Multilateral bargaining at the 2004 IGC: An empirical assessment1

Simon Hug2
CIS, IPZ, Universität Zürich
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR
General Conference Pisa, September 6-8, 2007

May 14, 2008

Abstract

This paper presents an empirical assessment of a multilateral bargaining model in a multi-dimensional policy space with the help of data dealing with the IGC negotiations after the successful conclusion of the Convent. The main empirical focus is on how the negotiation process (who initiates the negotiations at the IGC) interacts with the preference configuration of the negotiators and the preferences of the relevant actors who have to ratify the proposed treaty domestically. The results suggest that domestic ratification constraints played a considerable role in the success of particular negotiators at the IGC to realize negotiation gains.

Footnotes:

1  This paper emanates from the DOSEI (Domestic Structures and European Integration) project funded by the European Union in its Fifth Framework program and directed by Thomas König (Universität Speyer). An earler version was presented at the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference (Montreal, Canada, May 17-19) 2007), while parts of it were presented at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the very useful comments by participants at these event and the financial support of the Swiss Bundesamt für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Grant number BBW Nr 02.0313) and the Grundlagenforschungsfonds of the University of St. Gallen (Grant number G12161103). The paper has also benefitted from the research assistance by Tobias Schulz.

2  Institut für Politikwissenschaft; Universität Zürich; Hirschengraben 56; 8001 Zürich; Switzerland; phone +41 (0)44 634 50 90/1; fax: +41 (0)44 634 50 98; email: simon.hug@access.unizh.ch



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