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RESUME

ABSTRACT
The reports Learning to be (the Faure report), published in 1972, and Learning: The treasure within (the Delors report), published in 1996, commissioned by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), are known to belong to the foundational literature on lifelong learning. This paper, which draws on primary and secondary sources, will focus on a much lesser known aspect of these reports: their views on international development. The Faure report represented a counter perspective to the dominant development discourse based on “modernization”, in that it favoured “endogenous development” and anticipated the claims of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)
that called for fairer redistribution of resources from developed to developing countries. The *Delors report* reacted to the extension of neoliberalism to the field of development through the Washington Consensus and criticized the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF and the World Bank. Both reports reveal a great deal about the debates and contested ideas on development, the conflicts between educators and economists over educational planning and the shifting position of UNESCO in the multilateral arena between the 1960s and the 1990s. The author argues that both reports got entangled in the struggle over “global governance” in education for development and proved unsuccessful in asserting their worldviews against powerful counter-ideologies promoted by competing organizations such as the World Bank.

The reports *Learning to be*, otherwise known as the *Faure report*, published in 1972, and *Learning: The treasure within*, otherwise known as the *Delors report*, published in 1996, commissioned by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in order to offer visions on the future of education, are known to belong to the foundational literature on lifelong learning (Elfert, 2018). This paper will focus on a much lesser known facet of these reports: their views on international development. This aspect is of interest for two reasons. First, the reports shed light on the debates and controversies in relation to development in the context of their time. In particular the *Faure report* represented a counter perspective to the dominant development discourse in that it promoted “endogenous development”, which is driven at the local and national level and based on local knowledge and resources rather than on an understanding of development in terms of “modernization” and “catching up with the West” (UNESCO, 1976). The idea of endogenous development, which was widely discussed in the 1970s, lost traction when in the 1980s the Washington Consensus translated the tenets of neoliberalism, such as market liberalization and fiscal discipline, into the development strategies of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions. The *Delors report* reacted to these development strategies and criticized the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF and the Bank. Second, the contested ideas expressed in these reports tell us something about the shifting position of UNESCO in the arena of “global governance” in education and development.

This paper will be guided by the following questions: what represented the context of “development” to which the reports reacted and referred? What visions of development did the reports put forth? What influence did they actually have on education in developing countries? The last section of the paper will examine what the reports reveal about the shifts in global governance in education between the 1960s and the 1990s. These questions will be addressed by drawing on evidence gathered from an analysis of primary sources and archival materials (internal reports, correspondence and minutes) from the Faure and Delors Commissions, complemented by a review of secondary literature.
1. THE RISE OF EDUCATIONAL PLANNING IN THE 1960S

To situate the views of the Faure report on development, it is important to consider the historical constellation of the 1960s, when decolonization and the Cold War yielded the field of educational planning. In the political climate characterized by the ideological polarization between the United States and the Soviet Union, development gained ground as a foreign policy issue, and “the fear of communism became one of the most compelling arguments for development” (Escobar, 1995, p. 34). The emphasis on economic growth, which constituted a key factor in the rivalry with the USSR (Biddle & Holden, 2014), and the changes in production processes pushed to the forefront the concept of human capital, of which Theodore Schultz (1963; 1970) and Gary Becker (1964) represented two key proponents. The World Bank, founded in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), engaged with the concept of human capital as it fit neatly with its focus on infrastructure development. The World Bank was under pressure to encourage local participation in infrastructure development in developing countries. Moreover, it did not make sense to invest in industrial infrastructure if there were no workers who had the skills to make use of it (Heyneman, 2003, p. 316). Furthered by international organizations, consultants and “experts”, these ideas made their way to developing countries, many of which were susceptible to leaving their colonial pasts behind by engaging in planning and development on the basis of what Gunnar Myrdal (1968) called “modernization ideals” (p. 76). As Guy Benveniste (2007), one of the pioneers of educational planning, put it, “‘rational integral planning’ would avoid the inevitable disorders, waste, corruption, or overlap of plain everyday politics” (p. 1). He and his educational planning colleagues “thought of planning as a technical professional activity divorced from politics” (p. 7).

