THE STRUGGLE WITH(IN) LEONTIUS’ SOUL

I. INTRODUCTION

In Republic 4, Plato’s Socrates argues that there are three elements in the soul, namely the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. This paper focuses on the argument that distinguishes spirit from appetite in the story of Leontius, in which there are two interpretative cruxes. The first is to identify the way Socrates distinguishes spirit from appetite. The second crux concerns whether or not the rational element plays a role in the argument.

In section II, I shall present —and cast doubt on— the view that takes spirit, and spirit alone, to oppose Leontius’ appetite. In section III, I shall argue that there are two oppositions: in the first instance, the rational element opposes Leontius’ appetite and, when appetite overpowers reason, then Leontius’ spirited element opposes the appetitive. This account has an interesting consequence (section V), namely that there is a kind of disgust that would be appropriately characterized as rational, in the sense of arising from the rational element, specifically from its concern for the well-being of body and soul. In section IV, I address objections against the view defended. In section V, I offer a reconstruction of the argument in the story of Leontius and, drawing on the aforementioned consequence, I suggest that the primary target of musical training is the rational element of the soul.

II. SPIRIT’S ROLE IN LEONTIUS’ STRUGGLE

In Republic 4, 436 A 8–B 3, Socrates sets out to investigate whether or not the soul has three distinct elements within it; does the soul learn, become infuriated, and desire the pleasures of food, drink, and sex as a whole or does it do these with three distinct elements? To settle the question, Socrates introduces the so-called principle of opposites: ‘It is clear that the same thing will not be able at the same time to do or suffer opposites in the same respect and in relation to the same thing; and so, I suppose, should we find these things coming to be in them [sc. in cases of learning, becoming infuriated, or having appetites] we shall know that it was not the same thing but many’ (R. 436 B 9–C 2; cf. 436 E 7–437 A 1, 439 B 5–6). Socrates explicitly relies on this principle to show that there are two elements in the soul, namely the rational part and the appetitive part. It remains to be settled whether there is a third part in the soul:


2 Following convention, I shall speak also of ‘parts’ of the soul. It should be noted that Socrates does not use the word ‘part’ (‘µέρος’) in any of the arguments distinguishing the elements in the soul. That being said, later on there are instances of the word ‘µέρος’ referring to these elements (R. 442 B 10, C 4, 444 B 3, 581 A 6, 583 A 1, 586 E 5). For an interpretation of the meaning behind introducing the word ‘µέρος’, see J. Whiting, ‘Psychic Contingency in the Republic’, in R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.), Plato and the Divided Self (New York, 2012), 174–208 esp. 194 ff.

3 Since one interpretative issue concerns locating the opposition between spirit and appetite, for ease of reference I have divided the story into two sections: T1 (R. 439 E 1–440 A 1) and T2 (R. 440 A 2–8).
T1 Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δῶο ἡµῖν ὀρίσθω εἰδή ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυµοῦ καὶ ὁ θυµοῦµεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἢ ἐν ὑµµισµῶς;

"Ἰσως, ἐφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυµηµικῷ.

Ἀλλ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἄκουσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ, ὡς ἀρα 439 E 1

λεόντιος ὁ ἀγλαῖωνὸς ἀνιὼν ἐκ τοῦ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, ἀσθονόµενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τὸ δηµῖο κειµένους, ἀµα µὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυµοῦ, ἀµα δὲ αὐ ὁ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέψαι ἐαυτὸν, καὶ τέως µὲν µάχοτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοι ὁ 440 A 1

So then, I said, I have distinguished for us these two kinds of elements as being in the soul; now the other element of spirit, namely the one with which we get infuriated, is it a third thing, or would it be of the same nature with either of the other ones?

Perhaps, he said, I once heard something that I believe, namely that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he noticed some bodies lying by the executioner. He had an appetite to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned himself away; and for a time he struggled with himself and covered his face.

4 The standard interpretation is that the executioner is disposing of corpses of criminals. S. C. Todd, ‘How to Execute People in Fourth-Century Athens’, in V. Hunter and J. Edmondson (eds.), Law and Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford, 2000), 31–49 at 49, writes that ‘it is tempting instead to read this as the final stage of apotumpanismos [sc. a method of execution].’ Citing Antiph. 2. 4. 5, he notes that the word ‘nekros’ can also signify ‘a body in its death throes’ (49 n. 64) —cf. LSJ s.v. ‘νεκρός’ I 2. It could be, then, that the executioner is either disposing of (executed) corpses or executing criminals. I take no position on the matter, but prefer to speak instead of ‘the bodies’ (i.e. either corpses or bodies in death throes) or ‘the sight’ (i.e. either of executed criminals or of an execution). The point to stress is that, whether Leontius has an appetite to look at either corpses or an execution, he has an appetite to witness and so come into contact with death. This will be relevant below in section III, subsection ‘Anticipating an objection’.
But finally overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open, rushed toward the bodies, ‘Look for yourselves,’ he said, ‘you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!’

