Isabella DAMIANI, Université de Rome 2: Le Ferghana des frontières: analyse géopolitique d’une mobilité dangereuse

The topic of my intervention is the Ferghana valley, a region politically divided between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. My work consists in a theoretic and empiric geopolitical analysis of the daily life in the Ferghana of the borders nowadays, in relation to the territorial actors who politically, culturally and socially share this major Central Asian stake.

The first actor is the Nationalism, embodied since the fall of Soviet Union in the new Central Asian Republics that started policies of forced nationalization in their territories in order to make of the Nation the sole cultural and social reference. The policies of nationalization aimed especially at one of the culturally most independent regions: the Ferghana valley. This area represents the main challenge to the nationalization also because it is one of most important geopolitics and strategic stakes in the Central Asian zone, due to its fertility, its abundance of natural resources and its population density, one of the strongest in all Central Asia.

The second actor is the Religion, as the Ferghana is also the most religious and fervent region of the ex-Soviet Central Asia. This feeling was particularly exploited in the 1980s and 1990s by newly appeared fundamentalist movements that aspired to take over the political power, to depose the new Nation-states and to create of a great Islamic State whose centre would be the Ferghana valley.

The third actor is the Regionalism of the valley, a geo-cultural unity that survives among the inhabitants of the valley, beyond the national or religious identities, and in spite of the bordering of this region.

Four years of research on the field enabled me to make a complete analysis of the borders of this valley, to observe how the Ferganians live on the borders nowadays, to explore the representations of the three actors on the territory and to unveil the different representations of the border and their fluctuations: border as first or last line of defence, but also migration and borders, as through the phenomenon of Creeping migration, an informal displacement of border populations especially from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, perceived by Kirghizstan as a slip of the border on their territory in favor of Tajikistan, and which provokes extreme nationalistic consequences.


Since the French–English agreement regarding the drawing of the border between Palestine and Lebanon in 1923, significant changes have occurred, marked mainly by the use of violence. The examination of that turbulent history highlights the important fluctuation of limits in this borderland. This is partly linked to the blurred marking of the border, but also to the perception of Israeli State as illegitimate when it closed the border in 1948, cutting the full and free access to Palestine, and hindering movement between the close areas of Jabal Amel and Galilee. The first military operation provided by Fatah and the PLO was observed by the end of the 1960’s after a long process of mobilization. From that time, a war system was set up that inflicted heavy damage
and caused numerous changes to the border delineation, first by the Palestinians crossing for military operations followed by Israelis crossing for retaliation, and then by a more in-depth Israeli strategy to suborn Lebanese fighters in order to construct a rampart against the fedayeens.

After the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, this borderland became an Israeli–influenced area, with a cooperative and clientelist system with the Lebanese Christian villages of the border. In 1978, through the “Litani Operation,” it became more of a military security area under its surrogate control with a local stipend militia. In 1982, the biggest military invasion that went to Beirut allowed Israel to re–draw the political geography of South Lebanon, transforming half of the south of Lebanon into a full Israeli military and administrative controlled area with new erected borders within that zone, new entry points, and an open border system for Israeli goods along the Lebanese–Israeli international border. This redefinition of that space reached an end after the collapse of the US–Israeli coalition in Lebanon in 1983 because of the growing action of a civil and military local resistance leading to a three–scaled withdrawal until 1985. From 1985 to 2000, the fluctuation of the border zone was stopped because of the continuing Israeli occupation of the South Lebanese “security zone,” patrolled by their surrogate militia, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), along an 850 sq/m. Because they were facing daily attacks, waged mainly by the Islamic resistance militia (Hezbollah), The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) evacuate that zone in May 2000 opening a new era of instability, and a contest of the Israeli withdrawal line that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) tries to draw with the common consent of both the Israeli and Lebanese governments. Facing the US protector of the Israeli strategic interests in that area (e.g., the Shebaa Farms, the Kfarchouba hills, the town of Ghajar, and others), Hezbollah became a growing power in the definition of the South Lebanon area. After the 2006 war, one may easily notice the weakness of UNIFIL in the stabilization of the tensions on the border except its role in the drawing of the blue line (withdrawal line), even if many contested areas along the border are still pending.

Zeev ZIVAN, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Achva academic College: Is There A Frontier along The Gaza Strip Border? The Changes of the Frontier under the Grad Missiles Threat.

On February 2011, after two years of ceasefire a grad missile that was launched from the Gaza Strip landed in Beer-Sheva.

The Geographical distance between Gaza and Beer-Sheva is between 40 to 55 kilometers. In Israeli terms, when the entire West Bank of the Jordan River is only 27,000 skm, this is quite a long distance from the border line.

In past years, the state defined its frontier area in few different ways. In the early fifties, new immigrants were not sent to settle next to the border. The frontier settlements were settled by young Israeli born pioneers.

At the second step the frontier area was defined by the weapons that threat the settlements. It was the government obligation to supply the frontier Settlements with fences, watch-towers, shelters and other equipments. The settlers were a part of the 'Spatial Defense' that was organized by the Israeli Defense Forces. In the last decade, the 82" millimeters mortars and the Katusha rockets changed the definition of the 'Frontier Belt'.

A further step occurred in 2009 when for the first time a Grad Missile landed in the port city of Ashdod and in the Negev capitol Beer-Sheva. The missiles surprised the civilian population. Two of
the mid size cities of Israel were now under fire. All together, about half a million people were under threat.

In 2006, 4,000 missiles from the Hezbollah in Lebanon attacked northern Israel. Their goal was to hit the state center far beyond Haifa the northern port city. Since 2006, the combination of these two threats, put the entire Israeli Territory to a Frontier position with no difference between the near border population and the central cities of Israel. Changing officially the definition of the Israeli Frontier has an enormous economic effect. The need to defend schools from missiles will not include a small town like Sderot but will cover the entire state. Can educational and cultural institutes as well as hospitals continue their daily work under missiles threat?

The future perspective is that the civilian population, like in London in the Second World War, turn to be the aim of the attacker. European Delegations has arrived already to Israel to study from its short experience as a country under missiles threat.

Karine GATELIER, Modus Operandi, Grenoble: Des frontières mentales aux frontières politiques, des décalages conflictuels.

Florent BLANC, Ecole de la paix, Grenoble: Frontières, légitimité et résistance: comment la lutte contre le terrorisme renouvelle la réflexion sur la frontière.

At a time when one would want to think exchanges as freed from the constraints of political spaces thanks to the evolution of new technologies of communication, one is bound to witness the resurgence of the most physical manifestations of the border such as walls, fences and gates. Presented as the necessary tool to deny entrance to those a state considers dangerous or threatening, physical borders have come to be perceived, in a context of the war against terror, as a desired return to a dated conception of territories and national security strategies. It is this consideration that has to be examined further given how much this conflictuality radically transformed the various meanings of the term.

If the wall by its sheer presence in the physical and political spaces, but also through its symbolic, came to attract public attention, it is nonetheless necessary to address how given the all-encompassing and malleable definition of the notion of terrorism, the concept of border as evolved.

Often on, the border as fence or wall constitutes only one of the protections erected to protect against a threat that has come to be seen as proteiform, shapeless and constantly evolving. From a shapeless threat (USA Patriot Act of 2011) to an invisible one (Edelman), the concept invites a semiology and discursive analysis of experts’ speeches about a threat that comes in as many shapes and forms as one has a political use for. To the border as wall is to be added the border as the symbolic and technological space for social sorting whereby a selection between individuals coming through come to be made. In a word, the border, in terms of security procedures, has to be understood, first and foremost as a series of ones and zeroes that differentiate, include and exclude. For instance, to the physical walls and fences built between Mexican and American territories were added a series of smart borders based on technological sorting where electronic identities, or avatars, come to be treated in terms of fluxes through computer-assisted
surveillance systems scanning data flows to determine who can be let in and who needs to be scrutinized with increased attention (see the CAPPS program for instance).

Within the general context of the war against terror, the concept of border has to be at last, analyzed, in its very first meaning, as the line of differentiation between two sides. As such, while a former US president had invited a radical opposition between good and evil, the war on terror has come to be the specific symbolic locus of a constant negotiation and hesitation regarding the very definition of the ethics of the law where it came down to institutional processes and personal choices as to what definition and line of conduct was to be adopted. Based on field interviews carried out in the United States between 2003 and 2010, my paper will reflect on the evolving borders of ethics and legality regarding the war on terror and the attitudes chosen by those that came to be concerned with national security and the defense of a legality that respects the basic concept of human rights and democratic values.
Session 32. The paper of transnational identities and community dynamics in the making of mobile borders /  
Le rôle des identités transnationales et les dynamiques communautaires dans la fabrique des frontières mobiles (2) 

Eric LECLERC, E.A. 2534 Ailleurs, Université de Rouen: L’incorporation de la frontière par les travailleurs mobiles de l’informatique indienne.

In a world where diasporas are growing, more and more scattered across the globe, it is impossible to delineate the extension of nations by a solid line and make them match with a contiguous territory. The proliferation of social networks, technical and economic expansion that accompanies diasporas, makes the spatial boundaries less and less relevant. However, we would interrogate ourselves in this communication about the reality of the disappearance of the border? In the mean time when we declare the end of the border, more and more, we use metaphors of the archipelago, of the enclave, which are closed forms, to describe the evolution of the global urban network and the new forms of location of economic activities. Do these metaphors reflect old habits of speech ? or do they mean the reappearance of the border in new ways?

To answer these questions we will use the example of the Indian IT professionals who is a professional diaspora. Present in most cities worldwide, it is a professional group that operates primarily within a context of dual mobility. That's firstly the mobility of men but also the mobility of firms. The second characteristic of the Indian IT professionals, is to work in an environment that knows no borders. The fruit of their work moves on electronic networks regardless of national boundaries. But to cross borders and to move temporarily to new countries, most of Indian IT professional use ethnic strategies. As a result, they carry with them their national or regional identity and they shift the boundaries by incorporating them. Firms in turn, rely on mobility by moving the Indian IT professional or by relocating their business in emerging markets. Do these enclaves of development, as they are often called, are they new forms of privatization of the border?


Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on the history of the nation-building process in Poland, including the age-old Polish-Jewish relations and national movements of the Jewish people in Poland. However, relatively little attention has been given to the influence of Polish national movements on Polish Zionism. This paper will discuss the issues related to the formation and competition of Polish and Jewish nationalisms in Russian-ruled Poland (Kongresówka) from the turn of the century to the interwar period.

This presentation is a case study of the processes of nation-building in Poland (especially Kongresówka) from the 1890s to the interwar period. It will focus on also the emergence of the Polish Zionism as a variation of that processes. By doing so, the paper will examine how the Polish and other nations’ borders were determined, and how these borders were mobile and unstable during the processes.
The social and political background to these processes, including the development of the Polish nationalist ideology of “Wszechpolacy,” is discussed in the first part. Also, the paper will explore the leading role of one of the most influential Polish national ideologists from Russian-ruled Poland, Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), in the formation of this ideology in the late 1890s. The second part, we will examine the thought of a Polish Zionist, Apolinary Hartglas (1883-1953) and his changing attitude toward the Polish national movement and the ideology of “Wszechpolacy.”

Decha TANGSEFA, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand: Learning, Longing and Lying: Youths’ Voices in a “Temporary Shelter Area” along the Thai-Burmese Border Zones.

