Nationalism and Multiculturalism: A Strange Brew[1]

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Abstract Endorsing both nationalism (in one of its versions) and multiculturalism, this paper acknowledges tensions between them and speculates on the conditions required to make them compatible. Perry Anderson's theory of the imagined nature of nations, Will Kymlicka's group-sensitive individualism, and Charles Taylor's quasi-communitarian defence of a politics of recognition are taken a offering useful perspectives for this purpose. Cultural attitudes, idiosyncratically labelled "irony" and "chaos," are seen as essential preconditions, as from a structural political-economic point of view are democracy and justice.

A brew (strictly speaking a beer or ale) is strange if its component ingredients either produce an unpalatable drink (this is a failed brew) or surprisingly complement each other to make for a passable beverage (the British Shandy, which mixes ale and lemonade, is an example). The aim of this paper is to suggest two cultural ingredients to the nationalism/multiculturalism mix that, in proper proportions, make it a brew of the second sort. Later in the paper some structural ingredients will be seen to figure in this venture. Most of the examples will pertain to Canada, in part because of its commitment to multiculturalism – indeed, enshrining it in its constitution.[2]

As the term implies, a society is multicultural when its population includes people in demographically significant numbers from several different ethnic backgrounds each with distinctive cultures. In this paper, 'multiculturalism' is used in addition to refer to societies where protection and promotion of minority communities is a matter of government policies. Examples, in increasing levels of ambition, are: recognition of religious holidays; exemptions from otherwise prescribed rules (for instance to permit wearing veils in schools or work places to accommodate Islamic dress codes for women or head coverings for Sikhs); mounting classes as in after school programmes for children of immigrant communities to study their languages and traditions;

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[1] This paper is prepared for the Festschrift, not because Ronnie De Sousa is a beer enthusiast (he rather prefers the finer wines) nor because it engages his best-known research, which is on the emotions, though this does figure in one of the paper's theses, but because it reflects concerns often expressed by him to me (indeed often over wine) regarding problematic aspects of nationalism and multiculturalism in Canada and elsewhere.

[2] Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, added to its Constitution when it was patriated from Britain in 1982, says: 'This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multi-cultural heritage of Canadians.'

permission for and even funding of community-specific schools as alternatives to the main-stream public system; and provision for some civil law cases, as in divorce controversies, to be heard by tribunals of a minority's religious leaders, such as a Rabbi or Imam.

Nationalism has a harmless or even positive sense and a pernicious, negative one. Benignly regarded, nationalism involves the feeling of being comfortable ('at home') in the physical and cultural environments of a person's nation. It also involves taking pride in the positive accomplishments of one's nation or of fellow nationals and feeling shame for objectionable elements within the nation or for deeds destructive to other peoples. Nationalism in a negative sense involves the attitude that someone's nation is superior to other nations and that duties to one's nation override the dictates of ordinary morality – 'my nation right or wrong.' Nationalism in this sense is not just one point of normative and cultural reference. Rather nationalistic identifications override other identifications. The pernicious and the innocuous stances toward nationalism are expressed in John Dewey's reflections:

> Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals. (Dewey 1984 [1927], 157)

> [Nationalism is] a movement away from obnoxious conditions – parochialism on one hand and dynastic despotism on the other….Like most things in the world which are effective, even for evil, nationalism is a tangled mixture of good and bad. And it is not possible to disguise its undesirable results, much less to consider ways of counteracting them, unless the desirable traits are fully acknowledged. (*Ibid.*, 152)

Nationalism in the pernicious sense is in tension if not irreconcilable conflict with multiculturalism. There is also an essential difference between nations and minority ethnicities. I take it that among the defining characteristics of a nation are that it is comprised of people the bulk

of whom share a common language and see themselves as participating in the continuation of traditions inherited from a common history. In addition, a nation, unlike a cultural minority or a geographically dispersed population, is or has the potential to be a state. For instance, when in the 1960s nationalist sentiment began taking hold in Québec, thinking there changed from regarding Canada as comprised of two founding people's (the aboriginal peoples being conveniently forgotten) one of which was francophone with Québec 'at its centre' to the idea of a specifically francophone nation limited just to Québec (thus cutting Francophones in other provinces out of a Canadian Franco community including but not limited to Québec).

