Questions de Recherche 2 novembre 2017
Faculté des lettres, UNIGE

Sensorimotricité, kinesthésie et analyse des mouvements dans l'art et la littérature :

La question de l'haptique

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1) OVIDE, *LES MÉTAMORPHOSES*

http://www.cndp.fr/archive-musagora/ovide/MetXII.htm

Achille et Cygnus (XII, 64-145)

Cf. PDF *Ovide-Métamorphoses-XII*

2) JOHN MILTON, *PARADISE LOST*

http://www.paradiselost.org/8-Search-All.html

Ithuriel, Zephon, and Satan (IV, 786-827)

From these, two strong and subtle Spirits he [Gabriel] called
That near him stood, and gave them thus in charge.
Ithuriel and Zephon, with winged speed
Search through this garden, leave unsearched no nook;
But chiefly where those two fair creatures lodge,
Now laid perhaps asleep, secure of harm.
This evening from the sun's decline arrived,
Who tells of some infernal Spirit seen
Hitherward bent (who could have thought?) escaped
The bars of Hell, on errand bad no doubt:
Such, where ye find, seize fast, and hither bring.
So saying, on he led his radiant files,
Dazzling the moon; these to the bower direct
In search of whom they sought: Him there they found
Squat like a toad, close at the ear of Eve,
Assaying by his devilish art to reach
The organs of her fancy, and with them forge
Illusions, as he list, phantasms and dreams;

Or if, inspiring venom, he might taint
The animal spirits, that from pure blood arise
Like gentle breaths from rivers pure, thence raise
At least distempered, discontented thoughts,
Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires,
Blown up with high conceits ingendering pride.
Him thus intent Ithuriel with his spear
Touched lightly; for no falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial temper, but returns
Of force to its own likeness: Up he starts
Discovered and surprised. As when a spark
Lights on a heap of nitrous powder, laid
Fit for the tun some magazine to store
Against a rumored war, the smutty grain,
With sudden blaze diffused, inflames the air;
So started up in his own shape the Fiend.
Back stepped those two fair angels, half amazed
So sudden to behold the grisly king;
Yet thus, unmoved with fear, accost him soon.
Which of those rebel Spirits adjudged to Hell
Comest thou, escaped thy prison? and, transformed,
Why sat'st thou like an enemy in wait,
Here watching at the head of these that sleep?
Know ye not then said Satan, filled with scorn,
Know ye not me? ye knew me once no mate
For you, there sitting where ye durst not soar.

Traduction

Adaptation d'un texte électronique provenant de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France : http://www.bnf.fr/

Gabriel appelle deux esprits adroits et forts qui se tenaient près de lui, et il leur donne cet ordre :

« Ithuriel et Zéphon, de toute la vitesse de vos ailes, parcourez ce jardin ; ne laissez aucun coin sans l'avoir visité, mais surtout l'endroit où habitent ces deux belles créatures qui dorment peut–être à présent, se croyant à l'abri du mal. Ce soir, vers le déclin du soleil, quelqu'un est arrivé ; il dit d'un infernal esprit lequel a été vu dirigeant sa marche vers ce lieu (qui l'aurait pu penser ?), échappé des barrières de l'Enfer et à mauvais dessein sans doute : en quelque endroit que vous le rencontriez, saisissez–le et amenez–le ici. »

En parlant de la sorte il marchait à la tête de ses files radieuses qui éclipsaient la lune. Ithuriel et Zéphon vont droit au berceau, à la découverte de celui qu'ils cherchaient. Là ils le trouvèrent tapi comme un crapaud, tout près de l'oreille d'Eve, essayant par son art diabolique d'atteindre les organes de son imagination et de forger avec eux des illusions à son gré, de fantômes et songes ; ou bien en soufflant son venin il tâchait d'infecter les esprits animaux qui s'élèvent du pur sang, comme de douces haleines s'élèvent d'une rivière pure : de là du moins pourraient naître ces pensées déréglées et mécontentes, ces

vaines espérances, ces projets vains, ces désirs désordonnés, enflés d'opinions hautaines qui engendrent l'orgueil.

Tandis qu'il était ainsi appliqué, Ithuriel le touche légèrement de sa lance, car aucune imposture ne peut endurer le contact d'une trempe céleste, et elle retourne de force à sa forme naturelle. Découvert et surpris, Satan tressaille : comme quand une étincelle tombe sur un amas de poudre nitreuse préparée pour le tonneau, afin d'approvisionner un magasin sur un bruit de guerre ; le grain noir, disperse par une soudaine explosion, embrase l'air : de même éclata dans sa propre forme l'ennemi. Les deux beaux anges reculèrent d'un pas, à demi étonnés de voir si subitement le terrible monarque. Cependant, non émus de frayeur, ils l'accostent bientôt :

« Lequel es–tu de ces esprits rebelles adjugés à l'Enfer ? Viens–tu, échappé de ta prison ? Et pourquoi, transformé, te tiens–tu comme un ennemi en embuscade, veillant ici au chevet de ceux qui dorment ? »

« Vous ne me connaissez donc pas, reprit Satan, plein de dédain ; vous ne me connaissez pas, moi ? Vous m'avez pourtant connu autrefois, non votre camarade, mais assis où vous n'osiez prendre l'essor. »

MARCEL PROUST, *À LA RECHERCHE DU TEMPS PERDU*

Sodome et Gomorrhe II, chap. 1, éd. Antoine Compagnon, Paris, Gallimard, (1988) 1989, pp. 81-82.

L'inspiration obscure et irrésistible de la gaffe

A ce moment, un musicien bavarois à grands cheveux que protégeait la princesse de Guermantes salua Oriane. Celle-ci répondit par une inclinaison de la tête, mais le duc, furieux de voir sa femme dire bonsoir à quelqu'un qu'il ne connaissait pas, qui avait une touche singulière, et qui, autant que M. de Guermantes croyait le savoir, avait fort mauvaise réputation, se retourna vers sa femme d'un air interrogateur et terrible, comme s'il disait : « Qu'est-ce que c'est que cet ostrogoth-là ? » La situation de la pauvre Mme de Guermantes était déjà assez compliquée, et si le musicien eût eu un peu pitié de cette épouse martyre, il se serait au plus vite éloigné. Mais, soit désir de ne pas rester sur l'humiliation qui venait de lui être infligée en public, au milieu des plus vieux amis du cercle du duc, desquels la présence avait peut-être bien motivé un peu sa silencieuse inclinaison, et pour montrer que c'était à bon droit, et non sans la connaître, qu'il avait salué Mme de Guermantes, soit obéissant à l'inspiration obscure et irrésistible de la gaffe qui le poussa—dans un moment ou il eût dû se fier plutôt à l'esprit—à appliquer la lettre même du protocole, le musicien s'approcha d'avantage de Mme de Guermantes et lui dit : « Madame la duchesse, je voudrais solliciter l'honneur d'être présenté au duc. » Mme de Guermantes était bien malheureuse. Mais enfin, elle avait beau être une épouse trompée, elle était tout de même la duchesse de Guermantes et ne pouvait avoir l'air d'être dépouillée de son droit de présenter à son mari les gens qu'elle connaissait. « Basin, dit-elle, permettez-moi de vous présenter M. d'Herweck. » « Je ne vous demande pas si vous irez demain chez Mme de Saint-Euverte », dit le colonel de Froberville à Mme de Guermantes pour dissiper l'impression pénible produite par la requête intempestive de M. d'Herweck. « Tout Paris y sera. » Cependant, se tournant d'un seul mouvement et

comme d'une seule pièce vers le musicien indiscret, le duc de Guermantes, faisant front, monumental, muet, courroucé, pareil à Jupiter tonnant, resta immobile ainsi quelques secondes, les yeux flambant de colère et d'étonnement, ses cheveux crespelés semblant sortir d'un cratère. Puis, comme dans l'emportement d'une impulsion qui seule lui permettait d'accomplir la politesse qui lui était demandée, et après avoir semblé par son attitude de défi attester toute l'assistance qu'il ne connaissait pas le musicien bavarois, croisant derrière le dos ses deux mains gantées de blanc, il se renversa en avant et assena au musicien un salut si profond, empreint de tant de stupéfaction et de rage, si brusque, si violent, que l'artiste tremblant recula tout en s'inclinant pour ne pas recevoir un formidable coup de tête dans le ventre.

Ovide. *Métamorphoses*, Livre XII, *trad. Marie Cosnay*

Nescius assumptis Priamus pater Aesacon alis
Viuere, lugebat ; tumulo quoque nomen habenti
Inferias dederat cum fratribus Hector inanis.
Defuit officio Paridis praesentia tristi,
Postmodo qui rapta longum cum coniuge bellum
Attulit in patriam ; coniurataeque secuntur
Mille rates gentisque simul commune Pelasgae.
Nec dilata foret uindicta, nisi aequora saeui
Inuia fecissent uenti Boeotaque tellus
Aulide piscosa puppes tenuisset ituras.
Hic patrio de more Ioui cum sacra parassent,
Vt uetus accensis incanduit ignibus ara,
Serpere caeruleum Danai uidere draconem
In platanum, coeptis quae stabat proxima sacris.
Nidus erat uolucrum bis quattuor arbore summa,
Quas simul et matrem circum sua damna uolantem
Corripuit serpens auidoque recondidit ore.
Obstipuere omnes ; at ueri prouidus augur
Thestorides : "Vincemus", ait, "gaudete, Pelasgi ;
Troia cadet, sed erit nostri mora longa laboris ;"
Atque nouem uolucres in belli digerit annos.
Ille, ut erat uirides amplexus in arbore ramos,
Fit lapis et signat serpentis imagine saxum.

