

**Abstract:**

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty caused significant ratification problems for a series of national governments. The product of a new intergovernmental conference, namely the Amsterdam Treaty, has caused fewer problems, as the successful national ratifications have demonstrated. Employing the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of these successful ratifications. Drawing on datasets covering the positions of the negotiating national governments and the national political parties we highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in all fifteen European Union members states. This analysis allows us to characterize the varying ratification difficulties in each state from a comparative perspective. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestic interests, since member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at Intergovernmental Conferences.

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In View of Ratification.  
Governmental Preferences and Domestic  
Constraints at the Amsterdam  
Intergovernmental Conference

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# 1 Introduction

On March 30, 1999 the French government submitted its ratification papers for the Amsterdam Treaty to the Italian government and thus allowed the new treaty of the European Union (EU) to come into force on May 1, 1999. This completed a ratification process that hardly stirred the public's attention in the member countries, especially if compared to the involuntary defections of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (e.g., authors). This latter ratification caused significant problems for a series of national governments. A Danish referendum rejected the proposal on Political and Monetary Union and the British prime minister barely survived a vote of confidence. In spite of strong parliamentary support, the French president risked a referendum, and in some countries the required bicameral support or qualified majorities caused more problems than anticipated. The considerably less ambitious nature of the Amsterdam Treaty is probably not unrelated to its smooth ratification process. Moravcsik and Nicolaidis (1999a, 70) argue that governments widely circulated the draft proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in order ". . . to minimize the possibility of subsequent ratification failures."

This view is widely shared by observers and scholars alike. If it is correct, the Amsterdam Treaty provides a powerful illustration of the influence ratification constraints may have on the bargaining process of international treaties. Previous analyses of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty showed that the combination of the parliamentary ratification provisions and the preference profiles of the ratifying actors, namely the political parties represented in the national parliaments, allows for an accurate explanation of the successes and failures in these processes (authors). The cautious approach chosen by the national governments in negotiating the Amsterdam Treaty suggests that they also worried about ratification constraints. This

illustrates the lesson they have learnt from involuntary defections in the Maastricht ratification process: they carefully considered the ratification constraints imposed by their respective domestic political arena when negotiating the issues of the new treaty.

Even though this provides strong support for the two-level character of the bargaining process for the Amsterdam Treaty, it is an ambitious empirical concern to show how the negotiators at the IGC considered not only their own policy preferences but also paid attention to those of the relevant domestic ratification actors. The powerful metaphor of "two-level games" proposed by Putnam (1988), which implicitly draws on pioneering work by Schelling (1960), and the subsequent body of theoretical contributions is largely acknowledged, but the empirical work on two-level games still lags behind. In the study of the European Union the theoretical literature has drawn our attention to domestic politics and the interests represented in the arena of the member states. However, the empirical work is not yet systematic in covering all relevant ratifying actors and carefully deriving their preferences (e.g., Milner 1997 and Moravcsik 1998). Similarly, the precise institutions employed in the ratification process only get scant attention.<sup>1</sup> These, however, together with the preferences of the relevant actors, determine the domestic ratification constraints, which are considered to matter for bargaining outcomes by the two-level game literature.<sup>2</sup>

We take issue with this neglect of domestic institutions and demonstrate first that combining them with the preferences of all ratifying actors is crucial to understanding the ratification process. Second, in addition to this comparative study of the fifteen ratifying countries, we show

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<sup>1</sup> Caporaso (1999) clearly states this in his review of Moravcsik's (1998) book covering the five big bargains from Messina to Maastricht, when arguing that domestic institutions are completely absent in this author's argument.

<sup>2</sup> Admittedly, Milner (1997) analyzes in some detail the ratification procedures for the Maastricht Treaty in the countries she discusses. Nevertheless, her discussion of the preferences of political parties and interest groups fails to establish the crucial link with the exact ratification procedures. Especially given her decision to reduce the

that their domestic constraints influenced the negotiations at the intergovernmental level. We demonstrate that taking into account these domestic ratification constraints allows for an improved explanation of the outcome of the 1997 IGC in Amsterdam. Compared to previous work on two-level games conceiving a fixed bargaining issue space, our study reveals the influence of domestic constraints regarding the subtraction of issues. The Amsterdam IGC has been prepared in a series of preparatory meetings leading to a so-called maximalist issue package, and member states reduced the issue space of the draft proposal in order to find consensus.

Third our analysis examines how this consensus has been obtained. We investigate whether issues have been subtracted in those issue areas where a considerable number of domestic ratifying pivots preferred the status quo to the Amsterdam Treaty. Provided that the negotiating government and its domestic ratifying pivot have similar preferences (e.g, preferring the status quo to the draft treaty) on the relevant issues, we assess whether having a domestic ratification constraint on average leads to an improved bargaining position for the negotiating government. Unfortunately, we do not have measures on each member state's issue salience in order to examine IGC logrolls, but our results still show that member states with high domestic constraints and similar preferences on the treaty were more effective in determining the final set of treaty issues. The conclusions rely on a detailed analysis of the domestic ratification institutions and the preferences of the ratifying actors in all fifteen member countries. Only by taking into consideration this information can an accurate test of the insights from the two-level literature be carried out.

To demonstrate the importance of domestic ratification constraints, we proceed in the following way. In section 2 we start with a short presentation of the contents of the Amsterdam treaty. We

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Maastricht treaty to its EMU-dimension, it must surprise that she hardly discusses the identity of the pivotal parties

then proceed to a discussion of theoretical models of two-level games on which we draw. Given the particular type of bargaining occurring in Amsterdam, some precise hypotheses can be derived from a very simple two-level game, which we present in section 3. In section 4 we briefly present the ratification procedures and empirically derive the preferences of the ratification actors in the fifteen member countries. Section 5 presents the preferences of the negotiating governments, which we use to determine the gains and losses the negotiators incurred at the IGC. This allows us to test our theoretically derived hypotheses in section 6, and to demonstrate that taking into consideration the domestic ratifying pivots can lead to more accurate predictions of the bargaining outcome in Amsterdam. We conclude in section 7.

## 2 The Amsterdam Treaty and Two-level Games

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 2, 1997. As the planned successor of the Maastricht Treaty it amends the Treaty on European Union and the three Community Treaties. The most noteworthy modifications concern the areas of institutional change, justice and home affairs, a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), fundamental rights, employment, the environment and subsidiarity (Langrish 1998, 3). The final treaty was negotiated by member state delegations at the Amsterdam IGC in June 1997, which was formally launched at the Turin European Council in March 1996. Before that, a Reflection Group of member state representatives prepared the topics to be covered by the Amsterdam agenda, reporting to the Madrid European Council in December 1995. A regular working group of foreign ministers' special delegates was then established, reporting to monthly meetings of the foreign ministers. All these preparations produced a number of draft texts, initially as individual drafts and then as "General outline for a draft revision of the Treaties" produced for the Dublin European Council

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in the parliamentary ratification processes.



in December 1996 under the Irish Presidency. In our view, these preparations led to a package of issues to be negotiated at the Amsterdam IGC which has been dwindled down to a consensus set.<sup>3</sup>

According to two-level games these results obtained at the IGC in Amsterdam depend not only on the preferences of the negotiators, but also on the interests of the domestic actors in charge of ratifying the subsequent treaty. Ever since Putnam's (1988) seminal article "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games" scholars have been paying more attention to the details of the ratification hurdles faced by international treaties. A primary concern of current formal two-level game analyses is whether the uncertainty over domestic ratification constraints has the consequences conjectured by Schelling (1960) for the bargaining power of the constrained actor. These articles (e.g., Mayer 1992, Iida 1993 and 1996, Mo 1994 and 1995, Schneider and Cederman 1994, Milner and Rosendorff 1996, Fearon 1997) report that in general informational asymmetries advantage the actor with a domestic ratification constraint only partly known by the other actors.<sup>4</sup> Almost systematically these models assume a given preference profile and derive their results for the chosen setup. Most of them reduce their setup to two international bargainers with at least one of them being constrained by a domestic ratification actor. Under these conditions, the crucial questions concern the assumed location of the domestic

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<sup>3</sup> At the Madrid Council in 1995 the European Council had effectively eliminated enlargement and the post-1999 budget arrangements from the agenda of the Amsterdam IGC (Avery and Cameron 1998, 102). This delinkage led to the Commission's Agenda 2000 covering policies on the proper functioning and further enlargement on a separate agenda, published a few weeks after the end of the Amsterdam IGC. At the Amsterdam European Council of June 16 and 17, 1997, member states only agreed on the substantive provisions which would make up the new treaty. The final form of the new treaty in fact was not adopted by the new provisions at that time, but they were grouped into themed chapters at Amsterdam and underwent so-called "legal edition" over the summer (Langrish 1998, 3-4). These themed chapters were finally sent out as a sequence of amendments and signed at Amsterdam on October 2. This text consists of three parts, amendments to the old treaty, deletions of its obsolete provisions and final provisions including a renumbering of the articles.

