Département de philosophie

Emotion, Feeling and Value

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Philosophy Department of the University of Geneva

Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences

2009-2013

 

Project leader : Kevin Mulligan

Project members :

  1. Julien Deonna
  2. Fédérico Lauria
  3. Olivier Massin
  4. Alain Pé-Curto
  5. Fabrice Teroni

This project is the successor of the project Emotions, values and norms, 2005-2008

Background

A declared goal of the philosophy Project 10 for the first period of the NCCR was to help clarify the conceptual tools needed to investigate emotions and to interact with the other projects of the NCCR toward this aim. In the process, we would benefit from methods and results of other groups working beside us. This has proven difficult, but much headway in the quality of the discussion and collaboration has been accomplished. As a result, there now exists a mutual understanding of the goals, tools, and methods at least between the philosophers and our colleagues working within the Center, in particular the psychologists and the historians of religion. It is now crucial to fully exploit this hard-won accomplishment by fostering more formal collaborations between the projects.

In this spirit, our proposal for the next four years develops part of the work already done by our group in close interaction with other disciplines. This work has focused on four major areas. (1) The moral emotions (more particularly shame and guilt). (2) The emotion-value connection. (3) Pleasure. (4) Musil (see list of publications). In those four areas, we have seen how conceptual analysis – the clarification of the concepts used in the study of emotions – has complemented the empirical studies of psychology and neuroscience. It serves to both improve the framework with which empirical studies are constructed and sharpen the terms in which empirical data are interpreted. In the case of the moral emotions, the philosophy group has studied the empirical data sustaining the thesis that shame is a "social" emotion and has identified five distinct claims, each with varying degree of support from the data. So, for instance, we distinguish the claim that shame is social in the sense of being primarily concerned with social values (honor, reputation) from the claim that shame is primarily elicited in social contexts (presence of an audience), and we evaluate the varying support they have in the data. (Deonna & Teroni 2008a). This is one of the many cases in which conceptual analysis has proven fruitful for empirical research.

The central concept we intend to scrutinize through conceptual analysis for the next four years is the notion of valence. Valence is commonly thought to be an essential feature of affective phenomena, serving both to distinguish affective phenomena from non-affective ones (emotions, feelings vs. beliefs, desires) and to distinguish between types of affective phenomena (shame vs. pride). The concept of valence seems to us to be of particular interest in the interdisciplinary context of the NCCR. First, although it plays a key role in the empirical research on emotion, it is virtually unexploited in the current philosophy of emotion. The first aim of this project, then, is to see what philosophical use can be made of this psychological concept in the current debates on the philosophy of emotions. Second, the concept of valence is widely acknowledged to be ambiguous: it obscures important distinctions in ways of understanding polar oppositions in affective phenomena. And so the second aim of this project is to clarify that concept, to see whether the different senses that valence can take are completely unrelated, which would make the concept deeply ambiguous, or whether one can extract a core concept of valence that would unify its various uses. Such a conceptual clarification will be an important tool for framing and interpreting empirical research on valence. We expect therefore that a philosophical examination of the concept of valence will yield significant advances for both the philosophy and psychology of emotions.

The six modules of our project intend to throw light on the various definitions of valence as applied to emotion, be it in terms of the evaluative component (evaluating the object as good or bad), the feeling component (being pleasant or unpleasant) or the action-tendencies component (attraction or aversion). Although at a superficial level it might seem that positively valenced emotions are positive in all those three senses (evaluating its object as good, being pleasant and giving rise to attraction), on closer inspection the situation is more complex. In this project we intend to clarify the conceptual and empirical interrelations between these kinds of valence.

The project has the following structure. (1) Overall framework. (2) Six modules connected to this framework, each of which presenting possible collaborations with other projects within and outside the NCCR.