I myself too have heard it, he said.

The story, I said, certainly indicates this, that anger sometimes wages war against the appetites as something really different against another.

Indeed it indicates this, he said. (R. 439 E 1–440 A 8)

Socrates begins by asking whether spirit is a third element or the same in nature as either the rational or the appetitive element. Glaucon suggests that it is the same as the appetitive. To this Socrates responds by introducing the story about Leontius, which he comments on by focusing on Leontius’ anger. That is, the story is introduced at least to question the identification between spirit and appetite, and Socrates’ comment suggests that Leontius’ anger is meant to show us his spirit at war against appetite.

There are two interpretative cruxes. The first is that Socrates’ comment (440 A 6–7) strongly suggests that we look to T2 for the conflict between spirit and appetite; this is strongly suggested by Socrates’ talk of anger (orgē) which relates to the potentially aggressive character of the spirited part. But here, in T2, it is not obvious that Socrates relies on the principle of opposites. Without the principle of opposites as an explicit marker of a division in the soul, we are left to wonder exactly where Socrates distinguishes spirit from appetite. The second interpretative crux is that there seems to be a clear opposition between soul-parts in T1, but here Socrates does not state explicitly which parts

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6 The standard interpretation of Leontius’ appetite takes it to be sexual in nature, i.e. he is sexually attracted to corpses. This interpretation has been challenged recently on textual and exegetical grounds: the textual evidence is tenuous at best and the standard interpretation ignores the punitive context. For these challenges, and alternative views, see D. S. Allen, ‘Envisaging the Body of the Condemned: The Power of Platonic Symbols’, Classical Philology 95.2 (2000), 133–50 (for the challenge, 135–36 n. 4); Ferrari, ‘The Three-Part Soul’, 180–4 (for the challenge, 182); and R. Saadi Liebert, ‘Pity and Disgust in Plato’s Republic: The Case of Leontius’ ['Pity and Disgust'], Classical Philology, 108 (2013), 179–201 (for the challenge, 181–82 with n. 10).


these would be. We know at the very least that one part is the appetitive, but if some other soul-part opposes it in T1 it is unclear whether it is the rational or the spirited.

The principle of opposites in T1. Let us begin by showing that there is an opposition involving different soul-parts in T1. Perhaps one may be under the impression that Leontius’ disgust stems from his appetitive part and that his disgust and appetite are opposites only in appearance.\(^9\) We should resist this impression, however. To be disgusted (\(duscherainein\)) seems to involve an act of rejecting something\(^10\) as it is explicitly contrasted with actions or dispositions to accept or receive something\(^11\); and, as we shall see next, having an appetite is or involves accepting or receiving something. At Republic 437 B 8–C 5, Socrates asks Glaucn whether the appetites as a whole, along with wishing and willing, are to be included somewhere in the pairs of opposites exemplified by assent and dissent (\(to\ \text{epineuein\ }tôi\ \text{ananeuein}\)), wanting to have something and rejecting it (\(to\ \text{ephiesthai\ }tînos\ \text{labein\ }tôi\ \text{aparneisthai}\)), and taking something and pushing it away (\(to\ \text{prosagesthai\ }tôi\ \text{apòtheisthai}\)). A useful observation here is that having an appetite is associated with some notions that, when taken literally, imply a bodily movement in a certain direction.\(^12\) Since the subject of inquiry is the soul, the suggestion seems to be that these pairs of opposites involve movements of the soul.

Now, at the same time that Leontius has an appetite to look, he is disgusted and turns himself away. If there is anything to the point above, namely that having an appetite involves a movement of the soul toward its object, then when Leontius turns himself away from the sight there is before us an opportunity to apply the principle of opposites. For, in turning himself away Leontius is doing the very opposite of being impelled toward looking, and it would seem that one and the same thing (i.e. Leontius’ soul) is doing or undergoing opposites at the same time in relation to the same thing. However, the principle of opposites denies that this could be the case. If something draws back the

