Sponsoring Resolutions on Civil Wars in the UN Security Council *

Fang-Yi Chiou† Simon Hug‡
Bjørn Høyland §

Paper prepared for presentation at the conference
International Studies Association
(San Fransisco, April 4-7, 2018)

March 22, 2018

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council alone has the power, under chapter VII, to adopt binding resolutions concerning interventions in civil wars through peacekeeping missions. While some research has focused on the conditions under which such resolutions are adopted or rejected (most often due to a veto by a permanent member), we know little what influences whether such resolutions are introduced for consideration by the UNSC, or put differently, who sponsors such resolutions. This is problematic as the absence of an adopted resolution, for instance for creating a peacekeeping operation might be due to the absence of a sponsor for such a resolution or a negative vote on a resolution introduced. In part as a consequence, sponsorship decisions by the members of the UNSC are quite likely to be affected by the likelihood of winning approval by the fifteen members of the UNSC and the sponsorship decisions of other members. We propose an empirical approach that allows taking these interdependencies into account, and, when evaluating commonly used explanatory variables for the adoption of peacekeeping missions, we find results contradicting previous findings on the adoption of such resolutions.

*A very partial version of this paper has been presented at a seminar at the University of St. Gallen. Very helpful comments by the participants as well as the partial financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 100012-129737) is greatly appreciated.

† IPSAS, Academia Sinica, Taipei; email: fangyichiou@gmail.com

‡ Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences de la société ; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone +41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@unige.ch

§ Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Postbox 1097, Blindern, 0317 Oslo Norway ; phone +4722858598 ; email: bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no

1 Introduction

Since the end of the cold war peacekeeping missions by the United Nations (UN) have seen a dramatic increase both in number and in size (e.g., Mullenbach, 2013, 114). Not surprisingly numerous scholars have attempted to understand under what conditions the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) decides to intervene in armed conflicts (e.g., Gilligan and Stedman, 2001; Mullenbach, 2005; Mullenbach, 2013; Stojek and Tir, 2015; Marbach, 2017 forthcoming), also to understand whether such missions actually do help keeping or enforcing peace (e.g., Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Fortna, 2003; Fortna, 2004; Fortna, 2008) and protecting the civilian population (e.g., Hultman, 2010; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013; Hultman, 2013; Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2016; Hultman and Johansson, 2017).

The analysis of decisions to deploy UNSC peacekeeping missions has, however, been hampered by a parallel development in the UNSC since the end of the cold war, namely that decisions on such missions are oftentimes reached unanimously. This results from the fact that increasingly UNSC members only sponsor resolutions for which they are close to certain to obtain the necessary support in a meeting (see relatedly Peterson, 2005, 3). Consequently, the voting record on resolutions proposing to adopt peacekeeping missions offers almost no information on whether the UNSC members were divided and how various covariates might have influenced their views. Thus, scholars have attempted to circumvent this problem by only considering the decision to adopt a peacekeeping mission and by relying on more aggregate covariates, for instance whether the conflict country has a colonial tie to any of the permanent UNSC members, or their aggregated trade relations (e.g., Gilligan and Stedman, 2001; Mullenbach, 2005; Mullenbach, 2013; Stojek and Tir, 2015). Marbach (2017 forthcoming) proposes a possible solution to this problem by modeling the UNSC decision as the joint outcome of the individual decisions of each of the fifteen UNSC members with member-specific covariates. He assumes that the absence of a vote is equivalent to an implicit rejection either by veto or the required majority of members of the UNSC.

In the present paper we propose another way to deal with this issue by considering sponsoring decisions by UNSC members. This solution is motivated by the fact that each UNSC member may ensure, by sponsoring a draft resolution, that a topic, in our case a peacekeeping mission for a country in conflict, is debated in

a meeting of the UNSC. By not sponsoring such a draft resolution a member state cannot ensure keeping the issue of the agenda, but can decrease the likelihood of this occurring. This makes the sponsorship decisions by each of the UNSC members highly interdependent, which has not been acknowledged so far in the literature on the adoption of peacekeeping missions by the UNSC. We propose in this paper an approach to address this interdependency in a direct way that is amenable to many similar situations in other areas of research.[1] In an empirical analysis of sponsorship decisions by UNSC members on peacekeeping missions since the end of the cold war (until the end of 2014) we find that commonly used covariates have quite different effects on individual members of the UNSC. This highlights that much of the important process leading up to peacekeeping missions actually occurs before the voting stage.

In what follows, we first offer an overview over recent work on the adoption of peacekeeping missions by the UNSC and discuss the way in which draft resolutions for such missions are introduced for debate. Based on this overview we develop and present in section three our theoretical approach and the empirical model that derives from this approach. We also discuss alternative approaches to estimate models of interdependent choices, mostly based on spatial econometrics. In section four we present the data on which we draw that extends the data currently used in empirical work on UNSC decisions on peacekeeping missions. We present our empirical results in section five before concluding in section six, where we discuss both the implications of our results for research on UNSC peacekeeping missions and the applicability of our approach to other research areas.

2 Peacekeeping missions and the UN Security Council

In an influential study on civil wars Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol and Sambanis (2003) popularized the notion of "conflict trap," which describes the fact that countries affected by a civil war are likely to witness violent

[1] Strictly speaking the approach we propose has been developed to address theoretically and empirically roll call vote requests in parliaments (see Chiou and Yang, 2008; Chiou, Hug and Høyland, 2017). The structure of the strategic interaction amongst players is, however, similar, and this is the reason why we draw on this approach here.

conflicts repeatedly. This empirical finding makes the role of peacekeeping missions in general and those of the UN more specifically all the more important. In an influential study Goldstein (2011) argues that the UN has contributed to "Winning the war on war" (see also Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2017). Assessing the effect of peacekeeping missions is, however, far from obvious (for reviews of the literature, see Fortna and Howard, 2008; Dorussen, 2014). Early studies, for instance Doyle and Sambanis (2000), found that under certain conditions, e.g., encompassing mandates, peacekeeping missions could make peace more durable.[2] More recently, also to take endogeneity concerns more explicitly into account, scholars started to study more directly where peacekeeping missions were deployed (for a nice review of the various explanatory factors used, see Stojek and Tir, 2015). Gilligan and Stedman (2001), for instance, demonstrated convincingly that when deciding on where to deploy peacekeeping mission, the UNSC privileged conflicts in Europe and Latin America, was sensitive to the number of battle deaths and the size of the army. As Mullenbach (2005), who focuses more on international factors, they also found that after the end of the cold war, peacekeeping missions became more likely (see also Mullenbach, 2013). As in the subsequent study by Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) the authors conclude that the UNSC intervenes in the difficult cases, which tends to bias the estimates of their effectiveness generally downwards (for similar assessments and results see, Fortna, 2003, 2004, 2008)

Some scholars have also started to focus on more specific reasons for peacekeeping missions and their effects. Thus, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2013) assess whether violence against the civilian population makes an UN intervention more likely and whether such interventions are likely to reduce this violence (see also Hultman, 2010; Hultman, 2013; Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2016; Hultman and Johansson, 2017). The general finding is that such violence makes an intervention more likely, but that missions reduce only the violence perpetrated by the rebel groups. Stojek and Tir (2015), on the other hand, focus on trade relations between the country in conflict and UNSC members, finding that strong ties make peacekeeping missions more likely. Most recently, Marbach (2016), studying individual decisions by UNSC members, finds that refugee crisis make

[2]Only in an appendix did Doyle and Sambanis (2000) consider, with the help of a selection model, whether the fact that destinations for peacekeeping missions are not randomly chosen among the countries in conflict affects the results (see also Doyle and Sambanis, 2006).

UN peacekeeping missions considerably more likely. Whether a UNSC member is affected directly by refugees, however, appears not to influence its decision.

Marbach's (2016) study draws on his innovative approach to study committee decisions (Marbach, 2017 forthcoming). As in most conflict years no draft resolution is debated and voted upon in the UNSC to deploy a peacekeeping mission and most deployment decisions are reached unanimously Marbach (2017 forthcoming) proposes a partial-observability estimator. More specifically, the absence of a deployment decision in the UNSC can come about either by a veto by one of its permanent members or the failure to obtain the required majority of supporting votes (currently nine). His estimator takes these various ways in which failure to act can come about into account to assess what covariates affect each of the UNSC members' voting decisions. In addition he assumes that the failure to debate a resolution is akin to a negative decision. Doing so allows him to circumvent the problem that many studies have to rely on aggregated information as covariates. For instance Hultman (2013) uses information on whether the country in conflict used to be a colony of any of the five permanent members of the UNSC, while Stojek and Tir (2015) consider an aggregate measure of trade relations as well as aggregated affinity scores based on voting records from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for the five permanent members of the UNSC. It is unlikely, however, that each UNSC member is affected similarly by such factors (as is demonstrated by Marbach, 2016, 2017).

While Marbach's (2016, 2017) approach is elegant in dealing with these issues, it ignores important information related to the procedures in the UNSC.[3] More specifically, before a draft resolution proposing a peacekeeping mission can be debated in the UNSC, it has to be sponsored by at least one UNSC member.[4]

[3]It also ignores the voting information from resolutions on peacekeeping missions, but these could easily be integrated in his approach.

[4]Drafts can be submitted by UN members that have no seat in the UNSC, but debate in the UNSC requires a sponsor among the fifteen UNSC members. Sievers and Daws (2014, 267) note that if a resolution is drafted by a non-UNSC member than a UNSC-member has to "move" it, i.e. sponsor it for consideration (Bailey and Daws, 1998, 221). Consequently, all resolutions debated in the UNSC have at least one sponsor amongst UNSC members, So-called "presidential resolutions" have in a strict sense no sponsors or co-sponsors (none are listed, respectively mentioned, in the minutes of the UNSC meetings) (Sievers and Daws, 2014, 268). Bailey and Daws (1998, 553) note, however, that such a "text is implicitly sposored by the fifteen members of the Council." In our empirical data collection we follow this suggestion and code "Presidential resolutions" as sponsored by all 15 members of the UNSC. We have also started exploring how this coding decision affects our results, by implementing an approach

Thus, a first (and possibly the cheapest) strategy to make a peacekeeping mission less likely, for instance to Syria, is to abstain from sponsoring the necessary draft resolution.

3 Theoretical and empirical approach

As mentioned above, much of the work on UNSC decisions to deploy a peacekeeping mission focuses on the outcome and not the individual decisions of UNSC members (for a notable exception Marbach, 2016, 2017). This has to do, presumably, with the fact that most deployment decisions in the UNSC are reached unanimously since the end of the cold war. A reason for this development, which is also observable in the UN's General Assembly, is that much coordination and screening happens even before a resolution is drafted and introduced on the agenda (see, for instance Peterson, 2005, 3).

Marbach's (2016, 2017) approach, by considering unobserved implicit voting decisions by UNSC members, is in our view a step in the right direction by adopting a more actor-centered approach to third-party interventions (as championed by, amongst others, Findley and Teo, 2006). Going beyond this approach we take into account a crucial step between a possible crisis situation and the vote on a draft resolution, namely the sponsoring decisions by UNSC members on draft resolutions. As noted above, no draft resolution can be debated in the UNSC if it is not sponsored by at least one of its members. As a consequence, a first (and cheap) way to make a peacekeeping mission less likely is to refrain from sponsoring such a draft resolution. On the other hand, if a UN member is in favor of a peacekeeping mission, it is important that at least one member of the UNSC sponsors such a resolution. Thus, the interactions amongst UNSC members in their sponsoring decisions are akin to a participation or volunteer game, in which a set of actors decides simultaneously on whether to participate in a particular activity (see for instance Diekmann, 1985; Franzen, 1995; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2016, 207ff).[5]

In such simultaneous move games decisions are, however, interdependent,

proposed by Chiou and Yang (2008) for roll call votes whose requester is unknown.

[5]While the sponsorship actions are likely to be sequential, the decisions whether to sponsor a resolution are likely to be taken in a way much more akin to a simultaneous moves game. In addition, as discussed below, the data available on sponsorships does not offer information on the sequence of sponsorship decisions.

which has not been acknowledged in work on UNSC decisions.[6] We propose the adoption of a framework that allows taking into account this interdependence in a direct way.[7] More specifically, we assume that a set of actors with $j \in 1, .., N$ (with $N = 15$ for the UNSC since 1966 and 11 before) decides to sponsor (s) resolutions (R) with $i \in 1, .., K$ reflecting K conflict-years, our unit of analysis. As a single sponsor can guarantee that a resolution will be debated, we assume the following expected utilities for a sponsorship decision s and its absence $\widetilde{s}$:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_{ij}(s) &= U_{ij}(R) \\ EU_{ij}(\widetilde{s}) &= U_{ij}(R)(1 - \prod_{h \neq j}(1 - s_{ih})) \end{aligned}$$

While the expected utility of a sponsorship decision simply corresponds to the utility of a draft resolution ($U_{ij}(R)$), the one of not sponsoring a draft resolution is equal to the same utility, but multiplied by the probability that at least one other UNSC member sponsors a draft resolution (with s_{ih} being the probability of h sponsoring a resolution in conflict-year i).[8] This means that player j's net expected payoff of sponsoring a draft resolution in the i^{th} time of play is

$$EU_{ij}(s) - EU_{ij}(\widetilde{s}) = U_{ij}(R) \prod_{h \neq j}(1 - s_{ih}), i = 1, \ldots, K, j = 1, \ldots, N \qquad (1)$$

From this it follows that the sponsorship decisions, assuming that utility differences affect the choice probabilities through a logistic function (and thus assuming a type 1 extreme-value distribution for the errors),[9] are determined by the following:

[6] Marbach's (2016, 2017) approach relegates the interdependencies into the error terms, and thus considers them as a nuissance.

