Session 15. Debordering-rebordering in cross-border metropolitan regions / Dé- et reterritorialisation des frontières dans les régions urbaines transfrontalières

Christophe SOHN & Olivier WALTHER, Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies: Luxembourg Comparing cross-border metropolitan integration in Europe

Within the field of border studies, cross-border work is generally considered to be undergoing a process of integration. However, certain studies have shown that cross-border integration is not restricted to the economy in general or to cross-border work in particular, but rather includes other political, cultural and social dimensions. In addition, it has been demonstrated that the presence of strong interactions between territories separated by a border does not always indicate any convergence of their territorial characteristics. In other words, the development of cross-border economic relations does not necessarily imply any reduction in disparities or associated increase in territorial cohesion, which is one of the central aims of European spatial planning.

Against this background, this paper analyses the process of spatial integration in ten European cross-border metropolitan regions. On the basis of three indicators, relating to flows of cross-border commuters, gross domestic product and the housing market, it suggests that spatial integration can be viewed as a process of convergence between distinct territories, resulting from the intensification of interaction between social, political and economic actors. Our results allow, firstly, confirmation of the hypothesis that the greater the economic disparities, the greater the level of interactions measured by cross-border commuting. Our work also allows confirmation of the hypothesis that strong economic interactions have an impact on the cross-border integration of communities, measured by the proportion of residents based on the other side of the border. Finally, this article proposes three models of cross-border integration: by specialisation, by polarisation and by osmosis.

Antoine BEYER, Université Paris-Sorbonne & Bernard REITEL, CEPS/INSTEAD: Measuring cross-border integration: the case of public transportation

Jesús CAÑAS, Roberto CORONADO, Robert W. GILMER, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas & Eduardo Saucedo, New Mexico State University: The impact of maquiladoras on U.S. border cities

For decades, the maquiladora industry has been a major economic engine along the U.S.-Mexico border region. Since the 1970s, researchers have analyzed how the maquiladora industry affects cities along both sides of the border. Gordon Hanson (2001) produced the first comprehensive study at the impact of the maquiladora on U.S. border cities, considering the impact of these in-bound plants on both employment and wages. His estimates became useful rules of thumb for the entire U.S.-Mexico border. These estimates have become dated, as Hanson’s study covered the period from 1975 to 1997.

The purpose of this paper is to update Hanson’s results using data from 1990 to 2006, and to extend the estimates to specific border cities. For the border region as a whole, we find that the impact of a 10 percent increase in maquiladora production leads to a 0.5 to 0.9 percent change in employment. However, we also find that the border average is quite misleading, with big
BRIT XI Mobile borders | Abstracts. Wednesday 7 September, Geneva

differences among individual border cities. Cities along the Texas-Mexico border benefit most from growing maquiladora production. We also estimate the cross-border maquiladora impacts before and after 2001 when border security begins to rise, the maquiladora industry entered a severe recession and extensive restructuring and global low-wage competition intensified as China joined WTO. Empirical results indicate that U.S. border cities are less responsive to growth in maquiladora production from 2001-2006 than in the earlier period; however, when looking into specific-sectors we find that U.S. border city-employment in service-sectors are far more responsive post-2001.

Jen NELLES, University of Toronto, Canada & Frédéric DURAND, CEPS/INSTEAD: Political rescaling and metropolitan governance in the cross-border regions of Lille and Luxembourg

The process of de-bordering in the European Union has resulted in an intensification of functional interdependencies and the institutionalization of informally-defined cross-border metropolitan spaces. Various mechanisms of EU policy have encouraged the formalization and accelerated the proliferation of these cross-border regions, which has unfolded in parallel with ongoing internal processes of political and territorial rescaling. Although the emergence of these “new”, institutionalized, and multi-national regions is an incredibly significant and arguably unique phenomenon, the broader political implications of the emergence of these intermediary jurisdictions continue to be deliberated. This paper joins this debate and seeks to understand how, on one hand, these processes of European territorial reimagining and cohesion have affected the production of political space in a cross-border framework, and secondly, to study the particular cross-border dynamic that develops in these cross-border territories. In other words, to what degree have the emergence and governance of cross-border regions resulted in political rescaling through the creation of new territorial spaces and actors?

This paper compares the evolution and forms of cross-border metropolitan governance in the European regions of Lille (Eurometropole Lille-Kortirjk-Tournai) and Luxembourg (Greater Region). It provides a brief survey of the historical cross-border development of these regions before turning to the question of cross-border governance. Both regions have adopted very different structures and strategies for region-building and governance to suit different geographic social and institutional challenges. However, despite the lengthy functional and political evolution of these regions, and their adoption of recently created legal status, both have struggled to function effectively as political actors. Do the experiences of these two regions suggest that while processes of debordering and territorial rescaling may have resulted in the creation of new spaces without leading to the emergence of new political actors that have the capacity to play an important role in cross-border policy? What political actors are concerned with the production of cross-border spaces and how have they organized to initiate cross-border projects? Do traditional political hierarchies continue to dominate local and regional cross-border policy?
**Hans Peter DÖRRENBÄCHER, Christoph HAHN, Ines KRUMM**, Saarland University: Opportunities and limitations to the development of cross-border training: The case of the automotive industry and the health sector in the Greater Region SaarLorLux

Labor and training markets in cross-border metropolitan regions are characterized by large intraregional differences. These trends are further intensified by demographic changes, by a lack of skilled workforce and, in the case of manufacturing and trade, global competition. The establishment of trans-boundary cooperation in the areas of labor and training markets helps to solve these problems. By sharing and integrating their respective regional knowledge, cross-border metropolitan regions can preserve most of their social infrastructure and guarantee comfortable living conditions. This, in turn, attracts business start-ups and skilled workforce and therefore strengthens the competitive position of the entire cross-border metropolitan region.

The paper picks up these ideas and analyzes efforts toward the formation of integrated labor and training markets within the Greater Region SaarLorLux. By adopting a multilevel governance perspective which integrates the differing “function systems” within the Greater Region and their related institutionalized communication media, the paper reveals a complex constellation of parameters belonging to various spheres which either foster or hamper cross-border cooperation. Jurisdiction, legislature, and cultural attitudes are shaped and re-shaped by various actors belonging to different function systems at various geographical scales. This will probably result in the “emergence” of new borders (“re-bordering”) which were of minor relevance before. The opportunities and limitations to the development of cross-border training in the Greater Region will be explored within the framework of two case studies examining the automotive industry and health sector. Both sectors can be considered as important future issues for the Greater Region, the first as crucial industry sector and the second as huge social challenge.

**Manfred PERLIK**, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich: Cross-border cooperation in the Upper Rhine Region: The myth as a resource

The population of the Basel/Upper Rhine Region has a long experience in cooperation and cohabitation: This includes innovative periods as the dispersion of printing and literature, and industrial manufacturing as well as changing borders during wars. A specific prosperity of the Basel region can be attributed to a “primitive accumulation” due to the participation on slavery trade (via the port of Nantes) or the resistance against the Napoleon continental blockade against Britain (which founded the fortune of the mighty Christoph Merian Foundation). The two World Wars split the ethnic region into three: North-West Switzerland, Alsace and Bade though these retained a common trajectory. While this history is important the focus of this paper is the actual function of this trajectory in the European metropolisation process.

The major cities in the Upper Rhine region are in a defensive situation relative to the European spatial hierarchization process. The Swiss Basel has lost significance during centuries and at the end of the 20th century has been outperformed by the Zurich Metropolitan Region. Mulhouse, the “French Manchester” has lost its significance with the end of the Fordist period and the prosperous German Upper Rhine region is the only one in Germany which has not been selected as “Metropolitan”. In this situation the three partners try to play the European card: “Basel tickt anders” is a slogan to be distinct oneself from the rest of German speaking Switzerland. The Alsace region has experienced a “proto-Padania”-movement and the German Bade-Württemberg was always part of the counter-model against the German Rhenish Capitalism.
The actual situation shows that this strategy to mobilise the resources of Unique Selling Positions (USP) is successful although the regional development has not created a sense of integration. On the contrary, there are no signs of a cross-border production system of linkages between enterprises. But there are signs of a functional division of labour like working in Switzerland and living and consuming in France and Germany. Ultimately, this strategy may contribute a strong urban entity between the metropolitan poles of Lyon, Zurich and Stuttgart, which – under normative criteria of polycentrism – might represent a step towards spatial cohesion. The USP “Cross-border” (although now rather interrupted) and the multicultural approach (though only practiced by parts of the new middle classes) is now the common strategy. The cross-border situation is part of the search for new regional resources, comparable to landscape attractiveness for metropolitan regions like Munich or Geneva with “its” Alps. The presentation will use the results of the ESPON Metroborder project, the results of the conceptual work for empirical research on “uneven spatial development” in Grenoble and the debate about multilocal dwelling in mountain areas as part of uniqueness strategies.
Session 16. Cross-boundary mobilities and development / Développement transfrontalier et mobilités (1)

Claude GENGLER, Fondation Forum Europa, Samuel CARPENTIER & Philippe GERBER, CEPS/INSTEAD: Mobilité résidentielle transfrontalière du Luxembourg vers ses régions voisines: un panorama

This presentation is dealing with the crossborder residential mobility between Luxembourg and its border regions (Lorraine, Wallonia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland). The country sees an increasing number of active people leaving it and settling abroad while continuing to work in Luxembourg. After having determined the scope of the phenomenon as well as the points of departure and the destinations, the author will insist on motivations and some other interesting facets of this kind of residential migration.

Keywords: Luxembourg, Greater Region, border work, residential mobility, crossborder.

Rachid BELKACEM, Universités de Nancy, Isabelle PIGERON-PIROTH, Université du Luxembourg: Travail frontalier et développement transfrontalier au sein de la Grande Région Saar-Lor-Lux

This paper deals with the effects of cross-border work on the economic and social development of territories situated within the Saar-Lor-Lux Region (also known as the « Great Region »). It shows that cross-border work limited the impact of the local economic crisis resulting from the industrial restructurings in the territories of residence of these workers. Cross-border work also supported the economic development of the employment territories by supplying both the needed workforce and skills.

Rafaël COSTA & Thierry EGGERICKX, Université catholique de Louvain: Diversité démographique et profils migratoires des espaces frontaliers belges

During the last few decades, the Belgian border areas have experienced diverse demographic change. While population growth has been rather slow on the French border, it was remarkably accelerated in certain zones on the German, Dutch and Luxembourg borders. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the demographic dynamics in the Belgian border zones. After identifying 9 border zones, we analyse their demographic change based on Census and National Register data. This first analysis points out the demographic diversity of the different border zones, and moreover, the atypical demographic dynamics in the Luxembourg and Limbourg border zones. Both zones have experienced very rapid population growth during the last decades and are increasingly attractive to migration; however, whereas population ageing is particularly fast in Limbourg, Luxembourg is marked by a persistent young age structure. In this context, the question arises as to which extent the specific migration profiles of these zones influence their particular demographic dynamics. The second part of this work focuses on migration to and from these two zones by migrants’ nationality, origin/destination and age. Results suggest that the migration profiles are closely connected to the demographic particularities in both zones. The Luxembourg border zone attracts very young immigrants from Wallonia, which helps maintaining a young age structure. The Limbourg border zone, by contrast, attracts a Dutch immigration of all ages while a great number of young locals leave for other areas in Flanders; the combination of
these international inflows and intern outflows contributes to the rapid population ageing. Finally, even though migration profiles are very different in Limbourg and Luxembourg, our analysis suggests that they might imply a spatial and social segregation process in both zones.

Patrick RERAT & Kévin GERTSCH, University of Neuchatel; Alexandre MOINE & Philippe SIGNORET, Université de Franche-Comté: Cross-border migrations flows in the Jura region (France-Switzerland).

This paper addresses cross-border residential mobility in the Swiss-French Arc Jurassien. It analyses the profiles, trajectories and motivations of the households who make the housing choice to cross the border. Results show the central role of life course position and differentials in terms of accessing to homeownership on both sides of the border. Migrants moving to Switzerland are usually young adults who settle in urban regions and yearn for an urban way of life. In the other way, couples with children are first identified; they access to homeownership and search for a suburban quality of life.

Keywords: Border, migration, residential mobility, housing market, life course, homeownership

Hervé MUNZ, Université de Neuchâtel: Les mobiles frontières du patrimoine horloger de l’Arc jurassien.

Since a bit less than twenty years, some labels of valorization such as « Watch Valley », « Pays de la précision », « Pays de la chronométrie » have been progressively invented in order to characterize the specificity and the ability of the swiss Jura region in watches production. More recently, the category of « watch-making heritage » has appeared in order to underlie both the historical and the current importance of the links between the Jura territory and the watch-making industry.

Moreover, the social uses of such a category crystallize two main issues. First, in accordance with the extensions that the concept of heritage has got for the last fifteen years, the uses of the category of « watch-making heritage » include from now the living items (forms of knowledge and know-how, skills) that organize the practice of watch-making. Otherwise, these uses of heritage reproduce the swiss watch-making myth in identifying the boarders of the « skills territory » of the Jura region to the ones of the swiss territory.

Consequently, theses uses of « watch-making heritage » unvisibilize all that the swiss watch-making industry has owed and still owes to the transnational mobility of workers and to the circulation of skills.

Nevertheless, the ethnography that I drive on the different processes of « heritagization » within the watch-making field of the swiss Jura region shows that mobility has historically supported the emergence and still supports the implementation of local forms of watch-making know-how. These forms of know-how have obviously conditioned the formation of the « swiss » watch-making heritage.

Thus, this paper aims to nuance the association between heritage, territory and state-nation in addressing the watch-making heritage of the « swiss » Jura region in comparison to the transnational and cross-borderer mobilities that have made and still make it.
Session 16 b. Cross-boundary mobilities and development / 
Développement transfrontalier et mobilités (2)

Tamás T. SIKOS, Szent István University, Selye János University: Komárom and Komárno: A divided town and cross-border retailing.

Avant le changement de régime en 1989, les différences entre les communes des deux côtés de la frontière slovaque-hongroise étaient importantes quant au niveau économique et aux conditions de vie des habitants. Ces différences étaient encore plus frappantes dans le cas des villes de Komárom (en Hongrie) et Komárno/Révkomárom (en Slovaquie) divisées en deux brutalement par la frontière hongroise-tchécoslovaque créée en 1920. Les deux parties de la ville, l'une en Hongrie, l'autre en Slovaquie (à part la période de 1938-1945) ne parvinrent que sept décennies plus tard, à partir de années 1990, jusqu'à l'obtention des conditions politiques et économiques d'un développement urbain coordonné en commun et à long terme. D'après plusieurs signes, les deux villes s'approchent. Entre autres, le tourisme traditionnel et commercial croissant, la correspondance ascendant entre les deux villes en voiture et à pied, l'intensification progressive de la migration internationale et des trajets à travers la frontière et le renouvellement des relations personnelles sont les signes qui semblent les plus importantes. Après le changement de régime en 1989, tous les deux pays respirèrent et obtinrent la possibilité pour le développement. Le changement continuin se voit surtout à nos jours. Les entreprises privées, investisseurs et commerçants privés, profitant des possibilités changèrent profondément l'apparence des villes, l'ouverture des centres commerciaux se succédèrent. Dans le cadre de l'étude – d'après une recherche primaire –, nous souhaitons examiner les relations dans la vente au détail s'étendant au-delà de la frontière et en même temps l'effet des processus actuels sur les clients vivant sur place.

