Research seminars and Conferences in Economics and Econometrics
Friday March 1st, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Sidartha GORDON (Sciences Po, Paris)
" Hyperbole, Litotes and Irony in a Noisy Communication Game "
Abstract: We provide a class of tractable communication games where messages are noisy and the lying costs increase in the magnitude of the lie. Games in this class admit Nash-Bayesian equilibria where both players use affine strategies. There can be between one and five affine equilibria, all of them partially informative. There is always at least one, but at most three straight talk equilibria, in which both players' strategies are increasing. The sender may exaggerate in at most one of these equilibria, but possibly in none. There can also be up to two ironic equilibria, where both players' strategies are decreasing. In general, the optimal level of noise is not zero and differs for the two players. The receiver may prefer to deal with a less honest sender. If the receiver also has some information at the outset, both players may prefer the receiver to be initially less well informed. Finally, we study the limit of the equilibria as either (i) the noise vanishes or (ii) the lying cost vanishes.
with Georg NÖLDEKE (University of Basel)
Friday March 8, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Jamele RIGOLINI (World Bank, Washington)
Friday March 15, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Pierre-Philippe COMBES (Université de la Méditerranée / Aix-Marseille II)
" The Costs of Agglomeration: Land Prices in French Cities "
Abstract: We develop a new methodology to estimate the elasticity of urban costs with respect to city population using French land price data. Our preferred estimate, which handles a number of estimation concerns, stands at 0.041. Our approach also yields a number of intermediate outputs of independent interest such as a distance gradient for land prices and the elasticity of unit land prices with respect to city population. For the latter, our preferred estimate is 0.72.
with Gilles Duranton (University of Toronto)
Friday March 22, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Marion JANSEN (WTO and Université de Genève)
Friday April 12, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Julia SCHMIDT (IHEID)
Friday April 19, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Cédrid TILLE (IHEID)
Friday April 26, 2013 at 12h15, room M3220
Carmen MARCHIORI (LSE)
*** OLD SEMINARS ***
Friday December 14, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Alessandro MISSALE (Università di Milano)
--Seminar presented by Professor Alessandro MISSALE has been cancelled and replaced with a presentation by Professor Jaya KRISHNAKUMAR--
Jaya KRISHNAKUMAR (Université de Genève)
"Quantitative methods for capability approach "
Friday December 7, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
-SEMINAR CANCELLED-
Cédric TILLE (IHEID)
" A bargaining theory of trade invoicing and prices "
Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of international trade pricing where individual exporters and importers bargain over the price and expo- sure to exchange rate fluctuations. We find that the choice of price and invoicing currency reflect the full market structure of an industry, including the extent of fragmentation and the size heterogeneity across importers and across exporters. A low the effective bargaining weight of importers translates into high import prices and a low exchange rate pass-through into import prices. We characterize the outcomes under alternative market structures. The market structure matters not only for the outcome of specific exporter-importer pairs but also for aggregate variables such as the average import price, the average choice of invoicing currency, and the correlation between invoice currency choices and the sizes of trade transactions.
Friday November 30, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Fabrice MURTIN (OECD)
With Jean-Marc Robin
Friday November 23, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Salvatore DI FALCO (Université de Genève)
"Trading Off Human Vs Social Capital: Family Ties and Schooling Decisions "
Abstract: We analyze whether traditional sharing norms within kinship networks affect education decisions of poor black households in KwaZulu Natal. Theory predicts that the size of the kinship network ambiguously impacts on the incentive to invest in human capital (due to opposing “empathy” and “free rider” effects). Our empirical analysis, based on panel data, suggests the latter effect dominates: forced solidarity within the network discourages investments in human capital.
Monday November 19, 2012 at 17h15, room MS150
***Conférence Luigi Solari***
Prof. Robert ENGLE (Winner of the 2003 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences)
"European Systemic Risk "
Friday November 16, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Lukas MENKHOFF (Universität Hannover)
"Currency risk premia and macro fundamentals "
Friday November 9, 2012
Midterm Break
Friday November 2, 2012 at 11h15, room M5220 (in the Statistics Seminar)
Vladimir SPOKOINY (WIAS Berlin)
"Sparse Non-Gaussian Component Analysis"
Abstract: Non-Gaussian component analysis (NGCA) is an unsupervised method ofextracting a linear structure from a high dimensional data based onestimating a low-dimensional non-Gaussian data component. In this paper wediscuss a new approach to direct estimation of the projector on the targetspace based on semidefinite programming which improves the methodsensitivity to a broad variety of deviations from normality. We present thesetup of SNGCA. Then we introduce the new approach to recovery of thenon-Gaussian subspace and analyze its accuracy. Further we provide asimulation study and application examples, where we compare the performanceof the proposed algorithm SNGCA to that of some known projective methods offeature extraction.