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11 ‘\(δυσχεραίνω\)’ contrasted with ‘\(καταδέχο\αι\)’ (to receive, admit), R. 401 E 4–5; contrasted with ‘\(άποδέχο\αι\)’ (to accept or receive favourably), Pl. Lg. 751 D 1, Plt. 294 A 1–2, Arist. EN 1126b16–19, 1126b35; contrasted with ‘\(άσπάζο\αι\)’ (to welcome kindly, greet), Lg. 654 D 2–3; contrasted with ‘\(στέργω\)’ (to love or be fond of), Lg. 908 B 6–C 1, Arist. EN 1179b29–31; and, indeed, opposed to ‘\(επιθυ\µέω\)’ (to desire), Arist. Rh. 1378a3–6. Cf. P. Rozin, J. Haidt, and C. R. McCauley, ‘Disgust’, in M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, and L. Feldman Barrett (eds.), Handbook of Emotions (third edition; New York, 2008), 757–76 at 758, where it is said that ‘[d]isgust is manifested as a distancing from some object, event, or situation, and can be characterized as a rejection.’

soul at the same time it is impelled toward something, then there is something else in the soul different from that which drives it to look. Put this way, we should say that in T1 there is something else within Leontius’ soul opposing his appetite.

_Spirit’s opposition in T1._ Some commentators hold that, in T1, the spirited element opposes Leontius’ appetite. Here is one such account. In _Republic_ 10, Socrates avers that the non-rational elements, which include spirit and appetite, are particularly susceptible to appearances even when these are contrary to reality or to reason’s calculations. One way to understand this susceptibility is in terms of motivation, i.e. the non-rational elements are particularly motivated by appearances. On this view, some emotions could be explained by the motivations of a non-rational element simply because something appears to it in a certain way. Granted this, perhaps Leontius’ disgust and opposition arises from the spirited element because the sight appears disgusting to it. In other words, first Leontius’ appetitive element is drawn to the sight, but at the same time the sight appears disgusting to his spirited element and it rejects the sight.

There is yet another account of Leontius’ disgust and opposition in terms of the spirited part. First, the sight elicits disgust because it concerns (the bodies of) criminals, that is, agents of injustice;

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to put it another way, the sight elicits disgust because it concerns symbols of injustice. Second, there is a connection between disgust and the aischron, that is, the ugly-or-base. To wit, at Republic 401 D 4–402 A 6, Socrates praises the benefits of a proper education in musical training (mousikē): a well-educated person, rightly feeling disgust (orthō duscherainōn) praises and enjoys — and welcomes into his soul — the beautiful-or-fine things (ta kala) whereas he censures the ugly-or-base things (ta aischra). Injustice itself could be one of these disgust-eliciting things. Third, Socrates is quite clear that the nurturing he has in mind takes place while one is still young — to be precise, before one is capable of grasping the reason or account (logos). It would seem that the primary target of education in music-and-poetry is not the rational part of the soul, but the spirited part, in the sense of being the part of the soul that acquires or learns the (correct) opinions or beliefs imparted through stories told during musical training; put another way, the spirited part internalizes the norms of society. Therefore, on the view that spirit is educated to feel disgust in virtue of internalizing social norms, we

16 Saadi Liebert, ‘Pity and Disgust’, 182, 192.
17 Cf. R. 387 E 10–388 A 3; Lg. 654 C 8–D 3; Saadi Liebert, ‘Pity and Disgust’, 190–91.
19 R. 402 A 2–3; cf. R. 441 A 6–B 2 where Glaucon and Socrates seem to agree that children are generally devoid of rational calculation.
21 The view that spirit internalizes social norms is explicitly held by, e.g.: Gosling, Plato, 44–47, 49–50; Hobbs, Hero, 12, 29–31, 59–67; Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, 326; Moss, ‘Shame’, 163–68; Saadi Liebert, ‘Pity and Disgust’, 182, 190–91, 192. Moreover, the view that spirit is concerned with behavior that is either fine or shameful — i.e. behavior presumably measured in terms of social norms — is held by, e.g.: J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), 126–28; D. Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, 1993), 381–92; Lorenz, ‘Analysis’, 151–52; Richardson Lear, ‘Beauty’, 117–18.
may account for a spirited response in T1: since the spirited part learns to feel disgust at injustice and
the sight concerns symbols of injustice, then Leontius’ spirit feels disgust and rejects the sight.22

Regardless of the account one may wish to give for spirit’s lone opposition in Leontius’ case,
I find worth questioning the assumption that spirit opposes appetite without any intervention of
reason. For, there is compelling evidence that Socrates himself took Leontius’ case as one involving
the rational part. This comes out in the passage that follows T2.

