

# Roll call votes in the European parliament <sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

Analyses of roll call votes in the European parliament (EP) have become more and more sophisticated and been used to address many important research questions. That rather few votes in the EP are roll call votes has been neglected for quite some time. Drawing on a detailed dataset on policy positions (i.e., the DEU dataset) and combining it with information on votes in the EP, the paper proposes tests of a game-theoretical model dealing with the decision to call a roll call as a disciplining device. The empirical evidence supports several implications of this model, highlights, however, also that for some party groups roll call requests are hardly motivated by disciplining considerations.

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<sup>\*</sup> This paper draws in part on previous coauthored work by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a* and 2008*b*). Earlier versions were prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference (University of Iceland, Reykjavik, August 25 - 27, 2011) and at a seminar at the Institute of Advanced Studies (Vienna, January 19, 2012). Helpful comments by participants and especially Monika Mühlböck, research assistance by Danielle Martin, Franziska Spörri, Fabian Wagner, and Simone Wegmann, as well as the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grants No 100012- 108179, 100012-111909 and 100012-129737) are gratefully acknowledged.

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# 1 Introduction

Roll call votes (RCVs) in parliaments offer a wealth of behavioral data allowing to study numerous questions focusing on members of parliaments (MPs), political parties, elections etc.. This data comes, however, also with some pitfalls. As recent work has shown, scholars often neglect the exact “data generating process” (e.g., Morton, 1999) that leads to the observation of roll call votes. First of all, even scholars dealing with the parliament most frequently studied with the help of roll call votes (i.e., the US Congress) have long neglected, as have scholars dealing with other parliaments, that roll call votes often just make up a sample of all votes in a parliament. If we wish to infer more general properties of the political process, the characteristics of this sample relative to the population of all votes become of central importance (e.g., Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach, 2006; Roberts, 2007; Clinton and Lapinski, 2008; Hug, 2010; Crisp and Driscoll, 2012). Second, and in part related to the former point, voting in general and even more specifically in roll call votes is likely to be strategic. MPs will consider not only the proposal at hand when deciding to vote “yea” or “nay” but also the broader implications, most prominently what the final outcome of the decision process is likely to be (e.g., Clinton and Meirowitz, 2004). Third, even at the proposal stage, strategic considerations may be influenced by the anticipated occurrence or not of roll call votes (e.g., Londregan, 2000).

While these as well as various other limitations of roll call votes are normally acknowledged in the literature, few are the attempts to address them heads-on and integrate them in substantive research. This is most certainly the case in work using roll call votes to analyze the European parliament (EP). The most prominent books dealing with roll call votes (Kreppel, 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006) acknowledge in passing several of the problems mentioned above, but then proceed in their analysis without taking into account this problem.<sup>1</sup> A main reason for this is most likely that we have a quite limited theoretical understanding of these problems mentioned above. To take the first limitation (which I develop further below), namely that only a subset of votes is normally roll called in parliaments, there are very few complete theories dealing with roll call vote requests (or more generally the circumstances under which roll call votes

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<sup>1</sup>As mentioned above this is common practice even in research dealing with the US Congress (see for instance Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).

occur). While already for decades scholars have been surmising different mechanisms that might lead to roll call votes (see for instance Fennell, 1974),<sup>2</sup> to my knowledge only Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a*) offer for one particular mechanism, namely roll call requests as motivated by party disciplining, a complete theoretical account (see below). While Ainsley and Maxwell (2012) analyze a simple model addressing various reasons for roll call votes, they assume, however, that the location of the bill proposal is exogenous. This makes their model less complete than Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*), as the latter authors show that proposals differ in the presence of roll call votes. In the context of research focusing on the EP Carrubba and Gabel (1999), Kreppel (2002), Hix, Noury and Roland (2006), Thiem (2009) (see also Thiem, 2006, 2008), and Finke and Thiem (2010) offer partial theoretical arguments (largely based on decision-theoretic arguments), but not a complete theoretical model.

In the present paper I will not offer a new theoretical model dealing with the issues of roll call vote requests, but propose some additional empirical evaluations of Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model with the help of data from the EP. This model focuses exclusively on a mechanism that envisions roll call vote requests as being motivated by disciplining purposes.<sup>3</sup> As the authors acknowledge, other mechanisms are likely to prevail as well in parliaments, but the literature has focused quite considerably on this particular motivation for requesting roll call votes. The empirical material on which I will rely allows for initial tests which consider both the first two limitations discussed above, namely that roll call vote requests are strategically motivated and that proposals submitted by parliament will be affected by this.<sup>4</sup> The results suggest that roll call votes requested by a party group of the EP are more frequent when the proposal to be voted upon comes from the same party group and is close to its ideal point. Proposals by a party group that are farther removed from the party group's ideal point are less likely to be roll called by this party group but might be by another party group. As this empirical "regularity" is in accordance with an implication from Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model, this seems to suggest that disciplin-

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<sup>2</sup>Carrubba and Gabel (1999) offer a survey of these different mechanisms proposed in the literature (see also Carrubba, Gabel and Hug, 2008*a*).

<sup>3</sup>Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*b*) already provide some initial empirical tests, to which I will refer to below.

<sup>4</sup>This relates directly to the fourth hypothesis derived from Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model tentatively evaluated in Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*b*).

ing seems to be a mechanism (among others) present in the EP when it comes to explaining roll call votes. In addition, it appears that when a party group calls a roll call on one of its own proposals, its members' voting behavior is considerably affected. This suggests that the underlying mechanism of roll call votes as disciplining tool plays a role.

