

## MARKERS OF DERIVED ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND PARADOXES OF SPEECH ACT MODIFIERS

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### INTRODUCTION

In this paper I want to reexamine some facts about speech acts which have been associated with the notorious performative hypothesis (Ross 1970, Sadock 1969, 1974). The implications of these facts seem to be ignored, perhaps because the performative hypothesis of the late 1960s has been vociferously attacked since then. I find it somewhat strange that this particular aspect of Generative Semantics aroused such scorn and derision, since it was really an attempt to formalize the speech act theory worked out programmatically in Austin (1962, 1963), and more systematically in Searle (1969) and to integrate it into a syntactic and semantic theory which allowed abstract elements. This sort of theory seemed ready-made for phenomena of the sort found in the study of speech acts : for example, the notion of associating illocutionary force with question or imperative sentence form. Still more curiously, the results of considering the linguistic aspects of speech acts have not found their way into the grammar in some other form, unlike, for example, the lexical relations among causative, inchoative and simple verbs which have more recently been expressed in terms of meaning postulates (Montague grammar) or semantic interpretation rules and lexical rules (EST).

It is not my purpose to argue for the Performative Hypothesis, or for any other theory of the era 1968; if only because it has been shown that many supposedly semantic facts have an explanation in terms of Gricean implicature (Grice 1975). But I do want to argue that there is still a need for a responsible linguistic theory of speech acts. The disappearance from the scene of the performative hypothesis has basically been followed by negative progress, as much that was found out has been declared irrelevant or non-facts.

I want to review here briefly some of the facts which have been taken by many writers (including Sadock 1969, Davison 1975 and Anscombe 1980) as linguistic evidence regarding the nature of indirect speech acts. The categories of evidence include :

- a) how an indirect speech act is reported, in accordance with its conveyed force, rather than the force suggested by its surface form;
- b) the adverbial modifiers that co-occur with indirect speech acts, and whether there are co-occurrence restrictions between the conveyed illocutionary force rather than surface force; and
- c) the content and form of the surface speech, and what illocutionary acts may be conveyed.

These factors have been used to distinguish between three categories of speech acts,

- (i) direct speech acts, exemplified in (1) and (2);
- (ii) conventional indirect speech acts, exemplified in (3); and
- (iii) implicated speech acts, exemplified in (4) :

- (1) *I request you to come tomorrow at 9.*
- (2) *Come tomorrow at 9.*
- (3) *Could you come tomorrow at 9 (?)*
- (4) *The money will be available tomorrow at 9.*

(1) - (3) would be described as requests, (4) as a statement implicating a request. Adverbial modifiers co-occur with (1) - (3) and not with (4). The form in (3) is conventionally associated with requests, while (4) can be used to convey many different illocutionary acts besides a request, a promise, a prediction, a threat, an order, a suggestion, a decree, etc. (1) has a specific illocutionary prefix *I request*, which unambiguously marks it as a request. The form of (2) marks it as a member of a class of acts, orders, requests, advising, suggesting, etc. I will return to specific details about combinations of these factors in later sections.

#### THE RELATION BETWEEN PERFORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE USES OF VERBS

According to Gazdar (1979, 30-31), the performative analysis of speech acts (eg. Ross 1970 and Sadock 1974) requires that felicity conditions be identified with truth conditions. If the felicity conditions

on requests as speech acts are also truth conditions, of both the performative and non-performative uses of the verb *request* and instances of *request* should entail propositions representing truth conditions.

- (5) *John requested Harry to come to the party.*
- (6) *John wanted Harry to come to the party.* (sincerity condition)
- (7) *John attempted to get Harry to come to the party.*  
(essential condition)

In Gazdar's view, if performative verbs entail their felicity conditions, as truth conditions, then (5) should entail (6) and (7). If so, then sentences like (8) should be contradictory, in which the *because* clause states a purpose (desire and attempt) exactly the opposite of the one suggested by the main clause.

- (8) *John requested Harry to come to the party, because it was the only way he knew of to get Harry not to come to the party.*

Yet (8) appears not to be contradictory, or rather, it is possible to see how John might accomplish one goal by purporting to accomplish the opposite goal. Semantic entailment thus does not relate (5), (6) and (7).

Let us look more closely at this argument, which is cited by Newmeyer (1980, 215) as a telling piece of evidence against the performative hypothesis (though actually it is an argument against a number of diverse analyses of speech acts proposed by Searle 1969, Lewis 1970, Stampe 1975, etc.). The crucial examples given here (5) - (8) are not instances of performative verbs used performatively. Rather they are past-tense descriptions in the third person of an act of requesting. It is irrelevant for this case whether the actual act of requesting is including explicit mention of the verb *request*, though it might be if we were concerned about the truth and felicity conditions of a request uttered in a sentence with the imperative form.