Priam, le père, ignorait qu'avec les ailes obtenues, Aesacos
Vivait. Il le pleurait. Au tombeau où il n'y avait que son nom
Hector et ses frères avaient donné en vain des sacrifices.
La présence de Paris manquait à cette triste tâche.
Bientôt, avec l'épouse qu'il enleva, il porta
Une longue guerre à sa patrie. Mille bateaux conjurés
Le poursuivirent, et l'ensemble du peuple des Pélasges.
La vengeance n'aurait pas tardé, si les vents sauvages
N'avaient rendu impraticables les eaux, si la terre de Béotie
N'avaient gardé à Aulis riche en poissons les vaisseaux prêts à partir.
Là, selon la coutume de leurs pères, les Grecs préparent un sacrifice à Jupiter.
Quand le vieil autel s'embrase des feux allumés,
Ils voient un serpent bleu marine ramper
Sur le platane à côté des sacrifices en cours.
Il y a un nid de huit petits oiseaux tout en haut de l'arbre.
Eux, avec leur mère qui vole autour de la couvée perdue,
Le serpent les saisit, les enfouit dans sa gorge avide.
On reste de glace. Mais le prêtre qui prévoit la vérité,
Le fils de Thestor, dit : « Nous vaincrons. Réjouissez-vous, Pélasges.
Troie tombera, mais notre peine durera longtemps. »
Il attribue aux neufs oiseaux neuf années de guerre.
Le serpent, enroulé aux branches verdoyantes de l'arbre,
Devient pierre. Il reste rocher en forme de serpent.

Permanet Aoniis Nereus uiolentus in undis
Bellaque non transfert et sunt qui parcere Troiae
Neptunum credant, quia moenia fecerat urbi.
At non Thestorides ; nec enim nescitue tacetue
Sanguine uirgineo placandam uirginis iram
Esse deae. Postquam pietatem publica causa
Rexque patrem uicit castumque datura cruorem
Flentibus ante aram stetit Iphigenia ministris,
Victa dea est nubemque oculis obiecit et inter
Officium turbamque sacri uocesque precantum
Supposita fertur mutasse Mycenida cerua.
Ergo ubi, qua decuit, lenita est caede Diana,
Et pariter Phoebes, pariter maris ira recessit,
Accipiunt uentos a tergo mille carinae
Multaque perpessae Phrygia potiuntur harena.

Nérée continue ses violences dans les eaux d'Aonie,
Il n'y transporte pas la guerre, et certains croient
Que Neptune épargne Troie parce qu'il a construit les remparts de la ville.
Mais pas le fils de Thestor. Il le sait, il le dit,
Il faut apaiser la colère de la déesse vierge par le sang d'une vierge.
Après que la cause publique a vaincu la piété,
Et que le roi a vaincu le père, Iphigénie va donner son sang pur,
Debout à l'autel, près des prêtres qui pleurent.
La déesse est vaincue. Elle jette un nuage aux yeux de tous, au beau milieu
Du sacrifice, de la foule, des voix de ceux qui prient.
A la place de la fille de Mycènes, elle pose, dit-on, une biche.
Diane est adoucie par ce meurtre qui lui convient,
Et pareille à la sienne, pareille, la colère de la mer se retire,
Les mille bateaux reçoivent les vents dans le dos,
Supportent tout, débarquent sur les sables phrygiens.

Orbe locus medio est inter terrasque fretumque
Caelestesque plagas, triplicis confinia mundi,
Vnde quod est usquam, quamuis regionibus absit,
Inspicitur penetratque cauas uox omnis ad aures.
Fama tenet summaque domum sibi legit in arce,
Innumerosque aditus ac mille foramina tectis
Addidit et nullis inclusit limina portis ;
Nocte dieque patet : tota est ex aere sonanti,
Tota fremit uocesque refert iteratque quod audit ;
Nulla quies intus nullaque silentia parte,
Nec tamen est clamor, sed paruae murmura uocis,
Qualia de pelagi, siquis procul audiat, undis
Esse solent, qualemue sonum, cum Iuppiter atras
Increpuit nubes, extrema tonitrua reddunt.
Atria turba tenet ; ueniunt, leue uulgus, euntque
Mixtaque cum ueris passim commenta uagantur
Milia rumorum confusaque uerba uolutant ;
E quibus hi uacuas inplent sermonibus aures,
Hi narrata ferunt alio mensuraque ficti
Crescit, et auditis aliquid nouus adicit auctor.
Illic Credulitas, illic temerarius Error
Vanaque Laetitia est consternatique Timores
Seditioque recens dubioque auctore Susurri ;
Ipsa, quid in caelo rerum pelagoque geratur
Et tellure, uidet totumque inquirit in orbem.

Au milieu du monde il est un lieu, entre terre, mer
Et plages du ciel, frontière du monde triple,
D'où l'on voit ce qui est partout, même loin des régions,
Où toute voix pénètre dans les oreilles creuses.
La Rumeur y vit. Elle s'est choisi une maison sur les hauteurs,
Avec d'innombrables accès, mille ouvertures sur les toits,
Aucune porte pour fermer l'entrée.
De nuit, de jour, la maison est ouverte. Elle est tout entière de bronze sonnant.
Tout entière elle vibre, renvoie les paroles et répète ce qu'elle entend.
Aucun repos, aucun silence, en aucun lieu.
Ce n'est pas du bruit mais un murmure de petite voix,
Comme celui des vagues de la mer si on les écoute de loin,
Comme le son, quand Jupiter fait claquer
Les nuages noirs, des derniers grondements du tonnerre.
La foule vit dans l'entrée. On y va, on y vient, peuple léger.
Des inventions mêlées de vérité y flânent,
Des milliers de rumeurs, des paroles confuses y roulent,
Comblent de leurs discours des oreilles vides,
Colportent les récits, et la taille du mensonge
Croît. Un nouvel auteur ajoute quelque chose à ce qu'il a entendu.
Ici sont la Crédulité, l'Erreur sans scrupule,
La Joie vaine, les Terreurs d'épouvante,
La jeune Révolte, et les Murmures dont on ignore l'auteur.
Tout ce qui se passe dans le ciel, sur la mer
Et sur la terre, la Rumeur le voit. Elle mène l'enquête dans le monde entier.

Fecerat haec notum, Graias cum milite forti
Aduentare rates, neque inexspectatus in armis
Hostis adest ; prohibent aditus litusque tuentur
Troes et Hectorea primus fataliter hasta,

Elle avait répandu le bruit qu'avec une grande force armée
Les vaisseaux grecs arrivaient. L'ennemi en armes est là :
On l'attendait. Les Troyens l'empêchent d'aborder, protègent les rivages,
Et sous la lance d'Hector, premier, selon ton destin,

Protesilae, cadis ; commissaque proelia magno
Stant Danais, fortisque animae nece cognitus Hector ;
Nec Phryges exiguo, quid Achaica dextera posset,
Sanguine senserunt ; et iam Sigea rubebant
Litora, iam leto proles Neptunia, Cygnus,
Mille uiros dederat, iam curru instabat Achilles
Totaque Peliacae sternebat cuspidis ictu
Agmina ; perque acies aut Cygnum aut Hectora quaerens
Congreditur Cygno ;decimum dilatus in annum
Hector erat ; tum colla iugo candentia pressos
Exhortatus equos, currum derexit in hostem
Concutiensque suis uibrantia tela lacertis
"Quisquis es, o iuuenis, " dixit "solamen habeto
Mortis, ab Haemonio quod sis iugulatus Achille."
Hactenus Aeacides ; uocem grauis hasta secuta est ;
Sed quamquam certa nullus fuit error in hasta,
Nil tamen emissi profecit acumine ferri
Vtque hebeti pectus tantummodo contudit ictu.
"Nate dea, nam te fama praenouimus," inquit
Ille "Quid a nobis uulnus miraris abesse ? "
(Mirabatur enim.) "Non haec, quam cernis, equinis
Fulua iubis cassis neque onus caua parma sinistrae
Auxilio mihi sunt ; decor est quaesitus ab istis.
Mars quoque ob hoc capere arma solet ; remouebitur omne
Tegminis officium ; tamen indestrictus abibo.
Est aliquid non esse satum Nereide, sed qui
Nereaque et natas et totum temperat aequor. "
Dixit et haesurum clipei curuamine telum
Misit in Aeaciden, quod et aes et proxima rupit
Terga nouena boum, decimo tamen orbe moratum est.
Excutit hoc heros rursusque trementia forti
Tela manu torsit ; rursus sine uulnere corpus
Sincerumque fuit. Nec tertia cuspis apertum
Et se praebentem ualuit destringere Cygnum.
Haut secus exarsit, quam circo taurus aperto,
Cum sua terribili petit inritamina cornu,
Poeniceas uestes elusaque uulnera sentit.
Num tamen exciderit ferrum, considerat, hastae ;
Haerebat ligno. 'Manus est mea debilis ergo,
Quasque' ait 'ante habuit uires, effudit in uno ?
Nam certe ualuit, uel cum Lyrnesia primus
Moenia deieci, uel cum Tenedonque suoque
Eetioneas impleui sanguine Thebas,
Vel cum purpureus populari caede Caicus
Fluxit, opusque meae bis sensit Telephus hastae.
Hic quoque tot caesis, quorum per litus aceruos
Et feci et uideo, ualuit mea dextra ualetque.'
Dixit et, ante actis ueluti male crederet, hastam
Misit in aduersum Lycia de plebe Menoeten
Loricamque simul subiectaque pectora rupit ;
Quo plangente grauem moribundo uertice terram,
Extrahit illud idem calido de uulnere telum
Atque ait : "Haec manus est, haec, qua modo uicimus, hasta
Vtar in hoc isdem ; sit in hoc, precor, exitus idem."
Sic fatus Cygnumque petit, nec fraxinus errat
Inque umero sonuit non euitata sinistro,
Inde uelut muro solidaque a caute repulsa est;
Qua tamen ictus erat, signatum sanguine Cygnum
Viderat et frustra fuerat gauisus Achilles ;
Vulnus erat nullum ; sanguis fuit ille Menoetae.
Tum uero praeceps curru fremebundus ab alto
Desilit et nitido securum comminus hostem
Ense petens, parmam gladio galeamque cauari
Cernit et in duro laedi quoque corpore ferrum.
Haut tulit ulterius clipeoque aduersa reducto
Ter quater ora uiri capulo et caua tempora pulsat

