk of seeing *things* as this or that. Husserl, too, occasionally uses this idiom, e.g., when he says that an interlocutor perceives or grasps a speaker *as* a person who expresses this or that without the intervention of any conceptual knowledge or judgement (LI I §7).
- 30 An important application of the claim that perception unifies without the performance of an extra act is the thesis that perception identifies its objects without the help of judgements of identity – cf. vi.3 below.

- 31 For a good account of the different senses in which all the parts of a visual field may be said to be dependent, see *LI* III §10.
- 32 Köhler, of course, like the other Berlin Gestalt psychologists, accepts that there are mind-independent physical Gestalten. But because of his critical realism he does not think we see them (Köhler 1933, 16). On the critical realism of the Gestalt psychologists, see Hochleitner 1940. For a good account of the Berlin and Austrian accounts of Gestalt perception, both of which are mistaken, if Husserl is right, see B. Smith 1988. On the view that aspect switches are intermediate between sensory and intellectual changes, see Mulligan 1988.
- 33 Scheler 1921 II A 3, Scheler 1957, 448f., Scheler 1960, 165f., 171f. Cf. Linke 1929 §68, §76, Nachwort §1; Gurwitsch 1966 §§15–16 and Landgrebe 1954. One reason why the originality of Husserl's view has been insufficiently appreciated is that for him, as for Linke and perhaps for Wittgenstein, perceptual interpretation does not invariably involve judgement whereas the positions criticised by the Berlin school invariably assumed that to see is to judge.
- 34 An English translation of Köhler's paper, "On unnoticed sensations and errors of judgement," is to be found in Köhler 1971. Köhler's criticisms of the constancy hypothesis had been anticipated by von Kries 1904 and Krueger 1903 and, in philosophy, by Brentano.
- 35 The quotations here from Husserl and Koffka are discussed by Holenstein (1972, 296) who also defends the view that Husserl was guilty of something like the Constancy Hypothesis. Holenstein acutely criticizes Husserl's views on sensation from the point of view of the rejection of the interpretation-sensation model by Husserl in his writings on time awareness and from the point of view of Gestalt psychology.
- 36 Holenstein 1972, 284.
- 37 Holenstein (1972, 95–96) quotes from a revealing manuscript of 1932: "Is not my original view of an immanent sphere with immanent data which in the end only 'come to be interpreted' through the passive achievement of association still a residue of the old psychology and its sensualist empiricism? But how is one otherwise to put the matter? There are therefore no sense data without interpretation, [the property of] being interpreted, 'representation', is innate. But what can be done with this?" (Ms. B I 13 I, p. 8 (1932)). At one point in the *Investigations* Husserl mentions, and does not reject, the view that "sensuous contents are invariably and necessarily objectively interpreted, that they are always bearers of external intuitions, and can only be attended to as contents of such intuitions" (Appendix, 6, to *LI* VI). Recently Peacocke 1983 has defended the irreducibility of sensational to representational properties. But, unlike Husserl, he thinks that perceptual representation is

- conceptual and that aspect-changes are changes in representation that are conceptual.
- 38 *LI* V §2, cf. II §36; *Ideas* I §41.
- 39 See Hering 1879, 343; 1905; Hoffmann 1913, §2; Casati 1995, Rang 1990, Chap. V. Husserl occasionally uses Hering's concept of *Sehding*. Cf. Katz 1913, Hoffmann 1913, §6.
- 40 Two excellent accounts of the relation between perceptual interpretation and the profiles of the things we see are Hoffmann 1913 and Leyendecker 1980. See also Linke 1918, especially 75, 378 and Janssen 1921, 24ff. for extensive criticism. Ingarden 1933 contains a clear account of Husserl's views and applies them to a number of aesthetic problems. On the interpretation of Husserl's changing views of profiles and their appearances, see Chambon 1974.
- 41 Moore 1918, 234f. I ignore here Moore's worries about whether the side in question is or is not a private sense-datum. It should also be noted that Moore's topic is perceptual judgements not perception and that much of his account of the former is compatible with a distinction between the two, a distinction which is not however emphasised in his paper.
- 42 Cf. *LI* VI §10, §14(b), §29, §37; *DR* §16, §24; *Ideas* I §41; Husserl also mentions such cases as partial occlusion of what I am looking at, etc. Cf. Evans 1982, 176–77. For the evolution of Husserl's ideas before 1907, see *DR* §§17–18.
- 43 Cf. Evans 1982, 195, 174f., "Understanding Demonstratives" in Evans 1985, Dummett 1988 §12 on "proto-thoughts" and their dynamic nature in a discussion of Husserl on perception. On dynamic content, looks, etc., cf. Hoffmann 1913, Becker 1923, O'Shaughnessy 1990 and, for an extension of the idea to the realm of volitive content, Dokic 1992. The metaphorical character of Merleau-Ponty's occasionally fascinating developments of Husserl's views on dynamic content seem to have killed the topic until the work of Evans. Pears (*The False Prison*, 1988, II, 332 n., 405 n.) notes the connection between the last phenomenology of dynamic content and Evans and with pragmatism. An often inspired treatment of the phenomenology of dynamic perception in the light of pragmatism is Scheler 1926/1977. Scheler, however, dispenses with perceptual content.
- 44 Interestingly enough, the German verb "*spüren*" means to perceive, sense or experience and "*nachspüren*" to track or trail.
- 45 *DR* §44 (and *LI* VI §8). In spite of his distinction here between perceptual and logical "synthesis," Husserl unfortunately talks in the same section of *DR*, as he had occasionally in *LI*, of the "sense" rather than the content, of a perception; cf. note 9. Note that in addition to perceptual

