ATTITUDINAL NORMATIVITY WORKSHOP

7th-8th April 2022 | University of Geneva | Espace Colladon

7TH OF APRIL

9:00 Opening words

9:00–10:30 — Conor McHugh (Southampton)

Good Reasoning and Reasons to Suspend Judgment

A promising constitutive account of reasons says that they are premises of good reasoning. This account seems well placed to handle reasons for belief. However, some have objected that it has implausible implications about reasons to suspend judgment. The aim of this paper is to address these objections, and more broadly to consider how a proponent of the account should think about reasons to suspend.

10:45–12:15 — Jean Moritz Müller (Bonn)

Reasons, Correctness and Intentionality

Normative reasons of the right kind for an attitude (such as a belief or desire) are closely related to its constitutive correctness conditions. For example, right-kind reasons for belief are related to the constitutive correctness condition of belief in that only what bears on the truth of p is a right-kind reason to believe that p. As this link is typically understood, the properties that determine an attitude’s correctness (‘correctness-determiners’) – e.g. the truth of p in the case of believing that p – are not themselves right-kind reasons for this attitude. After all, supposing otherwise seems highly counter-intuitive: it sounds infelicitous to cite the truth of p in response to the request to give reasons for believing that p.

In this talk, I offer some grounds for thinking that correctness-determiners are right-kind reasons. I argue that this follows from the very fact that attitudes are intentional. They way in which attitudes are directed towards their intentional content implies that they are subject to a condition of appropriateness which presupposes that correctness determiners are corresponding right-kind reasons. I also show that the infelicity of citing them in response to reason-requests does not tell against this view.

14:00–15:30 — Andrés García (Lund)

Revisiting the explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value

The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object (the “enabling maneuver”). In this talk, based on a paper co-written with Francesco Orsi, I shall argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new version of the explanatory objection, to the extent that the explanatory role played by the constitutive properties of attitudes in value facts is assumed to be different from the explanatory role they play in fittingness facts.
15:45 – 17:15 — **Justin D’Arms** (Columbus)

*Response Dependence and the Alethic View of Emotional Fittingness*

Sentimentalist theories hold that values like ‘funny’ and ‘prideworthy’ are response dependent. According to my preferred version, to be funny or prideworthy is to be a fitting object of amusement or pride. The Alethic View of emotional fittingness holds that emotions involve various thoughts, some of which are evaluative, and that for an emotion to be fitting/correct is just for those thoughts to be true. This talk will briefly explain Rational Sentimentalism and the Alethic View, and then discuss some problems for the Alethic View. Some of the problems are due to the response-dependence of various values. I’ll suggest a way for the Alethic View to cope with these problems by becoming more sentientalist. But doing so abandons some of what made the Alethic View seem substantive and attractive to begin with. Moreover, the Alethic View seems to mis-characterize what is wrong with unfitting emotions. So we should try to understand the idea that emotions can be fitting/correct to their objects without the Alethic View.

**8TH OF APRIL**

9:00 – 10:30 — **Anne Meylan** (Zurich)

*Reasons to suspend judgement: evidential, zetetic, practical.*

There is a growing debate about the normativity of suspension of judgement. What are the reasons to suspend judgement? The classical approach is as follows: just as for beliefs, the reasons to suspend are evidential. The first goal of my presentation is to review and evaluate some of the already existing arguments that tend to show that the evidentialist approach is misleading. A popular alternative to the evidentialist approach is the zetetic one, according to which the reasons to suspend judgement derive from the ones that make an inquiry a good inquiry (Friedman forthcoming). In the second part of my presentation, I would like to show that the focus on the inquiry leads to an overly restrictive conception: it leaves out the practical reasons to suspend judgement. Just like the attitude of imagining, to suspend judgement as to whether p is an attitude that might be required for zetetic but also for practical reasons. In this second part, I will also be led to examine the relationship between practical and zetetic reasons.

10:45 – 12:15 — **Roberto Keller** (Geneva)

*Fitting Attitudes and Attitudes Worth Having*

It is one thing to claim that resentment towards a blunt remark is a correct, fitting, or appropriate reaction and another to claim that the remark at stake deserves, merits, or is worth resenting. To some this claim might be surprising, since the thought that some instances of resentment are fitting is often glossed in terms of the fact that some actions deserve or are worthy of resentment. I argue that this is an important mistake. After drawing the distinction between a fitting attitude and an attitude worth having, I show how it can illuminate our understanding of the normative import of correctness, and in turn make progress with respect to two areas of inquiry that trade on this notion: the normativity of belief and the fitting-attitude analysis of value.
In this talk, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might access values prior to emotional experience, we conclude that the attitudinalist is still in the game.

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the fit/value biconditionals. The biconditionals serve to disarm skeptical worries about the notion of ‘fit’ by giving us a systematic way of recognizing its role in our ethical practices; the biconditionals also serve as the bedrock of various metaethical projects, such as fitting attitude analyses of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. This paper considers different kinds of apparent counterexamples to the fit/value biconditionals. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; that a coincidence is somewhat surprising doesn’t imply that it is fitting for me to feel intense surprise in response to it; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because the person might be my sibling. We argue that avoiding such counterexamples requires revising the common understanding of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered.

17:15 Closing words