In this paper we draw on this more recent literature and bring it to bear in an analysis of two bills adopted in the Swiss parliament. Having available detailed information on the MPs preferences over various options voted on we are able to test whether MPs behave strategically and to what degree they are capable of anticipating the way forward through the agenda tree. We find evidence that MPs behave strategically, however, their foresight is not as perfect as we would expect from theoretical models.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston (August 28-31, 2008), a seminar at the University of Mannheim and at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago (April 2-5, 2009). Thanks are due to the participants at these events, especially Kenneth Shepsle and David Hugh-Jones, as well as to the Swiss Parlamentsdienste and especially Ernst Firschknecht and Andreas Sidler, who provided the main bulk of the empirical data used here and helped us using it. Tobias Schulz provided excellent research assistance, Stefanie Bailer, Michael Cemerin, Flavia Fossati, were an invaluable help in carrying out our MP-survey and Stefanie Bailer also provided helpful comments. The Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No 100012-111909) provided generous funding.
2 Institut für Politikwissenschaft; Universität Zürich; Hirschengraben 56; 8001 Zürich; Switzerland; email: sarah.buetikofer@ipz.uzh.ch
3 Département de science politique, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@politic.unige.ch