identification and logical identification, there is the intermediate case where my grasp of "this" and my perceptual state identify the same object and also the case where I make this identification explicit. Adapting a term of Husserl's we might call such identities "hybrid" or "mixed."

- 46 *LI* VI §29; cf. Campbell 1988, 282f.
- 47 Cf. *LI* VI §5, §6, and §8.
- 48 *LI* VI §10. Cf. Smith and McIntyre 1982, Chap. V. On the "unmediated disposition to treat certain present and future informational states" derived from an object, as germane to the evaluation of demonstrative utterances about it, see Evans 1982, 146–47.
- 49 *LI* I §§1–5, *DR* §51, §54. Cf. Mulligan 1990.
- 50 Cf. also *Ideas* II §18 (a), §32, §55. A good account of Husserl's views is to be found in Drummond 1978–79.
- 51 Cf. *Ideas* II, §40, "Each part of the visual field has a sensation value" (O'Shaughnessy 1980, I, 180). On body-images, cf. *Ideas* II §37, *DR* §47, Stein 1980, Schilder 1950, O'Shaughnessy 1980, I, Evans 1982, 163.
- 52 *DR* §49. Cf. O'Shaughnessy 1980, I, 197–98.
- 53 On this contrast, cf. Evans 1985 283ff.
- 54 Husserl attempts to distinguish between the (non-projective) way kinaesthetic sensations present parts of my body and the (projective) way visual sensations present parts of a house at *DR* §47 and §83; cf. also Stein 1980 44f. For another full account of the difference, within the framework of a representationalist theory of perception, see O'Shaughnessy 1980 I, 143ff. Husserl's account of intentional movement is a volitionist one. But like the Gestalt psychologists, Scheler and, for example, O'Shaughnessy (*ibid.*), he rejects the view that trying simply initiates and precedes movement. Rather, trying coexists with and causes movement, an achievement which is made possible by the fact that perception and volition accompany and steer one another; cf. Hua XXVIII, A, §§13–16.
- 55 Husserl marks the distinction between visual sensations and kinaesthetic sensations by calling the former *Empfindungen* and the latter *Empfindnisse* (*Ideen* II, §40).
- 56 Husserl *Ideen* II, §37. O'Shaughnessy suggests that the connection between bodily sensations such as kinesthetic or postural sensations, on the one hand, and their objects, body parts, is a direct and immediate relation. The notions of directness and immediacy involved here come out in a contrast he introduces between visual sensations and their objects, on the one hand, and bodily sensations and their objects on the other hand. The visual sensation is simply "red and bright" (say), and is not as such putatively of some physical object (e.g., balloon) but each bodily sensation is

either merely putatively or else actually of a body part (O'Shaughnessy 1980, I, 180). More precisely, in one of his characteristic formulations, "the basic 'given' is, not just feeling, not just feeling-in-a-certain-body-part, but *feeling-in-a-certain-body-part-at-a-position-in-a-body-relative-physical-space*" (O'Shaughnessy 1980, I, 165; cf. 217). Cf. Becker 1923 §§5–7.

