Une récente étude souligne les avantages d'un poste de « Executive Board Chair » dans les entreprises

L'étude, actuellement sous presse au Journal of Management, montre que la création d’un poste de « Executive Board Chair » génère de la performance en offrant un compromis qui assure autant la surveillance indépendante que l’implication dans la stratégie. Cette étude a été menée par Dr. Robert Langan, ancien collaborateur scientifique à la GSEM, Ryan Krause, professeur à la Texas Christian University et Markus Menz, professeur et doyen de la GSEM. Ces travaux ont bénéficié du soutien du Fonds national Suisse.

ABSTRACT [en anglais] :

Traditional agency theory views the proper role of the board chair exclusively as providing independent oversight to monitor and control the CEO. Recently, firms have introduced innovations in board leadership that have confounded these theoretical expectations. One notable innovation is the executive board chair, a corporate governance hybrid responsible for both oversight and strategic decision-making, challenging agency theory's prescription that the two activities remain separate. In this study, we argue that an executive board chair position can resolve the trade-off between independent oversight and involvement in strategy and therefore generate a performance advantage. We also predict that, owing to the blurring of lines between the CEO and board chair roles that the executive board chair position creates, the relationship will be stronger the greater the need to monitor and control the CEO but weaker when organizational complexity and board leadership demands are greater. Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2003 to 2017 provides general support for our arguments.

L’étude est disponible en libre accès : Executive Board Chairs: Examining the Performance Consequences of a Corporate Governance Hybrid

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