Cedentique sequens instat turbatque ruitque
Attonitoque negat requiem ;: pauor occupat illum
Ante oculosque natant tenebrae retroque ferenti
Auersos passus medio lapis obstitit aruo ;
Quem super inpulsum resupino corpore Cygnum
Vi multa uertit terraeque adflixit Achilles.

Tu tombes, Protésilas ! Les combats engagés coûtent beaucoup
Aux Grecs. Hector, par le meurtre de cet homme courageux, se fait connaître.
Les Phrygiens aussi apprennent, dans le sang abondant,
Ce que peut la main des Grecs. Déjà les rivages
De Sigée rougissaient, déjà le fils de Neptune, Cygnus,
Avait donné mille hommes à la mort, sur son char Achille
Abattait déjà toutes les troupes à coup de lance du Pélion.
Dans les rangs de soldats il cherchait ou Cygnus ou Hector.
Il tomba sur Cygnus. Hector, ce devait être
Dix ans plus tard. Alors, il excite ses chevaux qui à leur cou étincelant
Portent le joug, dirige son char sur l'ennemi
Et secoue les armes tremblantes dans sa main :
« Qui que tu sois, jeune homme, aie consolation
De ta mort. Tu es égorgé par Achille l'Hémonien ».
Et c'est tout. La lance lourde suit la parole.
Mais, bien que la lance sûre ne fasse pas d'erreur,
Il ne réussit rien avec la pointe de son fer lancé.
Il heurte seulement la poitrine d'un coup émoussé.
« Fils de déesse, par la Rumeur je te connais déjà », dit
Cygnus. « Pourquoi t'étonner que je ne sois pas blessé ? »
Achille s'étonnait en effet. « Ce casque que tu vois, fauve,
A la crinière de cheval, ce bouclier creux, dans ma main gauche,
Ne m'aident pas. Ce que je cherche avec eux, c'est la parure.
Mars prend les armes pour la même raison. Sans leur fonction
D'armure, je serai quand même invincible.
C'est quelque chose de ne pas être fils de la Néréide - mais fils
Du chef de Nérée, de ses filles et de toute la mer. »
Il dit. Et il envoie sur le fils d'Eaque un trait qui s'accroche
A la courbe du bouclier, qui brise et le bronze et les neufs
Premières peaux de bœuf, mais s'arrête à la dixième.
Le héros l'arrache. Encore d'une main vive
Il jette des traits tremblants. Encore l'autre est sans blessure,
Intact. Un troisième coup de lance
Ne peut briser Cygnus, découvert, offert.
Achille s'enflamme comme le taureau dans l'arène ouverte
Quand il cherche ce qui l'irrite de sa corne terrible
Et voit les tissus pourpres, voit qu'on évite ses coups.
Est-ce que le fer est tombé de la hampe ? Il regarde :
Il est bien accroché au bois. « Ma main est-elle faible,
Dit-il, a-t-elle perdu, sur un homme, ses forces d'avant ? »
Elle était capable, quand j'ai le premier
Renversé les remparts de Lyrnésa, ou quand j'ai rempli
De leur propre sang Ténédos, et Thèbes, ville d'Andromaque,
Ou quand le fleuve Caïque a coulé rouge du massacre du peuple,
Ou quand Télèphe a senti deux fois le travail de ma lance.
Et ici aussi : avec tous ces cadavres, dont j'ai fait et je vois
Les tas sur le rivage, ma main droite était capable. Elle l'est toujours ».
Il dit. Comme s'il doutait de ses actes d'avant, il envoie
Sa lance contre Ménétès, un Lycien du peuple.
Il brise son armure et la poitrine au-dessous.
Le mourant frappe de sa tête la terre lourde.
Achille arrache le trait de la blessure chaude,
Et dit : « C'est bien ma main, c'est elle, qui a vaincu autrefois. Je prendrai
Ma lance contre lui. Pour lui, j'en prie les dieux, je veux la même fin. »
Il parle ainsi et vise Cygnus. Le frêne ne se trompe pas,
Résonne sur l'épaule gauche qui ne l'évite pas.
Il en est repoussé, comme d'un mur ou d'un rocher solide.
Mais à l'endroit du coup, Cygnus est marqué de sang.
En vain Achille en est joyeux :
Il n'y a pas de blessure, le sang est celui de Ménétès.
Alors tout frémissant, du haut de son char,
Il bondit et se jette avec son épée brillante
Sur son ennemi impassible, il a troué de son glaive bouclier et casque
Mais son fer s'est abîmé sur le corps dur.
Il n'en supporte pas plus. Il ramène à lui son bouclier,
Et trois fois, quatre fois, du manche de son épée, frappe la bouche de l'homme
[et ses tempes creuses.

Il le suit quand il fuit, le presse, le rend fou, le pousse,
L'empêche de sortir d'effroi. La peur habite Cygnus.
Devant ses yeux nagent les ténèbres. Il fait
Quelques pas en arrière, tombe sur une pierre au milieu du champ.
Il trébuche, se renverse,
Achille fonce sur lui de toute sa force, le cloue à terre.

Tum clipeo genibusque premens praecordia duris
Vincla trahit galeae ; quae presso subdita mento
Elidunt fauces et respiramen iterque
Eripiunt animae. Victum spoliare parabat ;
Arma relicta uidet ; corpus deus aequoris albam
Contulit in uolucrem, cuius modo nomen habebat.

Hic labor, haec requiem multorum pugna dierum
Attulit et positis pars utraque substitit armis ;
Dumque uigil Phrygios seruat custodia muros,
Et uigil Argolicas seruat custodia fossas,
Festa dies aderat, qua Cygni uictor Achilles
Pallada mactatae placabat sanguine uaccae.
Cuius ut imposuit prosecta calentibus aris,
Et dis acceptus penetrauit in aethera nidor,
Sacra tulere suam, pars est data cetera mensis.
Discubuere toris proceres et corpora tosta
Carne replent uinoque leuant curasque sitimque.
Non illos citharae, non illos carmina uocum
Longaue multifori delectat tibia buxi,
Sed noctem sermone trahunt uirtusque loquendi
Materia est ; pugnas referunt hostisque suasque
Inque uices adita atque exhausta pericula saepe
Commemorare iuuat ; quid enim loqueretur Achilles,
Aut quid apud magnum potius loquerentur Achillem ?
Proxima praecipue domito uictoria Cygno
In sermone fuit ; uisum mirabile cunctis,
Quod iuueni corpus nullo penetrabile telo
Inuictumque a uulnere erat ferrumque terebat.
Hoc ipse Aeacides, hoc mirabantur Achiui,
Cum sic Nestor ait : "Vestro fuit unicus aeuo
Contemptor ferri nulloque forabilis ictu
Cygnus ; at ipse olim patientem uulnera mille
Corpore non laeso Perrhaebum Caenea uidi,
Caenea Perrhaebum, qui factis inclitus Othryn
Incoluit ; quoque id mirum magis esset in illo,
Femina natus erat." Monstri nouitate mouentur
Quisquis adest, narretque rogant ; quos inter Achilles ;
"Dic age, nam cunctis eadem est audire uoluntas,
O facunde senex, aeui prudentia nostri,
Quis fuerit Caeneus, cur in contraria uersus,
Qua tibi militia, cuius certamine pugnae
Cognitus, a quo sit uictus, si uictus ab ullo est. "
Tum senior : "Quamuis obstet mihi tarda uetustas,
Multaque me fugiant primis spectata sub annis,
Plura tamen memini ; nec quae magis haereat ulla
Pectore res nostro est inter bellique domique
Acta tot ; ac siquem potuit spatiosa senectus
Spectatorem operum multorum reddere, uixi
Annos bis centum ; nunc tertia uiuitur aetas.
Clara decore fuit proles Elateia Caenis,
Thessalidum uirgo pulcherrima, perque propinquas
Perque tuas urbes (tibi enim popularis, Achille,)
Multorum frustra uotis optata procorum.
Temptasset Peleus thalamos quoque forsitan illos ;
Sed iam aut contigerant illi conubia matris,
Aut fuerant promissa, tuae ; nec Caenis in ullos
Denupsit thalamos secretaque litora carpens
Aequorei uim passa dei est ; ita fama ferebat ;
Vtque nouae Veneris Neptunus gaudia cepit :
"Sint tua uota licet" dixit "secura repulsae ;
Elige, quid uoueas." ; (eadem hoc quoque fama ferebat)
"Magnum" Caenis ait "facit haec iniuria uotum,
Tale pati iam posse nihil ; da, femina ne sim,
Omnia praestiteris." Grauiore nouissima dixit
Verba sono poteratque uiri uox illa uideri,
Sicut erat ; nam iam uoto deus aequoris alti
Adnuerat dederatque super, ne saucius ullis
Volneribus fieri ferroue occumbere posset.
Munere laetus abit studiisque uirilibus aeuum
Exigit Atracides Peneiaque arua pererrat.

