

Workshop
Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks* and its Phenomenological Grammar
Workshop with Mauro Engelmann

July 21, 2025 | 9:30 - 18:00

University of Geneva

Colladon, C1/C2

9:30-10:00 – Introduction

Mauro Engelmann (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais)

Session 1

10:00 – 13:00 –

Sébastien Gandon (Université Clermont Auvergne) – chapters 1-4

Colin King (Providence College / University of Basel) – chapter 1

Romain Büchi (University of Geneva) – chapter 2

13:00 – 15:00 – Lunch break

Session 2

15:00 – 18:00 –

Jonathan Gombin (Bordeaux University) – chapter 4

Julia Franke-Reddig (University of Geneva) – chapter 5

Guillaume Fréchette (University of Geneva) - chapter 6-7

Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks*: The Logic of Phenomenology
Mauro Luiz Engelmann (UFMG – CNPq)

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