The Oligarchic Temptation and its Dangers¹

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1. Introduction

The European Union regularly celebrates linguistic diversity as a fundamental value, as well as a defining characteristic of a Union enriched by the very variety of its constituent cultures. However, this worthy position (variously expressed by the Parliament, by the Commission as a whole, or by the Commissioner entrusted with multilingualism) raises several questions.

Let us leave aside the queries of those who, overtly or covertly, are actually opposed to multilingualism, and are campaigning for barely veiled linguistic uniformity, usually in favour of the English language. Winning them over to the cause of linguistic diversity, by showing (among other arguments) that multilingualism is not only politically and culturally justified, but also makes good economic sense (both in terms of resource allocation, or *efficiency*, and resource distribution, or *fairness*) is a reasonable strategy that we have outlined elsewhere (see reading suggestions at the end of this paper). However, making such a demonstration is not my concern here.

Let us also leave aside the understandable concerns of those who observe that when it celebrates linguistic diversity, European officialdom generally refers only, or mainly, to the official languages of its member states, leaving in the shadow most of its regional or minority languages (particularly those that do not also happen to be a majority and official language in another member state).

In this paper, I wish to start out from another concern, namely, the discrepancies between official discourse and actual practices in European institutions (not to mention in the policies of its member states), in order to derive a critical perspective on those discrepancies, followed by some poicy suggestions. Of course, such discrepancies are regularly pointed out by a number of commentators, whether academics, elected politicians or

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concerned citizens, who observe that the actual workings of European institutions fall far short of its professed multilingual ideals. However, I would like to address these questions here in a somewhat unusual fashion, anchored in *language policy evaluation*.

For this purpose, I shall begin in Section 2 by reviewing a few telling facts illustrating the ambiguity of the EU's position *vis-à-vis* multilingualism – but also the undisputed complexity of the issues at hand. In Section 3, I propose an interpretation of these facts in language policy perspective, before reviewing selected language regimes for the European Union, devoting particular attention to what is called the "oligarchic" model, in which *some* of the member states' official languages enjoy privileged treatment. Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of *intercomprehension* (a term commonly found in the French-speaking literature but, tellingly, not in English, where the closest equivalent is "receptive competence"), because intercomprehension constitutes a major, yet almost completely untapped resource at the service of a balanced and sustainable multilingualism.

Rather than references in the course of the text, the reader will find a set of reading suggestions arranged by themes at the end of the paper.

2. Ambiguities in European discourse and practices

The fact that Europe's attitude towards multilingualism is frequently ambiguous is hardly surprising, considering that when linguistic diversity is mentioned in official discourse, such mentions can variously hark back to rather different notions. Sometimes, linguistic diversity is presented as an *established fact*, with the implication that Europeans "need" to learn languages in order to adapt to this reality. This type of statement is mainly "positive", in the sense that it purports to objectively describe what *is* (the degree of factual objectivity of the statements being a separate question).

At other times, however, linguistic diversity is presented as a *fundamental value* of the European Union, which expresses its very identity — it is important to observe, however, that the EU has never made diversity a fundamental *principle* of the Union like the free movements of goods, services or people, thus indicating a clear order of priorities in which language obviously only has a secondary position. This type of statement is mainly "normative", in the sense that it passes judgment on what is good or bad (and commendably presents multilingualism as "good").

However, the constant instability of official discourse, which oscillates between the positive and the normative dimensions, sows the seeds of ambiguity, because it enables decision-makers to dodge embarrassing questions. Whenever the positive (or "objective") restrictions on multilingualism are pointed out, officials can be excused from acting upon them by presenting multilingualism as an aspiration, that is, by shifting to the *normative* dimension. Conversely, when the desirability of multilingualism is invoked — a statement which could carry notable implications, for example in the form of curbing manifestations of linguistic hegemony in favour of one or another language – officials can then allude to the fact that Europeans *do* speak many languages, that linguistic diversity also finds expression in speakers' complex multilingual practices, etc.; in other words, falling back on the *positive* dimension enables to drown out more determined policy proposals.