Friday October 26, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Frédéric ROBERT-NICOUD (Université de Genève)
Abstract: Large cities produce more output per capita than small cities. This may occur because more talented individuals sort into large cities, because large cities select more productive entrepreneurs and firms, or because of agglomeration economies. We develop a model of systems of cities that combines all three elements and suggests interesting complementarities between them. The model can replicate stylised facts about sorting, agglomeration, and selection in cities. It can also generate Zipf's law for cities. Finally, it provides a useful framework within which to reinterpret existing empirical evidence.
With Kristian Behrens (UQAM) and Gilles Duranton (University of Toronto)
Friday October 19, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Mathieu COUTTENIER (UNIL) and Sophie HATTE (Paris)
"Mass media ex ante effects on the production of information: evidence from NGO reports"
Abstract: The media report news that in turn influences behaviors. This news is drawn from a set of available information. In this paper, we study how the set of information is ‘’ex ante’’ affected by the coverage strategies of media. First, we take an exogenous but anticipated shock of media coverage: the occurrence of sport mega-events (Olympic Games and FIFA World Cups). Then, we estimate the effect of this media coverage shock on the production of reports by NGOs. We use a unique database that collects the reports of NGOs on a sample of 572 firms in 140 countries between 2002 and 2010. Those reports deal with firm practices, and we know whether the tone of the speech is positive for the reputation of the firm or negative. We find that the profit-maximizing decision of the media in terms of coverage significantly impacts the production of information. More precisely, low complementary stories (reports on host and participant countries) are significantly less reported by NGOs, while the number of reports on highly complementary stories (practices of sponsors) significantly increases. Further, the fall in NGO reports about host and participant countries is driven by a fall in information that is good for firms’ reputation, and bad reports remain unaffected. On the contrary, both positive and negative reports concerning sponsors increase thanks to this change in the media coverage.
by Sophie Hatte (Paris School of Economics and University of Rouen) and Mathieu Couttenier (HEC Lausanne - DEEP)
Friday October 12, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
SEMINAR CANCELLED
Friday October 5, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Christoph WEISS (Uni Padua)
"Books are forever: Early life conditions, education and lifetime earnings in Europe"
Abstract: We estimate the effect of education on lifetime earnings by distinguishing between individuals who lived in rural or urban areas during childhood and between individuals with access to many or few books at home at age ten. We instrument years of education using compulsory school reforms and find that, whereas individuals in rural areas were most affected by the reforms, those with many books enjoyed substantially higher returns to their additional education. We argue that the longlasting beneficial effects of having books are due to the cultural environment in the household and the development of cognitive skills rather than short-term liquidity constraints.
By Giorgio Brunello, Guglielmo Weber and Christoph T. Weiss
Friday September 28, 2012 at 14h15, room MR040
Ricardo MORA and Iliana REGGIO, (Universidad Carlos III, Madrid)
Abstract: Difference-In-Differences (DID) estimators are widely used in empirical research in economics. The usual assumption to identify the impact of a specific treatment is that the average change in the outcome variable for the treated in the absence of treatment is equal to the average change in the outcome variable for the non-treated. For applications in which more than one pre-treatment period are available, we propose a simple regression model in which a set of estimators based on alternative DID trend assumptions can be easily computed and it is possible to test the validity of some assumptions and the equivalence of results. We provide an evaluation of how relevant the alternative assumptions are by applying the method to data from several recent papers.
Friday September 21, 2012 at 11h15, room M5220
Michele PELLIZZARI (OECD Paris)
"Evaluating students’ evaluations of professors "
Abstract: This paper contrasts measures of teacher effectiveness with the students’ evaluations for the same teachers using administrative data from Bocconi University. The effectiveness measures are estimated by comparing the performance in follow-on coursework of students who are randomly assigned to teachers. We find that teacher quality matters substantially and that our measure of effectiveness is negatively correlated with the students’ evaluations of professors. A simple theory rationalizes this result under the assumption that students evaluates professors based on their realized utility, an assumption that is supported by additional evidence that the evaluations respond to meteorological conditions.