During the 1960s the emergence of the field of development as a sphere of influence created “many opportunities for both cooperation and competition between [the international organizations]” (p. 2). In 1961 the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which administered the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, transferred into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Driven by a concern about skilled worker shortages, the OECD, in the late 1950s, established a Study Group on the Economics of Education (p. 2). In the early 1960s, the World Bank started to provide “soft loans” to countries aimed at investments in their education systems. The John F. Kennedy administration built education into its foreign assistance programs, such as the “Alliance for Progress” program for Latin America, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was founded in late 1961 (p. 2). The first American Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Kennedy administration, Philip H. Coombs, became the first Director of a new planning institute, the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), which was created in 1963 out of concerns about “potential conflict between international and bilateral missions sent to advise on education” (p. 3). UNESCO strongly opposed initial ideas to establish the institute with the OECD and UNESCO as principle donors, and it was eventually created as a semi-autonomous institution.
aligned with UNESCO, with the World Bank as the most important partner and donor, and the Ford Foundation acting as a “midwife” (p. 5).

The new “players” in the multilateral system such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) threatened the position of UNESCO, which had been founded after World War II as the United Nations’ specialized agency for education (among other mandates). In the late 1960s UNESCO struggled with the UNDP over funding priorities, in particular with regard to the Experimental World Literacy Programme (EWLP) (Jones, 1988, pp. 124-125). The EWLP represented a “kind of consolation measure” (Jones & Coleman, 2005, p. 203) as UNESCO’s dreams of a universal literacy campaign could not be realized due to lack of support, in particular by the United States and some Western countries. UNESCO’s Director-General at the time, René Maheu, indirectly referred to this conflict in an article published in 1974 in which he argued that the “operational activities, particularly those financed by the United Nations Development Programme, are often too tributary […] to a technocratic attitude of mind, which […] seriously handicap the full flowering of our efforts” (Maheu, 1974, p. 196).

The conflict was symptomatic of a shift in power dynamics among the international organizations working in development. While the United States and European countries had dominated UNESCO during the first decade of its existence, in the two decades between 1947 and 1967, 70 countries from Latin America, Asia and particularly Africa joined UNESCO (Morel, 2013, p. 70), causing a shift of the balance of power away from the Western countries. In the early 1970s, under the influence of “endogenous development” theorists, the Non-Aligned countries sought the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), calling for more control of their terms of trade, capital flows and fairer redistribution of wealth. The Third World used the United Nations and UNESCO as platforms to vocalize their political claims, which sharpened the tension between UNESCO and the US-backed UNDP and World Bank. While UNESCO attracted mainly educators and showed sympathy for the demands of the Third World countries for more self-determination, its funding organizations, such as the UNDP and the World Bank, were strongly influenced by the directions of American foreign policy and primarily employed educational planners who brought with them a more technical and economistic mindset. This proved to be a difficult situation for UNESCO, which became financially dependent on organizations that proved unwilling to fund educational programs that emerged from a worldview different from their own.

After Robert McNamara was appointed as World Bank President in 1968, it became impossible for UNESCO to raise funding for the EWLP. Under the new paradigm “Redistribution with growth,” the Bank under McNamara strongly expanded educational loans focused on poverty alleviation through the promotion of free-market growth. UNESCO’s literacy approach fell into discredit in the World Bank and the UNDP, as expressed in an April 1968 memorandum by Duncan Ballantine, the Bank’s education director, in which he described the Bank’s approach to literacy as “instrumental rather than as
an end objective, which it is still to a large extent in the Unesco approach” (Jones, 1992, p. 97; see also Dorn & Ghodsee, 2010, p. 375). What Ballantine meant was that UNESCO’s approach to literacy involved raising the literacy levels of the entire population as the organization considered literacy an end in itself and a basic human right, whereas the World Bank focused on raising only the literacy levels of those parts of the population it considered “instrumental” for economic development. Against this background, the UNDP and the World Bank considered the results of the EWLP disappointing (Jones, 1992, pp. 98-99). UNESCO responded by using a formal evaluation of the EWLP for a critique of the “view prevalent in United Nations and Western academic circles […] that development was first and foremost a question of economic growth, stressing capital-intensive development and high-level technical skills” (Dorn & Ghodsee, 2010, p. 397).

