

## SECONDARY MEANING, PARAPHRASEABILITY & PICTURES. FROM HOFMANNSTHAL TO WITTGENSTEIN

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- §2 On the Austro-German Philosophy of Lyric Poetry

### §1 An Austrian Tale

What is a meaning ? There is a well-known, indirect answer to the question : meaning is what is common to, for example, both an English sentence and its French translation. “Female Kantians are admirable” and « Les kantiennes sont admirables » surely express the very same meaning, sense or thought. Many sentences in everyday life and in science can be translated and paraphrased without loss of meaning. But the sentences which make up a successful lyric poem are frequently said to be non-translatable. Even a paraphrase of such sentences seems to omit part of their meaning. These apparent commonplaces were the focus of a great deal of reflection by many Austrian poets and writers and also by many Austrian and some German philosophers during the first half of the twentieth century. These reflections went in very many directions. They led to philosophies of lyric poetry and of other forms of verbal art, of analogues of non-paraphraseability in non-verbal art, of figurative language, metaphors, similes, synaesthesia, feelings and moods, kitsch, images, *Gestalten*, style and cultural morphology, of the distinction between representation and expression, and of the relation between literature and knowledge. They are central to the understanding some of the most important Austrian thinkers and writers had of their vocations. They led to critiques of politics, culture and journalism, and much else besides.

In what follows I first document the interest in the inseparability of form and content in Austrian literature and then consider what light the philosophers throw on the phenomenon.

That the content of fine poetry cannot be paraphrased without loss is an old idea for which the second Duke of Buckingham found a new expression. Such content, he said, cannot be “transposed”. An early Austrian opponent of transposition is Hugo von Hofmannsthal in 1893:

If you separate form from content you are not creative artists

Form is the sense of content, content the essence of form<sup>1</sup>.

Four years later he sketches many of the ideas at the heart of what was to become an Austrian obsession:

Man hört nicht selten die Rede: ein Dichterwerk sei mit bildlichem Ausdruck geziert, reich an Bildern. Dies muss eine falsche Anschauung hervorrufen, als seien die Bilder - Metaphern - etwas allenfalls Entbehrliches, dem eigentlichen Stoff, aus welchem Gedichtetes besteht,

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<sup>1</sup> Hofmannsthal 1946 167.

äusserlich Aufgeheftetes. Vielmehr aber ist der uneigentliche, der bildliche Ausdruck Kern und Wesen aller Poesie: jede Dichtung ist durch und durch ein Gebilde aus uneigentlichen Ausdrücken.

Die "Handlungen", die "Gestalten" sind nichts anderes, wofern man das Wort nur recht versteht: Gleichnisse, aus vielen Gleichnissen zusammengesetzt. Mit der Sprache ist es nicht anders, nur sind es unter den Redenden die Dichter allein, die sich des Gleichnishaften der Sprache unaufhörlich bewusst bleiben.

Was der Dichter in seinen unaufhörlichen Gleichnissen sagt, das lässt sich niemals auf irgendeine andere Weise (ohne Gleichnisse) sagen: nur das Leben vermag das gleiche auszudrücken, aber in seinem Stoff, wortlos.

Die Leute suchen gern hinter einem Gedicht, was sie den "eigentlichen Sinn" nennen. Sie sind wie die Affen, die auch immer mit den Händen hinter einen Spiegel fahren, als müsse *dort* ein Körper zu fassen sein<sup>2</sup>.

In 1907 the critic, Franz Blei, in the course of praising a translation of Wilde's poems by Gisela Etzel, writes that Wilde's poem "The Sphinx"

is language and nothing else. So much nothing but language that one wonders whether what is born only and so completely of language, of words with a particular sound (*Klänge*), a peculiar coloration and position with respect to each other, is at all translatable, ... I know, I know, that sounds alone do not determine a poem and that only criticism can separate what coincides: content and form. But I believe that poems, which are close to the essence of music, undergo formal arrangement and guidance more than any other series of words.

Nevertheless, he says, Etzel's translations are "Wilde's poems and they are German poems"<sup>3</sup>. Between 1910 and 1912 Austrian declarations about inseparability multiply. In 1911 Blei declares:

If one distinguishes between object and form, content and style – and the distinction is possible -, one distinguishes outside the poem<sup>4</sup>.

What a poem 'means' (*meint*) is always to be answered with the poem, never in any other way... What a poet *meant* can only be said with his words and in his language... The impossibility of explaining a poem in words other than those of the poet, this is an indication of artistic excellence.<sup>5</sup>

And what is true of poetry is true of works of art in general:

People, like theoreticians, forget the poet. He, too, first learns what he 'meant' from his poem. If he knew that completely beforehand, he would no longer have any reason to write the poem.

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<sup>2</sup> Hofmannsthal, "Bildlicher Ausdruck", in Hofmannsthal 1956 286.

<sup>3</sup> Blei 1907 109.

<sup>4</sup> Blei 1912 45.

<sup>5</sup> Blei 1912 46-7. Musil endorses the same criterion of artistic excellence (Musil 1983a 1149).

The work of art means nothing other than itself and this meaning (*Meinung*) can only be expressed in the language of the work of art.<sup>6</sup>

In 1911 Kraus formulates what is perhaps the best known statement of the inseparability of form and content in Austrian literature in his attack on Heine. The German poet is accused of introducing into German a French disease, the mere „coexistence of form and content in which there is neither quarrel nor unity“, the ancestor of journalistic ornamentation as a form of life.<sup>7</sup> In the same year, in a letter to Scheffer, Musil comments on his „Vereinigungen“:

der Tenor des Buches erwächst...aus einem Mittelding von Sprache und Gegenständlichkeit; das Bild ist nicht Ornament, sondern Bedeutungsträger, eine neue Wendung des Gegenstandes und - da dies wohl noch überhaupt von jedem nicht überflüssigen Bilde gilt, möchte ich weiter spezifizieren: eine Wendung, tatsächlich mehr denn sonst des Gegenstandes als des Gefühls vom Gegenstande im Beschauer, - im Gegensatz zu seiner üblichen Verwendung. Das Bildliche hat hier mehr Begriffliches in sich als sonst normal ist, mehr von der Rolle der direkten Beschreibung des äußeren u. inneren Geschehens. Darum ist das Bild kaum mehr Bild sondern eigentlicher u wesentlicher Ausdruck.