Mots clés: réseaux de la vente au détail, processus du développement de la vente au détail, centres commerciaux, vente au détail frontière, champs d’attraction

Zoltan TAKAC, Scientific Association for Hungarology Research Subotica: Student mobility or emigration flow?

The proposal summarizes the first year research results of the applicant within the project: The Integrating (trans)national migrants in transition states (IMIG) – joint research project in the framework of the co-operation programme SCOPES (2009-2012), submitted to the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), coordinated by Prof. Dr. Doris Wastl-Walter (Department of Geography, University of Bern).

Hungary and Serbia is considered a border region of two European countries in transition. It should be emphasized that this border region is „divided” by two states, EU and not EU members, although there are natural, cultural (national – Hungarian minority) and economical contacts among the closed borders. The research problem would be defined as: How to activate the cross-boundary prospectives? What are the capacities for cross-border cooperation and institutional networking?

Empirical background: 25 interviews have been completed on the topic of cross-border relationships of the institutions (leaders of institutions from North Vojvodina and South Hungary). Locations: Serbia and Hungary. Objective: Cross-border relationships of the institutions network -
positive examples. The cross-border relationship indicators: The level and development of cross-border relationships indicate the preparedness of the inhabitants and institutions for the EU membership, competitiveness (labor force, institutions of knowledge transfer, entrepreneurs) social, cultural and economic cohesion. The role of local-regional elite was considered in processes of cooperation between Serbia and Hungary. The institutional cooperating capacities were analyzed according to the question of social and cultural cohesion of border region (emphasizing the permanent mobility and diversity of its inhabitants). The most important cooperation-channel is higher education and cultural institutions. The high motive and number of emigrating/commuting Hungarian students towards Hungary began 1990. In 2010, 1 385 Hungarian students (from Vojvodina) studied in H, and 3 152 in SRB. There is high concentrated student mobility between H-SRB. It causes a very low returning rate of educated young elite (approximately 30%). The local-regional (academic and political) elite of minority, as the “changing agents” should initiate educational, cultural and economical cooperation in the border region (for example, establishing a multiethnic university, organizing common (multilingual) educational programs). The interview subjects were from state, institutional and university circles. The focus is on the intra- and interregional relationship network of „near-border” state institutions (educational and cultural co-operation, their embedment).

Research methodology: Statistical data comparisons (H-SRB) of border region, interviews, and literature, published by domestic (Hungarian and Serbian) border researchers were used.

Nutefé TSIGBE Koffi, Université de Lomé: Frontières et mobilité transfrontalière au Togo sous domination coloniale (1884-1960).

The Togolese nation was born in 1884 as a territorial entity internationally acknowledged at the conclusion of the signing of the protectorate treaty between Germany and local authorities. From then on, Germans were committed to demarcating their new space by establishing frontiers to the west, east, and north. After World War I, because Germany was defeated in Togo, the land was lost to the French-British coalition. The coalition undertook frontier readjustments between 1914 and 1929. The different borders established stemmed out from, among many, the colonizer’s will to break ancient dynamics of mobility of the Togolese and to ensure the control of trade flows through the land. In view of that situation of narrowing the field for people’s free movement, the Togolese had to resort to different strategies for both economic and social needs to cross borders.

Keywords: Frontiers, mobility, migrations, colonization, cross-border practices.

Adam MAHAMAT, University of Maroua, Cameroun: Mobilité transfrontalière et activités des femmes sur le pont de Nguéli (Tchad-Cameroun).

The crisis in Darfur (Sudan) became a crucial issue as from 2003 when the conflict reached the step of escalation and violence. Violent confrontations between the Janjeweed and the other populations triggered to local instability, provoked internal displaced and caused flows of refugees. The crossing of the border by the victims of Darfur was compulsory for many reasons. Some of them, fearing for their lives, migrated in Chad. The rebels of both sides, seeking for security and more elaborated strategies, chose to establish themselves in the neighboring country.

The paper intends to look at the signification of the frontier from three perspectives: escapement for the refugees, strategy for the rebels and territorial control for the States. Chad and Sudan have
alongside their border sides nineteen ethnic groups. The analysis also intends to show how, depending on the relationship between the States, the anthropological considerations and local variations, the role of the border can change. From conflicting space, the border can move to a peaceful area. From this perspective, the peaceful agreement between the Heads of States of both countries is representative of such situation.

The problem of the status of the refugees and the international refugee camps discloses another type of frontier called “internal borders”. Refugees from Nyala, El Geneina and El Fasher, sub States of Darfur, create their own frontiers in a foreign country (Chad). The challenge consists in re-crossing the frontier to regain the departure sites.

*Keywords: Borders, Refugees, Identity, Darfur, Chad, Sudan.*
Session 17. Walls and security barriers as mobile devices? / Les murs et barrières de sécurité, des dispositifs mobiles ? (1)

Alexandra NOVOSSELOF, Université de Paris-Panthéon-Assas: The perceptions of the Wall: the crossed example of the DMZ in South-Korea and the Green Line in Cyprus.

The key question in the presentation is to know whether South-Koreans are like Cypriots: the further they are from the wall, the greatest fear of the wall and of the reunification they have; the further they are, the more they oppose the reunification.

Cédric PARIZOT, Institut de Recherche et d'Etude sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (UMR6568): Après le mur: perceptions israéliennes de la séparation avec les palestiniens

This article analyses how and to what extent the separation wall built around the West Bank since 2002 has been able to create among the Israeli population the impression of being separated from the Palestinians. It asks this question at a moment when the building of this structure is largely uncompleted and when the mechanisms of control deployed by Israel maintain its presence deep inside the West Bank and thus, on both sides of the wall. Relying on ethnographic investigations of Israeli space practices as well as on observations of Israeli mechanisms of control deployed since 2002, this article shows that, as a project, and as a highly mediatized building, the wall became the support of projections for Israelis living in the coastal plain and the center of the country. These projections of an achieved separation are not merely fostered by the misrecognition of the path of the barrier and its discontinuity, but also by the efficiency of the less mediatized “remote mechanisms of control”, that have contributed to restore a feeling of sovereignty on the Israeli soil. This study helps understanding to what extent the mechanisms of control that are inscribed in postmodern forms of territoriality (mobility regime, remote policing) can actually reinforce modern representation of territory. Finally, this research leads to relativize the role of the materiality of borders in the construction of these same borders. As a matter of fact, if the wall works as a support of projections for the Israeli population that live far from it, for the people living next to it the superposition of other mechanisms of control make it lost its landmarking capacity.

Sarah KERR, McGill University: Relieving the US-Mexican Border: Examining the Pressures and Possibilities Surrounding the World’s Foremost Hyper Border

Border policy is often discussed within the frameworks of two approaches from opposing sides of the policy spectrum: full integration of regional spaces with free flows across internal borders (e.g. the EU) and highly securitized states with immense border infrastructure. Examining current policy on the US-Mexican border, it is increasingly evident that the adoption of the later option, in combination with the uneven free trade agenda has led to the growth of illicit markets for the movement of people and drugs, a violent narcotics war and created incredible pressure on the agencies and infrastructure in place to protect the physical border. I argue that it is time to consider middle-ground approaches that further integrate citizenship away from the border and into the domestic sphere and re-examine the discrepancies created between the intended values underlying NAFTA and the policy realities 16 years on. These approaches would put emphasis on
the use of available information technology instead of escalating militarization at the border, information sharing and cooperation between border agencies (such as been done on the US-Canadian border) and encourage the domestic permeation of citizenship through the creation of a national identity card system within the United States to be used to access social services and make major transactions (like those in place in Mexico and many EU countries). Tightening internal control could create the groundwork for increased flows of well-intention individuals, acting to better facilitate the development of well-incentivized guest worker programs, a steady legal flow of remittances into the Mexican economy and act to undercut illegal activity overseen by cartels. The final section analyzes the current domestic climate within the United States and outlines the challenges and likelihood of adopting new strategies given current discourses regarding freedom from government, concern surrounding long-term illegal immigrants, job creation and national security.

Amandine KERVELLA, Université de Haute-Alsace: Presse écrite et journaux télévisés face à la « barrière de sécurité » de Cisjordanie: quelles représentations médiatiques, en France ?

This communication aims at presenting a synthesis of the researches that we lead on the representations of the "wall" of the West Bank, in various French media,. It is structured by the following problem: on the visual and linguistic plans, what are interpretative and proceeded journalistic frames mobilized by the French media to represent a « wall » arousing so many debates?

At first, we will review the symbolic and politic stakes of these representations. We would like to show that, in a context of increase in importance of a more and more structured international public opinion and an increasing media globalization of flows, the question of the representation of the "wall", in international medias, establishes a major stake for the opponents and the promoters of this construction, who, from then on, spread various strategies to influence them. Secondly, we will propose a typology of the interpretative frames and the discursive processes mobilized by the media to represent the "wall", both at the level of the nature of the work and its objectives and consequences. We will see then for example if the definition of the "barrier" as element of reassurance, proposed by the Israeli government is resumed by the French media. If yes, how? What are the other mobilized frames? To conclude, we will propose hypotheses as for factors which can play on these media speeches.
Avoir pour ambition de traiter du patrimoine culturel dans sa relation à la frontière pourrait passer pour une antienne classique du thème « territoire et patrimoine ». Il n’en est rien. La frontière est autre chose que le territoire et si des points de conjonction existent à l’évidence, il est nécessaire de les dépasser pour comprendre l’ampleur de la richesse de la relation entre patrimoine et frontière.

La frontière, comme un ensemble de points, comme une limite marquée a deux abords : l’un pose la chose dans son essence ou sa définition, tandis que l’autre la protège contre l’envahissement par une altérité indésirable, lorsqu’il ne s’agit pas d’une tentative interne de sabordage. Dès lors, institution, la frontière devient une proie, et l’enjeu d’un continual débordement. Sa plasticité et sa porosité lui accordent sinon une double fonction, du moins le moment d’un lieu à deux sens : elle appelle mais empêche le passage ; elle repousse mais intègre. Sorte de peau indispensable, elle est lieu de vie des choses et des hommes : elle doit délimiter sans limiter, contenir sans enfermer, constituer sans pétrifier.


ses points alignés en continue, de la traverser librement à des points de contrôle, voire d’effacer son trait si nécessaire dans le cadre d’un intérêt culturel supérieur.

Fabienne LELOUP, Facultés universitaires catholiques de Mons: Mobilité et développement territorial : l’étude d’actions culturelles franco-belges

Recent research has shown how the opening of State borders constitutes an opportunity for development, not only by deleting the limits and then by increasing exchanges and mobility but also by creating new emergent areas.

The cultural sector has been used as an example of such an evolution. Cultural activities are analyzed either as a public cost, as a part of a touristic approach or as a basis for local planning.

The analysis of some Franco-Belgian cultural projects included in INTERREG policy is used in order to define the potential benefits of such projects and in order to check whether producers or consumers’ cross-border mobility is expected to be increased and whether such a mobility may be a part of a cross-border integrated development.

Christophe QUÉVA, Université de Paris 1, laboratoire Géographie-Cités (UMR 8504): Frontières en mouvement: recompositions et refondations de l’ancienne frontière interallemande.

For forty years, the former inner-German Border represented one of the major fracture in the German and European space. With the German reunification, it shifted from a separative function to an interface between the old and the new Länder (created after the reunification). In this context, the integration’s issues tend to forget or to erase the border, wishing to link the new and the old Länder, both spatially, economically, socially or politically.

However, the partition is still broadly present in the representations and practices of populations, and it expresses itself even more concretely in the context of a formal border’s patrimonialization’s project. Indeed, from the following days of Reunification, the border has become a symbol of German history, characterized by the weight of discontinuities. It has also become the framework for a renewed actors’ cooperation, in a perspective of environmental protection. The "Green Belt" project (Grünes Band), whose stakes are both ecological and memorial, is one of the avatars of this cooperation. It is an established hiking trail along the former border, punctuated by sites of memory and by conservation spaces. It is also a part of an european dynamics in the framework of the « European Greenbelt », corresponding to the former Iron Curtain, from Scandinavia to the Balkans.

To what extent does the former inner-German Border embody the complex dynamics of permeability and frontierization?

By leaning on the pioneering example of Grünes Band Thüringen’s project (Thuringia’s Green Belt), this article presents the issues of the former inner-German Border’s patrimonialization’s project for spaces and identities, from local to European level.
Bénédicte TOULLEC, Centre de recherche sur les médiations (CREM, ÉA 3476): Les frontières floues du journaliste « transfrontalier »?

The Greater Region is a term used to describe the area of Saarland, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Wallonia, and the French Community of Belgium. The programme of the Greater Region facilitates cross-border cooperation among the different stakeholders of the Greater Region and promotes the realisation of local and regional projects. In this area, we can find more and more newspapers (most of the time national or local). One way of approaching these newspapers, is to focus on their content: articles, photos, social representations, topics covered by the media, news imbalances (Zur Nieden, 2008), (Wiermer, 2010), etc. An other way is to focus on the journalists who used to write for these newspapers. This study aims to take stock of how the logic of a potentially cross-border media challenges the informational work of the journalist as linked to the citizen.

Media contribute to structuring the relationship of citizens to the territory (by the title of a section of a newspaper, by a broadcast area, ...). They also build their own borders, sometimes different from the administrative –national- borders. But in order to apprehend this relationship, we need to refer to many dimensions: historical, social, economic, linguistic... One of the most important of these dimensions is the place and the way journalists dread this territory. But who are these journalists? Did they use to live in a cross-border area? Do they impulse a cross border dynamic through their own experience? Have they got their own informational network, discussing with their news correspondent

This study aims to focus on the exemple of the Thionville’s edition of the Républicain Lorrain, a french local newspaper. This edition is interesting because it’s not so far from Luxemburg, and a bigger and bigger part of its area’s population use to work in Luxemburg. Republicain Lorrain had also a rich experience or practical cross-border information in Luxemburg. Semi-structured interviews of journalists and a participant observation of the role played by the local press in the context of an event constitute the elements of this work in progress

Monika M. VÁRADI, Ágnes EROSS, Patrik TÁTRAI, Hungarian Academy of Sciences: Cross-border migratory decisions challenged by national policy in the Serbian-Hungarian border zone.

The educational migration is considered to be one of the most significant one considering the migration from Serbia to Hungary. During the last twenty years many Hungarian families in Voivodina (the Northern region of Serbia) has come to decision that after their children finishing primary school in Serbia pursuing their secondary and tertiary studies in Hungary. Szeged, a city very close to the Hungarian-Serbian border, is one of the main destinations of this type of migration, while at the same time it is also a home for the most populous Vojvodinian community and serves as a scene for diverse, intensive cross-border activities.

Present study is based on the empirical research of an international project started in 2010. Narrative and structured interviews have been conducted with Voivodinian students live and study in Szeged (or formerly studies here) and also with the remarkable leaders of educational institutions and local experts in educational policy. Our main interest was to reveal how the direction and dynamics of cross-border migration and individual (or family) migratory decisions are challenged by – on the one hand – the nation policy (regarding the Hungarians outside Hungary) and educational regulations of the Hungarian government and its institutions; on the other hand, by the family and individual mobility strategies and practices.
Session 19. The (Un)familiarity and labour (im)mobility in borderlands. Historical perspectives on cross-border labour / Perspectives historiques sur le travail transfrontalier (1)

Bianca SZYTNIEWSKI, Radboud University Nijmegen and University of Utrecht: Unfamiliarity and Cross-Border Regions.