[7] What follows draws in part on similar presentations in Chiou and Yang (2008) and Chiou, Hug and Høyland (2017).

[8] This formulation obviously implies that we assume (at least for the derivation for our basic estimator) that there are no costs involved by either of the two actions.

[9] This also implies that errors are independently and identically distributed, which is a commonly used assumption in so-called strategic estimators (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Signorino, 1999; Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2016). An exception is Leemann's (2014) strategic estimator, which builds on the assumption that errors across actors are correlated.

$$
\begin{aligned}
s_{ij} &= \frac{1}{1+\exp(-(EU_{ij}(s) - EU_{ij}(\widetilde{s})))} \\
&= \frac{1}{1+\exp(-(U_{ij}(R)\prod_{h\neq j}(1-s_{ih})))}
\end{aligned} \tag{2}
$$

As equation 2 has to hold for each $j \in 1, ...N$, this defines an N-dimensional system of equations that can be solved for best response probabilities s^*_{ij}. These then allow us to formulate the following likelihood function:

$$
L(\beta, \lambda | x_1, \ldots, x_N, Y) = \prod_{i=1}^{K}\prod_{j=1}^{N}(s^*_{ij})^{y_{ij}}(1-s^*_{ij})^{1-y_{ij}} \tag{3}
$$

Maximizing this likelihood function yields estimates akin to the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) estimator as championed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996, 1998) and discussed in detail by Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016).[10]

This estimator tackles directly the interdependencies of sponsorship decisions and also allows for extensions. Following Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016) we consider the possibility that the actors involved in a strategic decision are affected differently by the utility differences between their two actions. Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016) propose to do this by introducing λ_j into equation 2 to capture these differences, which leads to the following equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
r_{ij} &= \frac{1}{1+\exp(-\lambda_j(EU_{ij}(r) - EU_{ij}(\widetilde{r})))} \\
&= \frac{1}{1+\exp(-\lambda_j(U_{ij}(R)\prod_{h\neq j}(1-r_{ih})))}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}
$$

$\lambda_j (\geq 0)$ reflects the steepness of the best-response correspondence, which may differ across the N players.[11] This setup, as proposed by Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016), is perfectly adequate for the analysis of experimental data, but problematic for observational data as Chiou, Hug and Høyland (2017) show. More specifically, when a λ_j tends toward zero, then the predicted probability of choosing

[10] Chiou, Hug and Høyland (2017) provide a more detailed discussion of this estimator in the context of a study on roll vote requests in parliament and present evidence on its performance compared to more traditional estimators.

[11] Note that not a full set of λs is identified so that the λ for one actor has to be set to 1 (or any other value).

either action approach $\frac{1}{2}$ and becomes equal in the limit. In a lab-experiment, where the two actions almost often only differ in their induced payoffs that are part of the utility differences, this is a logical consequence. In observational data, however, if an actor does not respond to utility differences, it is unlikely that she flips a coin to decide whether or not to sponsor a UNSC resolution. As Chiou, Hug and Høyland (2017) show, this unrealistic implication of equation 4, can be circumvented by introducing another parameter, namely τ which may be actor specific or subsume the same value for all actors (which is reflected in the following equation):

$$r_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\tau - \lambda_j(U_{ij}(R) \prod_{h \neq j}(1 - r_{ih})))} \tag{5}$$

This formulation has as consequence that when λ_j approaches 0 r_{ij} tends towards $1/(1 + \exp(\tau))$. As this effect is independent of any of the other players' action it also reflects non-strategic elements, like, for instance, the relative costs of the actions involved.[12]

Other ways to deal with these problems for traditional estimators due to strategic interdependencies exist as well. A first way is to estimate a multivariate probit model of sponsorship decisions, which relegates the interdependencies into the error terms and estimates the correlations amongst these errors.[13] Building on the idea that interdependent decisions have many parallels in models with spatial dependencies, spatial regression approaches (e.g., Franzese, Hays and Cook, 2016) have also been proposed.[14] We will start our empirical explorations with some of these commonly used approaches before presenting initial results based on our proposed estimator.

[12] In participation or volunteer games this is normally reflected in a cost parameter (K, see for instance Diekmann, 1985; Franzen, 1995, 207ff).

[13] An even simpler and more common approach is to estimate a hierarchical model on stacked data and calculate clustered standard errors, as does Thierse (2016) in a similar context when studying roll call vote requests by party groups in the European Parliament (see, however, the cautionary remarks by Angrist and Pischke, 2008; King and Roberts, 2015).

[14] Most closely related is Marshall's (2013) estimator, which takes into account not only the covariates separately for each actor, but also interacts them to account for mutual influences on decisions. These interactions are, however, not theoretically informed.

4 Data

To construct the dataset for our empirical analysis we follow closely Hultman's (2013) approach, extend it, however, both along the temporal and substantive dimension. Regarding the temporal dimension we extend the time period covered to the post cold war period until 2014. In terms of the substantive coverage we do not only consider resolutions that establish a peacekeeping mission, but also subsequent ones that extend or change their mandate or even propose to abolish it.[15]

As Hultman (2013) we use the UCDP/PRIO conflict data (restricted to intrastate and internationalized intrastate wars, see Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand, 2002; Allansson, Melander and Themnér, 2017), and identified with Mullenbach's (2013) data which conflicts were the object of UNSC resolutions on UN peacekeeping missions. As Hultman (2013) we consider not only conflict years (as defined by the UCDP/PRIO conflict data Gleditsch et al., 2002; Allansson, Melander and Themnér, 2017), but also the three next years after the end of the conflict. For all retained resolutions[16] we used Cockayne, Mikulaschek and Perry's (2010) data to identify their sponsors.[17] In addition we consulted Dreher and Vreeland's (2011) complete list of resolutions debated in the UNSC to check whether any resolution had been introduced but failed to be adopted.[18]

[15]While Hultman (2013), as many other studies, focuses on the initial decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission, many other subsequent decisions affect this deployment as well. In addition, some UNSC members also propose the ending of some missions in draft resolutions. As per conflict year several such resolutions might be sponsored, we only retained the one with the fewest sponsors, under the assumption that this was the most controversial proposal.

[16]We adopt a broader definition of peacekeeping missions than Hultman (2013), by using all those identified by Mullenbach (2013) and listed on the UN's website on peacekeeping operations (see `http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/`, consulted September 14, 2017). We list all resolutions putting into place peace keeping missions in table 4 in the appendix.

[17]For resolutions not covered by Cockayne, Mikulaschek and Perry (2010) we identified the sponsors in the minutes of the UNSC meetings, see for instance `http://undocs.org/s/PV.6324` for the resolution on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (`http://undocs.org/S/RES/1925(2010)`).

[18]We wish to thank Axel Dreher and Valentin Lang for giving us access to their updated dataset and responding to our queries. The following draft resolutions concerning the renewal or extension of PKOs failed to be adopted: i) draft resolution S/25693 demanding the restructuring of UNFICYP (sponsored by the United Kingdom), vetoed by Russia (`http://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3211`); ii) draft resolution S/1997/18 extension of MINUGUA (sponsoired by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain,

We use, as Hultman (2013), information on one-sided violence victim numbers and battle deaths from Eck and Hultman (2007) and Fjelde, Hultman, Schubiger, Cederman and Hug (2016), resp. Allansson, Melander and Themnér (2017). Following Stojek and Tir (2015) we use updated trade data from Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2009) and added information on colonial ties from Hensel (2014). The information on non-UN peacekeeping missions during the conflict years covered were gleaned from Mullenbach (2013). Figure 1 depicts the distribution of country-years as a function of how many UNSC members sponsored a resolution. Not surprisingly, the model category is a conflict-year with no sponsoring of a resolution. Two thirds of the conflict-years that see at least one resolution are of the "presidential" type, i.e. those that are implicitly sponsored by all UNSC members. The remaining third of resolutions is sponsored by between one and nine members of the UNSC.

5 Empirical results

We start our empirical analyses by first assessing how the various selected covariates affect sponsorship decisions without taking into account the interdependencies among UNSC members that are likely to exist. Consequently, we report in table 1 the results of fifteen logit models, each assessing what affects the sponsorship decisions of each of the fifteen members.[19] We use commonly employed covariates, render them, however, more specific as we focus on explaining sponsor-

Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Venezuela) vetoed by China (`http://undocs.org/s/PV.3730`); iii) draft resolution S/1999/201 on the extension of UNPREDEP (sponsored by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) vetoed by China (`http://undocs.org/s/PV.3982`); iv) draft resolution S/2004/313 demanding to terminamte UNFICYP (sponsored by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) vetoed by Russia (`http://undocs.org/S/PV.4947`); v) draft resolution S/2009/310 demanding the extension of UNOMIG established in 1993 (sponsored by Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America) vetoed by Russia (`http://undocs.org/S/PV.6143`). None of these draft resolutions were voted upon, while a conflict was ongoing or in the three years after the end of the conflict.

[19]Regarding the non-permanent members we consider them as representatives of their regional groups (for a discussion of this see Scharioth, 2010; Dreher, Gould, Rablen and Vreeland, 2014; Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). We have coded in our data the information which country occupied a particular seat for non-permanent members, but refrain from using this information in our empirical analysis so far.

Figure 1: Sponsoring resolutions on civil wars



ship decisions of specific countries.[20] As Hultman (2013) we find strong evidence that one-sided violence against the civilian population plays a significant role. For each member of the UNSC, an increasing number of victims increases the chances that it will sponsor a resolution. This effect is statistically significant for 6 members, three of which are permanent members. Similar identical effects we find for former colonies of Russia and the United Kingdom. All UNSC members are more likely to sponsor resolutions dealing with conflicts in the former countries, while the latter, i.e., former British colonies, are much less likely to see resolutions concerning them sponsored. While the former set of effects is statistically significant for all members, the latter are only significant for five of the fifteen members.

[20] As several of our variables have missing data, we code these observations as 0s and add an indicator variable for whether a particular observation has missing data. This corresponds to a so-called "modified zero-order regression" (Greene, 2003, 60) as proposed by Maddala (1977, 202).