Keine Wendung des Beschauers sondern ein Zuwachs des Gegenstandes.<sup>8</sup>

Musil then writes to Blei, referring to their recent discussion and to his „Vereinigungen“:

Ich möchte nämlich sagen,...daß in den Novellen von dem Ausdruck, der Art des Sagens, insonders dem Bildlichen u Parabolischen eine von der Norm abweichender Gebrauch gemacht wird. Es ist nicht sekundär, Zierrat u. bloß ergänzender Beitrag zu dem, was erzählt wird, sondern ein primärer, integrierender u. ganz wesentlicher Bestandteil dessen selbst. Die Bilder gehören zum Knochenbau des Buchs,...<sup>9</sup>

The ideas sketched in these letters had already been developed by Musil in a fragment entitled „Form und Inhalt“, to which we shall return, and figure prominently in his wonderful address on Rilke and „Literat und Literatur“.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Blei 1912 72, cf. 278-9. The view that a poet or writer makes discoveries in the process of writing and that art communicates knowledge goes back to the influential monograph of Konrad Fiedler (1887), a Munich aesthete. The view is explored by Scheler, Musil and Broch. Blei has much to say of interest about the relation between form and content. Thus he compares the poetry of his contemporaries to eighteenth century poets as follows: the latter „füllten nichts als eine von der Konvention getragene Form mit verstandesmäßigen Inhalten und gaben das Musikalische der Sprache, die latente Musik des Wortes ganz an die Musik, die daraus ihren schon nicht geringen Besitzstand ins Ungeheure steigerte. Der Vokalismus, der die Musik des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts auszeichnet, ist ebenso wie ihr Melos auf die Entfernung beider aus dem Gedichte nicht zum geringsten zurückzuführen. Die rücklaufende Bewegung der späteren Zeit mag dies bestätigen....Während unser Gedicht in George, Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Walser, Dauthendey, Schröder, den Reichtum gewann der die Musik des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts auszeichnete. Zu diesen Gedichten ist keine Musik mehr zu machen, denn ihre innere Musik ist grösser als irgendeine, welche heutige Musikanten imstande wären...“ (Blei 1911 287-8).

<sup>7</sup> Kraus 1986 36, cf. 43.

<sup>8</sup> Musil 1981 86.

<sup>9</sup> Musil 1981 87.

<sup>10</sup> Musil 1983 1299-1242, 1229-1242, 1203-1225. Austro-Hungarian interest in non-paraphraseability, which is omnipresent in the writings of the authors already quoted but also in the writings of, for example, Balázs, Kassner and Broch, has many possible sources. Formalist aesthetics in the Austrian Herbartian tradition (Zimmermann, Hanslick), according to which only form pleases aesthetically, was rejected by a member of the tradition, Nahlowsky, and also by Vischer (cf. Jäger 1982) and Fiedler. Another possible source is Nietzsche's

As already noted, the phenomenon of inseparability had an importance which was thought to go well beyond the context of poetry. Here the two most striking illustrations are provided by Kraus and Wittgenstein.

Kraus seems to have thought that linguistic, epistemic and aesthetic virtue, and in particular the inseparability of form and content, are not only inseparable from ethical and political virtue but that they wear the trousers. He seems, as Bouveresse puts it, to have adhered to a principle that might be formulated as follows: "Take care of language and language will take care not only of thought but also of reality itself!"<sup>11</sup>; „in a way, it is the critique of language which becomes social and political critique ».<sup>12</sup>

His "ethics of language" (Brecht) thus easily attracts the same criticism he levels against Heine and many others. As Blei puts it, "Kraus honed his sentences, never his thoughts"<sup>13</sup>. Musil's more judicious judgment exempts Kraus's satirical prose from the verdict of his friend:

Seine mehr mit Beziehungs- als Bedeutungsfülle geladene Sprache deckt vollkommen ihr Gebiet der satirischen Prosa, für das sie geschaffen wurde, verliert ihre persönliche Ausdruckskraft aber in der dichterischen Prosa und im Vers.<sup>14</sup>

One of the many puzzling aspects of Kraus' views is his requirement that the prose of journalists should be as inseparable from its content as the form of poetry. One may well think that the prose of a journalist who avoids clichés, stock phrases and cant and describes clearly and freshly what he has seen and learned does not also have to satisfy the requirement that what he says be inseparable from the way he says it. Is the prose of journalism not allowed to be, like that of every-day life and science, paraphraseable and translatable without loss? But this is not Kraus' view. Journalism, he thinks, has created a public for which "the art of the word" is nothing more than the ability to make an opinion clear; one writes, he comments

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description of Horace in *The Twilight of the Idols* ('My Indebtedness to the Ancients'; on « the union of form and content » in Nietzsche cf. Warner 1989 316-323; on the influence of Nietzsche on form and content on Kraus, see Timms 1986 192-195). Hofmannsthal's reflections may well have grown out of his encounters with the German poet Stefan George in Vienna. Both Blei and Kraus were influenced by Oscar Wilde ("Art never expresses anything but itself", *The Decay of Lying*; on Wilde and Kraus, see Timms 1986 188-192) and Blei also by Wilde's French masters. And Austrian poets were perhaps familiar with Rückert's

Was ist ein Sinnbild? Was der schöne Name meint:

Ein Sinn, mit einem Bild aufs innigste vereint.

Ein tiefer Sinn, der in ein schönes Bild sich senkt,

Ein schönes Bild, bei dem ein tiefer Sinn sich denkt.

Schön sei das Bild und klar, tief sei der Sinn und wahr,

Und miteinander eins untrennbar sei das Paar.

Twentieth century interest in the inseparability of form and content is by no means limited to Austria-Hungary. A. C. Bradley's 1901 lecture « Poetry for Poetry's sake » makes many of the claims to be found in the writings of his Austrian contemporaries (Bradley 1926).

<sup>11</sup> Bouveresse 2007 142-3.

<sup>12</sup> Bouveresse 2007 144. Cf. Timms 1986 341, 393. In Kraus' *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, the Optimist twits the Grumbler with just this view.

<sup>13</sup> Blei 1940 55. Blei also refers to Kraus' "apodictic career", which left no room for criticism or doubts (Blei 1940 54).

<sup>14</sup> Musil 1983a 1660. Language which displays this « fullness of relations » is also described by Musil as the mutual irradiation of words (Musil 1981 84). Similarly, Ingarden (1972 151) refers to the "opalescence" of expressions in literary works.

contemptuously, “‘about’” something<sup>15</sup>. This is one aspect of what Bouveresse calls Kraus’ ‘mythopoeic’ approach<sup>16</sup>.

