The consequences of one-sided violence on inter-ethnic relations*

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Abstract

Recent research emphasizes that individuals in war-torn societies are affected differently by several forms of violence. Especially, the distinction among acts of one-sided violence between targeted and non-targeted ones has been theorized to affect individuals differently. While one-sided violence is expected to reduce interpersonal trust and trust in governmental institution more generally, targeted one-sided violence should be even more detrimental, especially if carried out by government actors. Drawing on a large set of surveys and information on perpetrators and targets of one-sided violence we assess these expected effects empirically, drawing on variation both across time and space. Our results are in line with the hitherto largely anecdotal findings that targeted one-sided violence has nefarious consequences, well beyond those of violence more generally.

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1 Introduction

What is the impact of exposure to violence in civil conflicts on social and political trust? The empirical evidence is contradictory: while some studies confirm the conventional assumption that war violence decreases trust in other people (i.e., generalized social trust) and political institutions and leaders (i.e., political trust, see Price and Yaylacı, 2021), evidence from recent studies challenges this view and shows that exposure to war violence can be associated with constructive attitudes and behavior, such as with increased trust, prosocial behavior, and political participation (Bauer, Blattman, Chytilová, Henrich, Miguel and Mitts, 2016; Bellows and Miguel, 2006; Blattman, 2009; De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015*b*). What explains such contrasting findings?

In this paper, we propose that social and political trust depends not only on the intensity of violence - the predominant focus of previous studies - but also on the precise nature of violence (see Balcells and Stanton, 2021; Davenport, Mokleiv Nygård, Fjelde and Armstrong, 2019; Price and Yaylacı, 2021). More precisely, we propose that the impact of violence depends on the level of collective exposure to violence and, second, on the type of violence. We focus on group exposure (within a country and at the local level), which has been rarely examined within existing work (see Davenport, Mokleiv Nygård, Fjelde and Armstrong, 2019), and distinguish the types of violence on two dimensions: first, the target of violence (i.e., whether civilians or combatants were targets of the violence) and, second, the perpetrator of violence (i.e., whether the state or the rebel groups had perpetrated the violence). We hypothesize that violence against civilians – more so than the violence against combatants – decreases generalized social trust, whereas violence perpetrated by the state – more so than the violence perpetrated by the rebels – decreases political trust.

We test these hypotheses with data from conflict-affected countries around the world. Most previous studies on the impact of war violence have been conducted in a context of a single country (see Fiedler and Rohles, 2021), leaving open the question of the generalizability of the findings. To overcome this problem, we combine data from a multitude of cross-national surveys (i.e., Afrobarometer, Asiabarometer, Latinobarometer, the World Values Survey, the European Values Survey, and the International Social Survey) with conflict event data (i.e., UCDP One-Sided Violence, Ethnic One-Sided Violence, and the Battle-Related Deaths datasets). Our preliminary results lend considerable support to our claim that social and political trust are differently affected as a function of the type of violence and the perpetrator-target pair. More precisely, targets of one-sided violence against civilians in general are less trusting, independent of whether they were targeted by the government or rebel groups, while battle-related deaths have a smaller effect. We also find that violence perpetrated by the government, especially if targeted against civilians, decreases political trust.

2 Impact of war violence on social and political trust

Violent conflicts affect individuals' trust towards other people (i.e., horizontal or social trust) and the state and its institutions (i.e., vertical or political trust). Social trust is rooted in an "expectation of reliance that individuals in a community have towards each other on the basis of shared norms, mutual reciprocity, and cooperative behavior" (Moreno, 2011, 2672). Different types of social trust are typically distinguished depending on who is trusted. Generalized social trust refers to a tendency to trust people in general, beyond particular people one knows and interacts with (Mattes and Moreno, 2018). In contrast, particularized trust refers to trust in specific groups, such as one's immediate family, neighbors, or identity group (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).

Studies typically show that war violence tends to decrease generalized social trust (for a review, see Fiedler and Rohles, 2021; Price and Yaylacı, 2021). For example, studies conducted in the contexts of Croatia (Kunovich and Hodson, 1999), Kosovo (Kijewski and Freitag, 2018), Uganda (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013; De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015*a*), and Tajikistan (Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt, 2013) demonstrate a detrimental impact of violence, at least in the short term (for a broader study focusing on European countries, see Grosjean, 2014). The negative impact is typically explained in terms of conflict-induced distress, which can leave people with a lasting sense of untrustworthiness and hostility towards others (Kijewski and Freitag, 2018). However, some studies show that exposure to war violence does not necessarily decrease social trust, and can give rise to prosocial outcomes, such as increased trust and prosocial behavior (Bellows and Miguel, 2006; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014). Some authors argue that such positive effects result from the posttraumatic growth induced by exposure to violence (see Blattman, 2009). Others argue that it rather depends on the group membership: while exposure to violence can lead to an increase in ingroup trust, it is likely to decrease trust in other groups, especially the adversary group (De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015*a*).

Political trust refers to "a vertical sense of confidence in the formal, legal organizations of government and state, as distinct from the current incumbents nested within those organizations" (Mattes and Moreno, 2018, 267). Most studies examine trust in institutions such as police and the courts, as well as in the organizations of government in the forms of parliaments, presidents, and political parties (Newton, Stolle and Zmerli, 2018). Some previous studies have shown that war violence is detrimental to political trust (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2016). Some authors argue, however, that violence can increase political trust, as affected individuals may tend to rely on the state for protection. For example, Garcia-Ponce and de Pasquale (2014), in the context of Zimbabwe, have found that people express more trust in the national government when they were exposed to political violence.

In sum, whereas many studies confirm the conventional wisdom that war violence decreases social and political trust, the findings are not uniform, and some studies even document an increase in social and political trust following a civil war. One central question is, therefore, what explains such diverse findings? When is war violence more

likely to diminish social and political trust, and why?

One common aspect of the previous studies is that they tend to treat political violence as a homogenous construct and examine how the intensity of violence (e.g., the frequency of events or casualties) affects trust.[1] However, as recently pointed out by Price and Yaylacı (2021, 284), the character and dynamics of warfare deeply influence the consequences of civil wars" and, accordingly, "more attention should be paid to these dynamics." (for a similar argument, see Balcells and Stanton, 2021; Davenport, Mokleiv Nygård, Fjelde and Armstrong, 2019).[2] Hence, as an original contribution, we examine how the impact of violence depends on the level of collective exposure to violence and, second, on the type of violence.

3 Distinguishing the levels and type of violence

Previous studies have shown that social and political trust is influenced not only by direct, individual-level exposure to violence but also by collective, contextual-level exposure. Some authors argue that collective exposure is qualitatively distinct from individual exposure and can lead to different outcomes. For example, Bakke, O'Loughlin and Ward (2009), in the context of the North Caucasus, find that while personal exposure to violence has a negative impact on forgiveness, in communities that were more exposed to violence, average forgiveness was stronger. Similarly, Elcheroth (2006), across 14 countries and regions, found that while direct exposure to violence was related to lower condemnation of human rights violations, in countries that were more exposed to violence, average condemnation was higher. Most of the previous studies on contextual-level exposure have focused on nations or local communities as units of analysis. However, exposure to war violence does not vary only at the country or local levels but also at the group-level. Indeed, civil wars are typically fought between groups, and one's group membership structures the exposure and responses to violence (Muldoon, Lowe, Jetten, Cruwys and Haslam, 2021). Even if not personally victimized, belonging to a group targeted by violence can influence one's social and political attitudes. Moreover, whereas previous studies demonstrate the impact of violence at the local level, armed forces frequently target particular locations precisely because of their group composition (Wimmer and Miner, 2020). Group exposure to violence is, however, rarely examined within existing work (see Davenport, Mokleiv Nygård, Fjelde and Armstrong, 2019). Accordingly, in this paper, we examine how group exposure to violence - within a country and at the local level - is related to social and

[1] We note here, and will come back to this later, that the studies discussed here differ considerably also in their measurement strategies. On the one hand exposure to violence is sometimes measured at the individual level based on explicit survey questions, sometimes established by group membership or geographic vicinity to violent events. Similarly, trust is sometimes measured based on experimental games, while more frequently it is based on survey responses (see importantly for this, Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000).