Moreover, even when nations are in fact not unique states, there is a tendency for them to become one, and they almost always include sectors that actively strive for this.[1] Such nations also typically have some state-like characteristics. Taking sovereignty as a matter of degree never fully achieved by any state, but approximated to,[2] nations possess 'more' sovereignty within a federated or consociational state than do ethnic groups or other non-national components of the state. Thus, to the annoyance of many in other provinces in Canada, Québec possesses unique powers, for instance, over immigration and language policy and having French-style civil law unlike the common law in the rest of the country.

Because the cultural bases of both nations and the minority groups within them have institutional implications, there is always the possibility of tensions or conflicts. In Canada today, for example, there is resistance, mainly in Québec, to allowing Islamic women wearing veils in official buildings such as courts. In Ontario the government was obliged to resend initial support for Sharia courts in the face of public criticism, thus also distressing many in the Province's Islamic and Orthodox Jewish communities.

How severe these conflicts are depends in part on how strong and widely embraced the majority national culture is. That Canada is often held up as a model of successful multiculturalism

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[1]Charles Taylor's essay 'Why Do Nations Have to Become States?' is pertinent. He argues that nations need not become states, while rehearsing the reasons they are prone to do so. (1993, essay 3)

[2] Charles Beitz does a good job of reviewing senses of 'sovereignty' and showing how no state enjoys complete sovereignty. (1979)

is made possible by the fact that nationalist sentiment is weak in Anglo Canada (that is, in Canada outside of Québec, or CoQ, as it is called by Anglo-Canadian political scientists groping for labels). When there are tensions, a national culture enjoys the advantage of having state or state-like powers at its disposal. It also has this as a burden, since state leaders entrusted with enforcing laws must do so in ways that accommodate all of a population without alienating their national bases. The multicultural/national brew becomes strange in an unpalatable way when tensions take the form of group-based hostilities, discriminatory behaviour, and derogatory stereotypes. In some places, such as in the inner ring suburbs of Paris, violence can even result.[1]

Three reactions to such conflicts or apprehension of them can be seen to be inadequate, despite their popularity in many quarters. These are:

1. *Close the door to immigration for people from minority cultures.* Though called for by some citizens in several countries and attempted by some leaders (usually on the political right), this solution is almost always too late. Many if not most of the world's countries are already populated by people of diverse ethnic origins. But even if it were feasible, there is the problem that there are often good reasons for a state to want to increase immigration as part of an industrial strategy or to confront problems of an aging population.[2]

2. *Weaken multiculturalism.* This approach, to be seen in France and the United States among other places, reduces the policy dimension of multiculturalism mainly to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin. The intended effect of this stance is the erosion of the minority traditions. As no more than a negative right to try to preserve the language, religion, and customs of one's original culture, these things are unlikely to persevere through more than a few generations.

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[1] I discuss the potential for violent conflict in *'*Could Canada turn into Bosnia.*'* (2021)

[2] When a paper on this topic was given in Japan (at Ritsumeikan University in 2008) I found that the main interest in multiculturalism of Japanese scholars was linked to the question of whether Japan should open its doors to much more in the way of immigration where some saw this as essential for addressing an acute aging population problem while others feared that immigrant communities were threats to Japanese culture and potential sources of crime.

The strategy would have the most chance of success if members of minority populations wished to shed their cultures and remake themselves in the culture of the majority population or where they are prepared to acquiesce in the demise of their cultures in order to reap the benefits of whatever has led them to join or remain in the society of the majority. At the same time some from the majority see positive virtues to living in a multi-cultural society, for instance, to avoid the boredom of a culturally homogenous one or as offering windows on other parts of the world. They will not welcome this alternative and nor will most from minority cultures themselves, but if it succeeds it is not an accommodation of nationalism to multiculturalism but erosion of the latter.