In this article, the concepts of familiarity and in particular unfamiliarity will be placed in the context of cross-border regions. The content and level of familiarity, ranging from close familiarity to absolute unfamiliarity, could influence the perceptions and practices of local communities in relation to places and people across the border. As a result, the attractiveness of a destination on the other side of the border could depend on the familiarity or unfamiliarity of the actor with that place. Initially, it could be argued that when a destination is familiar to an individual, it will be visited more often. The actor is familiar with the surroundings, is comfortable with the language and culture, and will not be opposed to coming back. These views are also found in the policies of the European Union, where it is argued that removal of the physical borders between member states will contribute to further European integration and more cohesive cross-border regions. People in a border region will be easier in contact, become familiar, with one another, which will lead to a rise in cross-border practices. However, this appears not always to be the case. Mental borders and images do not necessarily change, while on the other hand, there might be a danger of over-familiarity. As MacKay and Fesenmaier (1997) state: “The more familiar a destination is, the more attractive it is; however, at a certain point, familiarity becomes less attractive”. A reverse trend could be indicated which implies that the more unfamiliar a destination, the more attractive it becomes. In this case, people want to discover the unknown and experience a new destination by themselves.

There are studies that focus on familiarity/unfamiliarity in the context of border regions; however, these studies include only little empirical research. Therefore, I would like to explore this concept further from a theoretical and empirical perspective by examining the relationship between unfamiliarity and cross-border practices in general and in particular, the theory that unfamiliarity, instead of familiarity, is the driving force behind cross-border interaction.

The topic could be included in the sessions: Border theory – mobile borders, and Borderlands and blurred borders.

Carsten YNDIGEGN, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Border Region Studies: Theoretical reflections on the significance of unfamiliarity in the cross-border interaction in the Danish-German border region.

In common sense perception, borders has been perceived as essentialist, as things. In the sociological theory, they are considered as social constructions. As political borders, they demarcate peoples. Political borders constitute although a too narrow perspective on spatial divisions between peoples. Political borders initiate and work in a complex set of relations with other types of borders, such as cultural, linguistic, and economic borders.

Borders are socially constructed, but the kind of construction take on different forms. While political borders are the outcome of institutional processes, often as a consequence of political power struggles, say wars, the other types of borders are social constructions that are created
through everyday social interaction (Paasi, 1996; 1998; 1999). Through such interaction, which has been termed ‘borderwork’ by Rumford (2008), building on the border theory of Balibar (Balibar & Williams, 2002; Balibar, 1998; 2004a; 2004b; 2009), unfamiliarity is being created. This has in an exemplary way been demonstrated by Sahlins (1989) and supported by the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982). On the other hand, social mobilization (Deutsch, 1961) and social contact (Allport, 1954) establish conditions for building familiarity in a border region.

In the paper it will be reflected theoretically how social interaction in the specific form of cross-border interaction may contribute to explain the interplay between borders and unfamiliarity as well as the interplay between cross-border interaction and familiarity.

**Dorte ANDERSEN**, Dpt. of border regions studies, University of South Denmark: Borderwork in a European No-Mans-Land: Everyday reflections on the effects of European Integration on border practice and identity discourse at the Slovenian/Croatian border on Istria

My paper focuses on continuing constructions of patterns of familiarity and unfamiliarity and thus on opportunities and barriers to cross-border interaction in the Croatian-Slovenian border on Istria. By investigating effects of de-bordering and re-bordering processes on border practices and national identity-formation in the area, the paper argues that borders have multifaceted roles to play (Schack, 2000), that they still matter (Bucken-Knapp/Schack, 2001), that they are continually renegotiated, and not necessarily in the direction inspired by European Union initiatives towards border regions and cross-border cooperation (Sandberg 2009).

Drawing on Rumford’s (2008) concept of borderwork, the paper investigates everyday border practices and identity discourse developed on what is both a new border and a border at the fringe of the European Union. The Croatian/Slovenian state border is relatively new, dividing territories, which had previously been (more or less) economically, politically and socially integrated for hundreds of years, and just as many other European borders, the Slovenian-Croatian border regions have no clear ethnical divides. Border practices and identity discourse on Istria have thus been heavily influenced by recent re-bordering processes, including the break-up of Yugoslavia and the fact that Slovenia was accepted into the European Union in 2004, whereas Croatia still awaits accession. Moreover, the border is today a Schengen border, causing new challenges for consumption-patterns and cross-border commuting, labour-market integration, taxation, and not the least in relation to the geopolitics of formerly integrated areas. In turn, the more technical challenges to cross-border interaction create formerly unknown constructions of familiarity and unfamiliarity in the border areas.

Hence, the European integration process has been among the aspects to reactivate a divide between Slovenian and Croatians aspirations, which now constructs new patterns of familiarity and unfamiliarity and thus new barriers to interaction. One could go as far as to claim that the European Integration-process has resulted in both dis- and reintegration processes in the former Yugoslavia and the significance of such processes are particularly interesting in regards of the Slovenian/Croatian border, which experienced a comparable quiet history in relation to other new territorial borders in the area. Instead of re-establishing the de facto unity of the border areas in the two countries, the European integration process has divided them, a divide that will probably have a lasting effect on integration processes and co-operation in the Slovenian/Croatian borderlands.
Jean-Luc DESHAYES, Université de Lorraine: Recherches sur le travail frontalier et lectures de la mobilité des frontières: entre excès d’usage et non-dit.

The researches on French workers who cross the borders to go to work in Belgium or Luxembourg insist on border characteristics in preference to the status of the workers. The border worker is at first an inhabitant of the border zone there before being a worker. This report allows to discuss the theoretical approaches of the mobility of the borders between misuse and unspoken. It does not mean that the borders do not exist and that their construction has no effect on the reality but that if we remove the term of border, we are obliged to think of the border work otherwise. The evolution of the work becomes more important.
Session 20. The mobile nature of Eco-frontiers /  
La dimension mobile des fronts écologiques (1 - Representations, symbols and utopias)

Sylvain GUYOT, Université de Limoges, UMR 6042 GEOLAB CNRS: Introductory presentation: The paradigm of ecological frontier.

There is a gap in the geographical/geopolitical literature about the process that motivates humans to conquer a mobile, boundless, timeless and invaluable wilderness in the name of plural ecologies to serve their own political interests in control and territory building by means of ‘green gerrymandering’.

The ecological frontier (or eco-frontier), a neologism produced by a contemporary greened civil society, can be considered as a new paradigm that embraces the mental representations and mobile spatial constructions of eco-conquest without restricting its temporal dimension to the present time. Indeed, the eco-frontier is a genealogical paradigm where new dynamics always revisit old processes.

The creation and use of the eco-frontier can illuminate the history of the global territorialisation of nature in the last three centuries. From a spatial point of view, two main understandings of the eco-frontier exist. The first characterises virtual and mental imageries of natural spaces of eco-conquest that are strongly associated with Westernised representations of nature. The second considers eco-frontiers as geographical processes to understand the green dynamics of territorial appropriation and reconquest. As a genealogical paradigm, the eco-frontier has a specific temporal dynamic that integrates the different historical contexts and political ideologies of nature. Three generations of eco-frontiers (Empire, Geopolitical and Global generations) began at different times and co-exist today, with superposition and percolation. Today, more and more empirical studies show how contemporary environmentalists and green stakeholders produce specific discourses and representations on global and mobile eco-frontiers.

This special session focuses on this current territorial domination carried out by contemporary eco-conquerors creating possible new geopolitics. Theoretical discussion on eco-frontiers as well as grounded empirical studies are welcomed for this special session.

Samuel DEPRAZ, Université de Lyon (Jean Moulin – Lyon 3), Laboratoire « Environnement, ville, Société » - UMR 5600 du CNRS: Les frontières immatérielles des espaces naturels protégés.

Establishing Nature Protected Areas makes new, official borders appear that have a visible expression in social organizations and landscapes. These borders are recorded and drawn with a high level of precision in cadastral regulations and maps, since they have a jurisdictional value; and they will be generally clearly expressed, on the field, thanks to the building of entrance gates, fences and/or information panels. However, as for any other border, there is also a strong symbolic and affective value attached to these ecological borders delimitating Protected Areas.

Nowadays, the managers of Protected Areas are striving to decrease – not to say to erase – the restrictive dimension of those material borders, since nature conservation policies are more and more integrated to regional and local planning measures. Managers are making their best to promote participative approaches, co-management or even devolution in the governance process of Protected Areas. In this prospect, one could say that the official borders of Protected Areas are intentionally less expressive, or blurred, as to incorporate them into regular local spaces of life and
spatial identities. But strong divides remain in the representation of local spaces since, on a symbolic level, the borders of Protected Areas may still be interpreted as the inherited expression of the initial violence that forced people to change their use of local spaces and places at the time of the creation of the Protected Area. The idea of a territorial confiscation to the advantage of another exogenous social group, in order to make the protected area a “territory for other people” (Leynaud, 1985), has deep grounds that will be still expressed in an implicit way in local stakeholder’s sayings when they depict nature protection policies. Anonymous degradations of information boards or the destruction of the signs, stakes or barriers at the entrance of Protected Areas, remain a visible proof of it.

The spatial conflict is thus often concentrated on the borders of Protected Areas, precisely because of the immaterial value of those borders, which are considered as the territorial markers of a symbolic constraint. Nevertheless, in other cases, the immaterial value of ecological borders will be more positive and even so expressive that their symbolic weight may overwhelm their official, administrative value. In some German Nature Parks (Naturparke), the border is meant to open to a “second world” of fantasy, full of mythological representations – that is, a spatial reference that is then to be considered as a transition line from the local reality towards the universal value of Nature, and, at the same time, an initiation path from the men’s world towards a fantasy land – not to say from a profane to a sacred world. A complete iconographical code with boards and statues has been implemented in the park to make this mental and spatial experience easier to reach; they invite visitors to detach themselves from everyday’s life.

Such an example, among others, leads to consider in a narrower way the weight of representations that are attached to the world of nature conservation. Beyond every conflict about the use and the regulations of spaces – that is, the material values of a Protected Area – shall one not see a form of “border mobility” from their material towards their symbolic value? The immaterial divide in spatial representations around ecological borders remains vivid – and is, maybe, not enough taken in account when trying to understand stakeholder’s relationships and local conflicts.

Julien DELLIER & Frédéric RICHARD, UMR 6042 CNRS GEOLAB, Université de Limoges: Migrations, environnement et recompositions sociales de Millevaches en Limousin: Front écologique ou enclave des utopies ?

The aim of this presentation is to underline links between rural social change and environment, starting from a fieldwork conducted on the Parc Naturel de Millevaches, an isolated rural protected area located in Limousin. We propose to focus on in-migrant population whose specific look at environmental stakes contributes to build an ecofront and to make it locally progressing. As the whole of Limousin, the Parc Naturel of Millevaches is an attractive migratory space at a national, and even international scale. In an ageing local population context and by balancing the natural demographic loss, the incoming population’s impact is massive. But migration dynamics are locally diverse according to the age and to the intensity of the incoming flux. It can mean that
in some areas, newcomers now play a key role in the local society but that in other ones, they are much less integrated to the political and social life.

The places in which new residents are the most integrated see arising social dynamics based on environmentalist and ecologist motivations (rural eco-district, organic and short chain supply food, “lagooning”, etc.). Interestingly, one can also observe other quite similar initiatives or projects led by local people that would underline the diffusion of a new political and social framework, even if modified by finally conservative attitude. Leading us to wonder about a possible conquest or colonisation of these areas by in-migrants, and possibly a rural gentrification process.

Finally, even if impact of newcomers can not be denied at very local scale (ie. commune), the question is still to know if they can spread their environmental representations and practices to the whole local society. And to know if they can impact the social and natural landscapes of the entire Parc Naturel Régional de Millevaches. It is therefore uneasy to define the eco-front dynamics, balancing between, on one hand, a spreading (from heart to the peripheries) vision of society environment or, on another hand, an enclosing utopia.
Hiroshi ITANI, Hokkaido University: Mobile Border and Townscape: A City in Sakhalin, Korsakov.

This presentation will explore the modern Sakhalin’s history in the view of a townscape. The transition reflects also the history of territorial issues between Russia and Japan until the pre-modern times, the difference of geopolitical notions and actions, and the changes of the meanings of the La Perouse (Soya in Japanese) Straight, thus, the presentation will consider the historical background to territorial issues, present day situation and share some tentative conclusion.

At first, Russia and Japan have continued the conflict on the northern islands; Sakhalin and the Kurils until the nineteenth century. In a sense, it is still in now. Why the two countries needed these islands? The Russian geopolitics is very simple. They need the passage to the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of Japan. Because Russian main entrances (Vladivostok, Nakhotka, and so on) are on the coasts of the Sea of Japan, they must pass the only three routes to go out the Pacific Ocean. Concretely, Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straight. If Japan occupy the island Sakhalin, Russian cannot cruise to the Ocean without permission of the Japanese Government. That is, for Russian people, Japan is the last hard test. In contrast, Japanese people did not have any necessity of Sakhalin strategically, but Hokkaido and Sakhalin were their territories mistily, because they thought the indigenous people Ainu were dominated by the Matsumae Clan. For example, Japan set the fishery and trade base named ‘Karafuto basho’ in 1790. But, the management of the base was transferred to the governmental merchant of the Matsumae Clan without any governing institutions—the manifest destiny for Japan.

Sakhalin is often referred to as the “Alsace-Lorraine of the Russian-Japanese border” because of frequent territorial and residential shifts since the latter half of the nineteenth century. But, it was different that the newcomer even religious institutions and graves also renewed all of the townscape. Eventually, towns had been growing without enough cultural accumulations for a long time. It illustrates both two countries have not respected each other and understood the opposite cultures.

Akihiro IWASHITA, Hokkaido University: Mobile Islands on the Border: the Kuril Island

Russia and Japan have continued the conflict on the northern islands; Sakhalin and the Kurils until the nineteenth century. In a sense, it is still in now. Why the two countries needed these islands?

In 1875, Russia and Japan entered into the treaty of St. Petersburg to exchange Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. In February of 1904, Japan declared the war against the Russian Empire. The result of the peace conference of Portsmouth, Japan gained the only southern half of Sakhalin. Furthermore, the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917. In 1920, Japan occupied the northern Sakhalin as the guarantee of the blood shedding incident in Nikoraevsk on the Amur. Japan called that operation ‘Indemnity Occupation’ in the wake of the Rheinland after the World War I. In 1925, the Soviet and Japan brought the negotiation to conclusion. For Russian people, the chance to dissolve Infamies of the past Wars visited in the year 1945. In August 9 of 1945, the Soviet government declared the war against Japan, and started the occupation of Manchuria and
Karafuto. The opposite endings became the forty years ago. The Soviet army conquered all of Karafuto and the Kuril.

**Paul Benjamin RICHARDSON**, University of Birmingham: The Southern Kurils as a ‘Hyper-border’: Russia’s National Destiny on the Edge of Eurasia.

The Southern Kurils are a volcanic chain of islands stretching from the northeast coast of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Kamchatka. The Russian Federation administers all the islands but its claim over the southern most ones is contested by Japan. In Russia, the debates over these islands’ destiny offers a revealing insight into the dynamic processes of ‘debordering’ and ‘rebordering’ which have been taking place in post-Soviet space over the last 20 years.