<sup>4</sup> Tangent to this question is work related to the setting up of domestic institutions, which tie the hands of government before the negotiations. Pahre's (1997) incisive analysis of this tendency in EU member states is reiterated (and updated) by Martin (2000, ch.6).

constraint's preference, the level of the negotiators' information and the perception of the agenda setting power or the bargaining protocol assumed to be used at the international level. Hammond and Prins' (1999) systematic exploration of all possible preference profiles in a simple complete information two-level game, however, suggests that some conclusions drawn from specific preference profiles might fail to generalize. They conclude that in two-level games "anything is possible" (Hammond and Prins 1999, 5). These remarks are of great value for empirical studies of two-level games, because they remind us that the theoretically derived hypotheses from formal two-level game analyses are highly contingent: depending on the empirical cases explored, one may find positive or negative effects of domestic ratification constraints.<sup>5</sup>

Another characteristic of the current theoretical literature on two-level games is their focus on one-dimensional bargaining spaces. Forays into two-level games with multidimensional bargaining spaces have been rare and have been carried out either under very restrictive assumptions on preference profiles (e.g., Milner and Rosendorff 1997) or for only a limited set of different preference profiles (e.g., Hammond and Prins 1999). The most solid result from these explorations is that the ratified multidimensional treaty will belong to the Pareto-set defined by the preferences of the negotiators and the ratifying agents. Which point in the Pareto-set will be chosen, depends even more strongly on the bargaining protocol assumed.

For these reasons, we draw our attention to the empirical concerns of a two-level analysis of the Amsterdam IGC. Besides the identification of the preferences of the domestic ratification actors, an important empirical question is the conception of the initial bargaining space itself. In the case of the Amsterdam Treaty, as well as for the previous Maastricht Treaty (authors), this space can hardly be empirically reduced to a single dimension. Most current formal two-level game

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<sup>5</sup>This may also explain to some degree why the case studies presented in Evans, Jacobson and Putnam (1993) hardly find any general empirical support for the simple two-level game hypothesis discussed in Putnam (1988).

analyses, however, assume a fixed, one-dimensional issue space. Theoretically, this assumption on the bargaining space excludes issue linkage, which might be a useful strategy for finding an agreement in international negotiations defined in a multidimensional space. Irrespective of domestic constraints, Tollison and Willet (1979, 430) show how adding issues allows for successful package deals, and Sebenius (1983, 1984) provides empirical insights into the use of consensus strategies consisting of adding and subtracting issues in international negotiations. While this literature sheds light on the crucial importance of changing the initial bargaining space for achieving consensus outcomes, this topic has never been addressed in the context of two-level game studies. In the following, we will develop and test a simple model of the relationship between these strategies and the two-level game aspect of the Amsterdam IGC.

### 3 A Simple Two-Level Game of Reducing the Bargaining Space

Regarding the initial bargaining space one may ideally distinguish between a so-called maximalist "top down"-conference package with possible subtraction of issues and a minimalist "bottom up"-setup which can be complemented by adding issues in the course of the negotiations. A maximalist draft treaty proposes integrative policies on all considered issue dimensions, while a minimalist package would start off from the status quo on all issues. Of course, both strategies are not exclusive but since IGCs are usually prepared by a series of meetings, it seems plausible to take a closer look at how maximalist packages with integrative implications compared to the prevalent status quo may be dwindled down by issue subtraction.<sup>6</sup>

In this case, if the starting point of the negotiations is a maximalist IGC proposal, all the relevant

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<sup>6</sup> In a series of preparatory meetings governmental and supranational actors produced a number of draft texts leading to a general outline for a draft revision of the treaties at the Amsterdam IGC.

actors are likely to have preferences somewhere between the no-integration status quo<sup>7</sup> and the complete integration solution. For the empirical case that interests us here, if the status quo and the proposed Amsterdam draft treaty correspond to one of these positions, actors have preferences somewhere between these two options provided that the status quo is not equal to the proposal. This assumption is reasonable because otherwise the Amsterdam proposal would just reaffirm the status quo. Given that taking some issues off the table leads to a result that all countries prefer the policies regulated in the Amsterdam Treaty to the status quo, the question arises what issues were subtracted. Obviously, subtracting issues may help to secure the required unanimous support among the negotiating governments, particularly in the case of differences in the issue salience of member states. But in addition, the selection of issues to subtract is also likely to be related to the domestic ratification constraints of the negotiating actors. In this view, the combination of the two-level game and negotiation analysis might provide further insights into the making of successful ratification packages.

Given our conception of an initial maximalist IGC issue space, the pivotal domestic ratification actor by definition has a preference somewhere between the Amsterdam Treaty and the status quo. In this case, Hammond and Prins' (1999, 5) "anything is possible" conclusion no longer applies. This simply because we now deal with a subset of preference profiles explored by Hammond and Prins (1999). More precisely, from their analysis it follows that if the pivotal ratifying actor prefers the status quo to the Amsterdam Treaty, the ratification is in jeopardy. Two conclusions can thus be drawn rather easily: First, we expect that issues would be subtracted in those issue areas where a considerable number of domestic ratifying pivots preferred the status quo to the Amsterdam Treaty. Second, provided that the negotiating

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
<sup>7</sup> We note here that we assume ex-ante status quo to be identical to the ex-post status quo, e.g., the policy outcome on issue dimensions that were not changed by the Amsterdam treaty. Given the difficulty of measuring both policy

government and its domestic ratifying pivot have identical preferences (e.g, preferring the status quo to the draft treaty) on the relevant issues, having a domestic ratification constraint should on average lead to an improved bargaining position for the negotiating government. On the other hand, if the preferences of the negotiating government and the ratifying pivot are opposed, the government will be less likely to wrestle concessions from its negotiating partners.

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locations, it seems appropriate to focus on the status quo ex-ante.

Figure 1: Four possible preference configurations



We illustrate our reasoning for a single issue in figure 1 where a governmental actor (G) either prefers the draft treaty (upper half of figure 1) or the status quo (lower half of figure 1). In both cases the domestic ratifying pivot may either prefer the status quo (RP) or the draft treaty (RP'). In the upper half of figure 1, if the ratifying pivot prefers the status quo (RP), the government preferring the draft treaty can hardly profit from the domestic constraint. If on other issues the ratifying pivot has a stronger preference for the bargaining outcome (RP'), it may discount the losses incurred on this particular issue. If this is not the case, the government will be hurt in the negotiations. In the lower half of figure 1 it clearly appears that if the government prefers the status quo, a ratifying pivot (RP) preferring the status quo may help in its negotiations. Changing the draft treaty on this issue - so that the status quo is maintained - not only increases the likelihood that the government in question is in favor of the bargaining outcome, but it also enhances the chances of domestic ratification success. If the ratifying pivot (RP') should prefer the draft treaty the government must hope again that should it succeed in keeping the status quo on this issue, the ratifying pivot might gain on other issues to ensure an overall ratification success.

Due to our conception of a maximalist proposal, a government may only gain in the IGC negotiations if it prefers the status quo to the draft proposal and is able to impose this preference in the final treaty. Consequently, it follows from the simple analysis presented in figure 1 that negotiation gains should be the largest in areas where both government and domestic ratifying pivot prefer the status quo. If only the government prefers the status quo to the draft treaty it may have some success in negotiating the maintenance of the status quo, but it can in no case refer to domestic ratification constraints. Finally, if only the domestic ratifying pivot prefers the status quo, it can only enforce the status quo if there are no possibilities of side-payments on other

issues. This draws our attention to the empirical location of the governments' and ratifying actors' preferences on the Amsterdam treaty proposal.

Our reasoning so far only applies to a single issue. But as argued above, the Amsterdam Treaty, as probably all international treaties, involved a whole host of different issues. Hence, the question arises how the negotiators dealt with this multidimensional issue space. We impose two simplifying assumptions, which allow us to derive testable hypotheses based on the arguments presented above. First, we (must) assume that the saliences the negotiators attributed to the various issues discussed in the Amsterdam IGC were identical. This is a very restrictive assumption, but in the absence of any solid empirical measure of saliences, it is a useful starting point. Second, we perceive the negotiation process as having proceeded from one issue to the next. More precisely, we assume that the bargaining over the numerous issues on the table in Amsterdam was dealt with in a piecemeal fashion, issue after issue. These two assumptions allow us to generalize the conclusions we reached from our simple model presented in figure 1:

Hypothesis 1: Negotiating gains should be the largest in areas where both government and domestic ratifying pivot prefer the status quo to the changes proposed in the Amsterdam draft treaty.

Hypothesis 2: If only the government or only domestic ratifying pivot prefers the status quo to the draft treaty the negotiating gains will be smaller.

## 4 Ratification Constraints in Fifteen Member States

Many empirical studies of ratification processes have been limited in several respects so far. Some scholars only employ the two-level metaphor in order to emphasize the importance of domestic actors, while others either rely on institutional hurdles (Milner 1997) or measurements



of a selective sample of ratifying actors (Moravcsik, 1998). In order to carry out a two-level analysis of the Amsterdam IGC negotiations, however, we need to determine the precise ratification constraints in all fifteen member countries. These are determined by the interplay of institutional requirements necessary for the ratification of an international treaty and the preferences of the actors involved in this ratification process. Here we first present the institutions relevant for the ratification process, before introducing the empirical strategy we employ to measure the preferences of the various ratifying actors. Putting together these elements allows us then to proceed to testing our theoretically derived hypotheses.

Almost all constitutions of the EU member countries contain specific articles regarding the ratification of international treaties. Most of these articles specify that the parliament has to be involved directly in the ratification process. As the roller-coaster-like ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty illustrated, however, ratification constraints may change after the adoption of a draft treaty by the governments (Milner 1997 and authors). While these changes in the ratification hurdles were widely discussed in the media when the governments struggled with the Maastricht Treaty, this was hardly the case with the new draft treaty. Nevertheless, even in this much smoother ratification process, important changes occurred. Hence, we briefly present the ratification process and outcome for each member country.