3. *Weaken nationalism.* One version of this approach is sceptical of the possibility of benign nationalism. An example in Canada pertaining to Québec nationalism is the approach which was most forcefully pursued by Pierre Elliot Trudeau when he was Prime Minister (1968-79 and 1980-84). In addition to vigorously promoting inclusion of a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the Canadian Constitution, he championed multiculturalism but denied that Québec constitutes a nation. This tack is analogous to the one that weakens multiculturalism, and it faces a similar problem. The implication drawn from Trudeau's stance and bitterly resented by Québec nationalists was an attempt to classify what they considered the Franco-nation of Québec as just one part among others of a Canadian multicultural mosaic. The combination of the historical roots of the Francophone presence in Canada and the state potential of Québec rendered this strategy unrealistic, and it exacerbated strained relations between Franco-Quebeckers and Anglo-Canadians. (A subsequent Prime Minister, an Anglophone Conservative, acknowledged the nationhood of Québec.)

A version of transforming, if not disposing of, nationalism is espoused by some Québec nationalists. This is to support 'civic nationalism' as against 'ethnic nationalism.' The ancestors of these two conceptions are sometimes identified as, respectively, Ernest Renan and Johann Gottfried Herder by current defenders of civic nationalism such as Yael Tamir (1993), David Miller (1995), and contributors to

Couture, ed. (1996). For the civic nationalist the culture of a nation should be thought of primarily as commitment to its principles of political association – in the case of liberal-democratic societies, to civil and political rights. Similar to the weakening of multiculturalism approach, the success of this one would likely mean the end of nationalism *per se*.

Liberal-democratic civic principles have a universalistic and therefore pan- or non-national character. Even if those who claim that liberal principles are in fact expressions of a local European-Protestant-Individualistic culture are right, this does not mean that at least the *pretence* of such principles is that they should apply equally to all individuals independently of their nationality or any other particular association. This approach, therefore, loses contact with nationalism. Miller and Tamir seem to recognize this, as they are not prepared to endorse civic nationalism in the stark sense of Renan. (Those who espouse civic nationalism are, I think, often either non-nationalists or nationalists draping themselves in a civic mantle to advance nationalist causes.)

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I now turn to some theorists whose approaches to nationalism and/or multiculturalism provide useful tools, but by themselves they are still inadequate. Reading their texts is like reading through a cook book for ideas about how to prepare something out of the ordinary – a hopefully successful even if strange brew – rather than finding in any one of them just the right recipe. The cookbooks in question are: *Imagined Communities* by Benedict Anderson (1991), *Multicultural Citizenship*, by Will Kymlicka (1995), and 'The Politics of Recognition,' by Charles Taylor (1994, essay 3).

Anderson convincingly argues that nations are not natural entities, but are constructed out of a variety of contingent historical currents non-essentially connected to one another that include discordant elements and are always subject to change. The coherence and permanence of nations is largely imagined by their inhabitants. One target of this thesis is nationalism in the negative sense, in which one's nation is thought of not only as a natural entity but as specially created by

God or tied to localized blood lines. Calling attention to the historically accidental nature of nations is a good antidote to these ways of thinking, and it opens avenues for transforming national cultures themselves through the integration of immigrant cultures into them. However, nationalists in the general population are not likely to be easily dislodged from their exalted view of their nation, and if they were, this would not by itself eliminate national and cultural minority conflicts since, whatever their origins, once national loyalties become matters of cultural habit, they have real force. The fact that something is constructed does not make it unreal (a chair is not an eternal substance, but one can still sit on it).

Kymlicka's approach is from the direction of liberal individualism. If a liberal is committed to the pluralist principle that individuals should not only be tolerated for pursuing their own goods in their own ways but also helped to do so, then a liberal society should provide requisite resources important among which are the cultural ones embodied in and requiring the continued existence of distinct groups. He thus maintains that the consistent liberal should defend group rights, such as the multicultural entitlements mandated in the Canadian Constitution. Though Kymlicka's stance has led some liberals to label him a communitarian to be ostracized from the individualist camp, his argument reflects a core liberal paradigm insofar as the moral imperative in defense of group rights is to provide individuals with 'horizons of choice.' In turn this supposes that a person's individuality includes as an important characteristic an ability autonomously to decide which of a menu of group-based commitments to make central to his or her life.