[2] Relatedly Cassar, Grosjean and Whitt (2013, 286) note that "[t]his leads us to speculate that effects of conflict on local norms are mediated both by the specificity and the salience of war-time divides."

political trust.

It is widely acknowledged in the literature that war violence is a complex phenomenon, and several scholars have aimed to conceptualize types of violence along various relevant dimensions (e.g., Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017). In this study, we focus on two dimensions: first, the target of violence (i.e., whether civilians or combatants were targets of the violence) and, second, the perpetrator of violence (i.e., whether the state or the rebel groups had perpetrated the violence).

It is common in the literature to distinguish war violence depending on the target: for example, most conflict event datasets distinguish violence between combatants (i.e., battles or two-sided violence) and violence against civilians (i.e., one-sided violence, see Eck and Hultman, 2007; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Similarly, the literature typically distinguishes the perpetrators of violence, most commonly between the government and the rebel forces (Eck and Hultman, 2007). Whereas several previous studies have examined determinants and dynamics of different types of violence (Fjelde and Hultman, 2013; Fjelde, Hultman and Sollenberg, 2016; Cederman, Hug, Schubiger and Villamil, 2020; Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg, 2021), only a handful of studies have examined their potentially different consequences. For example, in a series of studies in the former Yugoslavia, Penic and colleagues (Penić, Elcheroth and Morselli, 2017; Penić, Elcheroth and Spini, 2018; Penić, Vollhardt and Reicher, 2021) have documented the different impacts of the prevalence of violence against civilians and battles at the local level on various social and political attitudes and showed that violence against civilians is more detrimental for inclusive and peaceful attitudes. Relatedly Lewis and Topal (2021) show that trust decreases due to the exposure of violence while Villamil (2021) finds that ethnic identification increases when groups suffer from targeted one-sided violence. We aim to extend those findings, by examining whether social and political trust depend on the target and the perpetrator of violence.

3.1 Types of violence and social trust

We propose that generalized social trust depends on the target of violence, such that intentional violence against civilians is particularly harmful to their social trust towards other people. Studies show that violence that is (perceived as) intentional results in higher rates of psychological distress, stronger perceptions of threat, and reduced trust (Charuvastra and Cloitre, 2008), (Ozer, Best, Lipsey and Weiss, 2003). Such violence breaks shared norms of appropriate and acceptable behavior, undermining faith in human nature, and violating trust in other people (Muldoon, Lowe, Jetten, Cruwys and Haslam, 2021). We accordingly hypothesize that:

(H1) *Groups exposed to violence against civilians (by either the state or the rebels) have lower social trust.*

Whereas violence between combatants can also decrease generalized social trust through a similar mechanism of the increased psychological distress and perceived threat, we hypothesize that the negative impact is less pronounced than the one due to

more intentional violence against civilians.

Moreover, insofar the perceived threat diminishes social trust (Kijewski and Freitag, 2018), the detrimental impact of violence may be pronounced in the case of a substantial power difference between the target group and the perpetrator. The power difference is highest in most conflicts when the state targets civilians, especially a politically powerless group. Accordingly, we further hypothesize that:

(H1.1) *(Politically powerless) groups exposed to violence against civilians by the state have lower social trust.*

Whereas violence against civilians perpetrated by the rebels can also decrease social trust, we propose that the negative impact is more pronounced in the case of civilian targeting by the (typically) more powerful state.

However, as previously mentioned, not all studies show that violence decreases social trust; some studies document a remarkable resilience of the conflict-affected civilians (for a review, see Bauer, Blattman, Chytilová, Henrich, Miguel and Mitts, 2016; Penić, Drury and Bady, 2021). Some studies suggest that shared exposure to collective violence can foster shared social identity (e.g., communal or ethnic identity), which serves as a basis for social trust, mutually supportive behavior, and coordinated action within that group (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti, 2013). This bonding mechanism may be more likely when violence is indiscriminately imposed on an entire community by the perceived outgroup (e.g., political opponent) (Drury and Reicher, 2009; Krakowski, 2020). Insofar such an emerging particularized trust can extend to the generalized social trust, it is possible to formulate an alternative hypothesis:

(H1.2) *Groups exposed to civilian targeting by the politically opposed group have stronger social trust.*

It bears noting that H1.2 is more encompassing than H1.1 and contradicts the latter regarding one effect. In the data we have at hand under H1.2 we would expect that politically excluded groups that are subject to violence perpetrated by government have stronger social trust. As we consider excluded groups to be powerless for the sake of our study, H1.1 would lead us to expect the exact opposite. Thus, our empirical analysis will have to inform us which of the two hypothesis is more credible, even though they differ with respect to their generality.

3.2 Types of violence and political trust

We further examine whether political trust depends on the type of violence. Different theoretical perspectives converge to suggest that mistreatment (e.g., exclusion, discrimination) of a group by the state institutions and leaders has a detrimental impact on political trust. For example, procedural justice theories (Tyler and Blader, 2003) and social identity approaches (Haslam, Reicher and Platow, 2020) emphasize that excluded and discriminated groups are more likely to disidentify from and distrust the state institutions and leaders. In a large comparative study across 64 countries, Wimmer (2017) has found that politically excluded groups show less pride in their country.

We extend these perspectives to suggest that the state-based violence against groups is conducive to decreased political trust among their members. More specifically, we hypothesize that:

(H2) *Groups exposed to violence by the state (targeting either the group's combatants or civilians) will have lower political trust.*

We further hypothesize that the decrease in the political trust will depend on the target of violence, such that it will be aggravated when the state has targeted civilians of a particular group (as opposed to their combatants). The perception of the illegitimacy of the state's actions may be more pronounced in case of violence against civilians, thereby diminishing political trust:

(H2.1) *Groups exposed to violence against civilians by the state will have lower political trust.*

We summarize our expectations for both types of trust in Table 1.

	violence by			
	Government		Rebels	
	Battle	OSV	Battle	OSV
social trust H1	0	-	0	-
social trust H1.1	0	- if excluded	0	
social trust H1.2	0	- if excluded	0	- if included
political trust H2	-	-		
political trust H2.1	-	$>$ -		

Table 1: Expectations

4 Data

To evaluate our hypotheses we rely on a large set of surveys and combine it with information on violent events from the UCDP-GED dataset by Sundberg and Melander (2013) and more precise data on the targets of one-sided violence by Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg (2021), which expands on the UCDP One-Sided Violence (UCDP-OSV) dataset by Eck and Hultman (2007) (all updated, as appropriate by Pettersson, Davies, Deniz, Engström, Hawach, Högbladh and Öberg, 2021). As starting point we used Wimmer's (2017) dataset that is formed by a large number of surveys and information on the ethnic groups to which respondents belong to. We added to this dataset variables which appeared in the original surveys, but were not integrated in Wimmer's (2017) merged dataset (as our dependent variables are in part different) and added also datasets, amongst them from Afrobarometer Data (1999-2019), that were not part of his dataset.[3]

[3]This was possible as Andreas Wimmer kindly provided us with a version of his dataset that contains the survey-specific identifyers for respondents. As the same response categories for ethnic groups appeared in these omitted surveys, we extended Wimmer's (2017) coding of EPR-groups to these addi-

To this dataset we added first information from the Ethnic One-Sided Violence (EOSV) dataset (Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg, 2021). More specifically for each respondent in our survey data for which Wimmer's (2017) dataset provides information on which ethnic group (as identified by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, see Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009; Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker and Girardin, 2015) s/he belongs to, we coded whether the ethnic group was, according to the EOSV-dataset the target of one-sided violence (OSV) either by the government or rebels in the last five years before the survey.[4]

We then added, proceeding similarly, information on battle deaths caused by the government and rebel forces. For the former we relied on the ACD2EPR dataset provided by Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Gleditsch and Cederman (2012) and linked it to the GED-data to obtain, by aggregation, the number of casualties suffered by an ethnic group (where appropriate) at the hand of the government in a particular year. For the casualties caused by the rebel forces we assumed that all ethnic groups included in the government suffered from violence due to battles with rebel forces.[5] Again, we used a dichotomous coding (at least 25 casualties or not) and used the same five year rule to link this information to respondents in our surveys.