*Austria:* The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty required a special constitutional law before matters on the treaty proper could be decided. Such a law requires the presence of at least half of the members of parliament and a two-thirds majority of the votes (Const. Art. 44.1). The Austrian parliament adopted both proposals with the required majorities on July 9, 1998 (European Union 1999).

*Belgium:* The parliament ratified the Amsterdam Treaty on February 5, 1999 (AFP, February 6, 1999) with the last vote necessary, namely the one of the Brussels region. All other parliaments,

namely the upper and lower house as well as the regional and community assemblies, had already adopted the treaty well before (European Union 1999), each according to the requirement of a simple majority. The accord by the regional and community parliaments became necessary, because the Amsterdam Treaty infringed on some of their powers.

*Denmark:* The Danish parliament voted on the Amsterdam Treaty on May 7, 1998, with 92 MPs voting in favor, and 22 against, thus failing to clear the requirement of a 5/6 majority of the 175 MPs (AFP, May 8, 1998). Hence, the ratification could only be completed by holding a referendum, as had happened with the Maastricht Treaty. Despite some shivers, Denmark ratified the Amsterdam Treaty by referendum on May 28, 1998 with 55.1 % voting in favor (European Union 1999).

*Finland:* The Finnish president ratified the Amsterdam Treaty on July 19, 1998 (AFP, July 10, 1998). This followed the parliamentary ratification, which required a constitutional change. According to Art. 69.1 of the Parliament Act, treaties necessitating constitutional amendments can only be adopted if two-thirds of the members of parliament vote in favor. The Amsterdam Treaty easily cleared this ratification hurdle on June 15, 1998 with the support of more than two-thirds of the MPs (AFP, June 15, 1998).

*France:* On December 31, 1997 the French constitutional court came to the conclusion, that the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty required a constitutional change (European Information Service, European Report, January 7, 1998, Millns 1999). More than a year later, namely on January 18, 1999 the French parliament adopted in a joint session in Versailles by the Congress method a constitutional amendment with the required three-fifths majority with 758 votes in favor and 111 against (AFP, January 18, 1999). Subsequently, the lower house voted on March 3 with 447 in favor, 75 against and 10 abstentions, followed by the Senate on March 16, 1999 with 271 yes, 41 against (AFP, March 16, 1999) to adopt the Amsterdam Treaty.

*Germany* The German *Bundestag* ratified the treaty on March 5, 1998 by a vote of 561 in favor, 34 against and 50 abstentions (Agence France Press, 5.3.1998). The *Bundesrat* voted unanimously for the treaty on March 27 (AFP, March 27, 1998; European Information Service, European Report, April 1, 1998). Thus, it fulfilled the requirement of bicameral approval by two-thirds majorities, which had become necessary since the Amsterdam Treaty infringed on some prerogatives of the *Länder* and infringed on the constitution.

*Greece*: The Greek parliament adopted the Amsterdam Treaty on February 17, 1999 (European Union 1999) clearing the three-fifths majority hurdle, which exists for ratifications of treaties transferring powers to supranational organizations.

*Ireland*: Ireland adopted the necessary constitutional change by referendum on May 22, 1998, with 61.7 percent of the voters voting in favor. Subsequently the *Seanad* (June 18, 1998) and the *Dail* (June 25, 1998) ratified the Amsterdam Treaty (European Union) by simple majorities, as required by the constitution.

*Italy*: The lower house ratified the Amsterdam Treaty March 25, 1998 by 428 in favor, one vote against and 44 abstentions (Agence Europe No. 7201, 16.4.1998; AP, June 3, 1998). Thus, it easily cleared the constitutionally required simple majorities in both chambers.

*Luxembourg*: The lower house approved the Amsterdam Treaty on July 9, 1998 by 55 in favor and 4 abstentions, (Agence Europe No. 7261, 1.7.1998) and thus easily fulfilled the requirement of a two-thirds majority in parliament, which is required for treaties transferring powers to supranational organizations.

*Netherlands*: The upper house (75 members) unanimously approved of the Amsterdam Treaty on December 22, 1998 (AFP, December 22, 1998). It thus followed the *Tweede Kamer* (lower house) that had adopted the treaty on November 5, 1998 (European Union 1999). The constitution in both cases requires simple majorities for the ratification.

*Portugal:* The Portuguese government originally attempted to adopt the Amsterdam Treaty by referendum. The constitutional court, however, judged the question too vague and rejected the call for a referendum (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 7, 1998, 5). Subsequently, the Portuguese parliament adopted the treaty on January 6, 1999 (European Union 1999) by the required simple majority.

*Spain:* Both chambers of the Spanish parliament adopted the treaty in the fall of 1998, namely on October 8 (Chamber of Deputies) and November 24 (Senate) (European Union 1999), by the simple majorities as required by the constitution.

*Sweden:* The Swedish parliament ratified the Amsterdam Treaty on April 29, 1998 by 226 votes in favor, 40 against and 7 abstentions (AFP, 29.4.1998). The constitution requires for ratification a three-quarters majority in favor of a new treaty, provided the latter transfers powers to a supranational organization.

*United Kingdom:* The Amsterdam treaty was adopted by the House of Commons on January 19, 1998, followed by the House of Lords on June 11, 1998 (European Union 1999). Thus, the parliament translated the Amsterdam Treaty into national law, which required simple majorities.

Table 1: Procedures and dates of ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam

Member States	Procedure	Date of Parliamentary adoption	Deposit of instrument	Date of last elections before ratification
<b>Austria</b>	Parliamentary, two-thirds majority	Special constitutional law, amended Constitution & Treaty adopted on July 9, 1998.	July 21, 1998	Nationalrat: December 17, 1995; Bundesrat: division January 1995
<b>Belgium</b>	Parliamentary (Federal, Communities and Regions), simple majorities	Adopted by Senate (June 4), Chamber (June 17), Communauté française. (July 13), Région Wallone (July 15), Communauté germanophone. (November 30, 1998) Flemish Region (December 15) & Brussels Region (February 5, 1999)	February 19, 1999	May 21, 1995
<b>Denmark</b>	Parliamentary, five-sixths majority, then referendum	Adopted by Parliament on May 7, 1998 Referendum approved, May 28, 1998 (55.1% - 44.9%)	June 24, 1998	March 11, 1998
<b>Finland</b>	Parliamentary, two-thirds majority	Treaty adopted by the Parliament on June 15, 1998.	July 15, 1998.	Eduskunta March 19, 1995
<b>France</b>	Parliamentary, three-fifths majority in joint session	Revision of Constitution, January 18, 1999; Treaty adopted by the Assembly, March 4, and the Senate, March 16, 1999	March 30 1999	Assemblée Nationale: May 25 and June 1, 1997
<b>Germany</b>	Parliamentary, two-thirds majorities in both chambers	Adopted by the Bundestag on March 5 and by the Bundesrat on March 27, 1998	May 7, 1998	Bundestag October 16, 1994
<b>Greece</b>	Parliamentary, three-fifths majority	Adopted by the Parliament, February 17, 1999	March 23, 1999	22 September 1996
<b>Ireland</b>	Parliamentary, simple majorities in both chambers, referendum	Referendum approved May 22, 1998 (61.27%). Treaty adopted by Seanad, June 18, Dail June 25, 1998.	July 30 1998	Daíl Eireann: June 6 1997; Seanad Eireann: August 6 1997
<b>Italy</b>	Parliamentary, simple majorities in both chambers	Chamber of Deputies adopted the bill on March 25 followed by the Senate on June 3, 98.	July 24, 1998	both chambers: April 21, 1996
<b>Luxembourg</b>	Parliamentary, two-thirds majority	Adoption by the Parliament, July 9, 1998	September 4, 1998	June 12 1994
<b>Netherlands</b>	Parliamentary, simple majorities in both chambers	Tweede Kamer adopted Treaty, November 5; Eerste Kamer adopted on December 22, 1998.	December 31, 1998	Tweede Kamer: May 6, 1998; Eerste Kamer: May 29, 1995 (Provincial elections)
<b>Portugal</b>	Parliamentary, simple majority	Adopted by the Parliament on January 6, 1999.	March 19, 1999	October 1, 1995
<b>Spain</b>	Parliamentary, simple majorities in both chambers	Adopted by the Chamber of Deputies, October 8 and by Senate, November 24, 1998	January 5, 1999	March 3, 1996
<b>Sweden</b>	Parliamentary, three-fourths majority	Adopted by the Parliament on April 29, 1998.	May 15, 1998	Riksdag: September 21, 1998
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Parliamentary, simple majority	Adopted by the House of Commons on 19 January and the House of Lords on June 11, 1998	June 15, 1998	House of Commons: May 1, 1997

Sources: Adapted from European Union (1999) and sources mentioned in text.

Table 1 summarizes this information and gives additional details on the ratification process. As for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, several constitutional changes were necessary. According to the respective requirements Austria, Finland, France and Ireland adopted constitutional amendments permitting the subsequent ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. In two countries, namely Ireland and Denmark, a referendum became necessary, either because a constitutional amendment had to be adopted (Ireland) or because parliament failed to adopt the Amsterdam Treaty by the required qualified majority (Denmark). Finally, the parliaments in Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden had to adopt the Treaty by qualified majorities, while in all remaining parliaments simple majorities sufficed either in one or both chambers of parliament.