- 57 On the one-dimensional space of depth values and the way it combines with the two-dimensional system of extent to form a double continuum, see *DR* §49.
- 58 *DR* §48, *LI* III §25.
- 59 *DR* §49, cf. Becker 1923 §7.
- 60 *DR* §51; cf. the quite different account of the relation between visual sensations and interpretations above.
- 61 On the role of vicarious functioning in perception, see Brunswik 1934.
- 62 *DR* §52, §54; *EU* §19.
- 63 *DR* §67, *LI* VI §14 (b).
- 64 Koffka 1925, V, §9. On the two types of account, see Prinz 1987.
- 65 For a fuller account in English, see Drummond's excellent 1979 and 1983 papers. The sketch given here differs from that given by Drummond mainly in attaching greater importance to the distinction between perceptual contents and objects.
- 66 *DR* §58, cf. Becker 1923 §7 A.2 & C.
- 67 *DR* §70 "On pictures that belong to an identical object."
- 68 Cf. Hoffmann 1913 103ff. and Wittgenstein on distance from my physical eye vs. distance from my geometrical eye in the Blue Book.
- 69 *DR* §48, cf. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks* §206.
- 70 Drummond 1979, 28. Cf. *DR* §64, §69, 311f., 318f., Appendix. 4.
- 71 *DR* §§72–75, O'Shaughnessy 1990 §2.
- 72 On the step from orientation space to the homogenous space of physics, cf. Becker 1923.
- 73 *DR* §§35–37, §32; *Ideen* II, 59f.; Husserl 1979, 273; cf. Rang 1990, 176f., 280f.; on the optimal perception of sounds, see *Ideas* I §43. The axiological nature of perceptual optima and of typical objects is also described in *EU*. Cf. also Barry Smith's contribution to this volume. Current work on optimal forms and objects (e.g., by Rosch) goes back to the descriptions of singular (good, pregnant) forms by the Gestalt psychologists. Although Husserl talks of optimal appearances of objects and the Gestalt psychologists of optimal perceptual forms, since the latter are for the Gestalt psychologists phenomenal entities, they are, in fact, just what Husserl calls appearances.
- 74 Although this normally translates as "attitude," the latter word has come to be used for what are here called mental modes. The standard

- translation by psychologists of "*Einstellung*" as "set" is therefore a happy one. Because of the role of dispositions in sets, the common translation "mental set" is unfortunate.
- 75 Leyendecker 1980 (1913), 43, 64, 71, 72. Leyendecker's (and Scheler's) use of concepts such as *Milieu*, *Umwelt* and "set" clearly anticipate many descriptions of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein writes about one basic set at *Philosophical Investigations* II, iv, about "*Einstellungen*" and "*Stellungnahmen*" in seeing as at II, xi; cf. also *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, I, §§667, 670, 772. For a thorough description of the relation between sets and aspect switches, see Leyendecker 1980, 85f. Cf. also on aspect switches Schapp 1910, 98ff. Husserl's use of "*Einstellung*" differs from that of Leyendecker in that it is restricted to a few abstract distinctions between the theoretical, practical, phenomenological and natural "attitudes."
- 76 *LI* III §9. Jean Petitot (1994) shows that vague sensory types of object and the phenomena of fusion and phenomenal discontinuity are indeed mathematisable within the framework of "morphological geometry."
- 77 *LI* VI §10, §37. On this, see Tugendhat 1972, 75. See also *DR* §18 and *LI* V §15(b). Wittgenstein, too, returns frequently to the curious way in which a reference to an indeterminate range of possibilities is a determinate feature of propositions and perceptions, cf. *Tractatus* 5.156, *Philosophical Remarks* §§211, 213, *Philosophical Investigations* §98f. ("there must be perfect order in even the vaguest sentence").
- 78 *Ideas* I §140; cf §103 on the weightings of different possibilities; *LI* VI §10, V §20; II §37, §39. In his analysis of "motivational connections" (see note 49 above), Husserl points out that it is always possible to find a counterpart connection which expresses a relation of probability or causality. On Allers, Bühler and Wittgenstein on motives, criteria, and indication vs. causes, clues, and symptoms, see Mulligan 1990.
- 79 On what is co-present in perception, see *Ideas* I §27. On internal horizons, see Hua XI §1. On background vs. foreground, see Hua XXV, 31, *Ideas* I §35, §83. On the sense in which many perceptual properties such as bigness are relative to terms that "remain in the background," see *EU* §46. One group of such "absolute impressions" are the properties of orientation that present themselves as being monadic because their connection with, e.g., the "origo" of orientation space also remains in the background; see *DR* §48. A description of background information is given by Leyendecker 1980 §7. Karl Schuhmann has suggested to me that Husserl may have found the influential concept of a *horizon* in Jakob Friedrich Fries, *Grundriss der Logik*, Heidelberg 1827 (3rd edition), 74. On horizons in Husserl, see Smith and McIntyre 1982 Chap. V.
- 80 *Ideas* II, §18a.