As the Afrobarometer surveys also provide geo-coded information on the location of the interview (see BenYishay, Rotberg, Wells, Lv, Goodman, Kovacevic and Runfola, 2017), we created additional (again dichotomous) location-sensitive indicators for the exposure to violence. For battle deaths we proceeded as above by using the ACD2EPR-dataset and then for each battle-related event in GED coded which respondents resided at a distance smaller than 50 kilometers to the location of the event and belong to the same ethnic group as the casualties of the event. We proceeded similarly for OSV, where we were able to profit from the fact that the coding of the African part of the EOSV-data (Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg, 2021) the GED-data provided the starting point.[6] We use these initial codings of the ethnic groups targeted by OSV (which come with geo-coded information) to assess the ethnicity of OSV casualties by event.[7] To combine these casualties data with the Afro-

tional surveys.

[4]As we use both OSV for which Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg (2021) could determine intentionality and OSV where such intentionality could not be determined, we coded this variable as a dichotomy, namely whether OSV resulted in at least 25 individuals. This prudent strategy is especially advised as the intentionality of OSV and the resulting casualties are difficult to code precisely (for identical strategies, see Cederman, Hug, Schubiger and Villamil, 2020; Fjelde, Schubiger, Hultman, Cederman, Hug and Sollenberg, 2021). In a future iteration of this paper we will also assess the effect of intentional targeting in campaigns of one-sided violence.

[5]This is not a completely innocuous assumption, as for infighting conflicts both sides are formed by included ethnic groups.

[6]Note that proceeding in this way is quite different from the approach chosen by Villamil (2021), who also relies on geo-coded Afrobarometer data and links it with GED-data. but then codes target groups differently.

[7]We thank Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman and Margaret Sollenberg for having given us access to this data. It bears noting that this data is not available for all African countries. Thus, we will always refer to information on the countries covered in the analyses that will follow which is provided in the appendix.

barometer data we used the first six rounds, except the second, which does not allow to code the ethnic identity of respondents and is not contained in Wimmer's (2017) data.[8] For each Afrobarometer dataset we considered all events having taken place in the five years preceding the interview, except if in the meantime a new round of the Afrobarometer surveys was in the field.[9][10]

5 Empirical analysis

To test our proposed hypotheses we use as baseline for our empirical models the one employed by Wimmer (2017, 628), as our dependent variables are quite close, respectively identical, to his. Thus, we use "[g]ender, age, education, social class, marriage status, importance of politics, and religiosity" as individual-level controls in addition to several group-specific controls. As there is most likely considerable country-level heterogeneity in the survey responses, we use systematically country-fixed effects.[11] Given that almost all variables for the exposure to violence vary across ethnic groups, we consider these variables as group-level predictors.[12] Finally, we present in the main text results from models which cover only countries where individuals were exposed to at least one of the types of violence discussed above.[13]

As our hypotheses differ as a function of whether we consider social or political

[8] We also used Müller-Crepon, Pengl and Bormann's (2021 (forthcoming)) LEDA-data to assign respondents to ethnic groups but found fewer matches and thus refrained for the moment from using it.

[9] This implies that events having taken place in the year a survey was in the field are not considered. As a consequence our coding is conservative but assures that changes from one survey to another are correctly taken into account. It bears noting that the strategy used here is different from the one used for group- and country-level data. We will assess in future versions which approach seems the most reasonable.

[10] Finally, we also created similar exposure to violence variables at the country-level where we only considered different perpetrators (government respectively rebels) and whether OSV was targetting (intentionally, respectively non-intentionally) specific ethnic groups. Results for these exposure variables we only present in the appendix as a better integration would require a joint model.

[11] For simplicity's sake this is done by adding a set of country-dummies to all specifications.

[12] Obviously, for the country-level variables this is not the case, but as some group-specific controls are part of our baseline specification we adopt the same strategy. For the analyses using geo-coded information, the exposure variables strictly speaking vary across pairs of ethnic groups and geo-location. Due to the (differing) sampling strategy used in the Afrobarometers this implies however, that in some countries these variables are more or less the same thing as an individual-level predictor, while in other cases, they become almost group-level predictors. Thus it seems safe, again, to consider them as the group-level.

[13] This leads to a considerable reduction in the number of cases but provides more solid (and conservative) estimates. In the appendix we will in future iterations of this paper also provide results from models covering all respondents for which we have information on all variables (preliminary analyses suggest no substantive differences). Note that we follow Wimmer's (2017) approach to deal with missing data for individual-level predictors, namely to resort to "modified zero-order regressions" (Greene, 2003, 60) as proposed by Maddala (1977, 202). This consists of adding for each variable with missing data a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent has missing data and replacing in the original variable codes for missingness with a specific value.

trust, we structure our empirical analyses along our two sets of dependent variables. For social trust we use a very general question used mostly in Afrobarometers asking whether "others" can be trusted.[14] To measure political trust we rely on questions of trust in two institutions, namely the army and the president, respectively the government, as these questions appear most frequently in surveys. We also use the main variable used in Wimmer, Cederman and Min's (2009) analyses, namely national pride. As Wimmer (2017, 619) notes that in the few surveys in which the question of identification to the nation or to an ethnic group is asked, only a small correlation appears with national pride, we also use this variable to measure political trust.[15]

5.1 Exposure to violence and social trust

In Figure 1 we report our results for our hypotheses regarding social trust as estimated at the group level with the help of a hierarchical probit model. We present our results by depicting average changes in the predicted probability of trusting others, while keeping all other covariates at their sample values. As we estimate our models in a Bayesian framework, we use our posterior sample to calculate for every individual in our data 1000 changes in the predicted probabilities due to specific covariates and average these over all respondents (see for instance Gelman and Hill, 2007, 466).[16] As we estimate four different models (which differ with respect to the constraints that we impose on our coefficients) for each covariate four summaries of the average predicted differences appear in Figure 1.[17]

The first model considers the effect of exposure to violence generally (OSV and battle deaths) and Figure 1 suggests that it induces a decrease in social trust. As social trust is quite low in the countries covered by our analysis with only roughly a quarter trusting others, even the predicted average decrease by 0.03 is notable. Our hypothesis H1 states, however, that it is mostly OSV that leads to reduced social trust, which is borne out in the results depicted for the second model. While the differences in the

[14] While some scholars rely on more specific questions asking whether to trust "others" from the same or a different ethnic group (for instance De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015*a*; Lewis and Topal, 2021), these questions only appear in few surveys. In addition in the Afrobarometers, given that these questions are often asked one after the other, they are highly correlated. Thus, Lewis and Topal (2021, 4) report an overall correlation coefficient of 0.683, which actually varies across countries and reaches a value above 0.8 in some countries.