Though he does not wish to describe himself as a communitarian, Taylor does not take an individualistic point of view like Kymlicka's as his point of departure. His focus is on already constituted national or other culturally defined groups, which he urges should relate to one another with attitudes of seeking mutual recognition. This means that instead of regarding each other simply as aliens, or worse as threatening aliens, people whose identifications are importantly attached to group cultures should strive sympathetically to understand and where appropriate to learn from the cultures of other groups. As an Anglophone Quebecker, Taylor's concern is prompted by a desire to reduce tensions between Anglophones and Francophones within Québec and between Québec (which, like Kymlicka and unlike Pierre Trudeau, he sees as a national entity) and Canada outside it. Taylor assumes that there is enough commonality among peoples, including

shared moral views respecting such things as basic human rights, that a politics of recognition is possible.

I do not think it is necessary to adjudicate between Kymlicka's individualism and Taylor's quasi-communitarianism to see complementary merit in the recommendations of each perspective from the point of view of the problematic addressed in this paper. At the same time, even a population where there is a propensity to respect group rights and to seek sympathetic understanding may include divisive tensions. Group rights can conflict with each other, as when those claimed by national groups and by sub-national, minority groups are seen by group members as incommensurate. Looking into the heart of another group, someone might come to sympathetic understanding but might also be repulsed by what is seen, thus exacerbating tensions.

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The potential advantages to the orientations expressed by Kymlicka and Taylor, as that of Anderson, are ones that to be reaped must have found their ways into popular culture, but this culture needs yet more ingredients if they are to be taken advantage of. Those ingredients, I now suggest, are *irony* and *chaos*.

In his *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* Richard Rorty describes ironists as those who recognize that their principles for understanding themselves and the world, which he calls their 'final vocabulary,' are not shared by everyone and that there is no way to prove the superiority of their vocabulary over anyone else's. His political aim is to justify liberalism by reference to its potential effect of introducing irony into people's lives in such a way that they can 'imaginatively identify with others' and to this extent feel solidarity with them and want them not to be subject to suffering. This identification is not on the basis of recognizing a shared human nature, which Rorty denies exists, but is made possible by not being blinded by dogmatic ties to one's predominant group loyalties. (1989, chapter 4)

Much of Rorty's book is devoted to criticizing the idea that there must be universal vocabularies and to defending a form of liberalism premised on the recognition of irony rather than

trying to base itself on metaphysical theories of human nature or the like. For the purpose of this paper Rorty's other philosophical views, with which one need not agree, may be set aside to recognize the importance of irony as a component of everyday common sense. From a different philosophical orientation than Rorty's, John Stuart Mill broached a similar idea over a century earlier. One can read a passage from his *On Liberty* as a description of someone lacking a sense of irony:

> [The] world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact: his party, his sect, his church, his class of society…. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissident worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking. (1951 [1869] 106)

Neither Mill nor Rorty claims that to think of oneself ironically is to forego community identifications and loyalties. Rather, irony checks a tendency to consider one's community associations as the only worthwhile ones, so those who lack them are either culpably deficient or suffer the bad luck of not being able to enjoy a fully meaningful life. An ironic stance toward even the things most important to one involves an ability to adopt a critical attitude toward them. It means not taking oneself too seriously, and is often expressed in humour. The title of this paper, 'Strange Brew,' refers to a quite terrible movie starring two Canadian T.V. comics playing the beer-guzzling MacKenzie brothers who deliver themselves of streams of silly commentaries in exaggerated (English) Canadian accents which are all parodies of aspects of Canadian pretenses – moral superiority to Americans, love of moose, beavers, and hockey, producers of superior beer itself, and so on. That their television show skits were very popular among Canadians suggests that they do not take themselves too seriously and are to this extent ironic.

At one of the forums where I advanced this view, some voiced as a criticism that the benefits of irony only result when people are joking about themselves, but they do not spark self-critical attitudes when told by others. I do not take this observation as a criticism, but as an

opportunity to elaborate on the potential benefits of irony. In his discussion of the emotion of mirth, Ronald De Sousa identifies two varieties of those jokes made at the expense of some group or individuals (called 'phthonic' humour by him). In one variety someone is laughing *with* those who are the butt of the jokes and in the other variety they are maliciously laughing *at* them. Irony in Rorty's sense is of the 'laughing with' variety. This form of humour, as De Sousa also argues, depends upon identification with one's community while simultaneously, in a dialectical way, including a sense of alienation from aspects of it. (1987, 289-295)

I shall return to irony after indicating how the word 'chaos' is being used. I take the term from Hesiod's account of a key component in the ancient Greek religion of the earth goddess Gaia:

> Out of Chaos, Erebos and black night came into being; and from night again came Aither and day, whom she conceived and bore after mingling in love with Erebos. And Gaia first of all brought forth the starry Ouranos equal to herself to cover her completely round about, to be a firm seat for the blessed gods forever. Then she brought forth tall mountains, lovely haunts of the divine nymphs who dwell in the woody mountains. She also gave birth to the unharvested sea, seething in its swell. (Hesiod, 1957 [700BC] 24-25)

This mythic cosmology (on one account) addresses a puzzle that faced ancient Greeks about how there could be dawn and dusk instead of either sheer darkness, complete light, or a sudden transition from one to the other. The explanation is that Erebos and Aither stand between a dark earth and a light heaven. The gap that they occupy is chaos, thanks to which heaven and earth are kept from completely exhausting being, and this, in turn, allows Gaia to create individual things (the mountains, nymphs, sea, and so on).

In the realm of human cultural and other group identifications, I take chaos to be a protection against a 'totalizing' tendency that attends them. Totalization occurs when some one group commitment overwhelms all the others, either by casting them out of a person's sense of themselves (so just one of someone's nationality, religion, ethnicity, or class, to take a partial list, is all that matters to them) or by subordinating all identifications to a dominant one in a

homogenous whole. The first of these is exhibited in its extreme form in fanaticism; the second is, to take one example, the bedrock of one form of statist totalitarianism, where nationality, ethnicity, and sometimes religion are fused in service to a state. Religious fundamentalism may take either of these forms.

Irony and chaos are preconditions for taking advantage of the approaches to nationalism and multiculturalism proffered in the theories of Anderson, Kymlicka, and Taylor. I do not mean that once the ingredients of irony and chaos are added to the mix, multiculturalism and nationalism are no longer in tension – they're likely always to be a strange brew. It is doubtful that political macro-problems admit of complete solution, but this does not mean that they cannot be made less severe. There may always be some conflicts among group rights, but when champions of these rights are able to take an ironic attitude toward their groups, they will be less likely to lock themselves into intransigent positions or to see other groups as threats to their very being.

Similarly, fruitful mutual recognition is facilitated when people can appreciate similarities between one another outside the group identifications that call for a politics of recognition, for instance as being of the same profession, class, family situation, etc., even if there are persisting national and cultural minority conflicts. However, such appreciation requires gaps among the various aspects of their identifications, that is, an element of anti-totalizing chaos. Without irony and chaos it is unlikely that people could acknowledge the artificiality (constructed nature) of their nations, much less be prepared to participate in its reshaping to accommodate aspects of minority cultures within it.

How might a society's popular culture come to include irony and chaos? I speculate that the world helps. In today's world nations and transnational cultures (such as religions) become less insulated from one another, populations interpenetrate through migration, and cross-national entertainment media, not to mention the global web. In this situation there can be, and obviously is, a tendency toward fearful panic and a closing of ranks of the sorts most clearly seen in the resurgence of chauvinistic nationalism in many parts of the world and the growth of religious fundamentalisms. Counteracting such things is ground-level information about both similarities and differences across erstwhile national and ethnic divides. It is harder even for Mill's London

Churchman to resist irony in the 21st Century than in the 19th. Of the two tendencies, one would like to think that, though the first one (closing of ranks) has more dramatic immediate consequences (such as the rise of right-wing populism or terrorism), these are outweighed by cosmopolitan effects.

Be this hypothesis as it may, there are also possibilities for those who agree that their own communities would be the better for it were they infused with more irony and chaos to engage in popular-cultural politics to encourage such infusion. For instance, teachers, journalists, political leaders, entertainers, and, dare I suggest it, professors of philosophy are not without resources for communication at a popular-cultural level. In addition, there are ways that irony and chaos can be facilitated.

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So far the argument of this paper has been that the kinds of conceptions and prescriptions articulated by Anderson, Kymlicka, and Taylor along with appropriate policy and institutional implication have the potential to ameliorate tensions between and within nations and minority communities and that irony and chaos in the specified senses are preconditions for this result. I conclude by suggesting some more, now extra-cultural, background conditions that expedite a palatable nationalism/multiculturalism brew, namely, *democracy* and *social justice*.