The passage that follows T2 casts serious doubt on the view that spirit opposes appetite in T1. After
Leontius’ story, Socrates makes an observation concerning the nature of spirit’s opposition to appetite:

T3 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφη, πολλαχοῦ αἴσθανόμεθα, διὰν
βιάζονται τίνα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμία, λοιδοροῦντά τε
αὐτὸν καὶ θυμοῦμενον τὸ βιαζόμενο ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅσπερ
δυοῖν στασιαζόντοιν σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν
θυμόν τοῦ τοιούτου;

Do we not often notice this too elsewhere, I said, whenever appetites are forcing someone
contrary to his rational calculation, he rebukes himself and is infuriated with the forcing
element in him, that is, as if there were two factions, the spirit of such a person becomes an
ally with his reason? (R. 440 A 9–B 4)

Here Socrates observes that, when appetites are forcing someone against rational calculation, this
person both rebukes himself and becomes infuriated with that within him doing the forcing. Now, on
the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1, Socrates’ observation in T3 would be introducing
a different, complex kind of opposition between spirit and appetite. For, in T3, there is first an
opposition between reason and appetite and second an opposition between spirit and appetite. This is

22 An account along these lines could be given were the object of Leontius’ disgust in T1 not (the sight of) the
bodies, but instead the very appetite to look. Note, however, that the objection I raise immediately below would
hold also of this alternative account.
different from the view that takes spirit alone to be opposing Leontius’ appetite. The latter view, then, is committed to denying that T3 is a generalization or elucidation of Leontius’ case.23

We should resist reading T3 as introducing a different kind of opposition between spirit and appetite. For, this reading does not fit well with the text. Socrates begins his question with the adverb ‘oukoun’ which, in questions, invites assent either to an inference or to an addition to something that has already received assent.24 In this case, it seems to invite assent to an addition after Glaucon’s emphatic agreement to Socrates’ concluding remark that Leontius’ story ‘certainly indicates this, that anger sometimes wages war against the appetites as something really different against another’ (440 A 6–7). But the addition (i.e. T3) does not seem to be substantive. For, Socrates appears to be elucidating the struggle within Leontius’ soul, which is suggested by the adverbial ‘kai’25 after ‘oukoun’. The ‘kai’26 does not appear intended to add anything new to the conclusion of Leontius’ story, but it seems intended to stress the familiarity of Leontius’ struggle. If this is correct, then Socrates is simply saying that elsewhere there are cases just as (kai) Leontius’, that is, cases of a person’s rebuking her appetites because there is something within forcing her against rational calculation. T3, then, appears to elucidate Leontius’ case and since the opposition here involves the rational part, then it is not the case that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1.27

23 Supporters of the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1 seem to overlook this implication. For the view that T3 is in fact a generalization, without involving spirit in T1, cf. Penner, ‘Thought’, 103–04 n. 6; T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (New York, 1995), 212; Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, 326; Wilberding, ‘Morality’, 365; Singpurwalla, ‘Spirit’, 44, 48–49, and 57. Renaut is an exception: he holds both the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1 on account of the shame evinced by Leontius covering his face (La médiation, 180) and the view that T3 is an explanation of Leontius’ case, and so his reason and appetite are in opposition (La médiation 172–74). But why assume that Plato’s use of ‘παρακαλόπτοι’ (‘covered his face’) in T1 is a sign of shame and a reaction or expression of the spirited element, rather than another attempt at not looking at the scene, an attempt which goes hand in hand with Leontius’ being disgusted? (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me here.) There are two reasons to resist this assumption. First, it is not obvious that Leontius’ covering his face is a sign of shame. For, averting or covering one’s face from a disgust-eliciting source is a typical reaction (cf. D. Lateiner and D. Spatharas, ‘Introduction: Ancient and Modern Modes of Understanding and Manipulating Disgust’, in D. Lateiner and D. Spatharas (eds.), The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (Oxford, 2017), 1–42 at 8). Second, it is not obvious that shame is necessarily or always a response or expression of the spirited element. For, at R. 606 A 7–B 3, Socrates presupposes that our ‘best part’, namely the rational element (cf. M. Mastrangelo and J. Harris, ‘The Meaning of Republic 606a3-b5’, The Classical Quarterly, 47.1 (1997), 301–305 at 302 with n. 3) can experience shame.

24 LSJ s.v. ‘οὐκοῦν’ I.

25 LSJ s.v. ‘καί’ B 2.

26 The weight of this ‘καί’ was brought to my attention by Paolo Crivelli.

27 Further justification for taking T3 as elucidating Leontius’ case is developed below in section III, subsection ‘Further support for reason’s role’.
One may object that I have failed to take proper account of a key word, ‘allothi’ (‘elsewhere’, 440 A 9).\(^{28}\) For, ‘allothi’ marks the case in T3 as a different sort of case from Leontius’,\(^{29}\) thus undermining the suggestion that T3 is an elucidation. In other words, the case in T3 and Leontius’ case are not identical types. Yet this is still compatible with their having something in common (hence, the ‘kai’), namely their showing spirit in conflict with appetite. On the one hand, Leontius’ case shows spirit all on its own in conflict with appetite whereas, on the other hand, there are other cases (allothi) wherein it is also (kai) in conflict with appetite, this time however it follows reason’s suit, as its ally. Therefore, since T3 is a different sort of case wherein spirit operates in concert with reason, then we should read Leontius’ case as showing spirit all on its own in conflict with appetite.