Objectives – Research program over 4 years

The general goal of this project is to elucidate the concept of valence. The study will consist of five peripheral research modules centred on a core module: (1) Valence and intentionality of emotions. This core module will be approached conjointly by all the members of the project, while the peripheral modules will involve various sub-groups working in parallel. Those are: (2) Motivation and Regulation (Federico Lauria, Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni), (3) Hedonic valence (Olivier Massin, Fabrice Teroni, Kevin Mulligan), (4) Bodily feelings (Julien Deonna, Olivier Massin, Federico Lauria), (5) Valence and value (Alain Pé-Curto, Otto Bruun, Olivier Massin, Kevin Mulligan) (6) The valence of Self-reflective emotions (Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni, Otto Bruun, Alain Pé-Curto, Kevin Mulligan). Here is a brief outline of the issues dealt with in those modules. First, valence (emotions are either positive or negative) and intentionality (they are directed at objects) are two fundamental and related traits of emotions. What distinct relations, then, hold between the intentionality of emotions and their valence? Second, valence is often understood by appealing to the motivational aspect of emotional phenomena. Can then positive and negative valence just be reducible to respectively motivation to pursue and motivation to avoid? Third, valence is often understood in hedonic terms. How is hedonic valence to be construed? Fourth, the idea of valence must, in some way, be connected with the fact that emotions are accompanied by bodily feelings. Whereas both valence and bodily feelings are often construed, at least in part, as phenomenological in nature, they are nevertheless clearly distinct, since the latter need not be understood in terms of pleasures and pains. So what is the relation between felt body and valence? Fifth, the concepts of valence and value are clearly related, suggesting that valence may be basically an axiological concept. Studying the metaphysics of values, may therefore be of great help in understanding valence, and consequently, the emotions. Sixth, the peculiarly complex self-evaluative emotions, which appear to have double intentionality (at the world and at oneself), will constitute for us a particularly interesting case study of emotional valence.

Module 1: Intentionality and evaluation

(a) Content and links with already accomplished work.

It is a widely held view within the NCCR that emotions contain or constitute specific kinds of evaluations. The idea is that emotions arise from (or consist in) a subject's assessing his environment in terms of its significance for him. The fundamental questions concern the nature and structure of this assessment as well as its place relative to other aspects of emotions such as valence, bodily feeling, and motivation. It has long been recognized in the theory of emotion that there is a close relation between, for instance, fearing something on the one hand and finding that thing to be dangerous on the other. However, there remains a multi-faceted dispute about the precise nature of the tie between having such an emotion directed at a certain object and taking a certain evaluative perspective on that object. In this module we propose to continue the already ongoing research on three particular aspects of this relation.

(i)The ontological link between emotion and evaluation. One issue concerns the place of evaluation in the ontology of emotion and its relationship to the valence of emotion, the bodily feelings associated with emotions and the motivational element in emotion. In our ongoing research arguments have been presented for three distinct theses on this issue: (a) that evaluation constitutes a distinct antecedent to emotional episodes (Mulligan, 2007), (b) that evaluation is a component of emotional experience inextricable from its phenomenology (Deonna & Teroni 2008), and (c) that the evaluative element constitutes only a normative constraint or 'criterion of intelligibility' on emotional episodes (Teroni 2007). We will propose further evaluation of these theses and investigate the consequences of the different ontological constraints for an 'appraisal' model of emotion. We intend to construct experiments with the psychologists under the direction of Pr. Scherer and the neuroscientists under the direction of Pr. Vuilleumier, in order to develop on the findings of K. Berridge (2003) concerning the dissociation of appraisals from affective reactions, and its implications for the ontology of emotional appraisal.

(ii) The conceptual link between emotion and particular evaluations. Among both philosophers and psychologists it is commonly held that particular emotion-types are correlated with particular assessment-types (for instance, fear as correlated with assessments of danger). This has more recently been questioned (Mulligan 1998; Teroni 2007), but it raises the issue of how to circumscribe the conceptual link between emotion-types and evaluation-types. This also raises issues concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the empirical appraisal model which presupposes such a conceptual link. We intend to work closely with the psychologists studying appraisal processes to evaluate the empirical basis for the type-type correlations between emotions and evaluations, with eventual possibility for experiments.

(iii)The structure of affective evaluation. Much work remains to be done concerning the nature of the evaluative element in emotion in both philosophy and psychology. Philosophers tend to model the workings of affective evaluation on other, better understood, cognitive functions such as belief or perception. Yet both models face difficulties. Modeling affective evaluation on belief exposes one to the charge of over-intellectualization, whereas modeling it on perception raises important metaphysical issues about the values so 'perceived' (see module 5 below). In psychology, there are some outstanding theoretical issues concerning the structure of affective evaluation in the appraisal model. In particular there are worries concerning the warrant for modeling appraisal as a set sequence of appraisal checks, and issues surrounding the computability of the appraisal model so conceived. We intend to work in conjunction with formal ontologists of the Eidos project (cf. Links with external projects), and psychologists with a background in computing (Etienne Roesch) to study the issue of computability.

