In her paper “Evaluative Phenomenology” (2014), Michelle Montague argues for an account of evaluative property ascription in emotional experience where self-awareness takes centre stage. Montague argues that in emotional experience we are intentionally aware both of the phenomenal character of the experience and of the object or state of affairs represented evaluatively. Montague then gives the following account of evaluative property ascription: during the emotional experience of, for instance, sadness we are intentionally aware of both the disvalue inherent in the affective phenomenology characteristic of sadness and of the disvalue experienced as inherent in the object or state of affairs. We then notice the resemblance between the intentional contents of the two instances of awareness as both instantiating the disvalue “sad” and we consequently conclude that the close resemblance means that the object instantiates the disvalue “sadness”. In this paper I argue that Montague’s account distorts the evaluative phenomenology of emotional experience due to its inability to account for one of its essential experiential aspects: disclosure. Disclosure refers to the non-inferential ascription of an evaluative property to an intentional object (see Scheler 1973; Goldie 2007). Montague’s account, by contrast, entails an inferential conception of evaluative property ascription as the upshot of a comparison between the intentional contents of the two instances of intentional awareness. Crucially, I argue that Montague is inevitably led to this impasse by her mistaken conception, adopted by other theories of emotion, of self-awareness (see Slaby and Stephan 2008). The sort of self-awareness in play in emotional experience should not be construed as an intentional about-ness directed towards one’s ongoing experience but rather as a non-reflective, phenomenal awareness of the intentional object (Sartre 2004). Thus I suggest that any account of emotional experience that fails to distinguish between these two sorts of self-awareness is phenomenologically deficient.