There are three points to raise against this objection. First, ‘allothi’ need not mean a difference in kind, but only a difference in place or location.\(^{30}\) Indeed, in the Republic ‘allothi’ is used in this way, without suggesting or implying a difference in kind.\(^{31}\) Second, had Socrates intended to mark clearly the case in T3 as different in kind, one might have expected an expression such as ‘alloion ti’ (‘of another kind’).\(^{32}\) Third, there is one use of ‘allothi’ (R. 368 D 5) that serves as a precedent to my reading of it in T3. For, Socrates uses ‘allothi’ in a way compatible with finding the same thing elsewhere (allothi). This use of ‘allothi’ is found in the passage (R. 368 C 8–D 7) wherein Socrates proposes a method of investigation to answer the question what justice and injustice each is. The method of investigation proceeds as follows. Suppose that someone ordered us to read small letters at a distance, yet we lack keen eyesight. Nevertheless, someone notices that the same letters (ta auta grammata) are somewhere else (pou kai allothi), bigger and on a bigger surface. The method, then, would be to read first the larger letters in order to investigate the smaller ones, seeing if they really happen to be the same. The point is that what is to be found elsewhere (allothi) need not be something of a different kind, indeed it could even be the same. So, ‘allothi’ in T3 need not introduce a different sort of case from Leontius’.

III. REASON’S ROLE IN LEONTIUS’ STRUGGLE

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\(^{28}\) I owe this objection to Victor Caston.

\(^{29}\) Cf. LSJ s.v. ‘ἄλλοθι’ II.

\(^{30}\) LSJ s.v. ‘ἄλλοθι’ I.

\(^{31}\) Cf. R. 394 C 5, 460 B 1, 517 D 8, 584 D 8.

\(^{32}\) LSJ s.v. ‘ἄλλοιος’ I; cf. R. 500 A 3, 559 B 8, 598 A 9.
In this section, I shall argue for an interpretation of Leontius’ case that takes his appetite to be opposed first by his rational part in T1 and then by his spirited part in T2. First, I shall identify two facts that favor attributing a role to reason in T1. Second, I shall strengthen this view by appealing to a salient characterization of spirit, its alliance to reason. Finally, I offer an explanation of the rational part’s involvement in T1.

There are two interrelated facts in support of attributing a role to the rational element in Leontius’ struggle. First, let us recall that Socrates introduces the story about Leontius in order to show that the spirited element is not identical to the appetitive. Note, however, that he announces this sought-out distinction after he has told the story—and announces it in a curious way. Curiously, he says: the story ‘certainly indicates this, that anger sometimes wages war against the appetites as something really different against another’ (my emphasis, 440 A 6–7). It seems curious that Socrates here uses ‘anger’ (’orgē’) instead of ‘spirit’ (’thumos’). It seems curious on account of the wording with which Socrates first raises the question of the spirited element’s status: ‘now the other element of spirit, namely the one with which we get infuriated (to de dē tou thumou kai hōi thumoumēththa), is it a third thing, or would it be of the same nature with either of the other ones?’ (439 E 2–3; cf. 436 A 10). It is curious that ‘spirit’ does not appear in Socrates’ comment on the story; and the possibility that ‘spirit’ and ‘anger’ are being used interchangeably should not keep us from reflecting on Socrates’ opting for ‘anger’ instead of ‘spirit’. I suggest that, with ‘anger’, Socrates is deliberately narrowing down the presence of spirit in the story. ‘Spirit’ involves more than mere anger and using ‘spirit’ in Socrates’ comment might have led to confusion, e.g. to crediting the spirited part with a wider role in Leontius’ case, namely with being responsible for his disgust.

The most suitable candidate for the instance of anger is, I suggest, Leontius’ rebuke of his eyes in T2. Not only would anger be considered a natural response to losing the struggle, but also there is no other more natural and plausible place in the story to locate anger. (It would be puzzling were Socrates’ comment referring to Leontius’ disgust.) In other words, the anger of which Socrates

34 This will be relevant for the second interrelated fact.
35 Note, e.g., spirit’s role in the virtue of courage (R. 442 B 10–C 2) and its being spoken of as a lover of victory and honor (R. 581 A 9–B 5; cf. 586 C 7–D 2, 550 B 5–7).
speaks as showing spirit’s opposition to appetite does not direct our attention to the first part (T1) of Leontius’ story, but more naturally and plausibly to the second (T2).