Table 1: Logit models

	permanent					AFR			ASIA		GRULAC		WEOG		
	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	CEIT
(Intercept)	5.486	−71.683	29.052	−39.149	−64.912	−24.429	5.633	−3.435	6.120	19.096	20.013	−19.526	−9.093	−5.665	15.042
	(45.723)	(40.645)	(47.821)	(40.733)	(42.413)	(42.711)	(44.458)	(44.019)	(44.169)	(44.946)	(44.774)	(45.925)	(40.293)	(41.780)	(42.819)
log(victims one-sided violence + 1)	0.115	0.130*	0.127*	0.112*	0.098	0.073	0.114	0.108	0.102	0.096	0.138*	0.129*	0.117*	0.092	0.109
	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)
victims one-sided violence missing	−0.676	0.195	−0.777	−0.328	−0.021	−0.651	−0.477	−0.449	−0.098	−0.615	−0.093	−0.287	−0.006	−0.246	0.078
	(0.663)	(0.426)	(0.667)	(0.504)	(0.460)	(0.590)	(0.598)	(0.589)	(0.554)	(0.613)	(0.551)	(0.589)	(0.490)	(0.527)	(0.513)
log(imports + 1)	0.458	−0.056	−0.261	−0.320*	0.240*	−0.198	0.196	−0.074	0.384	0.224	0.037	−0.064	−0.014	−0.166	0.125
	(0.457)	(0.130)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.087)	(0.235)	(0.203)	(0.285)	(0.345)	(0.522)	(0.137)	(0.187)	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.178)
log(exports + 1)	−0.674	−0.032	0.076	0.153	−0.481*	0.379*	−0.261	−0.127	−0.450	−0.206	−0.079	−0.099	0.087	0.087	−0.517*
	(0.435)	(0.170)	(0.109)	(0.158)	(0.124)	(0.182)	(0.264)	(0.247)	(0.400)	(0.448)	(0.134)	(0.163)	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.201)
imports missing	−1.286	−0.220	−1.270	−0.521	0.523	1.507	−0.698	0.676	3.264	−1.487	0.293	0.220	0.393	−0.714	−2.629
	(1.878)	(0.940)	(0.929)	(0.958)	(0.947)	(0.847)	(0.673)	(1.026)	(1.974)	(1.810)	(0.741)	(0.596)	(0.426)	(0.653)	(2.938)
exports missing			0.124			−0.919	0.272	−0.621	−3.881*		0.114	0.425			1.735
			(0.797)			(0.833)	(0.656)	(1.021)	(1.890)		(0.792)	(0.554)			(2.951)
FRA colony	−0.383	−0.176	−0.328	−0.634	−0.477	−0.584	−0.246	−0.452	−0.172	−0.319	−0.398	−0.266	−0.310	−0.263	−0.339
	(0.428)	(0.376)	(0.427)	(0.396)	(0.381)	(0.417)	(0.417)	(0.413)	(0.401)	(0.412)	(0.421)	(0.411)	(0.379)	(0.396)	(0.410)
RUS colony	2.637*	1.842*	2.684*	1.866*	2.119*	2.329*	3.260*	2.398*	2.750*	3.640*	2.613*	2.136*	2.187*	2.139*	2.709*
	(0.925)	(0.667)	(0.728)	(0.690)	(0.688)	(0.753)	(0.784)	(0.780)	(0.832)	(0.988)	(0.737)	(0.716)	(0.671)	(0.696)	(0.722)
UKG colony	−0.743	−1.103*	−0.910*	−0.890*	−0.789	−0.955*	−0.507	−0.790	−0.770	−0.641	−0.580	−0.853	−0.958*	−0.695	−0.572
	(0.451)	(0.413)	(0.450)	(0.437)	(0.405)	(0.448)	(0.431)	(0.440)	(0.445)	(0.443)	(0.431)	(0.446)	(0.416)	(0.427)	(0.430)
year	−0.003	0.035	−0.016	0.019	0.032	0.011	−0.004	0.000	−0.004	−0.010	−0.011	0.008	0.003	0.001	−0.009
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
log(number of battle deaths (best est.) + 1)	0.148	0.167	0.137	0.106	0.049	0.216	0.079	0.099	0.156	0.110	0.041	0.150	0.114	0.128	0.053
	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.121)
number of battle deaths (best est.) missing	0.386	0.301	−0.290	−0.085	−0.301	0.671	0.124	0.292	0.416	0.383	0.032	0.536	0.651	0.595	0.075
	(1.225)	(0.967)	(0.996)	(0.984)	(0.992)	(1.216)	(1.214)	(1.219)	(1.219)	(1.218)	(1.219)	(1.246)	(1.199)	(1.208)	(1.224)
conflict ongoing	−0.591	−0.945	−1.169	−0.922	−0.746	−0.558	−0.469	−0.447	−0.460	−0.453	−0.374	−0.436	−0.049	−0.165	−0.190
	(1.094)	(0.825)	(0.836)	(0.829)	(0.832)	(1.090)	(1.094)	(1.087)	(1.089)	(1.088)	(1.098)	(1.104)	(1.082)	(1.082)	(1.087)
other third party intervention	−0.021	0.007	−0.038	−0.002	−0.035	0.017	−0.026	0.036	−0.022	−0.029	−0.017	−0.023	−0.052	−0.037	−0.045
	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.104)
number of PKO resolutions	−0.007	−0.041	−0.000	−0.051	−0.029	−0.020	−0.020	−0.012	−0.010	−0.000	0.013	−0.012	−0.008	−0.005	−0.002
	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Americas	−0.301	−0.507	0.697	−0.238	0.402	−0.630	−0.074	−0.456	−0.369	−0.397	−0.402	−0.492	−0.704	0.176	0.202
	(0.495)	(0.930)	(1.016)	(0.967)	(0.524)	(0.511)	(0.540)	(0.497)	(0.490)	(0.489)	(0.558)	(0.576)	(0.530)	(0.752)	(0.784)
Asia	−2.276*	−2.089*	−1.649*	−1.967*	−2.384*	−2.335*	−2.830*	−2.211*	−2.806*	−3.537*	−2.402*	−1.918*	−2.283*	−2.071*	−2.141*
	(0.842)	(0.461)	(0.538)	(0.520)	(0.510)	(0.583)	(0.596)	(0.621)	(0.780)	(0.936)	(0.550)	(0.521)	(0.480)	(0.505)	(0.547)
Europe	−1.655*	−0.647	0.611	−0.065	−0.203	−1.578*	−1.538	−1.803*	−1.800*	−1.460*	−1.176	−1.358	−0.933	−0.113	0.395
	(0.779)	(0.572)	(0.994)	(0.591)	(0.568)	(0.666)	(0.819)	(0.771)	(0.798)	(0.694)	(0.692)	(0.823)	(0.545)	(0.591)	(0.739)
Oceania	−14.311	−13.263	−13.213	−12.686	−13.429	−12.939	−13.295	−13.478	−15.061	−15.086	−13.645	−13.119	−13.287	−13.521	−13.981
	(742.946)	(750.677)	(754.392)	(756.510)	(752.226)	(754.315)	(751.288)	(756.356)	(658.581)	(750.320)	(756.103)	(754.698)	(757.035)	(757.026)	(755.917)
N	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175
AIC	411.879	507.657	442.974	470.135	478.595	433.236	420.441	429.991	422.866	421.832	434.239	425.496	484.016	458.252	441.204
BIC	797.125	892.903	848.496	855.381	863.841	838.758	825.962	835.513	828.388	807.078	839.760	831.018	869.262	843.498	846.725
$\log L$	−129.939	−177.829	−141.487	−159.068	−163.298	−136.618	−130.220	−134.996	−131.433	−134.916	−137.119	−132.748	−166.008	−153.126	−140.602

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Regarding trade relations we fail to find any statistically significant effects, with only few exceptions. The United Kingdom is much less likely to sponsor a resolution on countries from which it imports a large amount of goods. For the United States, to the contrary, this effect is positive. This same country also sponsors significantly less frequently resolutions on countries towards which it exports a large amount of goods. A similar negative effect for exports also appears for the Central European member of the UNSC, while the same effect is significantly positive for the first representative for Africa. Contrary to much of the literature we do not find any effects for the number of battle deaths, whether a conflict is ongoing or has attracted other third party interventions. Also, while almost systematically an increaseing number of resolutons dealing with a conflict decreases the chances of another sponsorship decision, this effect fails to reach statistical significance. As much of the literature, however, we find that sponsoring decisions are heavily affected by the continent on which the conflict occurs. Compared to Africa (base category), conflicts in Asia and to some extent Europe, see much fewer resolutions being sponsored.

Consequently, these initial results based on a set of logit models underline the importance of taking member-specific variations into account. When doing so some results reported in the literature fail to materialize, while others appear to have different effects for different members.[21]

[21]In the appendix we report the results from a model that is sometimes used to address estimation issues similar to the ones we encounter, namely a hierarchical logit model estimated on a dataset in long format (or stacked, see for instance Thierse, 2016, for an application to roll call vote requests). The results show that when assuming that independent variables have the exact same effect for all UNSC members, some of the results reported in the literature, for instance the positive effect of the number of battle deaths, appear again.

Table 2: Bayesian multivariate probit

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
constant	0.294	-2.159	0.698	-1.269	-1.612	-0.912	0.238	-0.599	0.349	-0.257	0.327	0.504	-0.422	0.101	0.124
s.e.	9.941	9.879	9.834	9.932	9.827	9.895	10.104	9.890	9.878	9.999	9.937	9.865	9.958	9.922	9.856
imports	1.643	-0.394	-0.535	-0.828	0.496	0.027	-0.554	-0.485	0.235	0.042	0.356	-0.179	-0.277	1.282	1.266
s.e.	1.249	0.372	0.309	0.440	0.316	0.298	0.415	0.550	0.634	0.539	0.453	0.401	0.461	1.111	1.346
exports	-2.069	0.249	0.215	0.407	-1.040	0.198	0.353	0.887	-0.502	-0.594	-1.070	-0.153	-0.217	-1.359	-1.041
s.e.	1.405	0.476	0.334	0.410	0.525	0.358	0.400	0.528	0.787	0.612	0.590	0.405	0.365	1.046	1.084
imports missing	-0.935	-1.532	-2.493	-1.016	-3.351	1.441	-0.475	2.911	-2.638	2.499	-3.933	0.095	0.671	5.406	0.826
s.e.	2.834	2.396	1.880	2.562	2.909	1.201	1.498	2.093	1.987	3.032	3.905	2.302	1.686	4.054	3.622
exports missing			-0.224					-1.733	1.077	-2.269	2.143	0.961	1.086	-5.367	
s.e.			1.487					2.097	1.602	3.112	3.942	2.516	1.456	4.019	
one-sided violence	0.418	0.469	0.409	0.449	0.361	0.407	0.267	0.280	0.455	0.384	0.353	0.489	0.439	0.400	0.369
s.e.	0.237	0.228	0.206	0.240	0.213	0.199	0.164	0.170	0.269	0.203	0.180	0.259	0.247	0.216	0.259
osv missing	-1.765	0.775	-1.738	-0.848	0.290	1.062	0.031	-0.785	-0.764	-1.502	0.440	0.809	-0.243	-0.018	-0.715
s.e.	2.015	1.177	1.551	1.346	1.397	1.395	1.277	1.511	1.407	1.426	1.195	1.566	1.578	1.795	1.380
French colony	-1.201	-0.787	-1.336	-1.214	-1.455	-0.750	-0.680	-1.497	-0.477	-0.680	-1.479	-1.449	-1.200	-0.368	-0.610
s.e.	1.449	1.083	1.372	1.076	1.177	1.170	1.099	1.268	1.390	1.072	1.437	1.355	1.383	1.106	1.244
Russian colony	4.551	5.324	4.613	3.201	4.549	4.939	3.328	5.126	6.689	5.012	5.352	4.225	3.624	6.740	5.848
s.e.	2.347	2.651	2.392	2.389	2.321	2.745	2.024	2.693	3.192	2.955	2.547	2.292	2.613	3.222	2.531
UK colony	-2.900	-3.172	-3.538	-3.092	-2.967	-3.428	-1.975	-2.873	-2.646	-2.212	-2.400	-3.414	-3.146	-2.263	-2.542
s.e.	1.584	1.531	1.621	1.591	1.418	1.688	1.191	1.478	1.272	1.326	1.685	1.930	1.631	1.262	1.216
Battle deaths	0.284	0.325	0.418	0.237	0.053	0.271	0.336	0.487	0.236	0.248	0.100	0.190	0.245	0.370	0.276
s.e.	0.365	0.319	0.321	0.311	0.372	0.294	0.319	0.370	0.314	0.336	0.312	0.287	0.361	0.343	0.287
Battle deaths missing	2.363	1.797	0.934	1.753	-0.125	2.816	3.551	2.809	2.406	2.924	1.596	3.558	2.642	2.934	2.753
s.e.	3.196	2.570	2.580	2.474	3.075	3.504	3.378	2.921	3.286	3.163	3.219	3.056	3.606	2.684	3.624
year	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006
s.e.	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.006
ongoing conflict	0.577	-1.315	-1.423	-0.526	-0.875	1.404	1.702	0.065	0.480	1.040	0.746	2.120	1.246	0.731	1.028
s.e.	2.389	2.258	2.730	2.267	2.455	2.903	2.696	2.655	2.811	2.754	2.810	3.080	2.852	2.615	2.854
3rd party interventions	-0.143	0.035	-0.373	-0.127	-0.079	-0.237	-0.203	-0.058	-0.284	-0.014	-0.263	-0.201	-0.095	-0.262	-0.210
s.e.	0.274	0.262	0.316	0.255	0.243	0.286	0.313	0.232	0.287	0.257	0.324	0.296	0.286	0.333	0.268
number of resolutions	-0.000	-0.003	-0.009	-0.010	0.025	0.043	0.027	0.050	-0.004	0.093	0.025	0.075	0.031	0.037	0.057
s.e.	0.172	0.143	0.166	0.172	0.140	0.143	0.158	0.126	0.184	0.161	0.189	0.175	0.181	0.181	0.176
Americas	0.607	1.010	2.243	0.151	0.504	-1.568	0.242	-0.906	0.653	0.152	0.375	-0.691	-0.276	-0.439	-0.444
34	1.360	2.204	2.379	2.642	1.296	1.528	1.996	1.450	1.478	1.275	2.191	1.485	1.564	1.325	1.643
Asia	-4.928	-5.530	-3.147	-4.619	-5.586	-5.634	-4.456	-5.115	-5.789	-4.834	-5.068	-4.894	-3.742	-6.211	-5.879
s.e.	2.573	2.258	1.687	2.036	2.027	2.467	1.849	2.293	2.277	2.286	2.231	2.170	1.743	2.582	1.923
Europe	-3.494	-1.567	1.143	0.123	-0.859	-2.472	-0.498	-4.366	-3.351	-4.529	0.327	-3.129	-3.996	-4.371	-2.857
s.e.	1.846	1.523	2.159	1.762	1.658	1.943	1.471	2.291	2.411	2.648	1.921	1.996	2.307	2.577	1.871
Oceania	-9.202	-8.687	-6.669	-4.195	-6.178	-5.846	-3.698	-7.958	-5.154	-7.535	-6.522	-4.381	-3.968	-6.236	-6.671
s.e.	7.180	7.630	5.326	7.006	6.398	5.122	5.436	8.685	5.973	6.270	5.401	6.091	6.385	5.114	6.350
N	1175														

Note: 1000 burnins, 9000 mcmcs

Accounting for interdependencies

A simple way to take into account the interdependencies of sponsoring decisions, though theoretically uninformed as discussed above, is to estimate models that allow for correlations in the error terms. Table 2 reports on the results of a multivariate probit model.[22] The results from this model echo some of those obtained based on simple logit models (table 1), render them, however, also more specific. Hence, the extent of one-sided violence appears still to increase the chances of a sponsoring decision, but only for few members do we find a statistically significant effect. Similarly, the effects of trade relations appear less important, as only the exports of the USA to a conflict country significantly decrease the chances of this UNSC member to sponsor a resolution. Similarly, while we still find positive effects for former Russian colonies, and negative ones for the British colonies, fewer of these effects reach statistical significance. And as before we find no effect for the number of battle deaths and other conflict-related variables, while the differences across continents largely survive.[23]

Results from the strategic estimator

Finally, in table 3 we report the results from a reduced specification of the previous empirical models but as estimated with our proposed QRE-estimator. More specifically we focus on three sets of variables that, according to our previously reported results, appear to consistently affect the likelihood of a sponsoring decision, namely the trade relations with the country in conflict, the latter's colonial heritage and the continent on which the conflict takes place.[24]

[22] As a maximum likelihood estimation proved cumbersome, we employed a Bayesian muktivarite probit model as implemented in the `bayesm` package. As we provide these results only for illustrative purposes, we only report some information on the posterior distribution of the coefficients (similar information on the variance-covariance matrix appears in the appendix).

