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The strained alliance: US-European relations from Nixon to Carter

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many descendants of migrants to this day, but the Swedish Deprivation of the late 1860s offers a suitable comparative example. Once these accelerants took effect, notes Akenson, emigration became an integral aspect of national life in both Ireland and Sweden, determining everyday life and how the countries functioned.

Well-written, meticulously researched and underpinned with many useful statistics, ranging from a breakdown of denominations to the agricultural output of Ireland to illustrate changes in the productivity of the Irish agricultural economy post-famine, *Ireland, Sweden and the Great European Migration 1815–1914* impressively demonstrates Akenson's knowledge and capacity to probe existing scholarship. This holds true, for instance, with respect to the long-held view, by Irish demographers and economic historians alike, that Irish demographic patterns did not differ significantly from those of the rest of Europe. That said, however, important similarities are traced for Ireland and Sweden: both countries saw what Akenson terms a 'pioneering stage of out-migration' in the early nineteenth century, which was followed by a period of 'axial stress.' (230) What is particularly important is that these periods, together with the emigration culture that subsequently emerged, highlight the degree to which Ireland and Sweden were thrust into a new age: a 'quantum jump,' as Akenson notes, of two societies moving from Europe's poor periphery to a transnational world. What singles *Ireland, Sweden and the Great European Migration 1815–1914* out as an exceptional contribution in transnational and migration history, therefore, is not only its outstanding range or that it is underpinned with statistics that give it important depth. It is Akenson's ability to re-conceptualise established scholarship on the Great European Migration, asking new questions and offering new answers within an innovative transnational framework.

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The strained alliance: US–European relations from Nixon to Carter, edited by Matthias Schultz and Thomas A. Schwartz, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 383 p., £55 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-521-899999-4

The 'Long 1970s' – stretching from the late 1960s to the early 1980s – have attracted considerable attention from historians in recent years. It is almost inevitable. Historians follow (and are bound by) the archives and their opening. Some countries, which apply rules, have now declassified many of the primary sources on which scholarly research can finally be based (alas, this is not the case for other countries, including this reviewer's). More important, the long 1970s are now recognised as years of profound structural transformation of the international system.

This change had a strong impact on US–European relations, to which this excellent collection of essays is dedicated. The decade saw the weakening, or even disappearance, of some of the most important pillars on which Transatlantic relations had rested since the beginning of the cold war. The popularity of (and

admiration for) the USA and its leaders dropped significantly throughout western Europe; the Bretton Woods compromise collapsed ignominiously, opening a chaotic and often conflictual transition to a new monetary regime; the economic balance shifted to the apparent disadvantage of the USA; America and its European allies, especially West Germany, pursued different *détentes* with the Soviet Union and clashed over the Middle East, particularly after the October 1973 war.

The essays comprising this volume deal carefully with these and other issues, which strained but did not break the alliance. However, they left a legacy of unresolved issues: in their introduction the two editors note how ‘many of the authors see the roots of some contemporary differences between Europe and the United States in this decade.’ (14)

The volume is divided into four parts. The first is dedicated to the problematic relationship between Nixon’s *détente* and Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*, and to its diplomatic and economic dimensions. The second part focuses on the re-launching of Europe in the early 1970s with Britain’s entry in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the collapse of the post-1944 monetary order. The third part discusses Kissinger’s misconceived attempt to reassert US leadership in 1973–1974 and the Helsinki conference where western Europeans played a crucial role. The final part – possibly the most innovative and path-breaking – concerns the second half of the 1970s and the Carter presidency.

The volume is indeed remarkable for several reasons: the high quality of all its essays; the coherence of its structure which is so rare to find in collective volumes that frequently are fragmentary and incomplete puzzles; and the capacity of the authors to converse, often explicitly, among themselves, thereby offering different perspectives and interpretations.

Particularly interesting are parts II and IV. The essays by Zimmerman and Gray on the dissolution of the Bretton Woods monetary order highlight the importance of the post-1944 compromise for US–European relations. This compromise ‘institutionalized transatlantic cooperation in managing international financial relations, balance of payments crises and fixed exchange rates.’ (125) Its collapse led the two sides of the Atlantic to a *terra incognita* and opened the way to a conflict over the definition of a new monetary order. As we know, the US emerged victorious from this conflict, although West Europe began the process that would eventually lead to the adoption of the Euro. These themes are debated in the very important essays by Schultz, and by Renouand and Vigil in the last part of the book, which contribute to what is fast becoming a new front of historical enquiry: the late 1970s and the tense relationship between the Carter administration and the Schmidt government over strategic as well as financial issues.

Almost all the essays deal with some quintessential ambiguities of US–European relations during the cold war that were clearly on display in the 1970s. On the one side, western Europe sought (and claimed) greater autonomy, but constantly dreaded a possible US disentanglement from Europe. On the other, Washington solicited Europe to contribute more to the common Atlantic cause – and also through an increase in European consumption to sustain the global capitalist economy in the second half of the 1970s – but feared Europe’s diplomatic autonomy, as seen by the ambivalent US reaction to Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*.

The only limit of this volume is that it is far too German-centric in its definition of what constituted US–European relations during the cold war. The German

question was obviously at the centre of the transatlantic relationship, and the changes in West German foreign policy in the 1970s drastically modified this relationship. Yet, there were other issues, particularly in southern Europe, which deserved to be considered. This shortcoming notwithstanding, *The Strained Alliance* is a very important book and is certainly destined to be essential reading for scholars of transatlantic relations for many years to come.

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Tom Paine's America: the rise and fall of transatlantic radicalism in the early republic, by Seth Cotlar, Charlottesville and London, University of Virginia Press, 2011, xiv + 269 pp., \$35.00 (clothbound), ISBN 978-0-8139-3100-5

This is an impressive work of scholarship that challenges some well-established interpretations of the politics of the early republic in America. Despite its main title, it is not primarily about Tom Paine's writings or about America during the years that he spent there actively engaged in its politics. Rather, it is an exploration of the rise and decline in America in the 1790s of the democratic ideas being espoused in that revolutionary decade by Paine and other radicals who were active in Britain, Ireland and France. Seth Cotlar maintains that Jeffersonian democracy in the early 1800s, when Paine was back in America, was very different from the radical democratic ideas that Paine and other British, Irish and French democrats had espoused in the 1790s and had helped many Americans to adopt in the early years of that decade. It is Cotlar's contention that Jefferson and many of his supporters joined with the Federalists after 1800 in rejecting the popular democratic radicalism that had flourished for a time in the 1790s. Jefferson distanced himself from Paine and from those radical American printers and authors who had done so much to see him elected President in 1800. This development explains why Paine was such a neglected and marginalised political figure during his last years in America. Regarded in the early 1800s as radical Jacobins threatening to de-stabilise American politics and to undermine its established constitutional institutions, Paine and those American radicals who agreed with him were regarded as foreign inspired agitators and atheistical anarchists who threatened to bring too many poor men into active politics.

To sustain this important thesis, Cotlar sets out to explore the intellectual history of how many politically minded American citizens engaged in the Atlantic-wide debate over democratic first principles throughout the 1790s. He points out that a great many European radicals migrated to America in the 1790s and did much to launch a wide and deep discussion in America of the political ideas that were being agitated in Britain, Ireland and France at this time. He examines how a number of radicals in such towns as Philadelphia, New York and Boston first published or reprinted, and then widely distributed, a great many books, pamphlets and newspapers that brought American readers news of political events and political