It may be objected that there could be a way to see spirit’s involvement in Leontius’ disgust in T1.\(^{37}\) In reply, we turn to the second (interrelated) fact in support of attributing a role to the rational part in Leontius’ struggle. Let us recall, again, the purpose of introducing the story about Leontius, namely to show that the spirited part is not identical to the appetitive. Above in section II (subsection ‘The principle of opposites in T1’), it was shown that, in T1, there is an opposition that falls under the principle of opposites, an opposition between two soul-parts one of which is the appetitive. Yet Socrates remains silent on the matter, i.e. neither does he note explicitly that there is an opposition between soul-parts in T1 nor, of course, does he announce that here, already at this point in the story, we have the sought-out distinction between spirit and appetite. Socrates’ silence is, arguably, of some consequence. For, whenever he sets out to show a distinction between soul-parts, as we shall consider below, the instant he finds it he announces it.

To recognize this last point, first consider the argument that distinguishes reason from appetite. Once Socrates believes to have found the right kind of opposition (between reason and appetite), he claims (\(R. 439\ C\ 2–D\ 8\)) that there are these two elements. He says nothing less and nothing more. Second, consider the argument that distinguishes spirit from reason wherein Socrates’ argumentative economy is most salient. The quotation from Homer —indeed, half of it— suffices to show the distinction (\(R. 441\ B\ 3–C\ 2;\) cf. 390 D 4–5).\(^{38}\) Socrates’ practice in arguing for distinct elements within the soul seems to be the following, when he arrives at the sought-out distinction, at that very moment he announces it. This motivates us to expect that, when Socrates sets out to show the distinction between spirit and appetite, he will announce it at the very moment he finds it. With this principle in hand, Socrates’ silence in T1 implies that the opposition here is not between spirit and appetite. The remaining option is the rational part’s opposition as elucidated by T3.

**Further support for reason’s role.** The interpretation that reason opposes appetite in T1 gains further support upon providing another justification for taking T3 as an elucidation of Leontius’ case. Note that T3 introduces explicitly a conception of spirit that Socrates goes on to stress emphatically.

\(^{37}\) Lorenz relies on Socrates’ associating anger with the characteristic trait of spiritedness to claim the following: ‘But being spirited to any extent at all is not just a matter of getting upset […] It is also to have settled dispositions to desire to act as that sense requires and to be strongly averse to behavior that offends it. It is thus quite natural for Socrates to attribute to Leontius’ spirited part not only his anger, but also, implicitly, a strong aversion to corpse-gazing that puts up a valiant, though in the end unsuccessful, fight against intense sexual desire’ (‘Analysis’, 152).

\(^{38}\) The fact that Socrates dedicates roughly one Stephanus page to the spirited part should not be taken as an objection against this observation of argumentative economy. For, on the view being defended here, Socrates is not arguing further for a *distinction* between spirit and appetite after the story about Leontius; he is elucidating with other examples an aspect of the spirited part, that is, its alliance to reason. For an insightful account of the spirited part’s alliance to reason, see Singpurwalla, ‘Spirit’.
namely that spirit is by nature an ally or helper of reason —if not corrupted by a bad education. Immediately following the claim in T3 that, when appetite forces someone contrary to reason, spirit allies itself with reason, Socrates confesses (R. 440 B 4–7) to thinking that Glaucon would not admit to perceiving or acknowledging his own spirit, or that of another person, in common with the appetites, not hindered from acting against reason’s command. Glaucon emphatically agrees, yet Socrates presses the point of spirit’s alliance with two further illustrations. Finally, Socrates asks (R. 440 E 1–4) Glaucon to reflect on the fact that spirit appears to be not something like appetite and he repeats the point that, in a faction in the soul, spirit bears arms on the side of the rational part. Socrates’ insistence strongly suggests that spirit’s alliance to reason is a significant feature both in identifying and in describing this part of the soul and it prompts us to suspect that the point holds throughout Socrates’ argument for distinguishing the spirited part, including the story about Leontius.

Now, looking back at the story on its own, it is not immediately obvious that the point about spirit’s alliance to reason comes through: after all, Socrates does not explicitly say that reason opposes appetite in T1, thus there is no immediate way for the story to contribute to the point. Perhaps one may not be troubled by this. But to treat Leontius’ case in this way, I find problematic: it creates a discrepancy with the rest of Socrates’ immediate discussion (and elsewhere) of spirit as an ally of reason. On the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1, Socrates would be introducing overall two kinds of opposition: on the one hand, in Leontius’ case, spirit opposes appetite without appetite first being opposed by reason —and on this view, there is no explicit explanation of spirit’s opposition; on the other hand, with T3 and the other examples, spirit opposes appetite after the latter is opposed first by reason —and in this case, there is an explicit explanation of spirit’s opposition, namely its alliance to reason. The point is the following. On the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1, there would be no way for Leontius’ case to contribute to the lengthy description of spirit as an ally of reason. But this characteristic of spirit, its alliance to reason, receives all the attention despite its being apparently obvious to both Socrates and Glaucon. Reading T3 as an elucidation of Leontius’ case, however, we are able to accommodate Leontius’ story into this characterization of spirit.