Friday May 18, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Claudia Keser, (Universität Göttingen)
Friday May 11, 2012 CANCELLED
Olivier Cadot (UNIL)
Friday May 4, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Jacques Silber and Joseph Deutsch (Université de Bar-Ilan)
" On Standards of Living and Equality of Opportunity in Latin America: A Look at the First Decade of the Twenty First Century "
Abstract: This paper looks at socio-economic mobility in Latin America during the first decade of the twenty first century. It takes an ordinal approach to analyze the intergenerational transmission of opportunities for standard of living. Such an ordinal approach allows one to rank matrices giving, for example for various countries, the distribution of individuals by level of education of their parents and the standard of living category to which they belong. Such comparisons are based on the concepts of rank and Generalized Lorenz dominance. The empirical illustration is based on the data of the 2000 and 2009 Latinobarómetro surveys which covered up to 17 Latin American countries. The standard of living of individuals (children) was estimated on the basis of two different methods: an algorithm computing the most common order of acquisition of durable goods and access to services, on the basis of which an ordered logit regression is estimated, and a correspondence analysis from which a latent variable assumed to measure the standard of living is derived.
Friday April 27, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Jose Ramon Uriarte (Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del Pais Vasco)
"Doubts and Equilibria"
Abstract: In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model by means of similarity relations. These cognitive features, together with an adaptive learning process guiding agents' choice behavior leads to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concept of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibrium and study its relationship with the Nash equilibrium concept.
Friday April 20, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Klaus Desmet (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
"Resistance to Technology Adoption: The Rise and Decline of Guilds"
Abstract: This paper analyzes the decision of workers specialized in the current technology to form guilds and block the adoption of a more productive technology that does not require their specialized inputs. We show that there is an inverted-U relation between guilds and the size of the market. When markets are small, firms do not want to adopt the more productive technology as profits cannot cover the fixed R and D costs. Hence, workers have no need to form guilds. For intermediate size markets, firm profits are large enough to cover the fixed R and D costs, but not large enough to compensate the existing workers for lower earnings, and so workers form guilds and block adoption. For large markets, these profits become sufficiently large to either compensate workers for lower earnings or defeat any resistance put up by workers. Hence, guilds disband and the more productive technology diuses throughout the economy. We verify that this inverted-U relation between guilds and market size exists in a data set on Italian guilds from the Middle Ages.
Friday March 30, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Salvatore Di Falco (London School Economics)
"Placebo -Effect in Randomized Controlled Trials for Development? Some Evidence from a Double-Blind Field Experiment in Tanzania"
Abstract: Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in the social sciences are not double-blind, so participants know they are "treated" and will adjust their behavior accordingly. Under some conditions this gives rise to so-called "pseudo-placebo effects," which may bias assessment of impact. We implement a conventional economic RCT and a double-blind experiment in rural Tanzania (randomly allocating modern and traditional cowpea seed-varieties to farmers), and speculate that placebo effects may play a role.
Friday March 16, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Rahul Mukherjee (Graduateinstitute Geneva)
"Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows"
Abstract: Countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets and exhibit concentrated corporate ownership. An equilibrium business cycle model of international capital flows with corporate governance frictions between outside and insider investors explains both phenomena. Investment dynamics under insider control leads relative dividend and labor income for outsiders to be more negatively correlated in countries with weaker institutions. Consequently, outsiders hold more domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. I provide empirical evidence on this hedging demand. Concentrated ownership arises because international diversification through the sale of domestic assets by insiders is penalized by lower stock market valuation.
Friday March 9, 2012 at 12h15, room M3220
Michael Wolf (Universität Zürich)
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Friday December 16, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Arusha Cooray (University of Wollongong)
Friday December 9, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Raphael Studer (University of Zurich)
Friday December 2, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Volker Grossmann (University of Fribourg)
We analyze the optimal policy towards growth and innovation in a semi-endogenous growth framework. By carefully calibrating the model, our results indicate that in advanced countries R and D should be subsidized to a much larger degree than is currently the case. This could entail very substantial welfare gains. It may not even induce short-run losses in consumption per capita, despite higher R and D investment. Moreover, we find that the optimal R and D subsidy to firms should change little over time, despite long transitional dynamics. It does not depend on the distribution of R and D skills in the workforce. The optimal subsidy to investments in physical capital is literally time-invariant.
