Shirking and Slacking in Parliament1

Elena Frech2  
Département de science politique
et relations internationales
Université de Genève 
 
, Niels Goet3  
Department of Politics and
International Relations
University of Oxford 
 
, Simon Hug4 
Département de science politique
et relations internationales
Université de Genève
 

First version: September 2017, this very preliminary version: Nov 6, 2017

Abstract

The behavior of individual members of parliament (MPs) is not only a question of conscience and their political position. Their choice to speak, vote, or otherwise select a behavioural strategy from a wide arsenal of parliamentary tactics is influenced by, among countless other factors, constituency interests, parliamentary rules, and the party leadership. Term limits remove one of the most important motivations of MP behaviour: re-election constraints. Following the literature we study whether term-limited MPs engage in shirking - not voting with the party line - and/or slacking - a reduction of parliamentary activities. Drawing on empirical material stemming from various Swiss parliamentary chambers we can assess these effects in different institutional settings (different term limits and different federal levels) and take advantage of behavioral data not available in other settings. More specifically, at the federal level we use information both from roll-call and other votes to assess in more detail how term-limited MPs engage in shirking towards their party and their constituencies. Speeches from all chambers studied allow us to determine how the proximity to the party leadership changes, offering additional insights into shirking behavior. These speeches together with other activities (e.g. bill introduction, questions, etc.) offer also information on whether term-limited MPs engage in slacking.

Footnotes:

1Partial financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grants No. 100012-111909, 100012-129737 and 100017L-162427) as well as the help by Thomas Dähler and Peter Frankenbach in providing data on the parliament in Basel-Stadt is gratefully acknowledged.
2  Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences de la société ; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; email: Elena.Frech@unige.ch
3  University of Oxford, Department of Politics and International Relations; email: niels.goet@politics.ox.ac.uk.
4  Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences de la société ; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@unige.ch


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