- 81 Conceptual seeing as, what Leyendecker calls "seeing through a meaning," is, as he points out, compatible with varying degrees of perceptual fullness. And although such conceptual subsumption is aided by perception of something as belonging to a certain type, the latter is independent of the former. Cf. Leyendecker 1980, 105f., 168f.
- 82 *LI* III §12 n. This point and the way it is developed are often taken to be a fruit of Husserl's transcendental turn. But Husserl's full account of the relation between concreta and things at *Ideas* I §§12–17 had already been partially sketched out in the first edition of the *Investigations* in a section (III §12) dropped from the second edition.
- 83 Cf. *LI* III §25, Shoemaker "Causal Properties" in Shoemaker 1984, 206–33.
- 84 Good accounts of awareness of light are given by Meinong's student Heider (1926, 1930) and O'Shaughnessy (1985).
- 85 *DR* §20, *Ideen* II, §15 (c)–(d). Cf. Michotte, A. 1982, *The Perception of Causality*, London: Methuen. An influential analysis of perception which succumbs to three Kantian temptations by introducing judgment, concepts and imagination into perception is Strawson 1974.
- 86 *DR*, Appendix 2, 341ff.; *LI* III §9 (first edition), *Ideen* II §15(d)f., §18(a). Rang 1990, Chaps. II, IV–VI, presents a detailed analysis of Husserl's account of causal properties. As Ingarden (1965, 48) points out, Husserl's account in *Ideen* II of the role of conditional properties brings him dangerously close to critical realism.
- 87 Husserl's account of the primacy of extent and his "new" account of the distinction between secondary and primary qualities are given in *Ideen* II, §§12–15(b). At *DR*, Appendix 3 Husserl appears to give what I take to be the right account of the relation between quality and extent moments, although he does not note that this requires a distinction between two types of dependence. Cf. *DR* §49.
- 88 Dretske 1969, 60–61. Cf. Mulligan 1995.
- 89 On dependence, see Kit Fine's contribution to this volume. On the relations between external and internal relations see Mulligan 1991 and 1993.
- 90 Becker 1923 provides a clear account of the different spaces distinguished by Husserl and their relation to physical space, drawing on materials now published in *DR*, and *Ideen* II.
- 91 Cf. "[T]he dependence [Abhängigkeit] of qualitative distance on the founding qualities . . . is univocally determined by the lowest specific differences of the latter and hence determined as a lowest difference – in contrast to mere functional dependence" (*LI* III §10).
- 92 On the "inner belonging together of perceptual shadowings and things," cf. *LI* VI §14b. Similarly, certain emotions fit or are appropriate to certain objects, according to Brentano and many of his heirs.

- 93 Husserl mentions but does not study in detail the internal relations in colour space (*LI* III §9); on visual fields, see *LI* III §13, V 15 b, and *DR* passim. On Meinong and Wittgenstein on internal relations in colour and other spaces, see Mulligan 1991. A thorough Gestaltist description of one type of internal relation in perception is Goldmeier 1972.
- 94 On disjunctivist accounts of perception, see Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1981, 1990, McDowell 1982, 1986, Child 1992. McDowell generalises the account beyond the perceptual case.
- 95 Reiner 1931, 11.
- 96 Prolegomena §51; cf. "We have . . . no right to assume from the outset that the objects of outer perception really and truly exist as they seem to us to be" (Appendix 2 to *LI* VI).
- 97 Cf. Prolegomena §§47; 50, 36.
- 98 Husserl 1979 (340, 341, 336) throws some light on our passage. Husserl here distinguishes between actual properties of a mental state and merely possible relative determinations and sketches the role of suppositions in specifications of semantic connections.
- 99 The employment of such a distinction between separable ingredients and inseparable aspects in the formulation of disjunctivism is due to William Child 1994.
- 100 Cf. Leyendecker 1913 §§8–9.
- 101 Cf. *LI* IV §11, V §§35–36, §§38–40.
- 102 Husserl describes the view that perceptual content is "object-dependent" in the following passage: "If one makes the reality of a perceived object part of the notion of perception, then outer perception is not, in this strict sense [the sense in which internal perception is perception] perception at all" (Appendix 2 to *LI* VI). For a weak notion of object-dependent content, based on a careful reading of Frege, see Künne 1992; on this see Mulligan and Smith 1986. For a very strong notion thereof see Mulligan and Smith 1986a. The type of object-dependence employed by Evans and McDowell stands between these two extremes.
- 103 Husserl is an "ideal" verificationist. For a judgement to have a truth-value is for it to be verifiable, but many true judgements are unverified (*LI* VI §39). But in a little noticed passage he asserts that although the Law of Excluded Middle holds unreservedly for all temporal entities "the exclusion of predicates in an *ideal* sphere (e.g., the sphere of meanings, of numbers etc. [and, we may add, states of affairs (cf. *LI* VI §30)]) is by no means obvious, but must be demonstrated afresh in each such sphere, or set up as an axiom" (*LI* VI §30).
- 104 For a good defence of non-propositional perceptual justification, see Kelley 1986.