Hence, it is hardly surprising that we are confronted with notable contradictions. For example, the EU recognizes 23 official and working languages (OWLs for short), and allows their use in Parliament. It guarantees, as a democratic right, that legislation affecting citizens is translated into all these OWLs. All this is made possible by the remarkable job of translators and interpreters, who keep the most complex linguistic services in the world to working. At the same time, actual procedures within the Commission tend to take place in three languages only, namely, English, French and German, which have been given the label of "languages of procedure" found nowhere in the Treaties; and it is common knowledge that in practice, most of the documents circulating within the Commission are in English, and that English is the most widely used language for internal meetings, while French is an increasingly distant second, and German barely enjoys what might be called a *Mauerblümchendasein* – it exists merely as a modest, unobtrusive flower growing from a wall. But an important clarification is in order before we proceed: the English language *as such* is not the problem. The threat to linguistic diversity would be the same if the dominant language were French, Swedish or Estonian. The problem is linguistic hegemony itself.

Nobody would claim that linguistic diversity and its manifestations constitute easily grasped social realities, and some of these ambiguities may also be due to understandable bafflement in front of the complexity of the issues at hand, which a few vignettes will be enough to illustrate.

Firstly, even circumscribing what is to be understood under "diversity" can be tricky. For example, let us observe that according to frequently quoted estimations, a little under 7,000 languages are currently spoken in the world; but only 3.5% of them are "native" to Europe. Yet of these nearly 7,000 languages, twelve are spoken (possibly in distinct variants) as a first language by half of the world's population and are therefore very "big" languages while at the other end of the spectrum, 500 are considered as being under immediate threat, and about 3,000 are expected to "die" (in the sense

that they would no longer have any native speakers) in the course of the 21^{st} century.³

Secondly, although the range of languages native to Europe is well-known, the same cannot be said about Europeans' language skills, since the sole source of comparable information is the moderately reliable Eurobarometer language survey. According to the latest figures, 34% of EU residents claim to know English as a foreign language; however, only one fourth of these 34% claim to have a "very good" level in this language; this amounts to 8.16% of residents. Let us note that by contrast, in England, the requirement to study a second language has been dropped from the curriculum of 14-16 year olds; over the six following years, a drop of 36% in enrollments in German as a foreign language has been observed (37% for French as a foreign language).

Thirdly, linguistic diversity is not only the product of home-grown diversity, and can be nurtured by migration flows. However, the latter affect different parts of the world very differently. In England again, some 12.5% of pupils in compulsory education have a first language other than English; but in a French-speaking city like Geneva, the share of pupils with a native language other than French exceeds 40%.

This brief sample of demo- and sociolinguistic facts should suffice to show that linguistic diversity is an immensely complex phenomenon, and that as a consequence, it is not easy to formulate lucid analyses and clear policies to deal with it. Yet we have to get a grasp on a few essential questions, such as:

- what should we make of current trends: is linguistic diversity, on the whole, decreasing (with the demise of small languages) or increasing (as a result of linguistically divers migration flows)? Hence, is societal multilingualism in danger or not?
- what general trends, if any, emerge from the chaos of observable facts, and what do these trends mean in the European context?
- <u>*if*</u> such trends should be cause for concern (as would be the case *if* we were to conclude that linguistic diversity is, on the whole, under threat, *and if* people genuinely value diversity), what type of policies should we develop to counter these trends?

These are the questions which we shall try to answer in the following sections of this paper.

³ If it is not easy to define "diversity" in the absolute, we can still *rank* different situations are more or less linguistically diverse, and much of the reasoning in this paper, if only for intellectual caution, rests on this notion of *relative* rather than *absolute* diversity.

3. Reframing diversity in policy perspective

Let us begin by a word of warning: when it comes to "language in society", the discourse of the media, of politicians, and even of scholars is riddled with clichés. The American political scientist Jonathan Pool has neatly expressed this point in a 1991 working paper where he wrote that language is an issue about which lay people and specialists alike seem to hold "extraordinarily stubborn beliefs". Thus, it is important to beware of apparently obvious answers and, most of all, of clichéd views that have the appearance of common sense but can turn out be quite shallow. This being said, can we make out some major trends out of the jumble of apparently contradictory facts? Three such trends seem plausible:

- 1. the dynamics of language learning (in particular, the centripetal force towards learning a dominant language, making it even more dominant) are likely to result in an increasing role for English as the most frequent second language ("L2"), yet along with continuing regional importance of a few major vehicular languages;
- 2. regional or minority languages ("RMLs") are likely to experience further erosion, possibly with a few notable exceptions confirming the rule, like Catalan, Basque and Welsh;
- 3. sustained migration flows are likely to result in *extensive linguistic diversification* (that is, an increase, in most parts of Europe, in the number of allophones) and, at least for the near future, *intensive linguistic diversification* (that is, an increase, in most parts of Europe, in the range of languages spoken).