In the next section I briefly discuss some relevant literature dealing with roll call votes in the EP and some more general work. Section three first discusses some implications of Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model and initial empirical tests presented in Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*b*). I then present the empirical strategies followed in this paper and present the results before concluding in section 4.

## 2 Roll call votes in the EP

From the early studies of roll call votes in the EP by Attina (1990) and Brzinski (1995) an important literature has developed using this data to address diverse research questions. Issues of party group cohesion and representation have played a central part in this literature (e.g., Kreppel, 2002; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006; Høyland, 2010; Kaniovski and Mueller, 2011). Quite quickly, however, Carrubba and Gabel (1999) and Carrubba, Gabel, Murrach, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach (2006) highlighted that roll call votes in the EP are predominantly called on non-legislative resolutions and, in addition, when considering legislative decisions they are quite a biased sample compared to all votes considered by Carrubba, Gabel, Murrach, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach (2006) in the first year of the fifth EP. A similar conclusion appears in Thiem's (2009) study of the first year of the sixth EP.<sup>5</sup>

Roberts (2007) and Clinton and Lapinski (2008) alert scholars to similar discrepancies for the US Congress, and for German local parliaments Stecker (2009, 2011) does so as well. Crisp and Driscoll (2012) discuss for Latin American parliaments the various voting procedures, and how they might influence roll call vote requests and their consequences. Finally, Hug (2010), drawing on a unique

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<sup>5</sup>Høyland (2010), drawing on a model proposed by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), shows that many estimates (policy positions, cohesion, etc.) differ if own considers that party pressure is likely to focus on legislative votes and not on simple resolutions. Below I will use a similar model to assess party effects in a specific subset of votes.

dataset allowing to compare voting behavior in roll call votes and other electronic votes (the results of which were unavailable to the politicians and the public) in the Swiss parliament, can show that roll call votes affect the behavior of MPs. More precisely, the cohesion of party groups is affected by the request of a roll call vote.

This latter study suggests that the reason leading to roll call votes cannot be simply ignored when analyzing the voting behavior of MPs (or MEPs for that matter).<sup>6</sup>

### 3 Requesting roll call votes and their consequences

As noted above theoretical studies on the motivations for roll call vote requests are largely absent (though see Fennell, 1974). Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a*) focus on a disciplining mechanism by modeling the interaction between two party leaders that may discipline their party members in a roll call vote.<sup>7</sup> The model is based on a spatial representation of policy choices in a one-dimensional space, where party leaders are located at the median position of their party group. The members of the party group are more or less dispersed around this position, leading, in some cases, to overlapping support for the distribution of locations of the two parties. Depending on the location of the status quo and the (endogenous) bill proposal one or both leaders may have an incentive to request a roll call votes in order to increase the likelihood of their preferred outcome to be chosen (the distribution of MEP positions maps probabilistically into the likelihood of a proposal being accepted). Based on the assumption that one party leader may make a bill proposal, Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a*) show that the circumstances under which roll call votes occur are dependent on the location of the status quo and the parties, as well as the distribution of MEP ideal-points. Drawing on a numerical equilibrium analysis they can derive a series of implications linking these factors to various observables.

Applying these implications to the EP, as is done by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*b*), this presumes that party group leaders have means to discipline MEPs.

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<sup>6</sup>Acknowledging this problem Settembri (2006) focuses on committee reports in a study of the EP.

<sup>7</sup>Under some conditions the conclusions of the model extend to more than two party leaders.

Thiem (2009) argues that these party leaders have very few sticks and carrots available, and that it is much more the national parties that have the potential to discipline MEPs.<sup>8</sup> Finke and Thiem (2010) suggest that proposals in the EP, given the open amendment process, cannot be controlled by party group leaders as assumed by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a*) and find in their empirical analysis some support for a signaling motivation for roll call vote requests.<sup>9</sup> Ainsley and Maxwell (2012), to the contrary, analyze a theoretical model by accommodating various signaling incentives for parties to request a roll call vote and show that at each vote one party would have an incentive to request such a vote. They conclude that only combinations of motivations or extensions to their model, like asymmetric information, can account for the fact that not all votes are roll called.

Thus, in this paper I will focus on the empirical implications of Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model. In preliminary empirical tests of some of these implications Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*b*) show that if the proposing party group is requesting a roll call vote then the cohesion of other party groups is stronger. Similarly, they can show that requests for roll call votes by the party group submitting a proposal is affected by the latter's size and preference heterogeneity. These two factors also influence a party group to request a roll call vote on a proposal by another group. These results are largely in accord with the theoretical expectations.

Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model also implies that roll call vote requests by a proposing party will occur mostly for proposals located more closely to the party group's ideal policy. Testing such an implication requires obviously, detailed information on the policy proposals and the positions of the various actors on these issues. In what follows I rely on data covering a series of decision processes and containing information on policy positions collected by Thomson and Stokman (2003) (see also Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König, 2006).

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<sup>8</sup>Interesting to note in this context are the studies by Hix (2002) and Lindstädt, Slapin and Wielen (2011). The latter study finds that around election time national parties influence more strongly MEPs, while around midterm, party groups in the EP appear more cohesive.