[23] In the appendix we report on an additional multivariate probit model, namely one estimated under the assumption that all independent variables have exactly the same effect for each member country (who differ only in their intercepts). The results come very close to those obtained with a hierarchical logit model (see table 7).

[24] Given the complexities in the estimation (i.e., a maximum likelihood function which is not necessarily smooth) we simplify our approach to missing data by imputing missing values with the help of the `mice` package. Also linked to the estimation complexities and the shape of the likelihood function we estimate the standard errors by boot-strapping and impute for each boot-strap run the missing data afresh. In tables 13 and 14 we report the results from a replication with standard errors derived from the Hessian, as well as from an extension where we allow the effects of the continent to vary across UNSC members.

Table 3: Strategic QRE estimator with bootstrapped errors

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
constant	-0.012	-1.919	-2.507	-0.187	3.165	-3.914	-3.468	-3.156	-2.783	-2.308	-0.772	-1.334	-2.037	-2.257	-2.877
s.e.	0.853	0.726	0.434	1.113	0.900	0.474	0.489	0.253	0.524	0.381	0.526	0.564	0.502	0.560	0.693
imports	-1.164	-1.591	-0.314	-0.224	-0.464	-0.651	-0.338	-0.166	0.923	2.297	0.734	-0.019	0.013	0.055	0.718
s.e.	0.538	0.548	0.481	0.449	0.541	0.429	0.425	0.325	0.559	0.766	0.772	0.500	0.511	0.581	0.422
exports	0.880	1.391	0.505	-0.339	-0.364	0.921	0.503	-0.161	-9.749	-3.212	-2.406	-0.493	-0.366	-1.259	-0.913
s.e.	0.593	0.591	0.372	0.509	0.592	0.495	0.367	0.405	1.383	0.697	0.801	0.541	0.402	0.475	0.397
Russian colony	4.534	0.801	0.912	1.891	-2.199	1.732	1.939	2.533	2.985	1.776	3.398	0.946	1.747	3.645	2.008
s.e.	0.783	0.905	1.026	0.795	1.037	0.818	0.795	0.718	0.943	0.983	1.369	0.684	0.718	0.682	0.867
United Kingdom colony	-3.852	-0.795	-0.188	0.762	-3.189	-0.791	0.405	0.690	-0.677	-5.272	-0.474	-5.203	0.094	0.207	0.017
s.e.	0.785	0.501	0.489	0.485	0.468	0.494	0.430	0.320	0.622	0.784	0.805	0.958	0.392	0.410	0.340
Americas	-0.659														
s.e.	0.383														
Asia	-1.850														
s.e.	0.390														
Europe	-0.220														
s.e.	0.398														
Oceania	-6.003														
s.e.	0.040														
τ	1.495														
s.e.	0.039														
llik	-3028.072														
N 1175															

Note: boot-strapped errors from 240 boot-straps and imputed missing data

Table 3 reports our results. Starting with the differences across continents (which we assume to have identical effects on all UNSC members, given the empirical results discussed above), we find the well-established results from the literature. Compared to conflicts in Africa, those in Asia are much less likely to see a resolution for a peace-keeping mission sponsored by a UNSC member. We also find a strong negative and significant coefficient for conflicts in Oceania, but this is likely to be the consequence of an issue of quasi-complete separation in the data.[25]

Regarding the effects of trade relations between a UNSC member and the country in conflict, we find much more nuanced results. While the multivariate probit model (see table 2), which takes the interdependencies naively into account, suggested only a marginal negative effect of exports on the USA's sponsoring decision, we now find much more varied effects. Hence, increasing imports from a country in conflict appears to diminish the chances that China or France sponsors a resolution, while at the same time increasing these chances for the occupant of the third African seat. Regarding exports, France is affected positively in its sponsoring decision, while the two Asian UNSC members, the representative from Central Europe and the occupants of the second and third African seat are less likely to sponsor a resolution when the conflict country is an important export market.

Finally, regarding the effect of the colonial history of the country in conflict we find again more nuanced results. While former Russian colonies in conflict are much more likely to be subject of a sponsoring decision by almost all UNSC members, our estimator suggests that at least the United States is much less likely to do so. Similarly, while former British colonies appear overall less frequently the object of a sponsoring decision, it is important to note that the coefficient for the United Kingdom now is positive and statistically significant.

6 Conclusion

Peacekeeping missions by the United Nations have become more prominent and their consequences the object of various research efforts. A conundrum in such studies is that the UNSC chooses in which conflicts to intervene, and our under-

[25] In analyses reported above, the coefficient for this continent came normally with large standard errors.

standing of these decisions is still scant. The effort to understand better when the UNSC intervenes is hampered by the fact that resolutions establishing peacekeeping missions are often adopted unanimously, which is the consequence of an increasing vetting effort before a draft resolution is even submitted. Thus, the literature has steered away from the question who supports particular peacekeeping missions to studying more broadly what characteristics of conflicts affect the establishment of peacekeeping missions.

A consequence of this is also that explanatory variables are often quite aggregate like the colonial ties with any permanent member of the UNSC or their aggregate trade relations. Following other forays in the literature we argue that an actor-specific perspective is warranted to gain a better understanding of the adoption of peacekeeping missions. To do so we innovate along two dimensions. First, given the development in the operation of the UNSC we take a step back and consider sponsoring decisions to gain an understanding of what affects the support of peacekeeping missions. Second, as such sponsorship decisions are highly interdependent, we propose empirical strategies that take these interdependencies into account.

This allows us to highlight that commonly used strategies that mostly rely on relegating interdependencies in sponsorship decisions into the error term (like hierarchical models with random effects or multivariate probit and seemingly unrelated regression models) come to quite different results than those obtained from approaches that explicitly model these interdependencies. Substantively, and quite contrary to the findings in the extant literature, we find that colonial ties matter for resolutions on peacekeeping missions. They matter, however, differently, namely such that former British colonies almost uniformly much less likely attract sponsorships, while former Russian colonies increase the chances of a sponsorship decision only for some countries. Similarly, we find that trade relations affect only some countries in their sponsorship decisions, even among the permanent members. Finally, as other studies we find that the continent on which a conflict takes place is systematically related to sponsoring decisions.

Our initial results vindicate our two-pronged research strategy to better understand the adoption of peacekeeping missions. As sponsorship decisions are the first step, information on which UNSC members support a resolution is a valuable piece of information. As our results on the effect of one-sided violence

shows, these sponsorship decisions are similarly affected as the adoption of a resolution on the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. Using this more disaggregated and actor-specific approach, and taking the implied interdependencies into account allows us also to resolve some puzzles in the literature. While many scholars argue that colonial ties should mattter, few find empirical evidence for this claim. Our results nicely show that not all colonial ties matter in the same way for all UNSC members. While former British colonies are generally less likely to be the object of a resolution establishing a peacekeeping mission, only some members sponsor with higher probability resolutions dealing with former Russian colonies. Similarly, trade relations have different effects with some permanent UNSC members appearing to take into account this element in their sponsorship decisions.

Consequently, we believe that much headway in understanding UN peacekeeping missions can be achieved by taking sponsorship decisions into account and by addressing the implied interdependencies among these decisions. We still need to demonstrate more fully that our proposed empirical approach is viable and leads to the correct answers. We are confident, however, that this is the case and that our approach is amenable to many other situations in which actors take simultaneous decisions in an interdependent fashion.

Appendix

In table 4 we list all the peacekeeping missions covered in our analysis, while table 5 provides a list of all conflicts. Table 6 offers descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Table 7 reports the results based on commonly used hierarchical logit models with random effects either at the conflict (1st model) or the conflict and conflict location level (2nd model). Tables 8 and 9 report the results from an implementation of (e Marshall, 2013)stimator to take spatial interdependencies into account. Table 10 reports the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms from the model reported in table 2. Table 11 reports the results of a replication of this multivariate model, under the assumption that all independent variables have the same effects for all UNSC members, while allowing the intercepts to vary. The corresponding variance-covariance matrix of the error terms appears in table 12 Finally in tables 13 and 14 we report the results first of the same model as the one reported in table 3, however, with standard errors derived from the Hessian. We report the same standard errors also in table 14, where we allow the effects of the continents to vary across UNSC members.

Table 5: Conflicts covered

ID	ConflictID	Location	Side A	Side(s) B	Start year
46	205	Iran	Government of Iran	KDPI	1946
224	209	Philippines	Government of Philippines	CPP	1946
70	218	India, Pakistan	Government of India	Government of Pakistan	1948
502	220	Paraguay	Government of Paraguay	Military faction (forces of Andres Rodriguez)	1947
95	221	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KNU	1948
206	222	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	ABSDF	1948
330	223	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	RSO	1948
84	224	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	BMA / NMSP	1948
68	227	India	Government of India	PWG / CPI-Maoist / MCC, PWG / CPI-ML-J, MCC, PWG	1948
464	230	Yemen (North Yemen)	Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	AQAP	1948
205	231	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KIO	1949
230	233	Guatemala	Government of Guatemala	URNG	1949
55	234	Israel	Government of Israel	PNA / Fatah / Hamas / Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, PRC /Fatah, Hamas, PIJ / Hamas, PIJ / PIJ	1948
189	251	India	Government of India	NSCN-IM	1955
85	253	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	KNPP	1957
51	259	Iraq	Government of Iraq	SCIRI / Ansar al-Islam, IS, RJF, al-Mahdi Army / IS, al-Mahdi Army / IS / Ansar al-Islam, IS / Ansar al-Islam, IS, al-Mahdi Army / Ansar al-Islam, IS, RJF	1958
524	260	Lebanon	Government of Lebanon	Forces of Michel Aoun, Lebanese Forces / Forces of Michel Aoun	1958
539	262	Laos	Government of Laos	LRM	1959
87	264	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	RCSS / MTA / RCSS, SSPP	1959
821	265	DR Congo (Zaire)	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Kata Katanga	1961

513	267	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	EPRDF, Military faction (forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie) / EPRDF, Military faction (Harar garrison)	1960
100	269	Nepal	Government of Nepal	CPN-M	1960
173	271	Iraq	Government of Iraq	PUK / KDP, PUK	1961
514	275	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	EPLF	1961
27	283	DR Congo (Zaire)	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	AFDL / CNDP / PARC-FAAL / MLC, RCD / AP-CLS, PARC-FAAL / RCD / M23, PARC-FAAL	1964
31	287	Burundi	Government of Burundi	CNDD / CNDD, Frolina, Palipehutu-FNL / Palipehutu / Palipehutu-FNL / CNDD, CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL / CNDD-FDD, Palipehutu-FNL	1965
26	288	Chad	Government of Chad	FARF, MDD / CNR, CSNPD, FNT, MDD / CNR, CSNPD, FNT / FUCD, RAFD, UFDD / UFR / Islamic Legion, MOSANAT, Revolutionary Forces of 1 April / FARF / MDJT / Islamic Legion, MPS / MDD, Military faction (forces of Maldoum Bada Abbas) / FUCD	1966
1	289	Colombia	Government of Colombia	ELN, FARC / FARC / ELN, EPL, FARC	1964
5	292	Peru	Government of Peru	Sendero Luminoso / MRTA, Sendero Luminoso	1963
615	294	Cambodia (Kampuchea), Thailand	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of Thailand	1975
432	297	Nigeria	Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	1966
517	298	South Africa	Government of South Africa		1966
987	299	Syria	Government of Syria	Syrian insurgents	1966
102	300	Cambodia (Kampuchea)	Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea)	KR / FUNCINPEC, KR / FUNCINPEC, KPNLF, KR / KPNLF, KR	1967
869	307	Guinea	Government of Guinea	RFDG	2000
104	308	Philippines	Government of Philippines	ASG, MILF / ASG, MNLF / ASG / ASG, MILF, MNLF - HM / MNLF / MILF / ASG, MILF, MNLF - NM / ASG, BIFM / ASG, BIFM, MNLF - NM / MILF, MNLF	1970
44	309	Sudan	Government of Sudan	NDA, SPLM/A / SPLM/A / NRF, SLM/A, SLM/A - MM / JEM, SLM/A-Unity / JEM, SLM/A, SPLM/A / Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, SARC, SRF / SRF / SLM/A / JVP	1971
29	314	Uganda	Government of Uganda	ADF, LRA, WNBF / ADF, LRA, UNRF II / UPA / LRA / ADF / LRA, UPA / ADF, LRA	1971
503	315	United Kingdom	Government of United Kingdom	PIRA / RIRA	1970
543	316	El Salvador	Government of El Salvador	FMLN	1972
530	322	Bangladesh	Government of Bangladesh	JSS/SB	1975
520	324	Iran, Iraq	Government of Iran	????	1972
405	325	Pakistan	Government of Pakistan	BLA, Baloch Ittehad / BLA / BLA, BRA / BLA, BLF, BRA	1973
39	326	Eritrea	Government of Eritrea	EIJM - AS	1993
154	327	Angola	Government of Angola	UNITA	1975
37	329	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	AIAI, ONLF / ONLF	1964
227	330	Indonesia	Government of Indonesia	Fretilin	1975
518	331	Morocco	Government of Morocco	POLISARIO	1975
157	332	Mozambique	Government of Mozambique	Renamo	1977
63	333	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban, UIFSA / UIFSA / Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami / Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Taleban	1975