What does this mean on balance? Is diversity increasing or decreasing? In fact, probably both. This apparent paradox can be resolved by introducing a distinction between objective and subjective diversity. Objective diversity, that is, *the number of languages present and used*, is most certainly going down on the whole, given the demise of small languages. Yet subjective diversity, that is, *the range of languages with which people are confronted in their every day lives*, is most certainly going up. Most people today experience much more contact with linguistic "otherness" than their grandparents ever did, and with ongoing migration, this trend is unlikely to abate. Here again, we have to conclude that linguistic diversity is a complex phenomenon.

So, on balance, should we worry about the future fortunes of linguistic diversity? The answer is twofold.

The answer is negative *if* we believe that diversity is not seriously under threat (for example, if we believe that our *experience* of diversity will always

be adequate, because it is nurtured by continuing migration flows even if small languages disappear), *and/or* if we believe that *even* if linguistic diversity were to disappear for good, it would not be that big of a loss.

Conversely, the answer is positive *if* we believe that linguistic diversity is really under threat, *and if* we believe that this erosion constitutes a harmful evolution (as pointed out in the opening section of this papers, our reasons for holding this view can be inspired by economic considerations, and rest on a concern for efficiency, fairness, or both).

In what follows, I shall adopt the second of these viewpoints. In other words, I shall assume that linguistic diversity deserves to be supported through public policies. Readers who consider that linguistic diversity is ultimately a nuisance may wish to part company with me here and move on to another paper in this volume. Yet I do not wish to list the arguments to the effect that preserving linguistic diversity converges with economic concerns of efficiency and fairness (not to mention the more standard political and cultural reasons usually invoked), since these are points abundantly developed elsewhere, and my purpose here is to explore the relative merits of different policy options that may tempt us *if* (let me insist: *if*) we believe (as, in fact, large segments of opinion seem to) that diversity is worth preserving.

But before proceeding, we must first dispose of the argument according to which protective and promotional measures are not really necessary because (owing to increasing *subjective* diversity resulting, in the main, from migration flows), we will keep being confronted with quite enough linguistic diversity. Why do I not share such a sanguine view? Essentially for the two following reasons:

- first, subjective diversity cannot be wholly divorced from its objective basis. The erosion of objective diversity is bound, ultimately, to undermine subjective diversity: even if migration flows continue unabated, the *intensity* of the diversity carried by these flows is likely to diminish;
- secondly, the increase in subjective diversity can feed illusions, generating a superficial *appearance* of diversity progressively voided of genuine content – what I have called elsewhere "Potemkine diversity", in reference to the fake villages put up by Marshal Grigori Alexandrovitch Potemkin (1739-1791), who wanted empress Catherine the Great to be favourably impressed by the number and prosperity of the villages she would drive through in her carriage, when visiting newly conquered lands placed under his authority.

Unfortunately, the very ambiguities of official European attitudes towards linguistic diversity abet Potemkine diversity: for example, encouragement to student mobility, which is supposed to encourage reciprocal cultural and linguistic knowledge among young Europeans, certainly results in more frequent contacts, but a disproportionate share of these contacts appears to take place through the medium of English. On balance, the effect of programmes like Erasmus on the vitality of Europe's linguistic and cultural diversity is open to question.

What are the options open for Europe? At this point, we can quote a set of seven language regimes, the first six suggested by the already quoted political scientist Pool, the seventh by a young Italian researcher, Michele Gazzola. These seven regimes are presented in the table below, and characterized in terms of four variables: the number of "OWLs" implied by a regime, the nature of the OWLs concerned, the number of directions of translation and interpretation this entails, and the extent of foreign language learning by some that a given regime implies.