This border over the islands emphasises the mobility, potentiality and ephemerality of certain territories to emerge as critical sites for defining national identity and national interests. In the post-Soviet period, these islands became saturated with various ideologies of nationalism and were transformed into a symbolic site of national importance, bound to Russia’s destiny by the politics of identity.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these islands’ destiny has at times become the intense focus of the elite in Russia’s political and intellectual centre. However, this region has proved not to be a blank, placid canvas on which the centre smoothly inscribes its will. During the 1990s, transgressions of the border around these islands proliferated and the government failed to provide the most basic services for its citizens leading to a profound resentment towards the federal centre. Therefore, it is suggested that the Southern Kurils can be seen as a kind of ‘hyper-border’: A site which is distant, and at times even beyond the state’s control but also invested with a profound symbolism that can be instantaneously linked to ideas of nation, state and national space.

More recently the current Russian leadership has perhaps recognised their significance and seems intent on turning them from an example of the dissonance between centre and periphery, into a symbol of the transformative power of the state. Therefore, it is over the hyper-border that the resurgent state’s power is most keenly felt yet, at the same time, it is also a polemical site where some members of the local elite voice their opposition to the visions of national identity produced in the centre.

Based on a detailed analysis of contemporary writings on these islands and personal interviews with the political elite in Moscow and the Russian Far East (including serving politicians, diplomats as well as former ministers, governors and leaders of political movements such as Aleksandr Dugin), this paper illustrates how the hyper-border of the Southern Kurils is a site where discourses of national identity and homeland are subverted, negotiated, and re-made at every geographical scale. It is in this dynamic challenge to the centre that the Kurils find themselves not on the periphery, but at the very heart of the political debate on What is Russia and Who is Russian. So much is at stake precisely because the edge of the nation is also its beginning.

**Masato TAMURA**, Historical Museum of Hokkaido: Mobile Border and Indigenous People: The Karafuto Ainu.

This presentation describes the relations between the Russian Japanese border transition and declination of indigenous peoples in Is. Sakhalin; the Karafuto Ainu.
Because Russia and Japan could not set up the borderline in Sakhalin until the latter of the nineteenth century, the two nations shared the island with the coexistence situation called ‘Nichiro-zakkyo’ [Russian and Japan living together].

However, the Treaty of St- Petersburg in 1975 stipulated that Sakhalin belonged to Russia (and Japan got the Kuril Islands instead of it). Over eight hundred Sakhalin Ainu people were forced to emigrate to Hokkaido by the Japanese Government, many of them became sick and died by the circumstance in a strange place, and few Sakhalin Ainu that survived returned their home island until 1904. Furthermore, in the Russo-Japanese War in July of 1905, Japan occupied all of Sakhalin, and the southern half of the island became the Japanese colony called Karafuto and Sakhalin was divided at latitude 50 degrees centigrade N. However, the Treaty of Portsmouth did not stipulate anything about the indigenous peoples in Sakhalin, and the Sakhalin Ainu were still the ‘imperial Russian’ people in the law of Japan. Therefore, they had suffered discrimination until 1945. Nevertheless, after the end of the World War II, most of the Sakhalin Ainu decided to ‘return’ to Japan (mainly Hokkaido) and the Soviet troops occupied the cast off in Sakhalin.

The mobile border of the East Eurasia keeps pulling people away in various directions and transferring them (in most times without any choice) from one place to another. The Sakhalin Ainu was only one of them. However, it is important that the Sakhalin Ainu exists as part of Hokkaido Ainu nowadays.
Sergey RUMYANSEV, Baku-Berlin: Re-Imagining the Borders: "Divided" Ethnic Groups in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus

In the post-Soviet period the whole South Caucasus region is being represented as a boundary periphery of Europe. Politicians, cultural figures and others who have a status (power) to speak on behalf of the dominant “imagined communities” (Azeris, Armenians and Georgians), represent the specifics of this boundary situation. Thus Armenia is a “Christian outpost” on the boundary of the Muslim world. The “Europeanness” is more important for Georgia - "Europe starts here". The cultural and political elite of Azerbaijan are trying to exoticise the very boundary state/status. This Republic is often represented as a kind of transit space: “Azerbaijan is a bridge between the East and the West”.

A boundary situation of the entire region is also represented as a space of "unjustly" divided "homelands". The all three dominant groups are represented as the divided nations in the nationalistic discourses. Various nationalisms, disseminated among Azerbaijanis, Armenians and Georgians, appeal to different mutually exclusive versions (images) of their historical homelands. The margins of these "historical homelands" are considered much broader than the modern political frontiers of the three republics of the South Caucasus. This is a discourse which, I believe, can be called a discourse of "incomplete sovereignty".

At the same time, these ideas confront the images of "historical homelands", which are being produced by intellectuals among representatives of various ethnic groups (“minorities”). Thus, in the post-Soviet period the nationalisms of the various ethnic groups, which have no Kin-States outside their country of residence (Talysh and Abkhazians, Lezgins and South-Ossetians), are trying to compete with the dominant groups’nationalisms. It should be stated that the context of “historic motherland” might be considered in regard to almost all of the mentioned ethnic groups (“minoritues”). For some of them the present habitat is considered as historic motherland (Lezgis, Talyshis, Abkhaz, etc.). But at the same time for Lezgis and South-Ossetia’s there are an “external motherlands” – part of Dagestan and North Ossetia in Russian Federation, where ethnic activists have much more freedom and possibilities to construct ethnic myths.

In the South Caucasus region (as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union) the ideas of nationality as a biological and inevitable (ascribed) characteristic of any human being become common, everyday or “banal” as defined by Michel Billig. “Banal nationalism” has not lost its power after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Namely in the context of the dissemination of such banal ideas the post-Soviet nationalisms and discourses about 'divided' nations gain particular massive popularity.
presentation I will analyze how the Ukrainian, Moldovan and Transnistrian media portray the borders of Transnistria in terms of their function, symbolism and local impacts. Specifically, I will illustrate how internet media have covered the role of the EU in providing border management expertise at the Ukrainian-Transnistrian and Moldovan-Transnistrian borders as well as how popular mass communication (namely Internet blogs and forums) reflect Transnistrian border issues.

Shinkichi FUJIMORI, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University: Borders can make Money? Trade between the Unrecognized State Pridnestrovie and Sovereign States

This presentation aims to examine the business aspect in unrecognized states. Unrecognized states, products of Soviet Union dissolution, are unique border regions. Under communist’ regime, these “states” have enjoyed quasi-nation status such as autonomous republic, though after collapse of Soviet Union, only 15 national republics received diplomatic recognition and these “States” were doomed to be a subordinate of newly independent national republics. Through civic war, these “states” successfully survived controled the territory. This means these states border do not exist de jure, but does exist de fact. Many explain the reasons of their survival by ethnic antagonism, military and economic supports from their donor state (Russian), and weakness of parent states from which they are trying to independent. However, few touch upon the economic aspect. Unrecognized states themselves have quite favorable economic conditions. First, they enjoy every trade agreement such as FTA which parent states concluded with other state. Second, they de-fact control border customs. Third, neighboring states lack transparency which allows them to conduct trans-border trade easily. Forth, they receive cheap natural gas from Russia or sometimes do not pay the bill since they are not a party to contract. In other words, they are free-rider of the world economy. Pridnistrovie (PMR) is a distingush example of this. In my presentation, I focus on Moldova Steel Works company which is located in the left bank of the Dniester River, contibutes more than 50% of PMR’s export and leads PMR national economy. This company has global competitiveness thanks to its world-class production processes and technologies, low energy prices, non-tariff barriers to trade and close location to Ukraine and Russia. Also, through this company, Russian and Ukranian “business clan” make money. Russian clan (Metalloinvest) owns this company, Ukranian clan (Privat) provides scrap metal and delivers metal products from PMR to the world market. This trade is labelled as a Moldovian, however totally controlled by PMR and not appeared in Moldovian official trade statistics. Both Metalloinvest and Privat are leading supporters for incumbent president in Russia and Ukraine. This example impy that both governments have less motivated to put a embargo on PMR to resolve the conflict.

Hiroshi FUKUDA, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University: Central Europe as a Shifting Zone: “Nostalgia” for Habsburg Monarchy and Sovereign States in the Interwar Period

The breakup of the “Iron Curtain” has invalidated the former concept of Eastern Europe, thus old and new regional concepts (re)emerged in the region, such as example Central Europe (or Mitteleuropa), Central and Eastern Europe, East Central Europe to name a few. All of these
concepts are amorphous and don’t have definite borders. We can adduce two reasons from a historical standpoint.

Firstly, the regional concept of Central Europe had been envisaged as a kind of a “corridor” between two Great Powers, i.e. Germany and Russia. For example, a Czech historian and politician, F. Palacký (1798-1876) did not demand the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy, but a reformed and federalized monarchy during the events of 1848-49. According to him, the Monarchy was necessary for small nations such as Czech people in order to survive between the two Powers.

Secondly, the concept of Central Europe had been under the shadow of its German version, i.e. Mitteleuropa. The most famous “prophet” of Mitteleuropa was F. Naumann (1860-1919), who proposed a creation of a Central European Community on the initiative of Germany during W.W.I. Since his concept was overinterpreted by the Nazis, the image of Mitteleuropa was severely damaged and regarded as taboo after W.W.II.

Currently, most of the former Eastern European countries belong to the EU and are enhancing its own stability. Even Western Balkan is (slowly but certainly) in the process of integration into the EU. However, in a sense, the geopolitical position of Central Europe is still unchanged. Central Europe is in peripheral compared to western part of the EU, on the other hand the region functions as a frontier to NIS.

Therefore, this paper would like to explore the complexity and fluctuation of Central Europe focusing on the contrast between non-German concepts and German ones in three periods, i.e. before W.W.I., the interwar periods, and during the W.W.II.
Gideon BIGER, Tel Aviv University: On Nations and International boundaries – the European case.

Our world is divided between more than 200 different independence countries and the numbers seems to continue growing. Today, much of the new independent states were form according to national criteria. Thus united multi-national Yugoslavia became six or seven (the independence of Kosovo is still under debate) independent national states as well as the 16 new national state of the former Soviet Union and the creation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

A world-wide view can present two main models for the relation between nations and Boundaries. The European-Asian, (the Old World) model on one hand and the American-African, (the New World) model.

The first model presents a situation in which a nation is exists way before an international boundary is demarcated, and the boundary is placed in order to include as much as the people of that nation. Thus Poland is the country of the Poles as well as Sweden and Thailand are the country of the Swedish and the Thai people.

The second model presents a situation in which the demarcation of the boundary line is the basic force in creating a nation. Thus the Argentine and the Canadian nations, as well and the Nigerian nations were created by those who live in the area demarcated by a line, as they never existed as nation before.

The same held true for the Middle East were the Syrian, the Lebanese, the Jordanians, the Iraqis and the Palestinian nations were created by the boundaries imposed on the Middle East by the European in the first half of the 20th century.

Europe presents a complicated situation. Although many of its independent states are nation-states, there are about 10 independent states which present a different model, more like the American-African model. Those are the five (or six) tiny states of Andorra, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, San Marino and Monaco (The Vatican state is a unique one). The others are Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland; all are states in which the nationhood is an outcome of the delineated boundaries. Those cases will be dealt with in particular, as well as other European examples.

Régis DARQUES, UMR 5281 ART-Dev, Montpellier Université Paul Valéry: La frontière balkanique: un concept holistique, une empreinte territoriale profonde.

The southern Balkans have been built on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the peninsula endured an almost continuous political and territorial decomposition / recomposition process. The Ottoman space was open and centralized. The territories that emerged from the independence of the Nation States are highly fragmented: the exchanges between new "liberated" neighbors went sometimes to a total depletion, the people’s circulation has been often limited to closed areas, the borderlines undoubtedly became major landmarks. The fuzzy boundaries inherited from the nomadic past of the Ottoman Empire and the past mapping techniques’ inaccuracy evolved into fixed geometric lines that each new independent State passionately wanted to make inviolable … at least temporarily.
When Montenegro and Kosovo became independent (2006 and 2008) and showed the last developments of this bordering "mobility" in the Western Balkans, the Eastern Balkans put up with an apparently reversed process of frontiers’ weakening, embodied in the European integration of Romania and Bulgaria (2007). Why do Albania and the former Yugoslav countries seem to be trapped into an unresolved past, whereas Europe tries to do its best to break down the territorial barriers and complies with an open world trade? For two centuries, the national Balkan States have put all their efforts into delineating areas of sovereignty, securing perimeters against external threats, building new centralities and marginalizing the territories considered unsafe. In this context, is the abolition of borders not a simply imported geopolitical myth, contradicted by any spatial analysis and field experience?

The Balkans are crossed by unlikely corridors, military indefensible territories, unnoticed and remote places. The fights’ imprints are still deep: thousands of villages wiped out, millions of displaced people, many colonized territories built from scratch. There is no Balkan region crossed by a present or past boundary line, whose fate was not determined by war or military conflicts. Under such conditions, the border itself becomes a holistic concept whose understanding determines the entire Balkan geographical studies.

This presentation will measure the borders’ transient nature through a specific GIS tool. Our attention will focus on the spatial delineation of “bordering perimeters” without being tied exclusively to borderlines. The analysis will also rely on the study of concrete cases, around the limits of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Marianna GYAPAY, EHESS: Les frontières de l’Empire des Habsbourg. Le tour et le récit de François Ier en 1817.

In 1817, Francis I the Austrian Emperor left for a long journey of five months to inspect the periphery of the Habsburg Empire. The very strong relationship which can be observed between the journey itself and the political sphere calls for a closer look at the interrelation of space and power. The weakening of the central power by the Napoleonic wars had territorial consequences, which explains why this journey can be considered to be an act of power-politics: center and periphery are both political and territorial modalities.

The route of the journey was chosen so that it could demonstrate imperial power and generate admiration. From an external viewpoint the journey was a kind of manifestation and definition of power: the route clearly confirmed and made others respect the borders of the Empire. From an internal viewpoint the royal travels evoked the old rite of the circuit journeys, when a lord with his vassal rode around the donated fief.

As a consequence of the journey, texts on the reflections of the observations were created. Whereas the journey itself constituted the physical, the narrative represented the intellectual cognition of the territory. As the Emperor became a methodical observer, the lands were not only places he visited but were transformed to serve as the basic patterns for his observations. In his diary, the Emperor introduces us to the geography of his country according to the standards of his time. It is of a utilitarian art; it is above all applied geography. Thus this diary can be regarded as a political and administrative act.

Multinationality was one of the significant characteristics of the Habsburg Empire. Eleven nationalities could be found on its territory; their identities were shaped by different factors: ethnicity, language, history, religion, etc. None of these peoples occupied a region, where there
lived only one nationality. Official borders nowhere corresponded to ethnic territories. National heterogeneousness was, with a few exceptions, the rule.

In my paper, I would like to show how Francis I comprehended and described these geographical, political, linguistic, ethnic and religious borders; what his points of view and the elements of his descriptions were, which enabled him to realize that he had crossed a border of any kind. In a broader sense I would like to show how he rediscovered the periphery of his Empire.

**Olga NASSIS**, University of Messina: The Balkan Bazaar of displaced border: peculiarity and transformations of the greek-albanian frontier.

The present paper focuses on the Greek-albanian border-line and the two main cross-border motorways. The paper deals chiefly with the local understanding of the border-line and the border-crossing, framed by the official nationalism of the two neighbor states and the informal discourse as well; beyond that, it also deals with the contradictions provided by the existence of two states divided by the border and linked through the roads.