If we added the *because* clause to either form of request, we would find that the combination sounds very contradictory indeed :

- (9) \* *Come to the party, because it's the only way I can get you not to come to the party.*
- (10) \* *I request you to come to the party, because it's the only way I can get you not to come to the party.*

Thus it seems that the *performative* use as opposed to the *descriptive* use of a verb like *request* does entail that the speaker wants the hearer to do the act mentioned, and is making an attempt to cause the hearer to do the act. In fact, it is essential for the success of the plan mentioned in (8) for dealing with the kind of person who can be counted on to do the opposite of what people request. In order to get Harry to act in this perverse way, John must get Harry to believe that he (John) is really inviting him to the party. If Harry perceives that John is not really requesting him to come, then he might come after all. If there were any possibility that requesting does not constitute an attempt to get someone to do the act named under some circumstances, then in this scenario Harry would have the option of ignoring the inference or whatever it might be that John is trying to get him to come to the party. Yet this does not seem plausible.

If performative uses of performative verbs or interrogative form, or declarative form do not have entailments upon which inferences can be based, there is no firm basis for the connection which has been seen between the literal content and form of indirect speech acts and the illocutionary acts which they convey. If requests do not have the entailments in (6), (7), then there is no explanation for the fact that asserting the sincerity condition (14) or questioning the preparatory condition (15) may convey a request (Searle 1969, 68), formalized as conversational postulates (Gordon and Lakoff 1971).

- (11) *Shut the door.*
- (12) *Speaker want hearer to shut the door.* (sincerity)
- (13) *Speaker believes hearer is able (will be able) to shut the door.* (preparatory)
- (14) *I'd like you to shut the door.*
- (15) *Can you shut the door ?*

In a later treatment of indirect speech acts (Searle 1975), it is claimed that utterances such as (14), (15) can be correctly interpreted as indirect requests with normal deductive processes and a knowledge of what the grammatical forms means, without special constructs such as syntactic idioms, postulates, etc. If so, then semantic information about what *request* must mean has to be accessible in order to match it with what (14) and (15) mean.

Stampe (1975) makes much the same point about explicit and inexplicit versions of the same speech act. It is possible for a speaker of English to interpret (16) as a promise, by virtue of knowing what *promise* means, (17) entailing (18) - (20).

- (16) *I'll be in the office at 9.*
- (17) *I promise to be in the office at 9.*
- (18) Future Act A of speaker (propositional condition).
- (19) Counts as an undertaking on the part of the speaker to do A (essential condition).
- (20) Speaker intends to do A (sincerity condition).

Thus a speaker of English who understands the meaning of *promise* can match a statement of a future act in the first person as being part of a promise, the propositional condition, and interpretable as a sincerely stated undertaking about a future act. Here Stampe is arguing inexplicit speech acts are interpretable in exactly the same way as explicit speech acts which contain an illocutionary force indicating device which specifies the illocutionary force of the utterance. His point is that the performative prefix which makes *clear* what the illocutionary force is is not what *constitutes* the illocutionary force of an utterance. A most convincing point here is that his account explains why many if not most commonplace speech acts lack performative prefixes. If the prefix, or illocutionary force indicating device of Searle 1969, were necessary to constitute the speech act, instead of just making it unambiguous, either one has to resort to abstract performative verbs, later deleted, or to claiming that most common speech acts are defective and without indications of illocutionary force. (If Gazdar wanted to deny that speech acts have consistent entailments, he would therefore be arguing indirectly for the abstract performative analysis, for (14), (15) and (16), since he would have defined the meaning of speech acts as totally context dependent and ungeneralizable. Hence Stampe's alternative would not be available as a means of connecting different surface forms with the same conveyed illocutionary force).

To return to the discussion of what makes performative uses appear to be different from descriptive uses is a pragmatic fact. In performative uses like (15) and (16), the hearer and addressee of the utterance has to construct an interpretation on the assumption that the

speaker has performed at that moment a volitional act which does not conflict with anything known in the context of discourse up to then. Thus the interpretation of a speech act must be based on both semantic information, the meaning of the words used and the speech act indicated by the words and sentence form, as well as pragmatic information consisting of information about the cotext, moment of utterance, participants in the speech act, etc., and assumptions about volitionality and possible plans the speaker may have in mind.

Though the description of speech acts cannot be wholly pragmatic (as Gazdar's final point seems to imply (1980, 35)), it is hardly new to claim that some part of the interpretation of an utterance involves contextual information (Stalnaker 1972, 1978). In some interesting research where speech acts are modelled in the same way as actions, involving plans and goals in both cases, it is demonstrated that interpretation of indirect speech acts depends either on the conventional use of form or on the existence of shared plans, and on the ability to perceive how a speech act may fit into a larger overall plan (Perrault and Allen, forthcoming, Cohen and Perrault 1979 and Cohen and Levesque 1980). Thus a speaker can understand (15) either as a conventional way of making a request, and interpret it as such, or as a literal question which is part of a plan to find out if the preparatory condition for a request does hold. A cooperative addressee can then anticipate the outcome of this plan by responding directly to the request.

The absence of contextual knowledge about whether the speech act of (5) really was a volitional act, not contradicted by other contextual circumstances, may explain why a past-tense report is understood somewhat differently from a request performed, as it were, before one's very eyes. There are other factors as well. Note that the use of another conjunction than *because* also introduces contradiction.