In addition to information about the domestic institutions we also need preference measures for the various domestic ratifying actors. Ideally these measures should cover all the issues discussed at the IGC and be available for all actors intervening in the ratification process. Since we limit our analyses to the parliamentary stage we only have to determine the preferences of the pivotal actor at that stage. To determine the preferences of these pivots, we should know the preferences of all MPs in each country. To some degree we can simplify our analysis by assuming voting discipline in ratification votes in parliament. Then the question becomes which party is the pivotal actor, and what its preferences are.

Table 2: Issue areas and preference measures

issue area	questions in Eurobarometer 47 (March-April 1997)
I: citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- right to vote for foreigners (q22.7)</li> <li>- right to be candidate (q22.8)</li> </ul>
II: interior	- EU responsible for matters not dealt with at national regional local level (q22.4)
III: employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- workers' right (q23g)</li> <li>- unemployment (q23i)</li> </ul>
IV: environment	- protection of environment (q23b)
V: type of integration	-
VI: new policies	- agriculture and fishing policies (q23j)
VII: foreign/security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- common foreign policy (q22.2)</li> <li>- defense policy (q22.3)</li> </ul>

We tackle these two questions by relying on Eurobarometer data to infer the issue positions of the political parties in each national parliament.<sup>8</sup> For this purpose, we employ individual responses to a series of questions related to the issue areas discussed in Amsterdam. We aggregate these positions to the level of the political party, by calculating the mean positions of the sympathizers of a particular party. Obviously, the Eurobarometer data does not allow us to have preference measures for each and every issue on the table at the Amsterdam IGC. By regrouping the issues in seven broad categories, we nevertheless find a series of questions in the Eurobarometer 47,<sup>9</sup> that relate to six broader issue areas of the IGC bargains (Table 2).<sup>10</sup> Given that the responses to these questions were binary, either in favor (1) or against a given policy (0), the mean position of a party group corresponds to the proportion of sympathizers of this party being in favor of a given policy.

In Table 3 we combine our information on ratification institutions with the preference measures derived from the Eurobarometer data. This allows us to identify the pivotal actor in the domestic ratification process and its policy preference for each issue area for which we have preference measures. For this we determined for all parliamentary actors their preferences in all issue areas. We then calculated, based on their preferences and size of their parliamentary representation, which parties were pivotal for changes from the status quo in the lower house and possibly the

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<sup>8</sup>In an earlier version of this paper we also employed data on national MPs (Wessels, Kielhorn and Thomassen 1996). Unfortunately, this dataset fails to cover all 15 member countries, and inferring the party's positions based on responses by the responses of MEPs proved haphazard. In addition, Gabel and Huber (2000) show that inferring the parties' position based on sympathizers is not too problematic.

<sup>9</sup>In the appendix we reproduce the exact question wording for the variables employed in this study.

<sup>10</sup>Below, when discussing in more detail the negotiations at the Amsterdam IGC, we provide evidence that roughly 80 issues were on the table, which fall into the seven categories appearing in table 2.



upper house.<sup>11</sup> The overall pivot and its preferences then characterize the domestic ratification constraint.

A simple example may illustrate this procedure. In the Netherlands two simple majorities in both chambers were necessary to ratify the Amsterdam treaty. We arrayed all parties according to their preferences in an issue area. Given simple majority rule, the party of the median MP in the lower house is the lower house pivot, while the party of the median MP in the upper house is the upper house pivot. Since all these preferences are normalized to a scale from 0 to 1, and 1 indicating the most "integration" position, values below 0.5 suggest that the pivotal actor prefers no integration in a particular issue area. Since in the Netherlands the accord of both houses was required, the pivot with the lower value, e.g. a preference closer to the status quo, is the overall parliamentary pivot. If the preference value for this pivot is less than 0.5, this indicates that a particular government faced a domestic ratification constraint in the particular issue area.

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<sup>11</sup>To determine the pivotal actor we used the information on the ratification procedure appearing in table 1. In the appendix we list for each issue area and each country the pivot in the lower house, as well as, if applicable, the pivot in the upper house and the overall pivot.

Table 3: Preferences of ratifying pivots at the domestic level

	I right to vote	I candidate	II subsidiarity	III worker's right	III fight unemploy- ment	IV environ- ment	VI agriculture	VII foreign policy	VII defense policy
B	CVP 0.44	CVP 0.29	PSC 0.83	ECOLO 0.67	CVP 0.74	CVP 0.73	ECOLO 0.69	CVP 0.76	CVP 0.77
DK	SD 0.32	SD 0.28	RV 0.67	SD 0.20	SD 0.39	SD 0.54	SD 0.55	SFP 0.46	RV 0.37
D	CDU/CSU 0.56	CDU/CSU 0.51	CDU/CSU 0.78	CDU/CSU 0.39	CDU/CSU 0.52	CDU/CSU 0.74	CDU/CSU 0.65	CDU/CSU 0.80	CDU/CSU 0.86
Gr	PASOK 0.51	PASOK 0.38	PASOK 0.84	PASOK 0.52	ND 0.58	ND 0.64	PASOK 0.43	PASOK 0.83	PASOK 0.82
I	PDS 0.75	RC 0.69	PDS 0.89	PDS 0.48	PDS 0.74	PDS 0.76	PDS 0.53	PDS 0.90	PDS 0.90
E	P.P. 0.82	P.S.O.E. 0.74	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.54	P.P. 0.67	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.87
F	RPR 0.49	RPR 0.33	RPR 0.54	RPR 0.40	UDF 0.54	PS 0.70	RPR 0.55	UDF 0.70	UPF 0.74
Irl	PD 0.75	FF 0.69	FF 0.84	FF 0.54	FF 0.53	FF 0.52	FF 0.41	FF 0.77	FF 0.68
GB	LAB 0.50	LAB 0.43	LAB 0.66	LAB 0.45	LAB 0.34	LAB 0.50	LAB 0.40	LAB 0.58	LAB 0.71
L	CSV 0.51	CSV 0.37	G 0.75	CSV 0.36	CSV 0.52	LSAP 0.63	G 0.51	DP 0.84	ADR 0.81
NL	CDA 0.55	CDA 0.45	VVD 0.66	CDA 0.49	PVDA 0.55	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.75	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.88
P	PS 0.65	PS 0.57	PCP/CDU 0.77	PS 0.49	PS 0.54	PS 0.52	PS 0.50	PS 0.76	PS 0.77
SF	SDP 0.50	SDP 0.46	KESK 0.71	SDP 0.16	KOK 0.38	RKP 0.42	KESK 0.09	VAS 0.44	VAS 0.26
S	M 0.53	M 0.43	SD 0.62	SD 0.22	SD 0.50	SD 0.53	SD 0.47	SD 0.51	SD 0.56
A	OeVP 0.39	SPOe 0.33	OeVP 0.67	SPOe 0.29	SPOe 0.49	OeVP 0.49	SPOe 0.45	SPOe 0.69	SPOe 0.69

## 5 Governmental Preferences and the Amsterdam Treaty Negotiations

Given this information about the domestic ratification constraints we can turn to using it for testing our hypotheses on the IGC outcome. For this purpose, we still need information on the preferences of the negotiating governments on the Amsterdam Treaty proposal which comprised a large set of issues. Concerning policy development, many issues on citizenship had been included in the draft proposal. The extension of judicial control over the respect of fundamental rights has been accompanied by the introduction of a mechanism for political control, by which the Council may commit a member state to have breached the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, the Council must take appropriate action to fight discrimination based on sex, race, religion or ethnic origin. The new provisions on fundamental rights are thus a cautious strengthening of former protections. Besides citizenship, the treaty also intensified activities in the field of justice and home affairs. Provisions on visas, asylum and immigration were brought within the legal order, while provisions on policy and criminal judicial cooperation remained in a truncated third pillar. These rearrangements of provisions on justice and home affairs were, however, a major development. Another important step was taken by a task promoting coordination between the employment policies of the member states with a view of enhancing their effectiveness. The Council may decide by qualified majority on guidelines which the member states shall take into account in their employment strategies. It may also adopt incentive measures, not to harmonize, but to facilitate cooperation in this area.

