Wittgenstein on intentionality and mental representation

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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to explain some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about intentionality in his later philosophy, in particular the claim that ‘it is in language that an expectation and its fulfilment make contact’ (Philosophical Investigations §445). P.M.S. Hacker has claimed that these remarks provide the basis for a ‘resolution of the problems and puzzles of intentionality’. I argue that they do not, and although provocative and suggestive, Wittgenstein’s ‘grammatical’ remarks provide no solution whatsoever to the problems of intentionality, even in their own terms. I conclude that if we want to understand intentionality, a ‘grammatical’ investigation in Wittgenstein’s sense will not help us, and we should look instead for inspiration to those philosophers who have given substantive phenomenological analyses of mental representation.