The inseparability of form and content is not only, as we shall see, a recurrent topic of Wittgenstein’s reflections, but one of the striking features of Wittgenstein’s life and *oeuvre*. His friend, Ludwig Hänsel, tells us that he had never met anyone in whom life and writing were so intimately connected.<sup>17</sup> This writing, doing philosophy, Wittgenstein himself tells us, involves working on oneself<sup>18</sup>. The form of the *Tractatus*, for example its decimal numbering system, has, it has been claimed, a rhythmical, musical structure<sup>19</sup>, a structure which differs markedly from that of the other great Austrian treatises (in seven parts) on logic of Bolzano and Husserl and their incessant paraphrases and repetitions. Wittgenstein indeed says of his treatise that his work is “rigorously philosophical and at the same time literary” (letter to Ficker, 7.10.1919).

Form, whether we are speaking about a poem, a treatise such as the *Tractatus*, a life or goods, is an ingredient of style. In a late remark Wittgenstein says:

“Le style c’est l’homme.” “Le style c’est l’homme même.” The first expression has a cheap epigrammatic brevity. The second, correct expression, opens up a quite different perspective. It says that style is the *picture* (*Bild*, image) of the man.<sup>20</sup>

Buffon’s sentence had been quoted by Kraus in 1921<sup>21</sup>, of whom it has also often been said that the man and the *oeuvre* are inseparable<sup>22</sup>. A few years earlier Scheler notes the connexion between style as a picture and types of humanity. Misquoting Buffon and bemoaning the lack of form of German life and goods, he claims that

the fundamental reason for the formlessness of our goods and in particular for the lack of a plastic, national form lies in the deeper cause which, in this sphere too, is indicated by »Le style c’est l’homme“.<sup>23</sup>

German goods will only possess a form, he tells his contemporaries, when there is a „plastic, complete model (*Gesamtvorbild*) of German humanity, a national style to succeed the Biedermeier style, one which would be comparable to such models or exemplars as the Gentleman or the Bushido. Without such a style, the formation of Germans lacks a pictorial or graphic standard (*bildhafter Maßstab*).<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> "Pro domo et mundo", in Kraus 1986a, 232.

<sup>16</sup> Bouveresse 2007 50

<sup>17</sup> Hänsel 1957 357.

<sup>18</sup> Wittgenstein 1984 472.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Kienzel 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Wittgenstein 1984 561. On Wittgenstein on style, see Schulte’s excellent paper (Schulte 1990).

<sup>21</sup> Kraus, *Die Fackel* 1921 65. Heine, too, had quoted Buffon’s remark, in his discussion of Platen.

<sup>22</sup> This view of Kraus is documented and criticised by Timms : in the case of Kraus, “the ‘style’ is by no means ‘the man himself’” (Timms 1986 169).

<sup>23</sup> Scheler 1982 326. Scheler’s philosophy of style and of structural similarities between aspects of cultures and civilisations builds on Duhem and anticipates ideas to be made popular by Spengler. The questions Scheler attempts to answer in this part of his philosophy are often questions of great interest to Wittgenstein.

<sup>24</sup> Scheler 1982 326. Blei, a friend of Scheler’s, or one of the other authors of *Das grosse Bestiarium*, asserts that, according to Buffon, „Style is of the man“ but goes on to say that what Buffon means is that style is „the

Although, as we have seen, reflection on the inseparability of form and content in poetry leads in very many directions, we must here limit ourselves to considering the starting point for such developments.

## §2 On the Philosophy of Lyric Poetry

The beginnings of a philosophy of lyric poetry within Austro-German philosophy emerge almost in parallel with the declarations of Austrian writers already quoted. A debate between Meinong and his student Witasek in 1904 is followed by Wolf Dohrn's 1907 monograph *Die künstlerische Darstellung als Problem der Aesthetik*, Johannes Pfeiffer's 1931 *Das lyrische Gedicht als ästhetisches Gebilde. Ein phänomenologischer Versuch* and subsequent publications, and Friedrich Kramář's 1940 *Die schematisierte Ansicht in der Lyrik. Ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Formbegriffs*<sup>25</sup>. During this period Musil, the philosopher amongst the Austrian writers, and Wittgenstein, as well as the graphologist and guru of *Lebensphilosophie*, Ludwig Klages, reflect at length on the relation between form and content in poetry.<sup>26</sup>

This philosophy of lyric poetry is, in many respects, an Austro-Munich phenomenon. Dohrn, Pfeiffer and Kramář all belong to the tradition of phenomenology inaugurated by the Austrian philosopher Husserl. Meinong, Witasek, Wittgenstein and Musil are all Austrian thinkers (not an epithet they would all have approved of). Dohrn and Klages, like Stefan George, were all associated with Munich. Dohrn was a member of the group of realist phenomenologists in Munich, a group strongly influenced by Lipps, who also strongly influenced Klages.

The philosophies of lyric poetry mentioned all assume that questions like the following all have to be answered. What is the relation between expression and representation and guidance or steering in the experience of reading poetry? What is the relation between these three linguistic functions in poetry and in ordinary uses of language? What rôles do affective phenomena, for example moods and emotions, and their objects, play in reading or listening to poetry? What is the role played by images (*Bilder*, pictures)? What rôles are

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sign of a human intelligence and sensibility...and can vary only with the person". He then attributes to Buffon the sentence « le style est l'homme même » (Blei 1922 224-5). A normally severe critic, Ernst Robert Curtius, warmly praises Blei, his *Bestiarium* and the theory of literature it contains, for example Blei's point that style is not subject to the will (Curtius 1922). On the now forgotten ideas shared by Curtius, Blei and, for example, Hofmannsthal, see the pioneering article by Lombardo (Lombardo 1995).

<sup>25</sup> Pfeiffer 1931 is a Freiburg dissertation, which was examined by Oskar Becker and Husserl, Pfeiffer's teacher. Kramář 1940 is a Vienna dissertation which may have begun life as a thesis supervised by Charlotte or Karl Bühler.

<sup>26</sup> By no means all Austrian thinkers accept that form and content are of equal value. Freud says: "I have often noticed that the content of a work of art attracts me more strongly than its formal and technical properties, which the artist regards as the most important" (Freud 1991 257). This passage is gleefully quoted and exploited by Bühler (1929 165), in the course of an extended criticism of Freud's account of pleasure. Freud has Goethe, at least in one mood, on his side. As Meinong (1968 372) notes, in Book 11 of *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Goethe sides with the friends of paraphraseable content and says that what is deep in poetry is what remains of the poet "when he is translated into prose".

played by the formal dimensions of poetic language ? As we shall see, the answers given to our questions raise many new questions.