This paper is part of a research that studies intertwining relations of three dimensions: identity, music and educational institution. The project focuses on how these dimensions affect young peoples’ conceptions and experiences of “home,” especially those of the Karen peoples. The young are parts of the peoples of exception in spaces of exception: those who have been forcibly displaced by violence from Burma and lived in areas where the Thai state names “temporary shelter areas” along the border zones. The study focuses on music as a vehicle of socialization by the old and as a cultural production of the young in a shelter area. It is based on an ethnographic research conducted between February 2008 to February 2010 in the highest educational institute in all shelter areas – the Leadership and Management Training College (LMTC). This paper addresses these entanglements through three categories of youth’s experiences in a shelter area: learning, longing and lying. While learning seemingly signifies socialization of youth by the old, hence situating the young within the present social matrix, longing connects the dots of the past with the lingering feelings of the present, no matter haunting or nurturing. Yet, it is lying that evinces how much youth’s psyches are caught in between various forces that wrought them: to be “good” members of their societies, to single-mindedly follow their dreams at the expense of friendship, or to follow their “basic instincts” on whatever cost. Weaving through these young Karens’ lives in the shelter area, the paper ends with a construction of conceptual discussion of “youth” and their “voices.”
Session 33. Multi-scalar perspectives of mobile borders governance / Perspectives multi-scalaires de la gouvernance des frontières mobiles (2 - The case of macroregions)


The aim of the paper is to explore how the Danube River, one of the most ancient frontier in Europe, is becoming a new mobile border due to the European Union project. Furthermore, more than a mobile border in time and space, the Danube River is nowadays a multi-scalar boundary in the EU enlargement context. Is this a mean to shift problematic cross-border relations between Central and Eastern countries?

The communication will focus on the danubian border between Bulgaria and Romania and its place in European policies developed since the last enlargement.

Two main issues will be addressed in the paper:

1. The Danube River between Bulgaria and Romania: an old mobile border.

From the Roman Empire till 1945, the Danube River has been a border characterised by its mobility: frontier of empires, uncertainty of the thalweg, conflicts which have laid to renegotiation during international conferences. The borders changes during the 20th century have stressed the fragility of the young nations-states such as Bulgaria and Romania. As inhabitants of the riversides could not appropriate the borderlands through territorialisation, socialist states have tried to reinforce their sovereignty by promoting strong and controlled borderlines. Due to the lack of achievement of state-nation building, borders in such countries have been mostly designed through top-down process and/or by external forces. We will show that in a way, too much mobile borders kills borders by rebordering instead of debordering as EU policies intend nowadays to do.

2. The danubian border between Bulgaria and Romania since EU enlargement: a multi-scalar border included in the regional issue in Europe.

The Danubian border is nowadays an area of collective project supported by EU policies such as cohesion policy (objective 3: transnational, cross-border cooperation), euroregions, and more recently the Strategy for Danube region (2010). All these policies give a wider territorial dimension to boundaries by introducing a regional scope. Instead of reducing/erasing borders, we can assess that EU policies emphasis on the regional dimension in the enlarged Europe is a mean to escape the long-lasting problems of borders in Central and Eastern Europe. By putting on the agenda regions instead of borders in its territorial policies, it is also a way for European institutions to fit with its own competencies, on the contrary to the border issue which still is a member states competency.
Since the 1990s and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Baltic region has been undergoing a full geopolitical reorganisation. The major factor in the new deal is a process of intense and fast regionalisation. This trend consists in recreating a long-lost unity with new economic, political and institutional networks. The Baltic Sea Region which has dreamt up lots of methods of cooperation may be seen as a laboratory of transborder regional integration process. But the unified and unifying Baltic area which has emerged as “the european model of regional integration” is at the moment questioned. The Region displays lots of challenges the Stakeholders have to try for.

We must remember that the Baltic area has never been unified, contrary to what may be thought. We can wonder to what extent this concept of unity accounts for what the Baltic Sea Region is today or if it does not come close to being part of a “Baltic myth”. The Baltic area is actually divided by lots of “Ghost boundaries”. These boundaries underline the diversity of Baltic identities (the Germans and the Slavs, the Hanseatic League and the Kalmar Union, the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, the “Baltic Occident” and the “Baltic Orient”). The institutional framework combines many areas of cooperation (Scandic-cooperation or “Scandinavism”, Balto-scandic-cooperation, Nordic-cooperation or “Norden”, Baltic-cooperation, Hanseatic-cooperation or “New Hanseatic League”, Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation, Euro-baltic-cooperation, Bilateralism or Multilateralism...). These “Olympic circles” (in contrary to “Concentric circles”) don’t intersect each other. Historically speaking, the Hanseatic period was able to create an « identity of networking » or even a « reticular identity » around the Baltic sea. This “reticular form” is contrary to the concept of “area(s)”. Offering a definition of the Baltic region is tricky. The « Baltic laboratory » is a very complex phenomenon.

However, decision-makers themselves concentrated recently their efforts on the definition of a new scale: the “macro-regional” approach. The “European strategy for the Baltic Sea Region” was adopted in June 2009 by the European Commission. This macro-region is the first in European Union to be implemented. The concept of “macro-region” is connected to the mythical unity of the Baltic Sea Region. In 2009-2010, the Commission has already started the preparation for the Danube Strategy, in order to begin with its implementation phase in 2011. Several Macro-regions are being identified throughout the European territory, covering large areas across national borders (the North Sea Region, the Mediterranean Sea Region, the Atlantic Sea Region ...).

To establish the blueprint describing the European strategy, the stakeholders took the problem of spatial cohesion into account (the gap between Sweden, Finland, Germany and former Eastern countries like Poland or Latvia, between the Baltic Sea Region of “Urban Shrinkage” and the Baltic Sea Region of “Urban Growth”, between the dynamic metropolitan areas and the growth corridors like Öresund Region or the Gulf of Finland and the poor and isolated rural areas) but they neglect the “external dimension” or “external challenge”. The limits of the macro-region are not clear. The European Commission did not mark clearly the external boundaries of the region (Fuzzy Boundaries?). Officially, the external boundaries are different for each thematic cooperation. But the European commission explains in the same time that it concerns the eight “Member States” bordering the Baltic Sea. Russia belongs to the functional Baltic Region based on economic exchanges (formal or informal) and investments but is an external partner regarding the macro-regional strategy. The stakeholders have neglected the complexity of the institutional and cultural framework in the Baltic Sea Region. The “fuzzy boundaries” enable the different stakeholders to come to an agreement whereas each decision-maker has his own definition of the area which
becomes, taking up Vincent Clément’s phrase “a multi-layered area” or a “nomadic area” (Space can be dilated as one wishes). The “Coopetition” (Cooperation+Competition) between the institutional frameworks (Nordic, Baltic...), between the decision-makers, between the States (for a leading role) is prominent. In this context, Crossborder-networks are stronger on the regional and local scale because on this scale, the boundaries, threats or opportunities, have to be crossed for economic, social and cultural reasons.

Anaïs MARIN, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki: Bridges over troubled waters. Transboundary tourism as a tool for reconciliation and region-building across shifted borders: insights from Eastern European Euroregions.

Many Central and Eastern European borders were shifted westwards as a consequence of World War II, thus producing “stump syndromes” and minority-related problems between states adjacent to what is now the external border of the EU. Upon shifting state borders, natural landmarks (mountain ranges, rivers and lakes) oftentimes served as demarcating lines. Whereas in the Middle East or Africa sharing water resources has usually been conducive of conflicts between riparian states, in Eastern European peripheries on the contrary water basins became cornerstones for cooperation projects that contribute to overcome past enmities and foster mutual understanding – at least locally.

In Eastern European borderlands, concern for the protection of transboundary waterways is oftentimes the most consensual common denominator for region-building initiatives: over the past 20 years, dozens of Euroregions were established across the EU’s Eastern borders that bear the name of a shared waterway. This is the case in areas where a river or lake is congruent with a state border (Lake Peipsi-Chudskoe between Estonia and Russia, the Bug river along Poland’s borders with Belarus and Ukraine, or the Prut that demarcates the Romanian-Moldovan border for example) as well as among countries irrigated by a transboundary river (such as the Danube, the Neman or the Dniestr).

Hereafter referred to as “geopolitics of bridging”, transboundary region-building processes across these waterways display some distinctive features that this paper will seek to highlight. Among other specificities, in Eastern European peripheries the sustainable management of transboundary waterways – that is to say coordinated development strategies and territorial planning in the field of wastewater management, navigation, fishing, transport infrastructures etc. – has recently opened the way to new cooperation projects meant to develop a transboundary ecotourism offer of services. This trend has led to the museification and marketing of borderlands as ideal destinations for “nostalgic” and “alternative” forms of tourism, such as soft mobility (“green”) tourism, which emphasises the attractiveness of the untamed natural landscape of these remote rural areas for adventure and outdoor sport activities (hiking, biking, horse-riding, canoeing, etc.).

The “debordering” dimension of most ecotourism projects in Eastern European peripheries stems from the fact that local stakeholders, border communities and territorial authorities have successfully lobbied for the introduction of exceptional border-crossing regimes, such as visa-free regimes for small scale cross-border traffic or cruise visas for tourist excursions on transboundary canals (Saimaa, Augustów, etc.).

Drawing on findings from a comparative field research conducted in Euroregions with non-EU participation established across Eastern European border waterways (Euroregions Bug, Neman, Country of Lakes, Upper Prut, Siret-Prut-Nistru, Lower Danube) the paper argues that ecological
concerns were conducive of cross-border cooperation projects that reach far beyond mere water management. Innovative plans for the sustainable development of these borderlands as ecotourism destinations have been the driving belts for exchanging best practices in other low policy fields such as education, culture and support for SMEs. In most cases, this fostered a de-/re-territorialisation of boundaries according to dividing lines, interests and feelings of belonging that challenge traditional state borders, thus reconnecting ethnic communities divided by shifted borders and opening “breaches” for new mobility flows across the so-called “Schengen curtain.”

Keywords: Sustainable transboundary water management; ecotourism; border shifts and stump syndromes in Eastern European borderlands (Finland, Poland, Romania); Euroregions with non-EU participation (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova).
Cristina DEL BIAGGIO, Department of Geography, University of Geneva (Switzerland) & Department of Regional Studies, University of Tampere (Finland): Bordering the Alps: drawing a “new space of action” inside the Alpine Convention’s limits.

In this paper, I will present some of the results of a 4-year research project carried out at the University of Geneva dealing with the regionalization process taking place in the Alps. The contracting parties of the Alpine Convention in 1991, involved drawing a map of the Alpine region, politically recognized the Alps, for the first time, as a contiguous region with distinct environmental and cultural characteristics (Price, 1999). Thanks to the process of constitution and implementation of the Alpine Convention, it has been possible to render national borders more permeable. Some scholars argue that this event is part of a bigger process, in which the Alps are emerging as an area of collective action (see special issue of the Journal of Alpine Research, 92-2, 2009). In fact, inside the perimeter defined by the Alpine Convention, a large number of cross-border initiatives have been launched, mostly framed and funded by the INTERREG programmes. Thus, it is precisely inside the area sketched by the Alpine Convention that a new space of action has been created, with new actors emerging.

With the shrinking in importance of the national level, we are now observing a proliferation of new European regional entities (Deas and Lord, 2006). The Alpine region constituting one of them, probably one of the most institutionalized, notably thanks to the signature of the Alpine Convention. As a result, multiple actors drawn from different levels of governance are emerging simultaneously and reconfiguring the existing Alpine territorial framework, resulting in a complex governance system. In this paper, the focus will be on how civil society organisations, with the help of committed local actors (inhabitants, local representatives, researchers, managers of protected areas, and ecological associations) organised within networks, are bridging national boundaries to deal with issues of sustainable development.