Tuesday November 22, 2011 at 12h15, room M3250
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné (HEC Montréal)
Friday November 18, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Alexander Wagner (University of Konstanz)
Thursday November 10, 2011 at 17h15, room MR290
Conférence Luigi Solari
Anthony Shorroks (UNU-WIDER)
Friday November 4, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Jonathan Kaminsky (University of Toulouse I)
Friday October 21, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Fabian Kruger (University of Konstanz)
Friday October 14, 2011 : DIES ACADEMICUS
Friday May 27, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Jean-Paul l'Huillier (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)
Friday May 13, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Alessandro Flamini (University of Sheffield)
Friday April 8, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Tony Berrada (University of Geneva, HEC)
A typical competitive industry equilibrium model has the following main ingredients: a continuum of competitive value maximizing firms, idiosyncratic and/or aggregate demand/productivity shocks, production functions and capital adjustment technologies which are common to all firms. In such models, the equilibrium outcome is generally described by some distribution over the set of firms. Depending on the precise nature of the model this distribution might describe: the size of the firm, the firm production capacity, whether the firm is active or not. Except for some simple models of entry and exit, very little is known about the equilibrium price and its dynamics. We formulate a continuous time, infinite horizon model of competitive industry equilibrium with the following main features: constant returns to scale, idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, capital adjustment costs. Instead of focusing on the distribution of firm sizes we focus on the equilibrium price. We show that the price can be obtained by solving a Forward Backward Stochastic Differential Equation and prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for some basic specification of the model and present explicit computation of equilibrium prices.
Friday April 1, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
Sergei Kovbasyuk (Toulouse School of Economics)
Friday March 18, 2011 at 12h15, room M3220
David Cuberes (University of Alicante)
Friday March 11, 2011 at 12h15, room M5274
Romain de Nijs (Paris School of Economics)
Friday December 10, 2010 at 14:15, room P1
Dominic Rohner (University of Zurich)
Friday December 3, 2010 at 14:15, room P1
Fabrice Defever (University of Nottingham)
(with Benedikt Heid and Mario Larch)
Friday November 19, 2010 at 11:15, room M 5220
Frank Cowell (London School of Economics)
"Our new approach to mobility measurement involves separating out the valuation of positions in terms of individual status (using income, social rank, or other criteria) from the issue of movement between positions. The quantification of movement is addressed using a general concept of distance between positions and a parsimonious set of axioms that characterise the distance concept and yield a class of aggregative indices. This class of indices induces a superclass of mobility measures over the different status concepts consistent with the same underlying data. We investigate the statistical inference of mobility indices using two well-known status concepts."
Thursday November 11, 2010 at 17:15, room MR290
Alberto Holly (University of Lausanne)
Friday November 5, 2010 at 14:15, room P1
Kui Wai Li (University of Geneva)
Friday October 29, 2010 at 14:15, room P1
Peter Zweifel (University of Zurich)
Friday October 22, 2010 at 14:15, room P1
Dmytro Kylymnyuk (University of Geneva)
Friday May 21, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Charles Staelin (Smith College)
Friday April 30, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Gary Fields (Cornell University)
Friday April 23, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Ruxanda Berlinschi (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Friday April 16, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Sylvie Charlot (University of Geneva, INRA)
co-écrit avec S. Paty et V. Piguet
Friday March 26, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs (coauteur Martin Hellwig)
Friday March 5, 2010 at 12:15, room M 3220
Peter Gottschalk (Boston College)
(written with R. Moffit)
Friday December 18, 2009 at 12:15, room M 3220
Laurent Pauwels (University of Sydney)
Structural Breaks in Panel Data Models
Friday December 11, 2009 at 12:15, room M 3220
Arnaud Chéron (Université du Maine, Le Mans)
Friday November 27, 2009 at 12:15, room M 3220
Michel Beine (University of Luxembourg)
Migration and Network: Does Education Matter More than Gender?
Monday November 9, 2009 at 17:15, room MR 290 (Conférence Solari)
Manfred Gilli (Université de Genève)
Optimisation in Financial Engineering - Of 'Good' Solutions and Misplaced Exactitude
Gabrielle Antille Gaillard (Université de Genève)
L'Importance de l'Input-Output en Économie Appliquée