- 105 *LI* VI §§16–29. Cf Russell 1959, Chap. 5.
- 106 On the correlation between all parts of perceptual content and all parts of the sense of a sentence, see *LI* VI §25, §40.
- 107 *LI* VI §§30–35. The distinctions between primary and secondary epistemic seeing of Jackson (1977, Chap. 7) and Dretske (1969, 78, 140, 153, 179) clearly lend themselves to redescription in terms of the distinction between optimal and less than optimal perceptual justification.
- 108 On internal relations between perceptions and assertions, cf. *LI* VI §4, §7. Verification relations are ideal (*LI* VI §24). On the logical connection between assertion and confirmation, cf. *LI* I §9, Prolegomena §51. Notice that wherever there is *Evidenz*, assertoric *Evidenz* – which does not guarantee the veridicality of the information I receive – or apodeictic *Evidenz* – which never concerns the real world – the mode of articulation of the relevant information is that of fit or conflict among parts of a whole. The distinction between an element of identification and an element of predication which is characteristic of the type of articulation of propositions is entirely foreign to it.
- 109 In Husserl's early accounts of appearance, these are conceived of as being in the first instance complex mental episodes. In *DR* and later, as he tends more and more to use the terminology of "pictures," Husserl comes to conceive of them as universals. This ontological question has, arguably, some important consequences for the way appearances constrain the veridicality of perception. On appearances as universals, see O'Shaughnessy 1990.
- 110 As noted in n. 10, Husserl talks mainly of visual perception rather than of seeing. It would be in the spirit of his account to say that the punctual achievement reported by "see" is precisely that of integrating a variety of complex perceptual activities.
- 111 Cf. Leyendecker 1980, 122, and, on the black point which "is" a fly, 110. The problem was discussed later by Blanshard, Austin, and Castañeda, among others.
- 112 *Ideas* I §150.
- 113 Cf. *Ideas* II §18(b) and Rang's (1990, 282f.) detailed discussion. Another tack, compatible with what Husserl says: colours are genuine mind-independent monadic properties but as a matter of fact they are not exemplified in our world. I owe this suggestion to Barry Maund.
- 114 Cf. Husserl *Hua* XIII, 46–70; Husserl's views on this matter are well developed in Stein, 1980.
- 115 Cf. *LI* VI §§1–6, IV §3, and Mulligan and Smith 1986. Husserl's changes of mind about the relation between indexically based and indexical-free thought seem to have been prompted by reflection on the difficulties posed by twin-earth fantasies for mentalist and Platonist accounts of

meaning. Cf. Husserl *Hua* XXVI, *Beilage* XIX. This led him to the view that all assertions about temporal items are indexical, cf. Preface to the second edition of *LI*. D. W. Smith 1989 is an analysis of acquaintance informed by Husserlian principles.

- 116 Perception does all the work in Husserl's early account of abstraction. Only later did phenomenologists come to see the importance of fully automatised patterns of action in the acquisition of concepts.
- 117 One example among many: Husserl's use of supposition or make-believe assertion and make-believe designation in his account of empty names and negative existential sentences at Husserl 1979, 335ff; cf. Evans 1982, Chap. 7, and *EU* §73. On Husserl's analysis of judgement, cf. Mulligan 1989, Mulligan 1989a, on his account of imagination cf. Mulligan 1995a.