Thus, the Alpine region can be considered a trans-border regions that, following McNeill, contributes to the shift from a one-dimensional map of Europe as having fixed borders to one in which scales of action are fluid (McNeill, 2004). But despite the capacity and skills of some key-actors to “jump scales” (Cox, 1998) and despite the willingness of networks of local actors to focus on more horizontal relations, the administrative, political and ideological structures of the networks and their members are not able to completely detach themselves from the administrative structures and borders. The Alpine case, as it will be presented, shows what Nahrath called a “great capacity of resistance of old administrative zoning” (Nahrath, 2009).
Sylwia DOLZBLASZ, Institute of Geography and Regional Development, University of Wroclaw:
From divided to shared spaces – the transition process in the Polish-Czech mountainous border area.

Mountain borders, by their very nature, tend to form a strong barrier between the neighbouring countries. Moreover, the spatial barrier is often reinforced by a functional barrier resulting mainly from the scarcity of infrastructural connections. The existence of strong political and administrative barriers between these countries deepens the marginal position of the mountain border area which lacks cooperation and connections between the actors from the regions divided by a state border. However, another scenario is also possible. The joint mountainous area divided by a state border develops a network of connections between various types of actors, which may result in the emergence of a trans-border region in the strict sense. Mountainous character of these areas do not create such strong barriers. In fact, it becomes an integrating factor, the element conditioning the development of connections and cooperation between the actors of the border region. A sine qua non for the development of such an optimistic scenario is significant reduction of the role of the state border as a barrier as well as favourable political conditions and joint / coherent development goals. The development of transborder tourism based on attractive natural conditions in the mountainous regions of the borderland also enhances the development of a transborder region.

The aim of this article is to analyse the change in the role of the state border in the mountainous parts of the Polish-Czech borderland. The paper also attempts at analysing the influence of the border and its changing character on the transformation process in the border areas, understood as a process of transforming separate border regions of both countries into a transborder region with a growing number and strength of transborder connections.

The article presents the most important factors affecting the transformation process, such as: the change in the course of state borders, political factors (Polish-Czech relationships; change in the political system in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 90's), natural features. The pace of the transformation process in the Polish-Czech border region in recent years was mostly affected by Poland’s and the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU, which intensified transborder co-operation. The other key factor seems to be the riddance of internal borders within the Schengen Zone, which deeply affects the integration of the border regions in a positive way. Changes in spatial transborder planning were also considered.

Special attention was given to the changes in the tourist centre in the Jizera Mountains. Geopolitical changes and the development of the state border affected the function of the mountain settlement. It evolved from glassworks, forestry services, border guards and custom office premises, through borderland protection army station to finally become a significant transborder tourism centre. With the view to analysing the integration process in the borderland, a spatial analysis was carried out into the road and rail connections as well as tourist trails. In order to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the role of the border in local tourism, a tourist survey was conducted (e.g. national border perception, the „tourist routes” in relation to the course of the border).

In order to answer the question about the character of changes on the way „from divided to shared spaces” the paper focuses on its spatial aspect.
Aline MOORE, Muséum national d’Histoire Naturelle, Paris: Re-imagining the Balkans: transboundary protected areas as vehicles for European integration?

This paper asks how the Balkans are being ‘re-imagined’ through the establishment of transboundary protected areas, and what the influence of the EU is in shaping this process. The establishment of Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPA), or Peace Parks as they are sometimes known, has been an important trend in worldwide conservation over the past 20 years. TBPA, ecological corridors and networks, and landscape or ecoregional approaches to conservation – which all necessitate cross-border cooperation – are heavily promoted by large conservation organisations such as the WWF and IUCN, reflecting the international outlook of these institutions as well as the phenomenon of the globalisation of conservation.

In the case of the Western Balkans, these large conservation organisations are joined by another ‘international’ actor – the European Union. Indeed, TBPA initiatives in this region are being carried out in the specific context of preparation for integration into the EU, and thus reflect the latter’s concern with ensuring stability and security in the region1. This naturally involves encouraging cross-border cooperation, but it also means harmonising policies – both environmental and other – in line with EU norms. The overarching influence of the EU thus raises several specific questions about transboundary conservation in the Balkans, especially in relation to the modes of governance associated with these initiatives and their role within a broader European political project: to what extent are TBPA in the Balkans contributing to the expansion of European economic, political and social models? Does the ‘Europeanisation’ of these regions provide further evidence of the phenomenon of globalisation, or are cross-border Peace Parks vehicles for a new brand of (European) cosmopolitanism? And what does this mean for the way these projects are received by local communities?

These questions are addressed through a case study in the mountains spanning Northern Albania, Western Kosovo and North-Eastern Montenegro: the Balkans Peace Park Project or Prokletije / Bjeshkët e Nemuna transboundary project. Qualitative research following an anthropological approach (semi-directive interviews with a range of institutional actors) was carried out in the region in 2009 and is currently ongoing.

Two factors are particularly significant with regard to the Prokletije / Bjeshkët e Nemuna project: firstly, it has been chosen as a pilot area for the creation of LAGs (Local Action Groups), based on the EC Leader+ model1, thus reflecting the influence of European modes of governance. Secondly, the region is populated mostly by ethnic Albanians who share a (largely) common natural and cultural heritage, and incorporates two countries – Albania and Kosovo – who see European integration as a viable route to regenerating their historical ties. TBPA initiatives in the region thus raise the issue of multiple constructions of territory (natural, ethnic, cultural, political...) and the redrawing of boundaries around a shared common heritage or good.
André SUCHET, IGA, Université Joseph Fourier : La frontière gisement d’altérité, ou l’activation d’une limite géopolitique en ressource territoriale. Géographie du tourisme et Ailleurs de proximité en Pyrénées.

The boundaries, as limits between states, can be treated as territorial resource, or a minima, as multi-scalar resource more or less territorialized (Amilhat-Szary, 2004). Indeed, both by structural and cyclical factors (economy, state or regional regulations, political and religious situations, local conditions ...), a differential between two countries generates a set of legal and illegal dynamics (Gasperini, 1996; Guillot, 2009; Velasco-Graciet, 1998, 2006). In times of peace, there is mobility of labor, smuggling or other traffic and consumption of duty-free. When prostitution is authorized on one side of the border, it grows up and sometimes it even supports the economy of a region. Otherwise, in times of conflict, we think of the exodus of refugees and smuggling of people. Wars, dictatorships, revolutions, ethnic or religious conflicts... so many situations that motivate the move. Closed borders, are often more important to cross. This sometimes brings up the paradox that the more difficult a border is to overcome, the more reasons there are to cross it.

Thus, economic borders, security or defensive planning, political, religious or ideological limits, between states were well-documented. From another perspective this work studies the border rather as a source of symbolic and geo-cultural otherness. The other side of the border is not neutral. Borders represent a source of otherness. Therefore, the border becomes a fundamental resource of the tourism phenomenon. Indeed, for most authors, tourism is motivated by the search for an Elsewhere that compensates for a daily Here. This Elsewhere can be exotic and distant (Bachimon, 1990; Cousin & Réau, 2009; Staszak, 2008), or it can be a proximal Elsewhere (Bourdeau, 2003; Piolle, 1993; Urbain, 2002).

With the goal of supporting, or, at least, debating this hypothesis, this study offers a set of empirical data and fieldwork in the Pyrenees at the border between France and Spain.

Anton GOSAR, University of Primorska, Slovenia: The cross-border brick-laying concept in the Alpen-Adriatic Region

The paper focuses on the development of tourism, in accordance with the principles of sustainability in the Dreilaendereck area of Austria, Italy and Slovenia. In the Alpen-Adria region where Slovenia, Austria and Italy join their borders the term "sustainable development" is understood as a direction towards economic co-operation, disregarding the borders and former political disputes. The Dreilaendereck (The Three-Border Area) alpine environment is characterized by several mountain ridges (The Julian Alps, The Karawanken, The Carnian Alps, The Gailtaler Alps) intermountain basins and valleys, as well as rivers and lakes (Faaker See, Woerther See, Lake Bled). But the most striking fact is that within an area of less than one-thousand square kilometers world’s three major languages and cultures meet: the Romance (Italian), Germanic (Austrian) and Slavic (Slovenian). The provinces of Krain and Primorska in Slovenia, Carinthia in Austria and Friuli-Venetia Giulia in Italy, being the administrative frame for the area, have agreed to place a bid for the Winter Olympic Games. The named facts and the fact that the area is, in sense of tourism, relatively underdeveloped has provoked the following research.

Through the concept of "bricklaying" the existing tourist attractions are glued together into one single tourist product. Several topical packages combining the natural and cultural elements of the area, and disregarding the state-borders, have been put together. The major idea was not to expand existing tourist infrastructure or produce new tourist attractions. Instead, the projects
points out the uniqueness of the area in its natural and cultural frame. The paper registers the existing supply in the area of all three countries. Through protected natural and cultural heritage sites, like within the Triglav National Park, through the winter sport enthusiast’s hidden destination, like Planica (world’s skijumping record) and Kranjska gora (World Cup alpine skiing), through the white-waters (Isonzo) and the Hemingway's battlegrounds of WW 1 (Caporetto), and through the outstanding features of the cultural performances (Kuffenstechen - Štehvanje) and the regional cuisines of the three cultures the transborder region could become recognizable within the European Alpine bow as a new and unique tourist destination. The fact that this is an area where bilingualism in different combinations existed for centuries and where the exchange of goods always linked people has produced a unique transborder regional co-operation. Several proposed packages, like the Europeus Sine Finibus program (mountaineering cross-border mountaineering), visiting cultural heritage sites, e.g. Terra Mystica) and the White Waters Experience (Bovec), are already operational. Several others, like the All-round Ski-Pass, the WW1 Trail program and the Multi-Cultural Educational program are in their final stage of preparation and should go on stage soon.

Emmanuel BRUNET-JAILLY, University of Victoria: In an era of security, is the territoriality of borders challenged?

What is security in the International Relations literature? There are two broad schools of thought: The ‘narrow’ debate about security studies focuses on the enduring primacy of military security (Buzan, Waever, deWilde, 1998) (Gray, 1994). ‘Political Actors’ are central, and ‘States’ are at the core of all discussions. Security is the study of the threat, use and control of military forces’ (Walt, 1991). Another ‘wider’ debate about security, however, points to the non-military sources of threats, and argues that threat is often non-military, but conceptualizes security in term of, for instance, the economy (Buzan, 1991, Luciani 1989), or the environment (Deudney, 1990). All in all, the post cold war period focused security studies on military and nuclear issues. Security was, then, about ‘anything that concerns the prevention of superpower nuclear war’ (Buzan, 1998). But once the Berlin-Wall fell the entire strategic community had to rethink its analyses. It was not about the East-West confrontation anymore but globalization. Those new understandings of what security is also affect our understanding of what borders are because security affects states and the primary markers of states: borders. Unsurprisingly, our understanding of borders, in this new era of security is also changing. Today’s borders ‘vacillate’ (Balibar, 2002). Borders are not at the border itself. Indeed, ‘Limites’ remain. They mark the end of a ‘sovereignty,’ and the beginning of another sovereignty. But, borders are no longer always clear territorial demarcations. They no longer embody the superimposition of sets of state functions, of sovereignty, administration, cultural control, taxation – they do not work for people and things in the same way anymore, nor do they filter people “equally.” Borders are multiple – their territoriality challenged.

Tony PAYAN, University of Texas at El Paso/Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez: Toward a Function-Based Theory of Borders.

