Séminaire de Recherche en Linguistique
Ce séminaire reçoit des conférenciers invités spécialisés dans différents domaines de la linguistique. Les membres du Département, les étudiants et les personnes externes intéressées sont tous cordialement invités. Description du séminaire 
| Titre | Multiple takes on de se: On referring to oneself (in different languages) |
| Conférencier | Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (University of Arizona) |
| Date | mardi 24 mai 2016 |
| Heure | 12h15 |
| Salle | L208 (Bâtiment Candolle) |
| Description | Ever since the seminal work of Hector Neri-Cstañeda (1966) on the amnesic war hero Quintus, the problem of assigning truth values to statements about oneself has been significantly developed and refined. Jakko Hintikka (1972), David Lewis (1979) and John Perry (1979) have analyzed propositions that express self-reference and self-attribution. Various explanations of the contrast between truth de re, de dicto and de se have been proposed. The issue took an interesting and novel turn when the syntax and semantics of de se expressions were examined. Gennaro Chierchia (1989), James Higginbotham (1991, 2003, 2010, 2013), Marina Folescu (in press) and Norbert Hornstein (1999) have offered convincing explanations of the special properties of expressions of possible, impossible or mandatory self-reference. Interesting commonalities and differences between different languages are presently being explored.
REFERENCES
Castañeda, H.-N. (1966). He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio 8: 130- 157.
Chierchia, G. (1989). Anaphora and attitudes De Se. In R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (Eds.), Semantics and Contextual Expression (pp. 2-31). Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications.
Folescu, M., & Higginbotham, J. (2012). Two takes on de se. In S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays (pp. 46-61). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, D. Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 513-543
Higginbotham, J. (1991). Belief and Logical Form. Mind and Language, 6 (4 (Winter)), 344-369.
Higginbotham, J. (2003). Remembering, imagining and the first person. In A. Barber (Ed.), Epistemology of Language (pp. 496-533). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Higginbotham, J. (2010). On words and thoughts about oneself. In F. Recanati, I. Stojanovich and N. Villanueva (eds.) Context-Dependence, Perspective, and Relativity. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter Mouton pp. 253-282
Higginbotham, J. (2013). Speaking (and Some Thinking) of Oneself. In N. Feit & A. Capone (Eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics (pp. 59- 67). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Hintikka, J. (1966). 'Knowing Oneself' and Other Problems in Epistemic Logic. Theoria, XXXII(1), 1-13.
Hornstein, N. (1999). Movement and control. Linguistic Inquiry, 30(1), 69-96.
Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs, 13(1)
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