<sup>9</sup>As I show below, almost all amendments voted upon on the floor are proposed by party groups or by committees. Relatedly Mühlböck and Yordanova (2012), drawing on a comparison between the sixth and seventh EPs, argue that their empirical evidence fails to lend support to these two explanations. As alternative explanation for the empirical findings they suggest that roll calls are requested for important votes which happened also to be contentious.

### 3.1 Data

The DEU (Decision-making in the EU) dataset covers controversial decisions in two years. According to Thomson and Stokman (2003, 17) “[w]e selected Commission proposals that were discussed in the Council in the period January 1999 - December 2000.”<sup>10</sup> For each of these decisions the researchers identified with the help of experts the main issue dimensions and elicited position estimates on these issue scales of Council members, the EP and the Commission, and in addition the reversion point and the final outcome. The data used here combines the DEU data with information covering the proceedings in the fourth and fifth EP, as these two parliaments voted on these issues. I identified all votes in these EPs that dealt with DEU-decisions and collected from the EP the contents of the amendments voted upon (both those that passed and those that failed) and tried to link these with the issues identified by Thomson and Stokman (2003) and Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König (2006).<sup>11</sup>

Before moving to the actual empirical test of the implication mentioned above, I first present some descriptive information on this combined dataset that allows for some insights in the current debate about the motivations for roll call vote requests in the EP. A first piece of information from the data collection effort concerns the share of roll call votes among votes on controversial legislative matters in the European parliament.<sup>12</sup> Assuming that the DEU data by Thomson and Stokman (2003) (see also Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König, 2006) accurately reflects controversial proposals during the period covered,<sup>13</sup> I find a much lower share of roll call votes for these proposals than the overall share reported by Hix, Noury and Roland (2006). While Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough,

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<sup>10</sup>In a previous version of this paper I had to limit myself to 62 out of the 66 decisions covered by these authors. In the present version, all decisions are covered, even though the EP has not yet delivered all the information for all codings necessary. I discuss this below. The full list of decisions appears in table 6 in the appendix, which also offers some basic information on these decisions.

<sup>11</sup>A similar approach has been chosen by Hansen (2008) to link DEU decisions with votes in the Council (see also Høyland and Hansen, 2010).

<sup>12</sup>Roll call votes can be requested in the EP by a party group or certain number of MEPs, namely 40 in the EPs under consideration in this paper. Only with the seventh EP are all final votes roll call votes carried out with the electronic voting system (see rule 166 of the “Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament”) (see Hug, 2012; Mühlböck and Yordanova, 2012, for studies dealing with this change of rules)

<sup>13</sup>One of Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König’s (2006) selection criteria was that the proposal submitted by the Commission to the decision-making process was controversial.

Montgomery and Schambach (2006, 700) report that slightly more than a quarter of all votes in the EP were roll calls (27.8 %) and less than a tenth (7.2 %) for legislative votes for the first year of the fifth EP,<sup>14</sup> I find 10.0 % (296 of 2973) for votes related to the DEU-decisions (see Thomson, Stokman, Achen and König, 2006).<sup>15</sup> As all votes considered here are legislative, it appears that controversial legislation leads to a slightly higher share of roll call votes.

Interesting to note is that on all the DEU decisions only four final passage votes were roll called, namely the “Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids” (COM(1995)655), the “Council Regulation (EC) No 2791/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down certain control measures applicable in the area covered by the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the north-east Atlantic fisheries” (COM(1999)345), “Civil and commercial judicial cooperation, enforcement of judgments: Brussels I, Lugano Conventions” COM(1999)348, and the “Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents” (COM(2000)030).

Consider next the identity of the requester for roll call votes in important legislative matters (table 1). It appears that party groups are the dominant actors. The overwhelming number of the 296 requests came from party groups and in less than 5 percent individual MEPs requested a roll call, even though they have the possibility to request roll call votes in groups.<sup>16</sup> Among the party groups the PPE, the Verts/ALE and the ELDR are the most frequent requester of roll call votes.<sup>17</sup>

A next important issue is whether the proposer of an amendment requests a roll call vote or whether it is a non-proposing party group. For this issue I present three separate sets of analyses. The first focuses on those amendments that were presented on the floor by individual MEPs. In a second one I focus on the party

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<sup>14</sup>Thiem (2009, 152f), for the first year of the sixth parliament finds very similar figures, namely overall a share of 22.9 % of roll calls and only 14.5 % roll calls on legislative matters. Finke and Thiem (2010), covering the whole sixth EP report a share of roll calls of 21.1 %, while, finally, Faas (2003, 851), referring to official statistics, suggests that “about 15 per cent of votes are taken by roll call.”

<sup>15</sup>Approximately the same share, namely 263 out of 2973, are electronic votes, leaving the huge majority, namely 81.2 %, to voice and show of hands vote.

<sup>16</sup>Finke and Thiem (2010) report a similar figure for the sixth parliament.

<sup>17</sup>Table 7 in the appendix offers the full names of the party groups and the abbreviations used in this paper.



Table 1: Requesters of roll calls (multiple requesters possible)

Party group	number of RCV requests	Share (in %) of RCV requests
ARE	3	1.0
EDD	5	1.7
ELDR	48	16.2
GUE/NGL	22	7.4
I-EDN	19	6.4
PPE	86	29.1
PSE	16	5.4
TDI	18	6.1
UEN (UPE)	18	6.1
Verts/ALE (V)	97	32.8
Individual MEPs	12	4.1
Total	344 (296)	116.3 (100.00)

group affiliation of the rapporteur of a given proposal,<sup>18</sup> while in the third one I combine the two pieces of information.