This paper argues that borderlines and borderlands are becoming spaces where functions are both increasing in number and poorly clarified. It posits additionally that borders are increasingly assigned more and more functions and must do with much the same infrastructure as before. This combination makes for more complicated borders, where quality of life of borderlanders prosperity opportunities are lost, and borders are further dehumanized. Borderlanders, that is, pay a high price for this. To deal with this, policy makers must find the way to classify, define, and decentralize border functions. This can be accomplished in part by devolving power to local authorities and moving border functions away from the borderline in order to recreate the border as spaces of orderly and efficient flows rather than as spaces of blockage and obstruction.
Donald ALPER, Western Washington University: Border Security in the Borderlands: The Importance of Local and Regional Governance as the Foundation of Effective Border Management.

The literature on border security is in agreement that highly centralized border security arrangements are not facilitative of effective border governance (see Zartman 2009; Sands 2009; Kieck nd; Gavrilis 2008). This literature points to the importance of dynamic regional processes with emphasis on the role of regional and local actors in the securitization process. We contend that border securitization, although conceived in terms of broad security missions of national governments, is carried out within a borderland context where mobility of persons and goods that cross borders are strongly interlinked with practices, techniques and rules of control and surveillance (Gruszczak 2010:5). The interlinking of security practices with cross border flows is important in legitimizing policies through local acceptance, mediating policies by local public and private actors seeking functional solutions to border problems, and translating policies to fit local circumstances. Our approach for examining the role of regional and local actors in the securitization process focuses on 1) attitudes of borderlanders toward security; 2) cross border institutions; and 3) scale and perspective in border policy thinking. The paper, drawing on evidence from the Cascadia cross border region located in the Canada-US Pacific west, shows how border security enhancement is shaped and sensitized by local and regional governance mechanisms, practices and scalar perspectives.
Maud VERHERVE, laboratoire DYRT, Université d’Artois: Frontières et carrefour, expérience de la mobilité, pratique de la circulation, représentation des frontières.

La frontière est, au plan théorique, devenue un outil de la pensée géographique qui permet de rationaliser et verbaliser les discontinuités. Se placer d’abord dans la perspective d’une archéologie de la frontière -au sens foucaldien du terme – (Foucault, 1966) permet de rendre compte de la construction d’un outil de pensée central pour ce qui devient une géographie des frontières (Picouet, Renard, 2007).

Entendre ainsi la frontière permet, alors, de concevoir ses effets et ses productivités, ainsi que déduire sa qualité nécessaire: la mobilité. L’épistémologie de la frontière que j’essaie d’élaborer doit permettre de la concevoir au-delà de la pensée de la ligne, et de la saisir au travers l’ordre symbolique, par les représentations (Gottmann). C’est à travers elles que peuvent s’observer les changements de morphologie perçus -matérielle, iconographique, mentale-, les fonctions qui sont attribuées à la frontière, et que peut se poser la question de savoir: quel est le sens des frontières, dans le vécu de ses acteurs? Où passe-t-elle et comment se manifeste-t-elle?

La notion de frontière mobile devient un concept opératoire. En effet, étant donnés les déplacements des frontières (des périphéries aux lieux centraux, de la sphère étatique au monde quotidien) et ses changements de morphologie, la question de savoir où sont les frontières devient difficile. C’est aux logiques d’actions des acteurs de ces frontières qu’il faut s’intéresser. La circulation frontiéralise. Dans la pratique des territoires et de la mobilité (Fumey, Varlet, Zembri, 2009), elle permet en effet d’observer les représentations (images mentales) et de déborder les représentations (cartographiques). La circulation est un principe d’organisation spatiale frontiéralisant. Parler de frontière mobile, c’est donc tenir que la frontière peut être envisagée comme un effet de mobilité, et qualifie les territoires par les expériences de passage et les pratiques de circulation des acteurs du quotidien.

Nous pouvons structurer cette position conceptuelle par une grammaire de la frontière articulée autour d’une chorématique du carrefour (Grison, 2002). S’il s’agit de penser la frontière par ses fonctions (mise à distance, contrôle, affirmation et reconnaissance des pouvoirs politiques, expression d’une entité territoriale), s’il s’agit de concevoir le sens de la frontière (celui qu’il a pour les acteurs et qui détermine des logiques d’action) il faut ajouter une dimension à la frontière telle que la pensée géographique la représente: la profondeur. C’est la figure de la « frontière-carrefour » que nous concevons pour représenter la productivité de la frontière qualifiée de mobile, et outrepasser la pensée de la ligne. La frontière-carrefour, étayée par sa grammaire est un moyen de rendre compte de la complexité des frontières et les recompositions que nous lisons dans les pratiques territoriales de la circulation et des passages.

Il s’agit non seulement de penser des frontières mobiles mais aussi des espaces mobiles (Retaillé, 2009), synthèse de territoire et de réseau. Nous proposons de soulever la question des difficultés de représentation géographique des phénomènes structurant la notion de frontière mobile: Comment rendre compte de la profondeur des représentations, de la temporalité des pratiques de la circulation et des expériences de passage observées?
C’est la frontiéralité comme sens et productivité de la frontière envisagée à partir de sa qualité mobile qui doit émerger : par analogie à la territorialité, elle est ce phénomène par lequel l’acteur de ces pratiques devient auteur des discontinuités, organisant par elles son espace. La frontiéralité apparaît comme un mode de territorialité conditionnée par des pratiques spatiales de la discontinuité, révélées par la circulation et les représentations.

Olivier WALTHER, Centre for Population, Poverty and Public Policy Studies (CEPS/INSTEAD): Reconsidering border markets and economic networks in West Africa.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to present an innovative approach of border markets in West Africa. Based on a research project which started in 2011, our objective is twofold. Firstly, we would like to examine the importance of border markets in the contemporary West African economy. Our hypothesis is that the specificity of border markets within the spatial organisation of West African networks is to offer a prime location for brokers, i.e. economic agents capable of building bridges between disconnected parts of markets. Secondly, we wish to explore new methodological ways of analysing the characteristics of border markets. Our hypothesis is that to date, most of the geographical and historical literature on cross-border economic networks in West Africa has considered networks in a metaphorical way. Our aim is to go one step further by considering networks as an analytical concept, using a combination of both social network analysis and qualitative tools.

Bernhard KÖPPEN, Universitaet Koblenz-Landau: What can Shopping Tourism tell us about Disparities and Integration?

Shopping Tourism can be considered as a typical phenomenon in border areas, reflecting mostly significant differences in wealth and prosperity, national taxes or quality and availability of certain goods. The specific trigger pulse in different border areas seems generally quite obvious and easy to understand. As own recent empirical studies on the German-Polish Border and the Finnish-Russian border show, even despite a relatively closed border – as between Russia and Finland – nameable shopping tourism takes place, due to the already mentioned international disparities.

Though, the idea of pure “one-way systems” being the main phenomenon in transborder shopping-tourism, is not absolutely true. Studies at the German-French border show, that shopping-tourism is even a significant feature, when the general conditions between two neighboring countries are very similar or even leveled, hence no elusive reasons for cross-border shopping do exist if one beliefs in bargains being the major motivation.

Putting emphasis on the French-German example with two-way shopping movements under leveled circumstances, it can be found that bargains are certainly of great importance, but that also other motivations, such as “general enjoyment” or culinary delight, occur notable. It should be also discussed, if finally the vivid shopping-tourism – being sometimes judged as a rather atavistic activity - between Germany and France might serve as an indicator of “everyday cross-border-intergration” by the citizens.
Michael STRAUSS, Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques in Paris: The State that Ate Europe! Iceland’s Volcanic Ash Cloud and Sovereignty over Mobile Territory.

What happens to boundaries when the very territory of a state becomes mobile? This paper examines the issue through the example of the 2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano, which caused parts of Iceland’s physical sovereign territory - its subsoil - to become airborne and drift into the sovereign airspace of other nations. International law pertaining to territorial title appears limited with respect to such circumstances, yet addressing them can have value for determining states’ rights and responsibilities, as well as practical matters such as state liability or even opportunities.

Among questions to be considered are: Did the ash from Eyjafjallajökull stop being part of Iceland after a certain point? If not, were the boundaries of other states altered as the ash cloud drifted into their space? If so, were the other states obliged to assume sovereignty over the arriving cloud, or did other options exist? What are the implications of the temporary nature of the phenomenon, given that some notions of sovereignty hold that de facto sovereignty may be temporary? Are the geographic limits associated with territorial sovereignty only horizontal, or can boundaries between states be three-dimensional (e.g., did the ash cloud’s movement put some Icelandic territory vertically above that of another state)?

The high economic costs and social disruptions that many states experienced as the result of the ash from Eyjafjallajökull justify responses to questions of this nature. The paper will give particular attention to how international law treats related issues - avulsion in boundary rivers, sovereignty over water resources that flow between states, and the mobility of natural resources once extracted.
Session 37. The mobile nature of Eco-frontiers /  
La dimension mobile des fronts écologiques (3 - The current ecologization of the world)

Mari MIYAMOTO, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University: Redefinition of the Cultural Borders in the Sphere of Environmental Conservation.

Since the Earth Summit in 1992, western theories and techniques for “global environmental conservation” have come to be regarded as absolute and universal. Indeed these techniques and theories have been steadily incorporated into developed countries. Moreover, many developing countries in Asia have institutionalized and pressurized rural societies to change their life styles and customs through the medium of multiple systems and techniques like regulations and development projects for conservation.

In this presentation, I would like to describe, on the one hand, how the devices of knowledge and discourses, which contain specific power relationships as natural resources management or environmental conservation, restrict and govern persons embedded in asymmetrical power structures. On the other hand, I would also like to show how persons who live in such governed and controlled spheres translate and reconstruct the macro social economic structure and resource use while pursuing comfortable and cultural life by using their social relationships and cultural resources, through the case study of Bhutan.

Jarmo KORTELAINEN, University of Eastern Finland: The European Green Belt: reshaping boundaries and environmental governance.

The paper focuses on the European Green Belt (EGB), which refers to efforts to create a network of conservation areas along the borderline that used to divide Europe into the socialist and capitalist blocks. The EGB initiative attempts to link ecologically valuable areas as continuous ecological networks that cross the entire continent. The EGB is divided into three sub-regions: the Fennoscandian and Baltic Green Belt in the North and along the coastline of the Baltic Sea, the Central European Green Belt, and the South-Eastern European Green Belt. The EGB network is studied as a form of transnational environmental governance, and its formation and furtherance are linked with the environmental governance discussion. Furthermore, the paper aims to show that EGB governance is changing the meaning of the former Iron Curtain borders. In addition to the ecological aspects and their effects on the ground, the EGB network has – to a certain extent – changed the role and function of boundaries and border areas. The former Iron Curtain borders have received a new transnational role as ecological networks and corridors, or loci of transboundary cooperation. In other words, a new transnationalisation of borderlands has emerged based on the cross-European network and border-crossing activities. Borders in their traditional and more functional sense, as dividing lines, have lost a great deal of their importance. At the same time, however, it maintains the borders. Although its goal is to develop a borderless ecological network, the whole network depends on borders of a particular kind. That is why it is vital for the EGB to reproduce the borders; their histories and changes or their crossings are repeated innumerable times in EGB documents and their rhetoric. The former Iron Curtain borders are the essential resources and elementary parts of the governance-generating network whose legitimacy is partly based on its ability to change their negative image and enhance better relations across them. Therefore, the borders have to be “kept alive”, though in a new sense.

This contribution deals with Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation area (KaZa) and more specifically with Hwange national park (Zimbabwe) as part of it in order to analyse 1/ how a protected area can impact a country involved in a transfrontier park on the social, economic and political point of vue and 2/ how a transfrontier park can be a tool of environmental justice?

