Phenomenological consciousness is both intentional and non-intentional
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There is a material dimension of subjectivity that constitutes a conscious feature profoundly different from the representational feature. The former corresponds in many respects to what for the contemporary philosopher of the mind is the qualitative mind or authentic consciousness (qualia).

In the Husserlian phenomenology non-intentional consciousness is also characterized by its inevitable conjunction with embodiment. However, in Husserl there are two ways of understanding the living body: the matter of the body and the body extension.

In some passages Husserl suggests that the relationship between the stream of experiences and the body extension can be read as a case of a material a priori thoroughly analogue to the essential link between colour and extension. This analogy, however, leaves completely unresolved the problem of the relationship between material body and qualitative mind.

Merleau-Ponty reconsiders as essential the material concept of body and, in doing so, he reintroduces in the phenomenological perspective a natural (but not naturalistic) point of view.