REGIME	# OF OWLS	NATURE OF OWLS	T&I DIRECTIONS	FLL NEEDS
MONARCHIC	1	English	0	English by all non- Anglophones
SYNARCHIC	1	'Outside' language (e.g. Esperanto)	0	'Outside' language by all
OLIGARCHIC	1 <r<23< td=""><td>e.g. English + French + German</td><td>6</td><td>English OR German OR French by all others</td></r<23<>	e.g. English + French + German	6	English OR German OR French by all others
PANARCHIC	23	All 23	n(n-1)=506	none
HEGEMONIC	23	All 23	2(n-1)=44, via English	none
TECHNOCRATIC	24	All 23 + 'outside' language	2n=46, via e.g. Esperanto	none
TRIPLE SYMMETRICAL RELAY	23	All 23	3(2n-3-1) =126	none

TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF LANGUAGE REGIMES FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Source: Grin, F., 2005: L'enseignement des langues étrangères comme politique publique. Paris : Haut Conseil de l'évaluation de l'école. Since these regimes have been discussed in detail in other publications, I do not intend to do so here; rather, let us focus on one of them, which Pool has called "oligarchic", because it privileges an oligarchy of languages – such as English, German and French, as in the case of the "languages of procedure" selected for the internal business of the Commission. Various versions of the oligarchic regime have been advocated by politicians and scholars (see reading suggestions at the end of this paper); of course, the number of languages who would be admitted into the oligarchy depends on who is speaking, and who is being addressed. The most common versions of the oligarchic regime typically include (in addition to English, German and French), Italian (for demographic reasons), Spanish (because of its worldwide influence) and sometimes Polish (the only Slavic language in this oligarchy, and the most important of the Slavic languages in today's EU).

Superficially, oligarchy is tempting (particularly, of course, for those who are lucky members of the club). But it has major drawbacks: firstly, it remains obviously and grossly unfair to others; secondly, it is fundamentally unstable and can be expected to progressively drift towards a hegemonic or even a monarchic regime, to the exclusive benefit of English.⁴ Even if supposedly restricted to the internal operations of EU institutions, it would undermine the so-called "1+2 model" encouraged by the Commission, according to which each European should know, in addition to his mother tongue, two foreign languages (or even more than two, yielding a "1+>2" model): here again, investment in a *third* language may drift towards tokenism, and dissolve into a "mother tongue plus English" model, with deleterious effects on diversity: all languages other than English would be progressively confined to provincialism, and the experience accumulated by RMLs over decades or centuries tells us where this leads.

Clearly, oligarchic regimes are a trap, or an illusion, which may be tempting for speakers of relatively "big" languages like German, French or Spanish, but going along, let alone advocating an oligarchic regime ultimately encourages the marginalisation of all these languages. Let us also point out that RMLs would be among the first casualties of an oligarchic regime, which makes the enthusiastic support to "hegemonic" or "monarchic" regimes

⁴ These simple facts are sometimes drowned out in the confusion arising from other proposals, such as the (rather absurd) idea to force every one in European institutions to speak a second language, whose predictable result would be to have all Commission civil servants expressing themselves in English, except the British and Irish who would make half-hearted attempts to speak French, before being urged by their interlocutors to switch back to English. Likewise, the animosity expressed by some RML advocates towards large, but not quite hegemonic languages (typically, French and Spanish) is arguably short-sighted, because it accelerates the decline of these languages for international communication, thus helping along the spread of English as a hegemonic language. Let us recall that as pointed out earlier, the problem is not English *per se*, but linguistic hegemony, no matter which language is its beneficiary.

by some RML advocates (possibly fed by – probably understandable – animosity towards "their" local dominant language) particularly baffling.

Just like I have chosen not to repeat here arguments in favour of multilingualism, because they are amply developed elsewhere, I shall abstain from discussing the converse of these arguments, that is, listing the negative effects of linguistic hegemony. Let us simply recall that linguistic hegemony implies considerable costs of various types, ranging from massive (and expensive) investment in the learning of the dominant language by everybody else, to non-material costs proceeding from the erosion of diversity – if the latter is considered as intrinsically desirable (again, something I believe to be true, but I do not necessarily expect all readers to share this view).