Meinong and Witasek discuss our question in the course of arguing about whether aesthetic emotions can be based on assumptions (make-believe judgements, suppositions), the objects of which are objectives (states of affairs, propositions). Witasek's argument for the inseparability of form and content is part of a critical discussion of views of Meinong. Witasek quotes Eichendorff's lines

Ich ging im Walde so für mich hin,  
und nichts zu suchen, das war mein Sinn...

Their aesthetic effect cannot, he argues, merely be due to the meaning of these lines or to the state of affairs they represent, important though this is. The states of affairs represented in a novel or a poem are not themselves the bearers of aesthetic properties. They are the vehicle of the bearers of such properties:

the beauty of the novel depends on its content, but only in roughly the way in which the value of a ship bearing precious objects depends on the ship, of the scent of blossom on the wind that passes over the lilac.<sup>27</sup>

Although the represented states of affairs are essential to the aesthetic effect, the direct bearers thereof are the presentations and their objects which go to make up the thoughts and the states of affairs these represent. It is the way such presentations present what they present and the way they are expressed that produces the aesthetic effect. In 1910 Meinong concedes to his pupil that the favourite school exercise of translating poems into prose has indeed verified thousands of times the point that this is the way to destroy all poetic content. But, he objects, the process of translation does not leave the state of affairs represented by a poem unchanged. The aesthetic significance and worth of an objective is due to certain properties of the "material" of the poetically represented state of affairs<sup>28</sup>.

In his 1907 monograph, Dohrn<sup>29</sup>, going beyond what Husserl and Lipps had said about meaning and expression, though staying much closer to Husserl than to Lipps, puts forward an important general claim about the relation between what is expressed and the way it is expressed. The relation between "expression and what is expressed" is

immediately to be distinguished from the likewise symbolic relation between meaning and what is meant. What is expressed is simply unique, it cannot, as it is, be given in any other expression. What is meant can change its sign, not arbitrarily [*regellos*] but within certain limits. Furthermore everyone sees that to say a sentence means a certain object and that it

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<sup>27</sup> Witasek 1904 169ff.

<sup>28</sup> Meinong 1977 §55 318-9.

<sup>29</sup> Dohrn took part in the discussions of the Munich group of realist phenomenologists and describes his monograph as an application of what Husserl had said about logical problems to aesthetics (Dohrn 1907, vi, 23). Parts 4 and 5 of his monograph apply his account of expression and aesthetic representation to Goethe's *Werther*. Its motto is taken from Winkelmann, "Il difficile è l'individuare". Dohrn makes extensive use of Lipps' account of *Einfühlung* (empathy). On Dohrn and for a development of related ideas, see Stein 1980, 55f., 85f..

expresses a certain experience is not to say the same thing. In so far as they are used in the living intercourse of language words do both.<sup>30</sup>

Whereas Meinong and Witasek merely claim that what a poem says and the way it says it are not at all independently variable, Dohrn claims that wherever there is expression the media employed are unparaphraseable and that this feature of expression in ordinary uses of language is what lyric poetry exploits, that in the "interaction between meaning and expression"<sup>31</sup> in poetry it is expression which wears the trousers. Dohrn's claim is also, as we shall see, at the heart of the philosophies of Pfeiffer and Kramař. Wittgenstein, too, thinks that the phenomenon of inseparability is linked to features of the relation of expression:

It may be that if it is to achieve its effect a particular word cannot be replaced by any other; *just as it may be that a gesture cannot be replaced by any other.* (The word has a *soul* and not just a meaning.) No one would believe that a poem remained *essentially unaltered* if its words were replaced by others in accordance with an appropriate convention<sup>32</sup>.

In a discussion of the facial expression of fear, Wittgenstein even says that "the fear has the multiplicity of the facial features. And if, for example, the features change slightly, we can speak of a corresponding change in the fear".<sup>33</sup> Just how strong is the relation between a mental state and the words, gestures or facial expressions which express it? Is it true that a mental state which is expressed by a particular sign could not have been expressed in any other way? Answers to these questions are needed if the expression relation is to be employed in a philosophy of lyric poetry. Such a philosophy should also bear in mind that in ordinary cases the expression of sadness in a face may correspond to no sadness in the bearer of the face. Wittgenstein points out that two types of expression should be distinguished and that there is no sharp dividing line between them. We often, he says, think

of the utterance of an emotion as though it were some artificial device to let others know that we have it. Now there is no sharp line between such 'artificial devices' and what one might call the natural expressions of emotion. Cf. in this respect: *a)* weeping, *b)* raising one's voice when one is angry, *c)* writing an angry letter, *d)* ringing the bell for a servant you wish to scold.<sup>34</sup>

In the following formulation of the relation between communication in ordinary contexts and poetry, Wittgenstein is perhaps assuming that the types of variation which are possible in the former case are not possible in the latter case:

The way music speaks. Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of information (*Mitteilung*), is not used in the language-game of giving information<sup>35</sup>

Musil's *Nachlass* contains a related contrast:

Literature (*Dichtung*) does not convey knowledge...Literature uses knowledge, of the inner world as of the outer world.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Dohrn 1907 59.

<sup>31</sup> Dohrn 1907 62.

<sup>32</sup> Wittgenstein 1973 69 ; first emphasis mine – KM.

<sup>33</sup> Wittgenstein 1973 176.

<sup>34</sup> Wittgenstein 1972 103. One philosopher who misunderstands the relation between natural and artificial expression is Klages, as Bühler demonstrates at length in his *Ausdruckstheorie*, which appeared just before Wittgenstein dictated the just quoted remark (Bühler 1933, ch. IX, 152-194).

<sup>35</sup> Wittgenstein 1967 §160 28.



But Musil also says that “in the end, the language of a poem is a language too, hence above all a communication (*Mitteilung*)...”. Its “meaning-content” (*Sinngehalt*) is “modified” in a way peculiar to the poem<sup>37</sup>. Wittgenstein and Musil, then, agree that the language of poetry depends on and modifies everyday, communicative language. But Musil also thinks that poetry and literature have a cognitive content.