De son bouclier, de ses durs genoux il lui écrase la poitrine,
Tire les attaches du casque ; elles serrent sous le menton,
Lui broient la gorge, lui coupent la respiration
Et le chemin du souffle. Achille était prêt à dépouiller le vaincu.
Il voit ce qui reste : les armes. Le dieu de la mer a mis son corps
Dans l'oiseau blanc dont jadis il portait le nom.

Ce travail, cette lutte de plusieurs jours a mené
Au repos. Chaque partie a posé les armes.
Pendant qu'une garde éveillée surveille les murs phrygiens,
Pendant qu'une garde éveillée surveille les fossés grecs,
Le jour de fête arrive où Achille, vainqueur de Cygnus,
Calme Pallas du sang d'une génisse égorgée.
Il place les morceaux de viande sur les autels brûlants.
L'odeur, acceptée des dieux, pénètre dans l'air.
Il y a la part des sacrifices et la part donnée aux tables.
Les chefs s'allongent sur les lits, remplissent de viande cuite
Leur corps, soulagent de vin leurs soucis et leur soif.
Ni le chant de la cithare ni des voix
Ni la longue flûte de buis percée ne leur plaît.
Ils passent la nuit en discours et la matière du discours
Est le courage. Ils rappellent les combats de l'ennemi, les leurs,
A tour de rôle aiment célébrer les dangers courus, souvent vaincus.
De quoi en effet pourrait parler Achille ?
Et de quoi les proches du grand Achille pourraient parler ?
Il est surtout question de la victoire sur Cygnus maîtrisé.
Ceci paraît extraordinaire à tous,
Que le corps du jeune homme soit impénétrable,
Impossible à blesser, qu'il abîme le fer.
Le petit fils d'Eaque s'étonne, les Grecs aussi,
Quand Nestor dit : « A votre époque, un seul
Méprise le fer, n'est blessé d'aucun trait :
Cygnus. Moi j'en ai vu un autre, autrefois, souffrant mille blessures,
Le corps jamais blessé, Cénus de Perrhébie.
Célèbre par ses exploits, il habitait
L'Othrys. Et ce qui était plus étonnant encore chez lui :
Il était né femme. ». Tous ceux qui sont là sont troublés
Par ce drôle de monstre, ils demandent que Nestor raconte. Parmi eux, Achille :
« Dis, vas-y, tout le monde veut entendre,
O vieillard éloquent, sagesse de notre époque,
Qui était Cénus, pourquoi a-t-il été changé en son contraire,
Où l'as-tu connu, dans quelles guerres, dans quelle bataille,
Par qui a t-il été vaincu s'il a été vaincu ? »
Le vieillard : « Ma vieillesse m'handicape,
Beaucoup de choses de mes premières années me fuient.
Je me souviens de certaines. Aucune, vécue à la guerre ou à la maison,
N'est plus attachée à mon cœur que celle-ci.
Si le grand âge a pu rendre quelqu'un
Témoin de nombreux événements, c'est moi. J'ai vécu
Deux fois cent ans. C'est maintenant mon troisième âge.
Cénis, la fille d'Élatus, était célèbre pour sa beauté.
Elle était la plus jolie des filles de Thessalie, - des villes voisines,
Et des tiennes (elle était de ton pays, Achille).
Beaucoup de prétendants la désiraient, en vain.
Peut-être même que Pélée aurait essayé sa couche,
Mais il avait déjà connu les noces avec ta mère,
Ou bien elles lui étaient promises. Et Cénis ne connaissait
Aucune couche. Elle allait le long des rivages isolés.
Elle y subit la violence du dieu de la Mer. C'est ce que dit la Rumeur.
Après que Neptune a connu ce plaisir d'amour nouveau,
Il dit : « Tu peux faire des vœux, ils ne te seront pas refusés,
Choisis ce qui te plaît. » Là aussi, c'est ce que dit la même Rumeur.
Cénis dit : « Cette injustice me fait faire le vœu
De ne plus pouvoir subir une telle chose. Donne-moi de n'être pas femme,
Tu m'auras tout donné. » Elle dit ces derniers mots d'un ton
Plus grave, qui pouvait sembler la voix d'un homme.
C'était le cas. Le dieu de la Mer lui avait déjà accordé
Le vœu et il avait ajouté celui de ne pouvoir être atteint
D'aucune blessure et de ne pas succomber au fer.
Cénus, heureux du don, s'en va, passe son temps
A des travaux d'homme, parcourt les plaines du Pénée.

Elaborated Knowledge: Reading Kinesis in Pictures

Ellen Spolsky
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Abstract Individuals learn, or try to learn, about other people from observing them and analogizing what they see to their own bodily or kinesic knowledge. We watch (for example) the position of limbs and the movement of eyes. We react to evidence of different states of muscle tension. Artists make use of their own kinesic knowledge and count on our understanding of it. But body language does not always reinforce knowledge available in other modalities, say, in language. As in other aspects of communication, conflicts are common between what can be known by observation and what may be known by other modalities. These conflicts are not errors but are a systematic aspect of the way we construct knowledge. The gaps between modalities are the necessary ground for human flexibility and creativity. A brief look at the work of Edouard Manet, Diane Arbus, and Barbara Kruger illustrates how artists take advantage of the conflict between information derived from bodily knowledge and that derived from language or other modalities of knowing.

We often see how people feel. Our assessment of what someone tells us may depend less on their words than on a kinesic intelligence by which we judge intentions and sincerity. We learn a lot by looking at others and by drawing analogies between their bodies and our own. As part of the project of deepening our understanding of the human ability to interpret complex

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texts and images, I have been interested both in specifying distinguishable competencies and in exploring how these separate ways of knowing interrelate in the process of interpretation. I assume the modularity of mind: the mind/brain is a heterogeneous collection of processors or modules, each suited by evolution to respond to a particular form of energy.[1] Concurrently, the brain assures the neurological calibration between the incoming structures of information, for example, sound waves and light waves, so that we can turn to look at something we hear, speak about something we see, and so on. In principle, the translations between modules, though never complete, are sufficient; if they weren't, the species would not have survived thus far. Small gaps, or conflicts between the outputs of different modules, are thus integral to the system itself. But this is not necessarily bad news. I aim, in this paper, to demonstrate how it is that the complexity of intermodular calibration is at once a threat to successful communication and the door to the elaborated knowledge of aesthetic experience.

It is important to understand at the outset why it is a principle of the modularity hypothesis that the calibration between information from different modules can never be complete. If they could, the diversity wouldn't be real or useful diversity. The modules are different because the stuff we need to know about the world comes diversely packaged. If there weren't an irreducible difference between the structures of information manipulated in different modules, keen hearing and touch could compensate *entirely* (for example) for lack of sight, but we know this is not the case. To put it another way, the connection and coordination of incoming data quite regularly meets the conditions of being necessary and sufficient for understanding, even though that understanding is never complete. Virtually all understanding is based on incomplete information, and is thus inferential. The brain makes a judgment—an interpretation—based on the information available to it from different sources. What we think of as knowledge, then, is always the result of inferential interpretation from less than complete knowledge. This is as true of seeing, which requires the coordination of different input from each of two eyes, as it is of the decision to pick up a spoon to stir one's coffee or of a reading of *King Lear*.

All understanding is a result of interpretation, from identifying object boundaries to reading literary texts, and all interpretation is cognitively continuous. Aesthetic judgments are not different knowledge so much as *elaborated* inferences produced at one end of a scale of complexity. The quantum advantage to the organism of having a variety of windows on the

1. In Spolsky 1993 I set this theoretical position out more fully, and trace the different ways the mind can be seen to make meaning in different styles of literary criticism.

world, even when those windows produce gaps that must be filled inferentially, is that those gaps are the loci of creativity. Not only is there no need for all systems to be entirely translatable into one another, but such an arrangement would actually be a disadvantage because it would be entirely rigid. It would close all possibility of reaction to new situations, or to old situations in new ways. The gaps in the system—the places where inferences must be constructed—are sites of productive indeterminacy in all brain functions.

So the first advantage to interpretive theory of assuming the hypothesis of brain modularity is that it allows a theory of creativity in interpretation. Second, and this is what I am particularly interested in here, it broadens both the descriptive and explanatory power of that theory which, at the moment, is grounded overwhelmingly in language interpretation. A reader's access to literary texts, however, also depends, for example, on the ability to construct visual images, and then to draw analogies and inferences from those images as well as from words. An account of a reader's ability to produce mental imagery in response to words will clearly be an important aspect of a theory of receptive competence. Toward this end, I began the exploration of the visual system as we depend on it to interpret complex pictures. The understanding of pictures requires kinesic intelligence, itself dependent on visual intelligence. If we can see how people feel, we can imagine how they look, and then how they feel, from descriptions in language of how they look. This kind of multiple embedding is of course the site of conflict as well as confirmation. An interpretive theory will have to account for both.