Greater emphasis was also put on the integration of environmental protection. A reference to promoting sustainable development was added. Member states may introduce new domestic provisions, but the Commission may reject such measures based on arguments linked to the internal market harmonization. New policies concerned energy, tourism, sports and consumer protection, while the area of a coherent foreign policy and security policy remained largely unchanged. Defense was the most controversial topic of the Amsterdam IGC, but in the end the Union should only foster close relations with the West European Union (WEU) in view of its possible integration into the Union. Most prominent was the creation of the office of High Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy which assists the Presidency in formulating common policies. But the voting rule has been changed to a so-called constructive abstention, which means that abstentions do not block common policies. In decisions not having military or defense implications, the Council may even vote by qualified majority voting.<sup>12</sup>

Table 4 provides a detailed list of the issues of the Amsterdam IGC and the participating actors' policy preferences. The positions of the seventeen participating delegations were collected by the EP's Task Force in preparation of the IGC. The EP itself has utilized these positions in its regular work (see Parliament's White Paper on the IGC, Vols. I and II, and the briefings on the IGC). The data reported in table 4 stems from the sixth final update drawn up by memorandums, press reports etc. The Task Force emphasizes that, despite their provisional nature, the tables of policy

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<sup>12</sup> While the Reflection Group had still stated that a major aim would be to prepare the Union's institutions for enlargement, an agreement on the number of Commissioners, the Council's voting thresholds, and the member state's voting weights could not be reached. By contrast, the protocol makes enlargement dependent on the Union's ability to reform its institutions and notes compensation for member states that have to give up their second Commissioner. That the Union could not find a solution is best illustrated by the treaty's provision stating that another IGC has to carry out a "comprehensive review" of its institutional provisions a year before the Union will exceed twenty members. Some progress has, however, been achieved on procedural transparency by simplifying the range of possible legislative procedures. Except for monetary policy provisions, the cooperation procedure has been largely abolished, and the EP has obtained a veto right under the (modified) co-decision procedure. At the same time, the notion of flexibility contrasts with the achievements on transparency since it is rather unclear how arbitrary the application and interpretation of its general conditions and specific limits will be. Therefore, flexibility seems to be an alternative option for flexible enlargement rather than being a solution that increases transparency.

positions "offer a reasonably reliable summary of the present situation as regards the IGC and should improve understanding of the Conference" (JF/bo/290/97, 12/5/1997, 1).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>The issues of these tables have been coded as one-dimensional issues with positions on ordinal scales ranging from 0 to 1.0. In addition to the 17 positions on each issue we coded the status quo and the Amsterdam bargaining result.

Table 4: Preferences over 79 policies of Amsterdam delegations

Policy Preferences Distribution				Policy Preferences Distribution					
No	Treaty Area	No Integration (0)	0.5	Pro Integration (1.0)	No	Treaty Area	No Integration (0)	0.5	Pro Integration (1.0)
1	I	2+*		13,c,ep	41	III	13+		* 2,c,ep
2	I	4+*	1(.75)	10,c,ep	42	III	14+*		1,ep
3	I	1+		14,c,ep*	43	V	11,c+		4,ep*
4	I	4+		11,c,ep*	44	IV	1+		14,c,ep*
5	I	5+*		10,c,ep	45	IV	+		15,c,ep*
6	I	8,c+*		7,ep	46	IV	1+		14,c,ep*
7	I	15,c,ep+*			47	IV	3+	1(.5)	11,c,ep*
8	I	15,c,+*		Ep	48	IV	11,c+	*(.25)	4,ep
9	I	5+*		10,c,ep	49	IV	14,c+*		1,ep
10	I	1+		14,c,ep*	50	V	2+		13,c,ep*
11	I	7,c+*		8,ep	51	II	10+		5,c,ep*
12	I	7,c+*		8,ep	52	V	7,ep+	c(.5)	8*
13	I	2+*	1(.5)	12,c,ep	53	V	3,ep+*	c(.5)1(.875)	11
14	I	12,c+*		3,ep	54	V	12,ep+	c(.5)1(.875)	2*
15	I	8,c+		7,ep*	55	V	12+*	C(.875)	3,ep
16	I	8,c+		7,ep*	56	V	15,c+*		0,ep
17	I	12+*		3,c,ep	57	V	13,c+*		2,ep
18	II	2+	12(.5)*	1,c,ep	58	VI	11+*		4,c,ep
19	II	+		15,c,ep*	59	VI	9+*	c(.5)	6,ep
20	II	1+	2(0.625)	12,c,ep*	60	VI	10+*	c(.5)	5,ep
21	II	+	3(.875)(.625)(.5)	12,c,ep*	61	VI	13+*		2,c,ep
22	II	+	3(.875)(.625)(.5)	12,c,ep*	62	VI	7+	*	8,c,ep
23	II	+	4(1x.875)(2x.625)(1x.5)	11,c,ep*	63	VI	14+*		1,c,ep
24	II	1+	4(1x.875)(3x.625)	14,c,ep*	64	VI	13+*		2,c,ep
25	II	12+*		3,c,ep	65	VI	10+*	1(.875)	4,c,ep
26	II	8+*	4(.875)	3,c,ep	66	VI	8,c+*		7,ep
27	II	3+*	5(4x.5)(1x.75)	7,c,ep	67	V	13,c+		2,ep*
28	II	7,c+	3(.875)	5,ep*	68	VII	7+	*	8,c,ep
29	II	3+	5(2x.5)(2x.875)(1x.75)	7,c,ep*	69	VII	3+*	1(.5)	11,c,ep
30	II	10+*	3(1x.5)(1x.75)(1x.875)	2,c,ep	70	VII	4+	4(3x.5) (1x.875)	7,c,ep*
31	II	8+		7,c,ep*	71	VII	15,c+*		0,ep
32	II	2+	4(.875)	9,c,ep*	72	VII	13+*		2,c,ep
33	III	6,c+*		9,ep	73	VII	5		10,c,ep+*
34	III	2,c+		13,c,ep	74	VII	15+*		0,c,ep
35	III	+		15,c,ep*	75	VII	8+		7,c,ep*
36	III	+		15,c,ep*	76	VII	1+	1(.5)	13,c,ep*
37	III	3+		12,c,ep*	77	VII	11+*	2(.875)c(.5)	2,ep
38	III	2+		13,c,ep*	78	VII	6+*		9,c,ep
39	III	4+		11,c,ep*	79	VII	5+*	1(.5)	9,c,ep
40	III	10+		5,c,ep*					

Abbreviations: 1-15 Number of Member States, C Commission, EP Parliament, + Status quo, \* Amsterdam Treaty

Table 4 summarizes our data on the actors' policy positions. The first column lists the number of the issue, the second column attributes the issues to the policy domains which appeared in table 2. Columns three to five show the number of member states sharing a policy position, as well as the position of the Commission (C) and the EP. We added the location of the legal status quo (+) and the Amsterdam outcome (\*). Over all issues we find a rather polarized distribution of policy positions, with actors either opposed to (0) or in favor of (1) these policies, but only a few occupy positions between these two extremes. For most issues, about two-thirds of the member states support a modification of the status quo, while they are more reserved in the area of citizenship (I) and even more reserved regarding the introduction of new policies (VI). In almost all cases, the EP has a pro-integrative policy position and the status quo is located at the non-integrative position. However, there is no clear pro- or anti-integrative tendency in the distribution of member-state policy positions.<sup>14</sup> Since treaty reforms require the unanimous support of all member countries, this suggests that some bargaining had to take place.

Even though this data does not indicate the delegations' salience on each issue, the information on the various actors' policy positions allows us to check whether there have been restrictions on further integration. As already mentioned, Moravcsik and Nicolaides (1999a) argue that governments widely circulated the draft proposals to minimize the possibility of subsequent ratification failures. We first assess this argument by analyzing whether IGC actors strategically excluded conflictual policy issues allowing them to raise the overall support for the draft text. Second, we examine whether some member states performed better in bargaining over the draft treaty. Table 5 provides a preliminary analysis, depicting for each national delegation and supranational actor the distance between its preferred outcome for each issue and the Amsterdam

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<sup>14</sup>The analyses we present below based on the data contained in table 4 give some of the reasons for the member states' final choice.

draft Treaty, respectively the status quo. Given that the IGC started with 79 issues and assuming for simplicity that all issues were equally important to all member states, the maximum distance between an actor's position and the outcome would equal 79. This maximum distance can occur for instance if a draft treaty proposes changes from the status quo (SQ) on all policies, but the delegation prefers the status quo (SQ) on all of them.<sup>15</sup> Almost systematically at least one supranational actor supported a more integrative position. Consequently, our assumption would resonate well with supranational actors preparing the IGC negotiations with a maximal proposal. The governmental actors then attempted to work themselves through this ambitious menu and dropped items on which no agreement could be reached. Since the status quo corresponds almost always to the non-integration position, our assumption of a maximalist package implies that the draft treaty envisioned more integration on most of these issues.

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<sup>15</sup>For simplicity we measure distances with a city-block measure and assume that these distances relate monotonically to the various actors' utility.



Table 5: Actors' distances from the status quo, the Amsterdam proposal and the final treaty

	COM	EP	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	LUX	NL	A	P	SF	S	UK
dist am'	27.13	5.00	21.00	50.25	44.75	30.50	32.13	45.88	51.88	24.50	33.50	37.63	30.00	38.00	44.88	46.50	53.00
dist sq	51.88	74.00	58.00	28.75	34.25	48.50	46.88	33.13	27.13	54.50	45.50	41.37	49.00	41.00	34.12	32.50	26.00
dist sq - dist am'	24.75	69.00	37.00	-21.50	-10.50	18.00	14.75	-12.75	-24.75	30.00	12.00	3.75	19.00	3.00	-10.75	-14.00	-27.00
dist am	28.13	40.75	29.25	18.75	30.00	27.75	28.38	31.12	24.63	31.25	21.75	18.62	25.25	30.25	21.88	19.75	24.75
dist sq - dist am	23.75	33.25	28.75	10.00	4.25	20.75	18.50	2.00	2.50	23.25	23.75	22.75	23.75	10.75	12.25	12.75	1.25
gains																	
dist am' - dist am	-1.00	-35.75	-8.25	31.50	14.75	2.75	3.75	14.75	27.25	-6.75	11.75	19.00	4.75	7.75	23.00	26.75	28.25

Note: Com-Commission, EP-European Parliament, B-Belgium, DK-Denmark, D-Germany, GR-Greece, E-Spain, F-France, IRL-Ireland, I-Italy, L-Luxembourg, NL-Netherlands, A-Austria, P-Portugal, SF-Finland, S-Sweden, UK-United Kingdom, dist am'-distance to initial Amsterdam draft treaty, dist sq-distance to status quo, dist am- distance to final Amsterdam treaty..