Linguistic hegemony is also patently unfair, since it entails transfers from the many towards the few –in this case, the roughly 13% to 14% of native speakers of English in the EU, who are ultimately spared the effort and expense to learn foreign languages. Using data for the 2002-2004, this amounts to a yearly savings of some € 6 billion for the United Kingdom alone (a little over \oplus 6.1 bn if Ireland is included in the estimation). And despite the massive investment in English by non-native speakers, the levels of proficiency they typically achieve fall far short of what is needed to interact with native speakers of the language on an equal footing. This is neatly summed up in French by an aphorism recalling that "en anglais, on ne dit pas ce qu'on veut, on dit ce qu'on peut" ("in English, you don't say what you want to say, only what you can say"). Native speakers of one language are therefore in a position of privilege that can translate into quite real advantages in a world where agenda-setting and decision-making are so heavily influenced by one's mastery of communication – and that stage, our observations converge will well-known work by sociologists or linguists about the power implications of language.

At this point, it is necessary to debunk a common myth known as "Euro-English" or "English as a *lingua franca*" (sometimes called "ELF"). Euro-English simply does not exist – and what *does* exist is of no policy consquence. It may a tempting journalistic gimmick, but the fact remains that non-native speakers are striving, with more or less success, towards native-speaker norm (after all, there are some 400 million native speakers of English in the world, and they still constitute a model that counts). Despite sustained research in applied linguistics on "ELF", precious few linguistic features departing from dominant native usage have actually stabilised, and they do not, by any stretch imagination, amount to an alternative to English, let alone a language *other* than English. If viewed as something "different" from native English, Euro-English or ELF is purely anecdotal. When

confronted with this rejoinder, distinguished ELF scholars make the convoluted claim that actually, ELF is not "another" language, but rather a situation, essentially defined by the fact that English is used for communication among non-native speakers (including situations of interaction in which some native speakers are also involved) quickly runs into logical tangles that are never addressed in the literature. It may be that native speakers of English have to make allowances when they find themselves in such contexts for example by avoiding colloquialisms that nonnative speakers are unlikely to be familiar with: and there are some courses designed to help native speakers of English address non-native interlocutors and be understood by them. But such courses last, at most, a day or two -afar cry from the years of investment required to acquire fluency in English as a foreign language (estimates of the effort needed to reach this goal are in the range of 10,000 to 15,000 hours of study and practice). Thus, ELF changes nothing to the problems of efficiency and fairness associated with any linguistic hegemony (whether the "hegemon" is English or any other "natural" language).⁵ All the talk about ELF may at most serve to obscure issues of power and unequality.

What, then is to be done? Ultimately, it is unlikely that a perfectly simple, cheap, efficient and fair solution can be found. Some claim that Esperanto fits the bill, and in many respects it probably does, *more than known alternatives.* The advantage, however, is relative more than absolute, and Esperanto is still so vehemently opposed by some that it is unlikely, at least in the short run, to constitute on its own a workable policy option. Rather, it is likely that solutions to the problems of linguistic diversity and its management have to be sought in the direction of *complex language regimes* combining several strategies, affecting the collective or the individual plane or both, and jointly resort to:

- encouragement to foreign language learning, possibly with an emphasis on the "personal adoptive language", a notion proposed in the report to the Commissioner for multilingualism tabled by a committee headed by the novelist Amin Maalouf;
- well-targeted use of translation and interpretation services;
- well-controlled use of a few dominant languages, particularly English;
- rotation systems ensuring that all languages (e.g., the EU's 23 OWLs) have equal access to the position of a *full* official and working language (and, more importantly, that no language is *always* and at all

⁵ For reasons which we do not have the time to discuss here, it is only for "designed" languages like Esperanto or Klingon that this problem does not arise, or only to a much lesser extent.

times official – which would immediately make the others obsolete for the purposes concerned);

- introduction of Esperanto alongside other languages for specific purposes
- development of intercomprehension, that is, receptive competence in neighbouring languages, together with language support services to users.