Focusing first on floor amendments table 2 shows that roll call vote requests by a given party group concentrate strongly on proposals by this same party group. For some party groups all roll call vote requests deal with their own proposals, for all other ones this share (last column of table 2) exceeds 0.5 (with the marginal exception of V).

Table 2: Requesters of roll calls and proposers of amendments

Party group	number of RCV requests	RCV requests on amendments by a party group	share of requests on amendments amendments by own party group
ARE	3	3	1.00
EDD	5	3	0.67
ELDR	48	17	0.59
GUE/NGL	22	11	0.73
I-EDN	19	16	0.88
PPE	86	32	0.63
PSE	16	9	0.78
TDI	18	3	1.00
UEN/UPN	18	17	1.00
Verts/ALE	100	44	0.59

Another way to look at this data is to focus on the proposals and assess how many of these are roll called. Table 3 provides this information. Not surprisingly, given the figures discussed above, the huge majority of floor proposals are voted upon by show of hand or electronic vote. For those that are voted upon in a roll

<sup>18</sup>Here I follow the strategy employed by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008b).

call vote we find again largely those that are requested by the proposing party.

Table 3: Requesters of roll calls and proposers of amendments

Party group	number of proposals by party group	number with roll call votes	share of roll call request by own party group
ARE	24	3	1.00
EDD	5	2	1.00
ELDR	123	17	0.59
GUE/NGL	136	15	0.53
I-EDN	65	19	0.74
PPE	157	38	0.56
PSE	138	13	0.54
TDI	12	3	1.00
UEN /UPE	93	24	0.71
Verts/ALE	117	39	0.67

Turning now to the proposals presented by the committees (table 4) I find that fewer of these proposals are subject to a roll call request by the party group of the rapporteur.<sup>19</sup> Still sizeable shares appear for the GUE/NGL, the PPE and the ELDR.

Table 4: Requesters of roll calls and proposers of amendments (from committee rapporteur)

Party group	number of proposals by party group	number subject to a roll call vote	share requested by own party group
ARE	80	4	0.00
EDD	0	NA	NA
ELDR	346	64	0.29
GUE/NGL	204	9	0.56
I-EDN	0	NA	NA
PPE	1001	42	0.36
PSE	847	94	0.11
TDI	31	0	NA
UEN/UPE	43	0	NA
Verts/ALE	300	49	0.31

Combining the information from tables 3 and 4 yields table 5. The modal category is still that a majority of proposals subject to a roll call vote by a party group is requested by the same party group. Clearly, however, assigning the party group label of the rapporteur to a proposal by a committee biases the results against finding a relationship between authorship of a proposal and roll call request.

<sup>19</sup>This might lend support to Settembri's (2006) argument that committees allow the EP to arrive at a consensus.

Table 5: Requesters of roll calls and proposers of amendments (from committee rapporteur and party group)

Party group	number of proposals party group	number subject to roll call vote	share requested by own party group
ARE	104	7	0.43
EDD	5	2	1.00
ELDR	437	71	0.28
GUE/NGL	331	24	0.45
I-EDN	65	19	0.74
PPE	1123	77	0.43
PSE	919	103	0.12
TDI	43	3	1.00
UEN/UPPE	133	24	0.62
Verts/ALE	401	80	0.43

### 3.2 Roll call requests and proposal location

As discussed above the main implication to be evaluated empirically from Carrubba, Gabel and Hug’s (2008a) model is that proposals subject to a roll call vote requested by the proposing party group are located more closely to the latter’s ideal-point than if another party group requests a roll call vote. An empirical test of this proposition requires information on a proposal’s location but also information on the location of a party group. While the former information is readily available for votes on amendments that could be linked with issues covered in the DEU-dataset, the latter is harder to come by. In initial tests based on a subset of the decisions covered here Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008a) compare the vote margins by party groups on various proposals to infer the ideal-point of party groups. In what follows I take a different path and infer an issue by issue ideal-point by relying on the roll call data from Hix, Noury and Roland (2006). This limits obviously the analysis to decisions where roll call votes took place on amendments that could be linked to issues identified in the DEU-dataset.

Overall at least one roll call vote was requested in 32 of the 66 DEU-decisions, while in the remaining 34 decisions all votes in parliament were taken by electronic voting or show of hands. Among these 34 decisions 21 had at least one (up to a maximum of 48) roll call vote that could be linked with issues from the DEU-dataset. If I break this down to the level of issues, the numbers become even smaller. Nevertheless for one issue (and thus decision I am able to proceed as charted out above.