394	333	Afghanistan	Government of Afghanistan	Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Taleban / Taleban / Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan / Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction, Hizb-i Wahdat, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Military faction (forces of Shahnawaz Tanay)	1975
76	335	India	Government of India	ATTF, NLFT / ATTF / NLFT	1979
544	336	Nicaragua	Government of Nicaragua	Contras/FDN	1974
33	337	Somalia	Government of Somalia	USC/SNA / ARS/UIC / ARS/UIC, Al-Shabaab / Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam / SNM, SPM / Al-Shabaab / SRRC / SNM, SPM, USC/SSA / SNM, SPM, USC/SNA, USC/SSA	1982
48	338	Iran	Government of Iran	MEK / Jondullah, PJAK / PJAK	1972
739	341	Liberia	Government of Liberia	LURD / LURD, MODEL / INPFL, NPFL	1980
516	345	South Africa	Government of South Africa		1978
71	347	India	Government of India	PLA / UNLF / PLA, UNLF / KCP, PREPAK / KCP, PREPAK, UNLF	1979
191	351	India	Government of India	Sikh insurgents	1981
99	352	Sri Lanka	Government of Sri Lanka	LTTE / EPRLF, LTTE	1975
50	354	Turkey	Government of Turkey	PKK	1983
538	356	Laos, Thailand	Government of Laos	????	1982
501	357	Suriname	Government of Suriname	????	1986
507	358	Togo	Government of Togo	????	1986
525	359	South Yemen	Government of South Yemen	????	1986
506	360	Burkina Faso	Government of Burkina Faso	????	1987
509	361	Chad, Libya	Government of Chad	????	1987
73	364	India	Government of India	Kashmir insurgents	1984
69	365	India	Government of India	ULFA	1983
719	366	Indonesia	Government of Indonesia	GAM	1989
546	367	Panama	Government of Panama	Military faction (forces of Mois's Giroldi)	1989
545	368	Panama, United States of America	Government of Panama	Government of United States of America	1989
108	369	Papua New Guinea	Government of Papua New Guinea	BRA	1989
504	370	Rumania	Government of Rumania	Military faction (forces of Nicolae Ceausescu), NSF	1989
1136	371	Iraq, Kuwait	Government of Iraq	Government of Kuwait	1990
260	372	Mali	Government of Mali	FIAA / ATNMC / CMA / MPA	1990
264	373	Niger	Government of Niger	CRA	1994
444	374	Rwanda	Government of Rwanda	FDLR / ALiR / FPR	1990
19	375	Senegal	Government of Senegal	MFDC	1988
1040	376	Russia (Soviet Union)	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Republic of Armenia	1990
1039	377	Russia (Soviet Union)	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	APF	1990
1089	378	Trinidad and Tobago	Government of Trinidad and Tobago	Jamaat al-Muslimeen	1990
146	379	Djibouti	Government of Djibouti	FRUD / FRUD - AD	1991
1045	380	Georgia	Government of Georgia	National Guard and Mkhedrioni	1991
505	381	Haiti	Government of Haiti	Military faction (forces of Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois) / Military faction (forces of Raol Cedras) / FLRN, OP Lavalas (Chimares)	1989
23	382	Sierra Leone	Government of Sierra Leone	RUF / AFRC, Kamajors, RUF / AFRC, RUF / RUF, WSB	1991
168	383	Turkey	Government of Turkey	Devrimci Sol	1987
116	385	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Republic of Croatia / Croatian irregulars, Republic of Croatia	1991
160	386	Algeria	Government of Algeria	AIS / AIS, GIA / AQIM / AQIM, GIA / Takfir wa'l Hijra	1985
40	387	Angola	Government of Angola	FLEC-FAC / FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R / FLEC-R	1991
15	388	Azerbaijan	Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	1991

118	389	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars	1992
115	390	Croatia	Government of Croatia	Serbian Republic of Krajina	1992
53	391	Egypt	Government of Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1981
124	392	Georgia	Government of Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia	1992
65	395	Tajikistan	Government of Tajikistan	UTO	1992
66	395	Tajikistan	Government of Tajikistan	Forces of Khudoberdiyev / PFT, UTO / Forces of Mullo Abdullo, IMU / IMU / Forces of Khudoberdiyev, UTO / Forces of Mullo Abdullo	1992
257	396	Azerbaijan	Government of Azerbaijan	OPON Forces	1993
249	398	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian irregulars	1993
61	400	Mexico	Government of Mexico	EPR / EZLN	1994
9	401	Russia (Soviet Union)	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1994
305	402	Yemen (North Yemen)	Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	Democratic Republic of Yemen	1994
241	403	Ecuador, Peru	Government of Ecuador	Government of Peru	1995
82	404	Pakistan	Government of Pakistan	MQM / TTP / Lashkar-e-Islam, TTP	1990
640	408	Congo	Government of Congo	Cocoyes, Ninjas, Ntsiloulous / Ntsiloulous	1993
654	409	Eritrea, Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia	1998
631	410	Guinea-Bissau	Government of Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998
661	411	Lesotho	Government of Lesotho	Military faction	1998
626	412	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	UCK	1996
148	413	Ethiopia	Government of Ethiopia	OLF	1974
629	414	Russia (Soviet Union)	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district	1999
913	415	Uzbekistan	Government of Uzbekistan	IMU	1999
366	416	Central African Republic	Government of Central African Republic	UFDR / CPJP / Forces of Francois Bozize / Seleka / Seleka, anti-Balaka	2001
857	417	Macedonia, FYR	Government of Macedonia, FYR	UCK	2000
735	419	Ivory Coast	Government of Ivory Coast	MPCI, MPIGO / MJP, MPIGO / FRCI	2002
72	421	India	Government of India	NDFB / NDFB - RD / NDFB-S	1989
98	422	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	UWSA	1997
420	423	Thailand	Government of Thailand	Patani insurgents	1965
1067	425	Nigeria	Government of Nigeria	NDPVF	2004
56	426	Israel	Government of Israel	Hezbollah	1986
437	429	DR Congo (Zaire)	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	BDK	1998
21	430	Niger	Government of Niger	UFRA	1991
429	432	Russia (Soviet Union)	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2007
470	434	India	Government of India	PULF	2000
475	434	India	Government of India		2000
447	435	Djibouti, Eritrea	Government of Djibouti	Government of Eritrea	2008
80	438	India	Government of India	KNF	1993
490	439	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	MNDAA	2009
841	11342	India	Government of India	GNLA	2010
578	11344	Sudan	Government of Sudan	Republic of South Sudan	2011
831	11345	South Sudan	Government of South Sudan	SPLM/A In Opposition / SSLM/A	2011
577	11346	Libya	Government of Libya	Forces of Muammar Gaddafi, NTC / Forces of the House of Representatives, Zintan Brigades	2011
431	11347	Mali	Government of Mali	AQIM / AQIM, al-Murabitun / Ansar Dine, Military faction (Red Berets) / AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, Signed-in-Blood Battalion	2009
979	11348	South Sudan, Sudan	Government of South Sudan	Government of Sudan	2012
467	11349	China	Government of China	ETIM	1990
408	11350	Bangladesh	Government of Bangladesh	PBCP-J / PBCP, PBCP-J	1994
335	11475	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	NSCN-K	1991
1019	11487	Malaysia	Government of Malaysia	Sultanate of Sulu	2013
812	13219	Ukraine	Government of Ukraine	Maidan	2014
811	13246	Ukraine	Government of Ukraine	DPR	2014
813	13247	Ukraine	Government of Ukraine	LPR	2014

1013	13349	Myanmar (Burma)	Government of Myanmar (Burma)	PSLF	1994
835	13604	Syria	Government of Syria	IS	2013
836	13675	Lebanon	Government of Lebanon	IS	2014
909	13692	Afghanistan, United Kingdom, United States of America	Government of Afghanistan	Government of United Kingdom, Government of United States of America	2001

Table 6: Descriptive statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
year	1,175	2,000.235	7.429	1,989	2,014
ConflictID	1,175	823.096	2,307.740	205	13,675
ongoing	1,175	0.625	0.484	0	1
sponsor USA	1,175	0.060	0.237	0	1
sponsor UKG	1,175	0.057	0.232	0	1
sponsor RUS	1,175	0.051	0.220	0	1
sponsor CHN	1,175	0.046	0.209	0	1
sponsor FRN	1,175	0.063	0.243	0	1
sponsor GRULAC2	1,175	0.048	0.213	0	1
sponsor GRULAC1	1,175	0.049	0.215	0	1
sponsor CEIT	1,175	0.051	0.220	0	1
sponsor AFR3	1,175	0.049	0.215	0	1
sponsor AFR2	1,175	0.048	0.213	0	1
sponsor AFR1	1,175	0.050	0.218	0	1
sponsor WEOG2	1,175	0.053	0.224	0	1
sponsor WEOG1	1,175	0.057	0.232	0	1
sponsor ASIA2	1,175	0.048	0.213	0	1
sponsor ASIA1	1,175	0.048	0.213	0	1
number of PKO resolutions	1,175	0.581	2.138	0	21
number of OSV victims	834	116.155	429.806	0	6,743
FRN colony	1,175	0.137	0.344	0	1
UKG colony	1,175	0.406	0.491	0	1
RUS colony	1,175	0.037	0.188	0	1
number of battle deaths (best estimate)	1,175	605.459	2,761.681	0	68,503
number of battle deaths (best estimate) missing	1,175	0.362	0.481	0	1
number of OSV victims	834	116.155	429.806	0	6,743
number of OSV victims missing	1,175	0.091	0.288	0	1
flow1_USA	1,175	5,650.306	22,381.150	0.000	387,579.900
flow2_USA	1,175	3,037.722	9,347.933	0.000	125,610.400
flow1_FRN	1,175	824.164	2,362.269	0.000	30,810.260
flow2_FRN	1,175	700.636	1,699.247	0.000	21,504.470
flow1_UKG	1,175	1,034.581	3,575.294	0.000	57,228.380
flow2_UKG	1,175	727.598	1,533.975	0.000	16,530.190
flow1_CHN	1,175	1,929.796	6,943.193	0.000	71,431.130
flow2_CHN	1,175	2,232.815	8,813.754	0.000	67,152.480
flow1_RUS	1,175	375.654	2,069.396	0.000	39,123.770
flow2_RUS	1,175	600.255	2,700.954	0.000	31,364.480
flow1_AFR1	1,175	23.150	106.245	0.000	1,155.611
flow2_AFR1	1,175	29.648	162.037	0.000	1,490.848
flow1_AFR2	1,175	49.248	370.560	0.000	7,587.722
flow2_AFR2	1,175	128.292	995.350	0.000	12,850.630
flow1_AFR3	1,175	107.870	670.728	0.000	12,948.210
flow2_AFR3	1,175	136.035	959.959	0.000	12,113.010
flow1_ASIA1	1,175	108.201	780.642	0.000	12,782.850
flow2_ASIA1	1,175	87.081	450.595	0.000	6,326.888
flow1_ASIA2	1,175	387.198	1,735.547	0.000	20,814.680
flow2_ASIA2	1,175	448.169	2,122.583	0.000	33,535.250
flow1_GRULAC1	1,175	149.597	1,109.053	0.000	28,956.480
flow2_GRULAC1	1,175	158.901	1,517.606	0.000	39,838.230
flow1_GRULAC2	1,175	131.531	1,567.696	0.000	38,786.690
flow2_GRULAC2	1,175	85.386	297.690	0.000	4,237.402
flow1_WEOG1	1,175	567.736	3,417.309	0.000	84,318.250
flow2_WEOG1	1,175	572.720	3,151.958	0.000	81,970.060
flow1_WEOG2	1,175	340.017	1,480.738	0.000	30,462.770
flow2_WEOG2	1,175	219.653	795.573	0.000	14,421.400
flow1_CEIT	1,175	70.854	358.887	0.000	5,041.380
flow2_CEIT	1,175	47.141	194.704	0.000	2,611.950
flow1_USA_m	1,175	0.017	0.129	0	1
flow2_USA_m	1,175	0.017	0.129	0	1
flow1_FRN_m	1,175	0.101	0.302	0	1
flow2_FRN_m	1,175	0.101	0.302	0	1
flow1_UKG_m	1,175	0.101	0.302	0	1
flow2_UKG_m	1,175	0.101	0.302	0	1
flow1_CHN_m	1,175	0.651	0.477	0	1
flow2_CHN_m	1,175	0.651	0.477	0	1
flow1_RUS_m	1,175	0.169	0.375	0	1
flow2_RUS_m	1,175	0.188	0.391	0	1
flow1_AFR1_m	1,175	0.432	0.496	0	1
flow2_AFR1_m	1,175	0.458	0.498	0	1
flow1_AFR2_m	1,175	0.361	0.480	0	1
flow2_AFR2_m	1,175	0.369	0.483	0	1
flow1_AFR3_m	1,175	0.475	0.500	0	1
flow2_AFR3_m	1,175	0.499	0.500	0	1

flow1_ASIA1_m	1,175	0.727	0.446	0	1
flow2_ASIA1_m	1,175	0.732	0.443	0	1
flow1_ASIA2_m	1,175	0.807	0.395	0	1
flow2_ASIA2_m	1,175	0.807	0.395	0	1
flow1_GRULAC1_m	1,175	0.096	0.295	0	1
flow2_GRULAC1_m	1,175	0.100	0.300	0	1
flow1_GRULAC2_m	1,175	0.129	0.335	0	1
flow2_GRULAC2_m	1,175	0.151	0.358	0	1
flow1_WEOG1_m	1,175	0.229	0.420	0	1
flow2_WEOG1_m	1,175	0.229	0.420	0	1
flow1_WEOG2_m	1,175	0.141	0.348	0	1
flow2_WEOG2_m	1,175	0.141	0.348	0	1
flow1_CEIT_m	1,175	0.157	0.364	0	1
flow2_CEIT_m	1,175	0.151	0.358	0	1
number of third party interventions	1,175	0.243	1.198	0	12

In table 7 we report on a hierarchical logit model. Focusing on model 2, which comprises random effects both at the conflict and the country level, we find quite different results from those focusing on individual UNSC members. More specifically, the extent of one-sided violence and the colonial heritage no longer play any significant role in explaining sponsorship decisions. On the other hand, the number of battled deaths and other third-party interventions decrease the likelihood of sponsorship decisions, while this likelihood is much more likely while a conflict is still ongoing. If we control for whether a resolution establishing a peacekeeping mission has already been adopted, we find that the USA and France are significantly more likely than the first African representative to sponsor subsequent resolutions. Similarly, we find now that the number of victims of one-sided violence increases the chances of a sponsorship decisions, while the remaining significant effects found for model 2 remain the same, except for ongoing conflicts. The coefficient for this indicator variable becomes positive, suggesting, quite logically, that when controlling for situations where a peacekeeping mission has already been adopted, subsequent resolutions are more likely if the conflict is still ongoing.