2. THE FAURE REPORT

The Faure report was the outcome of the International Commission on the Development of Education, established by UNESCO in 1970. To a certain extent the idea to produce a report on the future of education constituted a reaction to the World Bank’s Partners in Development (the Pearson Report) and the UNDP’s Jackson report, a capacity study on the UN’s role in development. It was after a long discussion about these two reports during its 84th session that UNESCO’s Executive Board made the decision to create the education commission (UNESCO, 1970a, pp. 103-186). René Maheu argued that while the Pearson report constituted a “kind of general introduction into the problems of development” and provided a good overview of education as a strategy of development, a strategy for education was needed: “I believe that this [initiating a UNESCO report on education] is the logical and normal follow up of the more general initiative undertaken by the Bank, and I wish this endeavor to be tackled as soon as possible” (Maheu, in UNESCO, 1970a, p. 104; my translation from French). Maheu was even more concerned about the Jackson report, which potentially had far greater financial consequences for UNESCO as it promoted a more consolidated UN approach to development assistance, which Maheu considered an attack on UNESCO’s autonomy. He particularly criticized the report’s perspective on education, which in his view would lead to the subordination of education to the short-term perspective on development promoted by the economists:

Educational planning is linked to the planning of the general future of a nation for 10 to 12 years. So how can we accept that the programs established by the economists, which don’t go beyond a general horizon of four to five years, are considered a priori imperatives, which need to be followed by Ministers of Education, educators, parents, children, students, as if they were given by divine providence (UNESCO, 1970a, pp. 105-106; my translation).

The conflict between the educators and the economists over who gets to control the field of education goes back to the days of fundamental education, UNESCO’s first post-World War II flagship education program. Clarence Beeby, Assistant-Director General of UNESCO from
1948 to 1949, devoted one chapter of his book *The Quality of Education in Developing Countries* (Beeby, 1966) to the topic of “Economist and Educator”, two professions which in his view have “shared neither basic assumptions nor immediate aims, neither their vocabularies, nor […] their techniques” (p. 18).

The Commission represented a way for UNESCO to affirm its authority as an intellectual driver of education (Jones & Coleman, 2005, p. 84). As a contribution to the Second Development Decade and the International Year of Education, a report on the future of education was meant to help member states “formulate strategies for the development of education” (UNESCO, 1970b). Edgar Faure, the Chairperson of the Commission, explained in one of the meetings of the Commission that the First UN Development Decade had focused on “studying the development of the economy”, and that the Commission should focus on the development of education, both in relation to the economy, but also by “going beyond the problem of the economy” (UNESCO, 1971, p. 6).

Including Edgar Faure (who had been Education Minister in France for a short period of time, appointed by General de Gaulle after the May 1968 student uprisings in Paris to undertake the reform of the universities), the Commission was composed of seven members: Felipe Herrera from Chile, an economist and first President of the Inter-American Development Bank; Abdoul-Razzak Kaddoura, a nuclear scientist from Syria; Henri Lopes, Education Minister from 1969 to 1972 and later Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo; Arthur V. Petrovsky, Member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and the Academy of Educational Science of the USSR; Frederick Champion Ward of the Ford Foundation, USA; and Majid Rahnema, who had just resigned as Minister of Higher Education and Sciences in Iran.

The *Faure report* is mostly known for its role as catalyst for the concept of lifelong education (Boshier, 1998; Elfert, 2015; 2018). In terms of its view of development, it reflected the attitudes of some of the members of the Faure Commission who were proponents of endogenous development and dependency theory, which held that underdevelopment in the Southern part of the world was caused by structures, regulations and practices set up by the Western countries. Abdul-Razzak Kaddoura later participated in a UNESCO panel that produced a (favorable) report on the NIEO and reiterated many of the ideas of the *Faure report* (UNESCO, 1976). Majid Rahnema, who became known as a theorist of “planned poverty” (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997), brought the ideas of critical theorists such as Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich into the Commission.

The *Faure report* called for “solidarity” with developing countries and demanded more equal participation in education and “equitable redistribution” (Faure et al., 1972, p. 49) of other material and immaterial resources, such as scientific knowledge and technologies between developed and developing countries. The report made a point of not viewing developing countries in isolation from industrialized countries. It emphasized the “universal nature” of education (p. xxvii), and it raised the problem that developing countries copied the education
system from the model of their former colonizers, which the report considered “elitist” (p. xxvii).