The votes analyzed relate to the “Directive 2001/37/EC of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products” (COM(1999)594). According to the DEU-data there were five main issues covered (Thomson and Stokman, 2003):

1. export of tobacco products
2. strength of health warning
3. disclosure of product information
4. updating of directive
5. ban on product descriptives

Votes in the EP focusing on this set of issues mostly focused on the second one. Out of a total 200 of votes in the EP, 47 related to the second issue, namely the “strength of health warning.” Of these 17 were voted upon in roll call votes.<sup>20</sup> Taking these 17 roll call votes I carried out an estimation based on a simple IRT-model (see Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004).<sup>21</sup> Such a model estimates the ideal-points of MEPs in a policy space and for each policy proposal voted upon a so-called “difficulty” and “discrimination” parameter. These latter estimates allow the calculation of the estimated dividing line between the “yea” and “nay” positions in the policy space.<sup>22</sup>

Figure 1 depicts first of all the relationship between the location of the dividing lines estimated for the 17 proposals and the location of the proposals on the issue scales identified by the DEU-data (Thomson and Stokman, 2003).<sup>23</sup> The line summarizes the results of a linear regression, suggesting that the estimated location of the dividing lines is quite considerably related to the positions of the proposals on the issue scales.<sup>24</sup> This rather close fit allows to assess (tentatively)

<sup>20</sup>One vote was a “vote en bloc” covering two proposed amendments.

<sup>21</sup>As Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) nicely discuss, their approach to estimate ideal points is amenable even to situations where the number of votes is rather limited.

<sup>22</sup>If the underlying IRT-model is  $p_{ij}(yea) = \Phi(\beta_j \times \theta_i + \alpha_j)$ , then the cutting lines for proposals  $j$  can be estimated by  $\frac{-\alpha_j}{\beta_j}$  (the  $i$ s are indexing over legislators).

<sup>23</sup>Figure 5 in the appendix depicts the estimated ideal-points for the MEPs. This figure suggests that despite the limited number of votes the estimates are reasonably precise.

<sup>24</sup>This relationship should hold, provided that each proposal is pitted against the reversion point, identified as 0 in the DEU-data.

how proposals by particular party groups are positioned compared to their ideal point. The latter is estimated on the basis of the average position of all MEPs belonging to a particular party group. To map it into figure 1 it has to be noted that the dividing lines are located at mid-distance between the proposed policy and the status quo. As the latter are, according to the DEU-dataset at 0, I adjust the estimated policy positions of party groups on the DEU-scale for this property.

Figure 1: Proposals as a function of who requests a roll call vote: PPE on tobacco issue “strength of health warning”




Figure 1 focuses on the proposals submitted by the PPE. I depict the ideal-point of the PPE on the horizontal scale of the dividing lines and project it on the

DEU-scale. The position on the vertical axis provides an estimate of the PPE’s ideal-point on the DEU issue scale. I also highlight the proposals by the PPE that were roll called. One was roll called by the PPE itself (solid circle), while four others were roll called by other parties (triangles). Figure 1 suggests that the proposal by PPE that it roll called itself is quite close to the party group’s estimated ideal point, its proposals roll called by other party groups are, however, at the same distance on the vertical axis. As all these proposals are located at 0 on the DEU issue scale, however, they are located at the same distance when considering the vertical axis.

A similar analysis on the same issue dimension can be carried out for the ELDR. Figure 2 reports the results. The ELDR is positioned further to the left than the PPE. Overall the ELDR roll called four of its proposals and three of these are closer or equally close as all other of its proposals that were roll called by other party groups. Only one of its proposals that it roll called is as far away from its ideal-point as the furthest removed proposals roll called by other parties groups.

Analyses of this type require a sufficient number of roll call votes on a specific issue as identified by the DEU-data. In addition, for at least one party group that submitted proposals I need to find at least two roll call votes, one called by itself and one called by another party group. For various reasons no other decision or issue for which we had all the relevant information fulfilled these criteria or they had to be dropped for other reasons.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, the partial support of the

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<sup>25</sup>Three other decisions (and in total four issues) satisfy the first criterion. For the “Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption” (COM(1995)722/1) I find two issues on which the EP voted upon in eight (first issue: “fat content of chocolate”), respectively ten (second issue: “labeling of chocolate”) roll call votes. As the rapporteur for this decision came from the Verts/ALE, I find eight proposals by the latter, two of which were roll called by the same party. Unfortunately, these two votes (together with three others) took place in the fifth EP, while the remaining votes took place in the fourth EP. Consequently I refrained from carrying out a similar analysis as the composition of the EP changes considerably. For the second issue I find that the UEN proposed 4 amendments, but unfortunately the UEN requested roll call votes on all four of them violating the second condition presented above. Consequently I was unable to use this decision as well. The “Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens” (COM(1998)135) was another candidate, with eight votes on the first issue (“Prohibition of the use of cages”), four of which were roll called. Unfortunately, in two of these proposals the PSE was among the authors but also among the roll call requests. For the other two proposals the Greens (Verts) were both the proposer and the requester of a roll call vote. Finally, for the “Civil and commercial judicial cooperation, enforcement of judgments: Brussels I, Lugano Conventions” (COM(1999)348), the

implication presented on the basis of one DEU-decision and one of its issues is rather limited.