In table 8 and 9 we report on a logit model proposed by Marshall (2013) that takes the interdependencies into account. More specifically, this estimator relies on estimating first an auxiliary regression in which all covariates for a particular country are interacted with those of all other countries. The predicted values of this regression reflect the contribution of the other countries effects and are added as additional regressor to the main equation. As tables 8 and 9 show taking these interdependencies into account affects some of the results. While in all previous analyses the extent of one-sided violence increased the chances of all members of the UNSC to sponsor a resolution, controlling for the theoretically expected dependencies makes this effect go away for the United Kingdom, as well as for the

Table 4: Peacekeeping missions covered (adopted between 1989-2014)

Country	UNSC resolution	UN Mission
+ Central African Republic	UNSC Res. 2149 (April 10, 2014)	(MINUSCA)
+ Mali	UNSC Res. 2100 (April 25, 2013)	MINUSMA
+Syria	UNSC Res. 2043 (April 21, 2012)	(UNSMIS)
+ Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire/DRC	UNSC Res. 1925 (May 28, 2010)	(MONUSCO)
+ Chad	UNSC Res. 1778 (September 25, 2007)	(MINURCAT - Chad)
+ Sudan	UNSC Res. 1769 (July 31, 2007)	(UNAMID - Sudan/Darfur)
+ Sudan	UNSC Res. 1590 (March 24, 2005)	(UNMIS)
+ Côte d'Ivoire	UNSC Res. 1528 (February 27, 2004)	(UNOCI)
+ Burundi	UNSC Res. 1545 (May 21, 2004)	(ONUB)
Haiti	UNSC Res. 1542 (April 30, 2004)	(MINUSTAH)
+ Liberia	UNSC Res. 1509 (September 19, 2003)	(UNMIL)
+ Cote d'Ivoire	UNSC Res. 1479 (May 13, 2003)	(MINUCI)
+ Serbia/Kosovo	UNSC Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999)	(UNMIK)
+ Sierra Leone	UNSC Res. 1270 (October 22, 1999)	(UNAMSIL)
+ Zaire/DRC	UNSC Res. 1279 (November 30, 1999)	(MONUC)
+ Indonesia/East Timor	UNSC Res. 1272 (October 25, 1999)	(UNTAET)
+ Sierra Leone	UNSC Res. 1181 (July 13, 1998)	(UNOMSIL)
+ Angola	UNSC Res. 1118 (June 30, 1997)	(MONUA)
+ Guatemala	UNSC Res. 1094 (January 20, 1997)	(MINUGUA)
+ Croatia	UNSC Res. 1037 (January 15, 1996)	(UNTAES - Croatia)
+ Bosnia	UNSC Res. 1035 (December 21, 1995)	UNMIBH (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
+/+?? Croatia	UNSC Res. 981 (March 31, 1995)	(UNCRO - Croatia)
+ Angola	UNSC Res. 976 (February 8, 1995)	(UNAVEM III)
+ Tajikistan	UNSC Res. 968 (December 16, 1994)	(UNMOT)
+ Georgia	UNSC Res. 858 (August 24, 1993)	(UNOMIG)
+ Liberia	UNSC Res. 866 (September 22, 1993)	(UNOMIL)
+ Somalia	UNSC Res. 814 (March 26, 1993)	(UNOSOM II)
+ Cambodia	UNSC Res. 745 (February 28, 1992)	(UNTAC)
Bosnia	UNSC Res. 758 (June 8, 1992)	(UNPRFOR)
Croatia	UNSC Res. 743 (February 21, 1992)	(UNPRFOR)
+ Mozambique	UNSC Res. 797 (December 16, 1992)	(ONUMOZ)
+ Somalia	UNSC Res. 751 (April 24, 1992)	(UNOSOM I)
+ Morocco	UNSC Res. 690 (April 29, 1991)	(MINURSO)
+ Angola	UNSC Res. 696 (May 30, 1991)	(UNAVEM I)
+ El Salvador	UNSC Res. 693 (May 20, 1991)	(ONUSAL)
+ South Africa/Namibia	UNSC Res. 632 (February 16, 1989)	(UNTAG)
+ Nicaragua	UNSC Res. 644 (November 7, 1989)	(ONUCA)

source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/

first representatives from Latin America and Western Europe. Note that for the West European representatives, the effect just marginally fails to reach statistical significance.

Table 7: Hierarchical logit models

	Dependent variable:	
random effects	conflict ID	sponsor conflict ID and Side A
	(1)	(2)
sponsor (AFR1 omitted)		
AFR2	−0.073	−0.064
	(0.229)	(0.231)
AFR3	−0.079	0.031
	(0.230)	(0.230)
ASIA1	−0.074	0.017
	(0.234)	(0.235)
ASIA2	−0.029	0.001
	(0.234)	(0.236)
CEIT	−0.091	−0.005
	(0.233)	(0.233)
CHN	−0.093	−0.034
	(0.235)	(0.237)
FRN	0.172	0.156
	(0.242)	(0.244)
GRULAC1	−0.177	−0.210
	(0.236)	(0.239)
GRULAC2	−0.202	−0.105
	(0.234)	(0.234)
RUS	−0.147	−0.093
	(0.233)	(0.234)
UKG	−0.023	0.032
	(0.240)	(0.240)
USA	0.079	0.103
	(0.259)	(0.261)
WEOG1	0.063	0.105
	(0.231)	(0.233)
WEOG2	−0.061	−0.045
	(0.234)	(0.236)
log(imports + 1)	−0.052	−0.060
	(0.045)	(0.045)
log(exports + 1)	0.067	0.081*
	(0.046)	(0.046)
imports missing	−0.136	−0.121
	(0.294)	(0.295)
exports missing	−0.058	−0.090
	(0.297)	(0.297)
log(victims of one-sided violence + 1)	−0.031	−0.027
	(0.020)	(0.020)
victims of one-sided violence missing	−0.314*	−0.302*
	(0.169)	(0.169)
log(number of battle deaths (best estimate) + 1)	−0.229***	−0.230***
	(0.047)	(0.047)
number of battle deaths (best estimate) missing	−2.503***	−2.597***
	(0.412)	(0.410)
ongoing conflict	−1.241***	−1.331***
	(0.333)	(0.331)
third part intervention	−0.106***	−0.089***
	(0.030)	(0.030)
number of previous PKO resolutions	−0.376***	−0.370***
	(0.035)	(0.035)
FRA colony	−0.160	−0.281
	(1.773)	(2.336)
RUS colony	0.470	0.675
	(2.019)	(4.295)
UKG colony	−2.605*	−2.825
	(1.578)	(3.723)
continent (Africa omitted)		
Americas	−0.730	−0.994
	(2.045)	(2.890)
Asia	−2.785**	−3.153
	(1.420)	(2.902)
Europe	−0.647	−0.587
	(1.832)	(3.019)
Oceania	−9.992	−66.336
	(128.001)	(5,479,416.000)
Constant	−4.626***	−4.632***
	(1.499)	(1.738)
Observations	17,625	17,625
Log Likelihood	−1,941.939	−1,939.752
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,951.878	3,949.504
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	4,216.298	4,221.701

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Sponsorship decisions controlled for dependencies I

	CHN	CHN	FRN	FRN	RUS	RUS	UKG	UKG	USA	USA	AFR1	AFR1	AFR2	AFR2	AFR3	AFR3
(Intercept)	−1.57	−1.52	−2.03*	−1.97*	−2.42*	−4.58*	−2.22*	−4.34*	−1.37*	−1.85*	−2.78*	−2.61*	−2.36*	−2.31*	−2.46*	−2.25*
	(1.82)	(1.83)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.30)	(0.70)	(0.40)	(0.75)	(0.36)	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.45)
log(osv_tot + 1)	0.15*	0.15*	0.14*	0.14*	0.15*	0.10	0.13*	0.19*	0.10*	0.11*	0.12*	0.12*	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.14*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
osv_m	−0.57	−0.58	0.47	0.45	−0.74	−0.21	−0.15	0.75	0.18	0.23	−0.51	−0.52	−0.42	−0.46	−0.35	−0.23
	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.66)	(1.19)	(0.48)	(0.76)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.57)
rus_col	2.70*	2.75*	1.98*	1.97*	2.89*	1.94	2.03*	0.73	2.30*	2.48*	2.62*	2.56*	3.33*	3.32*	2.56*	2.52*
	(0.91)	(0.92)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.72)	(1.37)	(0.67)	(1.12)	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.74)	(0.75)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)
ukg_col	−0.62	−0.62	−0.93*	−0.94*	−0.84	−0.56	−0.69	−1.41*	−0.59	−0.68	−0.73	−0.71	−0.43	−0.46	−0.68	−0.76
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.78)	(0.43)	(0.65)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.42)
log(imports + 1)	0.49	0.48	−0.07	−0.08	−0.25	−0.11	−0.32*	−0.12	0.25*	0.25*	−0.22	−0.24	0.19	0.20	−0.09	−0.08
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.25)
log(exports + 1)	−0.70	−0.70	0.00	0.01	0.04	−0.02	0.18	0.08	−0.46*	−0.42*	0.37*	0.35	−0.27	−0.27	−0.10	−0.15
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.25)
imports_m	−1.04	−1.08	−0.26	−0.28	−1.30	−0.61	−0.47	−0.47	−0.46	−0.34	1.31	1.19	−0.72	−0.74	0.52	0.47
	(1.79)	(1.79)	(0.92)	(0.92)	(0.92)	(1.67)	(0.95)	(1.78)	(0.94)	(0.93)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.99)	(1.03)
flow2_RUS_m					0.19	−0.03					−0.82	−0.80	0.29	0.32	−0.49	−0.45
					(0.79)	(1.57)					(0.80)	(0.78)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.99)	(1.02)
Americas	−0.17	−0.14	−0.41	−0.40	0.75	−1.17	−0.09	−0.57	0.26	0.19	−0.44	−0.41	0.03	−0.00	−0.34	−0.32
	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.98)	(1.97)	(0.97)	(1.80)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Asia	−2.13*	−2.11*	−2.11*	−2.11*	−1.62*	−1.31	−1.94*	−0.58	−2.42*	−2.50*	−2.32*	−2.33*	−2.79*	−2.74*	−2.19*	−2.09*
	(0.82)	(0.82)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.93)	(0.51)	(0.71)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Europe	−1.47	−1.47	−0.53	−0.54	0.72	0.27	0.14	−0.28	−0.13	−0.21	−1.29*	−1.27*	−1.43	−1.41	−1.64*	−1.58*
	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.95)	(2.03)	(0.58)	(0.98)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Oceania	−14.25	−14.21	−13.64	−13.59	−13.28	−12.45	−12.84	−11.78	−13.71	−13.61	−13.23	−13.27	−13.32	−13.25	−13.50	−13.28
	(738.86)	(738.14)	(755.91)	(756.28)	(754.66)	(1249.47)	(755.23)	(1243.07)	(753.84)	(749.92)	(752.31)	(751.80)	(748.18)	(748.18)	(756.48)	(751.57)
pred_w		−0.09		−0.13		6.69*		5.72*		0.53		−0.19		−0.20		−0.57
		(0.36)		(0.25)		(0.58)		(0.50)		(0.28)		(0.32)		(0.32)		(0.30)
N	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175
AIC	400.72	402.66	500.22	501.97	433.29	150.00	461.56	217.98	469.03	467.39	424.80	426.43	407.76	409.37	418.66	416.77
BIC	644.04	666.25	743.53	765.56	696.88	433.87	704.87	481.57	712.34	730.98	688.39	710.30	671.35	693.24	682.25	700.64
$\log L$	−152.36	−149.33	−202.11	−198.99	−164.64	−19.00	−182.78	−56.99	−186.51	−181.69	−160.40	−157.22	−151.88	−148.68	−157.33	−152.39

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Sponsorship decisions controlled for dependencies II