The way in which these distinct strategies could be combined into a *robust architecture for communication in multilingual contexts* is a challenge for current language policy research, because this perspective has never been systematically explored before. As to the last of these strategies, "intercomprehension", it has been surprisingly neglected, and has almost never been studied in language policy perspective. Yet it holds very promising potential, and the end of this paper is devoted to a closer look at intercomprehension.

4. Assessing intercomprehension

"Intercomprehension" refers to the capacity of two or more persons with different, yet related native languages (like French and Italian, or Polish and Czech) to understand each other, in writing or even orally, without, however, necessarily being able to speak or write the others' language. Research suggests that receptive skills in neighbouring languages can be developed very fast (and therefore inexpensively). If intercomprehension were more systematically developed within language families (particularly, in the case of the EU, the Romance, Germanic and Slavic languages families), it would vastly increase the number of situations in which participants in an exchange could freely express themselves in their native language (with much more flexibility and eloquence than when they are forced to express themselves in a foreign language like English), and yet be understood by interlocutors who have *receptive* competence in that language.

At the same time, intercomprehension is an everyday, banal situation which most people experience so frequently that they do not even notice it. For example, a native speaker of Spanish travelling to Italy will have no trouble understanding most of a newspaper article in Italian, even if he has never studied Italian. If this interlinguistic familiarity were cultivated, vast possibilities would open.

Transposing this everyday experience into a full-fledged policy strategy is not automatic; however, we can sketch out some general implications through a simple version of intercomprehension in which languages are arranged in twelve "intercomprehension groups" as shown in Fig. 1. Some related languages are deliberately organised in separate groups, because intercomprehension among them would be considered relatively more challenging – e.g., between Romanian and French, as opposed to between Italian and French. In Fig. 1, four languages of the Romance group are placed at the centre, but similar effects arise for each "intercomprehension group".




FIG. 1: INTERCOMPREHENSION GROUPS

BG: Bulgarian; CZ: Czech; DE: German; DK: Danish; EE: Estonian; EL: Greek; EN: English; ES: Spanish; FR: French; GA: Irish; IT: Italian; LT: Lithuanian; LV: Latvian; MG: Hungarian; ML: Maltese; NE: Dutch; PO: Polish; PT: Portuguese; RO: Romanian; SK: Slovak; SN: Slovene; SU: Finnish; SV: Swedish

The double lines connecting language groups denote the fact that thanks to intercomprehension, not only can translation (or even interpretation) be saved *within* groups, but the number of directions of translation *between* groups can also be reduced to two for each pair. For example, a document initially produced in Spanish will no longer need to be translated into Italian, Portuguese and French; in addition, it will be enough to translate it into *one* language per group; for example, if it is translated in Swedish, it

will be accessible, thanks to the development in intercomprehension, not only to native speakers of Swedish, but of Danish as well, saving the need to translate from Spanish to Danish.

Thus, intercomprehension is a strategy that encourages multilingualism at a substantially reduced cost. It is, in a sense, a cheaper version of the panarchic model. Much work remains to be done to move from what is, at this point, an everyday but highly case-dependent experience – as well as a general theoretical scenario – to an operational policy strategy. In particular, the following issues deserve particular attention:

- how does intercomprehension fit into actual processes of exolingual communication?
- how should perceived or actual asymmetries in intercomprehension (for example between Spanish and Portuguese) be dealt with?
- if intercomprehension is developed for EU civil servants and European MPs, could it also be proposed to European citizens more generally, and on what terms?
- what would the ensuing language dynamics *within* intercomprehension sets (for example: {Spanish— Italian— Portuguese— French}) look like? Is there a risk of one language becoming hegemonic within a given set?
- according to what sets of rules should intercomprehension be combined with other instruments, notably rotation systems?
- how should the costs and the benefits of introducing intercomprehension be shared between EU member states?
- what are the precise cost implications? (at this point, available estimates are only preliminary, but they suggest that expenditure on translation and interpretation could be reduced almost by half);

Clearly, important questions remain to be addressed and solved. However, the example of intercomprehension suggests that there are ways, if the political will is there, to move towards balanced and sustained multilingualism, thus asserting a truly multilingual ethos.

Reading suggestions

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