The following proposal reflects on an area affected by the historic proliferation of fluid, intertwined and overlapping borders, which are reinscribed in complex forms both in the official narrative of Nation-state and in real societal bodies. The Greek-albanian case shows both the centrality of the border in shaping identities and social relations, and in legitimating the Nation-state. In an age during which the european infrastructure policy is redefining the space and its borders, and the 'europeanisation' process brings along newly formed expressions of nationalism, the Greek–albanian conflict can be seen as an expression of anxiety that comes to terms with the new ethics of the market economy. In this respect, the crowded border-road is the "rite of passage" through which Greek-albanians re-shape their identity; it goes without saying, the border still represents the symbolic and material reference for this power-related dynamic.

Dalma AHUES, FUCaM: Frontières: Le peuple Mapuche en Argentine.

In southern Latin America there are two different countries, one on each side of the Andes, Argentina and Chile. But in the south of these two countries are the Mapuche who consider themselves as one people, speaking one language, living in one whole territory. The Andes represent for them an element of communication and not a border. They consider the borders imposed by the Chilean and Argentinean governments as political borders “impeding their medical, economical, organizational and cultural development”. They do not legitimize this border.

They recognize although other borders in their territory, their identity evolution, the use of their native language (the mapuzungún), the kind of organizations they create and the vision they have of the foreigners. These borders, geographical or symbolic exist in both Chilean and Argentinean cases with some particularities. This text will focus in the population that lives on the Argentinean side.

Geographically, or territorially, they recognize two borders: historical and contemporary. The historical borders are those that draw the boundaries of the ancestral territory, which is being claimed in the present only for its acknowledgment by the government. The contemporary borders are mainly defined according to the presence of Mapuche population in the territories. This territory includes the Province of Neuquén in Argentina, connected to the Chilean side, including the Andes territory, limited at north by the Biobío River and Chiloé at south. These territories are claimed to be populated and governed by the Mapuche today.

Their symbolic borders are formed according to the use of their native language, their identity and its recovering, their organizations and their perspective of the “others”. These borders, present in each aspect, are deeply associated to the territory, especially in the separation between the rural and the urban, for example the use of the native language shows large differences, also the reconstruction, recovery and/or preservation of their identity and their perspective of the “others”, mostly because of the different everyday nature. These environments are different essentially in two aspects: the extent of the Argentinean culture’s influence because of the proximity in everyday nature in the urban and the deep bond to Nature that is still particularly present in the rural.

Michel BRUNEAU, UMR Europe, européenité, européanisation de l’université de Bordeaux: Des frontières à la diaspora: les Greco pontiques.

The Pontic Greeks, of the Black sea, are in the long duration a people of the borders, from the Multiethnic-Empires (Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian) to the Nation-States (Greece). First we will show that the Pontic Greeks are a people of the mountains (uplands), the Pontic Alps, at the fringes, in a singular region of Anatolia, guardians of the eastern borders of the Byzantine Empire.

1 Extract from an interview with a member of an independent community radio in Argentina.
in touch with the Turcoman Emirates. The Russian tsarist Empire, when expanding towards the South, especially in Caucasus, has repelled Muslim populations and attracted Christian populations to resettle these territories. The settlement of the Pontic Greeks has been encouraged in the Caucasus valleys south of Tbilissi and the steppic region of Kars-Ardahan on the Armenian plateau annexed by Russia during forty years (1878-1918). The Pontic Greeks have been moved to Greece following the Lausanne treaty (1923) which has decided the Exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. The same for the Greek Caucasian of the Kars-Ardahan region retroceded to Turkey. These refugees have been strongly encouraged to settle in the North of Greece (Macedonia and Thrace) near the borders in a new « acritic » location.

They have very early migrated around the Black sea and in Caucasus becoming a diaspora. They have then re-created mobile and symbolic borders that we can understand through the concept of « iconography » of Jean Gottmann. Among all the Greek refugees of Asia Minor, Pontic Greeks are those who are the most attached to keep and pass their identity on to the next generations, building memory places. They have created in diaspora, within their numerous associations, an « iconography » especially rich, referring to their places and territories of origin (Pontus, Caucasus). They have built on their host or resettlement territories shrines and monuments where happen periodically memorials and cultural events. So they have created mobile borders that help them to keep and reproduce their own diasporic identity. To have been in the long duration a mountain people of the borders, a minority protecting her religion and culture, does it allow us to understand better the strength of their identity assertion in comparison to the other refugees or exchanged Greeks of Asia Minor?

Outside of this case, we will ask ourselves if there is a link between the position of a people who has been living at the fringes and/or borders of a country in the long duration and his capability to create mobile borders which characterize a diaspora, as other examples, like those of the Kurds or the Armenians, let us suppose?

Gueda GADIO, Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales - Sorbonne de l’Université Paris Descartes, CEPED (Centre Population et Développement. UMR 196 (Paris-Descartes-INED-IRD):
Entre Guyane et Suriname, le fleuve Maroni: frontières mouvantes au fil de l’eau.

Western Guyana seems a fertile ground to deal with border areas and blurred boundaries. Indeed, this area is characterized by its geographical specificity – a landlocked French territory (Amazonian forest) on the South American continent, sharing a border with Suriname (Maroni river) - on the one hand and its socio-cultural environment on the other hand, with the people living there, namely the descendants of the Bushinenge. These are the descendants of slaves who fled the plantation system during the slave period (from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century). The Bushinenge form a community that can be divided into six social groups namely the Ndjukas, Alukus (or Bonis), Saramakas, Paramakas, Kwintis and Mawais.

It seems important to specify what the Maroni River, “half French” and “half Surinamese”, really is. This border river is rather vague because international law has not determined the official delimitation. In addition to Bushinenge people, the river is a way of communication and to some isolated areas, it is still the only mean of transportation. Therefore, for a number of living Bushinenges the Maroni river (from French Guyana or Suriname side), it seems incongruous to talk about border.
At this point, we must emphasize that the Bushinenge population living on the French side is mostly originating from Suriname. Indeed, it was to escape the Dutch settlers and their allies at the time, namely the Ndjukas, that Bushinenge Aluku found refuge on the French side during the second half of the nineteenth century. The Civil War in Suriname (1986-1992) also enhanced the movement of people from Surinam to French communes (municipalities). Kinship ties persist among members from living on these two territories.

In this regard, we note that the majority of Bushinenge define their homes or places of life, referring to the Maroni River and not to French or Surinamese territories.

The article will look more closely at the coping strategies of Bushinenges from West Guyana and their relationship to the river, which can be described as a space of resources. The inhabitants of West Guyana take advantage of their dual position. According to their interest, sometimes opting for French law (for example, they claim their rights to family benefits) or sometimes to blurred regulations or to the lack of rules, for river transport for example. The river is not navigable officially, the controls on the Maroni are rare and therefore deviant practices (informal economy) expand.

Laurent GAGNOL, SET UMR 5603 / PACTE-Territoires UMR 5194: Des frontières contre les nomades « sans frontières » ? L’exemple des Touaregs et des frontières sahariennes.

Nomadism is made possible only by the existence of a free and open space. But it can not be associated with a constant wandering that would admit no limit nor any territorial attachment. Numbers of geographers and ethnologists got interested in nomads’ forms of territoriality. But, is it possible to assume that there are clear and precise limits, even boundaries that separate the areas controlled by different nomads or that separate them from sedentary populations? On the other hand, is it true that the borders that were drawn in the Sahara are due to French colonization and the delimitation between Algeria and the French West Africa?

The Saharan borders have definitely divided the Tuareg area into multiple States (it would have been hard to act differently, given the mobility and dispersal of this population). But contrary to popular opinion, if this frontier looks geometrical and therefore « artificial », it is not so. It appears that the layout of these colonial Saharan borders mainly overlap the internal divisions of the Touareg confederations. Despite the territorial claims from Libya and Khadafy’s many unsuccessful annexing attempts, the borders inherited from the French colonization have remained. What was (and what is) the point of this border? Did it actually set a barrier against the nomads as the common analysis often claims? What were and what are the means around that barrier? We will also show that this border constitutes (and always has constituted) an opportunity for the Touaregs to avoid or confront the power of sedentary governments.

However, it is key to understand that demographic, political and real estate dynamics that shape the Saharo-Sahelian desert tend to freeze these spatial strategies based on mobility and fluidity. For example, some development programs try to help people to adapt to desertification by securing pieces of land, guiding people with land tracks and creating « attachment places ». They even put signs on « transhumance » (summer grazing) routes, sometimes international ones. This process is supposed to make the border crossings easier for nomads but in the same time it tends to reinforce the borders by materializing them. This increasing delimitation happens as a closing process for nomads. In nomads’ spatialities, we will argue that ending zones are also junction zones.
This proposal, derived from a doctoral work, will focus on the nomads’ conception of borders by following the geohistorical journey of Saharan borders and the strategies that Tuareg people developed in order to cope with them. Close attention will be paid to several Saharan wells that are key points at the border between Sahelian countries (Niger, Mali) and Northern Africa countries (Algeria, Libya). We would like to show how these strategic “knots” are, places of separation as well as places of junction.

Benjamin GAYON, Ecole Polytechnique de l'Université de Tours – Département Aménagement,
Cyril BLONDEL, UMR CITERES – CNRS/ Université de Tours: L'identité comme moteur de la construction d'un territoire transfrontalier ? Le cas du Pays Basque.

Under the combined effects of supranational processes (intensifying globalization, European construction) and national and sub-national ones (territorial repositioning of the State at the regional or local level e.g. through decentralization), some structures that seemed fixed and immutable, including for social researchers, are now challenged and seem to be more scalable. This is particularly accurate when observing borders that have seen their statute evolving from marginalized spaces to key areas. For a long time considered as administrative and political limits only, their nature and functions have been evolving in the enlarging European Union, that has made of them one of its priorities. Cross-border cooperation initiatives may benefit nowadays from the European support, the Commission wishing to turn borderlands into real projects’ and exchanges’ territories.

On the other hand, the constructivist revolution in social sciences (Avanza & Laferté, 2005) has also changed the fixed approach of some concepts: such as identity, that may be now perceived more as a process than as an immutable state. The process of collective identity construction is notably based on essential territory components.

Thus, some notions that seemed frozen in a first glance can be questioned, in particular through the evolving meaning given to them, but also through their interrelation and their interdependence. Identity construction may be a socio-cultural element of a borderland space to be considered in the project of a territory. This project may indeed modify the identity construction processes through its impacts on borderland regions upon which these identifications are based. Our question deals precisely with the interrelation between cross-border cooperation and identity construction in the Basque Country at the French-Spanish border. The construction of the Basque identity is based on common elements to both sides of the border, and the European Union now appears, for some Basque nationalist leaders, as a vehicle for the recognition of a Basque identity integrated into the European space. The main issue addressed in our article is: to what extent the Basque identity can be the driving force of the construction of a cross-border territory between France and Spain?

It should be first noted that the French-Spanish border, set in 1659, is an old European border that left a strong mark, still nowadays and despite of the opening of the European borders and of cross-border initiatives. The parallel construction, and in a differentiated manner, of the French and Spanish States led to the coexistence, on both sides of the border, of two different Basque territories at all levels (administrative, political, economic), including in their relation to Basque identity. It seems legitimate to consider at least two Basque identity constructions in the Basque Country, different because partly based on territories with different characteristics, and that, despite of the existence of common elements of identification (including in particular the language). The consideration of the identity differs between French and Spanish actors but also
depends on the scale of the cross-border cooperation projects. The most local and directly cross-border level of the Bidasoa-Txingudi Consorcio, which already has a habit of working at the cross-border level, seems to favor and to invest in the field of the Basque identification, underlining their common elements. At a larger scale, the Eurocity, whose projects are slowly materialized, keeps out of these identity considerations by focusing on interventions in functional fields (transport, mobility). Finally, the identity construction hangs differently over the decisions and the visions of cross-border cooperation for the French actors depending on their localization: in a distanced way on the urban, touristic and accessible coast; while keeping strength and relevance (through Basque language practice in particular) in the more rural and isolated inland.

Thus, based on our empirical study, we will conclude on the multiplicity of the identity construction’ processes, even in places where one would expect a certain homogeneity/consistency. Another important point is the function that borders keep (in particular the persistence of their symbolic dimension) in territorial-based identification processes, despite of the European will to erase them within the European space.
Risk management strategies associated with the quest to securitize transnational mobility have triggered a technological race to embed borders into the human body. If borders are about achieving power through the ordering of difference in space, then the dispersion of border making strategies to the smallest and most personal of spaces – the body – appears natural. Accordingly, bodies are imagined as spaces to inscribe borders on. They become border bodyspaces. Embodied borders present obvious advantages. They are highly mobile and utterly individual, allowing constant and accurate movement control at the smallest spatial scale. From this perspective, they are seen by many as the breakthrough that settles globalization’s security versus mobility bordering dilemma. The belief is that mobile risks can be estimated from mobile bodies and efficiently eliminated at the border, so that traffic flows are not disrupted. The body makes the ideal border, as it is always at hand, ready to be performed whenever circumstances require. Given such attributes, the appeal of embodied borders is immense. It is the promise of unmitigated power over the movements of the human being that largely explains why policymakers and corporations around the world have enthusiastically embraced embodied borders.

This bordering logic has adopted a view predominant in natural sciences that sees the body as a material object that can be rendered digitally knowable with the help of technology. Biometrics and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies, among others, are used to acquire comprehensive knowledge about every mobile body even before it crosses state borders. Then, these bodily data are used to classify people in terms of good versus bad mobility in order to produce categories that are amenable to risk contingency calculus. In this way, knowledge of the body results in power over the body. This is, at the same time, power over the most intimate and mobile of spaces.

The appeal of wireless technologies such as RFID lies in the possibility of automated remote control identification while on the move, which reduces transactions costs and speeds up flows by minimizing human intervention. In essence, this amounts to a high tech surveillance tool that enables tracking the location of people (and objects) in a network at any time without stopping them. These techno-bordering practices raise essential questions about power relationships in society as well as about the prospects of democratic life in the twenty-first century.

Stephan SCHEEL, Open University, Milton Keynes: The Visa Information System: Biometric Re-Bordering & the Appropriation of Mobility.

As of the envisaged start of operation of the Visa Information System (VIS) in 2012 the consular posts of the member states of the European Union (EU) will issue biometric visas, whereby the VIS will become the largest biometric data base in the world (Broeders 2007). According to official documents two of the main purposes of the VIS are to prevent 'visa shopping' (i.e. the parallel and consecutive lodging of several visa applications at different consulates) and to facilitate the re-identification and subsequent deportation of so-called “visa overstayers” (i.e. migrants who
remain within the EU after their visa expired) who account for the majority of so-called “irregular” migrants (European Council 2007).

Despite of the quantitative significance of these migration strategies for the phenomenon of “irregular” migration, only one empirical study of the European visa regime has been conducted to date (Bigo/ Guild 2003). But the latter does not consider the strategies of the 'unwanted' to get access to and remain inside the Schengen area. As part of an ongoing dissertation project this paper tries to address this research gap. Drawing on the current implementation of the VIS as a case study it is asked: How will the introduction of biometric visas along with the implementation of the VIS alter the chances and strategies of the “unwanted” to get access to and stay within the Schengen area?