The negative claim that form and content are inseparable is not very informative if it is unpacked only in terms of non-translatableability or non-paraphraseability. One positive claim about the relation between form and content is that they form a *Gestalt*. One of the best formulations of this view is due to Musil. Form and content are not merely mutually dependent, he says; there is “an interpenetration of form and content” which together form a *Gestalt* which has a distinctive quality of its own. Musil notes that the precise nature of *Gestalten* is a matter of controversy but thinks, like the founder of Gestalt psychology, Christian von Ehrenfels, that the formation of *Gestalten* “plays a great rôle everywhere in dealing with the tasks set by life”.<sup>38</sup> When Musil describes the simplest sorts of *Gestalt* perception, for example of a figure in some lines, of a melody in a series of sounds, he says that what emerges in such perception is “no longer a mere sensory impression, and is not yet the content of distinct concepts”<sup>39</sup>. (Wittgenstein makes a more specific claim: in many cases of aspect perception, the latter lies between seeing and thinking). And he suggests that something like what occurs in simple perceptual cases occurs when we hear, read and understand lines of poetry as they ought to be understood.<sup>40</sup>

As we have seen, many of the writers and philosophers quoted so far assume, often without argument, that experience of moods, in one or another sense of the term, and images (pictures, *Bilder*) are essential to the aesthetic experience of the reader of successful lyric poetry.<sup>41</sup> What, then, are moods and pictures ?

### **Images (Pictures)**

In 1910 Kraus says about Goethe’s „Über allen Gipfeln“, a poem which figures prominently in his reflections and those of Musil<sup>42</sup>:

Wie über allen Gipfeln Ruh' ist, teilt sich Goethe, teilt er uns in so groß empfundener Nähe mit, daß die Stille sich als eine Ahnung hören läßt<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> Musil 1983 967.

<sup>37</sup> Musil 1983a 1212.

<sup>38</sup> Musil 1983a 1218-1219.

<sup>39</sup> Musil 1983a 1222, cf. 1212.

<sup>40</sup> Musil knew the works of the Berlin Gestalt psychologists (Köhler, Koffka, Lewin) and Wittgenstein, too, refers to some of their writings. But in many respects the views of Musil and Wittgenstein about the perception of aspects and *Gestalten* are closer to the views of the first Gestalt psychologists, in Graz (Meinong, Witasek, Ameseder, Benussi) and Vienna (Bühler).

<sup>41</sup> On objections to the assumption, see Kramář 1941 88ff., Ingarden 1965.

<sup>42</sup> Wittgenstein and Bühler (1929 48) also refer to Goethe’s lines.

<sup>43</sup> Kraus 1986 48.

This stillness is perhaps heard but it is also something the reader or listener imagines hearing. Stillness is an example of what Kramař calls a perceptual or intuitive aspect (*Ansicht*). Aspects (pictures, images and objective appearances) are a category often appealed to in the philosophy of perception. The first philosophy of the rôle of aspects in the literary work of art is given by the Polish phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden, in his 1931 *Das literarische Kunstwerk*<sup>44</sup>. Aspects, he argues, constitute one of the strata of literary works of art such as novels, along with the meanings of sentences and the states of affairs these represent. They are the ways in which characters, actions, scenes and their interrelations are presented. Aspects are not only visual but also auditive and tactile. (Similarly, Meinong and Wittgenstein use „Aspekt“ to refer to visual and non-visual aspects). In ordinary perception, aspects typically flow continuously into one another. But in the imaginings which go to make up reading a literary work of art aspects are determined by linguistic meaning rather than perceptual information and are thus merely *schematised aspects*. The latter are not merely the objects of aesthetic experience they are also made and held available (*paratgehalten*) by the literary work of art<sup>45</sup>. They are permanent possibilities or rather potentialities which may be actualised and also completed by the reader. The literary work of art, Ingarden argues, does not represent aspects, as it represents scenes and actions. Aspects are projected (shown) by metaphors, similes and other types of figurative language, and by rhythm.

Kramař develops Ingarden's account and applies it to lyric poetry showing in great detail how, for example, slight modifications of the word-order of lyric poetry can disrupt the presentation of aspects and how certain rhythms and aspects or pictures exclude each other.<sup>46</sup> One novel feature of his account is the use he makes of Klages' (controversial) distinction between *Takt* ("beat", time, measure), the repetition of the same, and rhythm, the repetition of what is similar. His taxonomy of aspects distinguishes static and dynamic aspects, aspects presented with and without the help of figurative language, and organic and inorganic aspects, as well as a variety of aspects - in the poetry of Goethe, Mörike, George and Rilke - which bursts the bounds of such elementary taxonomies<sup>47</sup>.

### **Feeling Characters & Other Characters**

Closely related to the category of intuitive pictures, images or appearances is the category of *feeling characters*, a category often overlooked by philosophers of emotions, although it figures prominently in what artists say about lyric poetry. In a discussion of a transposition of Goethe's "Lichtlein schwimmen auf dem Strome/Kinder singen auf dem Brücken" (*St. Nepomuks Vorabend*) Musil says (in a passage which deploys a number of technical terms from Husserl) that its object or intentional object is not any state of affairs, but

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<sup>44</sup> Ingarden 1965, in particular §40. Waldemar Conrad had anticipated Ingarden's account of aspects in art. Ingarden's account of aspects in ordinary perception is to be found in (Ingarden 1997 75ff.).

<sup>45</sup> In the philosophy of non-translatable uses of language are compared to kinetic energy and more or less untranslatable uses to potential energy; we are also told that Musil suggests instead of "potential" the term "iridescent" (Blei 1922 222-223).

<sup>46</sup> Kramař 1941 36-37, 45-47, 57-8, 85-87. Cf. Pfeiffer 1940 16.

<sup>47</sup> Must lyric poetry always present aspects? On contents of « atemporal generality » in lyric poetry, cf. Pfeiffer 1931 48-53.

a “‘mood’” (*Stimmung*) or something emotional<sup>48</sup>. Elsewhere he refers to a *Stimmungswert* or atmospheric value, a term also employed by Riegl. The object of Goethe’s verse and of its paraphrase are not the same and “the unity between form and the object of the poem is very intimate”.

When a poet refers to the moods bound up with reading or listening to lyric poetry he may, of course, have in mind the moods felt by the reader or poet. When Hofmannsthal says that a poem is a “weightless web of words which produces a *Stimmung*”<sup>49</sup> he perhaps has in mind the reader’s affective response to poetry. When Wittgenstein says he knows Schiller’s “*poetische Stimmung*”, in which one is receptive to nature, in which thoughts seem to be as *lebhaft* as nature<sup>50</sup>, he is referring to a mental or psychological state or disposition. Sometimes a reference to the moods expressed by lyric poetry is a reference to a “lyric self”, either to its moods or to the atmospheric values with which it is presented.<sup>51</sup>

What are these atmospheric values ? Consider cheerfulness and sadness. We predicate cheerfulness of both persons and colours. Similarly, we predicate sadness of both people and landscapes. The cheerfulness of a colour and the sadness or melancholy aspect of a landscape, the exultant aspect or plaintiveness of a melody were called feeling characters by Moritz Geiger, a realist phenomenologist from Munich.<sup>52</sup> Feeling characters belong to a larger family illustrated by predications or impressions to the effect that blue is quiet, violet solemn, a line meanders or a column rises. Characters, then, correspond to affective, vital or behavioural properties of organisms. They are not value properties although the distinction is not always observed, perhaps because the psychological counterparts of feeling characters often exemplify value properties<sup>53</sup>. A poem may present or show despair whether or not it is also about, contains predications of, despair.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Musil 1983a 1299-1300.