Based on the underlying mechanism of the implication I wish to test, it is possible, however, to assess its relevance in another way as well. As the proposing party group requests a roll call vote to ensure passage of its proposal, it is likely that it will exert more pressure on its MEPs than in the case when another party group requests a roll call vote.<sup>26</sup> To estimate this party pressure I estimate a modified IRT-model that accounts for such party inducements (see Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004). While the simple IRT-model looks as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ij} &= Pr(y_{ij}|\theta_i, \beta_j, \alpha_j) \\ &= F(\theta_i\beta_j - \alpha_j)\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

with  $\theta_i$  equal to the MEP's estimated ideal-point,  $\beta_j$  and  $\alpha_j$  respectively the discrimination and difficulty of issue  $j$ , a modified model presents itself as

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{ij} &= Pr(y_{ij}|\theta_i, \beta_j, \alpha_j, \gamma_j, \delta_j) \\ &= F(\theta_i\beta_j - \alpha_j + \gamma_j + \delta_j EPG_i)\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

As Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) nicely discuss, this model can only be estimated if we can assume that for some issues  $j$  both  $\gamma$  and the  $\delta$ s are zero. Consequently, I take as baseline all proposals by the ELDR on the tobacco issue discussed above but roll called by another party group. For all these cases I assume that the simple IRT-model as specified in equation 1 applies. For the ELDR proposals roll called by itself I assume that equation 2 applies.<sup>27</sup> In

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ELDR (either as party group or as party group represented by the rapporteur) was the author of all proposals with DEU issues roll called by itself (four times) or another party group (once). Unfortunately, the issue positions of all these five proposals are identical, making the mapping of dividing lines based on votes on the DEU issue scales impossible.

<sup>26</sup>It has to be noted that this expectation is not the same as the first hypothesis tested by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008b). The latter hypothesis, based on Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008a) model predicts that the cohesion of a party group should be higher if an opposing party group both authors and roll calls a proposal compared to a situation when the former party group did not author the proposal but roll called it. In the analyses presented here, I compare proposals by the same party group and distinguish whether it or another party group requested a roll call vote.

<sup>27</sup>Høyland's (2010) study of legislative and non-legislative roll call votes proceeds in a similar way. Thus, I relied on Høyland's (2010) replication code and estimated the model with JAGS (Plummer, 2010).

addition, again as discussed by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), one set of MEPs has to be the baseline in the party pressure model. As there is in each EP a set of MEPs without party group affiliation, I consider these as “omitted category.”

In figure 3 I depict the results of these analyses focusing again on the tobacco issue analyzed above and the ELDR. I depict the point estimate and the credible interval for the estimates of the party inducement effects for all the roll call votes on this issue requested by the ELDR on proposals by this same party group. I would expect this effect to be largest for the ELDR, as this party group requested roll call votes on its own proposals. This, however, materializes only in part. As figure 3 shows, for three party groups, namely the ARE, the PPE and the UEN, the means of the estimates are practically equal to zero, indicating that in these votes, compared those ELDR proposals roll called by other parties the behavior of their MEPs did not differ. Compared to these three parties the panel for the ELDR shows some party inducement effects (i.e., the mean of the estimates differs from zero), but the credible intervals for each of the four votes comprise zero. Much stronger, though still statistically insignificant effects, I find for the PSE<sup>28</sup> and the GUE/NGL, while the effects for the Verts/ALE are still stronger and for three of the four votes statistically significant. Consequently, this analysis provides only weak support for the prediction that in roll call votes requested by a party group that also authored the proposal party inducements should be more important.

Figure 4 depicting the same analysis for votes on the “Civil and commercial judicial cooperation, enforcement of judgments: Brussels I, Lugano Conventions” offer, however, stronger support. Again the analysis focuses on proposals by the ELDR and for each of the four votes I find strong and statistically significant party effects for this party group. This is, however, also the case for five other party groups, namely the ARE, PPE, UEN, GUE/NGL and the PSE. Only for the TDI and the Verts/ALE do I find modest, respectively nonexistent party effects. Consequently, this analysis provides some evidence that is at least partly in line with the implication tested here.

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<sup>28</sup>Interesting to note is that the PSE was the other party group that submitted proposals on this issue and several of these votes were roll calls, one of them requested by the PSE. As there is only one such vote, I refrained from carrying out the estimation of IRT-model with party inducements for this case.



Figure 2: Proposals as a function of who requests a roll call vote: ELDR on tobacco issue “strength of health warning”




Figure 3: Party group inducements in votes proposed and roll called by ELDR on tobacco issue “strength of health warning” ( $\delta$ -estimates)





Figure 4: Party group inducements in votes proposed and roll called by ELDR on Civil and commercial judicial cooperation, enforcement of judgments: Brussels I, Lugano Conventions issue “jurisdiction of e-commerce cases” ( $\delta$ -estimates)



## 4 Conclusion

In this paper I offered empirical tests of one implication from Carrubba, Gabel and Hug's (2008*a*) model, namely that proposals by a party for which it requests a roll call vote are more closely located to its ideal-point than those roll called by other parties. Analyses focusing on one issue related to the tobacco-directive offered some support to this contention for two EP party groups, namely the PPE and the ELDR. Given the quite demanding criteria to carry out such analyses on an issue by issue basis, no other decisions or issues could be analyzed in such a way. As the mechanism for this implication relies on the idea that party groups that request a roll call vote on their on proposal will try to influence their members, I also offered an empirical test of this proposition based on two of the DEU-decisions. In both of these analyses I found some support for the fact that party groups in such situations influence their members more than if other party groups request roll call votes.

Consequently the empirical analyses presented here lend some support to the theoretical model proposed by Carrubba, Gabel and Hug (2008*a*). As this model is based on only one motivation for roll call vote requests, this is obviously no proof that only disciplining attempts explain roll call vote requests. Quite to the contrary. Arbitrating between different mechanisms, however, requires complete theoretical models covering these mechanisms (see for such an attempt Ainsley and Maxwell, 2012). Consequently, work in this theoretical direction is of considerable importance.