By conceptualizing securitization as a “technique of government” this paper considers the introduction of biometric visas along with the VIS as important transformations of a security dispositif, which aims at the surveillance, control and regulation of human mobility on a global scale (Bigo 2002; Dillon/ Reid 2001). Hence, the consulates of the member states of the EU are conceptualized as “securitized sites” where the visa applicants are confronted with and subjugated to practices and technologies of surveillance, interrogation and control. These securitizing practices follow a governmental logic in the Foucaultian sense as they rely on the active cooperation and participation of the individuals they seek to govern. Thus, tactics of resistance are possible within the parameters set by the securitizing practices (Huysmans/ Guillaume, forthcoming). Through the analysis of official documents, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the implementation of the VIS and an evaluation of the proliferating literature on biometrics this paper tries to assess in a first step how the VIS will alter the rationale of the European visa regime in general and the visa application process in particular. In a second step it tries to assess, how these technical innovations will influence migration strategies like “visa shopping” and “visa overstaying”.

First, it is argued that the introduction of biometric identifiers and their linking to other data stored in the VIS leads to a qualitative shift in the principal rationale of the European visa regime from “governing at a distance” (Bigo/ Guild 2005) to a logic that Louise Amoore has called “governing by identity” (Amoore 2008). Through the practice of profiling an identity is constructed behind the back of a visa applicant out of the data shadow s/he produces. This identity is subsequently fixed to his/her body, whereby physical characteristics function as an anchor for the data accumulated in the VIS. From this follows second, that – once in operation – the VIS will successfully prevent “visa shopping” while maximizing the risk of deportation for “visa overstayers”. But contrary to the proponents of the VIS it is concluded, that its implementation will not reduce “illegal migration” but rather lead to an increase in unauthorized border crossings and attempts to forge Schengen visa.

Tamara VUKOV, Center for Mobilities Research and Policy, Drexel University (Philadelphia, PA):
The Floating Wall, the SIS, and the Taser: Mobile Border Technologies in Emergent Smart Border Regimes of Fortress Europe & North America.

This paper will constitute an initial theoretical foray into the conceptual grounding of a research project I am currently commencing as a postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Mobilities Research and Policy at Drexel University. The broader postdoctoral project (details of which are included below) will undertake engaged research and investigation into the shifting politics of mobility, governmental enforcement, and migration in 3 border regions of what critics call Fortress
Europe and Fortress North America: the post-Yugoslav Balkans (as an outlying border region of the European Union), the US-Mexico border, and the Canada-US border. These three regions have important strategic and political significance in the border regimes of North America and Europe, and are exemplary instantiations of recently emergent “smart border” regimes or what Angela Mitropoulos calls Borders 2.0 (2008).

I plan to examine these shifting border regimes through the lens and guiding images of 3 recent governmental-technological innovations in the infrastructure of border policing, as encapsulated in the forms of: (1) the floating US-Mexico border fence (Imperial County, California), (2) the Schengen Information System database of the European Union, and (3) the taser as a border policing technology that has drawn particular attention at the Canadian border, through the youtube propelled news event around the taser death of Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski in 2007 at a border checkpoint at the Vancouver airport.

The aim of this paper, therefore, will be to develop a preliminary conceptual examination and exploration of these three border technologies, not so much as objects of extended description and focus per se, but as technocultural lenses that refract onto the larger political and social dynamics of each border regime. (1) FLOATING WALL: With respect to the US-Mexico border, the floating border wall that was unveiled in early 2009 offers a particularly stark encapsulation of larger shifts that are going on in this particular border regime. Built in the sand dunes of Imperial County, California, a geographical terrain that has always made it particularly difficult to physically demarcate the border in the shifting sands of the dunes, the wall has been constructed to float atop the sand dunes. With the floating wall, the border becomes a curiously mobile, shifting and fluid barrier, one that encapsulates the larger process through which borders are becoming increasingly diffused and mobile in the ways they are enacted in supranational border regimes (Finoki). (2) SIS: The Schengen Information System (SIS), along with the planned implementation of SIS2, are further manifestations of this process in the context of Europe, wherein electronic databases, biometric data, and an outsourcing of policing and detention centers at and beyond the external borders of the EU become modes of increasingly differentiated and targeted forms of screening for “risk” attached to differently racialized and sexed migrant bodies (Vukov 2006). (3) TASER: Finally, the taser or conducted energy weapon has been presented as a neutral, non-lethal tool of border enforcement (as well of wider policing and law enforcement functions) in much the same way that recent policies have mobilized a vocabulary of safety, protection, and technological mastery (smart borders and weapons) to put a friendly face on heightened forms of targeting, interdiction and exclusion of migrant border-crossings (Vukov 2007). In the case of the taser, this came rather dramatically to light as a media event via the internationally circulated viral video of the taser death of Polish immigrant Robert Dziekanski at the hands of 4 RCMP officers at the Vancouver airport in 2007. My paper proposes to examine and explore how each of these three mobile border devices come to constitute sophisticated and fluid, yet ultimately (I will argue) contaminated technological solutions to enact increasingly variegated forms of preemption, interception, and channeling of those on the move.
Raoul GSCHREY, University of Applied Sciences Frankfurt/Main: Delimitations. Mechanisms of Surveillance and Control of Migratory Movement along the European Borders.

In a „Europe without borders“, the control of movement of individuals and groups has become an important issue of security policy. The disintegration of inner-European, national borders has led to a consolidation and militarisation of the external frontiers and to the construction of new mobile borders, which penetrate our cities and streets. The responsibility for the enforcement control measures at the outer frontiers is increasingly transferred to the supra-national border agency FRONTEX, or to the countries of origin or transit. These measures of enclosure and determent lead to serious humanitarian problems and the violation of human rights. The claim for a right of asylum and freedom of movement is developing into one of the vital moral issues of the European idea.

Highly technical means of surveillance and control are used to prevent irregular and unwanted movement, especially by migrants from the south. Fences and their movement detectors and surveillance cameras, biometric identification, mechanisms of social sorting, and mobility management slow down migratory movements. Holert and Terkessidis call this situation “petrified movement” which keeps migrants from participating in public life.

The analysis draws a bow from dragnet controls at transit intersections and in public transport of our cities, over the highly technical surveillance of the Mediterranean, the seemingly insurmountable frontiers of the European enclaves on the African continent, to the newly established centres for the migration management in African countries. These developments along the recently establishing borders will be highlighted by documentary and artistic positions.
The borderlands usually constitute peripheries from the socio-economic point of view. They often coincide with valuable natural landscapes and are frequently relatively little transformed by the human economic activity. Additionally, they tend to feature numerous historical and cultural attractions. Existence of boundaries as barriers and of boundaries remaining in isolation contributed to an improvement of the quality of natural environment, which brought the establishment of a number of areas of legally protected nature in the close vicinity of boundaries.

The research are focusing to polish-slovak and eastern boundaries of Poland. They represent two generations of eco-frontiers proposed by Guyot (2010): geopolitical eco-frontier and global eco-frontiers. On the one hand the polish borderlands (e.g. between Poland and Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus) from geopolitical point of view constitute buffer zones with many national parks, divided by international borders. On the other hand these borderlands constitute a kind of global eco-frontier in contemporary point of view. The process of opening up of the boundaries (a change of function) provides to new situation and is useful to creation of the transfrontier parks, green edges, environmental network and eco-tourism development. They are also very important areas of world heritage sites.

In most cases the eco-frontier in Central Europe constitutes very important tourist regions. They are the attractive areas in terms of nature, landscape, and tourism, owing to which anthropogenic pressure is amplified, along with the tourist traffic, while, on the other hand, there exists a strongly developed need of protecting this areas. In Central and Eastern Europe many of the national parks are privilege situation near the state borders (Denisiuk et all, 1997). The fact nine Poland’s national parks already exist along national boundaries. Additional two parks are adjacent to sea frontier three are situated near the border. Five parks from this number constitute international parks situated on both side of the border (Karkonoski NP, Tatra NP, Bieszczadki NP, Pieniński NP, Bialowieski NP). The Pieniny Mountains, taking in the two countries’ Parks of this name, which began cooperating in 1932 - by the creation of Europe’s first transboundary protected area between the two countries.

Nevertheless, such claims for ecofrontiers may have social and economic impacts that can influence regional politics with sometimes unexpected consequences at a higher political level, especially when the ecofrontier is located in a borderland (Guyot 2010). In comparison with other frontier areas of Poland, the Polish-Slovak border presents itself in a kind of dual manner. On the one hand, it is a zone which is very valuable from the point of view of nature, featuring the longest belt of protected areas along any of the two countries’ borders and constituting a tourist attraction so major that development in this respect must be seen as the area’s best option. On the other hand it is characterized by a low level of economic use, such that social and economic activity can and must be developed in harmony with nature (via sustainable development). There is thus likely to be a constant increase in: the role of pro-environmental activity seeking to preserve the environment in a form as little modified as possible; the significance of protected areas; touristic use and the need for joint action in regard to the relationship between tourism and nature conservation.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the areas adjacent to the polish borders have a great chance of preserving their valuable natural features. In turn, by way of the development of transport and other infrastructure, these may serve a further expansion of tourism and an activation of the whole region. The future of these borderlands depends on many factors in which most important are the management of what are naturally-valuable areas accordance with the principles of sustainable development. Another one is a leading objective behind the establishment and operation of transboundary cooperation in the form of the conservation of the natural environmental and the putting of nature to tourist ends, and hence towards the goal of socioeconomic development. Eco-frontiers in Central Europe are strategic spaces with regard to the future of nature resources and global change.

Julia ELLIS BURNET, School of Environmental Science, University of Nova Gorica: Impasse or Passage: Landscape Barriers in Borderlands.

The borderlands of four adjacent Central European nations were studied in order to ascertain topographical, perceived and political, landscape barriers which have shaped land use and human settlement of the region and the extent to which these factors have impacted upon localised demographic patterns, land use, urban and infrastructure development. Small sections or “windows” between north eastern Slovenia, south eastern Austria, south western Hungary and northern Croatia were focus areas. The Mura River, which has acted as both border and boundary for a millennium and the low range of wooded hills, the Kulsoerd Range, separating the Orseg Valley in south western Hungary from the Ratkovski potok Valley in north eastern Goricko were studied in detail. The study was based on stability maps generated from time stepped historical maps spanning almost 230 years (1780-2009).

From a topographical perspective terrain, in placing limitation on human and other biotic passage across the landscape, is of primary consideration. The Mura River demonstrates, quite dramatically, the environmental impact that a fast flowing, snow melt fed river system has not only within its riverine corridor, but also on human associations and interactions along the corridor.

Fear has been an important element in human-forest interactions. In the map series studied road lines skirted core forest areas. A central forest area is contiguous along much of what is now the political border between north eastern Slovenia and south western Hungary.

During the post World War II Yugoslavian period the northern state borderlands with Austria and Hungary were highly secured. On the Hungarian side forest lands were cleared, regularly ploughed and checked for human foot prints. On the Austrian side the state border was also highly secured after World War II resulting in crop specifications (i.e. less than one metre in height) within the 100 metres border zone.

The analysis of the time stepped map data and stability mapping indicates a slight but perceptible population shift away from the landscape barriers in north eastern Slovenia and a dramatic shift in the Orseg Region of south western Hungary. Earlier population shifts may be due to the periodic flood events of the Mura prior to bank modification during the twentieth century and a reluctance to inhabit land bordering upon dense forests. The creation of boundaries, transference and countertransference dynamics over the past 229 years can be seen through population adjustment to the physical environment and as a response to socio-political inhibitions.
Juliet FALL, Université de Genève, Making the world: Black lists, fixed borders and mobile aliens

In this paper, I explore how the globe is harnessed as a pertinent scale through which to define specific natural threats. As plants and animals have harnessed humans in their global struggle for survival, spreading around the world and crossing boundaries, I explore the discrepancy between global discourses of otherness – the plants and animals listed as undesirable within Global Black Lists (“100 of the World's Worst Invasive Alien Species”) – and national definitions of undesirable species drafted by states, as required by signatories of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The paradox of drafting definitions of plants and animals as threats on a global scale, for species that necessarily come from somewhere originally, is used to productively question what it means to think of nature in political terms as alien, invasive, out-of-place, unnatural and non-native, and as spatially bounded.
While walls have been a constant throughout history, even during the second half of the 20th century, the end of the Cold War marked the end of an era and signalled the wall’s fall from favour as a political institution. 9/11 appears to have brought back the wall as a political object and instrument, both in terms of quantity, since there is now an unprecedented number of walls, greater even than during the Cold War, and in terms of the length of walls built or planned. Through the discourses that legitimize their construction, one can detect the functional evolution of borders and borderwalls. In fact, since 2001, the purpose of new walls has been not so much to convert front lines into de facto borders as to curb two threats: migratory flows and terrorist groups. Those fencing practices also show a definite state opportunism, as justifications for a same border wall change along with public opinion data or the international environment. However, as data show that border walls are not as impenetrable as said, why do states persist in building them? This paper first addresses the discourses on the walls in order to see how those border walls are in fact a little more a product of domestic policy than foreign policy. Second we will see how fencing practices are seeking a deterrence effect rather than an absolutely secured border.

Moroccan Western Sahara, to use the UN’s terms, is an illustration of mobile borders. This territory is claimed by the Polisario Front movement, but it has been administered and controlled since 1976 by the Moroccan authorities, which designate it as “Southern Provinces of the kingdom”. This territorial conflict belongs to the category of so-called “frozen conflicts” since 1975. I do not attempt to rehash the conflict, its reasons, its actors and its stakes. Rather, using maps and from personal observations based on fieldwork, I want to underscore, first, the challenge of localizing the Moroccan Western Sahara border, second, the strategy of invisibilization of UN’s line deployed by the Moroccan authorities and third, the border’s delocalization from the North to the East, accompanied by a “barrier process”.

The real border coincides with an oblique axe, instead of a horizontal one. First, I will emphasize the contrast between the usual mapping representation of the Moroccan Western Sahara border as a Northern line (as we can see in newspapers and books printed outside of Morocco) and, on the other hand, its existence on the ground that is characterized by its invisibility. This erasure is a deliberate strategy of the Moroccan authorities, aimed at incorporating the contested area into the rest of national territory. In practice, only the increasing density of military checkpoints on the main roads gradually reveals one’s entry into a contested status zone. Moreover, the Moroccan subdivision of the territory for administrative purposes is creating another sinuous border, which does not coincide with the UN boundary. Considering cultural and human components adds more complexity. Indeed, the separation between Berber (called Chleuh) and Arab (here, the Sahrawi) groups coincides with a borderland called the Noun valley, located approximatively from 100 km North of the imaginary line drawn by international diplomacy.
The second part of my presentation concerns the permeability of the defense wall—consisting of fortified dunes built in the 1980’s—which delimits, on the East, the Saharan territory under Moroccan control. The disputed boundary is not generating a dead zone but rather stimulating investment in human, territorial and economic development, and an open-border policy on the part of the Moroccan State (cf. road and air connections, cultural and touristic promotion, extraversion of fishing activities, labour migrations).

Other borderlands and limits inside this former Spanish territory will also be mentioned: for example, maritime borders shared with Spain (Canary Islands), the former Spanish border surrounding the Sidi Ifni enclave (returned to Morocco in 1969), the limits of the tribal confederations. Although these are often forgotten or at least less discussed, their impacts are noneless significant, especially with regard to migrations, fishing activities, and local and national political strategies. The project of an electronic wall between Algeria and Morocco announced by Algerian authorities in 2009 will also be referred to.

Stéphane ROSIERE, Université de Reims: La « barrière » Schengen: aspects concrets, logiques et objectifs.