40 Note that Socrates repeats the point about spirit’s alliance also in asking (R. 441 A 2–3) whether it is a third part, distinct from reason. I discuss further spirit’s alliance to reason below, in section IV, subsection ‘The double duty of alliance’.

41 The conception of spirit as an ally of reason is implicit in Socrates’ distinction between spirit and reason in Odysseus’ restraint (R. 441 B 4–C 2); and the conception is reiterated elsewhere in Book 4 (R. 441 E 3–5, 442 B 5–C 2) as well as in Book 9 (R. 589 B 3–4). Moreover, it is clearly emphasized also in Phdr. 253 D 3 ff. (253 D 7–E 1 and 254 C 1–3) and in Ti. 70 A 2–7, B 3–C 1, D 3–6. Cf. Singpurwalla, ‘Spirit’, 48–49.

42 As it seems that some commentators are not: this is precisely a consequence to which those who deny a role for reason in Leontius’ case are committed.

43 This will be relevant in the next paragraph.
Perhaps we should not expect the point about spirit’s alliance to reason also in the story about Leontius. In reply—and to justify further T3 as an elucidation of Leontius’ case—let us pick up on a point mentioned earlier, namely that Socrates seems intent on identifying the cause of opposition when he distinguishes the elements of the soul. In the argument that distinguishes the rational and appetitive elements, Socrates explains the cause of the opposition to appetite, that is, reason. (The explanation may be lacking in detail, but it is an explanation nonetheless.) Furthermore, in T3 and the other examples concerning spirit, Socrates explains the cause of spirit’s behavior in terms of its being an ally or helper of reason. These two instances suggest that, in addition to distinguishing the different elements, Socrates is interested also in identifying—however sketchily—the cause of opposition or behavior. If this is correct, then we should expect him to identify some cause in Leontius’ case. As Leontius’ story stands on its own, as we have observed, there is no explicit identification of the cause underlying spirit’s opposition to appetite. On the view that spirit opposes the appetitive element in T1, we would have to embrace this silence. On this view, again, there is a lack of consistency between Leontius’ case and the rest of Socrates’ discussion concerning spirit. Indeed, there is a lack of consistency not only between Leontius’ case and the rest of Socrates’ discussion about spirit, but also between Leontius’ case and Socrates’ argument distinguishing reason from appetite: Leontius’ story would be the only place where Socrates distinguishes two parts of the soul without also identifying the cause of the opposition. Surely there is no inconsistency here, but on the view that spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1 Leontius’ case stands out in an unfavorable light.

Of course, we need not embrace the silence: we could dispel it. As we have seen, we could read T3 as elucidating Leontius’ case and, read this way, Socrates’ argument for the distinction between spirit and appetite would identify the cause of opposition between these two soul-parts. Reading Leontius’ case with T3 renders a consistency to Socrates’ immediate discussion about spirit which we should embrace rather than deny: first, it shares with the rest of Socrates’ discussion about spirit the claim that this part is, by nature, an ally of reason; second, it shares with Socrates’ argument distinguishing reason from appetite the fact that Socrates identifies also the cause of opposition. This consistency would be lost were we to deny that T3 elucidates Leontius’ case. Therefore, it is preferable to read T3 as elucidating Leontius’ case and since T3 states explicitly that reason first opposes appetite, then reason should be taken to oppose Leontius’ appetite in T1 and spirit opposes it in T2.

44 Of course, as commentators have shown, one may attempt to supplement the explanation with another characterization of the spirited part (cf., above, n. 37). Yet these attempts seem to ignore the point about spirit’s alliance to reason.

45 Indeed, it at least ignores the idea that spirit is by nature an ally of reason.

46 Read this way, we highlight the already apparent similar structure in Leontius’ story and T3: both identify, first, an appetite in opposition to something else and both passages observe that, because of the agent’s weakness (or conflict), he then abuses himself and gets angry with that within him doing the forcing.
Anticipating an objection. On the view I am defending, Leontius’ rational element opposes his appetite in T1. Yet one may be doubtful because it is far from evident that either the appetite or the sight of the bodies would fall under the purview of the rational element. In reply, note that one concern of the rational element is the well-being of the soul and the body (cf. R. 442 B 5–8). Studies have shown that the emotion of disgust is related to noxious objects, i.e. it is a ‘rejection response’ to protect the body and soul from the threat of harm.\(^{47}\) For instance, one may be disgusted by things that are harmful to the body because they are a source of disease.\(^{48}\) Corpses are one such elicitor of disgust.\(^{49}\) Contact with corpses, then, would fall under the purview of the rational element.