[15] It bears noting, however, that the ethnic dimension implicit in this question is likely to lead to a rather imprecise measure, contaminated by some aspects of social trust, more specifically in-group trust.

[16] The posterior samples for all models were generated after 3000 burnin-iterations from 10'000 iterations which were thined by a factor of 10. More detailed information on the posterior distributions appear in the appendix, where we also offer information on the countries and years covered in the various analyses. As the sample from which the 1000 iterations are drawn is quite small (given the complexities of the model), convergence is still an issues, which means that all results in this paper have to be taken as preliminary

[17] In the appendix Tables 2 and 3 provide information on the posterior distributions of the main variable, respectively the countries and years covered in this analysis.



Figure 1: Exposure to violence and social trust

average changes in probabilities are quite small, it is still the case that the effect is slightly stronger for OSV than for battle deaths as H1 stipulates.[18] As our hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 suggest in addition that not only the type of violence matters but also who is targeted in OSV campaigns, we consider two additional models where perpetrator and target group are interacted for OSV.[19] Contrary to our expectations formulated in H1.2 we find that social trust decreases if a group suffers OSV at the hands of a politically opposed group, less so, though, than if the group is allied. Thus, if members of included groups are subject to OSV by rebels or members of excluded groups are subject to OSV by the government, their social trust decreases. If the government or the rebels engage in OSV against their own groups (measured as being part of an included or an excluded group) social trust decreases also, but less so. In the final model, where all effects are allowed to vary freely, we note that for excluded groups targeted by the government in OSV campaigns social trust decreases, which is in line with H1.1, though estimated with considerable uncertainty. In addition the effect of OSV on included groups is even more strongly negative and even slightly positive for OSV perpetrated by rebel forces.[20]

[18]This is also borne out in a comparison of the deviance information criterion (DIC) which clearly favors the model distinguishing between these two types of violence. It bears noting, however, that the convergence of Bayesian estimations has not been assessed in detail, so these results have to be taken with a grain of salt.

[19]Note that the average changes in predicted probabilities are calculated conditional on belonging to a specific target group, and thus need to be compared with caution to the other effects.

[20]It bears noting, however, that the DICs suggest that these more specific models are not preferred to



Figure 2: Exposure to violence (geo-coded) and social trust

In Figure 2 we depict the same changes in predicted probabilities based, however, on a model in which exposure to violence is geo-coded (as discussed above).[21] As such data can only be used for some Afrobarometer rounds, the number of observations is smaller, and, as a consequence, the uncertainty in our estimates larger. Contrary to the previous analysis (Figure 1) we find less support for our hypothesis H1. More specifically, violence seems to generally increase social trust, and in addition, this positive effect is stronger for OSV than for casualties on the battlefield. Thus, on average the probability of trusting others in this sample is only 0.17, which increases by more than half (0.1) if individuals are subject to OSV, while it barely budges (0.03) due to battle deaths. We find, though, some support for H1.1, as OSV by the government targeted at excluded groups reduces somewhat their trust in others compared to a situation in which other groups are targeted. Finally, we do not find support for H1.2 as OSV targeted at one's own group appears to increase the likelihood of trusting others by almost 0.1, while decreasing it by about 0.02 if opposing groups are targeted. Consequently, the geo-coded exposure variables suggest that the resilience argument is more supported in our analyses. These results give the first indication that the effects of violence on social trust may depend on the level of analysis, where the localized

the one comparing only battle deaths and OSV.

[21] Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distributions and on the countries and years covered by the analysis. For analysis with geo-coded exposure variables we use random effects at the level of group-location pairs, ensuring that the correct uncertainty is reflected in our estimates. Note, that compared to the group-level analyses, some exposure are variables are 0 for all respondents, and thus are not included in the models.

violence may be likely to foster a "collective coping mechanism whereby members of communities that have few options to flee band together to cope with threats and trauma" (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014, 616).

5.2 Exposure to violence and political trust

When it comes to political trust our hypothesis H2 leads us to expect that especially violence perpetrated by the government, whether in OSV campaigns or on the battlefield, reduces political trust.



Figure 3: Exposure to violence and political trust: president/government

Our first dependent variable is trust in the president or government, and our estimation relies on a hierarchical ordered probit model. Again we depict our results in Figure 3 average changes in predicted probabilities for the response category "trust a lot," which on average in the sample is close to 0.25.[22] The first model, assuming that all government perpetrated violence has the same effect, suggests that violence does not affect trust in the government. Only when we distinguish between the two types of violence do we find, and this in accordance with H2.1, that OSV perpetrated by the government reduces political trust. More specifically, the probability of trusting the president or government a lot decreases on average by 0.06 Battle deaths, on the other hand appear to increase trust in the government, namely by about 0.05.[23]

[22]Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distribution and the countries and years covered in this analysis. Note that the dependent variable has four categories and "a lot"



Figure 4: Geo-coded exposure to violence and political trust: president/government

For the geo-coded exposure variables (Figure 4) [24] the results are somewhat weaker. In the sample used for this estimation the probability of trusting the president or government is larger than 0.4. Given that we can not estimate all effects due to the sparseness of the geo-coded data, we only find that OSV perpetrated by the government decreases this probability on average by 0.2, while battle deaths caused by the rebels increase the probability of trusting the government a lot just by a little less than 0.04. Notable is that OSV perpetrated by government against an excluded group reduces the probability of trusting the government a lot by more than 0.9.[25]

For our second dependent variable, namely trust in the army, we estimate again a hierarchical ordered probit model and report in Figure 5 the average changes in predicted probabilities of trusting the army a lot.[26] These predictions lend support to our hypothesis H2, as trusting the army a lot becomes considerably less likely if respondents are part of an ethnic group exposed to violence by the government. While on average the probability of trusting the army a lot is 0.25, this probability decreases

corresponds to the highest value.

[23]It is likely that this effect is due more to the fact that there is a civil war than the casualties occurring on the battlefield by themselves.

[24]Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distribution and the countries and years covered in this analysis.

[25]This has to be taken with a large grain of salt as the effective sample from the posterior distribution for the underlying coefficient is very small, which is also likely due to a problem of (quasi-)complete separation..

[26]Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distributions and the countries and years covered in this analysis.

by almost 0.02 if individuals belong to groups that suffer casualties either due to OSV or battles. Distinguishing, following H2.1, between OSV and battle deaths, our models predict that especially OSV reduces trust in the army, as it reduces by almost 0.05. On the other hand battle deaths due to government forces do hardly change the probability of trusting the army a lot. When we also consider casualties due to actions by the rebels, we note that trust in the army is hardly affected. This holds even when we take into account the political status of the targeted group. Thus, overall Figure 5 lends considerable support to our two hypotheses (H2 and H2.1) concerning political trust.



Figure 5: Exposure to violence and political trust: army

In Figure 6[27] we find again the whopping negative effect of 0.9 due to OSV targeted by the government at excluded groups if violence is coded based on geographic information, despite the fact that on average in the sample this probability is above 0.4. Such violence basically makes the probability that an individual of the targeted group has no chance of trusting the army a lot. Next to this effect, all others pale by comparison. It bears noting, however, that all the average changes in predicted probabilities that are depicted in Figure 6 are negative, except the one for battle deaths inflicted on members of included groups. Thus that the probability of trusting the army a lot decreases by approximately 0.03 due to violence, respectively OSV perpetrated by the government, is in support of our hypotheses H2 and H2.1. The DIC suggests, however, that it is mostly H2 that is supported in the data, as relaxing the constraints on the effects of different forms of violence does not lead to better models according to this

[27]Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distributions and the countries and years covered in this analysis.

criterion.