This paper analyses the 'Schengen barrier' surrounding the Schengen zone. One of the first aims of this communication is to compare this barrier with such similar systems in the world. From a global point of view, the Schengen 'barrier' is one of the longest border barriers in the World but it is not well-known, israelian or american border barriers are surely more famous. This 'discreet' barrier, frequently ignored by european citizens themselves, is very heterogeneous. So, the second aim of this paper is to describe its framework which consists of ‘point’ of control (in international airports for instance, these will not be presented), lines (external borders), and areas (zone of coopération include mostly inn the european neighbourhood Policy). The Schengen area appears to be a ‘system of systems’ that Frontex agency tries to homogenize. The role of this european agency can be underlined. Frontex agency must deal with some contradictions (as USA fo instance) and mainly not to bother flows and commercial relations between Schengen zone and its neighbourhood and the rest of the world while ensuring a high degree of security in control of the external borders of Schengen zone. In a third part, I shall insist on the efficiency of this 'system of systems' focusing on the opacity of Frontex agency, the porosity of external borders and the growing letality resulting of the sophistication of the Schengen 'barrier'.

Keywords: border barrier, European Union, Frontex agency, illegal migration, Schengen zone
Jean-Emmanuel MEDINA, Centre de droit international (CDI) de l’Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3: Géopolitique des murs et des clôtures. Nouveaux obstacles, nouvelles perspectives.

Over twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, number of walls and fences keep increasing. If in the past these edifices often had a defensive function directed against other sovereign entities, nowadays they are mainly built against non-state and transnational actors, acting also at the boundaries and inside the states. The author aims to show that the proliferation of walls and fences led to a bracketing of globalization and reflects, despite all appearances, the advent of a post-Westphalian order in which the nation-state is gradually deprived of its sovereigny.

Keywords: Barrier, Boundary, Immigration, Gated community, Globalisation, Post-Westphalian order, Poverty, Security, Terrorism, Wall.
Session 28. The changing borders of migration regimes / Les frontières changeantes des régimes migratoires (2)

Sabine HESS, University of Göttingen: “We are facilitating states”. The role and function of the ICMPD in the context of the changing border regime.

This paper is based on a two-year research project analysing in depth the practices and governing rationalities of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, based in Vienna. Starting with the general insight that the border policies of the European states have been changing dramatically in form, content and location for at least the last 20 years, the paper will focus on this small but nevertheless pro-active non-state organisation, which has long become one of the leading actors of such multiple transformations. The analytical concentration on the governing discourses, practices and rationalities of the ICMPD is based on the observation in recent border literature (e.g. Lahav/Guiraudon; Transit Migration) that alongside the traditional, previously exclusive actor of bordering practices, the state, a whole set of non-state actors have been entering the scene. The common analyses are divided into two opposite arguments: Either it is argued that these actors will replace the state which is withering away under the different pressures of globalisation; or the analysis still solely rests on the states and neglects the importance of these actors for the ongoing transformation of borders.

Against this background the argumentation of the paper is twofold. Firstly it will shed light on the new relationship between non-state actors like the ICMPD and the European states the ICMPD addresses in the context of its work. My analysis will focus on the working routines and rationalities of the “Budapest Process”, one of the oldest and still active regional consultation processes in the context of migration and border policy more or less concentrating on Eastern, South-Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. I will show how the Budapest Process and the ICMPD as its general secretariat is applying a whole set of practices vis à vis the states which can be labelled following Foucault’s writings as governmental - not leading to the replacement of states or the opposite. Rather I will show how a new assemblage is being created with a certain autonomy of such non-state actors like the ICMPD but still resting on and reinventing statehood.

Secondly I will shed light on another transformation within the overall changes of the border regime from fixed linear to flexible, fuzzy, deterritorialised as well as newly spatialised border practices. In this respect I will concentrate my analyses on the second regional consultation process of the ICMPD - the MTM-process and its central governing (imperial) tool, the i-Map, a digital map on migration routes based on a huge data bank filled in by countries of origin and transit. The i-Map started in the context of the MTM process which was initiated by Europol, Frontex and the ICMPD alongside the increasing political initiatives like Rabat and the Barcelona Process integrating the north and central African states into the Europeanised border and migration regime. Meanwhile, the i-Map is produced for Eastern Europe and the CIS countries alike and found sponsoring bodies like the UNHCR as well as the US state department, all of them being convinced of the political reasoning of the i-Map. In my analysis I will also question the political reasoning of the i-Map in the context of the southward externalisation of the European border regime and the other, often stated transformations of border practices. I will analyse the i-Map as a telling example that the transformed, more mobile, more fuzzy and more reticularly organised border regime is increasingly dependent on knowledges and knowledge governance. I am going to label this transformation as a knowledgeisation of the border leading to specific knowledge scapes. This in turn shows again that THE border is not existing any more, it rather is
multiplied into different scapes with different spatial formations and different political rationalities.


This communication studies empirically the mobility of the European external borders towards the Sahara and the Mediterranean sea. Whether it relies on an operational cooperation, the use of high technology tools developed by military firms or the export of legal measures, the deterritorialisation of the south border of the European Union has to face challenges, i.e. the respect of asylum and human rights, the geopolitical implications of its implementation and the conjunctural crisis that demonstrate the ambiguity of a process supposed to outsource the surveillance and control of the European borders. Consequently, the physical borders come back inevitably according to the reorganisation of migratory routes and the by-pass strategies of exiled people.


With its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004, Malta has become an external border of the EU. Its geographical position between continental Europe and Africa places the micro-state at the front line of the EU’s irregular migration policies, as irregular migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa attempt to make their way to mainland Europe. Between 2002 and 2011, 14,000 irregular arrivals landed in Malta and the Maltese authorities are charged with preventing immigrants from reaching the mainland.

This paper examines the implementation of European border control policy in Malta. The Maltese border highlights the change of borders’ shapes from linear to punctiform (P. Cuttitta, 2007), as well as the diversification of border controls from a unique frontier to “concentric circles” (B. Tholen, 2010). This paper intends to show the buildup of a “migratory regime” (V. Tsianos, S. Hess, S. Karakayali, 2009) on the Maltese archipelago, where Sub-Saharan immigrants are blocked and screened at the front gate of the European Union.

As a wall between North and South, the Maltese state uses a diversity of border controls measures within its micro territory. The consistent use of handcuffs, immediate fingerprinting, administration of numerical identifiers, and a policy of detention, all combine to structure a carceral living environment for migrants. Despite the security devices in place, empirical observation shows that Sub-Saharan migrants still manage to reach the mainland. Among other strategies used by these migrants, a European relocation program allows some of them to leave the archipelago and start a new life in another member state.

Based on fieldwork that combines ethnographic observation in reception centers with semi-formal interviews, this research intends to analyze the immigration policy-making of an island-border within the European Union.

The reinforcement of the U.S.-Mexico border and increased highly technical securitization has led to less migrant crossers through the traditional gates, using dangerous crossing points and consequently an important jump in border deaths, the proliferation and a more robust migrant traffickers, and the end of the traditional circular Mexican US-migration process, among other consequences. Simultaneously, in the face of perceived federal ineffectiveness on immigration, the U.S. states are more aggressively considering immigration-related legislation, most of them highly restrictive. The number of Bill introductions jumped from 570 in 2006 to 1,400 in 2009, motivated by nativist and anti-immigrant assumptions that illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, contributes to burdens on public services, steal jobs, etc.,

We will examine the controversial and unconstitutional Arizona legislation SB1070 as an example which demonstrate fears about the growing number of Latinos, especially Mexicans, with the purpose to drive undocumented immigrants out of their communities. Also we will describe the significant increase in anti-immigrant organizations, local politicians and public opinion, in general, that try to legitimize their actions. We will then point in the broader context, local anti-immigration regulations, the development of anti-immigrant policies and practices and the rise of anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment in the US.
To explain today’s immobility in cross-border labour the concept of unfamiliarity has been introduced. Mental barriers seem to have a long-lasting impact on cross-border mobility. Inhabitants of European nation-states have come to orient on the territory within the state’s boundaries and to identify as its citizens. State borders have generally come to be perceived as rather closed, marking national differences. As this phenomenon is a result of historical processes, it can be relevant to look at cross-border labour from an historical perspective.

This paper presents the case of cross-border labour in the mining districts in the Belgian-Dutch-German borderland, known today as the Euregio Meuse-Rhine. In this area, four coalfields were situated close to each other: the Campine and Liège basins in Belgium, the mining region around Aachen in Germany, and the Dutch mining district of South Limburg. Although part of different national economies, job qualifications for miners were more or less equal. Therefore, an integrated cross-border labour market for work in the mines could have been formed, as if borders were non-existent. The main question I want to address in this paper is: to what extent were twentieth-century mining labour markets in the Euregional border area connected across borders? The question can also be turned around: to what extent did the existence of state borders prevent or hamper the cross-border clearing of regional labour markets in each country? The incidence of cross-border commuting to the mining areas will be related to the impact of state borders.

Border-crossing as a way to equalize labour markets had been important in the years before the First World War, and, to a certain extent, also in the 1920s. After 1930 cross-border labour diminished sharply. Commuting would only be resumed on a large scale in the closing period of the Dutch mines in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the 1930s cross-border mobility was replaced by a conscious policy of regionalisation of mining labour markets. Dutch mining companies, supported by the influential Roman Catholic Church in Limburg, tried to control their labour force and to bind them to mining in the region. This strategy was relatively successful: only in extreme circumstances miners defected from these ties to start working at the other side of the border. Only large discrepancies in wages and employment opportunities led to border-crossing during restricted periods and for specific groups of workers, who were considered outsiders. In this sense unfamiliarity was the rule, border-crossing the exception.

This makes clear that cross-border labour was not based on labour market integration, but on disparities between countries. Miners crossed the border because they wanted to take advantage of differences in prices, wages, and employment opportunities. This phenomenon has been called the border paradox, because in these cases state borders were both barriers – for market integration - and corridors – for cross-border labour. The border, because of its existence, became a bridge for cross-border interaction.
Contemporary cross-border labour mobility in the European Union remains at very low levels. This is also the case in the Danish-German border region of Sønderjylland-Schleswig today, even though there has been a considerable increase in South-North commuting during the first decade of the 21st century (Hansen and Nahrstedt 2000; Buch, Schmidt et al. 2009; Herrmann, Korzhenevych et al. 2011; Korzhenevych, Bröcker et al. 2011). This in spite of an open labour market since Denmark’s joining of the then European Community in 1973, an uneven development of employment vs. unemployment in the region since the 1970’s, considerable wage differences in certain branches of industry, and national minority institutions providing bilingual education during all the period.

Contrary to the contemporary situation, labour market related cross-border mobility seemed to be much more common in the 19th century. In our paper, we will present some first results of our case study within the EuroCoreCode project “Unfamiliarity as signs of European times: scrutinizing historical representations of otherness and contemporary daily practices in border regions”, funded by the European Science Foundation, analyzing labour related mobility under the concept of (Un)familiarity (Spierings and van der Velde 2008). Here, the Schleswig case with its multicultural history and different bordering, de-bordering and re-borderings since the 1800’s can provide valuable insight on the influence of borders on labour related mobility in a longue durée perspective.

Despite the de-bordering process the mobility of workers within the EU still faces some constraints. The persistence of administrative, legal and language barriers difficult even greater mobility as desired in an integrated economic area where, for example, capital and goods circulate more easily. To providing information and advice to potential mobile works the European Commission created the EURES (European Employment Services), a network designed to facilitate the free movement of workers within the European Economic Area.

The Euroregion Galicia / Norte de Portugal has one of the 20 cross-border EURES that was set up in 1997 justified by the intense labour flows that on a daily or weekly basis crosses the border to seek job opportunities in Galicia. The Norte de Portugal region as a younger population, which in a context of ageing population can be an advantage over other regions, and an average annual growth rate above the national average; on the reverse, Galicia is the one where the population is more aged and showed a negative average annual growth rate between 1991 and 2001, further exacerbating this problem. Wage differentials and population ageing in Galicia are stimulating commuter labour flows.

In this case language is no problem but workers namely in the construction, health care, shipbuilding and even the automobile industry are harmed because they cannot see their certificates of vocational training obtained in Portugal recognized in Galicia. Despite the effort EU has been made concerning the recognition of diplomas in the case of qualifications and
professional skills there is still a long way to go. Another problem that penalizes the commuter workers, particularly those that maintain two residences, is that they are subjected to double taxation.

For the EU to act to eliminate these barriers it is important to identify and understand the obstacles that are preventing the deepening of economic integration process and especially that are costly both to regions where there is a potential offer of employment that is not locally satisfied, either for workers with skills that could filled it but face obstacles that eventually limit or even prevent such mobility.

The aim of this paper is precisely to identify these obstacles with regard to cross borders workers mobility in this euro region. Rather than quantify this phenomenon we chose a qualitative approach through content analysis of a set of in-depth interviews to employees who live or have lived the experience of cross-border mobility, EURES partners and the representatives of trade unions, which have monitored and reported cases of irregularities these workers are subject to.

Key words: labour mobility, cross-border commuting, Galicia/Norte de Portugal

Diana OLIVEIRA, Université de Toulouse Le Mirail: "Andorra, the country of the Pyrenees".

"Andorra, the country of the Pyrenees," it’s a physically integrated country in mainland Europe, but not belonging to this community, lies about 280 km from the mediterranean coast.

The country lived of the primary sector through the first half of the twentieth century which forced large populations to migrate in the direction of the nearest land, the north-east of Spain and in greater number for Barcelona.

Due to construction of the first passageways in the 30s of last century which connected by land, Andorra and Spain, the historical particularities such as the Spanish Civil War the WWII caused an enabling environment to transform the national landscape and also develop the tertiary sector.

The trade and tourism, until then absent or barely present in the country’s realities, became the main pillars of its economy. An economic that slowly as been growing and transforming the landscape and, consequently, the lifestyles of indigenous and residents of the country.

The number of infrastructures directly and indirectly related to tourism were thus multiplying in order to be able to absorb all this new demand. An Exponential growth which caused a great need for foreign labor. Workers who came mainly from boundary areas like the nearest communities from Spain, France and later from Portugal.

Emigration increased with the arrival and development of winter sports in the early 60’s. A flow of emigrants was needed to address the lack of manpower of the indigenous and they arrive to work temporarily. Until now, the flow of tourists and day trippers increases every year, and this happen naturally.

At the begining of XXI Century, we began to experience the reverse phenomenon ... Tourism sector the pillar of our economy is showing strong losses and thus diminish the flow of permanent and / or temporary workers.

This thesis aim to study the importance of temporary workers coming from the Mediterranean coasts (mainly Spanish), other European countries and belonging to other continents (mainly workers from South America), where the limited periods of Tourist attractions (beach or snow) affects the number of workers and work in Andorra tourism sector.
After this brief presentation of Andorra, with reference to its location and the historical past which he lived, I will show the importance that Spain and more specifically the community of Catalonia, had on the development of Andorra. An importance that we can divide into two historical parts: in the 30’s the Andorran emigrated to Catalunya and then the opposite happened, the Spanish began to emigrate to Andorra.