What Is Kinesic Intelligence and Who Needs It?

Human kinesic intelligence is our sense of the relationship of parts of the human body to the whole, and of the patterns of bodily tension and relaxation as they are related to movement.[2] Kinesic knowledge is also our sense of the muscular forces that produce bodily movement and of the effect of that movement on other parts of the body and on objects within the environment. Kinesic knowing is knowing that you lean toward a heavy trunk to push it, and that you swing your arm backward to throw a ball forward. Kinesic sense is also a spatial understanding of the relation of limbs to torso—their relative lengths and bulk and their relative extension and natural orientation: if you catch your toe on a step you will fall forward and

2. On kinesic (or kinesthetic) intelligence, see Bateson 1968, Gardner 1985, Sacks 1984, and Jackendoff 1987.

extend your arms. The knowledge of one's own body's poise and control, or lack thereof, allows one to make analogies to other bodies and to draw inferences from those analogies. It contributes to one's ability to assess the chances of an outfielder's catching a fly ball, or to infer that someone who is bent over feels tired or defeated. By extension, our kinesic intelligence is called upon to help us understand two-dimensional pictures or icons, from Rembrandt's sad prophet to the international traffic sign for a school children's crossing. We also use it to produce mental imagery.

Recognizing the facial and bodily gestures of other people is dependent on the kinesic sense, although these are also conventionalized within cultures. Both folk wisdom and academic opinion agree that reading another person's body language is a powerful mode of knowing about that person. Students of nonverbal communication assume that kinesis provides an extra way of knowing that reinforces or disambiguates verbal messages. This belief is probably a result of the assumption that kinesis is less open to conscious control than other modes of expression, and therefore that it delivers a kind of direct truth. I can guard my tongue, but may not have such control over my smile. The anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1972 [1966]: 377–78) surmised that "courtesy rules" in many cultures, such as the taboos on observing other people, or parts of other people, witness this truth. In Western culture, he notes, one is taught that it is rude to stare at people: "too much information," he claims, "can be got that way." While there are obvious cultural differences between body languages, there is also some evidence that we can count on being able to recognize some universals in the expression of emotion. According to the work of Paul Ekman et al. (1972), the basic emotions of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and interest, seem to correlate cross-culturally with facial gestures.

If it is true that some categories of communicative bodily behavior are less easily brought under voluntary control (and if some are even universals), then these gestures are, we could say, situated on a border between biological and cultural knowledge: they may be just a bit more "natural," more resistant to cultural manipulation. Norman Bryson seems to be claiming this, as he puzzles out the relationship between what one knows by recognizing a stereotype and what one knows by observing and identifying with another human body in a picture. He calls the codes of gesture and posture "*under*-determined." In contrast to the codified representations of stereotypes, "gesture is the last outpost of the sign as it crosses from the codified into the concrete (where it disappears)" (1983: 154). This sounds like the claim made by the anthropologist Adam Kendon that "the study of gesture allows us to look both ways: . . . inward toward the process of mental representation . . . and outward to the social processes by which communicative codes become established" (1986: 44).

But Bryson confounds several different kinds of messages in the visual field, not all of which are equally underdetermined. He lumps together as "a register of connotations" "physiognomics, pathognomics, gesture, posture, [and] dress," all of which he sees as equal "provocation to perform an act of interpretation which is strictly speaking an improvisation, a minutely localized reaction that cannot—impossible dream of the stereotype—be programmed in advance" (1983: 153–54). Many gestures, however, are entirely conventional, and dress can certainly be stereotyped. Posture, eye focus, blushing, and expression are somewhat more resistant to cultural codification.

However, whether or not there is a stable relationship between what is natural and what is culturally coded (and this is far from clear), it is important to note that students of nonverbal communication have found that those gestures that are assumed to be under less conscious control are more likely to be believed than more conventionalized messages, when the two conflict.[3] Artists can be expected to take advantage of the possibilities of conflict these assumptions produce and to play at the borders between modules.[4] The viewer of a painting, then, is in something of a bind: we naturally "learn" from what we see by analogy with our own bodies. Yet we cannot assume that paintings deliver direct kinesic knowledge: no matter how "natural" a figure looks, it has not escaped encoding. Body language in painting inevitably evokes a kinesic reaction from the viewer, but is also interpreted as embedded within a set of contexts, most of which depend on kinds of knowledge that are not kinesic.

Most immediately, titles of pictures or words used within them demand to be accounted for in any interpretation of the kinesthetics of figured bodies.[5] The art-historical context of the picture, or the setting and interests of the viewer of the painting, are taken into account as well. I am par-

3. "When either consistent or conflicting messages are given over multiple channels, the kinesic tends to be the most believable" (Rosenfeld, Shea, and Greenbaum [1981]). The authors here cite seven references to experiments which are said to demonstrate this claim.

4. Identifying kinesthetic representations in painting as separate from other aspects of visual understanding (i.e., understanding the meaning of a painting by its references to earlier painting), would be (and here I am sympathetic with Bryson's aims) appropriate to what Elaine Scarry has called "the interventionist impulse of materialist criticism" (1988: xi). In her introduction to *Literature and the Body* she makes the case for a consideration of bodies in the aftermath of an idealist criticism which, in its emphasis on the nonreferentiality of language, promoted a view of artistic production as inconsequential. She claims, then, that attention to the body is therapeutic: "The body is both continuous with a wider material realm that includes history and nature, and also discontinuous with it because it is the reminder of the extremity of risks entailed in the issue of reference" (ibid.: xxi). Attention to the kinesic/somatic aspects of communication should further the investigation of whether and how art and art criticism can work to diminish those risks.

5. I will use the word kinesics for bodily knowledge, and kinesthetics for its refraction through pictures.

ticularly interested in demonstrating how one's kinesthetic understanding may compete, rather than cooperate, with other structures of information, complicating rather than simplifying the reading of the image.

To this end, we might focus initially on two particularly powerful aspects of bodily kinesthetics in pictures: eye focus and the alignment of head and torso. Both operate in the dimensions of space and time. Both reveal the spatial orientation of the body to other figures in or out of the painting. Analogies or disanalogies suggest themselves either between figures in the picture, or between the figures and the viewer. Furthermore, because bodily motions and reactions are sequences, the portrayal of any instant within the sequence allows temporal inferences about what has just happened and what might be about to happen. They suggest a narrative. Notice the intermodular calibration at work: while neither the ability to analogize, nor to construct narrative sequences are themselves kinesic abilities, they both depend crucially on structures of information gained by kinesis.

Deriving Narrative from Kinesic Clues

It is part of our bodily intelligence to be able to distinguish between stable and unstable positions—that is, between postures which, because of the relative alignment of body parts, can be maintained indefinitely, and those which cannot. The latter are, ceteris paribus, interpreted as being part of an action and thus as having a before and after, and usually as having a cause and/or an intention as well. Giving attention, say, to a book on one's lap, can be seen as a comfortable and thus relatively stable position. Stretching an arm up and away from the body will generally be interpreted with an explanatory motivation: as reaching for something, perhaps. We know, for example, that when one changes the focus of one's attention, the head moves first, and the torso only afterwards, to align itself more comfortably with the head. Looking at Manet's *La nymphe surprise* (Fig. 1), we thus infer that we are observing a moment *after*. Something or someone has intruded on the stability of the woman's body and forced it to refocus. A misalignment between head and torso might also be interpreted as the moment *before*: before the figure decides to reorient her torso in order to commit her attention to what she sees. But that will not happen here, and we know that kinesthetically as well. We know she has already decided not to turn because she has hunched her left shoulder in the opposite direction from the orientation of her face, and her right hand seems positioned to draw it even further forward, as if to maximize the coverage of her breasts that her arm and the angle of her shoulder can provide. That her gesture,

Figure 1 Edouard Manet, *La Nymphe Surprise* (Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, Buenos Aires).

furthermore, seems calculated to hide implies an intruder whose aim is to see what she does not want to reveal (a person, then, not an animal).

Having concluded that she has, at least temporarily, decided against reorienting to give full attention to whomever she looks at or to allow his intrusive looking, we note other information that conflicts with this judgment. It is part of our kinesic understanding to recognize that eye contact

is made at pauses, at the boundaries of interpersonal communication, and is conventionally interpreted as an invitation to a response. It is a way of yielding the floor, of letting the other person know that it's his or her turn to speak. Conversely, one averts one's eyes to avoid giving such an invitation.[6] If we say, then, that the woman's gaze invites response, we now infer from the conflict between the rejection of contact or response through body pose and the invitation of the eyes waiting for a response, that she looks at an intruder. Only an intruder—unexpected, and so far unexplained—could account for the doubleness: though unwelcome, an intruder might present some danger and thus must be attended to.

Not surprisingly, then, a survey of recent interpretations of this picture uncovers three different narratives. First, taking Manet's title, *La nymphe surprise*, seriously, one might be justified in assuming that the woman is surprised because she has been caught unawares. But does her expression show any anxiety about what might follow? Is she drawing her towel around herself because she does not want to be seen naked? As a second possibility, Juliet Wilson Bareau claims that without the title we might see the figure as drying herself, rather than hiding her nakedness. She is "shivering a little after her dip in the river. Her gaze, turned towards the spectator, indicates little more than the calm interest in the viewer-voyeur beyond the picture plane . . . as she continues with her toilet" (1986: 36). Rosalind E. Krauss enters a third story: "A nude woman stares insolently outward. The viewer realizes that . . . *he* is the one who disrupts the private universe of the painting. . . . Looking begins to fuse with violation" (1969: 624).