- (21) \* *John requested Harry to come to the party (and)*  
*he didn't want Harry to come to the party.*
- (22) \* *John requested Harry to come to the party but in*  
*doing that he wasn't attempting to get Harry to come*  
*to the party.*
- (23) \* *John requested Harry to come to the party, since it*  
*was the only way he knew of to get Harry not to*  
*come to the party.*

*And* and *but* are connectives which preserve the truth values of their conjuncts, except under specific circumstances (Karttunen 1973, Gazdar 1980), while *since* presupposes (entails) the truth of its complement. *Because* may but does not necessarily preserve the truth value of its complement (Fodor 1977, 38). Hence (8) may receive the interpretation in which the purposes inferrable from requesting do not contradict some larger plan of which the request is a part. The overall purpose and the purpose which the speaker represents himself or herself as having are contradictory, however. While this is the case, the lack of contradiction is more a fact about connectives in English than about the meaning of *request* in its descriptive use.

One of the objections to the notion that performative uses are somehow distinguished in meaning from descriptive uses is that it introduces multiple truth values - felicity conditions versus truth conditions - and requires some special mechanism for interpreting what seems to be one and the same verb in two different fashions. Descriptive uses are somewhat different from performative uses. Under negation, performative verbs do not presuppose their felicity conditions, nor do felicity conditions get cancelled except in negative implicative contexts such as *try to, not manage to* (Davison 1973). Negation conveys that no act of that description took place, if used in non-contrastive sentences. Denial of felicity conditions creates a description of a deviant or contradictory act, as different from a case of cancelling a conversational implicature as from a combination of negation and a verb like *regret*. Hence we may safely assume some semantic content for performative verbs, closely related to the classic conditions described in Searle (1969), omitting possibly only the 'non-obvious' conditions as general properties and not specific conditions on individual illocutionary types.

#### SYNTACTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MODIFIERS AND SPEECH ACTS

Another claim which has been fiercely attacked involves a syntactic and semantic relation between adverbial modifiers and speech acts themselves, not their propositional contents. Case include :

- (24) *Frankly, this argument is getting boring.*
- (25) *Frankly, what are the chances of another snowstorm ?*
- (26) *I literally don't have a cent at the moment.*

*Frankly* describes the speaker's attitude towards the message or the expected answer, and *literally* indicates that the contents of the statement are exactly accurate.

In (24) - (31), adverbial clauses refer to the speaker's attitudes towards the felicity conditions of the speech act, its position in discourse, and its relation to the addressee's knowledge and attitudes.

- (27) *If I remember correctly, Key to the Mint came in second in the 1974 Derby.*
- (28) *If you don't know already, the proposal is due on February 23rd at 2 p.m.*
- (29) *To make a long story short, we found the corkscrew in the refrigerator.*
- (30) *If I may say so, this argument is getting boring.*
- (31) *To continue, we next looked in the garbage for the corkscrew.*

Not that these adverbial modifiers all consist of subordinate clauses, introduced by subordinating conjunctions or the purpose infinitive. What these examples all have in common is the fact that the adverbials make little if any sense if interpreted as ordinary modifiers of the contents of the speech act.

Like the notion that the felicity conditions of performative verbs are equivalent or identical to their truth conditions, these apparently anomalous modifiers have respectable antecedents in ordinary language philosophy. Just as the notorious performative analysis followed very closely the conclusions of Austin (1962, 1963) and Searle (1969), so the analysis of the *if* clauses like the ones above was suggested in a paper by Austin (1956 (1970), 210, 213).

- (32) *There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.*
- (33) *I paid you back yesterday, if you remember.*

Austin notes that these uses of *if* are odd in that they are not paraphrasable as other uses of *if* are, and in particular do not undergo contraposition. But Austin, and Ducrot in discussing similar examples in French (1972, 175-6), assume that these sentences are well-formed and interpretable under some standard or derived characterization of the meaning of the conditional. For example, the *if* clause in (32) defines the conditions

under which the hearer might find the asserted information relevant; the conditional in (33) expresses one reason why the hearer might believe the speaker, namely that the hearer already knew the information.

Adverbials such as these have a use : they allow a distinction to be made among indirectly made speech acts. A request such as (34) may be modified by various *if* and reason clauses :

- (34) *Shut the door, if you wouldn't mind.*
- (35) *if you can manage it.*
- (36) *because it's cold in here.*
- (37) *since you are the closest to it.*

The request to shut the door may also be made by uttering various other speech acts which do not have the overt form of request, that is, are not imperatives, or do not contain the performatively used verb *request* :

- (38) *Would you shut the door ?*
- (39) *Can you shut the door ?*
- (40) *Are you able/willing to shut the door ?*
- (41) *I'd like you to shut the door.*
- (42) *I am desirous of your shutting the door.*
- (43) *It's cold in here.*

But not all of the above forms allow the same range of adverbial modifiers exemplified in (44) - (47) :

- (44) *Could you shut the door, because it's cold in here.*
- (45) ??*Would you be able to shut the door, because it's cold in here.*
- (46) *Would you shut the door, since you're closest to it.*
- (47) \* *It's cold in here, because you're closest to it.*

There is some principled distinction between overt requests and conventional requests on the one hand, and implicated requests on the other.