<sup>49</sup> „Poesie und Leben“, Hofmannsthal 1956 263.

<sup>50</sup> Wittgenstein 1984 112.

<sup>51</sup> Musil rejects the view that the expression (*Kundgeben*) peculiar to literature is any sort of subjective utterance or expression (Musil 1983a 1224).

<sup>52</sup> Geiger (1911 20). Scheler (1966 263) calls the sadness in a landscape, the calm of a river, the serenity of the heavens “emotional, qualitative characters” (*emotionale qualitative Charaktere*), and “objective mood characters” (*gegenständlichen Stimmungs-Charakteren*) Geiger’s subjects call feeling characters „atmospheres“ (Geiger 1911 7). Such atmospheres have come in for a great deal of attention in recent German philosophy influenced by Klages. See, for example, Andermann & Eberlein (eds.) 2011. Geiger’s account is in some respects anticipated by Weininger’s development of Avenarius’ account of what he also calls “characters”.

<sup>53</sup> Geiger also distinguishes his feeling characters from what he calls « object characters » such as the warmth and coldness of colours, the sharpness or breadth of tones (1911 21-22), novelty and familiarity (Geiger 1911 23). Do the clarity and darkness of tones belong here ? A minority view, defended by Brentano, has it that the clarity of colours and of sounds is the very same feature. Words, too, Geiger points out, have their characters. “Ross” sounds distinguished, “Gaul” undistinguished. They also have feeling characters: the feeling character of the adjective in “high prices” and “high mountains” is not the same. Translations of poems which reproduce the sound and the sense of the original may therefore well fail to reproduce the feeling characters of words. Familiarity and novelty, he adds, also belong to the characters of words in poems. Geiger’s philosophy of characters anticipates a large empirical literature (cf. Wertheimer 1960) and indeed the reflections of Wittgenstein on just the phenomena described by Geiger. The last word on characters by a member of the Munich group of phenomenologists is perhaps to be found in von Hildebrand’s *Ästhetik*: on feeling characters, see Hildebrand 1977 174-8, on word characters and on their fit or adequacy, see Hildebrand 1984 268ff.

<sup>54</sup> Pfeiffer 1940 22.

We can begin to locate the peculiarities of feeling characters by contrasting them not just with feelings or emotions but with other possible objects of emotions. The emotion of fear, according to many philosophies of emotions, has two distinct objects: the dog, for example, and its danger. Similarly, indignation's object is a certain situation or action and its injustice. Feeling characters, it seems, are a third, distinct type of object of emotions. As Geiger and his subjects put it, the cheerfulness of a colour seems to cover the colour, to be where the colour is. Feeling characters seem to spread themselves over objects and, to this extent, to be objective. Thus a situation may be fearful. Although emotions can project or reveal feeling characters, the latter, Geiger suggests, can also be given in the absence of all emotions<sup>55</sup>. The latter claim may, of course, be rejected. The choice here resembles a choice concerning other aspects of emotions. Philosophers who think of emotions as being directed towards objects (a dog, a past deed) and values (its danger, its shamefulness) disagree about whether the value of an object is revealed only by emotion or is typically grasped before the emotion. One possible view of the objects of emotions, then, is that where an emotion has three objects – things, creatures or situations, values and feeling characters – grasp of objects of the second and third kind precedes the emotion. According to another view, only emotions can disclose feeling characters and values. And a third view is that our relation to feeling characters differs from our relation to values.

Wittgenstein famously says that the world of the happy woman differs from the world of the unhappy woman (*Tractatus* 6.43). And in his *Notebooks* he says that „the world of the happy is a happy world (29.7.16). Whatever Wittgenstein may have meant, it seems plausible to say that a female Kantian who is happy about her life is intentionally directed towards three things, her life, her good luck and the shimmer of the feeling character of happiness, sunniness, through which her life, her happy world, appears to her. As Husserl puts it, anticipating later accounts of feeling characters, in “joy about some happy event” the event itself seems to be “coloured by pleasure (*lustgefärbt*)”<sup>56</sup>.

What is the relation between the sensory or intuitive pictures or aspects we have considered and what have been called feeling characters? Kramař suggests that the latter are a special case of the former<sup>57</sup>.

*How* does poetry present us with pictures and feeling characters? Pfeiffer's answer takes as its starting point a remark made by Husserl (a distant relative of Hofmannsthal's) during lectures in 1926-7, a remark which makes the same point made earlier by Dohrn. In the normal use of words we mean objects and states of affairs thanks to the meanings of these words. But the normal ascendancy of the „telos of meaning“ is a relation which can be *modified*:

to the extent that a word fulfills an aesthetic function the sensory (bodily) expressive component comes to participate in the disclosure of meaning. The sensory word-form in poetic

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<sup>55</sup> Geiger 1911 20.

<sup>56</sup> Husserl 1984 V §15(b) 408-409

<sup>57</sup> Kramař 1940 69ff..

structures is therefore untouchable (*unantastbar*); even a slight variation in the sound qualities can change the meaning content.<sup>58</sup>

Poetry “grows out of a radicalisation of the linguistic tendency to express (intimate, *Kundgabetendenz*)”.<sup>59</sup> The what and the how of poetic intimation or expression differ from those of the simplest cases of linguistic expression of states of mind. The former is a much more indirect affair than the latter. The separability of meaning and words is fully realised only when language has a cognitive function<sup>60</sup> and is not even typical of ordinary speech. Pfeiffer’s answer to our question is somewhat disappointing. The language of poetry “conjures up”, “symbolizes” “awakens”, “mood qualities”, “qualities which resemble moods”, “objective atmospheres” and pictures, which enjoy a “quasi-intuitive presence”. When Pfeiffer attempts to understand “conjure up” etc. he is reduced to saying that the relation of “tension” between an ordinary description employing “Der Mond ist aufgegangen” and what verifies or illustrates this is *cancelled* when the sentence occurs in a poem by Claudius. The sentences of lyric poetry make present a ‘reality’ which is ‘contained’ in the form of the sentences thanks to the exercise of aesthetic phantasy.<sup>61</sup>

