

## Mental Simulation and the Reification of Beliefs

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Simulation theory has been put forward as an account of our folk understanding of the mind. In this paper, I examine a neglected argument to the effect that there is an essential limitation of simulation itself, which cannot explain a crucial ingredient of our ordinary, folk-psychological conception of beliefs. Even if it is conceded that simulation gives the subject some sense of what happens in the world when someone believes something, the understanding of *facts* of believing that can be extracted from simulation is incomplete; simulation theory must be augmented with a theory of beliefs as genuine *constituents* of such facts. Folk psychology reifies beliefs in order to deal with an essential requirement for mastery of the folk-psychological concept of belief. Hopefully, a reflection on the limits of simulation will lead to a better understanding of the role of theory in ordinary belief-ascriptions.