All three of these interpretations make inferences from the conflict between messages of the figure's eyes and her body. All three read "intruder" in one way or another. Yet it is important to note that even if this level of knowing evokes agreement that there is an intruder (a dram of truth that none of these three interpreters can resist), they still produce three different interpretations. Since recognition of body orientation and facial expression does not, apparently, prevent the emergence of different narrative explanations, the original hunch of so many—that bodily knowledge is less subject to conventionalization, and is therefore less ambiguous—is here shown to be an oversimplification.[7] The different readings of this painting reveal both identity and difference.

Traditional art-historical reading, of course, has other ways of disambiguating. Identifying the story the artist had in mind, for example, and

6. See Argyle et al. 1981 on the functions of the gaze.

7. Manfred Clynes, in his early work on the relation of muscle state to emotion, acknowledges that "a sentic state can be expressed in a variety of modes—from tone of voice to gestures using many different parts of the body" (1977: 27).

then identifying the convention matching the woman's posture and expression with the conventionally understood emotions of the story is a conventional way of arbitrating between alternative narratives. But even with this resort to traditional disambiguation, this particular picture eludes interpretive closure, since art historians have reason to connect it both to the story of Susanna and the Elders and to a pastoral in which a satyr peeks out of the trees.[8]

Kinesis and Pictorial Composition

In Manet's *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe* (Fig. 2), our kinesthetic sense again produces more puzzles than it resolves. The two kinesthetic representations which have drawn the most comment are the posture of the nude again, and the composition and relationship of the figures. In an age when the composition of figures in a painting was expected to indicate the status relationships, psychological ties, and the emotional and narrative dependencies of the figures, the grouping here would have been almost illegible. Both eye focus and proximity are responsible for the confusions. Why, if they are sitting close enough together for their limbs to be touching, or almost touching, do they seem so out of touch with each other? This question is asked again by the lack of eye contact between members of the group. The man at the right who extends his arm seems to be trying to make a point, but the woman surely isn't paying attention. Neither is the other man maintaining eye contact. We could call his averted gaze (Beattie 1981) "abstracted," and read it as a conventional indication that he is lost in his own thoughts and is not seeking response. Is the arm gesture itself one of emphasis, or an attempt to get the two to return their attention to his discourse?

8. Although the picture now hanging in the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, Buenos Aires, is the one you see, with no other figures in the picture, Manet's preliminary sketches and recent X rays of the painting suggest at least two different contexts into which the figure might at first have been painted and then later, for various reasons, separated from. It might have had a satyr in the upper right corner, peeking out from behind the trees, as Manet's own title suggests (see Bareau 1986). But Krauss's explanation is strengthened if the context of the picture was the story of Susanna and the Elders. The argument for this contextualization is that in an engraving depicting the Susanna scene, for example, the woman is posed in the same way as Manet's bather, and the two old men are clearly present. (Vorstermann after Rubens, reproduced by Bareau [1986: 31]). Their very unattractiveness encourages the spectator's sympathy with the woman. If, however, as in Manet's version, the men are not present, and yet the spectator recognizes the reference, then *he* is the one being stared at; he (and it must be a *he* here) would have to recognize himself as the intruder. The painting might be a rather sophisticated joke. Tamar Yacobi (personal communication) suggests that the picture may refer to the Venus de' Medici in the Uffizi, a reference that would further complicate the reading since the gestures of the classical Venus are meant to exhibit, not to conceal.



Figure 2 Edouard Manet, *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (Musée d'Orsay, Paris).

Continuing the theme of nonconnection, one of the group has wandered off to bathe, and nobody is looking at her, nor does she seem to be looking toward them. As in *La nymphe surprise*, the woman's stare out of the painting and a twist away from the orientation of her torso implies the presence of someone or something outside the picture plane who has attracted her glance. Here too, the woman yields attention and invites a response. The immediacy of the intrusion, again, is suggested by the misalignment of her head, not yet accommodated by her body. Her shoulder is not hunched, however; she is not hiding or protecting herself from the intrusion. Nor does she reach for the wrap, the presence of which implies that she could cover herself if she wanted to. Why is she relaxed if a stranger is approaching? Is the intruder perhaps known and welcome? Is it the painter?

Social codes provide additional fuel for inference: Manet's contemporaries attributed her lack of self-consciousness about her nudity to her being a prostitute. In fact, she was apparently identified by friends of Manet as a model he had painted before, and as such she was considered a woman of easy virtue. But if her role in the social event is that of a prostitute, why do the men seem not to relate to her with any sexual interest? Why is their posture so relaxed in her presence? On the other hand, if she

is a painter's model, then perhaps the relevant convention is the pretense that one is not excited by the nudity of a painter's model. But then why is there no evidence that either gentleman is or has been painting? Is the painter the one the woman looks out at?

From the lack of eye contact among the figures in the painting we might infer a lack of other connection, but this would conflict with the inference we draw from their sitting so close together. The thematized nonconnection is contradicted by the nude's inviting a response from the intruder which she does not get from the men "in" the painting. Presumably one of the reasons that so many of the original spectators of this painting found it disturbing is that they found no way to resolve all of these questions in a unified interpretation. The painting was submitted to the Paris Salon of 1863, but was rejected, and was hung in the protest exhibition mounted by the avant-garde, the Salon des Refusés. The miscalibration of kinesthetic clues such as timing and sequencing allow the inference of a deliberate rejection of traditional norms of composition and can be a source of humor. Indeed, several art historians read the main female figure as drawing attention to the artificiality of the picnic, raising the possibility that Manet's grand picnic painting is a parody of the pastoral conventions of earlier works, such as Giorgione's *Concert champêtre*.[9]

The same inferences about the body language of the nude woman in the foreground lead Robert L. Herbert to understand an affront to traditional art-historical conventions and conventional social behavior. Manet's parody of art is signaled by the traditional subject matter and the specific references to earlier pastoral scenes by Marcantonio Raimondo and Giorgione. His rejection of social norms is established by inferences from his model's "frank stare" which "fixes the onlooker's eye. At the same time, her very boldness . . . thwarts any male expectations of sexual submissiveness. She not only gives the impression of a living model, but of one who is in entire control of her actions." He cites E. Lipton: "Stark naked, she nonetheless refuses the erotic script" (1988: 173). If she is also a recognized model, it makes her appearance as a river goddess self-reflexive in a parodic way. Note here that it must be Herbert's kinesic sense that grounds his

9. We can see in the words of John House that he infers parody from kinesthetic as well as art-historical knowledge; he casts his reading in the past tense as a description of what contemporary audiences, seeing the picture displayed in the Salon des Refusés "must have thought": it must have seemed

> to its public a startling travesty of the idea of the *fête champêtre*: the modern costumes and the uncoordinated gazes of the figures, with the naked woman looking directly at the spectator, made it impossible to envisage the scene as an idyll taking place in a land of make-believe, safely distanced in time or space. (in Bareau 1986: 9, 12)

inference that her stare is "frank." Here is how I reconstruct the chain of inference: I assume that Herbert is reacting to what he knows about direct or averted glances. Michael Argyle et al. (1981: 286) says that the averted gaze functions to protect one from intrusion by cutting down on perceptual distraction while thinking. A direct gaze, then, is an appeal for interpersonal communication and implies the opposite of introspection. It implies nonthinking, noncognition, and thence, simplicity, openness, directness, lack of complication, and frankness as opposed to scheming or evasiveness. All of these suggestions of the opposite of thought are then also inferences of eroticism, of a frankness or openness which is physical rather than intellectual. The naked body of a woman, of course, reinforces this reading.

It is possible that there is one other kinesthetic clue to a reading of the picture as parody, and that would be our sense of whether bodies are relaxed or tense. In the Marcantonio Raimondo etching (assumed to be the source of the grouping) the three figures are relaxed in an appropriately pastoral way; of course, they are two river gods and a nymph sitting by a river—that is, literally in their element. Manet's figures, however, are transposed city folk and they don't seem to know quite how to dress or act—unless they are taking their cues from the literary tradition of pastoral. We might say that it's no wonder they're not entirely relaxed; or we might say that their relaxation is part of the parody: go out to the country and pretend—to be river gods?

So far, the evidence seems to support my claim that kinesthetic knowledge is not especially privileged in being less ambiguous than other kinds of knowledge, but before I leave this subject I want to acknowledge that there are also nonkinesthetic clues that reinforce the interpretation of parody: the picnic spilling from the basket invokes the classical cornucopia of an ever-providing nature, and the fruits must be symbolic rather than realistic since they don't grow in the same season (Cachin and Moffett 1983: 165). The classical pastoral interpretation hinted at would cast the woman as goddess of nature, but here her beauty is far from ideal. Furthermore, the fashionable clothes discarded by her side parody any claim to divinity by locating her in a specific historical time, and make her "undressed rather than nude" (ibid.: 170). It is thus a combination of structures of information —kinesthetic and other—that produces the interpretation of parody. We again see that while the kinesic sense is indeed separable from other modes of knowing, it gives rise to inference and participates in the construction of narratives independently and in conjunction with information from other modules. It also produces ambiguous readings which seek disambiguation. When those other clues are themselves ambiguous, as is usually the case, preference judgments are made from the weight of the combined evidence.