Pfeiffer’s answer can be made a little more precise by comparing aesthetic responses to pictures and poems. Consider a picture of a purely fictitious rabbit. We see, we say, the rabbit, the picture and its physical properties. In fact, we *see* the rabbit *in* the picture, that is to say, we imagine seeing a rabbit, and we see the picture. And if the picture is not a mere pretext for free-floating phantasy, if we are interested in the picture, the make-believe seeing is controlled or steered by what we really see. The phenomenon of steering or guidance, which plays a prominent role in the writings of Marty, Bühler and Wittgenstein, is overlooked by both Pfeiffer and Kramař. But it plays a central rôle in our grasp of poetry as well as of pictures. In our responses to poetry, the sentences we read or hear and understand do not merely represent states of affairs, they steer the activities of our imagination. The perceptual and intuitive imaginings and the pictures and characters which are the objects of such phantasy are at every step steered by what we see or hear and by what we understand.<sup>62</sup>

Wittgenstein’s distinction between the “‘primary’” and “‘secondary’” meaning (*Bedeutung*) of a word and his discussion of related distinctions throws light not only on predications of what we have called characters but also on our understanding of poetry<sup>63</sup>. He introduces the distinction in a discussion of claims such as

Mittwoch ist fett (Wednesday is fat)

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<sup>58</sup> Pfeiffer 1931 5-6. Pfeiffer notes that Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* does not say as much but nevertheless attempts to introduce a lot of Heideggerian waffle into his account.

<sup>59</sup> Pfeiffer 1931 13.

<sup>60</sup> Dohrn 1907 55-63 gives a number of counter-examples to this sort of claim.

<sup>61</sup> Pfeiffer 1931 16-28. Pfeiffer’s claims are presented in the context of detailed readings of many different poems. See, for example, his account of the very different atmospheric values which different poems present the moon as carrying (Pfeiffer 1931 35-6).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. von Hildebrand 1984 240-252.

<sup>63</sup> For Meinong’s distinction between primary and secondary meaning and expression, see Meinong 1977 §4 24-29, Mulligan 2012 115-124. As far as I can tell, neither Meinong nor Wittgenstein ever explicitly apply their distinctions between primary and secondary meaning (expression, understanding) in their discussions of the inseparability of form and content in poetry.

Dienstag ist mager (Tuesday is thin)  
For me the vowel *e* is yellow

He is inclined to say that Wednesday – rather than Tuesday - is fat (but cf. “mardi gras”). Then “fat” has a “secondary” meaning. “Only someone for whom the word has a « ‘primary’ “ meaning uses the word in its „secondary’ “ meaning”:

Secondary meaning is not any „figurative’ “ (*übertragene*) meaning. If I say „For me the vowel *e* is yellow“, I do not mean: ‘yellow’ in a figurative meaning,- for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the concept ‘yellow’.<sup>64</sup>

Elsewhere Wittgenstein says that a secondary meaning *can* be called a figurative (*übertragene*) meaning but that „yellow“ in our example is not used in a way which is „*bildlich*“. The key contrast to which Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention is that between the relation between an expression which is *bildlich*, such as „Abschneiden der Rede“ (cutting off someone's speech), and an expression which is not *bildlich*, such as „Abschneiden eines Fadens“ (cutting off a piece of thread), on the one hand, and the relation between the primary and secondary meaning of an expression, on the other hand. In the case of „Abschneiden der Rede“, Wittgenstein says, one is not obliged to use such a *bildlich* expression<sup>65</sup>. One may *perhaps* say that in the latter case, there is a metaphor which may, because it is a metaphor, be replaced by an explicit comparison (as when, instead of saying that Sam is a lion, we say that he resembles a lion in that both are courageous) but that this is not possible where words have a secondary application<sup>66</sup>. A related, genetic claim is made by Pfeiffer :

A genuine image (*Gleichnis*) is not something which can ever come about only through conscious transfer and comparison (*bewusst-übertragendes Vergleichen*)<sup>67</sup>.

And Musil's Ulrich famously says that an image may avoid being a comparison thanks to its affective dimension: “every image (*Gleichnis*) is ambiguous for the understanding but univocal for feeling”<sup>68</sup>. In Musil's address on Rilke the contrast between images and comparisons is quite explicit:

Man kann sagen: im Gefühl dieses großen Dichters ist alles Gleichnis, und – nichts mehr nur Gleichnis. Die vom gewöhnlichen Denken getrennten Sphären der Wesensgattungen scheinen sich zu einer einigen Sphäre zu vereinen. Niemals wird etwas mit einem anderen verglichen – als zwei andere und Getrennte, die sie dabei bleiben –; denn selbst wenn das irgendwo geschieht und gesagt wird, irgendeines sei wie das andere, so scheint es schon im gleichen Augenblick seit Urzeiten das andere gewesen zu sein.<sup>69</sup>

When Wittgenstein distinguishes between an incorrect and a correct way of describing the affective dimension of the language of art he puts forward the claim we have already

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<sup>64</sup> Wittgenstein 1977 II xi 346-7. On Musil's treatment of synaesthesia, see Freij 1972 39ff., 80 ff.

<sup>65</sup> Wittgenstein 1984a §§797-9.

<sup>66</sup> On the relation between secondary meaning and metaphors, see Schulte 1990a. Wittgenstein's distinction between primary and secondary meaning is his last modification of a view crisply stated in the *Tractatus*: „The possibility of all *Gleichnisse*, of all the figurative nature (*Bildhaftigkeit*) of our mode of expression, is based on the logic of depiction (*Abbildung*) (4.015), that is, on structural and inner similarities.

<sup>67</sup> Pfeiffer 1940 25.

<sup>68</sup> Musil 1983b, II, 1347.

<sup>69</sup> Musil 1983a 1237.

come across that the work of art seeks to convey only itself. Thus in a late criticism of Tolstoy he writes:

There is *much* that could be learned from Tolstoy's false theorizing that the work of art conveys 'a feeling'.—And you really might call it, if not the expression of a feeling, an expression of feeling, or a felt expression. And you might say too that people who understand it to that extent 'resonate' with it, respond to it. You might say: The work of art does not seek to convey *something else*, just itself...

And it does start to be really absurd, to say, the artist wishes that, what he feels when writing, the other should feel when reading. Presumably I can think I understand a poem (e.g.), understand it in the way its author would wish,—but what *he* may have felt in writing it, that doesn't concern me *at all*<sup>70</sup>.