The KaZa is a Peace Park defined by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as a tool to strengthen cooperation between States in a same area and preserve biodiversity, prevent and resolve conflicts, be a vector of reconciliation and sustainable development on the regional level. Negotiated since 2003 to become the world’s largest conservation area (287 132 km2), it links five southern African countries : Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

As the Durban Accord (5th world parks Congress, 2003) - "We see protected areas as providers of benefits beyond boundaries – beyond their boundaries on a map, beyond the boundaries of nation states, across societies, genders and generations", priority is given to preservation and (sustainable) development that should overlap the borders. These objectives may create a new "territory". So, from law and political science analysis, this project of biodiversity preservation added to a cross-border reorganization process of social groups presents the interest to place sustainable development in its environmental, ecological, regional and social aspects.

Located on the heart of the KaZa, the Hwange national park experiments the influence that can have ecology on the internal policies (in Zimbabwe) and at the regional level (the cross-border area) in a context of poverty, degradation of living conditions and violation of human rights due to the financial and economic crisis. It allows to draw the determiners of the reconstruction of Zimbabwe both at the national and regional level and tests the stakes of the KaZa: protect biodiversity, avoid conflicts, be the mainspring of the regional development.

It is the relations between frontier/transfrontier and environmental justice that can be approached here by the law and political science methods.

Gregor TORKAR, Laboratory for Environmental Research, University of Nova Gorica, Romina RODELA, Wageningen University and Research Centre: Landscape Complexity in Borderlands: Landscape Complexity in Borderlands: A Case Study from Prekmurje (Eastern Slovenia).

Cultural landscape is formed in a process of territoriality in order to obtain control over space, which is a set of constant processes, interactions, phenomena and activities. A strategy of every living being (or a group) is to form its territory. Humans are territorial animals and this “territorial nature” is generic and indelible (Audrey, 1966). Humans define territory with borders on the basis of “what is mine” and “what is not yours”. Delimitation of territories seems to be an anthropological and socio-psychological constant that requires a line between the self and the other, between the own group identity and the other group, between the “friend and the enemy” (Schmitt, 1950). Borders, dividing politically constructed territories or functional (economical, cultural, security, ecological etc.) systems, can be an important factor in the formation of cultural landscapes. The paper aims to give an analysis of impacts borders have on landscape complexity to understand landscape diversity in the of Prekmurje (Eastern Slovenia).
To the south Prekmurje is divided from the rest of Slovene territory by the Mura river, on the west and northwest Prekmurje borders with Austria, on the northeast and the east it borders on Hungary and on the southeast it borders on Croatia. It follows from this that we can understand Prekmurje as a borderland characterised by different types of borders that include both a state border but also regional borders (Mura river) from within the country.

This paper explores local peoples’ perception of past and present changes in the landscape which were affected by state borders. We conducted 35 face-to-face interviews with the local inhabitants (i.e. residents) who came from 26 settlements within the Prekmurje region.

Four different types of perceptions of borders within in the landscape were identified – (1) border still existent, (2) border changing to non-existent, (3) non-existent and (4) becoming a new border.

Most of the state borders delineating Prekmurje from surrounding countries are losing physical and mental importance for residents, especially after 2004 when Slovenia and Hungary joined the European Union. But respondents also reported about the existing state border with Croatia established in 1991 and the negative impacts of recently established Landscape Park Goričko – which brought a new border in the region. The respondents reported about ecological, social and economical impacts of borders.

For example, the formation of Iron Curtain between Hungary and former Yugoslavia in 1949 caused geopolitical re-orientation and the state border became highly secured. Respondents explained that the border cut economical and social strings between nations and minorities. Until the end of 1960s, when the first border crossings were open, they had no or minimal communication with relatives living on the other side of the border. Many people were forced to leave the area close to the border; they abandoned the land and went abroad. The privately owned land, especially in Hungarian side of the border, was nationalized and field patterns were changed. The state border lost importance for local residents after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, and especially after 2004 when Slovenia and Hungary joined the European Union. But for many of the respondents it is still as a mental barrier in place.

This indicated for the type of impact former state border on the River Mura had. Since the establishment of the Štajersko (Styria) – Hungarian border in the 11th and 12th century until the First World War the Kučnica and Mura River (the section of Mura River between Gornja Radgona and Razkrižje) defined the state border. Respondents remembered the border from the storytelling of their parents and grandparents. They were told that there was no bridge in this section of the river until 1922, therefore ferries were used. In Prekmurje inheritance patterns followed the Hungarian tradition which grants inheritance rights to all family members who inherit a proportional quota of each patch of land. The side effect is seen in sliced field patterns that are unlike those in other regions of Slovenia. This field patterns enabled the existence of many hedgerows delineating the properties and contributing to the landscape diversity of Prekmurje.

Today, this section of the Mura River is no longer perceived as a state border by respondents, but some see it still as a psychological barrier in place (e.g. floods).

The paper is an outcome of EU funded research project TransEcoNet, launched in 2009, where we collaborated with 16 partners from Central European countries. The goal of the project is to understand and promote transnational ecological networks. To achieve this, the border has to become the (physical and mental) line where the landscapes are linked, strengthened and not divided.
Adoram SCHNEIDLEDER, EHESS-CRFJ: Lebanese in the Galilee: Stabilizing the mobile Israel-Lebanon Border.

Negotiated and defined in the 1920’s the colonial border between the French Mandate in Lebanon and the British Mandate in Palestine was to become the border between the future states of Lebanon and Israel. The creation of the State of Israel at the expense of Palestinian national aspirations however has laid the foundations for a diversified relation to this border amongst inhabitants of the Galilee today depending notably on their belonging to the indigenous Arab population or the immigrant Jewish population. The bending northwards of this border during the last twenty-five years of the 20th century (Israeli invasions, the “Good Fence” policy, and the establishment of the Security Zone in Southern Lebanon) which ended in the unilateral Israeli withdrawal of May 2000 was accompanied by a rapprochement of two regions (Upper Galilee and Jabal Amil of Southern Lebanon) which had previously undergone nearly 30 years of separation (1948-1976).

This article proposes to explore dynamics in the stabilization and interiorisation of this border among inhabitants of the Galilee through the study of border-crossing practices of Lebanese currently residing in the Galilee. We will be considering two groups of Lebanese migrants, who arrived under two different structural circumstances and settled respectively on opposite sides of the Arab/Jewish spatial divide that runs through the Galilee. The first group is composed of Lebanese migrant workers who crossed the border during the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and the “Good Fence” policy (from the late 1970’s until 2000). The second group is composed of members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families who crossed the border seeking refuge during the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.

Drawing on a comparison with Malkki’s study of Hutu refugees who settled in two different socioeconomic and political sites in Tanzania, we will see how two different patterns of border crossings, landing on opposite sides of the Arab/Jewish divide in the Galilee, produce different levels of interiorisation of the Israel-Lebanon border and different uses of categories of identity defined by it.

The discreet presence today of southern Lebanese women in Arab villages of the Galilee hints to a moment (late 1970’s to 2000) of re-emerging pre-border practices (pre-1948) while their supple use of categories challenges and blurs the nation-state meaning expounded by the border and the spatial division it imposes. Contrastingly, the ripples sent out by the cast stone of SLA refugees throughout the Galilee’s double layered social fabric, Jewish and Arab, appear to enhance the more dynamic separation of groups along the nation-state cosmology materialized by the border, resulting in an endorsement and novel use of categories and labels such as “Israeli”, “Lebanese”, “Phoenician”, “Palestinian” and “Arab”.
Noemi GAL-OR, Institute for Transborder Studies (ITS) and Department of Political Science, Kwantlen Polytechnic University & Michael J. STRAUSS, Centre d’Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, Paris: The Shab’a farms: A geopolitical "who’s on first?".

The proposed paper looks at the Shab’a Farms - the linchpin excuse in the Hizb’Allah rhetoric justifying the destabilisation of the relationship Israel-Lebanon-Syria.

It contemplates the possibility of defusing a violent conflict by borrowing the lease - a légal instrument in domestic law of contract and real property and private international law – and turning it into a public international legal device.

The Shab’a (Shebaa) Farms, a tiny area located where Israel, Syria and Lebanon converge, is home to a geopolitical version of “Who’s on First?” It is arguably the most convoluted dispute over sovereignty and control in modern times, and has exasperated diplomats for decades.

Israel captured the Shab’a Farms from Syria during the Six-Day War of 1967 and still occupies the area today. But Syria says the occupied land is Lebanese. Lebanon agrees – at least in official statements. Its political leaders are not all convinced; one recently said the Shab’a Farms belongs to Syria and that Israel’s occupation there isn’t Lebanon’s problem. Lebanon has proposed that the United Nations take charge of the area. But the United Nations has agreed with Israel’s claim that the territory is Syrian. Enter Hezbollah, which insists it is Lebanese, and this is what keeps returning the Shab’a Farms to regional prominence: the militant group regularly shells Israel’s forces there, claiming that Israel is illegally encroaching on Lebanese territory.

The United States, the European Union, Egypt and others – all consider it necessary to résolve the Shab’a Farms conflict. As yet, none have had any success in pushing the parties toward a settlement.

Amid this confused situation, there are two things the Shab’a Farms don’t have: inhabitants (they left), and a claim by the Palestinians. The absence of these potential obstacles to a solution might make the dispute over the area more amenable to resolution than other territorial conflicts in the region.

Our paper, the first detailed work about the Shab’a Farms, will discuss how resolving this geographically small conflict can create the conditions for broader progress in regional peace talks. It will also propose to view the Shab’a Farms as a proto-type for the resolution of territorial conflicts by proposing a model of international trusteeship enabled by an international lease as a the legal instrument of conflict resolution.

Bastien SEPULVEDA, Université de Rouen: Le fleuve Bío-Bío dans le Chili central: les fonctions multiples et mobiles d’une frontière « naturelle ».

This paper deals with the multiple and mobil functions of a main river of central Chile called Bío-Bío. From 1641 to 1881, this river constituted a formal border between the Spanish kingdom –and then the Chilean state– and an indigenous territory controled by the Mapuches who made themselves famous for the strong resistance they pitted against the colonial power. The Araucanian Pacification campaign, led by the Chilean army in 1861, broke down the mapuche independance and took away from the Bío-Bío river its historic function of border. Progresively colonised and incorporated into the Chilean jurisdiction during the twentieth century, the southern fringe of the river still constitutes the framework of the contemporary indigenous geopolitical program. But rather than separating two different cultural entities, the Bío-Bío river
can be understood as a link connecting the two poles of the contemporary mapuche identity. From its origins in the andin lakes of the Alto Bío-Bío to its mouth on the Pacific coast among the inner city of Concepción, the Bío-Bío’s flow draws the route taken by many generations of Mapuches who’ve left in search of a better life.

Juan Manuel TRILLO, University Carlos III of Madrid, Valerià PAÜL, University of Santiago de Compostela: One of the oldest boundaries in Europe? A critical approach to the Spanish-Portuguese border in the central raia.

From an international point of view, the boundary between Spain and Portugal is one of the most stable in the world, with some authors arguing that it has a history of almost a thousand years, since Portugal became an independent kingdom at the beginning of the 12th century. However, that is not the case. Firstly, because the boundary was not clearly demarcated until the second half of the 19th century, although some previous attempts were accomplished, and indeed some major changes are reported in that century and before. Secondly, because the boundary has never acted as a line on the ground. Even in the worst period of ‘iron curtain’ at the middle of the 20th century, when Portugal and Spain were experiencing fierce dictatorships, the boundary was more a door for people coming from both sides than a barrier. It represented more a frontier-zone than a frontier-line, a reason why we suggest that historically it is more accurate to use the term border than boundary. Thirdly, since the entry of both states into the European Community in 1986, the border has substantially shifted towards new meanings and it no longer constitutes an over-imposed impediment continuously kept and reinforced by states, but it is seen as an opportunity for positive development in several ways.