The *Faure report* did not refer directly to the NIEO because it was produced before the time when the NIEO gained prominence – the Declaration of the NIEO was adopted by the United Nations in 1974, two years after the publication of the report. However, it promoted the ideas underpinning the NIEO, ideas which were associated with the economists Raúl Prebisch and Hans W. Singer (Gilman, 2015, p. 3; Singer, 1978). The *Faure report* cites Prebisch – who is referred to as a “highly regarded economist” (Faure *et al.*, 1972, p. 96) – and the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, another proponent of “self-reliance” and the NIEO, who is mentioned in relation to his statements about the colonial nature of education in developing countries (Faure *et al.*, 1972, p. 10).

3. THE DELORS REPORT

The Report *Learning: The treasure within* (the *Delors report*), the second UNESCO report on the future of education, was launched by the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century in 1996, in the context of the “Education for the Twenty-First Century” program, one of the ambitious initiatives started by Federico Mayor, UNESCO’s Director-General from 1987 to 1999. Although larger and much more diverse in its composition, the Commission was again chaired by a French socialist politician and intellectual, the President of the European Commission at the time, Jacques Delors. The Commission was situated in a very different socio-political context than the *Faure report*. After the fall of the Berlin Wall education was high on the agenda again. The educational demands of the new states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of China represented challenges that UNESCO needed to address, and the idea to produce a new education report was born at an education symposium held by UNESCO in collaboration with Chinese authorities in November 1989 (Power, 2015, p. 92).

In his address to UNESCO’s 140th Executive Board, Delors pointed to “three current crises” that marked the world in which the Commission was situated: “the economic crisis, the crisis of the ideology of progress and a certain form of moral crisis” (UNESCO, 1992, p. 2). In terms of the economic crisis, he challenged the “development model,” which he perceived as inadequate, and he referred to the Brundtland report’s emphasis on sustainable growth. He deplored that only a ridiculous amount of global development aid (0.03%) went into education (UNESCO, 1992, p. 4).

The Delors Commission presented “globalization” as the broad global context that determined the thinking of the Commission (Delors *et al.*, 1996, p. 14). The “deregulation and the opening-out of financial markets” (p. 41) led to all economies being “dependent on the movements of a steadily growing mass of capital” (p. 41), which entailed “interest-rate differentials”, “speculative forecasts” and “short-termism” (p. 41). The “economic
interdependence” brought about by globalization was painted in a predominantly negative light, in that “the industrial crises of the most developed countries reverberate throughout the world” (p. 41), making “the disparity between winners and losers in the development game even more blatant” (p. 42).

The Delors Commission frequently discussed the contradictions embedded in globalization. In line with the Faure report, it criticized the economization of education, in particular in its relation to development. On the one hand the Commissioners stressed the uniformity brought about by globalization, since through “global communications […] the values underlying the ‘global village’ were disseminated to all.” On the other hand they were worried about an increasing “ethnic and religious conflict” and “religious fundamentalism” (UNESCO, 1993, p. 2). The report further referred to “the international market-place, with its increasingly technology-driven societies” and “alienation from cultural values and traditions” (p. 2). It envisaged lifelong education “as a means of strengthening the bond between education and culture” (p. 3). Delors deemed it necessary “to build global economic development on solidarities and not on exploitations” (Delors, 1992, p. 2; my translation).

The Delors report propagated the four pillars of education: learning to know; learning to do; learning to live together; and learning to be (Delors et al., 1996, pp. 85-98). The emphasis shifted from the Faure report’s individualistic “learning to be” to the more intercultural perspective of “learning to live together”, which the Commission regarded as the most important of the four pillars and the guiding principle of the report (Delors et al., 1996, p. 22; see also Carneiro and Draxler, 2008). Elsewhere, I have interpreted the utopian and collectivist stance taken by the Delors Commission as a reaction to neoliberalism (Elfert, 2015, p. 4; Elfert, 2018). The Delors Commission criticized structural adjustment programs, which “forced countries into situations in which actions designed to produce long-term benefits became impossible” (UNESCO, 1993, p. 7), and it debated the possibility of exchange of debt as a way of supporting education. Several members of the Delors Commission, such as Michael Manley (1993), warned of the dangers of structural adjustment. As Prime Minister of Jamaica, he had gained first-hand experience with these programs. He called the moment when he signed an agreement with the IMF “one of the bitter traumatic experiences of my public life” (Black, 2001). Manley proposed that an IMF compression program should include World Bank and Regional Bank finance for education and training. He also called for a bigger role for international organizations such as UNESCO, UNDP and UNCTAD in the system of international development. Fay Chung, who had been Minister of Education in Zimbabwe, equally criticized structural adjustment as “a far too narrow and too purely an economist conceptualization of development” (UNESCO Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, 1995, p. 3). She maintained that Africa needed to decide what it wanted the purpose of education to be, because “only when the purpose of education has been clearly defined can Africa decide what type of education is suitable for its development” (p. 3), and she assigned an important role for education “in creating and defining the values that will make Africa politically and culturally united, coherent, and
forward-looking” (p. 3).