Parody at the Juncture of Nature and Convention

One of the many parodies of Manet's *Dejeuner* is the pastiche created by Sally Swain and titled *Mrs. Manet Entertains in the Garden.*[10] In it, the mens' positions are taken by women (in man-tailored suits) while both Manet's women are now men—the one in the forefront entirely naked, and the one in the pool beyond only naked to the waist. The woman to the right leans on her left elbow as her raised right hand offers a coffee cup in mockery of Manet's pretentious gesturer. While Manet's men are at ease, and the woman in the foreground is not, Swain's sex reversal presents a scene in which the women, whose torsos and heads are aligned, seem to be at ease in their bodies, while it is the men whose bodies and heads are twisted uncomfortably, seeking response. The offer of coffee (sociability, warmth, sustenance), parodies the sexism inferred from Manet's kinesthetic distinction between the men who are involved in thought, or talk, and the women who are immersed in sensuality, one literally, as a bather, the other "frankly" seeking erotic response.

The feminist parody here leads one to ask about kinesthetic knowledge: How far can we generalize from the commonality of human bodily experience, before we are enjoined to take into account the gender of those bodies? Since men and women do not have entirely the same experiences of their bodies, it is unlikely that they would produce and respond to art in the same ways. To begin an exploration of how women's kinesic sense produces artistic kinesthetics, then, and how these might relate to the words used as titles, my next two examples are pictures by women.

The Conflict between Kinesis and Intention

The first example is a photograph taken by Diane Arbus, titled *A family one evening in a nudist camp, Pa. 1965* (Fig. 3). It is instructive to have a photograph in the context of my discussion of kinesic knowledge, and not only paintings. Part of Diane Arbus's artistic originality was to question the modernist assumption that a photographer, in photographing people unawares, would catch their body posture or facial expression exposing some truth about them that they would rather have hidden. She made a point of having her subjects pose, in many cases, even letting them choose the set-

10. Swain's 1988 collection of parodic pictures is called *Great Housewives of Art.* She imitates the style of the artist, and his subject matter, changing some details so that the painting is now about housekeeping. Thus a ballet dancer in a tutu, painted in the style of Degas, is leaning over a vacuum cleaner in "Mrs. Degas vacuums the floor." Similarly, "Mrs. Klee cleans out the bird cage," and "Mrs. Matisse polishes the goldfish."



Figure 3 Diane Arbus, *A Family One Evening in a Nudist Camp, Pennsylvania* Pennsylvania. 1965. Gelatin-silver print, $14\frac{5}{8}$"×$14\frac{1}{2}$" (37.3×37.1 cm.). The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Purchase. Copy Print. Copyright © Estate of Diane Arbus 1972.

ting. Thus we see them as they claim they want to be seen, and yet what is revealed is still multivalent and mysterious.

Our understanding of the particular figures in this picture is enhanced not only by our kinesic sense of body poses and facial expressions but also by our sense of the size and shape of our bodies.[11] These notions, of course,

11. Jackendoff (1987: 195–96) cites evidence that this sense can be "fooled" as it were, or modulated, under experimental conditions, if certain muscles are mechanically vibrated; the body is thus apparently given contradictory clues about, for example, how long one's arms are. It doesn't occur to Jackendoff, however, that much less arcane cultural production, specifically commercial advertising, has a great influence on how one perceives one's body, and how one values its form. A woman may have an abiding sense of her body as being too fat, a man of being too short, an African in Europe of having the wrong kind of hair.

are heavily culture-specific, and cultural manipulations of body image are centrally relevant, I believe, to Arbus's picture. She has chosen to pose a group of subjects who, by their allegiance to the idealism of the nudist movement, assert their rejection of normative standards by which they would be considered fat and ugly. Their commitment is to resist a certain line of kinesthetic ideology and to insist that they are comfortable in their bodies. The adults in this photograph share with the artist a commitment to pushing their rejection of any idealization of the body to the extreme ends of social acceptability. Arbus lets them have their say, as it were, yet she is also using her camera to record what she calls "the gap between intention and effect. . . . There's a point between what you want people to know about you and what you can't help people knowing about you" (Arbus 1972: 2). The resulting harshness is her trademark.

The subjects assert their commitment by their obvious willingness to be photographed. Like their nudity, it is a conscious statement about getting away from dissimulation and disguises. Their "frank stares" into the camera reinforce this willingness to meet the response of the viewer. That is, the adults' stares do—the adolescent, by more twisted posture and crossed leg, seems to demur somewhat. Her body is oriented toward her parents, from which we might learn that she is attentive to their ideological commitments, but she is wearing shorts. Other contradictions emerge: The woman's sunglasses, by hiding her eyes, compromise her claim to openness, as do the tan lines indicating her concession—she has worn a bathing suit this summer. The poses of both adults are traditional display poses for young, well-built bodies—her raised knee is a stereotypical "bathing beauty" pose—indicating that they have not escaped all kinesic conventions. As against their claim that the exposure of genitals is natural and not worthy of notice, the woman's raised knee frames the man's penis in a central part of the picture. Thus Arbus proves her point: "everybody needs to look one way but they come out looking another way" (ibid.: 1).

Sally Swain's pastiche is downright good-humored compared to the brutality of this photo, though like Swain's, Arbus's photograph can also be read as a parody of a pastoral scene. The poor quality of the photograph is, in this reading, intentional. Gone is the food and the conversation of Manet's picnic; there is no living water in the background. The flat banality of the landscape denies any attempt to recover a Garden of Eden, betraying the sitters' aspirations to natural beauty and significance. The industrial world intrudes with the tail fin of a car. The figures, for all their nakedness, are not naked to us—the ambiguities and conflicts remain. Naked bodies do not give up all their secrets. The kinesthetic representations we sense are not definitively interpretable outside of ideology—are

not more directly readable than the representations in any other representational system. We both understand and fail to understand them as surely as we understand and fail to understand the naked or the clothed figures in Manet's *Déjeuner*.

The Conflict between Word and Image

Barbara Kruger's untitled photomontage (Fig. 4), though it makes no pretense of being a record of real people, depends nevertheless on our kinesic knowledge. The pieces of the doll evoke the image of an adult female body, of that body as a plaything, and of the girl child who would play with the doll. The central figure is unstable: it is both a representation of a woman and a real broken plaything. The relation of Kruger's words to the picture and to its possible audiences is not simple entitling. Viewers are asked to see the words as applying in at least three ways: first, they apply to or belong to the doll parts which need assembling. Second, they are addressed to the viewers themselves as imagined assemblers of the doll. Whatever the doll itself evokes, it apparently cannot be assembled without directions. Third, they apply to viewers as interpreters of the picture: they must use the picture, assemble its bits according to Kruger's instructions, such that its intended critique can work in the world.

But even before I react to the words, I react to the picture of the disassembled doll. For me, it is a frightening image from childhood, truly a broken idol. I invested my dolls with life, named them, and loved them. A broken one was horrifying in an animate way: I assumed the doll was sick, and worried that it might die. But at the same time, that very illusion of life was broken when one saw that a beloved doll was held together with rubber bands and articulated metal rods. The doll repair service in my neighborhood called itself a "doll hospital," easing my pain somewhat while colluding in my illusions. But just as I am thrown back to the imaginary world of childhood, the harsh counterimaginative message hits: Don't imagine or animate, don't indulge, don't identify, don't play—just follow directions. When you don't, or even when you do, things break.

I can conjure several narratives of conflict suggested by the disassembled doll in the presence of both directions for its construction and (in case you had any inclination to disobey) metadirections that insist you follow the directions. That the doll parts will make an "adult" doll with breasts rather than a baby doll provides ground for analogizing the conflict to a statement about the problem of freely constructing one's adult body image (say) according to one's own imagination rather than according to standard issue cultural directions. A nastier interpretation would include an ac-



Figure 4 Barbara Kruger, *UNTITLED (USE ONLY AS DIRECTED)* 1988. (The Saint Louis Art Museum).

knowledgment that the doll has been deliberately taken apart for Kruger's composition. We have come on the scene after a transgressive act has been performed. Or is the doll's state of dismemberment the consequence of a refusal to follow directions? Or are the directions directions for disassembly? We may want to read the head's position on the floor, lower than the torso with its absent and thus not absent genitals, as an indication of someone's idea of the relative importance of a woman's head and genitals, and/or as a sign that the limbs are disconnected because the instructions *cannot* be followed. The doll's fixed smile, however, shows that at least one socially prescribed norm of female behavior is honored: even dismemberment will not wipe the smile from her face. The picture is both rich in possibilities and painful in its refusal to yield a satisfying interpretation.

In the Arbus picture the words and the picture do not produce completely overlapping readings; if her words are cooperative with regard to the viewer, ostensibly helpful, they are aversive with regard to her subjects and her picture. Arbus was willing to allow her viewers to share her condescension to her subjects. Kruger, however, doesn't let the viewer off so easily. She uses words aggressively not only against her prime target, the social construction of women, but also turns them against the complacent viewer as well. Both pictures exhibit the uneasy relationship between words and the pictures to which they are nevertheless clearly tied. They annotate, add, explain, and clarify, but they also produce contradictory meanings.

The Advantages of Modularity and Modular Conflict

These pictures show a variety of ways in which kinesis, language, and vision come together but frequently conflict, thus often failing to increase clarity. The partial alignment between kinesic and other kinds of visual and conceptual knowledge is interestingly explained as a consequence of that genetic inheritance that contributes to our survival as a species. Not only is epistemological conflict inevitable, it's good for us.