What is the relation between the two claims made by Wittgenstein that poetry and predications of what Geiger calls characters cannot be paraphrased? Clearly, one connexion is that where poetry contains such predications the impossibility of paraphrasing such predications is a case of the inseparability of poetic form and content. Wittgenstein gives an example of such a case, words spoken by Care (*Sorge*) at the end of Goethe's *Faust* :

It is important, however, that there are all these paraphrases! That one can describe care (*Sorge*) with the words "Ewiges Düstere steigt herunter". I have perhaps never sufficiently stressed the importance of this paraphrasing<sup>71</sup>.

Although there are many paraphrases of care, Goethe's paraphrase of care, we may think, is itself non-paraphraseable. The passage quoted goes on to consider the role of association in the genesis of descriptions like that given by Goethe :

Joy is represented by a countenance bathed in light, by rays streaming from it. Naturally that does not mean that joy and light *resemble* one another; but joy - *it does not matter why* - is associated by us with light. To be sure, it might be that this association is taught the child when it learns to talk, that it is no more *natural* than the sound of the words themselves – it is enough that it exists. ("Beethoven" and Beethoven's works.)

Geiger, like a good realist phenomenologist, does not agree. He argues that the rôle of association in the predication of what he calls characters can be understood in two different ways, one of which he rejects. The way in which past experiences "flow together" to give a word "a new face" is, he argues, often misunderstood. Association plays an important rôle but its significance is misunderstood:

It is not the case that all the contexts in which the word "Ross" occurred are awakened in me when I hear the word again and go to make up the word character. We may more simply assume the possibility of an independent reproduction of characters.<sup>72</sup>

The inseparability of form and content, if Musil and others are to be believed, entails the inseparability of these from their object. This in its turn entails not only what many of our authors describe as what might be called the *reflexivity* of the work of art – it says or means only itself – but also what they call its *intransitivity* – it is not about anything in any ordinary sense of the word, not about anything which may be independently specified. As Wittgenstein puts it, we are victims of an illusion if

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<sup>70</sup> Wittgenstein 1984 533.

<sup>71</sup> Wittgenstein 1984b I §853, cf. §732.

<sup>72</sup> Geiger 1911 22-3.

repeating a tune to ourselves and letting it make its full impression on us, we say "This tune says <something>", and it is as though I had to find <what> it says. And yet I know that it doesn't say anything such that I might express in words or pictures what it says. And if, recognizing this, I resign myself to saying "It just expresses a musical thought", this would mean no more than saying "It expresses itself".<sup>73</sup>

Wittgenstein also makes the more general claim: "One could say: the work of art does not want to communicate (*übertragen*) anything else, but only itself".<sup>74</sup> Musil makes a similar claim about pictures:

What does a picture want, mean, signify ?...The answer to the question, as is well known, is never a purely rational proposition, but something which can only be articulated with difficulty...; the meaning (*Meinung*) of the picture is the picture itself, is its *Gestalt*, and the picture has no other content, otherwise pictures could speak.<sup>75</sup>

And in his 1931 essay "Literat und Literatur" he says:

It is a platitude that the word of the poet has an "elevated" (*gehobene*) meaning (*Bedeutung*), but it is no platitude that this meaning is not the ordinary meaning plus such elevation (*Hebung*) but rather comes about as a new meaning that neither coincides with the original meaning nor is independent of it. The same is true of the other, in the more narrow sense formal means of expression in poetry; they too communicate (*mitteilen*) something, but their use involves a reversal of the relation between what they transmit and what remains so to speak intransitively bound to the phenomenon (*Erscheinung*).<sup>76</sup>

We have returned to our starting-point, Hofmannsthal's wonderful comparison of those who seek "behind the poem" what they call its "real meaning" to apes seeking with their hands a body, *there*, behind the mirror. But we have still not determined whether poetry really is completely translatable or paraphraseable. Is the meaning of, say, Goethe's „Über allen Gipfeln“ paraphraseable without loss? Is the view formulated by Musil in 1913, and shared, as we have seen, by many of his contemporaries, that "works of art can never be decomposed without remainder into specifiable meanings (*angebbare Bedeutungen*)"<sup>77</sup> correct?

It depends. On one conception of meaning, often favoured by those who identify meaning or sense as what a sentence and its translation express<sup>78</sup>, meanings and concepts are more or less abstract entities. On this view, none of the considerations adduced so far make it plausible to say that a poem cannot be successfully paraphrased without remainder<sup>79</sup>. The poem and its paraphrase or translation may then have exactly the same meaning. This conception of meaning is that of Husserl. And Husserl, I suggest, was inconsistent when he

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<sup>73</sup> Wittgenstein 1972 166. On music according to Wittgenstein and his Austrian contemporaries, see Mulligan 2012 117-119.

<sup>74</sup> Wittgenstein 1984 114.

<sup>75</sup> Musil 1983a 1517. Musil thinks that what is true of poetry and pictures is also true of what he calls "essays": "it is the mark of an essay that its inner core is as little translatable as a poem into prose" (Musil 1983a 1450).

<sup>76</sup> Musil 1983a 1223. Was the term "intransitive" suggested to Musil by Rilke's "intransitive love"? On transitive and intransitive (emphatic) uses of a word, see Wittgenstein 1972 158.

<sup>77</sup> Musil 1983a 1000.

<sup>78</sup> « express » here, of course, is the relation between words or sentences and meanings and not the relation between signs, sentences, faces and the mental states these express (utter, intimate, manifest, show).

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Kivy 1997.



made the claim which, as we have noted, Pfeiffer attributes to him. But there is a very different conception of meaning, a conception expounded by Wittgenstein, according to which the meaning of a word, in the most important meaning of “meaning”, just is its use. If we add to this claim the view, accepted by both Bühler and Wittgenstein, that whatever is required to give words meaning or sense, that it to say, a use, belongs to language, then it is indeed plausible to say that poetic language cannot be paraphrased without loss. For on this conception, the pictures and feeling characters we imagine and grasp when reading lyric poetry, thanks to the way poetry steers the interested and responsive reader, belong to the way the words of poetry are used.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Wittgenstein's account of secondary meaning, it is sometimes suggested, is related to his views about the intrinsic value, particularly ethical value, of actions and persons and to the insinuation in the *Tractatus* that such values, and much else of metaphysical importance besides, although they are not *sayable* or *predicable*, nevertheless *show* themselves. This insinuation led the down-to-earth Cambridge philosopher, Frank Ramsey, to point out that, if you cannot say something, you cannot whistle it either. In a draft of his novel, Musil's pharisaical and pedagogical fool, Prof. Lindner, "whistled metaphysical examples" (Musil 1983b II 1517).

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