In the context of its discussions about development, the Commission paid a great deal of attention to the role of the World Bank. At its fourth session in April 1994, the Commission held a working group with World Bank representatives who presented the forthcoming World Bank education report, *Priorities and Strategies for Education* (published in 1995), which focused on poverty reduction and basic education (UNESCO, 1994, pp. 8-9). At its sixth session held in February 1995, the Commission asked for the draft of the World Bank report to be retabled (International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, 1995, p. 1), which points to the great interest the Commission showed in it. Watson (1999) called *Priorities and Strategies for Education* an “antidote” to the *Delors report* (p. 9), and Mundy (1999, p. 46) asserted that the *Delors report* indirectly responded to it. Indeed, the two reports differed in important ways and exemplified how far the World Bank and UNESCO, who had collaborated very closely during the 1960s and 1970s, had moved away from each other. While the *Delors report* presented a utopian vision of education, the World Bank report took a pragmatic approach focusing on education as investment in “economies’ growing demands for adaptable workers” (World Bank, 1995, p. 1). Jones and Coleman (2005) called the strategy “nothing less than a celebration of ‘Washington consensus’ thinking on education” (p. 119) and observed that “for the first time, a bank education policy document on education was open and straightforward about the neoliberal basis of the bank’s work in education” (p. 122).

It is important to note that the report was highly controversial also among World Bank staff (Heyneman, 2003, p. 328).

On the one hand, the Delors Commission saw reasons for optimism, given that access to education had greatly expanded, also in light of the Education for All (EFA) initiative that had been launched at the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in Jomtien in 1990. On the other hand, the Commissioners were concerned about short-term thinking in education. They criticized the export of the Western school and evaluation system to developing countries, which were “overwhelmed by the pressure of numbers and the need to expand educational access” (International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, 1994, p. 7). In their view, evaluations focusing on “quantifiable measures of productivity” did not do justice to the “complex factors related to values and to long-term societal influences” (p. 2). The Commissioners also called for the need to transform “assistance” into “partnership,” because in many cases not only had expertise and material assistance been passed on, but also “prejudices, fashions, and errors” (p. 2). They observed the contradiction that while many bilateral and multilateral organizations (they mentioned the World Bank) placed greater emphasis on education, spending on education was declining (p. 2).

Delors made it very clear that his interest in engaging with the other international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank on “how they deal with education as capital” (Henderson, 1993) was motivated by his desire to “rehabilitate” education as a value
in itself in accordance with “the ideals at the foundation of Unesco and the whole UN system” (Henderson, 1993). He was out to protect education from “utilitarian policies in a world of shrinking budgets” (Henderson, 1993) and “economic pressure” (Delors, 1994, p. 345; Henderson, 1993) in “a battle of ideas to be fought and won,” as he explained to Henderson (1993). But Delors’ call to de-economize and humanize education and development did not fall on fertile ground as I will discuss in the next section.

4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPORTS TO DEVELOPMENT

Many responses to the Faure report and the Delors report reflected doubts as to the practicability of the ideas put forward by the reports, and only a few offered the prospect of implementing concrete policy measures on its basis. Although UNESCO meant the Faure report to be a contribution to the Second Development Decade, it seems to have failed to reach the developing world. While it dealt with the perspectives and challenges of developing countries, many of its recurrent themes, such as the critique of the school system and its focus on the concept of lifelong education, did not speak to developing countries. As Rubenson (2006) argued, “the Third World countries regarded lifelong education as a luxury of the Developed World” (p. 71). Peter Williams, who was seconded to the Faure Commission’s secretariat from the Education Ministry in Ghana where he was working under Ford Foundation auspices, suggested that the Faure report exemplified “the kind of symbolic declarations by the French of the importance of Paris and culture”, conceived by highly intellectually trained Commissioners who kept “philosophizing” (cited in Elfert, 2018, p. 136).