	ASIA1	ASIA1	ASIA2	ASIA2	GRULAC1	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	GRULAC2	WEOG1	WEOG1	WEOG2	WEOG2	CEIT	CEIT
(Intercept)	−2.04*	−2.04*	−1.04	−1.21	−2.61*	−2.72*	−2.65*	−5.10*	−2.59*	−2.22*	−2.33*	−2.29*	−2.27*	−3.24*
	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.79)	(1.81)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.29)	(0.71)	(0.32)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.27)	(0.53)
log(osv_gov + osv_reb + 1)	0.14*	0.14*	0.11*	0.12*	0.15*	0.17*	0.15*	0.01	0.14*	0.11*	0.12*	0.12*	0.13*	0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
osv_gov_m	−0.05	−0.04	−0.55	−0.48	−0.04	−0.03	−0.16	−1.41	0.09	−0.04	−0.17	−0.18	0.07	−0.10
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(1.08)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.50)
rus_col	2.88*	2.90*	3.64*	3.58*	2.71*	2.62*	2.31*	1.87	2.33*	2.37*	2.30*	2.28*	2.87*	3.14*
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.70)	(1.48)	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.72)
ukg_col	−0.69	−0.74	−0.58	−0.52	−0.53	−0.61	−0.75	0.15	−0.85*	−0.80*	−0.59	−0.59	−0.49	−0.53
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.74)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
log(flow1_ASIA1 + 1)	0.37	0.38	0.21	0.23	0.05	0.06	−0.08	−0.24	−0.02	−0.01	−0.18	−0.18	0.13	0.12
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)
log(flow2_ASIA1 + 1)	−0.44	−0.44	−0.21	−0.24	−0.10	−0.12	−0.08	0.10	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.10	−0.52*	−0.52*
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.20)
flow1_ASIA1_m	3.30	3.30	−1.41	−1.32	0.35	0.36	0.23	−0.30	0.36	0.24	−0.69	−0.70	−2.59	−3.08
	(1.92)	(1.89)	(1.76)	(1.77)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.59)	(1.36)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.65)	(0.65)	(2.87)	(3.37)
flow2_ASIA1_m	−3.80*	−3.89*			0.05	0.05	0.38	−0.06					1.72	2.17
	(1.83)	(1.81)			(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.54)	(1.31)					(2.89)	(3.38)
Americas	−0.27	−0.23	−0.27	−0.35	−0.29	−0.28	−0.41	2.62*	−0.58	−0.60	0.26	0.24	0.32	0.21
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(1.00)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.76)	(0.75)
Asia	−2.77*	−2.85*	−3.38*	−3.43*	−2.34*	−2.34*	−1.94*	−1.09	−2.26*	−2.22*	−2.08*	−2.09*	−2.14*	−1.97*
	(0.77)	(0.79)	(0.88)	(0.88)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.90)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.53)
Europe	−1.69*	−1.71*	−1.33	−1.48*	−1.03	−0.99	−1.22	0.15	−0.77	−0.81	0.01	−0.01	0.50	0.48
	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.72)	(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.81)	(1.45)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.72)	(0.71)
Oceania	−14.95	−14.97	−14.94	−14.87	−13.57	−13.62	−13.32	−12.48	−13.39	−13.34	−13.64	−13.65	−13.93	−14.00
	(670.22)	(675.37)	(752.79)	(751.41)	(755.94)	(755.35)	(754.13)	(1242.40)	(756.49)	(757.27)	(755.78)	(755.73)	(755.87)	(751.64)
pred_w		0.17		0.23		0.22		6.79*		−0.39		−0.05		1.18*
		(0.30)		(0.34)		(0.42)		(0.68)		(0.30)		(0.30)		(0.52)
N	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175	1175
AIC	410.98	412.65	410.41	411.94	422.23	423.95	413.79	163.05	472.02	472.38	446.13	448.10	428.62	423.93
BIC	674.56	696.51	653.72	675.53	685.82	707.82	677.38	446.91	715.34	735.97	689.44	711.69	692.21	707.80
$\log L$	−153.49	−150.32	−157.21	−153.97	−159.12	−155.98	−154.90	−25.52	−188.01	−184.19	−175.07	−172.05	−162.31	−155.97

Standard errors in parentheses
* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Regarding colonial ties we find again that former British colonies are less likely to be the object of a sponsorship decision by any of the UNSC members. Interesting, again, is the fact that by controlling for the interdependencies this colonial tie fails to significantly affect sponsoring decisions by the United Kingdom and the first representative of Latin America. Former Russian colonies, however, are much more likely to be the object of a sponsorship decision by China, Russia, the first represenative of Africa and the Central European representative.

Equally interesting is the fact that imports from a conflict country decrease the likelihood of a sponsorship decision by France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the first representative of Africa and the second for western Europe. When controlling for the interdependencies the effect for France marginally fails to reach statistical significance. Exports, on the other hand, diminish the likelihood of such sponsorship decision for the USA and the representative of Central Europe, but increases it for the first representative from Africa. These latter effects are largely unaffected by the interdependencies that exist among sponsorship decisions.

Table 10: Variance-covariance matrix of multivariate probit

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
CHN	43.895	18.212	0.328	-10.661	-6.267	-5.419	13.927	3.432	-18.093	9.804	0.857	-10.024	1.994	-2.374	-6.956
2	24.922	10.341	5.057	9.612	5.521	5.779	8.892	6.080	11.269	7.577	4.390	7.270	5.321	5.108	8.019
FRN	18.212	25.916	8.354	0.946	8.017	-12.628	4.676	0.016	-1.730	3.249	1.062	-10.323	-16.139	-9.055	-7.498
4	10.341	15.133	6.055	3.830	6.445	9.052	4.629	3.496	4.068	3.039	3.917	8.016	9.671	5.582	6.326
RUS	0.328	8.354	25.771	14.357	-2.339	-10.621	3.756	3.015	7.829	-8.439	3.210	10.313	-1.495	7.556	-4.798
6	5.057	6.055	15.098	9.053	4.707	8.366	4.127	4.003	6.224	6.969	4.466	6.804	3.586	5.519	4.830
UKG	-10.661	0.946	14.357	34.005	2.986	-3.548	6.423	-4.772	-2.160	2.318	13.313	8.230	0.130	6.325	-14.565
8	9.612	3.830	9.053	19.136	3.906	4.960	5.777	5.031	5.639	6.156	8.718	6.381	3.679	5.751	8.406
USA	-6.267	8.017	-2.339	2.986	41.531	21.982	3.830	-13.181	-2.918	-5.734	5.483	5.761	-17.155	-26.193	9.698
10	5.521	6.445	4.707	3.906	23.637	13.150	4.769	8.776	5.003	4.663	5.926	5.068	10.814	17.836	7.586
WEOG1	-5.419	-12.628	-10.621	-3.548	21.982	45.409	17.065	1.473	-6.035	-2.037	-6.217	14.819	6.243	-14.699	10.570
	5.779	9.052	8.366	4.960	13.150	26.074	10.151	4.111	5.519	5.546	7.345	9.616	4.733	11.475	7.513
WEOG2	13.927	4.676	3.756	6.423	3.830	17.065	26.138	9.495	-9.186	3.950	-7.356	3.266	3.808	-2.265	-6.019
14	8.892	4.629	4.127	5.777	4.769	10.151	15.025	5.630	7.454	4.274	6.231	4.817	4.210	4.617	5.007
AFR1	3.432	0.016	3.015	-4.772	-13.181	1.473	9.495	25.644	13.413	5.355	-15.933	-3.460	1.117	6.101	-12.511
16	6.080	3.496	4.003	5.031	8.776	4.111	5.630	14.459	8.014	6.475	10.669	3.991	3.115	5.882	9.676
AFR2	-18.093	-1.730	7.829	-2.160	-2.918	-6.035	-9.186	13.413	33.250	2.563	-2.819	4.569	-8.600	-1.851	-9.423
18	11.269	4.068	6.224	5.639	5.003	5.519	7.454	8.014	19.248	5.253	4.065	5.028	7.839	4.077	6.926
AFR3	9.804	3.249	-8.439	2.318	-5.734	-2.037	3.950	5.355	2.563	42.089	22.572	-4.229	-0.869	-11.246	-32.451
20	7.577	3.039	6.969	6.156	4.663	5.546	4.274	6.475	5.253	23.792	14.622	5.783	5.214	6.283	22.461
CEIT	0.857	1.062	3.210	13.313	5.483	-6.217	-7.356	-15.933	-2.819	22.572	42.750	12.059	2.150	-9.823	-17.536
22	4.390	3.917	4.466	8.718	5.926	7.345	6.231	10.669	4.065	14.622	24.640	7.914	4.987	7.699	11.332
GRULAC1	-10.024	-10.323	10.313	8.230	5.761	14.819	3.266	-3.460	4.569	-4.229	12.059	27.141	10.673	-0.651	4.073
24	7.270	8.016	6.804	6.381	5.068	9.616	4.817	3.991	5.028	5.783	7.914	15.953	7.043	3.493	5.293
GRULAC2	1.994	-16.139	-1.495	0.130	-17.155	6.243	3.808	1.117	-8.600	-0.869	2.150	10.673	25.489	15.045	3.265
26	5.321	9.671	3.586	3.679	10.814	4.733	4.210	3.115	7.839	5.214	4.987	7.043	14.196	9.336	4.228
ASIA1	-2.374	-9.055	7.556	6.325	-26.193	-14.699	-2.265	6.101	-1.851	-11.246	-9.823	-0.651	15.045	30.327	1.671
28	5.108	5.582	5.519	5.751	17.836	11.475	4.617	5.882	4.077	6.283	7.699	3.493	9.336	16.381	3.845
ASIA2	-6.956	-7.498	-4.798	-14.565	9.698	10.570	-6.019	-12.511	-9.423	-32.451	-17.536	4.073	3.265	1.671	43.135
30	8.019	6.326	4.830	8.406	7.586	7.513	5.007	9.676	6.926	22.461	11.332	5.293	4.228	3.845	24.772

Table 11: Bayesian multivariate probit with common effects

	b	s.e.
CHN	-0.743	2.545
FRN	-0.221	2.541
RUS	-0.589	2.542
UKG	-0.378	2.542
USA	-0.254	2.542
WEOG1	-0.420	2.542
WEOG2	-0.540	2.543
AFR1	-0.647	2.543
AFR2	-0.697	2.542
AFR3	-0.698	2.541
CEIT	-0.591	2.540
GRULAC1	-0.662	2.542
GRULAC2	-0.703	2.539
ASIA1	-0.681	2.541
ASIA2	-0.699	2.543
imports	-0.017	0.036
exports	-0.023	0.038
imports missing	-0.065	0.286
exports missing	0.037	0.293
one-sided violence	0.136	0.027
one-sided violence missing	-0.075	0.146
FRN colony	-0.364	0.122
RUS colony	2.061	0.370
UKG colony	-1.028	0.192
Number of battle deaths	0.115	0.035
Number of battle deaths missing	0.647	0.331
year	-0.001	0.001
ongoing conflict	-0.119	0.290
3rd party interventions	-0.037	0.026
number of previous PKO resolutions	0.011	0.016
Americas	-0.173	0.146
Asia	-2.110	0.351
Europe	-0.978	0.228
Oceania	-6.446	4.721
N	1175	