The foundational assumption of a cognitively responsible theory of interpretation is the assumption of modularity that I mentioned earlier: having many ways of knowing provides the species with a variety of ways of responding to a varied and changing world. The next step is also important: the information from the various modules can't, in principle, be calibrated entirely. Because the diversity is valuable, evolution has brought our species to the point at which there is sufficient correlation between the input of different modules (in this case, sight and kinesics) such that one can know, when looking at Manet's *Le déjeuner sur l'herbe* that the woman bending over into the stream is in no danger of losing her balance, but not

so entirely overlapping that we forget whether we saw or felt her hand dip into the water.

Jerry A. Fodor's modularity theory (1983) was an early and influential attempt to describe this state of mind/brain performance. Modules, according to Fodor, are constructed with a fixed neural architecture, and are built to respond quickly and automatically, each one in a very specific domain. The visual system, then, is a set of visual processing modules. One module, for example, reacts to (interprets) straight lines; another calculates the parabolas of surface curves. For Fodor, the language module was another such set. A module responds rapidly because it is "stupid, or encapsulated": that is, it has no access to any general store of knowledge, and its processing is blind to context variation (to anything that might be knowable in another module) or to memory. Connections between modules within a system and connections between systems are made after the modular work is done. This delay is crucial. While we ultimately need the information produced from different modules to be coordinated, we also depend on the modules to react to both familiar and unexpected information without prejudice. To the extent that a module can work independently of already-in-place structures of information, the individual is protected from the dangers of interpreting in the direction of old expectations, that is, within what has been called the "hermeneutic circle," or the "always already." Neurologically speaking, then, there is a level of interpretation that is *not* identical with initial perception. There is a gap between modular perception and the contextualization of that perception within the framework of memory, and of knowledge being simultaneously collected by other modules.

Just as the time gap is crucial to the possibility of new knowledge, so are the system's gaps in connectivity. A neural system in which every reactive neuron was already as fully connected as it could possibly be would produce only already-known responses because it would already instantiate all its possibilities. This couldn't be the way the human neurological system works because the species wouldn't have survived this long if it were. Individuals deal effectively with the unknown by producing new connections—new interpretations. These are opportunistically assembled by connecting existing paths that have served other purposes. Planning, imagining, and creating take place by means of this slower, connective thinking, though the process is largely opaque to the conscious self. We often don't know how it is that after a while, a solution to a problem "occurs" to us. It seems safe to say that the success of human interpretation depends on the functioning of both the speedy and the slower processes.

The problems with Fodor's original formulation of modularity cannot concern us here, except to say that his model cannot explain the conflicts

we have seen in the discussion above, nor why we would value those conflicts.[12] Ray Jackendoff (1987) has produced a usable version of the modularity hypothesis, exploring some of the evidence that not all levels of all modules are connected with all levels of all others. Jackendoff doesn't take the final step that deconstructionist hermeneutics, for example, takes, to explain why it would actually be counterproductive to close all the gaps.[13]

Connectionist theories are modularity theories in that they recognize localization of brain function.[14] They also tell a convincing story of how the brain grows into modularity, making the numerous connections it needs in its particular environment to coordinate the information from the various modular receptors. The nervous system is not, under this description, a precisely wired system. Daniel Dennett describes it like this:

> In our brains there is a cobbled-together collection of specialist brain circuits, which, thanks to a family of habits inculcated partly by culture and partly by individual self-exploration, conspire together to produce a more or less orderly, more or less effective, more or less well-designed virtual machine. . . . By yoking these independently evolved specialist organs together in common cause, and thereby giving their union vastly enhanced powers, this virtual machine, this software of the brain, performs a sort of internal political miracle: It creates a *virtual captain* of the crew, without elevating any one of them to long-term dictatorial power. Who's in charge? First one coalition and then another, shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits that tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an interminable helter-skelter power grab. (1991: 228)

12. The modularity theory was developed to explain language competence. Fodor's "strong" modularity theory has been seriously compromised by research in vision and psycholinguistics (see Garfield 1987). Connectionist theories have been developed within cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience but have not produced an impressive account of language learning. Although proponents of computational modularity theories and connectionist theorists often describe each other's positions as radically wrong and doomed to fail, they all know that the positions are not in fact mutually exclusive. An outsider such as myself can work with their points of agreement in the attempt to forge a link between brain and interpretive theory. It is important to me, for example, that both theories begin with a recognition that the world is a complicated place with lots of different kinds of stuff in it, and it is unlikely that any single way of receiving and analyzing its stimuli could be adequate. In this, they are both modularity theories, retaining rather than reducing this complexity, which is so important to the theorist of interpretation. A fuller discussion of this issue is available in Spolsky 1993.

13. Interestingly, Harold Bloom's (1975) theory of creativity as misreading seems parallel here. The judges of the Salon of 1863 thought Manet's canvas was full of mistakes, although others demonstrated greater flexibility by interpreting his deviance from the norm as creative.

14. For good summaries of the state of the field and the issues that are now being debated, see Garfield 1987 or Dennett 1991.

In Gerald Edelman's (1989) description, a network of neurons that was born yesterday already has a good many connections constructed according to genetic instructions. The stimuli that pour in through the child's senses stimulate the groups of cells at the receptor sites, and if the organization of a particular group of cells is fortuitously well adapted to the needs of the infant in his or her environment, the connective paths of synapses within the group will be reinforced for future use. Furthermore, a group of neurons which is almost adequate can grow new connections as a result of the stimulation of the environmental input. The neuronal group will be further strengthened by repeated use and will survive, outbidding other cell clusters for the job of mapping for that child what the world out there is like. These maps are then ready to interpret the same or similar kinds of stimuli in the future.

The process of adaptation toward stimuli is dynamic. The brain keeps up with the changes that take place in the body (body growth, brain injury) or in the body's environment by extending new axons and dendrites as needed from the neurons already in place, until a satisfactory arrangement is found. As connectionist theories explain, the precision coding assumed by a binary computational model of the brain would be a distinct disadvantage because it would restrain adaptability. The brain is built, rather, without detailed instructions about how the nerve endings will connect with other neurons or with muscles, but with the innate potential for new growth. This is the only way, the evolutionary biologists argue, that animals could have evolved, as evolution selects for behavior which increases the chances of survival. What Edelman, for example, calls adaptability we can see as creativity in both production and reception.

The modularity theory describes heterogeneity; the connectionist modules have this modularity and more. In addition to postulating neurons that are genetically differentiated so as to react to different aspects of the environment—to light or to sound—they add another source of intra- and interpersonal dissonance. Since each individual's brain grows in response to the particular environment in which it finds itself, each subsystem or module (vision or hearing, say) will develop differently. Assuming normal access to stimuli, each individual will develop an equally adequate but marginally different visual system. Artists can be expected to notice and cultivate these differences.

Neural connections continue to expand with growth and remain revisable throughout the life of the individual. The most basic perceptions of the world differ among people. Mutual attunement and tolerance of difference are good enough most of the time, but are hardly perfect: we cannot,

in an ideal sense, assume that everyone sees the same green. But here we must remember that the modules within a single mind/brain are valuable precisely because they deal with fundamentally different kinds of information. The awkwardness of our performance when we try to translate visual images into words, for example, is, in this theory, a true reflection of the internal limits of communication among the heterogeneous modular processes.

Here, then, is the confluence between interpretive theory and brain theory. Philosophers and poets have long noticed that language cannot entirely recreate what one sees or feels. Recent theory has emphasized not only the inadequacy of verbal description vis-à-vis visual or sensual experience, but also the power of words to suggest (not only to hearers but to speakers themselves) images, sensations, and thoughts beyond those of their original context. The brain theory confirms that these features of language are not merely matters of local inadequacy—gaps that a larger vocabulary or a new metaphor could fill. The phenomenon of incommensurable readings is not accidental and is not open to correction; it is built into the structure of the brain, and provides openings for imaginative leaps on which initially survival, and eventually complex thinking, depend.

The conclusion I want to draw from this discussion is not about kinesis or about kinesthetics or about pictures, but about cognition. Our interpretations of the pied beauty of the world are, as Edelman says, "neither complete nor error free," and brain processes are "adaptive rather than strictly veridical" (1989: 264, 316). It seems clear that adding channels of knowledge cannot automatically be assumed to confirm or reinforce knowledge from other channels. What we can say, however, from the evidence of the interaction of visual, kinesic, linguistic, and social/pragmatic competencies brought to bear on the set of pictures examined above, is that knowledge from one channel can be counted on to *elaborate* knowledge from other channels.

Elaborated knowledge is the product of multiple channels of knowing, each of which is phenomenologically distinct. The distinctions are maintained in an individual's experience; for example, the experience of seeing is different from the experience of remembering a story that is accompanied by visual images. When the task of interpretation is not under time pressure (and this itself is part of our traditional idea of what an aesthetic experience is), the creative—that is, the recombinatory—possibilities of the system can be allowed to flower. We have here, then, the basis for a theory of knowledge that could distinguish a realm of the esthetic not by the claim that its processes are different in kind, but rather by an appre-

ciation of the complexity of the interpretation.[15] The production of that interpretation, furthermore, is slow and notoriously open to challenge and revision by the interpreter herself as well as by others. Aesthetic understanding, in this view, is elaborated knowledge. As a distinguishable kind of knowing, it largely overlaps (how largely remains to be determined) with understanding in fields such as philosophy, political science, physics, and psychology, in which complex and unstable interpretations are produced idiosyncratically.

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15. Complexity is used here in the technical sense: a system that is complex is neither entirely random, nor rule-governed.

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