Models of Multilateral Negotiations and
Ratification1
Simon Hug2
IPZ, Universität Zürich
Paper prepared for presentation at the
ISA conference March 1-5, 2005, Hawaii
First version: August 2002, this version: Jul 24, 2005
Abstract
Models of international negotiations have so far been severely limited,
either by considering one-dimensional bargaining spaces or by reducing the
set of negotiators to two parties. Such models can hardly reflect
negotiations in the current international context, may it be in the realm
of the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, etc.
The lack of empirical correspondence becomes even more glaring, when
the ratification of international treaties in these various organziations
is considered. Thus, the paper proposes to take stock of the possibilities
how existing multilateral bargaining models might be applied to negotiations
of international treaties which are subject to domestic ratification
processes.
Footnotes:
1 This paper emanates from the DOSEI (Domestic
Structures and European Integration) project funded by the European
Union in its Fifth Framework program and directed by Thomas König
(Universität Speyer). Very preliminary versions of this paper were
presented at the Universität Mannheim and at the Freie Universität
Berlin, while a more complete version was delivered at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 - 5,
2004, Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the very useful comments by
participants at these events, especially by Michael Gilligan, and the
financial support of the Swiss Bundesamt für Bildung und
Wissenschaft (Grant number BBW Nr 02.0313) and the
Grundlagenforschungsfonds of the University of St. Gallen (Grant
number G12161103).
2 Institut für
Politikwissenschaft; Universität Zürich; Hirschengraben 56; 8001
Zürich; Switzerland; phone +41 (0)44 634 50 90/1; fax: +41 (0)44 634
50 98; email: simon.hug@access.unizh.ch
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