Later I shall explain the peculiarities of the country and more specifically the particular of its labor law. Legislation based on a quota system of employment and oral contracts, still in use this days, creating a work environment of its own and an important movement of manpower. Finally, I will present the elements of this study and the methodologies that were used.
This paper critically examines the European Union’s externalization of asylum and migration control to African countries in the Maghreb region with a particular focus on the cases of Morocco and Libya. The development of the EU’s external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs is traced through the Tampere and Seville Precidency Conclusions, central JHA Council Regulations, such as the creation of the Frontex agency and Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) as well as through Communications between the European Commission and the JHA Council. It is argued that analyses of these discourses reveal that the bordering processes of EU externalization are characterized by being compromises between differing agendas of actors such as Member States, the Commission and Frontex. The paper then moves on to offer a conceptual model to understand EU externalization. The key processes underpinning the dynamic expansion of the European border network to North African countries are identified as functioning through multifaceted flows of control equipment, funds, personnel and data between European Member States as well as to African countries of transit-migration. Examples of these flows include bilateral donations of military and surveillance-equipment, funding of third countries’ border control capacities such as patrol and detention structures in Libya, Frontex-operations in West African territorial waters, the Italian-Libyan push back practice and the EUROSUR and SIS-databases. The outcome is the creation of a decentralised and fluctuating complex of control elements which transcends European territorial space. The EU emerges as the main regulator of this extra-territorial border-complex through references to the Schengen Border Code, financial programmes as well as union arrangements with third countries concerning visas, readmission agreements, ILOs and Frontex working arrangements. The paper claims that the European borders now manifest a transnational governance through a differentiated mobility regime in which the free mobility of Schengen-citizens are facilitated through the impediment of the mobility of nationals from the global South who are subjected to high levels of control and surveillance. It is argued that these effects of the EU’s transnational border complex necessitate an expansion of the category of forced migration to include what is here termed border-induced displacement. The external dimension of the EU border thereby functions as a second-order displacement of already displaced migrants. Border-induced displacement is argued to be a useful conceptualization, since it allows for crucial aspects of the EU border regime such as examination of the humanitarian consequences of externalization and corruption regarding smuggling and border control. Finally it opens for critique of support for North African dictators based on the European desire to move the interception and circulation of migrants further away from the European territory to third countries whose territories are used as buffer zones.
Lisa MONTMAYEUR, PACTE-UMR 5138: La frontière gréco-turque dans le contexte européen: espace d'ouverture, espace de fermeture?

Les territoires actuels de la Grèce et de la Turquie ont fait partie pendant plusieurs siècles d'un même ensemble politique, l'Empire Ottoman. S'il n’existait alors pas a proprement parler de frontières entre ces territoires, ils représentaient déjà historiquement le point de rupture (ou de jonction) d'une frontière floue et imaginaire entre ce qu’il était commun d'appeler les territoires de Roumélie et Anatolie (termes utilisés pour designer respectivement la partie occidentale et orientale des territoires sous domination ottomane).

Le tracé actuel de la frontière gréco-turque est le fruit d'une histoire conflictuelle entre les deux pays, hérité a la fois du traité d’indépendance de la Grèce en 1831 - après la guerre qui l'a opposée a l'Empire Ottoman pendant plus de 10 ans – et du Traité de Lausanne de 1923 signé entre les deux pays a l'issue de la guerre gréco-turque de 1919-1922. Le traité de Lausanne a non seulement fixé le tracé des frontières actuelles entre les deux pays mais aussi provoqué la migration forcée croisée (sur critère de religion) de plus de deux millions de réfugiés entre les deux pays (échange de population de 1923). Issue de cette histoire aussi bien complexe que conflictuelle, le tracé des frontières terrestres (en Thrace) et maritimes (en Mer Egée) reste encore dans une certaine mesure un objet de conflit entre les deux pays, si l'on songe aux revendications territoriales grecques de certaines îles de la Mer Egée ou aux revendications turques des territoires de Thrace occidentale grecque ou vit une importante minorité musulmane turcophone qui a été exemptée de l'échange de population. Ces frontières, très fortement militarisées et longtemps restées quasi-hermétiques, sont les marqueurs spatiaux du conflit larvé et de l'absence de contacts qui a caractérisé les relations entre les deux pays pendant de nombreuses années.

Les années 1980 marquent néanmoins un point de rupture important par rapport a cette tendance évoquée précédemment. En effet, a partir de cette période, les statistiques mettent en évidence une augmentation constante des flux commerciaux et touristiques entre les deux pays. (d'abord de Grèce vers la Turquie, mais aussi maintenant de Turquie vers la Grèce). Certaines municipalités (notamment en Egée) mettent en place des initiatives de coopération dans le domaine environnemental, touristique et économique, transformant ainsi les territoires frontaliers en nouveaux espaces de coopération transnationale et transfrontalière. Comment expliquer ce changement? Tout d'abord, il semble que l'amélioration des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays au niveau intergouvernemental constitue un facteur d’assouplissement de l'imperméabilité qui existait auparavant entre les deux frontières (comme par exemple la série d'accords dans le domaine économique, touristique et culturel signés entre I. Cem et G. Papandhreou en 1980 appelé processus de Davos). Le rôle joué par la société civile pour promouvoir le rapprochement entre les deux pays a un niveau non-gouvernemental (qui s'est réellement révélé lors du tremblement de terre de 1999) est un autre facteur propice a cette dynamique de rapprochement. Les chambres de commerces, associations (de réfugiés notamment) et les municipalités ont développé des liens aujourd'hui pérennes visant a promouvoir le rapprochement entre les deux pays.

Mais l'acteur qui semble jouer un rôle aussi prépondérant que paradoxal dans le champ des relations gréco-turques est indéniablement l'Union Européenne. En effet, 1981 est la date d'entrée de la Grèce dans l'Union Européenne. Ce changement géopolitique va avoir des conséquences très importantes dans les relations entre les deux pays. Avec l'entrée de la Grèce dans l'Union, la frontière qui sépare la Grèce de la Turquie n'est plus seulement une frontière binationale, mais représente la ligne de frontière entre l'Union Européenne et le Moyen Orient. L'Union va joué un rôle ambivalent visant tout autant a durcir la frontière qu’a encourager les
initiatives de coopération transfrontalières entre les deux pays. Notamment dans le cadre de sa politique migratoire, l'UE encourage la Grèce à contrôler strictement les flux migratoires en provenance de Turquie. Cette logique est à la base du projet de construction d'un mur à la frontière terrestre gréco-turque pour limiter le passage de migrants clandestins en Grèce. Mais dans le même temps, l'UE vise à promouvoir un partenariat entre la Grèce et la Turquie pour gérer ces mêmes flux clandestins. Avec la candidature de la Turquie à l'Union Européenne, les deux pays se trouvent en voie d’appartenir à un même ensemble supra national. L'UE encourage dans cette perspective, par le biais de financements relativement conséquents, la pacification des frontières et le développement d’espaces de coopération économiques, politiques et culturels entre les deux pays, surtout si ce type de projet est porté par la société civile ou des acteurs politiques locaux.

La frontière gréco-turque nous semble donc un objet d'étude intéressant pour étudier la dynamique contemporaine paradoxale de durcissement des frontières dans un contexte de développement croissant d'initiatives de coopération transfrontalières multiscalaires et portées par différents acteurs : les gouvernements, les acteurs non-gouvernementaux et l'Union Européenne.

Oleksandr SVYETLOV, University of Tampere, Finland: The “EU-ropenisation” of Europe’s “periphery”, EU-Ukraine.

In this paper I will analyse the interplay between “Europe” and Ukraine in terms of policies, identity/mental maps and rhetorical discourses. I would like to analyse the interactionist cultural-political stand-off between political elite in the European Union and Ukraine and their mutual relations since Ukraine’s independence, as well as predict future developments drawing upon experience of 2004-2007 enlargement. I will try to explain the course of the EU-Ukraine dialogue and interaction with help of identity discourses. I also analyze the decision of the European Union to expand to Central and Eastern Europe. The analysis will be guided by debate between rationalist and sociological approaches to the study of the European Union. The material is collected through the review of literature, content analysis of political statements and policy papers as well as personal interviews with politicians, experts and scholars in Ukraine and Europe.

By the end of 1990s there appeared new lines of division on the continent between Western-Central and Eastern Europe. Central Europe’s active cooperation with EU and later enlargement partially resulted in the disappearance of the area of free flow of persons, goods and services. But today Europe’s political boundaries do not coincide with its geographic ones, with Ukraine being one of the most vivid examples.

On the other hand there emerged new opportunities for enlarged Europe and Ukraine. The re-emergence of Ukraine on the map of Europe was a powerful impetus to consider some broader issues concerning Europe’s internal divisions and “external” boundaries. Indeed, how can the EU avoid creation of cultural, social and economic buffer zones between inner and outer Europe?

The Ukrainian independence coincided with an important turning point – intensification of European political integration and creation of the European state. The need to legitimize these policies in member states called for creation of ideological narratives of common European destiny, identity, history, territory and values. The European categories of reference fell on fruitful soil within Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian politicians fell victim to this display of discourses, as all these ideas, so actively propagated in Europe, though having universal application and value, concerned only the EU states and plausible candidates with a continuous positive record of
adherence to the Copenhagen criteria, but not the “outsiders” like Ukraine. Through the rhetoric of common European house the EU pragmatically meant to give more power to its internal institutions and demolish the obstacles to deeper integration and consolidation.

Last decade has seen Ukrainian government’s declarations and practical attempts towards joining the EU. The reaction in Europe has been mixed and temporally uneven with initial reluctance and later ensuing careful maneuvering in rhetorical discourses and declarations. Since 1991 the integration into EU became a useful escape, which gave Ukrainian elite very useful rhetorical concepts of “European values”, “democracy”, “standards”, “market economy” and many other things which were not, or maybe could not be explained to the society in the face of political and economic, but also historical reality. Arguments in favour of the EU have been the “European” belonging of Ukraine and "European" standards of living. One can often hear that something is “undemocratic”, “unEuropean”, “below European standards”. In general the word "European" in Ukrainian private and public discourses became synonymous with "quality" and "modernity".

The media thereby played a crucial role in dissemination and transfer of these cultural messages which were to become the norm and assumed normativity of use and preference. The transfer of cultural notions, adaptation and popularization was performed by the news and broadcasting networks. The Ukrainian YES-forum and other initiatives served as a sustainable platform for these purposes.

For political forces the “let’s join Europe” slogan, which implies not only a geopolitical shift but a substantial improvement of living standards, became the easiest ideology which in practice takes different forms, as the Ukrainian society is split and unconsolidated. Ukraine was tasked with first internalising European ‘common values’ by importing and implementing European norms before the EU adopts a decision on what to offer Ukraine. By the mid-2000s, quite consistent with ‘back to Europe’ rhetoric, but also as a result of a cold welcome to the EU club, the emphasis shifted to ‘let’s build Europe in Ukraine’ slogan, which was particularly visualised during the Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in 2006.

The EU’s power of attraction proved to be one of the most powerful tools of indirect influence on democratisation in Ukraine. “Return to Europe” was among the most influential factors, gradually internalised in Ukraine. Indeed, the “EU factor” was conducive to the governmental efforts to implement reforms, the elite’s desire to “return to Europe”, and development of the pro-European civil society. The EU served as a major reference point and focus for many Ukrainian civil society organizations advocating reforms and promoting European integration.

The finality of European boundaries is not given per se, but constantly negotiated, and the EU therewith remains potentially open to such current “outsiders” like Ukraine and others, who dream of European institutional affiliation. In the eyes of many outside the EU, it is a proved and practice-certified cure for almost all domestic economic ails and political misfortunes of elite, the fact, which is of special pertinence in the case of the Ukrainian EU-policy of President Yushchenko.

As far as theory is concerned, constructivism highlights the importance of EU’s social identity, resultant from a continuous interplay between the states. Social identity implies a stable set of linkages between the self-perceived membership in a group of states, like the EU and the agent’s attitudes, perceptions and values resulting in social behavior. The Ukrainian political elite, following the examples of other CEE states, pursued the task of EU-approximation by essentially narrative-rhetorical means (rhetorical politics of identity appeared well suited), but with slow and incremental on-the-field progress.
The core of realist beliefs concerning enlargement, on the other hand, predicts that the EU expands if enlargement is indispensable and efficient for the purpose of balancing the perceived challenges and threats. Realists presuppose the existence of self-interested and egoistic actors.

Independent of theoretical approach, Ukraine’s attempts to gain concession from the EU concerning membership were met with European concerns over the need to preserve the gains of the European project – be it cultural socialization, relative political cohesion, economic and geopolitical power or hard currency. Internally, the EU’s enlargement fatigue has been accompanied by worries that the recent expansion to twenty-seven member states will turn the EU into a bureaucratic monster, unable to make concerted decisions, thus further undermining its democratic legitimacy. Besides, the overstretching across the continent may threaten EU’s functionality; hence, many spoke of EU’s finality of current political borders. Out of its image and security considerations the EU also used the promise of future membership in order to promote stability along its borders.

Though the European integration was assertively articulated as a dominant strategy since Ukraine’s independence, under Yushchenko things began to look a bit better, as after the Orange events, which underlined the determination of Ukrainian people to join the rest of Europe and legitimized Ukraine’s political leadership, the EU could find fewer obstacles to justify any further keeping Ukraine at the Eurasian gate, at least from a foreign policy perspective.

Still Ukraine’s road to Europe looks definitely long and thorny, which results in the general feeling of exclusion from this community of belonging. After the Orange revolution the political rhetoric was supplemented with gradual reforms and foreign policy activisation. However, foreign policy is a poor substitute for the lack of transparent governance domestically, especially in the context of ongoing corruption scandals.

Nevertheless, the 1986 accession negotiations with Portugal and Spain lasted for almost 10 years and the 2004 Enlargement for some countries took almost 15 years. Bearing that in mind, Ukraine should not be disappointed by the inevitable difficulties and setbacks it may face on its “Return to Europe” project.

Johannes WIEDEMANN, University of Flensburg, Germany: The Transformation of the European Border Regime: Frontex and Operation HERA.

The last decade saw the establishment of an European Union agency, long title „European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union”, commonly known in as Frontex. This agency was made in charge of the common border security polity established by the Schengen aquis which abolished all internal borders for the free movement of persons.

The Schengen culture of internal security consists of the following traits: The blurring of external and internal security, pushing transgovernmental modes of decision-making to the threshold of supranationality in order to empower the Commission and the Council with executive competencies in the field of justice and home affairs, the pre-emptive approach of countering threats to internal security right at their external source and the tendency to instrumentalize third countries for the task of countering those threats in a fashion which can be defined as „remote control policies“. In that sense, Schengen exemplifies a merged field of policy uniting foreign affairs and international relations with concerns of interior security.
So how does the actual application of the Schengen aquis institutionalized in an agency like Frontex affect or transform the border regimes of Member States in particular and the European Union in general? Analyzing the legal and deriving organizational design of the agency itself and describing the operational design of a distinctive and exemplifying Frontex deployment like the Frontex operations HERA I, II and III in the context of the 2006 immigration crisis on the Spanish Canary Islands leads to the definition of the characteristics and implications of the operational outcomes. These results are promulgating an operational paradigm which might point out to the pre-conditions and consequences of the ongoing transformation in the European border security regime. In the operations HERA I, II and III, EU Member States’ border guard units coordinated by Frontex executed European border protection operations against illegal immigrants in de facto alien territorial waters in order to divert boats with immigrants back to the beaches they started from.

The innovation in border security policy which the HERA-paradigm represents is the externalization and forward deployment of migration control into countries of origin and transit, The European Unions border regime is not consistent with the edges of physical territory of all Member States anymore. The dialecticism of abolishment of internal borders triggering forward deployed border surveillance is creating new categories of inside and outside, internal and external of European space and non-European space.

Katiaryna ZHUK, Grenoble Ecole de Management, Politique de voisinage, une transformation de la frontière source de conflit.