At the empirical level, and focusing on the EP, obviously a broader database would be desirable. Given the criteria discussed above, however, some limitations are hard to overcome. Circumventing these demanding criteria is obviously possible, for instance by combining the various issues of a particular decision, or even aggregating over several or all issues.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, pushing the empirical analyses further is certainly an important future avenue for research.

Finally, once both the theoretical groundwork is laid and a proper empirical basis for evaluating the various mechanisms leading to roll call votes (in the EP, or elsewhere) is available, work in this area should inform more general work using roll call votes to address important substantive issues.

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<sup>29</sup>Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins (2005), for instance, aggregate the positions of the member countries across all issues in such a way.

## Appendix

Table 6 lists the decisions analyzed in this paper and shows how many amendments were voted upon in the EP, for how many of these amendments a DEU issue scale could be used, on how many votes a roll was called, and finally the intersection of these two last criteria.<sup>30</sup> Table 7 lists the party group names and their abbreviations, while figure 5 depicts the ideal-point estimates for the one issue analyzed in figures 1 and 2 in the main text.

Table 6: Decisions, issues, and votes analyzed

code	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
CNS/1999/276 COM(1999)658/2	2000/821/EC Council Decision of 20 December 2000 on the implementation of a programme to encourage the development, distribution and promotion of European audiovisual works (MEDIA Plus - Development, Distribution and Promotion) (2001-2005)	69	3	3	1
CNS/1999/066 COM(1999)111	1999/784/EC Council Decision of 22 November 1999 concerning Community participation in the European Audiovisual Observatory	3	0	0	0
CNS/1999/192 COM(1999)440	2000/98/EC Council Decision of 24 January 2000 establishing the Employment Committee	2	2	0	0
COD/1999/275 COM(1999)658/1	Decision No 163/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 January 2001 on the implementation of a training programme for professionals in the European audiovisual programme industry (MEDIA-Training) (2001-2005)	48	1	2	1
COD/1998/195 COM(1998)329	Decision No 253/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 January 2000 establishing the second phase of the Community action programme in the field of education Socrates	78	7	4	1
CNS/1998/354 COM(1998)768	1999/847/EC Council Decision of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection	24	0	0	0

<sup>30</sup>This difficult task of matching roll call votes, amendments and DEU issues is probably not yet complete, as information on some rejected amendments have not yet been made available by the European parliament, despite multiple requests.

<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
CNS/1999/274 COM(1999)686	2000/596/EC Council Decision of 28 September 2000 establishing a European Refugee Fund	37	4	0	0
COD/1995/341 COM(1995)655	Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on company law concerning takeover bids	53	31	1	0
COD/2000/062 COM(2000)111/1	Regulation (EC) No 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries	31	6	0	0
CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)188	Council Directive 1999/105/EC of 22 December 1999 on the marketing of forest reproductive material	24	4	0	0
COD/1996/161 COM(1995)520	Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees	106	17	10	3
CNS/1998/331 COM(1998)693	Council Directive 1999/49/EC of 25 May 1999 amending, with regard to the level of the standard rate, Directive 77/388/EEC on the common system of value added tax	2	1	0	0
CNS/1998/092 COM(1998)135	Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens	70	23	7	4
CNS/1998/189 COM(1998)320	Council Directive 1999/81/EC of 29 July 1999 amending Directive 92/79/EEC on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes, Directive 92/80/EEC on the approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes and Directive 95/59/EC on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco	8	0	0	0
CNS/1999/056 COM(1999)062	Council Directive 1999/85/EC of 22 October 1999 amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards the possibility of applying on an experiment basis a reduced VAT rate on labour-intensive services	9	4	1	0
COD/1998/191 COM(1998)297	Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures	42	12	0	0

<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
COD/1999/217 COM(1999)456	Directive amending Directive 64/432/EEC: health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine	5	2	0	0
COD/1997/264 COM(1997)510	Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth motor insurance Directive)	56	22	0	0
COD/1998/325 COM(1998)586	Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on electronic commerce")	82	12	0	0
COD/1996/112 COM(1995)722/1	Directive 2000/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 relating to cocoa and chocolate products intended for human consumption	105	78	34	27
COD/1998/252 COM(1998)461	Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions	30	15	3	3
COD/1999/127 COM(1999)296	Directive 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on energy efficiency requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting	27	5	9	3
COD/1999/083 COM(1999)158	Directive 2000/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 October 2000 amending Council Directive 94/55/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the transport of dangerous goods by road	4	2	0	0
CNS/1999/225 COM(1999)565	Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation	76	12	1	0

<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
COD/2000/066 COM(2000)142/3	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 94/57/EC on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant activities of maritime administration	44	4	5	0
CNS/1996/114 COM(1995)722/3	Council Directive 2001/110/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to honey	43	8	0	0
CNS/1996/115 COM(1995)722/4	Council Directive 2001/112/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption	27	16	1	0
COD/1997/359 COM(1997)628	Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society	156	27	42	7
COD/1999/244 COM(1999)594	Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products	200	130	48	24
CNS/2000/223 COM(2000)537	Council Directive 2001/41/EC of 19 January 2001 amending the sixth Directive (77/388/EEC) on the common system of value added tax, with regard to the length of time during which the minimum standard rate is to be applied	4	2	0	0
COD/1999/158 COM(1999)329	Directive 2001/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2001 amending Directive 95/2/EC on food additives other than colours and sweeteners	7	2	0	0
CNS/2000/127 COM(2000)303	Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof	47	10	6	1
COD/1996/085 COM(1996)097	Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art	84	20	6	2