Democracy refers to ways that groups of people make collective decisions or otherwise take collective actions. Such undertakings are democratic to the extent that all those affected by a joint action are able to play meaningful roles in its undertaking. The aspect of democracy pertinent to this paper is the one identified by Dewey in his tract, *The Public and its Problems*. (1984 [1927], 235ff.) While the starting point of democracy in most theoretical approaches is individuals confronting each other, for Dewey the starting point is publics confronting problems. A public for him is made up of any constellation of people whose actions affect one another over protracted periods of time and who faces persisting problems common to all its members ranging from meeting subsistence needs to such as the provision of cultural amenities, the deployment and containment of technology, or meeting environmental challenges. Publics are not homogenous and

may include groups with conflicting values and interests, but the problems they face are common to all their members, and they call for collective action effectively to be addressed. Public problem solving for him involves a public's recognition of itself *as* a public, that is a public *pour soi*, as well as one *en soi* that confronts common problems calling for joint action whether recognized or not.

Democracy is especially suited to public problem solving. It calls on citizens to submit themselves to collective decision-making procedures (voting, seeking consensus, negotiating compromises, delegation of decision making to representatives, etc.) in spite of their differences, and it has evolved into its modern, liberal form precisely to make this possible. That is, *pace* Carl Schmitt on the political right and (on one interpretation) Rousseau on the left, democracy is pluralistic.[1] Engagement in pluralist-democratic activities requires participants to be tolerant of each other's motivating views, about which they may disagree. Habits of thought and action conducive to such toleration is nurtured in democratic practices and culture, and it is institutionalized in legal and legislative structures. In this way democracy is an important source for normalizing and enforcing chaos.

In keeping with the attraction of paradoxes with which some democratic theorists are enamored, a pessimist might argue that democracy thus conceived presupposes that pluralist-friendly gaps already exist, and to a certain extent this is accurate. Another of Dewey's views pertinent here is that problem-solving is always a self-building process. That elements of a solution to a problem are implicated in means to addressing it is to be expected. The resulting picture is of a spiral, in the current case where germs of chaos, as of irony, make modest democratic ventures possible, which in turn prompts democratic growth, and so on. Like all Pragmatists, Dewey prefered 'pulling one's self up by one's boot straps' metaphors to 'chicken and egg' ones

If democracy facilitates chaos, social justice facilitates irony. By social justice is meant ensuring that members of a society have equal opportunities, and in more robust forms also resources, to pursue meaningful lives (as they variously conceive of them). This is an ideal goal

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[1] A critique mainly of Schmitt's denial of the compatibility of pluralism and democracy is by Chantal Mouffe (1998, chapter 8).

by reference to which public and private policies and institutions are ranked as being more or less just. A minimal requirement is the maintenance of welfare floors such that nobody need fear destitution.

The way that justice facilitates irony is by removing a major impediment to it – anxiety bred of insecurity. When members of a majority confront insecure employment opportunities they may come to resent lower-paid immigrant and other job competitors. When members of an immigrant community are consigned to low-paying, temporary jobs (if they can find work at all) and when their prospects for getting out of an economic ghetto are slight, they realistically conclude that beyond their families, they can count only on the other members of their community for help and support. Since this community is made up of similarly insecure people, its own strength and survival is precarious. Such circumstances are not conducive to adopting self-critical, ironic, attitudes. People in a lifeboat are not prone to make fun of the boat and those rowing it.

The same situation can pertain to national groups. Quebeckers as a whole now enjoy a relatively good standard of living, but it was not always so. In the period leading up to the sovereigntist movement (that is from the military conquest of Québec by England in 1759 until well into the 20th Century) living standards were low especially for its Francophones, who were, moreover, mainly obliged to work for firms owned by Anglophones in and, largely, outside of the province. Few observers doubt that this played a significant role in the stronger manifestations of Québec nationalism.

Removing insecurity does not always or automatically cause closed-group identification to yield to irony, and there are no doubt other sources of such identification than economic insecurity. Religious fundamentalism among middle class people in the United States, for instance, seems to be nurtured by something like suburban alienation. But it is not the claim of this paper that there is a guaranteed recipe for a palatable brew of nationalism and multiculturalism or, indeed, any other problematic social mix. I hope that nonetheless I have identified at least some of its ingredients.

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