The Faure report’s critical attitude toward the school annoyed some commentators, such as Jeanne Hirsch who signed responsible for the response of the Swiss National Commission to UNESCO. She pointed out that the references to Ivan Illich in the report “have not only surprised but shocked many people” (Commission nationale Suisse pour l’UNESCO, 1973, p. 5). The author of the OECD response, Edwin M. Martin, a high-ranking American diplomat who chaired the OECD Development Assistance Committee, basically lambasted the report. He contended that “the description of the desirable goals [for education in the respective countries] has heavy ideological overtones which are inappropriate in a U.N. document designed to have global significance” (OECD, 1972a, p. 1). He denounced the report for making statements of wider social problems that “are often greatly over-simplified and sometimes highly controversial” (p. 1), instead of focusing on educational issues. Martin’s tone became particularly polemical in relation to the Faure report’s call to drop the practice of “tied aid” and decrease interest rates for loans to developing countries (Faure et al., 1972, pp. 255-256):

Nor do I see why terms of loans should be softened for all developing countries, including relatively rich ones where the result will only be to make it easier for them to buy more Cadillacs and Phantoms and Mirages. For the poor ones sure, but to cut total volume to increase the reserves of the oil exporters seems to be a little foolish (OECD, 1972b, p. 2).
The Delors report suffered the same fate as the Faure report in that commentators did not consider it practical enough and criticized it for resorting to “the language of idealism and dreams” and presenting an argument qualified as “essentially normative rather than empirical” (McGinn, 1998, pp. 230-231; see also Watson, 1999, p. 10). An analysis of press clippings and reviews of the report concluded that the main criticisms tended to “fall into three categories: that the report is too general, that it is full of good sentiments but not practical enough, and that it has not developed enough the notion of learning throughout life” (Task Force on Education for the Twenty-first Century, 1997, p. 2).

Elsewhere, I have referred to the Faure report and the Delors report as “unfailures” (Elfert, 2016) as these reports, in particular the Delors report and its “four pillars of education” (commonly referred to as “four pillars of learning”), continue to exert a “soft power” among scholars and educators to this day. The report elicited some responses and inspired some initiatives, in particular from Europe, Latin America, and Canada, but it arguably had very little influence on education policies worldwide (Elfert, 2018, pp. 184-187). While the World Bank had noticed the Faure report, it ignored the Delors report, as in the 1990s UNESCO was not a reference point for the Bank anymore. The report also remained largely unnoticed in the United States, which was not a member of UNESCO at the time of its publication.

5. THE SHIFT IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN EDUCATION

While UNESCO was founded with a strong education mandate, the World Bank is arguably today the most influential international organization when it comes to education in developing countries. Between the 1960s and 1970s the authority shifted from UNESCO to a new group of powerful multilateral institutions that entered the field of international education, such as the OECD and the World Bank (Mundy, 1999, p. 40). In the words of Reid-Henry (2017), “international bodies like the World Bank […] were assigned new roles as the surveillant and disciplinary organs of a Western-oriented global market economy” (p. 212). The challenge to UNESCO’s exclusive education mandate had already posed a dilemma for René Maheu during the 1960s exemplified by his conflicts with the UNDP. Symptomatic of the shift in authority was the abandonment of the UNESCO-World Bank Co-operative Agreement in 1989 (Bahr, 2008, p. 23). The collaboration between the two agencies started in the early 1960s when the Bank got involved in educational lending. At that time UNESCO was the lead authority in education and the World Bank funded many of its projects. Maheu courted the Bank, because he knew a good relationship could benefit UNESCO, but the correspondence between the Bank and UNESCO from 1961 and 1962 “reveals the acute sensitivity on both sides about each other’s territory” (Jones, 1992, p. 47). When the World Bank quickly needed to move on staffing its education program as demands for educational loans were rapidly increasing, the UNESCO-World Bank Co-operative Agreement was established in 1964, as a “product of pragmatism” (p. 71). A joint UNESCO-World Bank department – the Educational
Financing Division (EFD) – was established at UNESCO headquarters. The joint department reflected the close collaboration between the World Bank and UNESCO during the 1960s, in which the World Bank acted as funder for educational projects for which UNESCO provided the technical expertise (Elfert, 2018, p. 158). However, as Heyneman (2003) pointed out, the World Bank’s monetary dominance led to a shift in the dynamics of the UNESCO-World Bank relationship: “UNESCO’s cooperative Program [...] was 75% financed by the Bank hence often placing UNESCO in a position of compromise [...] the Bank virtually had the field of education policy to itself” (pp. 328-329). But UNESCO had its share in the decline of the program as it did not attach enough importance to it. According to Jallade (2007, p. 5), “the operation of this program has suffered from internal opposition” (my translation from French). As Bahr (2008) explained, “linking education development to considerations of resource allocation and cost-effective utilization of resources, and thus to considerations of feasibility, was seen as quasi-colonial, and incompatible with education as a basic right” (p. 3). The ideological opposition to the program in UNESCO was exacerbated during the term of the “tier-mondiste” Director-General Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow from Senegal.