Figure 6: Exposure to violence and political trust: army (geo-coded)

Finally, we consider two measures of political trust used by Wimmer (2017). we first start with his main dependent variable, namely national pride. Figure 7 shows that[28] while on average in the sample used the probability of being very proud is close to 0.7 being exposed to violence perpetrated by the government hardly affects this pride, contrary to what we would expect according to H2. Distinguishing, however, between OSV and battle deaths we find that the probability of being very proud decreases on average by 0.04 in the former case and increases very slightly by 0.02 in the latter. When considering also the target of violence, we note more significant changes in the average predicted probabilities. Thus, the probability of being very proud decreases by more than 0.1 when a group is targeted in OSV by government, especially if the group is affiliated with the latter.[29] Notable and somewhat surprising is that battle deaths caused by government forces increase the probability of being very proud by almost 0.2 and this both among included groups and excluded groups. Again, this effect is likely also simply due to the mere occurrence of a civil conflict.

[28] As the question on national pride was not asked in the geo-coded Afrobarometer surveys that we use, we cannot present a similar analysis with geo-coded information. Tables 14 and 15 in the appendix provide information on the posterior distribution, respectively the countries and years covered.

[29] It bears noting that the average changes in predicted probabilities depicted here (and elsewhere) for specific target groups were calculated only for these target groups. Hence the decrease in the probability of being very proud due to OSV perpetrated by the government against an included group indicates that included groups not targeted by OSV have a probability of 0.1 higher to be very proud. The same holds for all other average predicted differences specific to target groups.



Figure 7: Exposure to violence and political trust: national pride

When we consider national or ethnic identity as a measure of political trust (see relatedly Robinson, 2014), we also find the detrimental effect as expected by our hypothesis H2 with the help of a hierarchical probit model.[30] Individuals belonging to ethnic groups that suffer from exposure to violence at the hands of the government identify less with their nation, a probability which in the sample here is approximately 0.4. The second model where we compare casualties due to OSV and battles we find strong evidence in support of H2.1. More specifically, when it comes to violence perpetrated by the government, especially casualties in OSV campaigns, identification with the nation becomes less likely, decreasing by more than 0.1. If we also consider exposure to violence perpetrated by the rebels and who is targeted, we find this also matter.[31]

Figure 9[32] provides again at least partial support for our hypotheses based on geocoded exposure variables. While in the sample used in this analysis the probability of identifying with the nation is slightly above 0.6, being exposed to any type of violence perpetrated by the government reduces this probability by slightly more than 0.1. When we consider OSV by government separately this decrease in the average

[30]Tables 16 and 17 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distributions and on the countries and years covered by the analysis.

[31]Bear in mind that for the changes in the predicted probabilities for included and excluded groups, these are all calculated conditional on being member of an included, respectively excluded group. Thus, they are not directly comparable with models where the target of violence is not part of the model.

[32]Tables 18 and 19 in the Appendix provide information on the posterior distributions and on the countries and years covered by the analysis.



Figure 8: Exposure to violence and political trust: national identity or ethnicity

predicted probabilities is slightly larger, namely approximately 0.11, which is in line with H2.1. When we consider also battle deaths inflicted by rebel groups (which decrease the probability of identifying with the nation by almost 0.2), we find still the same effects for violence perpetrated by the government. It is also this model which according to the DIC is preferable. Allowing all coefficients to vary freely provides the additional insight that OSV by government targeted at excluded groups reduces the likelihood of identifying with the nation by almost 0.4.



Figure 9: Exposure to violence and political trust: national identity or ethnicity (geo-coded)

6 Conclusion

Most scholars studying civil wars would concur with Blattman and Miguel's (2010, 42) assessment that "[t]he social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts." Part of these social and institutional legacies are also the effects exposure to violence have on social and political trust. The literature, however, is replete with contradictory findings, in part due to different approaches, conceptualizations and measurement strategies. In this paper we argued that an important dimension concerns the conceptualization of violence, namely whether it concerns civilians or soldiers, and who is targted by whom.

Adopting a group-level perspective we proposed hypotheses on how the effect of violence on social and political trust differs according to the type of violence. Our preliminary results, drawing on a large set of surveys and detailed (in part geo-coded) information on the type of violence (i.e., one-sided violence vs battle deaths, governmental or rebel perpetrators, included or excluded groups as targets) provides support for our claims. First of all especially one-sided violence against civilians decreases generalized social trust, more so than violence in the battlefield. This effect depends in part, as postulated by us, also on the perpetrator-target relationship. Second, political trust among individuals being part of groups taken as targets of violence by the government is most strongly negatively affected. This effect is stronger if violence targets civilians than if it is related to battles.

These findings suggest that not all violence has the same effect on affected individuals. It very much depends on the context in which it takes place, who is responsible for it and who is targeted. Thus future work should be more attentive to these differences, as they allow to be clearer about the mechanisms linking exposure to violence to changes in inter-ethnic relations.

Appendix

In this appendix we first provide more details on the posterior distributions stemming from the models presented in the main text, as well as information on the countries and years covered in the analyses, first for social trust, then for political trust. In the next subsection we present, without commenting, similar analyses where the exposure variables are coded at the national level and are not group-specific. Finally, in the last section we present tables with descriptive statistics of all variables used in the models presented in the main text.

Social trust: group-level and geo-coded exposure variables[33]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov. and rebels	0.18^*			
	$[0.09; 0.28]$			
Excluded	0.27	0.35	0.12	0.24
	$[-0.38; 0.92]$	$[-0.49; 1.32]$	$[-0.54; 0.79]$	$[-0.46; 1.01]$
Battle deaths by gov. and rebels		0.24^*	0.15^*	0.18^*
		$[0.10; 0.40]$	$[0.06; 0.24]$	$[0.07; 0.33]$
OSV by gov. and rebels		0.29^*		
		$[0.06; 0.58]$		
OSV by gov. x excl.			0.22	
			$[-0.68; 1.17]$	
OSV by gov. x incl.			0.25^*	
			$[0.08; 0.43]$	
OSV by rebels x excl.			-0.03	
			$[-0.36; 0.31]$	
OSV by rebels x incl.			0.30^*	
			$[0.07; 0.54]$	
OSV by gov. and rebels against opposing group				0.31^*
				$[0.04; 0.62]$
OSV by gov. and rebels against supporting group				0.21^*
				$[0.01; 0.44]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 2: Social trust and group-level exposure to violence

[33]Note that in the all the hierarchical models estimated we include group-level random effects (in addition to country-level fixed effects), such that the exposure variables, and all other variables that vary essentially only among groups, are considered as group-level covariates in the estimation. If the exposure is coded based on geographic location the random effects at the location-group level ensures that the appropriate uncertainty is reflected in our estimates.