(b) Links with other modules.

(i) An investigation of the ontological issues concerning the role of evaluation in emotion will benefit greatly from a greater understanding of its relation to valence and bodily feeling in order to establish whether they constitute distinct components of emotional experience or are to be conceived as a unified whole.

(ii) A study of the conceptual links between evaluation-types and emotion-types will help elucidate and critically evaluate some theories concerning the metaphysics of value, in particular those that identify values in terms of their dependence on certain emotional evaluations.

(iii) A study of the structure of emotional evaluation is also closely tied to the metaphysics of value. As mentioned above, certain 'perceptual' accounts seem to presuppose realism about values. Clarification concerning the distinctions among kinds of valence and kinds of bodily feelings will also help elucidate the (possible) role of such facets of emotion in the cognition (or projection) of values.

Module 2: Motivation and regulation

(a) Content and links with already accomplished work.

(i)Two widely-held theories of emotions are the following. The first one has it that emotions simply consist of specific combinations of beliefs and desires. Fear of the dog would for instance be the belief that it approaches together with the desire not to be bitten. The second one conceives of emotions as satisfied or frustrated desires. If true, a consequence of this second claim is that emotions are not a sui generis object of study. Research on the emotions would amount to do research on conative phenomena in general. We believe both theories and variations on them to be fundamentally wrong-headed (Deonna & Teroni 2008b): emotions have a fundamental role to play in our mental make-up and cannot be reduced to any other kind of mental state. The aim of this module is to isolate precisely what this role consists in, as well as to investigate the links between emotions and desires. Our hypothesis is that emotions provide desires with what is to be desired. That is, without emotions or another source of axiological information, there is simply nothing for a creature to desire, except maybe at the level of mere impulses and drives. Testing this hypothesis requires an in-depth study of the different kinds of conative phenomena as well as their links with emotions.

(ii) A consequence of our view is that the link between emotions and motivation is often indirect. This gap allows for controlling and orienting the short- and long-term behavior associated with emotions. We would be particularly interested to build on already existing exchanges with the projects concerned with emotional regulation, in particular focusing on the conceptual foundations of empirical research and the problematic notion of "regulation" and "impulsivity" (Project 1, G. Gendolla, S. Korb, and Project 7, M. Van der Linden).

(b) Links with other modules.

(i) Major theories of valence have it that valence should be explained in terms of motivational impact, a topic discussed within module 3, Hedonic Valence.

Module 3: Hedonic valence

(a)Content and links with already accomplished work.

We easily distinguish positive (joy, admiration, pride, amusement, etc.) and negative (sadness, fear, anger, shame, hate, etc) emotions. One way of understanding this valence is in term of pleasantness and unpleasantness of emotions. There exist two main accounts of what hedonic valence amounts to. First, it can be explained in terms of desires. Pleasant mental states could be equated with desirable ones, (« more of this » vs. « less of this ») or with representation of satisfied desires (goal congruence vs. goal incongruence). Second, pleasantness can be identified with some primitive phenomenological qualia (pleasant vs. unpleasant feelings).

Drawing on Massin's already accomplished work in this area (Massin, doctoral dissertation in progress), we shall in this module focus on hedonic valence in order to address the following questions:

(i) Is hedonic valence analyzable in terms of desires? That is, can pleasant affects be defined as desired mental states or as mental states that satisfy one's desires? If not, how are we to account for the relation between pleasantness and motivation?

(ii) Is it necessary for a mental state to have hedonic valence in order to be an affective phenomenon, as the so-called hedonic theory of emotion has it? One first way of denying this is to claim that some emotions, such as surprise, are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. A second way of doing so consists in affirming that to be pleasant is not the only way for an emotion to be positive: not all valence is hedonic.

(iii) Is it possible to experience simultaneously pleasant and unpleasant emotions (mixed feelings)? We intend to collaborate with the project on appraisal processes in the elicitation of emotions led by K. Scherer & G. Gendolla, and the Neural Architecture project in order to study possible divergent correlations between distinct hedonic dimensions in emotions and their neural bases.

(iv) Instead of construing pleasantness in terms of desires or feelings, is there a third way to understand it in axiological terms (in link with module 5): could hedonic valence be a specific kind value, namely hedonic value?