In the run-up to the World Conference on Education for All (WCEFA) in Jomtien, UNESCO favoured a more comprehensive approach to education as represented by its focus on adult education and lifelong learning. It sought a broader definition of basic education that encompassed adult literacy, particularly because the WCEFA was technically an event held in the context of International Literacy Year 1990 (Rauch, 1995, p. 194). At the time, the World Bank firmly promoted the principle that investments in primary education brought the highest rates of return, and the Bank wanted to make EFA about the expansion of primary education (Heyneman, 2003, p. 324). UNESCO’s Assistant Director-General for Education, Colin Power, described a meeting in which the World Bank left no doubt as to its priority:

At my first meeting with the Bank on EFA, I was given a set of documents outlining the Bank’s position, and informed that all we need to do at the WCEFA is to endorse that position. For the Bank, EFA = UPE: education for all boiled down to universal primary education (Power, 2015, p. 48).

The World Bank prevailed with its perspective on the expansion of primary education, which was accompanied by a massive increase of private provision of schooling in developing countries.

6. CONCLUSION

The study of both the Faure report and the Delors report offers insights into the shifts in global governance in education for development between the 1960s and the 1990s. Both reports proved unsuccessful in asserting their worldviews against powerful counter ideologies that won the day. As Reid-Henry (2017) put it in his article about Gunnar Myrdal’s 1970 report The Challenge of World Poverty: “For at least the next few decades, the dominant trend in economic development would be for poverty reduction rather than redistribution, and the
problems would be almost entirely located in the poor countries alone” (p. 220). The Faure report’s call for redistributive justice and the acknowledgement of responsibility of the industrialized world for the problems of developing countries did not sit well with the Western neocolonial worldview. In the struggle between the educators and the economists over the authority for education, the latters’ paradigm of the economic return of education underpinned the breakthrough of educational planning as a tool for development that was “essentially rationalist in approach and interventionist in conclusions” (Myrdal, 1968, p. 709; see also Jolly et al., 2004, p. 90).

Third World calls for greater self-determination through the NIEO lost traction around the time when the political economy shifted towards neoliberalism in the late 1970s. Gilman (2015) qualified “the failure of the NIEO [as] the result of a deliberate and concerted strategy on the part of leaders in the north, compounded by strategic choices on the part of the south” (p. 10). The NIEO came under heavy attack from conservative political forces, led by the United States and its Heritage Foundation, which vilified UNESCO for its engagement with the movement. UNESCO’s initiative to produce a New World Communication and Information Order (NWCIIO), which constituted the organization’s main contribution to the debates over the NIEO, led to the withdrawal of the United States and the United Kingdom from UNESCO in 1984 (Astre, 1985; Preston, Herman & Schiller, 1989, p. xvii).

Constellations of “global governance” of education for development continue to shift. Several commentators have suggested that “the Bank’s hegemony in education for development is likely to be challenged” (Mundy & Verger, 2015, p. 17) in the years to come. With its “capacity to manufacture the ‘common sense’ of society” (Rubenson, 2008, p. 242), the OECD will likely expand its influence in education in developing and emerging countries, but also other players have come to the fore, such as philanthropic foundations and large corporations, reaping the profits of what has become a multi-billion dollar business (United Nations General Assembly, 2014, p. 7). Although UNESCO still formally functions as coordinating agency for the revamped EFA process (in 2015 rebranded as Education 2030 agenda), UNESCO’s influence in the global governance of education has steadily declined, and its intellectual voice, of which the Faure report and the Delors report remind us, has faded.

REFERENCES