The reason *why* such co-occurrences are of interest is that the adverbial modifiers seem to make reference to felicity conditions or reasonableness conditions on speech acts. The differences demonstrated between (44) and (45), (46) and (47), would therefore be indicative of differences in actual illocutionary force. But the adverbials also form a class of facts which can be interpreted as evidence for the presence at some deep syntactic/semantic level of a performative sentence or some

other marker of illocutionary force. The argument goes as follows : adverbials are modifiers of syntactic constituents. But in cases such as (27) - (31), there is no constituent in the speech act itself, not even the whole sentence, which the adverbial seems to modify. The sentence nevertheless is a well-formed, interpretable combination of modifier and something. We would like to assume only one class of adverbials and conjunctions which take subordinate clauses. Therefore, the adverbials modify the speech act as a whole.

Certain writers who reject the performative hypothesis have tried to reduce the status of sentences like (27) - (31) to that of non-facts, or at least non-significant facts. K. Bach and R. Harnish, who reject 'ordinary usage' as evidence for or against theoretical representations of words and sentences in English (1979, 122), characterize sentences such as (48) as ungrammatical but acceptable in some pragmatic, but undefined, way.

(48) *Since you're so smart, what's the answer ?*

"Thus a locution that violates grammatical rules (my emphasis AD) need not be regarded as grammatical just because it can be used with identifiable illocutionary intent" (1979, 232). Whatever course may be open to philosophers or psychologists, linguists cannot do research with the rules of grammar defined in advance, and decide arbitrarily what occurring, acceptable sentences of the language to ignore. Bach and Harnish, however, have decided that sentences like (48) are just "syntactic liberties" taken with the language, on a par with sentences such as, which seem to involve semantic and pragmatic liberties :

(49) *I blew my hooter (horn) but it would not work  
because it had been stolen.*

(50) *Coming home I drove into the wrong house and collided  
with a tree I haven't got.* (Cited in Bach and Harnish 1979, 232).

These accident reports, by the (apparently dazed) drivers, seem ludicrous and in some sense unintended - performance errors - while (27) - (31) are normal and subject to rules, some of which will be described in this section.

The existence of modifiers not apparently connected with the propositional contents of an utterance therefore cannot be denied. What may be denied is that such modifiers argue for the actual presence of an

abstract performative sentence in the speech act. But in any case, the constraints on form, occurrence and interpretation of these modifiers must be accounted for in some perspicuous way.

One of the facts which must be explained is the existence of two readings for an adverbial, as in (51) :

(51) *I am going to Japan (,) because the fortune teller said so.*

In one reading, the speaker is going to Japan because she was (previously) told by the fortune teller that she should go to a foreign country, and she chose Japan; while in the other, the speaker announced that she will go to Japan, and the basis for believing that this will occur is the prediction of the fortune teller. If there is just a single syntactic relation between the adverbial clause and the main clause, the existence of two readings is not easily explained in the context of the Chomskyan grammatical tradition, in which ambiguities are explained as the result of derivations proceeding from distinct initial phrase markers (Chomsky 1965).

J.R. Davison (1973) notes that reason adverbials in particular show ambiguities of interpretation which are not related to a performative/proposition distinction of what is modified. These include a sort of lexical ambiguity : *because* may be interpreted as "in order to" or "as a result of", depending on background knowledge of the discourse context, general knowledge, and the presence of other information within the utterance (eg. *conjecture* vs. *report*). Clearly, information from context may provide a very full or disambiguated interpretation of the intended meaning of a sentence; and not every ambiguity can be resolved by appeal to illocutionary force. Nevertheless, contextual information alone is not sufficient to explain differences of form and interpretation in sentences with adverbial modifiers.

For instance, the *if* clause in (52) in English is ambiguous between the reading paraphrased in (53) and the one paraphrased in (54) :

(52) *If you need me, I'll be at home all afternoon.*

(53) *I will be at home all afternoon so as to be available if you need me.*

(54) *This information may be of relevance to you. I will be at home all afternoon.*

The *if* clause in the (54) reading, like Austin's sentence (32), seem to modify the speech act, rather than the propositional contents.


In German, there are two possibilities of word order in the main clause, corresponding to two interpretations of the role of the *wenn* clause :


(55) *Wenn du mich brauchst, bleibe ich den ganzen Nachmittag zu Hause.*

(56) *Wenn du mich brauchst, ich bleibe den ganzen Nachmittag zu Hause* (M. Vuillaume, cited in Cornulier to appear).

The word order in sentence (55) is normal if the preposed adverbial clause is part of what is asserted, and modifies the statement as a *reason* or *motive* for staying at home. The abnormal, uninverted word order in (56) seems to imply that the preposed adverbial is not part of what is stated, that it does not modify any part of the main clause, and that it is not as closely 'in construction' with the main clause as the *wenn* clause in (55). The structure then suggests the interpretation that the adverbial clause expresses a reason for making the statement to that particular addressee, the one who might be in need of the information about the speaker's whereabouts.