Our case study focuses in the central sector of the border between Galicia (Spain) and Portugal, locally known as raia. Specifically, this is the area corresponding to the counties of Terra de Celanova, Baixa Limia and A Limia in Galicia, and the municipalities of Melgaço, Arcos de Valdevez, Ponte da Barca, Terras de Bouro and Montalegre in Portugal. It must first be stated that the border supposedly established in 1139 separated the kingdom of Galicia and the newly born kingdom of Portugal. Spain did not exist at this stage and consequently it cannot be said that the border between Spain and Portugal has a lifetime of almost nine centuries. Changes have been constant since the 12th century and there are uncertainties about where the border was established during this long time, and also, as it was stated, about the real meaning of border/boundary as a line. In this area of study, the definitive act of demarcation dates from 1864 and it represents the end of most of the existing spatial ‘doubts’, such as O Couto Mixto, a kind of free republic between Spain and Portugal with obscure roots in the Middle Ages that existed until the second half of the 19th century. Since then, the states have made an effort to close the border, but relations from both sides do persist and also in some critical moments there have been strong links such as the presence of guerrillas crossing the border and fighting against both dictatorships, different migration flows, or the very active smuggling for decades. Since 1986, smuggling has obviously disappeared and now new forms of borders are rising, for instance the creation of a cross-border national/natural park, the development of a shared Biosphere Reserve, or the implementation of different tools to improve cooperation.

This research starts from qualitative interview work carried out amongst the local people in order to understand the reconfiguration of the border and borderlands over the last decades. Also, it feeds from a systematic literature review of historians and geographers who have studied the area. This background revision has been very important in order to understand that the border has
not been historically stable as it was supposed to be, so that it is best conceived as a mobile and unstable border than as a fixed boundary line.

**Akihiro HIRAYAMA**, Hokkaido University: The Governance of Mountainous Borderlands in North Vietnam during the First Indochina War.

The First Indochina War was fought in the land of Vietnam as a war of independence from 1946 to 1954. At the beginning of the war, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam escaped the capital, Hà Nội, and moved to the mountainous provinces such as Thái nguyên and Tuyên Quang, which were located northwestward from Hà Nội. The French troops soon almost surrounded the location of the DRV government. This means that the French troops held a strong position in such regions as the Red river delta, the northern mountainous borderlands between North Vietnam and China, and the western mountainous borderlands between North Vietnam and Laos.

Under such a geopolitically isolated situation, the DRV government started to expand their political influence over the western mountainous regions in order to establish the trade route of military supplies from overseas Vietnamese in Thailand and Laos. Then, after the victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the Kuomintang Party in 1949, the DRV government tried to penetrate through the northern mountainous regions to acquire political and military supports from the People’s Republic of China. As a result of the war, the DRV government succeeded in embracing the rural societies and ethnic minorities in mountainous borderlands in North Vietnam.

In this presentation, I would like to illustrate the shifting power relation between the government of the DRV and the French troops during the First Indochina War, and examine how that power relation affected the governance of mountainous borderlands in North Vietnam.
Victor KONRAD, Carleton University: Impacts of Security Primacy on the Geography of the Canada-United States Borderlands.

The infusion of greater security to make the border between the U.S. and Canada more definitive and incisive has in fact created a broader borderland of border-related interaction, most of it aligned with and impacted by enhanced security. This condition of security primacy has had spillover effects in the borderlands where spatial and temporal concentration of security has constructed new landscapes, complications, security zones, ‘breaking points’ in borderland functions, and essentially a new geography of the Canada-U.S. borderlands. Six related impacts on territory, environment and community are discussed in this paper. First, and most apparent, is the spatial re-ordering resulting from paramount security: a more sharply defined and altered hierarchy of border crossing points, a stretched securitized zone between and beyond these points, expedited corridors funneled through the security zone, and differentiated extension of the security zone through the borderlands. Another impact of heightened security is the spatially focused and detrimental effect on the environment. Also, the social fabric of the borderlands is being stretched and torn with barriers, regulation changes, wait times, and restrictions of the heightened security border. Communities near the border are impacted socially and economically with enhanced security, whereas communities across the border are strained severely to the point of dissolution. A heightened sense of uncertainty prevails in these communities, and among the business, cultural and social groups who live there. Security primacy impacts most activity in the borderlands and it does so in unpredictable ways. Finally, pervasive security polarizes secured and non-secured spaces, places and people to create a segregated spatial dynamic in the borderlands that rivals the division enforced by the border itself. This paper explores the aforementioned impacts, and then suggests the dimensions of affirmation of borderlands community, place and culture that are necessary to realign the operational space that security primacy has appropriated.

Randy William WIDDIS, University of Regina, Department of Geography: Negotiating the Evolution of Canadian Borders and Canadian-American Borderlands: An Historical Approach.

In recent years, the study of borders has been preoccupied with a number of themes, including: the simultaneity of globalization and regionalization processes, the liminal nature of border regions, and the debordering/rebordering paradox. Together, these concerns along with others have led many to rethink the nature and role of borders in what is viewed to be a period of exceptional change. The borderless world hypothesis has been rejected as theorists have come to view borders and mobilities as complimentary rather than antithetical concepts. Contemporary borders are more differentiated than ever and the current phase of globalization is characterized by unprecedented flows and mobilities that transcend but do not eradicate borders. Today's borders are fluid, constantly remade by technology, new laws and institutions, security requirements and the realities of international commerce.
Yet while borders continue to exist and are arguably more fluid and dynamic than ever before, this doesn’t mean that borders prior to the current phase of globalization (1945 onwards) were relatively static and stable. Borders and borderlands are historically constructed, and therefore the meanings connected to them are constantly changing along with political, economic and social developments taking place both externally between and internally within states. As borders and borderlands change, so do their capacity to reterritorialize and rescale place and identity. Because nation-states are constructed and reconstructed to adapt to changing contexts, borders are, by necessity, malleable. What is constant is the fact that borders are always in a state of becoming, albeit at different rates and in different ways.

This paper contends that a more insightful understanding of the fluid and mobile nature of contemporary borders is afforded by an historical perspective that recognizes elements of the past in the present and views such boundaries as “the results of social action taking place in various institutional practices and on various historical and spatial scales” (Paasi, n.d.). Historical research in turn can benefit from the study of contemporary border and borderlands because researchers engaged in the latter have been generally more active and successful in conceptualizing and theorizing borders and borderlands than those engaged in the former (Wynn, 2006; Konrad and Nicol, 2008). In particular, a postmodern approach opens new routes of inquiry into the history of borders, boundaries and borderlands. This argument is developed with reference to Canadian borders, both internal and external, as they have evolved over time.


This presentation discusses power, culture and identity within a border studies framework focusing on Jim Lynch’s Border Songs, a novel set in the Pacific Northwest. The Peace Arch Park, featured prominently, is a symbol of mutual understanding and straddles the international boundary. There, people can walk from the United States to Canada and vice versa. Nevertheless, this historically grown interaction in the borderlands becomes increasingly difficult. Permeability of and mobility across the border is compromised. With the thickening of the Canada-U.S. border after 9/11, due to increased securitization and new documentation requirements for travelers (Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, 2009), local communities all along the 49th Parallel are at a crossroads.

Jim Lynch explores the struggle for power at and control of America’s Northern border by creating a most unusual Border Patrol agent in his novel. Protagonist Brandon Vanderkool’s striking physique, six-eight and “232 pounds of meat and bone stacked vertically beneath a lopsided smile” (4) is a reminder that he literally embodies Lynch’s humorous and subversive approach to power relations and the questioning of recent changes along the Line. The dyslexic Border Patrol agent sees things other people do not see, epitomized in his obsessive love and extraordinary skill for birding. While birding on the job, the rookie agent Brandon makes numerous busts of “buds and bodies” (63) alike and thus quickly turns into a “shit magnet” (65) in the eyes of the other less successful and unmotivated senior agents. By literary means, Lynch highlights and critiques the current transformations in the Canada-U.S. borderlands in terms of power, permeability, and mobility.
Nadia ACHEHBOU, Université de Strasbourg Laboratoire Cultures et Sociétés en Europe (CNRS / UdS) & Technische Universität Berlin, MISHA: Frontières mobiles: les villes du pèlerinage.

The borders are often thought in term of barriers. It is a wall on which we come to crash or a point which demands the payment of taxes. I suggest investigating the notion of border towards the sociology of religions, by reflecting it not in terms of lines and cracks, but by using the concept of spheres and curvatures. A shape which I take from Peter Sloterdijk's universe, in which the sphere is a plastic term. (Sloterdijk,1998; 2002)

I take as an example, the pilgrimage by choosing two cities: Jerusalem and Mecca. Both cities present a comparable political context: a political will of homogenisation of the population and an accelerated globalization.

This demonstration bases on one hand on a ground made in Jerusalem in 2010 within the framework of my researches. On the other hand for Mecca I am inspired by Omar Saghi’s book (Paris - Mecca, Saghi, on 2010) and narratives of pilgrimage.

In Jerusalem and in Mecca borders stresses the complexity of the concept of the border. A subject crossing the interdisciplinary research fields of sociology, geopolitics and philosophy. The purpose of the communication is to investigate a methodology stemming from these various disciplines.

Marc BERTIER & Jean-Marc STÉBÉ, Nancy Université – Université Nancy 2: Les frontières cognitives de l’intra-urbain.

Research published by the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) have allowed, through statistical figures given for micro-territories (IRIS), to implement the social photograph of an urban space. These maps, representing an urban networking, show zones in which economical and social difficulties are concentrated. The borders of these fragmented zones often but not systematically, corresponds to the borders of the neighbourhood of high-rise housing estates.

The analysis made by Louis Wirth (2006) on the jewish ghetto in Chicago points out the presence of an intangible border between the ghetto and the remainder of the urban territory. In the same way, we look for traces of symbolic borders in the city in order to define their presence- we will avoid the question of whether there are ghettos in France as it is not the subject of the communication. We can define these urban borders by considering a city as a space of communication through all items displayed in it such as building, street, bridge, urban furniture...

In addition we sharpen further our analysis by focusing on a specific architectural type, the high-rise housing estate, also limiting our research to the ones built around the city of Nancy.

Like Christian Devillers (1974), who considers the architectural type as a meaningful structure, we can say that the high-rise housing estate allows the reading of the city; We will explore the...
cognitive processes which give a meaning to architecture. We will show which social representation are linked to the high-rise housing estate, allowing us to read the hypothetical symbolic borders.

Anna DEWAELE, EHESS/CEIAS: De la ville ouverte à la ville des murs? Mutations et mobilités des frontières urbaines à Chandigarh.

Chandigarh is an Indian new town designed by Le Corbusier. The concept of urban borders in transition seems quite relevant in Chandigarh because of its history, its organization and its appropriations. Within the framework of this conference, it is especially interesting to study the contemporary transformations of the urban borders and their perceptions inside this emblematic town of the 20th century.

