

Workshop  
*The Intentionality of Emotions*  
*Themes from Austro-German Philosophy*

**Titles and Abstracts**

**In Defense of the Reactive View of Emotion: A Reply to Díaz & Tappolet**

Jean Moritz Müller (& Olivier Massin)

In a forthcoming paper, Díaz & Tappolet attack the view that emotions are reactions to value. According to this view, which goes by the name 'reactive view of emotion' (or 'reactivism', for short), emotions are necessarily felt for reasons provided by (real or merely apparent) exemplifications of specific value properties. Focusing on the particular case of fear, they put pressure on two central considerations offered in support of reactivism: (i) reactivism captures first-person emotional experience (von Hildebrand 1969; Müller 2019), (ii) the view is borne out by common ascriptions and explanations of emotion (Mulligan 2010; Müller 2019; Massin 2023). Most centrally, Díaz & Tappolet adduce linguistic evidence based on corpus analysis and survey data to challenge (ii). According to their findings, explanations of emotions explicitly citing value properties as reasons are less frequent than reactivists suppose. Moreover, those citing non-evaluative reasons need not be read as presupposing evaluative reasons, as reactivists have argued.

In this paper, we defend reactivism against this charge, raising challenges both to the methodology chosen by Díaz & Tappolet in assessing (ii) as well as to the interpretation of their data. As we argue, it is far from clear that the reactivists's take on ordinary emotion ascriptions and explanations requires vindication by means of corpus analysis and experimental linguistics. This is because those methods are not obviously suited to uncover the norms governing ordinary use of emotion terms (Sandis 2021, 2022; cf. Cavell 2002). Moreover, we show that the statistical infrequency of explanations explicitly citing evaluative reasons is plausibly explained by the fact that such explanations are implied by canonical emotion ascriptions and therefore already part of the conversational common ground whenever speakers enquire about reasons for an emotion. Finally, we demonstrate that the experimental data presented to show that

emotion explanations citing non-evaluative reasons do not presuppose evaluative reasons admits of a rivalling interpretation that is consistent with the claim that they do.

### **Theodor Lipps on the Concept of Freedom: Action between Feeling and Will**

Philipp Schmidt-Boddy (Heidelberg University)

In this talk, I present Theodor Lipps's theory of freedom, as outlined in the ninth lecture, "Freedom of the Will (Determinism and Indeterminism)" ("Die Freiheit des Willens. (Determinismus und Indeterminismus)"), from his work *The Main Questions of Ethics* (*Die ethischen Grundfragen*, 1899). I then discuss it in light of his theory of feeling and volition developed in *Of Feeling, Willing, and Thinking. A Psychological Sketch* (*Vom Fühlen, Wollen und Denken. Eine psychologische Skizze*, 1902).

Lipps develops a notion of human or "real" freedom (*wirkliche Freiheit*) in opposition to what he sees as a problematic conception of *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*. He argues that genuine freedom consists in acting in accordance with one's personality and character.

Given the central role Lipps attributes to various forms of feeling – such as self-feelings, value-feelings, and object-directed emotions – in shaping how the *Ich* (ego) engages with the world, I argue that feeling and emotion play a fundamental role in the realization of freedom. The aim of the talk is to explore this role and assess it in relation to traditional theories of free will as well as to perspectives held by Lipps's contemporaries. Such a comparison, I suggest, may also offer valuable insight into how Lipps conceptualized the intentional structure of emotional experience.

### **Meinong and Scheler on the intentionality of the emotions**

Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran (University of Marburg)

### **Bridging Contemporary and Austro-German Perspectives on the Intentionality of Emotions: Cognitivism**

Bruno Poli (University of Geneva)

The general hypothesis I will draw upon is that the main theses currently defended in contemporary philosophy of emotions are either identical to or can be seen as specifications of theses already articulated within the Austro-German philosophical tradition (in authors such as Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl, Stein, Meinong, etc.). By showing that this is the case, I argue that it becomes legitimate to transfer arguments between these contexts, thereby offering new ways of assessing contemporary theories. In this presentation I focus on cognitivism. The first part of my talk will be dedicated to presenting and defending the metaphilosophical perspective outlined above. The second part will show what are the main theses advanced by cognitivism in contemporary philosophy. In the third part, I will show that equivalent theses are found in Austro-German philosophy. Finally, I will present a case study in which Austro-German cognitivism offers a response to a recurrent challenge facing contemporary cognitivism, namely, the claim that cognitivism is conceptually too demanding, thus excluding animals and children from its scope.