The two interpretations of (52) and the two forms of (55) and (56) can be explained by postulating two syntactic relations for the adverbial clauses, one in which the clause is associated with the main clause, or some constituent of it, and the other in which it is in a syntactic construction with some higher order constituent. Of course, this higher constituent need not be an abstract sentence with a performative verb in it. It could be moved by a general movement rule into the TOPIC node dominated by  $\bar{S}$  (Elisabet Engdahl, p.c.), though I find the application of some rule such as "Move NP" to a subordinate clause to be something of an *ad hoc* analysis. Two possibilities are represented schematically below :





At any rate, it seems that there is a sufficient number of ways to represent a *linguistic* relation, syntactically and semantically, between the adverbial clause and the assertion it is combined with.

For the German example, the inversion rule would not apply to either of the above structures because the adverbial which is preposed is not closely enough 'in construction' with the main clause. The conditional would receive the interpretation of a speech act modifier under the same conditions.

There must be a linguistic rather than pragmatic relation between adverbial clause and the rest of the speech act it modifies. In an obscure paper (Davison 1975a), I pointed to a similarity between speech acts with modifiers (as well as indirect speech acts) and sequences of speech acts in discourse, one of which had an anaphoric relation to the other. For example, the hedge on the reasonableness of asserting an uncomplimentary remark may also be expressed as a separate sentence :

- (59) *If I may say so, that dress isn't very becoming to you.*
- (60) *May I say something (tactless/critical/unpleasant) ?*  
*That dress isn't very becoming to you.*
- (61) *To make a long story short, it turned out that*  
*Henry had no intention of coming to the party.*
- (62) *I'll make this short. It turned out Harry had no*  
*intention of coming to the party.*

Note that what precedes (or follows) has an anaphoric word in it, such as *this*, *the following*, *something*, etc. which refers to the adjacent speech act. One could therefore argue that the adverbial modifiers mentioned in connection with speech acts do not really have a *sentential* connection with the speech act they modify. Rather they just have some kind of pragmatic connection, as in the two-sentence paraphrases given above

in (60) and (62). Under this analysis, no special account would have to be given for single sentence combinations of speech act and modifier : they would be interpreted by the 'same' rules as for adjacent speech acts in discourse, ignoring differences of syntactic structure and the presence or absence of overt anaphoric expressions like *this, so, etc.*

There are syntactic requirements, however, for the occurrence of *so* and *it*. The anaphoric expressions may always follow their antecedents, but if they precede, they must also be linguistically connected with the constituent containing the antecedent. The connective may be either subordinating or coordinating, but it must be there :

- (63) *The Governor is resigning. John told me so/it.*
- (64) *John hasn't said so, but he's planning to leave.*
- (65) \* *John hasn't said so/it. He's planning to leave, however.*
- (66) *If I may say so, that dress isn't becoming.*
- (67) \* *May I say so ? That dress is not very becoming.*

Hence, for a certain class of alleged speech act modifiers, a pragmatic connection is not sufficient to explain their well-formedness and interpretation. The conditions for the coreference of *so* and a following antecedent require reference to a linguistic and not just a pragmatic connection, even though explicit linguistic expression of connection and pragmatically inferred connection are sometimes very similar (cf. Schmerling 1975).

Mittwoch (1977) proposes that adverbials of the type discussed in connection with speech acts are base generated as part of the sentence (propositional contents) with which they are combined. She proposes a linguistic connection, but no syntactic differentiation of speech act modifiers from sentence or constituent modifiers. The interpretation of a modifier as a modifier of the speech act is derived by a strategy of interpretation which is at least in part based on contextual knowledge : "(a) find a logical connection between the meanings of the two clauses...; (b) or as second best, find a logical connection between the meaning of the adverbial clause and the preparatory or sincerity condition of the speech act made by uttering the main clause" (1977, 188). This strategy of interpretation would therefore be no different from a pragmatic strategy relating sentences in discourse.

Yet it also resembles a straightforward compositional semantic procedure of interpretation which would derive two interpretations of purpose or reason adverbials, or rather parsing procedures that can assign the adverbial to the lower or higher sentential constituents, with resulting differences of semantic interpretation :

(68) *John said that Harry didn't sign his request in order to make trouble.*

(69) *I thought that you didn't have any money because you forgot to cash a check.*

Mittwoch's strategy works for assigning interpretations both within a sentence and between a main clause as speech act, and its modifying adverb. Hence it ought to work for deeper degrees of embedding within the propositional contents of the speech act, just like a semantic rule. It ought to be able to supply more than one reading for (68) and (69) above, and to apply both to case (a) as well as case (b), to describe the ambiguity of (52). Since case (b) is a default case, a second best option, it is only available, in Mittwoch's statement of it, when case (a) is not. Yet we have seen that the facts are otherwise.

Mittwoch's statement of the strategy of interpretation also makes no allowance for subtleties of interpretation of *because* when it is preposed, depending on whether it is interpreted as modifying the speech act or its propositional contents. J.R. Davison noted an ambiguity of descriptive uses of *because*, as cause or as motivation.

(70) *Fred howled outside the door because he wanted to come in* (cf. J.R. Davison 1973, 14).