First, we can notice that the border between India and Pakistan has an impact on Chandigarh. This is an closed border because of the complex and turbulent relations between the two countries since the Partition. The creation of this new border is the reason of the foundation of Chandigarh, the choice of its creation's site but it also explains the strong symbols linked to this new town. Chandigarh is supposed to represent independent India, its modernity and its power against Pakistan. The Indian government decided to put Le Corbusier in charge of the design of Chandigarh because of its modern theories in architecture and urban design. Due to this context, there is a concrete but also an intangible border between the two country.

Beyond this context of foundation, we can notice that the concept of border in transition could be questioned at different scales. Nowadays Chandigarh seems to be separated from its satellite-towns and even from its country. Le Corbusier designed a green border around the city. It was an area of non-construction within a 16 km radius. This separation was reinforced in 1966 when Chandigarh became an Union Territory and the State capital of Punjab and Haryana. The urban border became a State border. In reaction to this change, the States of Punjab and Haryana decided to create each a satellite-town inspired by the urban morphology of Chandigarh. Competitiveness started between the three town and the urban border became stronger. This situation inspired an island imagination. We can observe various no man's lands between Chandigarh and its satellite-towns. The borders of the city are clearly identified and people declare that Chandigarh is not really in India. A new strong border is created between the town and the national territory.

Inside the city of Chandigarh, we can notice that the urban borders move in space and time. Originally the open space was one of the main concept of the new town. Equally Le Corbusier designed the master plan on the principle of functions’ segregation. Therefore some urban borders were present since the foundation of Chandigarh. But we can notice nowadays that the number of urban borders seems to increase at the different scales of the town. We can observe the construction of walls around the sectors, fences around the open spaces and extension of private houses to the detriment of public spaces. There is a mobility and a marking of those urban borders. Those changes are presented as heritage of the original principles of modernity and functionalism. Originally Chandigarh was supposed to “be open to give ; open to receive” like the main symbol of Chandigarh, the Open Hand. According to some inhabitants, Chandigarh is nowadays a “city of walls”. Those new limits are reinforced by the relations between the centre and the periphery and also by the socio-spatial segregation. In the same time, some old urban
borders disappear like the green border that is nowadays turned into an information and technology park. The spaces of transition in Chandigarh become, bit by bit, real urban borders. Beyond the list of those many urban borders in transition at different scales, this paper deals with their social and identity issues. The creation and the transformation of urban borders is a way of appropriation of Chandigarh. Within the framework of urban borders in transition, we can also deal with the evolution of this new town and its symbols.


Hebron is an emblematic example of the effects of occupation upon communities and of the creation of internal urban borders. The 1994 massacre at the Ibrahimi Mosque led to the creation of the 1997 Protocol of Hebron, which divided the city into two parts. The largest part of the city, H1, is under Palestinian Authority control, while H2, which includes the Old City, was placed under Israeli Military control. The Old City is the heart of the traditional Hebronite culture. Hebron is one of the oldest cities in the world, dating back 5500 years ago.

More than 80,000 Palestinians live in the Old City, alongside a population of 400 Israeli settlers, who are protected by approximately 1500 soldiers. Within the Old City, there are ‘restricted areas.’ These are as a result of the Jewish settlements and the Second Intifada in 2000, which led to the gradual closure of Al Shuhada Street, transforming this lively economic centre into a ‘ghost town.’ These areas now have a higher presence of military control.

Considering this specific context and the need for comprehensive data regarding the impacts of the occupation in the Old City, a pilot project was conducted on two areas of the Old City: upper Al Shuhada Street and Haret Al Salayme. These areas are considered representative and significant because of their proximity to Israeli settlements and because they sit at either end of the belt of settlements stretching along Al Shuhada Street. These two areas experience the occupation in different ways. For example, Al Shuhada Street sits immediately facing two settlements, while Haret Al Salayme is close by but not immediately next to a settlement. As a result, the residents of the former are not permitted to rehabilitate their homes and transporting supplies into a restricted area blocked by checkpoints is difficult. The latter has received significant assistance from the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee in an attempt to restore the neighbourhood.

The paper will focussed on results and prospects of this pilot project around four major themes; home and place attachment, hardship, symbolic violence and coping mechanisms, as they relate to the physical and social realities of occupation.

Home and place attachment:

The notion of ownership and the bond to the house and land were particularly pertinent. Despite the occupation, staying in the Old City, in order to maintain a Palestinian presence, is a form of resistance. The sense of belonging to the community is linked to the land, the built environment, kinship and ancestry.

Place attachment seems as important as home attachment. Often the place identity is expressed through the belonging to the Old City or the surroundings of Ibrahimi Mosque, more than belonging to a specific physical house, particularly for those renting. The notion of holiness and Hebron being their ancestral land is particularly strong.

Ardships:
Hardships can be divided between direct and indirect victimisation. Among the direct victimisations, all forms of violence (physical, psychological, structural and symbolic) are palpable: daily harassment, verbal insults, stone throwing and dog attacks, as well as the shutting or burning of shops, the closure and inaccessibility of goods and social services (such as medical care).

Indirect victimization includes the restriction of freedom of movement, denying people the right to visit family and friends freely. It has also impacted upon the fulfillment of cultural traditions. Marriage is a key issue. Moving to the Old City is not attractive for future brides or grooms and the ceremony is often required to be held outside the Old City breaking the traditional norm of holding it at the bride’s family home.

Above the factual occupation, there is a tendency for inhabitants of the Old City to create ‘mental walls,’ a form of self imposed occupation. Fears and unpredictability lead to self imposed restriction of movement and incapacity to imagine the future.

Symbolic violence:
As well as numerous acts of physical and psychological violence, significant acts of symbolic violence were observed. Symbolic violence can be described as a form of violence which target values, culture and social norms of a specific community. In the Old City, one can refer to Bogdanovic’s concept of urbicide or Hanafi’s concept of spaciocide. Destruction or harm to the built environment, cultural practices and the denial of mobility, are significant act of symbolic violence. Due to the settlements above, public spaces belonging to the Palestinian community have been spoilt by rubbish thrown on them, with no exception given to religious sites. Additionally, the difficulties of using rooftops or obtaining new items, whether furniture, building materials or otherwise, and the prohibition of repairing homes, are representative of the same form of violence. Many families have a complicated locking system, in order for them to feel safer.

Coping mechanisms and Sumud:
Despite the occupation and the continued suffering of the Palestinian people in the Old City, inhabitants in H2 have developed common coping mechanisms in order to face the current situation. Faith, relationships with neighbours, family ties and friendship were among the most prominent.

One of the major coping strategies of the people of the Old City is to avoid confrontation; by scheduling school timetables and planning spaces in a way that settlers and Palestinians do not interact with each other. In some cases this leads to the denial of occupation in order to consider life as normal as possible.

The use of social networking sites (including Facebook) and rooftops are also common coping mechanisms. The first enables the community to create a connection with the outside world and acts as an information tool. The second gives some individuals a sense of control and protection when looking out at the Old City from the rooftop. Additionally, it is a space of freedom and creativity, sometimes used as a rooftop garden.


The Wall is certainly the most extreme form a border can take, that which resembles the most to a complete closing between two societies (Raffestin, 2005). The Berlin Wall was not only a material object dividing “sustainably” the former capital of Germany in two, it also had a large influence at the emotional and symbolic level. The dismantling of the Wall in 1990 led to a large spatial...
discontinuity which divides the urban infrastructure of a reunified city. More than 20 years after
the reunification (“Die Wende”), we try to understand the transformations on the space previously
occupied by the Wall. What remains from this object when the actors who built it have
disappeared? How have the traces left by its dismantling been managed? How have the public
authorities sought to convert this space?

The challenge for public bodies was first to bring together the two Berlin on administrative,
morphological and functional levels. Thus, the Wall and its traces still emerged as a discontinuity
that had to be reduced. Then, a process of giving new meaning to the Wall through the
implementation of different landscape plans began. The public bodies then south to enhance
some of the memory of the Wall while promoting the development of new urban functions, for
instance, that of recreational activities. The way in which this space has been designed and
developed not only reveals the differences of interests of each actor, but also and especially their
representations.

The divergent interpretation of the history of Germany (especially the period of the division
between two States) became a source of conflict. However, although dismantled and rejected by
the people right after the Reunification, the Wall has become a fundamental component of the
urban identity of Berlin in the beginning of the beginning of the 21st century.

Bénédicte TRATNJEK, Université Paris-Sorbonne: Frontières mobiles et fragmentations spatiales
dans les villes en guerre: de la géographie des combats à la géographie de la peur.

Cette proposition de communication s’appuie sur des recherches empiriques et bibliographiques
menées dans le cadre d’un doctorat en géographie sur les villes en guerre, dans une approche
comparatiste (principalement Abidjan, Beyrouth, Mitrovica et Sarajevo). Au prisme de ces espaces
urbains où chaque acteur en arme tente d’imposer dans la ville son discours et ses intentionnalités
politiques, il est possible d’interroger le concept de frontières mobiles : en effet, les lignes de front
et les lignes de fractures dans les villes en guerre ne doivent pas être entendues comme des
« hasards » des batailles. Il existe, dans ces villes, une géographie des combats qui est mise en
scène par les belligérants, afin d’asseoir leur contrôle territorial sur un quartier ou sur l’ensemble
de la ville. Comprendre les intentionnalités des différents types de belligérants revient à mettre en
exergue leurs stratégies territoriales dans la ville. Au prisme de la notion de « quartier-territoire »
proposée par la géographe Elisabeth Dorier-Apprill, on se propose d’interroger les différents sens
des frontières urbaines, et surtout leur utilisation par les acteurs en arme pour mettre en place
une « géographie de la peur », s’appuyant sur des modifications coercitives du peuplement dans la
ville. Qu’il s’agisse de rivières-frontières, de frontières mentales ou de frontières matérialisées
sous la forme de barricades ou de murs, elles procèdent d’une fragmentation de la ville comme
espace politique qui tend à s’ancrer dans l’immédiat après-guerre et menace le processus de
pacification.

La question de la frontière dans la ville prend en compte trois types de division : les frontières
matérialisées, les frontières vécues et les frontières revendiquées. Les premières sont visibles dans
la ville, tandis que les deux autres types procèdent d’une conceptualisation mentale d’une division
vécue ou voulue qui se traduit principalement dans les pratiques spatiales des groupes qui
s’identifient comme « différents » par rapport aux « Autres », c’est-à-dire à ceux qui vivent dans
« l’autre » territoire délimité par cette frontière intériorisée. Pour qu’il y ait différenciation, il faut
qu’il y ait catégorisation. C’est pourquoi, les territoires vécus sont délimités dans l’imaginaire
collectif en fonction d’une appartenance et d’une appropriation du territoire, qu’elles soient effectives ou fantasmées. Dans les faits, ces trois types de frontières s’entremêlent, s’alternent, voire se confrontent. L’intérêt de cette distinction est de révéler les pratiques spatiales des habitants à travers les contraintes matérielles qui leur sont imposées (telles que les murs, les barricades, les grillages, les check-points...) et les contraintes immatérielles qui leur sont inculquées (à travers les discours politiques, qu’ils reposent sur le sentiment identitaire ou l’appartenance sociale). Tous ces types de frontières urbaines sont donc le fruit d’un construit social qui traduit les rivalités entre les acteurs de la ville.