In the first two rows of table 5 we report the distances of IGC actors with respect to the draft Amsterdam Treaty (am') and the status quo (sq). The difference between these two distances, reported in the third row, indicates whether a government or a supranational actor preferred the status quo or the draft treaty discussed at the IGC. If the value for a given actor is positive, then the draft treaty is closer to the preferred policy of this actor than the status quo, while a negative value indicates the opposite. The findings show that for the 79 IGC issues both supranational actors have the largest distance from the status quo, except for Belgium and Italy, while seven countries are located rather close to the status quo (UK, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, France and Finland). Since these countries by definition also have large distances to the draft treaty, they all have negative values for the difference in the two distances (dist sq-dist am').

According to contract theory, such negative values preclude the adoption of a treaty under unanimity rule, since some actors prefer the status quo. The picture changes, however, when we look at the final Amsterdam Treaty, which only comprises changes to the status quo on 40 issues. The fourth row in table 5 reports the distance between each actor's ideal point and the final issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (am). Even though France, Germany, Italy and Portugal still have large distances to the Amsterdam Treaty, they also have large distances to the status quo after the exclusion of almost half of the policy issues. Comparing again the distance to the status and the Amsterdam Treaty and subtracting these two distances (row 5 in table 5) suggests that for all governmental and supranational actors the Amsterdam Treaty was finally preferable to the status quo. Hence, the subtraction of issues led to a Treaty that was acceptable to all actors involved in the IGC.

This indicates that all participating actors benefited from eliminating the 39 issues but some are profiting more than others. Comparisons of this type, namely across countries, are, however, fraught with difficulties which especially quantitative analyses bring to the forefront. More

specifically, in order to determine whether some countries profited more than others, one either has to have a common standard to assess gains and losses objectively across countries, or to engage in interpersonal comparisons of utilities, a well-known dangerous territory. But any empirical test of hypotheses derived from a two-level games perspective reflecting the advantages or disadvantages of domestic ratification constraints has to accept either of the two hardly attractive solutions.<sup>16</sup> Without comparing interpersonal utilities we take a closer look at the impact of ratification constraints on the subtraction of issues. This analysis will focus on the relationship between the proportion of subtracted issues and the number of countries with ratification constraints. Following we will, however, use these distances in order to specify this relationship. Given our measures of distances and our assumptions concerning the equality of saliences on the various issues, we presume that the distances give us a common, objective standard to assess gains and losses incurred by the negotiators in Amsterdam.<sup>17</sup>

Under these conditions, we find that particularly countries having preferred the status quo to the maximalist draft treaty could reduce their distances toward the finally adopted treaty. These differences between the two distances appear in the last row of table 5. They clearly suggest that the seven countries with negative values in row 3 of table 5 gained much at the IGC. Incidentally, the Netherlands and Luxembourg which both had preferred the draft treaty to the status quo, profited quite considerably, too. The two supranational actors, together with Belgium and Italy, on the other hand, lost out in the negotiations. Not surprisingly these four actors were also those that had the strongest preference for the maximalist package. Hence, for them

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<sup>16</sup> Readers unconvinced by this assumption can read what follows as based on interpersonal utility comparisons. Such comparisons are quite common in the relative gains debate in international relations, and it is also useful to note that they are quite common in qualitative studies on bargaining, for instance in the EU (e.g., Milner 1997, ch.8 and Moravcsik 1998), where assessments about who won more in a bargain are recurrent. Hence, rejecting interpersonal utility comparisons or a common standard to assess gains and losses would put into jeopardy any empirical tests of central hypotheses derived from two-level games.

subtracting a series of issues was unlikely to make them suddenly prefer the status quo to the Amsterdam Treaty.

## 6 Issue Subtraction and Domestic Constraints


The strong influence of the IGC actors' preferences on the bargaining outcome clearly transpires in the following analysis. Since the IGC issues listed naturally fall into seven categories, we determined for each of these categories the proportion of issues being dropped from the table during the negotiations.<sup>18</sup> Similarly we counted for each issue area the number of governments which preferred the status quo to the draft treaty. Figure 2 depicts a strong relationship between these two indicators. While in issue areas where only one or two governments preferred the status quo (i.e., employment (III) and environmental issues (IV)), hardly any items were dropped from the Amsterdam Treaty, in others, more than half the topics were subtracted. For instance, in the area of new policies (VI) fourteen out of the fifteen countries preferred the status quo to the Amsterdam draft treaty. Not surprisingly, eight of the nine issues in this area were left out and remained at the status quo.

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<sup>17</sup> Using ordinal rankings of these distance changes would avoid theoretical confusions about interpersonal utility comparisons, but provide fewer empirical insights into this relationship.

<sup>18</sup> We consider issues where the Amsterdam treaty envisioned no changes from the status quo as issues that were taken off the table. These appear in table 4 as those where status quo and the final Amsterdam treaty are at the same location.

Figure 2: Subtraction of issues and governmental preferences in seven issue areas



As such the results depicted in figure 2 provide considerable support for a liberal intergovernmentalist view on the bargaining process (e.g., Moravcsik 1998).<sup>19</sup> If the preferences of the governmental actors reported in table 5 already incorporate the preferences of domestic actors, a strong relationship is to be expected. While figure 2 clearly shows an important link between national preferences and negotiation outcomes, this analysis is probably too crude. First, the literature on two-level games would suggest that ignoring domestic ratification institutions and actors is not appropriate. Second, it is too crude since we refrain from looking more closely at the gains and losses that the various governments incurred at the IGC.

The results indicate that the IGC negotiations led to changes favoring some countries to the disadvantage of the interests of others. While some of these changes can certainly be explained by the fact that some governments had a preference for the status quo over the draft treaty, others remain unexplained. For instance, Denmark and Germany had rather similar overall preferences, as depicted in the first two rows of table 5. But Denmark's gain, as reported in the last row, was twice as large as Germany's. Whether domestic ratification constraints have played a significant role in this regard is subject of our following analysis. Hence, we take a closer look at the two-level nature of the bargaining process with respect to issue subtraction and the member states' bargaining power.

For the purpose of analysis we rely on the gains-indicator reported in table 5. More precisely, this indicator measures the differences between two distances, namely the distances from actors' ideal point to the draft treaty and the final adopted treaty. Subtracting these distances from each other shows how much closer the final policy moved to the actors' ideal point. Obviously larger such moves are preferable, while negative values indicate that the draft treaty was closer than the

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<sup>19</sup>Analyses of the Amsterdam IGC largely based on this assumption appear in Moravcsik and Nikolaidis (1999a, 1999b and forthcoming).

finally adopted Amsterdam Treaty. This difference is the central dependent variable in the analyses that follow. Table 6 reports the results of three simple models attempting to explain the various governments' gains and losses in the various issue areas. In the first model (first column of table 6) we simply used the number of times a particular government preferred the status quo to the draft treaty in the six issue areas as independent variable.<sup>20</sup> As the results suggest, this intergovernmental explanation explains to a large degree the gains and losses of the various governments. For each additional issue area where a government preferred the status quo, it could hope on a gain of five points in the negotiations. In the second model we used the same number but based on the parliamentary ratifying pivot. Again, as the number of issue areas increases in which the parliamentary pivot prefers the status quo, the government may expect a gain. This gain, however, is slightly smaller, namely just below five points.

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<sup>20</sup>Since we could not rely on any information in the Eurobarometer for the preferences in one issue area, we had to drop it from this analysis.

Table 6: Explaining the gains at the IGC

	b (s.e.)	B (s.e.)	b (s.e.)
number of issue areas where government prefers status quo	5.00 (2.33)		
number of issue areas where parliamentary pivot prefers status quo		4.65 (2.53)	
number of issue areas where both government and parliamentary pivot prefer status quo			11.58 (4.86)
number of issue areas where only parliamentary pivot prefers status quo			5.66 (2.09)
number of issue areas where only government prefers status quo			5.88 (3.38)
constant	6.73 (4.26)	2.54 (6.63)	-7.67 (6.42)
standard error of the estimate	11.27	11.68	9.47
N	15	15	15



The theoretical discussion of two-level models suggests, however, that gains should be highest when both government and ratifying pivot prefer the status quo. Model three (third column in table 6) tests this expectation and finds support for our hypotheses. If both government and parliamentary ratifying pivot prefer the status quo in a particular issue area, the government may on average expect a gain of more than eleven points. If only the government prefers the status quo in an area, while the parliament is happy with the draft treaty, the gain is slightly less than six. This gain is almost identical to the one a government might expect if in an issue area only the parliament prefers the status quo.

Figure 3: Constraints and overall predicted gains




Figure 3 illustrates these results graphically. As the number of issue areas with constraints increases, governments may expect larger gains, provided that these constraints are not appearing only in the parliamentary arena. The effect of constraints is highest if they are shared by government and parliamentary ratifying pivot, and slightly less in the case of only governmental or only parliamentary constraints. This clearly supports the view that domestic ratification institutions matter for the bargaining results at the international level.