That is, Fred howls because he was not let in, or because he wants to let his owners know that he wants to come in. With *because* as modifier of performative verbs, there is another reading, equivalent to *since*, approximately the same as 'given that', 'it follows from', as in (71) :

(71) *Since all the beer has disappeared from the refrigerator, John has returned from his trip.*

The *since* clause gives the evidence for the truth of the asserted proposition, the grounds on which the speaker bases his or her belief in the asserted proposition, implying that the felicity conditions on the assertion are met. The reason clauses do not give a motive for speaking, either as

purpose or impelling cause, nor a cause for the state of affairs in the assertion. Yet if *because* is substituted for *since* or *as* in preposed clauses, the only readings are the cause/motive ones, not the ones referring to the felicity conditions.

(72) *Because all the beer has disappeared from the refrigerator, John has returned from his trip.*

This sentence, unlike (71) above, conveys John's motives for returning, if he were strictly against the presence of alcohol in the house. It does not express the speaker's grounds for belief. Likewise, the reason clause in (73) expresses the speaker's qualifications for confirming appointments, while in (74) it expresses, somewhat oddly, the speaker's motive for confirming an appointment :

(73) *Since I am the representative of the Governor, I hereby confirm your appointment as Game Warden.*

(74) *Because I am the representative of the Governor, I hereby confirm your appointment as Game Warden.*

Whatever procedure must be included in the grammar for interpreting modifiers, it must be able to make reference to distinctions of interpretation outlined above, ones which are dependent on what is modified, with which lexical items, and in what syntactic position.

Direct reference to illocutionary force, rather than just performatives verbs, is necessary, since the use of an adverbial in case of reported speech acts allows only the cause/purpose reading (Davison 1973) :

(75) *Edith asserted that John had returned, because/since all the beer had disappeared from the refrigerator.*

(76) *Mabel confirmed my appointment as Game Warde, because/since she was the representative of the Governor.*

It is also necessary to distinguish performative from non-performative uses in discourse sequences. Mittwoch uses the following non-equivalence between discourse sequences and single utterances as evidence against the performative hypothesis. She proposes that (78) should be just as acceptable as (77), if the performative hypothesis is correct and modifiers modify the speech act in both cases. Yet (78) is strange.

(77) *Your breath smells. I tell you this since (because) I am your friend (cf. I'm telling you this AD).*

(78) \* *Your breath smells, since I am your friend* (1977,185).

The odd combination in (78) results from the fact that the reason clause does not express grounds for the asserted proposition being true, or why the hearer does not already know it. The discourse sequence in (78) has the interpretation of the *descriptive* use of *tell, telling this*, that the reason clause expresses a motive for speaking, for asserting an unpleasant fact. It has this interpretation only because it modifies a verb not used performatively. So the example, while relevant and of interest in an account of meaning, does not bear directly on the presence of a representation of illocutionary force in (77). It certainly is not an argument falsifying the performative hypothesis.

In this section, I have noted various facts about adverbials and meaning or illocutionary force (or both) which need to be accounted for linguistically, though surely with some pragmatic information as supplement. It is not necessary to do away with these facts in some way in order to argue against the performative hypothesis, nor is it necessary to represent them with the performative hypothesis. There are no doubt any number of ways of representing linguistic connections between lexical material, syntactic configurations and indicators of illocutionary force. In any case, the restrictions and meaning differences noted here are exceedingly useful in investigating the 'real' nature of speech acts whose form is indirectly related to their illocutionary force.

#### SPEECH ACT MODIFIERS AND INDICATORS OF DERIVED ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

In this section I will note certain similarities between adverbial modifiers which have been taken as modifiers of illocutionary acts, and the conventional forms which indicate derived illocutionary force. I will discuss them in relation to a problem of semantic interpretation of speech acts and their modifiers, described as an unresolvable paradox in Boër and Lycan (1977). The principal reason I want to discuss it here is that it concerns crucially the relation between the conveyed illocutionary force of a speech act and various devices which serve to specify intended illocutionary force. In the process, it will be possible to summarize some of the results of the preceding sections and make specific statements about meaning relations and their consequences.

The paradox of Boér and Lycan (1977) may be summarized briefly as follows.

(1) It is assumed that meaning is defined in terms of truth conditions. But as Austin (1962) points out, illocutionary acts are not evaluated in terms of truth or falsity. The contents of a speech act, its propositional contents, may be interpreted in terms of truth conditions, but the part of the sentence which indicates the illocutionary force of the utterance (performative prefix, syntactic form, etc.) is evaluated in terms of felicity or infelicity. Adverbials of the kind just discussed, illustrated in (79) - (82) below, are not part of the propositional content of the speech act :

- (79) *Frankly, what are the chances of our getting there on time ?*
- (80) *It was literally covered with gold and jewels.*
- (81) *In conclusion, much research is needed on this vitally interesting topic.*
- (82) *Since the candidate has emerged smiling, the thesis defense has been successfully passed.*

They are assumed to be modifiers on the speech act, yet are not part of it. So they cannot be interpreted either in terms of truth conditions, like the propositional contents, nor in terms of felicity conditions, like the indicators of illocutionary force. Yet clearly they contribute to the sum total of meaning which is conveyed linguistically by these sentences (if they are uttered as speech acts). If the adverbials were omitted, the meaning of the sentence would be somewhat different. As they stand, (79) is a request for an answering statement phrased in frank terms, (80) is a statement which may be literally true, (81) is a statement made in conclusion, while (82) is a statement whose truth is based on another piece of information stipulated as true.