<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
COD/2000/060 COM(2000)137	Directive 2002/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 amending Council Directive 96/53/EC laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum authorised weights in international traffic	7	3	0	0
CNS/1999/047 COM(1999)055	Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000 of 17 December 1999 on the common organisation of the markets in fishery and aquaculture products	71	28	4	4
CNS/1999/202 COM(1999)492	Council Regulation (EC) No 1051/2001 of 22 May 2001 on production aid for cotton	20	2	0	0
CNS/1998/288 COM(1998)546	Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) amending Regulation nr 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty	6	1	0	0
CNS/1998/109 COM(1998)158/3	Council Regulation (EC) No 1254/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal	145	6	14	0
CNS/1998/110 COM(1998)158/4	Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products	47	10	4	2
CNS/2000/250 COM(2000)604	Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/2001 of 19 June 2001 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector	79	8	0	0
CNS/1999/255 COM(1999)636	Council Regulation (EC) No 1298/2000 of 8 June 2000 amending for the fifth time Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms	1	1	0	0
COD/1998/240 COM(1998)450	Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products	43	7	0	0
CNS/1999/050 COM(1999)070	Council Regulation (EC) No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 establishing a list of types of behaviour which seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy	3	1	0	0

<i>continued</i> code	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
CNS/2000/358 COM(2000)855	Council Regulation (EC) No 1513/2001 of 23 July 2001 amending Regulations No 136/66/EEC and (EC) No 1638/98 as regards the extension of the period of validity of the aid scheme and the quality strategy for olive oil	50	14	0	0
CNS/1999/246 COM(1999)608	Council Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000 of 20 July 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 on the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products	13	5	0	0
CNS/1999/236 COM(1999)576	Council Regulation (EC) No 1672/2000 of 27 July 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops, to include flax and hemp grown for fibre	34	16	2	1
COD/1999/204 COM(1999)487	Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97	73	25	9	2
CNS/1999/151 COM(1999)364	Council Regulation (EC) No 2040/2000 of 26 September 2000 on budgetary discipline	42	9	0	0
CNS/1999/235 COM(1999)582	Council Regulation (EC) No 216/2001 of 29 January 2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas	80	12	4	0
CNS/1999/132 COM(1999)312	Council Regulation (EC) No 2454/1999 of 15 November 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 relating to aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in particular by the setting up of a European Agency for Reconstruction	34	3	0	0
COD/1998/300 COM(1998)600/2	Regulation (EC) No 257/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 January 2001 regarding the implementation of measures to promote economic and social development in Turkey	48	11	0	0

<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
CNS/1999/214 COM(1999)494	Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership	53	4	1	0
COD/1998/134 COM(1998)226	Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2000 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code	15	3	0	0
CNS/1999/116 COM(1999)260	Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention	38	2	13	0
CNS/1998/347 COM(1998)728	Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector	46	9	0	0
CNS/1999/154 COM(1999)348	Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters	42	16	7	5
CNS/2000/030 COM(2000)027	Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement	20	7	0	0
CNS/1999/163 COM(1999)382	Council Regulation (EC) No 657/2000 of 27 March 2000 on closer dialogue with the fishing sector and groups affected by the common fisheries policy	3	2	1	1
CNS/1998/299 COM(1998)600/1	Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2000 of 10 April 2000 regarding the implementation of measures to intensify the EC-Turkey customs union	26	6	0	0
CNS/1996/160 COM(1996)296	Council Regulation (EC) No 850/98 of 30 March 1998 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the protection of juveniles of marine organisms	80	7	15	1

<i>continuedcode</i>	decision	votes	votes with issues	rcvs	rcvs with issues
COD/1998/323 COM(1998)623	Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies	60	11	1	0
COD/1999/252 COM(1999)617	Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2001 on the interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail system	70	34	4	3
CNS/1999/072 COM(1999)130	Council Regulation (EC) No 1308/1999 of 15 June 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 2377/90 laying down a Community procedure for the establishment of maximum residue limits of veterinary medicinal products in foodstuffs of animal origin	1	0	0	0
CNS/1999/138 COM(1999)345	Council Regulation (EC) No 2791/1999 of 16 December 1999 laying down certain control measures applicable in the area covered by the Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the north-east Atlantic fisheries	1	0	1	0
COD/2000/032 COM(2000)030	Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents	118	4	34	2
CNS/2000/062B COM(2000)111/2	Council Regulation (EC) No 1725/2001 of 23 July 2001 concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries. In what follows DEU-decisions will refer to the 62 remaining ones.	1	0	0	0
Total		2973	749	296	113

Table 7: Party groups and their abbreviation

Abbreviation	Name
ARE	European Radical Alliance
EDD	Europe of Democracies and Diversities
ELDR	European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party
GUE/NGL	European United Left/Nordic Green Left
I-EDN	Independents for a Europe of Nations
PPE	European People's Party
UPE	Union for Europe
UEN	Union for a Europe of Nations
TDI	Technical Coordination of Democrats and Independents
PSE	Party of European Socialists
V	Greens
Verts/ALE	Greens/European Free Alliance

Figure 5: Ideal-points on tobacco issue “strength of health warning”





Figure 6: Ideal-points on laying hens issue “prohibition of the use of cages”



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