	1995	1996	1997	2000	2001	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009
Azerbaijan	0	0	1736	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	1480	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	1156	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	1201	0	0	0	0	1041
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1101	0
Georgia	0	1057	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	107	0	0	0	763	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1816	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	2153	0	13768	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	4092	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1116	0	0	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	1149	0	0	0
Mexico	108	227	0	1456	1189	0	3090	0	0	889
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1775	0	0	0
Peru	0	141	0	0	1284	0	0	0	0	991
Philippines	0	1174	0	0	1171	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	1158	0	0	0
South Africa	0	573	0	0	796	0	0	765	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1463	0	0	0

Table 3: Social trust with group-level exposure: countries and years covered (with number of respondents)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov. and rebels	-0.85			
	$[-2.40; 0.31]$			
Excluded	-0.07	-0.01	-0.07	-0.02
	$[-2.01; 1.89]$	$[-1.41; 1.42]$	$[-1.67; 1.45]$	$[-1.29; 1.08]$
Battle deaths by gov. and rebels		-0.56	-0.54	
		$[-1.77; 0.27]$	$[-2.00; 0.40]$	
OSV by gov. and rebel against opposing group		36.45^*		
		$[0.98; 67.47]$		
OSV by gov. and rebels against supporting group		-0.87		
		$[-2.45; 0.13]$		
OSV by gov. x excl.		24.86		
		$[-0.81; 63.80]$		
OSV by gov. x incl.		-1.26		
		$[-4.13; 0.88]$		
Battle deaths by gov. and rebels				-0.44
				$[-1.26; 0.29]$
OSV by gov. and rebels				-0.76
				$[-2.89; 1.01]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group-location random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 4: Social trust and geo-coded exposure to violence

	2005	2006
Benin	1079	0
Ghana	1159	0
Kenya	1116	0
Malawi	684	0
Mali	1149	0
Mozambique	382	0
Namibia	357	0
Nigeria	1775	0
Senegal	1158	0
South Africa	0	375
Tanzania	663	0
Uganda	1463	0
Zambia	824	0

Table 5: Social trust with geo-coded level exposure: countries and years covered (with number of respondents)

Political trust: group-level and geo-coded exposure variables[34]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.01			
	$[-0.04; 0.05]$			
Excluded	-0.21	-0.19	-0.09	-0.11
	$[-0.59; 0.18]$	$[-0.50; 0.14]$	$[-0.36; 0.22]$	$[-0.53; 0.27]$
Battle deaths by gov.		-0.23^*	-0.20^*	
		$[-0.30; -0.16]$	$[-0.26; -0.14]$	
OSV by gov.		0.22^*	0.22^*	
		$[0.15; 0.28]$	$[0.16; 0.28]$	
Battle deaths by gov.			0.22^*	
			$[0.12; 0.31]$	
OSV by rebels			-0.25^*	
			$[-0.34; -0.16]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				0.07
				$[-0.79; 0.87]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.24^*
				$[-0.34; -0.16]$
OSV by gov x excl.				0.46
				$[-0.13; 1.07]$
OSV by gov x incl.				0.27^*
				$[0.20; 0.36]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				0.27^*
				$[0.15; 0.41]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				-0.14
				$[-0.37; 0.09]$
OSV by rebels x included				-0.38^*
				$[-0.52; -0.24]$

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 6: Political trust: government or president

	1995	1996	1997	2000	2001	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Azerbaijan	0	0	1715	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	1446	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	1164	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	1211	0	0	0	0	0	1073
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1146	0	0
Georgia	0	1091	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	104	0	0	0	717	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1815	0	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	2046	0	14016	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1085	0	0	1362	0
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	310	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	1123	0	0	1203	0
Mexico	111	236	0	1453	1195	0	3072	0	0	0	909
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1838	0	0	1769	0
Peru	0	138	0	0	1304	0	0	0	0	0	1019
Philippines	0	1154	0	0	1121	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	1101	0	0	1112	0
South Africa	0	537	0	0	777	0	0	1132	0	391	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1445	0	0	1823	0

Table 7: Political trust: government or president

[34]Note that in the all the hierarchical models estimated we include group-level random effects (in addition to country-level fixed effects), such that the exposure variables, and all other variables that vary essentially only among groups, are considered as group-level covariates in the estimation. If the exposure is coded based on geographic location the random effects at the location-group level ensures that the appropriate uncertainty is reflected in our estimates.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	1.15^*			
	$[0.16; 2.23]$			
Excluded	0.86^*	0.59^*	0.63^*	0.60^*
	$[0.59; 1.20]$	$[0.42; 0.76]$	$[0.45; 0.81]$	$[0.43; 0.77]$
OSV by gov.		0.79^*	0.83^*	
		$[0.03; 1.47]$	$[0.08; 1.60]$	
Battle deaths by rebels			-0.29^*	
			$[-0.50; -0.07]$	
OSV by gov. x excl.				43.94^*
				$[19.90; 62.33]$
OSV by gov. x incl.				0.71
				$[-0.09; 1.44]$
Battle deaths by rebels x incl.				-0.28^*
				$[-0.50; -0.07]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group-location random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 8: Political trust: government or president (geo-coded)

	2005	2006	2008	2009
Benin	1055	0	1078	0
Botswana	0	0	35	0
Ghana	1127	0	1096	0
Kenya	1085	0	1361	0
Liberia	0	0	310	0
Malawi	644	0	665	0
Mali	1123	0	1203	0
Mozambique	421	0	526	0
Namibia	349	0	1128	0
Nigeria	1838	0	1769	0
Senegal	1101	0	1112	0
South Africa	0	370	391	0
Tanzania	675	0	1107	0
Uganda	1445	0	1821	0
Zambia	807	0	0	850
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	870

Table 9: Political trust: government or president (geo-coded)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.09^*			
	$[0.03; 0.15]$			
Excluded	-1.12^*	-0.97^*	-1.14^*	-0.82^*
	$[-2.01; -0.32]$	$[-1.62; -0.37]$	$[-1.96; -0.42]$	$[-1.46; -0.21]$
Battle deaths by gov.		-0.00	-0.00	
		$[-0.07; 0.07]$	$[-0.08; 0.08]$	
OSV by gov.		0.25^*	0.28^*	
		$[0.16; 0.35]$	$[0.18; 0.39]$	
Battle deaths by gov.			-0.06	
			$[-0.17; 0.05]$	
OSV by rebels			0.04	
			$[-0.12; 0.20]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				0.16
				$[-0.63; 1.02]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				0.01
				$[-0.07; 0.08]$
OSV by gov x excl.				0.24
				$[-0.66; 1.05]$
OSV by gov x incl.				0.23^*
				$[0.14; 0.33]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.05
				$[-0.16; 0.04]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				0.21^*
				$[0.02; 0.40]$
OSV by rebels x included				-0.12
				$[-0.29; 0.07]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 10: Political trust: trust army

	1995	1996	1997	2000	2001	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009
Azerbaijan	0	0	1754	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	1381	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	1158	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	1212	0	0	0	0	1044
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1179	0
Georgia	0	1075	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	101	0	0	0	741	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1823	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	2052	0	13976	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	1040	0	0	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	1125	0	0	0
Mexico	111	236	0	1437	1198	0	3068	0	0	895
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1842	0	0	0
Peru	0	140	0	0	1327	0	0	0	0	1010
Philippines	0	1177	0	0	1173	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	1066	0	0	0
South Africa	0	547	0	0	737	0	0	1114	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1443	0	0	0

Table 11: Political trust: trust army

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.44			
	$[-0.83; 1.94]$			
Excluded	0.83^*	1.05^*	0.43^*	0.69^*
	$[0.12; 1.77]$	$[0.19; 2.48]$	$[0.10; 0.83]$	$[0.12; 1.44]$
OSV by gov.		0.58	0.19	
		$[-1.01; 2.55]$	$[-0.47; 0.82]$	
Battle deaths by rebels			-0.27	
			$[-0.57; 0.04]$	
OSV by gov. x excl.				24.37^*
				$[0.57; 83.67]$
OSV by gov. x incl.				0.15
				$[-0.92; 1.32]$
Battle deaths by rebels x incl.				-0.44
				$[-1.01; 0.06]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group-location random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 12: Political trust: army (geo-coded)

	2005	2006
Benin	1039	0
Ghana	1118	0
Kenya	1040	0
Malawi	668	0
Mali	1125	0
Mozambique	411	0
Namibia	341	0
Nigeria	1842	0
Senegal	1066	0
South Africa	0	354
Tanzania	668	0
Uganda	1443	0
Zambia	812	0