- (2) If no distinction is made between the propositional contents of the speech act and the indicators of illocutionary force and its modifiers, in terms of how meaning is determined, then sentences like (79) - (82) would receive the wrong interpretations. Clearly the felicity of the statements in (80) and (81) is dependent on the truth of the propositional contents of the statements, not on whether (80) is literal or (81) is really the concluding remark. Further, it is impossible to

distinguish between the performative and descriptive uses of verbs like *state* if no distinction of truth conditions is made for descriptive versus performative uses (In fact Lewis 1972 proposes that there is no *semantic* difference between performative and descriptive uses).

As Boër and Lycan described the paradox, it was crucially a problem for the performative hypothesis, since the adverbials which are implicated (in the criminal sense) in the paradox are also taken to be evidence for the presence of an abstract performative verb, or for a performative use of an overt verb, if one is expressed. But actually the paradox is a problem for any linguistically based theory of speech acts which is intended to account for meaning in terms of truth conditions and illocutionary force in terms of felicity conditions. It is commonly accepted that the meaning of verbs used performatively and the meaning of other words, including descriptive uses of performative verbs should be defined in similar terms, either identical terms or ones which are easily equatable (see the summary of such discussion in Fodor 1977). The boundaries between propositional contents and indicator of illocutionary force are notoriously obscure : compare *forbid* and *command... not*, where the location of the negation may be in the lexical item expressing an illocutionary act, or in the propositional contents of the command (*ibid.*).

Much of the evidence reviewed in this paper which has been taken as reasons for incorporating illocutionary force into a theory of syntactic form and linguistic representation of meaning has demonstrated strong parallelisms between patterns in structures in true or false propositions and structures used to express illocutionary acts. Hence evidence for the performative analysis is also evidence against any account of performative verbs which distinguishes meaning from illocutionary force. Clearly also, an account of illocutionary force is in some sense dependent on a theory of meaning, perhaps defined truth conditionally, since sentences convey illocutionary force at least in part by virtue of what they mean conventionally. For example, the felicity of a promise cannot be determined without a knowledge of the meaning of *promise* and its propositional contents, the meaning of the words in its complement. Thus illocutionary force is simply a *stronger* interpretation (in some sense) of a linguistic object which must have previously been interpreted semantically. What seems to me to be the strengthening factor is a pragmatic one, namely the

recognition of the speaker's intention to perform an act of the kind specified by the form and contents of the utterance (Searle 1969).

The recognition of an utterance as an action of a particular type, relatable to goals and intentions like other acts, has been mentioned in the previous sections. The recognition of this sort may in fact be identified with the notion of pragmatic truth proposed in Sadock (1979) by which indicators of illocutionary force and their modifiers are judged. Pragmatic truth is a combination of conditions regarding context of utterance and the meaning of words; some part of the meaning of an illocutionary act does depend on the conditions which obtain in the context of utterance, and these conditions need not always refer to the defining qualities of the speech act as statement, question, etc.

This distinction is important in defining the relation between the modifier and the speech act. If we are able to interpret adverbials modifying speech acts in just the same way as when they modify parts of propositions, except that truth on a specific occasion is used as a criterion, rather than truth independent of context, it is important to be able to claim that adverbials are used in just the same way in both types of usage. This is the case for adverbials of manner such as *frankly*, *literally*, which have to do with the intentions of the speaker about the manner of expression used, and *expositives* such as *in conclusion* and its 'performative' version *I conclude by* (cf. discussion of this class of speech act in Austin 1962 and McCawley 1977, 21-22 ; the latter notes that *begin*, *conclude* allow speech acts as complements). As Boër and Lycan observe (1977), the adverbial may fail to be true while the speech act modified by it may at the same time be perfectly felicitous as a speech act of a particular type. The act's manner of execution and position in discourse are not crucially related to its force and the conditions which define it. Hence, we would expect that adverbials of this kind would behave alike for both performative and descriptive uses. It is indeed the case : all the forms below in (83) - (84) express the same relation of the speech act to its discourse as (81) :

(83) *I concluded by saying/stating/proposing that much research was needed.*

(84) *In conclusion, the speaker said that much research...*

But in the course of this paper, I have noted that performative uses and descriptive uses of certain adverbials do not express exactly the same relations.

Unless the differences can be explained independently on the basis of another principle, these facts would seem to argue for two non-equivalent determinations of meaning from the meanings of the part of the complex expression. That is, different kinds of truth conditions would be associated with the constituent modified by the adverbial, and the difference would be reflected in two possible derived meanings. In performative uses, reason adverbials express justifications for the felicity of the speech act. In non performative uses, the adverbial expresses causes, motives or purposes, as well as justification.