Note: 1000 burnins, 9000 mcmcs

Table 12: Variance-covariance matrix of multivariate probit with common effects

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
CHN	5.480	2.038	0.147	-1.055	-0.882	-0.653	1.480	0.646	-1.612	0.946	0.068	-0.931	0.155	-0.655	-0.862
	1.360	0.649	0.531	0.647	0.581	0.616	0.594	0.481	0.809	0.612	0.571	0.553	0.538	0.682	0.622
FRN	2.038	3.170	0.912	0.050	0.741	-1.095	0.382	0.175	-0.329	0.356	0.259	-0.743	-1.193	-0.990	-0.936
	0.649	0.773	0.414	0.466	0.454	0.583	0.392	0.420	0.568	0.465	0.489	0.502	0.541	0.582	0.547
RUS	0.147	0.912	3.243	1.653	-0.258	-1.330	-0.030	0.658	0.903	-0.735	0.822	0.898	0.162	0.829	-1.427
	0.531	0.414	0.819	0.584	0.529	0.735	0.467	0.489	0.571	0.534	0.547	0.430	0.487	0.505	0.669
UKG	-1.055	0.050	1.653	4.204	0.662	-0.304	0.424	-0.090	0.072	-0.352	1.338	0.931	0.105	0.841	-1.621
	0.647	0.466	0.584	1.054	0.543	0.549	0.473	0.567	0.613	0.634	0.613	0.469	0.482	0.539	0.761
USA	-0.882	0.741	-0.258	0.662	5.092	2.386	0.339	-1.316	-0.989	-0.834	0.430	0.256	-1.385	-1.956	0.833
	0.581	0.454	0.529	0.543	1.257	0.731	0.501	0.686	0.703	0.595	0.553	0.499	0.692	0.854	0.549
WEOG1	-0.653	-1.095	-1.330	-0.304	2.386	5.564	1.902	-0.053	-1.181	-0.264	-0.594	1.367	0.705	-1.572	1.180
	0.616	0.583	0.735	0.549	0.731	1.378	0.630	0.545	0.777	0.514	0.593	0.508	0.507	0.731	0.606
WEOG2	1.480	0.382	-0.030	0.424	0.339	1.902	3.283	1.062	-0.547	0.617	-0.713	0.330	0.353	-0.890	-0.507
	0.594	0.392	0.467	0.473	0.501	0.630	0.799	0.436	0.468	0.453	0.537	0.411	0.434	0.577	0.447
AFR1	0.646	0.175	0.658	-0.090	-1.316	-0.053	1.062	3.361	1.628	0.362	-1.260	-0.103	0.468	0.522	-1.671
	0.481	0.420	0.489	0.567	0.686	0.545	0.436	0.831	0.564	0.525	0.634	0.458	0.444	0.457	0.741
AFR2	-1.612	-0.329	0.903	0.072	-0.989	-1.181	-0.547	1.628	4.170	0.387	-0.341	0.170	-0.573	0.163	-1.302
	0.809	0.568	0.571	0.613	0.703	0.777	0.468	0.564	1.037	0.590	0.592	0.452	0.540	0.537	0.764
AFR3	0.946	0.356	-0.735	-0.352	-0.834	-0.264	0.617	0.362	0.387	5.199	2.474	-0.050	-0.818	-1.900	-2.180
	0.612	0.465	0.534	0.634	0.595	0.514	0.453	0.525	0.590	1.281	0.750	0.492	0.595	0.946	0.848
CEIT	0.068	0.259	0.822	1.338	0.430	-0.594	-0.713	-1.260	-0.341	2.474	5.362	1.609	-0.057	-1.058	-1.592
	0.571	0.489	0.547	0.613	0.553	0.593	0.537	0.634	0.592	0.750	1.346	0.600	0.504	0.604	0.698
GRULAC1	-0.931	-0.743	0.898	0.931	0.256	1.367	0.330	-0.103	0.170	-0.050	1.609	3.242	1.186	-0.066	0.315
	0.553	0.502	0.430	0.469	0.499	0.508	0.411	0.458	0.452	0.492	0.600	0.791	0.495	0.423	0.480
GRULAC2	0.155	-1.193	0.162	0.105	-1.385	0.705	0.353	0.468	-0.573	-0.818	-0.057	1.186	3.207	1.647	0.211
	0.538	0.541	0.487	0.482	0.692	0.507	0.434	0.444	0.540	0.595	0.504	0.495	0.799	0.566	0.541
ASIA1	-0.655	-0.990	0.829	0.841	-1.956	-1.572	-0.890	0.522	0.163	-1.900	-1.058	-0.066	1.647	4.083	0.001
	0.682	0.582	0.505	0.539	0.854	0.731	0.577	0.457	0.537	0.946	0.604	0.423	0.566	1.023	0.608
ASIA2	-0.862	-0.936	-1.427	-1.621	0.833	1.180	-0.507	-1.671	-1.302	-2.180	-1.592	0.315	0.211	0.001	5.213
	0.622	0.547	0.669	0.761	0.549	0.606	0.447	0.741	0.764	0.848	0.698	0.480	0.541	0.608	1.296

Table 13: Strategic QRE estimator with common effects

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
constant	-9.042	2.437	-2.783	0.413	2.173	-3.144	-3.042	-2.679	-2.623	-2.941	-0.014	-2.17	-0.18	-2.804	-4.013
	(0.012)	(NaN)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.058)	(0.092)	(NaN)	(0.069)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.448)	(0.082)
imports	1.489	-0.751	-0.497	-0.909	0.07	0.423	-1.067	0.546	1.367	0.08	0.7	-1.667	2.411	0.654	0.957
	(NaN)	(NaN)	(0.112)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.206)	(0.222)	(0.056)	(0.05)	(0.261)	(0.254)	(0.294)	(0.069)
exports	-1.263	-0.013	0.525	0.457	-0.716	-0.105	1.1	-0.331	-2.029	-0.433	-1.423	1.343	-3.599	-0.775	-0.861
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(NaN)	(0.388)	(0.335)	(0.203)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.545)	(0.032)	(0.089)
rus col	13.46	-0.001	5.003	2.053	3.393	2.76	2.295	3.426	4.554	3.888	3.708	3.489	1.914	4.138	2.82
	(2.747)	(5.763)	(4.924)	(5.227)	(4.73)	(5.711)	(6.219)	(5.563)	(5.148)	(5.56)	(5.241)	(5.067)	(5.624)	(5.729)	(6.152)
ukg col	3.476	-2.03	-1.027	-2.391	-2.445	-1.832	0.612	-1.107	-2.19	0.013	-3.104	-0.7	-3.502	-0.66	0.586
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.08)	(NaN)	(0.005)	(NaN)	(NaN)	(0.129)	(NaN)	(0.002)	(0.055)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.045)	(0.115)
Americas	4.36														
	(NaN)														
Asia	-1.674														
	(0.089)														
Europe	-0.403														
	(0.128)														
Oceania	-6.461														
	(15.361)														
τ	1.54														
	(0.003)														
N	1175														
llik	-3108.429														

Table 14: Strategic QRE estimator

	CHN	FRN	RUS	UKG	USA	WEOG1	WEOG2	AFR1	AFR2	AFR3	CEIT	GRULAC1	GRULAC2	ASIA1	ASIA2
constant	-0.146	-0.045	-0.083	-0.055	0.169	-0.042	-0.28	0.121	-0.212	-0.113	0.119	-0.578	0.265	0.057	0.109
	(NaN)	(0)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(NaN)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
imports	0.249	0.494	-0.027	0.04	0.183	0.555	0.549	0.165	1.183	0.19	0.121	0.29	-0.415	-0.051	-0.149
	(0)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0)	(NaN)	(0)	(0.005)	(NaN)	(0.003)
exports	0.189	0.093	0.245	0.025	-0.556	0.022	0.215	0.241	0.7	0.418	0.208	0.298	-0.192	0.311	0.043
	(NaN)	(0)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0)	(0)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(NaN)
rus col	1.057	0.911	0.977	0.933	0.995	0.915	0.951	0.967	1.04	1.039	0.981	0.976	0.931	1.065	0.932
	(0.525)	(1.02)	(1.414)	(1.96)	(2.574)	(1.077)	(1.495)	(1.708)	(2.058)	(1.916)	(1.52)	(2.49)	(1.652)	(1.592)	(2.158)
ukg col	0.179	-0.1	0.182	0.181	0.328	0.309	0.388	0.504	0.26	0.264	0.792	-0.23	0.49	0.339	0.593
	(0.001)	(0)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(0.003)
Americas	0.365	0.333	0.361	0.321	0.464	0.319	0.338	0.351	0.352	0.324	0.327	0.394	0.431	0.365	0.329
	(0.628)	(0.656)	(1.954)	(1.87)	(4.421)	(0.816)	(0.636)	(1.856)	(1.891)	(1.123)	(1.85)	(1.713)	(2.506)	(1.755)	(2.036)
Asia	0.249	0.494	-0.027	0.04	0.183	0.555	0.549	0.165	1.183	0.19	0.121	0.29	-0.415	-0.051	-0.149
	(0.001)	(0)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0)	(NaN)	(0)	(NaN)	(0.001)	(NaN)	(NaN)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Europe	0.16	0.457	0.441	0.495	0.541	0.247	0.327	0.176	0.04	0.041	0.518	0.23	0.146	0.159	0.048
	(0.644)	(0.352)	(2.807)	(3.076)	(NaN)	(0.494)	(NaN)	(3.147)	(1.952)	(1.76)	(2.13)	(2.395)	(4.274)	(2.992)	(3.626)
Oceania	-2.677	-2.754	-2.652	-2.665	-2.709	-2.671	-2.705	-2.682	-2.754	-2.679	-2.757	-2.721	-2.686	-2.664	-2.693
	(4.034)	(5.515)	(7.87)	(6.985)	(15.144)	(3.311)	(4.706)	(6.243)	(4.863)	(6.771)	(5.554)	(11.91)	(6.063)	(5.361)	(6.719)
τ	3.980														
	(0.003)														
N	1175.000														
llik	-4178.971														

References

Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander and Lotta Themnér. 2017. "Organized violence, 1989–2016." *Journal of Peace Research* 54(4):574–587.

Angrist, Joshua D. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2008. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bailey, Sydney Dawson and Sam Daws. 1998. *The procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barbieri, Katherine, Omar M.G. Keshk and Brian M. Pollins. 2009. "Trading data: Evaluating our assumptions and coding rules." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(5):471–491.

Carnegie, Allison and Christoph Mikulaschek. 2016. "The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars." Paper prepared for presentation at the 9th Annual Conference on The Political Economy of International Organizations, Salt Lake City, January 7-9, 2016.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Gleditsch and Julian Wucherpfennig. 2017. "Predicting the Decline of Ethnic Civil War: Was Gurr Right and For the Right Reasons?" *Journal of Peace Research* 54(2):262–274.

Chiou, Fang-Yi, Simon Hug and Bjørn Høyland. 2017. "Strategic roll call vote requests." Paper prepared for presentation at the General Conference of the European Political Science Association, (Milano, June 2017).

Chiou, Fang-Yi and Wanying Yang. 2008. "Strategic Choices of Roll Call Requests." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL.

Cockayne, James, Christoph Mikulaschek and Chris Perry. 2010. *United Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset*. International Peace Academy (IPI).

Collier, Paul, Lani Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development Policy*. New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Diekmann, Andreas. 1985. "Volunteer's dilemma." *Journal of conflict resolution* 29(4):605–610.

Dorussen, Han. 2014. "Peacekeeping Works, or Does It?" *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 20(4):527–537.

Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94(4):779–801.

Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dreher, Axel and James Raymond Vreeland. 2011. "Buying Votes and International Organizations." Paper prepared for presentation at the conference The Political Economy of International Organizations, ETH and University Zurich, January 2011.

Dreher, Axel, Matthew Gould, Matthew D. Rablen and James Raymond Vreeland. 2014. "The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council." *Public Choice* 158(1-2):51–83.

Eck, Kristine and Lisa Hultman. 2007. "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War. Insights from New Fatality Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2):233–246.

Findley, Michael G. and Tze Kwang Teo. 2006. "Rethinking third-party interventions into civil wars: An actor-centric approach." *The Journal of Politics* 68(4):828–837.

Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, Livia Schubiger, Lars-Erik Cederman and Simon Hug. 2016. "Wartime Patterns of Civilian Abuse." Paper preparted for presentation at the LSE Workshop on State Violence, May 20.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace After Civil and Interstate Wars." *International Studies Review* pp. 97–114.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War." *International Studies Quarterly* 48(2):269–269.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerent?s Preferences after Civil War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fortna, Virginia Page and Lise Morjé Howard. 2008. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature*." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:283–301.

Franzen, Axel. 1995. "Group size and one-shot collective action." *Rationality and Society* 7(2):183–200.

Franzese, Robert J. Jr., Jude C. Hays and Scott J. Cook. 2016. "Spatial- and Spatiotemporal-Autoregressive Probit Models of Interdependent Binary Outcomes." *Political Science Research and Methods* 4:151–173.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2008. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2):89–122.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Stephen John Stedman. 2001. "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" *International Studies Review* 5(4):37–54.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5):615–637.

Goeree, Jacob K., Charles A. Holt and Thomas R. Palfrey. 2016. *Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Stochastic Theory of Games*. Princeton University Press.

Goldstein, Joshua S. 2011. *Winning the War on War*. New York: Dutton/Plume (Penguin).

Greene, William H. 2003. *Econometric Analysis (Fifth Edition)*. New York: Prentice Hall.

Hensel, Paul R. 2014. "ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0." Available at `http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html`.

Hultman, Lisa. 2010. "Keeping peace or spurring violence? Unintended effects of peace operations on violence against civilians." *Civil Wars* 12(1-2):29–46.

Hultman, Lisa. 2013. "UN peace operations and protection of civilians. Cheap talk or norm implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1):59–73.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon. 2013. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):875–891.

Hultman, Lisa and Karin Johansson. 2017. "Responding to Wartime Sexual Violence: UN Peacekeeping and the Protection Agenda." *Global Responsibility to Protect* 9(2):129–146.

King, Gary and Margaret E. Roberts. 2015. "How Robust Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to Do About it." *Political Analysis* 23(2):159–179.

Leemann, Lucas. 2014. "Strategy and Sample Selection: A Strategic Selection Estimator." *Political Analysis* 22(3):374–397.

Maddala, G.S. 1977. *Econometrics*. New York: McGraw Hills.

Marbach, Moritz. 2016. "Refugees and the UN Security Council." University of Mannheim.

Marbach, Moritz. 2017 forthcoming. "Analyzing Decision Records from Committees." *Political Science Research and Methods* .

Marshall, Jeffrey B. 2013. "Free-Riding and the Montreal Protocol: A New Approach for Directly Estimating Strategic Interdependence." Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 2013.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games." *Games and Economic Behavior* 10:6–38.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1996. "A statistical theory of equilibrium in games." *Japanese Economic Review* 47(2):186?209.

McKelvey, Richard D. and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games." *Experimental Economics* 1:9–41.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2005. "Deciding to Keep Peace : An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions." *International Studies Quarterly* 49:529–555.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 2013. "Third-party peacekeeping in intrastate disputes, 1946–2012: A new dataset." *Midsouth Political Science Review* 14(1):103–33.

Peterson, M.J. 2005. *The United Nations General Assembly*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Scharioth, Nicolas. 2010. *Western Democracies in the UN*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

Sievers, Loraine and Sam Daws. 2014. *The procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 93(2):279–297.

Stojek, Szymon M and Jaroslav Tir. 2015. "The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: Trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states." *European Journal of International Relations* 21(2):352–376.

Thierse, Stefan. 2016. "Going on record: Revisiting the logic of roll-call vote requests in the European Parliament." *European Union Politics* 17(2):219–241.

Vreeland, James Raymond and Axel Dreher. 2014. *The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council Money and Influence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.