Les frontières vécues procèdent de représentations mentales : elles résultent d’une géographie de la peur qui aboutit à un enfermement communautaire et à une volonté de distanciation. Les communautés ainsi territorialisées peuvent être définies par leur identité culturelle (religieuse, ethnique, linguistique), sociale et/ou politique : il ne faut pas limiter l’analyse aux seuls critères culturels, encore moins à la seule ethnie ou religion. Les frontières vécues peuvent coïncider ou non avec des lignes de front issues du conflit et il conviendra d’interroger leur pérennité au regard de cette confrontation entre lignes de fracture vécues et lignes de combat. Bien qu’elles soient le fruit de représentations mentales, les frontières vécues tendent à se rendre visibles soit par leur matérialisation, soit par leur transformation en no man’s land. Dans les deux cas, la violence de la guerre accélère l’homogénéisation des territoires perçus comme délimités par des frontières mentales. Leur visibilité et leur linéarité sont générées par les pratiques spatiales qui résultent des appropriations territoriales (réelles et/ou vécues) par les deux communautés ainsi séparées et des processus d’identification de ces groupes en rejet de « l’Autre ». Elles aboutissent à des différenciations spatiales qui produisent des discontinuités dans l’espace urbain, qui sont directement liées aux sentiments d’insécurisation.

Ces lignes de fracture perçues peuvent également se transformer en frontières revendiquées. Il s’agit alors pour des acteurs politiques de concrétiser la délimitation de leur territoire, ou du moins du territoire qu’ils revendiquent comme tel. L’analyse de la fragmentation politique de la ville en guerre doit pour autant ne pas faire abstraction des spécificités de chaque ville, mais également prendre en compte les stratégies territoriales différenciées des nombreux acteurs politiques à l’intérieur d’une même ville : tous ne militent pas pour une fragmentation de l’espace urbain en une multitude d’espaces politiques juxtaposés sans articulation entre eux. Par conséquent, la notion de frontières revendiquées relève de l’étude des intentionnalités des différents acteurs politiques et de la territorialisation de leurs objectifs entre intentions et contraintes. Il est donc primordial d’éclairer l’analyse en posant ces différents acteurs urbains, leurs discours, leurs intentionnalités, leurs actions, leurs interactions, leur place dans la société urbaine, leur rôle dans la communauté (à l’échelle de la ville ou du quartier, au niveau de la société urbaine ou de la communauté identitaire, sociale et/ou politique...), leurs moyens... Ces délimitations dans la ville sont le fruit d’un construit social et politique et traduisent de nouvelles territorialités, qui sont autant de défis dans les processus de reconstruction et de pacification.
Session 41. Multi-scalar perspectives of mobile borders governance / Perspectives multi-scalaires de la gouvernance des frontières mobiles (3)

Lucile MEDINA, UMR ART-Dév, Université Montpellier 3 : Les coopérations et mobilisations collectives comme éléments d’un débordement des frontières.

The paper aims to question the mobile nature of political boundaries, with reference to their varying degree of closure, the changing nature of their functions and of their perception by concerned actors. Mobility will not be considered here in a physical sense, or resulting from an internal or external projection, but in the sense that boundaries are always shifting.

Latin America boundaries and especially those of Central America ones, the field of our research, are mobilized for this analysis. Many of Latin America boundaries have undergone a reversal of perspective, linked with emerging regional integration processes. From often disputed margins to icons of the sovereignty of independent countries, boundaries are key spaces of national and transboundary cooperation.

Our aim is to contribute to the debate on "moving borders” launched by the organizers of the symposium. We analyse their relative erasure or at least their new malleability, due to ongoing cooperation on both sides of borders. We want to focus not only on institutional cooperation but also on transboundary mobilization and collective action initiated by the "civil society", whose emergence is more recent. How and on which basis do they emerge? How do they go beyond the border and contribute to change its function and the way people perceive it?

We will emphasize in particular these two drivers of shifting borders:
- First, transboundary cooperation programs. These institutional initiatives bring together local actors and are often driven by the countries themselves, encouraged by supranational bodies; they have been met with mixed success.
- Second, emerging cross-border and transnational mobilizations. These mobilizations often result from cooperation projects or sometimes emerge as a response to contested projects (factories, etc.). They constitute a recent and less researched field of investigation and will be addressed here in more detail. The case of the Gulf of Fonseca (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua), a space of shared livelihoods and resources, offers an illustrative example of this emergence.

Laetitia PERRIER BRUSLÉ, IRD Bolivie: Faire le mur et construire des ponts. Evolution paradoxe d’une région transfrontalière à la tri-frontière Bolivie-Brésil-Pérou.

The Bolivia-Brazil-Peru tri-border region, located in Amazonia, was at first divided by a paper borderline which existed only on maps. The Bolivian state, in its foundation period, was unable to make it exist on the ground. At the end of the nineteenth century, rubber exploitation had begun. It changed the destiny of these margins abandoned by the national states. This empty and lonely space became attractive. For the three states, the aim was to appropriate the new Eldorado and make borders effective. For Bolivia and Peru in particular, it soon became clear that the flux of Brasilian Nordestins migrants represented a threat for their fragile sovereignty. Finally, imbalance of states’ power and of number of inhabitants explains the Brazil’s territorial gains. In Bolivia this territorial lost has left deep wounds in the collective memory. From this date, the Bolivian people has realized that the Northern frontier is weak and that it should be defended and protected. It
should be a fence more than a bridge. But it has been impossible to make this ambitious project a reality. Because of the lack of contact with the national center, the inhabitants have been obliged, until today, to establish trans-border relations in order to deal with the difficulty of goods supply. The border has been a place of intense trade.

These historical perspectives allow us to understand the contemporary evolution of the tri-border region, marked by the dialectic of opening and closing at a time when continental integration obliges South American states to foster circulation of goods on their border. In this communication I will present functional and symbolic ambivalences of South American borders, backing up the reflection with the Bolivian frontier. The focus will be multi scalar and the method is based on the multiplicity of points of view. For example, according to the continental integration scheme, the tri-border must be opened because it’s located in a strategic place,. On the other hand, at the national scale, the border seems to head towards more closure. The migrants coming from the Andes make both sides of the border move away because their conception of the border is based on the nationalist representation of the territory as a besieged citadel.

The interest of the Bolivian case lies in the fact that the country shows a paradoxical evolution since the first Evo Morales election in 2005. The Indian’s president has not innovated in the field of political representation. In a certain way, he has revived a centre-based power when former liberal governments had developed local governance. At the scale of the border, this situation results in contradictory processes: closure and colonization of the border by Andean people and de facto opening of the border thanks to local informal regulations. Our reflection about material and spatial inscription of Bolivian borders can be placed in the studies’ field of the type of regulations and controls which exist in border regions and which depend on national contexts. We will also explain how the traditional border dialectic (opening-closing) can be transcended by a multi scalar approach.

Jean-Louis SANKA, UMR-CNRS 5185 ADES, Université Michel de Montaigne (Bordeaux3): Les dimensions économiques, politiques, régionales et spatiales des Néo-Urbanités frontalières des Rivières du sud / The economical, political, regional and spatial dimensions of The Rivers of South borders Neo-Urbanities.

Xavier MARCHAND-TONEL, Laboratoire d’Étude et de Recherche sur l’Économie, les Politiques et les Systèmes sociaux (LEREPS), Université Toulouse I Capitole: La désinstitutionnalisation paradoxale d’une frontière. L’exemple du programme européen INTERREG IIIa France-Espagne.

An attempt to reduce the effects of a national frontier may lead to the weakening of the latter but also to its reinstitutionalization and to the creation of new demarcations.

Our study deals with the programme INTERREG IIIa France-Spain, that was financed by the European Union during the period 2001-2008 in order to promote an integrated development between the regions located on both sides of the Pyrénées. It is essentially based on the method of the « strategic analysis of organizations » (Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg). Several techniques were used: an analysis of the legal rules, over thirty semi-structured interviews with the main actors of this policy and a direct observation of the monitoring and steering committees for three years.

The frontier appears to have remained a structuring factor of INTERREG IIIa France-Spain. It had some major consequences on the functioning of the programme: it was a constraint through the national budgets of structural funds, the balanced distribution of roles between the institutions of the two countries and the demand of a french-spanish partnership in every project asking for a
financial support. However, this policy was the frame of a cross-border governance for at least two reasons: the actors involved knew each other very well, which made arrangements generally easy to find, and the programme had a leader, the Conseil régional d’Aquitaine, that was weak but that could settle conflicts in a « transformational » way (James MacGregor Burns). Nevertheless, INTERREG IIIa France-Spain had its own outside and inside boundaries: it could subsidize almost only operations set up in the départements and provincias along the Pyrénées and it was divided in three territorial subsystems that were not totally but broadly distinct. The frontier was not abolished: it was split and blurred.
Session 42. Mobile Borders of the Korean Peninsula in regional perspective / Les frontières mobiles de la péninsule coréenne dans une perspective régionale

Takashi KIMURA, Kyushu University: South Korean Democratization and the Politics Surrounding the Revival of the Dignity of Political Dissidents.

The Korean peninsula is one of the last arenas in the world where the Cold War still exists, which is greatly influencing the peace and security in this region. This presentation will examine the “divided nations” of the Korean peninsula taking into consideration that despite that there is no significant military confrontation in the area the two nations are still “at war” and there exists a situation which time of peace and war are paradoxically coexisting in the Korean peninsula.

More specifically, this presentation poses to explore the peace of East Asia through the analysis of “questionable deaths” and “public peace incidents” as symbols of the political oppression during the military junta in South Korea and how these deaths and incidents were dealt with after the post-military junta or after the transition to democracy in 1987 and how that has affected the national narrative in South Korea and the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and neighbouring regions.

Hyein HAN, Kunguk University: Logic of Inclusion or Exclusion?: The Korean Diaspora in Sakhalin.

The Chosun people that emigrated to Sakhalin through the policies Imperial Japan, were able to return to Korea as "permanent returnees" 44 years after “liberation.” At present or 66 years after liberation, the Chosun or Korean people that have returned from Sakhalin still face various problems and issues in terms of adapting to their so-called “hometown” of Korea which is still deeply rooted with “anti-communist” ideology.

Some have raised the issue that the responsibility for such problems have derived from the colonial rule of Japan which abandoned their fundamental responsibility after the war, however, it is clearly evident that the South Korean as well as the North Korean government also have historic responsibility as they have abandoned the Sakhalin Korean problem in light of the political tool for stability or maintaining their systems.

The presentation will analyze the issues of the permanent return of Sakhalin, with particular emphasis on the logic utilized by concerned parties, how the Korean government saw the issue even after concluding the Japan-Korea treaty, and how the Soviet Union and Japan included and excluded the Sakhalin Koreans in the political context of the divided nations of the Korean peninsula, using Korean diplomatic archives and newspaper articles.

The economic cooperation between North Korea and China has entered a new phase since the 2000s and opened continuously, however, the scale, content and method of economic cooperation has entered a new dimension. One of the important characteristics of the new economic cooperation is the strategic judgment of China vis-à-vis its policy toward North Korea. In the past, international political relations that surround the Korean Peninsula were limited to simple economic relations. However, the two countries economic cooperation could possibly affect and influence the nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, sanctions and the regime itself.

This presentation will explore the North Korean and Chinese economic cooperation and its influences in Northeast Asia by examining the “northeastern promotion plan” which includes the regional cooperation among North Korea and the three northeastern provinces of China which are Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning. This area in the past was known to be the most industrialized area in China with a heavy concentration on heavy and chemical industries and state-owned enterprises until the open door policy was implemented in 1980s and seriously deteriorated in 1990s. However, the Chinese motioned a strategy in 2003 to build and promote this area once again. While energy sources and the demand for mineral resources suddenly increased with the economic development of the northeast area, the incomes for North Korea mineral resources of Chinese companies increased, and the North Korean mine investment for security of energy sources and the original material have begun to rapidly increase as well. Such economic cooperation will greatly affect the future of North Korean foreign economic relations and could lead to a new order in Northeast Asia.