Bargaining, Delegation and Enforcement in International
Organizations
Simon Hug1
CIS; IPZ, Universität Zürich
1st Conference on the Political Economy of International
Organizations
Monte Veritá, February 3-8, 2008
First partial version: Jul 12, 2009
, please do not quote
Abstract
International organizations involve a complex web of bargaining,
delegation and enforcement. While the theoretical literature has started
to make some foray in studying how enforcement of international
agreements (which form the essence of international organizations)
affects the way in which these agreements are negotiated, the issue of
delegation is still largely neglected. In this paper I propose to
theoretically analyze how bargaining over international agreements is
affected simultaneously by the problems of enforcement and the
delegation of tasks to both an international body and/or member
countries.
Footnotes:
1 Institut für
Politikwissenschaft; Universität Zürich; Hirschengraben 56; 8001
Zürich; Switzerland; phone +41 (0)44 634 50 90/1; fax: +41 (0)44 634
50 98; email: simon.hug@access.unizh.ch
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