## 7 Conclusion

Compared to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty hardly aroused the publics' attention. In this paper we take this as a clear indication for the two-level nature of international bargaining. The governments of the fifteen member countries learnt a lesson from the animated ratification debates and debacles that finally resulted in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). As shown in a previous paper (authors), this animated ratification process is largely predictable based on a careful analysis of the institutionally determined domestic ratification hurdles and the policy preferences of the ratifying actors. Consequently, if the insights of the literature on two-level games are correct, member countries should have attempted to avoid "involuntary defection" (Iida 1996) by considering closely the ratification hurdles and the policy preferences of the parties represented in the national parliaments.

The empirical analyses presented in this paper show that the fifteen member countries have largely succeeded in this endeavor. In addition, however, the domestic ratification constraints determined by the institutionally defined ratification hurdles and the preferences of the relevant ratifying actors influence the outcome of the bargaining process. We showed that those countries

which preferred the status quo in a particular issue area were much more likely to move the bargaining outcome toward their ideal point if their domestic ratifying pivot also preferred the status quo to the draft treaty. This result was possible by reducing the set of issues initially proposed to modify the treaties.

Thus, our analysis has wide-ranging implications for future research on ratifications of international treaties in particular and two-level games in general. With respect to the more general implications for two-level games an important lesson concerns empirical tests. Such tests only make sense if the notion of "domestic ratification constraint" is taken seriously. Much too often in empirical work relying on Putnam's (1988) metaphor, these constraints are vaguely operationalized as the preferences of interest groups or vague references to poorly measured preferences of political parties. Such an approach ignores the centrality of the parliamentary ratification of international treaties, especially since these parliamentary constraints often set higher hurdles than those set for the formation of governments. Hence, governments of member countries have to find support outside their government coalition, and thus the policy preferences of the relevant political parties are of prime importance. Similarly, the exact nature of these institutionally determined ratification constraints are hardly considered most of the time. Even less attention, with the notable exception of Milner (1997), is paid to the changes in the ratification procedures that occur after a draft treaty has been signed.

While we state these points with respect to empirical work on two-level games, it is obvious that this state of affair in part also derives from the theoretical work. Most of the models proposed in the literature hardly address the important interplay between preference profiles and institutionally determined ratification hurdles. As systematic studies of two-level games show, assuming particular preference profiles restricts the generalizability of conclusions reached at the theoretical level (Hammond and Prins 1999). Especially in relation with changes in the

ratification procedures that may lead to changes in the identity of the pivotal actor (in one-dimensional spaces), this is of crucial importance. The distinction between a maximalist "top down"- and a minimalist "bottom up" package also seems to be of utmost importance because both allow for different strategies to reach an acceptable outcome.

Hence, our approach to studying the effect of domestic ratification procedures appears to be generalizable, provided that a given ratification process shares the following characteristics with the Amsterdam Treaty. First, informational asymmetries should be largely absent in the ratification process, e.g., governments must have consulted widely with their domestic ratifying agents in a public fashion. Second, the bargaining over the draft treaty has to start from a maximalist package, which is slowly reduced by contentious issues. Third, the bargaining should occur over one issue at a time. If any of these conditions fails to apply, parts of our theoretical and empirical strategy is no longer applicable. More precisely, each element suggests a more complicated theoretical model. Obviously, this suggests that the theoretical literature on two-level games still has ways to go. But so does the empirically oriented literature on ratifications of international treaties.

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# Appendix

## Question wording and overall response frequencies

### *Eurobarometer 47.1*

Q.22. What is your opinion on each of the following proposals ? Please tell me for each proposal, whether you are for it or against it.  
(EACH STATEMENT IS READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER FOR EACH INTERVIEW)

READ OUT	For	Against	DK
1. There should be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union (M)	7589	6565	1987
2. The Member States of the European Union should have one common foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union	9804	3704	2630
3. The European Union Member States should have a common defence and military policy	10045	3929	2167
4. The European Union should be responsible for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional and local governments	9584	3282	3272
5. The President and the members of the European Commission should have the support of a majority in the European Parliament. Otherwise, they should resign	10866	1541	3731
6. In matters of European Union legislation, taxation and expenditure, the European Parliament should have equal rights with the Council of Ministers, which represents the national governments	7435	3247	5452
7. Any citizen of another European Union country who resides in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the right to vote in local elections	8231	6039	1866
8. Any citizen of another European Union country who resides in (OUR COUNTRY) should have the right to be a candidate in local elections	6583	7456	2102
9. Children should be taught at school about the way European Union institutions work	14076	976	1087
10. The European Union should support film and television production in Europe in order to achieve a better balance between American, Japanese and European productions	9900	2790	3446

Q.23. Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union.  
Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union ?

READ OUT - ROTATING THE ORDER	(NATIONAL) government	The European Union	DK
a) Defence	8053	7137	953
b) Protection of the environment	5990	9503	650
c) Currency	7256	7761	1126
d) Co-operation with developing countries, Third World	3717	11309	1119
e) Health and social welfare	10476	4966	701
f) Basic rules for broadcasting and press	8591	6302	1248
g) Workers' rights vis-à-vis their employers	9229	6018	889
h) Immigration policy	7261	7930	950
i) The fight against unemployment	7538	7934	672
j) Agriculture and Fishing policy	7596	7414	1133
l) Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties	5181	9883	1075
m) Education	10162	5267	716
n) Scientific and technological research	4362	10741	1036
o) Rates of VAT (Value Added Tax)	7407	7188	1549
p) Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union	4297	10432	1410
q) Cultural policy	9828	5215	1094
r) Rules for political asylum	6903	7996	1247
t) The fight against drugs	4507	10963	674

Source: Melich (1999)

From the questions cited above we selected those closely related to the issue areas discussed at the Amsterdam treaty negotiations. Employing listwise deletion, we only considered the

responses of individuals given answers to all questions we employed and which also stated a preference for a political party. The positions of the parties were determined by the mean position of their sympathizers. Based on the constitutional provisions reported in table 1 we determined the pivotal parties in all chambers in parliament and their respective position on a particular issue. We report in table 7 the identity of the parliamentary pivotal actor (in both houses if applicable) and its ideal-point (located between 0 and 1), while table 8 lists the abbreviations used in table 7.

In table 9 we report for all actors and for all issue areas the distances to the draft treaty (dist am'), to the final Amsterdam Treaty (dist am), and to the status quo (dist sq). In addition we indicated if an actor preferred the status quo to the draft treaty (sq pref=-1) for all particular issue areas. In table 10 we report the losses and gains of the governmental actors in each of the issue areas.



Table 7: Preferences of ratification pivots over 6 issue areas

issue area	I	I	II	III	III	IV	VI	VII	VII	
	right to vote	candidate	subsidiarity	worker's right	fight unemployment	environment	agriculture	foreign policy	defense policy	
pivot	q2207	q2208	q2204	q2307	q2309	q2302	q2310	q2202	q2203	
B	lower house position	CVP 0.44	CVP 0.29	PSC 0.83	ECOLO 0.67	CVP 0.74	CVP 0.73	ECOLO 0.69	CVP 0.76	CVP 0.77
	upper house position	CVP 0.44	CVP 0.29	PSC 0.83	ECOLO 0.67	CVP 0.74	VLD 0.81	SP 0.73	CVP 0.76	CVP 0.77
	overall position	CVP 0.44	CVP 0.29	PSC 0.83	ECOLO 0.67	CVP 0.74	CVP 0.73	ECOLO 0.69	CVP 0.76	CVP 0.77
DK	lower house position	SD 0.32	SD 0.28	RV 0.67	SD 0.20	SD 0.39	SD 0.54	SD 0.55	SFP 0.46	RV 0.37
D	lower house position	CDU/CSU 0.56	CDU/CSU 0.51	CDU/CSU 0.78	CDU/CSU 0.39	CDU/CSU 0.52	CDU/CSU 0.74	CDU/CSU 0.65	CDU/CSU 0.80	CDU/CSU 0.86
	upper house position	SPD 0.62	SPD 0.53	B 90 / G 0.80	SPD 0.41	SPD 0.53	CDU/CSU 0.74	SPD 0.66	CDU/CSU 0.80	SPD 0.87
	overall position	CDU/CSU 0.56	CDU/CSU 0.51	CDU/CSU 0.78	CDU/CSU 0.39	CDU/CSU 0.52	CDU/CSU 0.74	CDU/CSU 0.65	CDU/CSU 0.80	CDU/CSU 0.86
Gr	lower house position	PASOK 0.51	PASOK 0.38	PASOK 0.84	PASOK 0.52	ND 0.58	ND 0.64	PASOK 0.43	PASOK 0.83	PASOK 0.82
I	lower house position	PDS 0.75	FI 0.71	PDS 0.89	PDS 0.48	PDS 0.74	PDS 0.76	PDS 0.53	PDS 0.90	PDS 0.90
	upper house position	PDS 0.75	RC 0.69	AN 0.93	PDS 0.48	PDS 0.74	PDS 0.76	PDS 0.53	PDS 0.90	PDS 0.90
	overall position	PDS 0.75	RC 0.69	PDS 0.89	PDS 0.48	PDS 0.74	PDS 0.76	PDS 0.53	PDS 0.90	PDS 0.90
E	lower house position	P.P. 0.82	P.S.O.E. 0.74	P.P. 0.86	B.N.G. 0.56	P.P. 0.54	P.P. 0.67	IU 0.50	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.87
	upper house position	P.P. 0.82	P.P. 0.79	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.54	P.P. 0.67	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.87
	overall position	P.P. 0.82	P.S.O.E. 0.74	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.54	P.P. 0.67	P.P. 0.47	P.P. 0.86	P.P. 0.87
F	congress position	RPR 0.49	RPR 0.33	RPR 0.54	RPR 0.40	UDF 0.54	PS 0.70	RPR 0.55	UDF 0.70	UPF 0.74
Irl	lower house position	PD 0.75	FF 0.69	FF 0.84	FF 0.54	FF 0.53	FF 0.52	FF 0.41	FF 0.77	FF 0.68
	upper house position	PD 0.75	FF 0.69	FF 0.84	FF 0.54	FF 0.53	FF 0.52	FF 0.41	FF 0.77	FF 0.68
	overall position	PD 0.75	FF 0.69	FF 0.84	FF 0.54	FF 0.53	FF 0.52	FF 0.41	FF 0.77	FF 0.68