(b) Links with other modules.

These questions directly connect with module 1, Intentionality and evaluation. How is the valence of emotions related to the value of their objects? Some adopt a reductionist answer. One can either reduce the valence of an emotion to the perception/acquaintance of an external value; or reduce the value of the external object to a projection of the internal valence of the emotion. By contrast, non-reductionist answers consider the valence of emotions and the value of their objects as two distinct features and face the challenge of explaining how they relate. One common answer is to claim that valence is a property of reactions or responses to perception or intuition of value (Mulligan). An important puzzle is then to explain the apparent normative link between the valence of emotions and the value of their objects if the relation between the two is merely causal. That is, why do we consider positively valenced emotions that bear on negative values (such as Schadenfreude) as incorrect?

Module 4: The valence of bodily feelings

(a) Content and links with already accomplished work.

A study of conceptual issues surrounding the place of feelings in a theory of emotion will be structured under three subjects of investigation.

(i)The first topic of investigation regards the commonplace but often unexplained link between emotions and feelings. What are feelings? What are the distinctions between bodily feelings and other kinds of feelings? The term covers a vast array of phenomena and psychologists and philosophers employ differing vocabularies to refer to feelings. The first aim of this module is to draw important distinctions within this area: hedonic feelings (pleasures and pains), kinesthetic sensations (feeling the contractions of my stomach), proprioception (feeling the position of my arm), perceptual sensations (sensation of blue), etc. Finding a common language between philosophers and psychologists is a necessary condition for understanding the roles of these different phenomena in emotions. We shall more particularly focus on the way psychologists use the distinctions objective vs. subjective feelings and conscious vs. unconscious feelings.

(ii)Second, and directly connected to the first topic, we want to investigate how we should conceive the links between emotions and feelings, a question which has constantly arisen both in psychology (James, Cannon) and in philosophy (James, Prinz, Robinson). It has been claimed by Deonna & Teroni in a book published during the first period of the NCCR that, far from being just a trail of the emotions, bodily feelings should be understood as preparations for actions that present the world to the subject in terms of significance for her. Whereas this idea functions well for some emotions, in particular those that are basic and oriented towards the future, it is less clear how it should be applied with respect to other emotions. What about sadness and the feeling of injustice, to name just two examples? Answering this question will require close collaboration with the psychologists working on response patterning to gain a better understanding of the physiological reaction elements peculiar to each emotion-type.

(iii) Third, some psychologists (Damasio, Ledoux) have claimed that the felt part of the emotions could be underscored by substitute mechanisms when there is no peripheral activation, the so-called "as-if loop". What does simulating bodily feelings entail? We intend to work closely with psychologists and neuroscientists in order to understand the peculiarities of bodily feelings simulation within the general account of simulation, empathy, and mental time travel (cf. also Affective dynamics project).

(b) Links with other modules.

(i) The first topic will benefit from a close interaction with module 3, Hedonic valence. One fundamental question here concerns the connection between bodily feelings, pleasure/displeasure and valence.

(ii) The second topic is closely connected with module 1, Intentionality and evaluation. Deonna and Teroni claim that bodily feelings inasmuch as they are in part distinctive preparations for action must be conceived of as the way the world is presented to the subject in terms of its significance for him. Does this capture the intentionality of the emotions?

Module 5: Valence and value

(a) Content and links with already accomplished work.

One question lurking in the background of the first five modules is the place of values in a theory of emotion. Values enter at least in four essential components of emotions. First in the evaluation of the object of the emotion, second in the evaluation of the pleasantness of the emotion, third in the evaluation of the fitness between the value of the object and the hedonic value of the emotion (e.g. sadistic pleasure), fourth in the fitness between the value of the object and the attendant actions-tendencies. Thus valence in all its forms is fundamentally an axiological concept. During the first period of the NCCR, we have extensively studied the emotion-value connection, but mainly with epistemological considerations in mind (i.e. how are values known through emotions? Cf. Deonna & Teroni 2008b; Mulligan 2007; Teroni 2007). Focusing on the metaphysics of value (i.e. what are values?) will allow us to shed a different light on and deepen our understanding of this connection.