Table 13: Political trust: army (geo-coded)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.58^*			
	$[0.54; 0.63]$			
Excluded	-0.62	-1.07	-0.41	-0.13
	$[-1.95; 0.60]$	$[-3.38; 1.32]$	$[-1.88; 1.02]$	$[-1.69; 1.38]$
Battle deaths by gov.		0.86^*	0.84^*	
		$[0.82; 0.92]$	$[0.80; 0.89]$	
OSV by gov.		-0.44^*	-0.34^*	
		$[-0.53; -0.34]$	$[-0.45; -0.24]$	
Battle deaths by gov.			-0.28^*	
			$[-0.40; -0.16]$	
OSV by rebels			-0.37^*	
			$[-0.45; -0.27]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				0.88
				$[-0.35; 2.14]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				0.87^*
				$[0.83; 0.91]$
OSV by gov x excl.				-0.29
				$[-2.03; 1.39]$
OSV by gov x incl.				-0.34^*
				$[-0.43; -0.24]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.27^*
				$[-0.37; -0.16]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				0.11
				$[-0.10; 0.34]$
OSV by rebels x included				-0.51^*
				$[-0.61; -0.39]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 14: Political trust: national pride

	1995	1996	1997	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008
Azerbaijan	0	0	1806	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	1118	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	1122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	156	0	0	0	796	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	2257	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	4080	0	1014	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1112	0	1361
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	315
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1151	0	1231
Mexico	109	233	0	1485	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1859	0	1821
Peru	0	144	0	0	484	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	0	1182	0	0	1185	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1143	0	1160
South Africa	0	588	0	0	796	590	0	0	384	561
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1461	0	1846

Table 15: Political trust: national pride

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	-0.48^*			
	$[-0.69; -0.30]$			
Excluded	-0.33	-0.53	-0.53	-0.51
	$[-0.97; 0.34]$	$[-1.57; 0.48]$	$[-1.64; 0.46]$	$[-1.33; 0.32]$
Battle deaths by gov.		0.07	0.06	
		$[-1.56; 1.75]$	$[-1.64; 1.84]$	
OSV by gov.		-0.75^*	-0.81^*	
		$[-1.12; -0.38]$	$[-1.20; -0.51]$	
Battle deaths by gov.			-2.76	
			$[-7.43; 1.74]$	
OSV by rebels			0.62^*	
			$[0.21; 1.11]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				1.02
				$[-0.76; 2.83]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.25
				$[-1.62; 1.01]$
OSV by gov x excl.				-0.23
				$[-1.42; 1.01]$
OSV by gov x incl.				-0.65^*
				$[-0.87; -0.43]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-2.63
				$[-5.97; 0.35]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				-1.63
				$[-3.37; 0.16]$
OSV by rebels x included				0.56^*
				$[0.24; 0.93]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 16: Political trust: national identity or ethnicity

	1995	1996	1997	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2008
Azerbaijan	0	0	1806	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	1118	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	1122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	156	0	0	0	796	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	2257	0	0	0
Israel	0	0	0	0	4080	0	1014	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1112	0	1361
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	315
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1151	0	1231
Mexico	109	233	0	1485	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1859	0	1821
Peru	0	144	0	0	484	0	0	0	0	0
Philippines	0	1182	0	0	1185	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1143	0	1160
South Africa	0	588	0	0	796	590	0	0	384	561
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1461	0	1846

Table 17: Political trust: national identity or ethnicity

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	-1.10			
	$[-3.45; 0.74]$			
Excluded	0.37	0.37	0.42	0.25
	$[-0.06; 0.90]$	$[-0.06; 1.03]$	$[-0.08; 1.12]$	$[-0.04; 0.62]$
OSV by gov.		-1.12	-1.27	
		$[-3.79; 0.80]$	$[-4.52; 1.03]$	
Battle deaths by rebels			-1.66^*	
			$[-2.96; -0.80]$	
OSV by gov. x excl.				-38.89^*
				$[-86.90; -2.99]$
OSV by gov. x incl.				-0.64
				$[-2.30; 0.80]$
Battle deaths by rebels x incl.				-0.99^*
				$[-1.65; -0.56]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group-location random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 18: Political trust: national identity or ethnicity (geo-coded)

	2005	2006	2008	2009
Benin	1104	0	1075	0
Botswana	0	0	36	0
Ghana	1164	0	1079	0
Kenya	1112	0	1360	0
Liberia	0	0	315	0
Malawi	668	0	673	0
Mali	1151	0	1231	0
Mozambique	430	0	537	0
Namibia	368	0	1137	0
Nigeria	1859	0	1820	0
Senegal	1143	0	1160	0
South Africa	0	384	561	0
Tanzania	668	0	1106	0
Uganda	1461	0	1844	0
Zambia	825	0	0	861
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	927

Table 19: Political trust: national identity or ethnicity (geo-coded)

Analyses with country-level exposure to violence[35]

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV, gov. and rebels	0.04^* $[0.00; 0.09]$			
Excluded	0.26 $[-0.24; 0.79]$	0.15 $[-0.45; 0.76]$	0.25 $[-0.20; 0.77]$	0.09 $[-0.36; 0.56]$
Battle deaths by gov. and rebels		-0.18^* $[-0.30; -0.09]$	-0.14^* $[-0.21; -0.08]$	-0.14^* $[-0.20; -0.08]$
OSV by gov. x incl.		-1.81^* $[-3.04; -0.79]$		
OSV by rebels x excl.		1.98^* $[0.92; 3.35]$		
OSV by rebels x incl.		2.24^* $[1.14; 3.56]$		
OSV by gov. and rebels against opposing group			0.08^* $[0.01; 0.16]$	
OSV by gov. and rebels against supporting group			-0.02 $[-0.15; 0.09]$	
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 20: Social trust (only countries with exposure to violence) at country level



Figure 10: Exposure to violence at the country-level and social trust

[35]Note that in the all the hierarchical models estimated we include group-level random effects (in addition to country-level fixed effects), such that all variables that vary essentially only among groups, are considered as group-level covariates in the estimation.



Figure 11: Exposure to violence and political trust: army (country level)



Figure 12: Country-level exposure to violence and political trust: president/government

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.09^*			
	$[0.05; 0.13]$			
Excluded	-0.11	-0.11	-0.09	-0.11
	$[-0.44; 0.21]$	$[-0.43; 0.22]$	$[-0.41; 0.22]$	$[-0.42; 0.17]$
Battle deaths by gov.		0.02	0.05	
		$[-0.07; 0.10]$	$[-0.02; 0.12]$	
OSV by gov.		0.15^*	0.16^*	
		$[0.09; 0.21]$	$[0.11; 0.21]$	
Battle deaths by rebels			-0.17^*	
			$[-0.22; -0.12]$	
OSV by rebels			-0.03	
			$[-0.08; 0.01]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				-0.06
				$[-0.25; 0.13]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				0.07^*
				$[0.00; 0.15]$
OSV by gov. x excl.				0.42^*
				$[0.14; 0.72]$
OSV by gov. x incl.				0.15^*
				$[0.09; 0.20]$
Battle deaths by rebels x excl.				0.12^*
				$[0.01; 0.22]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.22^*
				$[-0.26; -0.17]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				0.07
				$[-0.05; 0.20]$
OSV by rebels x incl.				-0.05^*
				$[-0.10; -0.01]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 21: Political trust: government or president (country level)