If the speech act is felicitous, what is implied (linguistically) is a set of felicity conditions, as noted in earlier sections. The content of the reason adverbial expresses a felicity condition directly or conversationally, depending on whether the conjunction is *if* or a conjunction like *since* which stipulates its complement as true (the difference follows from the fact that the speech act implies that the felicity conditions hold, and while one may be uncertain whether *one* of them holds, it would be redundant to stipulate that *one* of them is true by using a conjunction like *since* - the redundancy of asserting that the speech act conditions hold is likewise evidence that felicity conditions are more than a matter of Gricean conversational principles, even though these overlap with some conditions on speech acts).

Thus the relation between speech act and adverbials is one of entailment of the following sort, schematically :

If the speech act were not the entity which implies meaning, then the surface form would suggest the reverse relationship, at least conversationally, as in the solipsistic reading of (86) :

(86) *Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her* (Ross 1970).

In one literal mind sense, the implicational/causal relations between propositions associated by *since*, *for*, etc. are reversed by the intervention of the speech act as a linguistic constituent.

Here I want to point to similarities of reason adverbials and conventional expressions of indirect speech acts. (87) and (88) are related, in that (87) may convey exactly the same act which is directly expressed in (88) :

(87) *Can you hand me the encyclopedia ?*  
(88) *Hand me the encyclopedia.*

But, as Morgan (1978) points out, it is wrong to say that sentences of the form in (87) entail sentences of the force in (88), at least some of the time, as in Gordon and Lakoff's proposal.

Here also, the entailment relations are actually the reverse of what they might appear to be on initial observation. A request entails, among other things, that the speaker believes that the hearer is or will be able to carry out the request. Taken literally, the form in (87) is a means of finding out whether the hearer is able to carry out the request. The actual question and its contents are analogous to the reason adverbials schematized in (85) :

The question in (87) is a means of implying that a felicity condition holds, assuming the hearer anticipates the speaker's plan, mentally answers the question in the affirmative and recognizes that the conditions for felicitous request do hold at that moment. Thus a question like (87) can be interpreted non-literally, as a request, only by taking its form and contents literally - or at least seriously. The request reading subsumes the question reading, at least conversationally, so that we have the pragmatic equivalent of a privative ambiguity of the kind described in Zwicky and Sadock (1975), the kind of ambiguity which is notoriously hard to establish as such (cf. Searle 1975, who claims that there is not such (semantic) ambiguity).

In any case, we now have a principle for distinguishing the meaning relation of these speech act 'specifiers' (including felicity condition modifying adverbials and indicators of derived illocutionary force) from the usual adverbial-modified constituent relationship - that is, the inclusion relationship of the speech act and the felicity conditions conveyed at least conversationally by the specifier. The relationship in (82) is different in the reported version in (90).

(90) *Since the candidate emerged smiling, Mark stated that the thesis defense had been successfully passed.*

The reason clause expresses the event which impelled Mark to make a statement, not just the justification which Mark invoked as evidence for his statement. Since performative uses such as (82) are understood as intentional acts and attempts to achieve the results which a given kind of speech act has, the motives are encapsulated in the meaning of the speech act; the fact that felicity conditions hold does not require one to perform the act. If one does perform the speech act, justifications of it are in order, but these cannot be the same as motives, because these seem to be subsumed under performing a volitional act.

Some explanation of this sort may also explain why (87) as a request is not reported as (91) :

(91) *She asked me if I could/would be able to pass the encyclopedia.*

Here again, the descriptive use of words and reports of speech acts does not achieve the same effect as performative use; (91) is generally not conventionally understood as a request in the sense that (87) is. While linguists would accept only with reluctance the notion that (87) has two absolutely linguistically distinct underlying relations, that the relation between its form and the ability to convey a request is just a question of its being a fixed expression or idiom, it is hard to explain why just this form, and not other semantically equivalent sentences, are understood in this conventional way. Morgan (1978) has made the interesting proposal that it is a convention about the sentence form that it is used to make requests, but while this proposal avoids problems of assigning underlying forms of a kind suitable for questions, or conversational postulates, etc., and avoids the indeterminacy of a purely pragmatic solution

not sensitive to distinctions of form, it does not explain the more or less consistent request-like properties of performative uses of sentences like (87) - co-occurrences and reports, etc. Zuber (1980) suggests that the forms are *marked*, and in fact there is a great deal of attractiveness to the idea, if markedness has the effect of reversing entailment relations, and we have seen that meaning relations seem in fact to be reversed with adverbials and markers of indirect force in performative 'intentional act' uses. Thus 'be a convention of language' can be interpreted as 'be marked', and able to convey a stronger meaning than the actual contents would seem to imply. Much of this proposal does however remain to be worked out.

#### CONCLUSION

I have argued in this paper that three aspects of speech acts, (a) descriptive reports, (b) adverbial modifiers, and (c) conventional form, are validly used as diagnostic of illocutionary force, and that linguistic patterns of meaning and grammaticality suggest parallelisms between linguistic relations within propositions in speech acts and speech acts themselves. I have argued against the notion that pragmatic relations alone are enough to account satisfactorily for the illocutionary force of sentences as utterances, and against the notion that discarding the performative hypothesis absolves the linguist from having to propose a legitimate semantic theory of speech acts involving some kind of pragmatic factors.

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