One core question in the metaphysics of values is whether or not we should analyze values in terms of emotional responses. For instance, is justice to be defined in terms of the prevalent tendencies towards anger and guilt within a society? Responding affirmatively consists in holding that emotions constitute values (as in social constructivism). This answer takes different forms, depending on how we fix the relevant class of emotional responses (Deonna & Teroni 2008). One may for instance appeal to normal responses in a purely statistical sense, to an ideal spectator, or simply, as Kant would have it, a rational one. Insofar as such views hold that values essentially depend on contingent human responses, they qualify as types of subjectivism about values. In contrast, responding negatively to our initial question is tantamount to defending a form of realism about values: emotional responses should be analyzed in terms of values, not the reverse (as in natural kind theories). We shall argue that adopting the latter, realist position provides us with a powerful tool for making relevant distinctions within the emotional domain. If we want to make distinctions between types of emotions (moral vs. non-moral, social vs. non-social, epistemic vs. non-epistemic, personal vs. non-personal, etc.) we need first to secure the corresponding distinctions between types of values (moral vs. non-moral, for instance injustice vs. beauty, and so on). In this regard, we intend to continue our ongoing collaboration with the Eidos metaphysics group on value theory (cf. Links with external projects).

(b) Links with other modules.

(i) If values are analyzable in terms of emotional responses, how is it that they appear to qualify objects in the world rather than our own mental states? How are value projected onto the world? If, on the contrary, values exist independently of our emotional responses, how are they accessed? If emotions are indeed responses, what do they respond to? Does intuition or 'feelings of value' play any fundamental role in our access to the axiological world (Mulligan 2007)? Answering these questions will benefit from an investigation of the topics covered by module 1, Intentionality and evaluation.

(ii) Many of the problems raised above also connect with issues examined within module 3, Hedonic valence. For instance, is pleasure something that is intrinsically valuable? Malicious pleasures suggest a negative answer. Moreover, is it possible to deal with such cases (organic unities) while saving the intuition of an intrinsic value of pleasure? Is pleasure itself an axiological rather than a psychological property, that is, could pleasantness be equated with a type of value?

(iii) How are we to fix the axiological criteria by which the fitness between the perceived value of the object and the action-tendencies, discussed in module 2, is judged, be it in terms of evolutionary adaptiveness, moral appropriateness, personal values?

(iv) How are we to secure the distinction between personal and non-personal values at the axiological level, in order to define self-reflective emotions, discussed in module 6?

Module 6: Self-evaluative emotions

(a) Content and links with already accomplished work.

The sub-class of emotions including shame, guilt, pride, remorse and agent-regret, collectively known as the self-evaluative emotions are peculiar in their complexity. They raise a number of particular issues in regard to their intentionality, their associated bodily feelings, and their link to motivation and regulation.

(i) Self-evaluative emotions are first and foremost peculiar in their dual intentionality. They involve both an evaluation of the subject's circumstances and an evaluation of the subject herself. In shame, for instance, one evaluates some behavior or event as shameful for oneself and evaluates oneself as worthless in light of this. Some preliminary work on this dual intentionality has already been completed (Deonna & Teroni 2008; Bruun & Teroni forthcoming). Further work will aim to understand the mechanism by which the outwardly oriented intentionality triggers the self-evaluative attitude. What is required in one's self-conception for an evaluation of one's environment to trigger an evaluation of one's self? What is the self that is so evaluated? How does this self-evaluative attitude affect or shape one's long-standing self-conception? We would be particularly interested to collaborate with Suzanne Kaiser on the response patterning of shame and guilt (Project 2), Tobias Brosch on the related quasi-self-evaluative emotion of envy (Project 1), and Ernst Fehr's group on the behavioural tendencies associated with the induction of shame and guilt (Project 9).

(ii)If, as on the hypothesis above, bodily feelings are to be understood as "preparations for actions that present the world to the subject in terms of significance for her" (see module 2), the self-evaluative emotions present two peculiar difficulties. Firstly, for the canonical cases of shame, regret, remorse and pride, there is no evident action-type for which the typical bodily feelings associated with these emotions can be clearly regarded as preparations. How can we then account for their bodily feelings? Secondly, although guilt has a typical action tendency – reparation – it is often conceived of as a long-standing affective state that need not involve an enduring bodily feeling. How do we account for the phenomenology of such long-standing affective states?

(iii) Self-evaluative emotions are often cited as playing an important role in self-regulative behavior. Shame and guilt in their prospective form motivate the subject to avoid short-term pleasures for the sake of so-called 'higher' goods. However, how do such emotions perform this function? I.e. how do such emotions motivate by means of the creation or cognition of higher personal values? Does the regulative function of self-evaluative emotions differ from that of other forms of reflective prioritization?