GB	lower house position	LAB 0.50	LAB 0.43	LAB 0.66	LAB 0.45	LAB 0.34	LAB 0.50	LAB 0.40	LAB 0.58	LAB 0.71
L	lower house position	CSV 0.51	CSV 0.37	G 0.75	CSV 0.36	CSV 0.52	LSAP 0.63	G 0.51	DP 0.84	ADR 0.81
NL	lower house position	RPF 0.55	AOV 0.50	VVD 0.66	CDA 0.49	PVDA 0.55	VVD 0.86	SP 0.77	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.88
	upper house position	CDA 0.55	CDA 0.45	VVD 0.66	CDA 0.49	PVDA 0.55	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.75	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.88
	overall position	CDA 0.55	CDA 0.45	VVD 0.66	CDA 0.49	PVDA 0.55	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.75	VVD 0.86	CDA 0.88
P	lower house position	PS 0.65	PS 0.57	PCP/CDU 0.77	PS 0.49	PS 0.54	PS 0.52	PS 0.50	PS 0.76	PS 0.77
SF	lower house position	SDP 0.50	SDP 0.46	KESK 0.71	SDP 0.16	KOK 0.38	RKP 0.42	KESK 0.09	VAS 0.44	VAS 0.26
S	lower house position	M 0.53	M 0.43	SD 0.62	SD 0.22	SD 0.50	SD 0.53	SD 0.47	SD 0.51	SD 0.56
A	lower house position	SPOe 0.46	SPOe 0.33	OeVP 0.67	SPOe 0.29	SPOe 0.49	OeVP 0.49	SPOe 0.45	SPOe 0.69	SPOe 0.69
	upper house position	OeVP 0.39	SPOe 0.33	OeVP 0.67	SPOe 0.29	SPOe 0.49	OeVP 0.49	SPOe 0.45	SPOe 0.69	SPOe 0.69
	overall position	OeVP 0.39	SPOe 0.33	OeVP 0.67	SPOe 0.29	SPOe 0.49	OeVP 0.49	SPOe 0.45	SPOe 0.69	SPOe 0.69

Table 8: Abbreviations of political parties

country	party abbreviation	party name
<b>B</b>	ECOLO	Ecologists (Wallon)
	CVP	Christian Peoples Party
	PSC	Christian Social Party
	VLD	Liberal Party (Flemish)
<b>DK</b>	SD	Social Democrats
	SFP	Socialist Peoples Party
	RV	Radical Party
<b>D</b>	SPD	Social Democratic Party
	CDU/CSU	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
	B 90/G	Bündnis 90 / Grüne
<b>Gr</b>	PASOK	Panhellenic socialist movement
	ND	New Democracy
<b>I</b>	FI	Forza Italia
	PPI	Partito Popolare Italiano
	AN	Alleanza Nazionale
	PDS	Partito Democratico della Sinistra
	RC	Refounded Communists
<b>E</b>	P.P.	Popular Party
	P.S.O.E	Spanish Socialist Workers Party
<b>F</b>	RPR	Rally for the Republic
	UDF	French Democratic Union
	PS	Socialist Party
<b>Irl</b>	FF	Fianna Fail
	PD	Progressive Democratic Party
<b>GB</b>	LP	Labour Party
<b>L</b>	LSAP	Workers' Party
	GLEI-GAP	Green Left Ecological Initiative
	CSV	Christian Social Party
	<b>NL</b>	RPF
CDA		Christian Democratic Appeal
SP		Socialistische Partij
PVDA		Labour Party
VVD		Liberal Party
AOV		General Association of Elderly People
<b>P</b>	PS	Socialist Party
	PCP/CDU	Communist Party/Unified Democratic Coalition
<b>SF</b>	SDP	Social Democrats
	KESK	Center Party
	KOK	Coalition Party (Cons.)
	VAS	Left League
	RKP	Swedish People's Party
<b>S</b>	M	Conservatives
	SD	Social Democrats
<b>A</b>	ÖeVP	Austrian People's Party
	SPÖe	Socialist Party
	GAL	Green-alternative list

Table 9: Distances from draft treaty, status quo and Amsterdam Treaty per issue area

issue area	COM	EP	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	LUX	NL	A	P	SF	S	UK	
I	dist am'	8.00	1.00	3.00	15.00	10.00	4.00	6.00	6.50	14.25	3.00	6.00	6.00	4.00	7.00	10.00	12.00	11.00
	dist am	8.00	11.00	9.00	5.00	8.00	8.00	10.00	9.50	3.75	9.00	6.00	6.00	8.00	9.00	6.00	4.00	5.00
	dist sq	9.00	16.00	14.00	2.00	7.00	13.00	11.00	10.50	2.75	14.00	11.00	11.00	13.00	10.00	7.00	5.00	6.00
II	dist am'	1.00	0.00	5.00	7.25	5.63	5.50	3.13	6.38	8.13	3.50	4.50	5.50	2.88	8.50	6.63	6.38	10.50
	dist am	5.50	4.50	1.50	4.50	5.13	5.00	4.63	4.88	6.63	5.50	4.00	3.00	4.13	4.00	6.13	4.63	6.00
	dist sq	15.00	16.00	11.00	8.75	10.38	10.50	12.88	9.63	7.88	12.50	11.50	10.50	13.13	7.50	9.38	9.63	5.50
III	dist am'	2.00	0.00	0.00	3.00	8.00	2.00	3.00	6.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	3.00
	dist am	0.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	5.50	1.50	2.50	4.50	3.50	2.50	2.50	1.50	1.50	2.50	3.50	1.50	0.50
	dist sq	8.00	10.00	10.00	7.00	2.00	8.00	7.00	4.00	6.00	7.00	7.00	6.00	8.00	5.00	6.00	6.00	7.00
IV	dist am'	2.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00
	dist am	0.25	1.75	1.25	0.75	0.25	0.25	0.75	2.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.75	1.25	0.25	0.75	2.75
	dist sq	4.00	6.00	5.00	5.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	2.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	5.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	3.00
V	dist am'	5.63	3.00	6.00	5.00	7.00	5.00	7.00	8.00	8.00	6.00	7.00	7.00	6.00	4.00	5.25	7.00	8.00
	dist am	4.38	5.00	4.00	3.00	5.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	6.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00
	dist sq	3.38	6.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	4.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	5.00	3.75	2.00	1.00
VI	dist am'	6.00	0.00	2.00	8.00	7.00	5.00	6.00	7.00	6.00	2.00	7.00	9.00	7.13	5.00	8.00	8.00	8.00
	dist am	3.50	8.50	6.50	0.50	2.50	4.50	2.50	2.50	3.50	6.50	1.50	0.50	1.38	4.50	0.50	0.50	1.50
	dist sq	3.00	9.00	7.00	1.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	7.00	2.00	0.00	1.88	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
VII	dist am'	2.50	1.00	4.00	11.00	5.13	7.00	4.50	8.00	9.50	5.00	4.00	4.13	7.00	5.50	9.00	8.13	9.50
	dist am	6.00	7.50	4.50	2.50	3.63	5.50	5.00	3.50	3.00	3.50	4.50	4.38	3.50	7.00	2.50	5.38	5.00
	dist sq	9.50	11.00	8.00	1.00	6.88	5.00	7.50	4.00	2.50	7.00	8.00	7.88	5.00	6.50	3.00	3.88	2.50



Table 10: Gains and losses per issue area

gains	COM	EP	B	DK	D	GR	E	F	IRL	I	LUX	NL	A	P	SF	S	UK
I	0.00	-10.00	-6.00	10.00	2.00	-4.00	-4.00	-3.00	10.50	-6.00	0.00	0.00	-4.00	-2.00	4.00	8.00	6.00
II	-4.50	-4.50	3.50	2.75	0.50	0.50	-1.50	1.50	1.50	-2.00	0.50	2.50	-1.25	4.50	0.50	1.75	4.50
III	1.50	-2.50	-2.50	0.50	2.50	0.50	0.50	1.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	2.50	0.50	2.50	0.50	2.50	2.50
IV	1.75	-1.75	-0.25	0.25	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	0.25	1.75	1.75	0.25	0.25
V	1.25	-2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	0.00	2.00	2.25	4.00	4.00
VI	2.50	-8.50	-4.50	7.50	4.50	0.50	3.50	4.50	2.50	-4.50	5.50	8.50	5.75	0.50	7.50	7.50	6.50
VII	-3.50	-6.50	-0.50	8.50	1.50	1.50	-0.50	4.50	6.50	1.50	-0.50	-0.25	3.50	-1.50	6.50	2.75	4.50