	1995	1996	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Armenia	0	0	1930	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	1715	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	1446	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	1164	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	1211	0	0	0	0	0	0	1073
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1146	0	0
Georgia	0	1091	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	617	0	995	0	0	0	0	886
India	104	0	0	0	0	717	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1815	0	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2046	0	14016	0	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1085	0	0	1362	0
Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	310	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1123	0	0	1203	0
Mexico	111	236	0	0	1453	1195	0	0	3072	0	0	0	909
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	938	0	0	937	0	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	349	0	0	1128	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1838	0	0	1769	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	3230	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	0	138	0	0	0	1304	0	0	0	0	0	0	1019
Philippines	0	1154	0	0	0	1121	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3645	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1101	0	0	1112	0
South Africa	0	537	0	0	0	777	0	0	0	1132	0	391	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1445	0	0	1823	0
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	987	0	0	0	0
United States	1374	0	0	1167	0	0	0	0	0	2290	0	0	0

Table 22: Countries covered for political trust: government or president (country level)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Battle deaths and OSV by gov.	0.08^*			
	$[0.02; 0.14]$			
status_excl	-0.52	-0.62^*	-0.64^*	-0.59
	$[-1.09; 0.05]$	$[-1.30; -0.00]$	$[-1.20; -0.05]$	$[-1.20; 0.06]$
Battle deaths by gov.		0.01	0.04	
		$[-0.08; 0.11]$	$[-0.03; 0.11]$	
OSV by gov.		0.18^*	0.07	
		$[0.08; 0.28]$	$[-0.01; 0.15]$	
Battle deaths by rebels			-0.05	
			$[-0.10; 0.00]$	
OSV by rebels			0.17^*	
			$[0.12; 0.21]$	
Battle deaths by gov. x excl.				-0.03
				$[-0.26; 0.19]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				0.04
				$[-0.04; 0.12]$
OSV by gov. x excl.				-0.08
				$[-0.52; 0.35]$
OSV by gov. x incl.				0.09^*
				$[0.01; 0.18]$
Battle deaths by gov. x incl.				-0.04
				$[-0.10; 0.02]$
OSV by rebels x excl.				0.26^*
				$[0.15; 0.37]$
OSV by rebels x incl.				0.15^*
				$[0.10; 0.21]$
Control variables	yes	yes	yes	yes
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Group random effects	yes	yes	yes	yes

* Null hypothesis value outside 95% credible interval.

Table 23: Political trust: army (country level)

	1995	1996	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009
Armenia	0	0	1952	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	1754	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	1381	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	1158	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	1212	0	0	0	0	0	1044
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1179	0
Georgia	0	1075	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	619	0	988	0	0	0	865
India	101	0	0	0	0	741	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1823	0
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2052	0	13976	0	0
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1040	0	0	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1125	0	0	0
Mexico	111	236	0	0	1437	1198	0	0	3068	0	0	895
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	929	0	0	931	0	0
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	341	0	0	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1842	0	0	0
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	3766	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	0	140	0	0	0	1327	0	0	0	0	0	1010
Philippines	0	1177	0	0	0	1173	0	0	0	0	0	0
Russia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3672	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1066	0	0	0
South Africa	0	547	0	0	0	737	0	0	0	1114	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1443	0	0	0
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	992	0	0	0
United States	1397	0	0	1173	0	0	0	0	0	2296	0	0

Table 24: Countries covered for political trust: army (country level)

Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
pride	44,037	1.411	0.707	1.000	1.000	2.000	4.000
nationorethnic	23,948	0.380	0.485	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
trust army	46,064	2.273	1.009	1.000	1.000	3.000	4.000
trust presgov	46,102	2.423	1.032	1.000	2.000	3.000	4.000
trust other	51,986	1.742	0.438	1	1	2	2
OSV by gov.	51,986	0.426	0.494	0	0	1	1
OSV by rebels	51,986	0.595	0.491	0	0	1	1
Battle deaths by gov.	51,986	0.731	0.444	0	0	1	1
Battle deaths by rebels	51,986	0.710	0.454	0	0	1	1
Battle deaths by gov.	51,986	0.334	0.472	0	0	1	1
Battle deaths by gov.	51,986	0.098	0.298	0	0	0	1
cowgroupid.x	51,986	48,650,389.000	23,874,871.000	7,001,000	37,201,000	64,502,000	84,003,000
age	51,986	37.553	15.082	0	25	47	130
gender	51,986	1.490	0.501	0	1	2	2
education	51,986	1.791	0.736	0	1	2	3
married	51,986	1.417	0.731	0	1	2	2
class	51,986	1.173	0.457	0	1	1	2
politicized	51,986	1.425	0.553	0	1	2	2
size	51,986	0.434	0.299	0.0004	0.170	0.694	0.900
powerless	51,986	0.013	0.115	0	0	0	1
autonomy	51,986	0.024	0.153	0	0	0	1
discrim	51,986	0.015	0.121	0	0	0	1
downgraded	51,986	0.128	0.334	0	0	0	1
religiosity	51,986	1.362	0.672	0	1	2	2
gendermissing	51,986	0.001	0.025	0	0	0	1
classmissing	51,986	0.033	0.178	0	0	0	1
marriedmissing	51,986	0.145	0.353	0	0	0	1
politicizedmissing	51,986	0.031	0.173	0	0	0	1
religiositymissing	51,986	0.110	0.313	0	0	0	1
educationmissing	51,986	0.004	0.065	0	0	0	1
agemissing	51,986	0.002	0.044	0	0	0	1
trust other.1	51,986	1.742	0.438	1	1	2	2
excluded	51,986	0.079	0.270	0	0	0	1
warhist	51,986	0.437	0.745	0	0	1	4

Table 25: Descriptive statistics of data used for analysis with group-level exposure variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
nationorethnic	28,059	0.406	0.491	0	0	1	1
trust army	11,826	2.055	1.137	1.000	1.000	3.000	4.000
trust presgov	27,085	2.128	1.124	1.000	1.000	3.000	4.000
trust other	12,066	1.834	0.372	1.000	2.000	2.000	2.000
OSV by gov.	28,059	0.001	0.032	0	0	0	1
OSV by rebels	28,059	0.000	0.000	0	0	0	0
Battle deaths by gov.	28,059	0.000	0.000	0	0	0	0
Battle deaths by rebels	28,059	0.0153	0.123	0	0	0	1
cowgroupid.x	28,059	49,100,499.000	4,594,781.000	43,201,000	45,003,070	54,103,000	57,111,000
age	28,059	35.451	14.573	0	25	44	130
gender	28,059	1.503	0.500	1	1	2	2
education	28,059	1.554	0.688	0	1	2	3
class	28,059	1.208	0.485	0	1	1	2
politicized	28,059	1.239	0.445	0	1	1	2
size	28,059	0.315	0.283	0.005	0.140	0.430	0.940
powerless	28,059	0.025	0.155	0	0	0	1
autonomy	28,059	0.039	0.193	0	0	0	1
discrim	28,059	0.033	0.179	0	0	0	1
downgraded	28,059	0.262	0.440	0	0	1	1
religiosity	28,059	1.753	0.443	0	2	2	2
nationorethnic.1	28,059	0.406	0.491	0	0	1	1
classmissing	28,059	0.035	0.184	0	0	0	1
politicizedmissing	28,059	0.008	0.089	0	0	0	1
religiositymissing	28,059	0.005	0.071	0	0	0	1
educationmissing	28,059	0.002	0.049	0	0	0	1
agemissing	28,059	0.011	0.106	0	0	0	1
status_excl	28,059	0.063	0.244	0	0	0	1
warhist	28,059	0.119	0.439	0	0	0	2

Table 26: Descriptive statistics of data used for analysis with geo-coded exposure variables

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