(b) Links with other modules.

The research of the self-evaluative emotions module cuts across the other modules by providing a particular case study relevant to important issues concerning intentionality (module 1), bodily feelings (module 4), and motivation and regulation (module 2).

Methods

Our principal method of investigation is conceptual analysis, as complemented and informed by relevant empirical research in neuroscience, experimental psychology, anthropology as well as historical and literary disciplines. The core elements of conceptual analysis include (i) investigation of linguistic usage, (ii) a close attention to ontological distinctions amongst the phenomena examined, (iii) imaginative attention to narrative contexts in which emotions occur, (iv) introspection, (v) comparison with neighbouring emotional phenomena, (vi) careful analysis of connexions to related classes of mental phenomena (actions, judgments, moods, desires, valuing), (vii) a close attention to the tools and set of interests peculiar to the metaphysics of value, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy.

Competencies and resources

The project will involve collaborators already implicated in the ongoing research of project 10 "Emotions, Values, and Norms": Otto Bruun, Julien Deonna, Olivier Massin, Fabrice Teroni, Alain Pé-Curto, Fédérico Lauria as well as temporary external post-doctoral researchers: Catrin Misselhorn (Tuebingen), and Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (Berlin).

Possible Collaborations within the NCCR and with external projects

Our research on Intentionality and Evaluation (module 1) will benefit greatly from a close collaboration with psychologists in Projects 1 and 2 working on the evaluative processes in emotion and on the sequencing of response patterns. The investigation of motivation and emotional regulation (module 2) raises issues that require close collaboration with psychologists within the NCCR working on motivational and regulational issues. We will develop collaborations with psychologists working on emotional regulation (actual Project 1, Gendolla, Korb, and Project 7, Van der Linden). Work on pleasure (module 3) has strong connections with the actual project on the appraisal processes in the elicitation of emotions led by K. Scherer & G. Gendolla, and would benefit from closer collaboration. The study of feelings and their role in a theory of emotion (module 4) makes sense only in close collaboration with people within the NCCR working on the biology and physiology of the mechanisms underlying emotions. Also the particular issue of the existence of "as-if loop" mechanisms is crucial for understanding phenomena such as simulation and mental travel (see Affective Dynamics Pre-proposal). Understanding the mechanisms underlying these phenomena can only be done in close collaboration with psychologists. The nature of values (module 5) may also be the topic of a focus we intend to propose in collaboration with D. Sander and M. Van der Linden on Values, Goals, and Memory. With regard to the self-evaluative emotions (module 6), we would be particularly interested to collaborate with Suzanne Kaiser (Project 2), Tobias Brosch (Project 1), and Ernst Fehr (Project 9) on response patterns, and behavioral tendencies more broadly, of self-evaluative emotions. With regard to the metaphysical issues surrounding values (module 5), Philosophy Project 10 is associated with the Geneva Philosophy department Eidos metaphysics FNS-funded project (see appendix on grants). We are already collaborating with members of a module within it on the metaphysics of values (Fabian Dorsch and Gian-Andri Toendury). Moreover, all the modules will benefit from a planned overarching empirical (questionnaire-based) study of everyday attitudes towards the valence aspects of emotions in order to discover where they are situated along various moral, hedonic, motivational spectrums. In constructing this study, we intend to collaborate with the psychologists of Project 1 and the inter-disciplinary group of the language and culture Research Focus.

References (publications cited in the text):

  • Berridge, K., 2003, "Pleasures of the brain", Brain and Cognition 52, 106-128.
  • Bruun, O., & Teroni, F, forthcoming "Shame and Guilt as Moral Emotions", submitted.
  • Deonna, J., & Teroni, F., 2008a, Is Shame a Social Emotion?, submitted.
  • Deonna, J., & Teroni, F., 2008b, Qu'est-ce qu'une emotion?, Paris, Vrin (in print 2008)
  • Mulligan, K., 1998, "From Appropriate Emotions to Values", Monist, 81: 11, pp. 161-188.
  • Mulligan, K., 2007, "Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects", Disputatio, Vol. II, No. 23, November 2007, 205-228.
  • Teroni F., 2007, "Emotions and Formal Objects", Dialectica vol 61, 3, pp. 395-415.

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