

## Abstracts for parallel sessions

[Session 1 A] ] Bob Beddor, National University of Singapore and Carlotta Pavese, Cornell University

What is the relation between skillful action and knowledge? According to most philosophers, the two have little to do with each other: practical intelligence and theoretical intelligence are largely separate domains. This talk questions received wisdom on this front. We develop and defend an intellectualist account of skills. On this view, skills are identical to know-how, which in turn can be reduced to states of propositional knowledge. We argue that this account has a number of explanatory advantages that have thus far gone unrecognized. In particular, it explains why all skillful actions are intentional; it also accounts for the close connection between skills and know-how. We go on to compare our account with dispositionalist treatments of skills, including a recent proposal due to Stanley and Williamson (2017).

[Session 1B] Max Goetsch, Freie Universität Berlin: Knowledge and its Modality

Modal theories of knowledge, whether they are phrased in terms of safety or sensitivity, have often been seen as ways around the notorious Gettier-problem. Their susceptibility to new Gettier-style counterexamples, in turn, lends *prima facie* abductive support to the view that knowledge admits of no reductive analysis and hence to the knowledge-first programme. In my talk, I want to canvass a novel explanation for why extant modal theories face the Gettier-problem anew: they have failed to take into account the local nature of knowledge, much like the modal and conditional analyses of dispositions of old had failed to take into account the local nature of dispositions. Thus, I will argue that the Gettier problem for modal theories is just an instance of a more general problem that also afflicts well-known analyses of modal properties like dispositions: the problem of mimicking. In dealing with the Gettier problem, the epistemologist can therefore avail herself of the resources developed in the metaphysics of dispositions. My diagnosis as well as its moral are neutral as to whether knowledge is reducible. But, if correct, the diagnosis slightly weakens the abductive support for taking knowledge to be irreducible.

[Session 2A] Dario Mortini, University of Glasgow: Knowledge-first: Metaphysical Credentials

The central objections to knowledge-first epistemology, since its arrival on the scene 20 years ago, are now mostly well-known. While many of these objections have been methodological, other criticisms have been more substantive. It is fair to say that, at present, all of the main substantive objections to knowledge-first epistemology have received sophisticated responses on behalf of knowledge firsters – all with the exception of a very new kind of objection called the supervenience objection. The supervenience objection challenges knowledge firsters' metaphysical credentials by maintaining that the view is incompatible with uncontroversial supervenience requirements on epistemic properties. In this talk, I charitably construct this hitherto entirely unaddressed objection on behalf of knowledge-first critics and show that,

ultimately, the objection does not stick. The upshot is a clear appreciation of both why supervenience does not make any trouble for the knowledge-first project, and moreover, why knowledge firsters have stronger metaphysical credentials than even its proponents have thus far appreciated

[Session 2B] Yair Levy, Tel Aviv University: The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority

Philosophical orthodoxy has it that *intentional action* consists in one's *intention* appropriately causing a motion of one's body, placing the latter as (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel's argument, canvassing extant objections to do both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me in the second part of the paper to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY.

[Session 3A] Michael Cohen, Stanford University: Inexact Knowledge and Dynamic Introspection

Timothy Williamson's work on the relation between inexact knowledge and the KK principle has proven to be extremely influential in epistemology and elsewhere. In particular, cases of inexact observations have been used extensively in the recent literature on higher-order evidence and higher-order knowledge. I argue that the standard understanding of inexact knowledge is incomplete. Although it is convenient to assume that cases of inexact knowledge can be modeled statically, they should be analyzed as dynamic cases that involve change of knowledge. Consequently, the underlying logic should be dynamic epistemic logic, not its static counterpart. I develop a novel semantics for inexact updates and model inexact observations with it. When reasoning about inexact knowledge, it is easy to confuse the initial situation, the observation, and the result of the observation; I analyze the three separately. As a result, new insights can be gained regarding inexact knowledge and forms of epistemic introspection.

[Session 3B] Wes Skolits, University of St Andrews/Rutgers University: Perception as a Way of Knowing: A Defense

The aim of this paper is both constructive and defensive. Firstly, I shall outline the main elements of a theory of perceptual justification on which the rational force of perceptual experience is grounded in its knowledge-producing power—a Williamson-inspired theory of perceptual justification. We can state this view in slogan form as follows: Perception is a Way of Knowing (PWK). Three aspects of this position will be explicated in connection to Williamson's landmark KAIL. Firstly, this theory of perceptual justification falls out of a strongly externalist (i.e., Williamsonian) theory of epistemic justification according to which S is justified in believing that p if and only if S knows that p. Secondly, this position is committed to the

Entailment Thesis, viz., the principle that if S perceives that p, then S knows that p (concomitant with a thesis Williamson defends in KAIL on which knowledge is the most general factive mental state). Finally, PWK is an instance of “weak epistemological disjunctivism,” a position committed to the denial of evidential sameness on which one’s evidence is same in the good case of veridical perception and the bad case of illusion/hallucination. Each of these core aspects of PWK will be drawn from Williamson’s KAIL and thoroughly explicated in the constructive part of the project.

After outlining the main commitments of PWK, I turn to the defensive part of the project. As I noted above, weak epistemological disjunctivism is a view committed to the denial of evidential sameness. Strong epistemological disjunctivism adds to this commitment a reflective access requirement: on this view, when S perceives that p in the good case, the fact that S sees that p is accessible to the subject upon reflection. (This makes strong epistemological disjunctivism a modified version of internalism.) In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2012) argues for the superiority of strong epistemological disjunctivism. In particular, Pritchard offers two main arguments bearing on PWK and to which I’ll respond in the second part of the paper. Firstly, Pritchard claims that the linguistic evidence derived from our folk practices of citing factive reasons supports strong epistemological disjunctivism. Secondly, along with the independent work of John Turri (2010), Pritchard argues against the Entailment Thesis. In short, both offer purported counterexamples to the Entailment Thesis. Since strong epistemological disjunctivism, but not weak epistemological disjunctivism, can accommodate the denial of this thesis, Pritchard takes this to be dispositive for his position.

In the critical portion of the paper I respond to both arguments. In response to the first argument, I show that the linguistic evidence from which Pritchard draws (in particular, the folk practice of citing factive perceptual reasons) equally supports the weak epistemological disjunctivist position, PWK. Consequently, this linguistic evidence does not provide a distinctive reason in favor of Pritchard’s disjunctivism over PWK. In reply to the second objection, which is aimed at the Entailment Thesis, I defuse both Pritchard’s and Turri’s critical arguments; I show that their purported counterexamples to PWK fail. Rather, I show that the considerations to which they draw our attention undergird the entailment between perceiving that p and knowing that p.

Let me briefly elaborate on the substance of the second response, which takes on the bulk of the critical part of the paper. To establish their counterexamples to the Entailment Thesis, Pritchard and Turri assume a condition on propositional seeing on which the possession of the relevant concept Q is sufficient for propositional seeing that Q in cases where Q obtains. However, I show that this account is problematic. Further conditions are necessary for propositional seeing; in particular, the relevant sort of application of concepts in perceptual experience must obtain in order to enable propositional seeing. By evaluating these and further cases of propositional seeing derived from neuropsychology, I show that these further conditions must obtain. Consequently, I defuse Pritchard’s and Turri’s objections to the Entailment Thesis.