Two difficulties may arise. First, one may worry that citing as evidence the above-mentioned conception of disgust as a rejection response would be anachronistic.\(^{50}\) There are, however, uses of the verb ‘to be disgusted’ (’duscherainein’) pointing to this conception of disgust in the Republic. There are, in addition to T1, six instances of the aforementioned verb in the text.\(^{51}\) The contexts for all instances preceding T1 strongly suggest that the things or activities worthy of a person’s being disgusted are thus in virtue of being harmful to the soul. For instance, in the course of his challenge to Socrates, Glaucon suggests (362 B 4–5) that the extremely unjust person is not disgusted by doing injustice. Given the context of Glaucon’s challenge, namely for Socrates to show the powers of justice and injustice when each on its own is present in the soul, powers framed in terms of the benefit or harm, the good or evil, each brings into the soul, I suggest that Glaucon’s extremely unjust person is not disgusted by doing injustice presumably because he or she does not think it harmful to him- or herself, or his or her soul (cf. R. 358 C, E, 360 D, 362 B–C, 363 C–D, 364 A, 366 D). Moreover, I would add, he or she is not disgusted by doing injustice presumably because he or she is not disgusted by making another person’s life worse off or making another person worse (cf. R. 335 B 6–C 8). I submit, then, that the appeal to the aforementioned conception of disgust would not be anachronistic.

A second difficulty may be that there is no threat to the well-being of the body. As noted above (n. 4), perhaps Leontius does not come across corpses of executed criminals, but an execution and perhaps an execution does not present a threat of harm to the body. So, it would not fall under the purview of the rational part. Moreover, even if Leontius does come across corpses, the ancient Greeks might not have been concerned with corpses as a potential threat of physical infection, that is, as a threat of bodily harm.\(^{52}\) So, the corpses too would not fall under the purview of the rational part. In other words, there is no threat to the well-being of the body. In reply, I offer an explanation of


\(^{49}\) Rozin et al. write: ‘Contact with death and corpses is a particularly potent elicitor of disgust […] The prototypical odor of disgust is the odor of decay, which is the odor of death’ (‘Disgust’, 761).

\(^{50}\) I thank Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi for this worry.

\(^{51}\) R. 362 B 5, 366 C 7, 388 A 1, 396 D 7, 401 E 4, and 475 B 11. The last instance does not fall under the conception being discussed, but rather means something like ‘to make difficulty’ (cf. R. 475 C 3 and 502 D 6).

reason’s role that should cover all possible scenarios. Leontius’ appetite impels him toward some bodies, whether in the throes of execution or already executed, that would put him into contact with the pollution (miasma) of death. For the ancient Greeks, death was a source of pollution, that is, a condition both contagious and dangerous, and to be avoided. In other words, death-pollution poses a threat to the well-being of a person and, as such, it would be a concern of the rational part. Since Leontius’ appetite impels him toward coming into contact with death-pollution and since this poses a threat to his well-being, it falls under the concern of the rational part, which draws back the soul. Thus, it is the rational part that opposes Leontius’ appetite in T1.

Admittedly, the concerns pertaining to miasma are not at all evident in the text. There are, I find, two further pieces of evidence motivating the view that reason first opposes appetite in T1. First, when Socrates reflects on the case showing the distinction between the rational and the appetitive elements, he and Glaucon agree (439 C 10–D 3) that, in cases involving appetites that arise from

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53 Scenario 1: Leontius’ appetite is sexual in nature and corpses are its object. Scenario 2: the appetite is non-sexual (in nature) and corpses are its object. Scenario 3: the appetite is non-sexual and an execution is its object.

54 For a conception of contact with pollution as a coming into the same social space, see Parker, Miasma, 39.

55 Parker, Miasma, 4.

56 The Gods avoid the pollution of death (Parker, Miasma, 33 with n. 3); criminals are a source of pollution (Parker, Miasma, 5 and 45 with n. 47); and for a rejection —or at least a doubt— of the idea that unburied corpses (ataphoi) are not pollutants, see Parker, Miasma, 46–47.

57 One may still doubt that disgust is a response or expression of the rational element. Perhaps the doubt is motivated by an assumption along these lines, namely that emotional responses or expressions of the rational element are not immediate; for, they require calculation or reasoning. In other words, one may doubt that disgust is a response or expression of the rational element because disgust is an immediate reaction, apparently involving no calculation or reasoning, but the emotional responses or expressions of reason are not like this. I offer two thoughts in reply. First, Plato is committed to the view that not all emotional responses or expressions of the rational element require or depend on reasoning. For, on the one hand, reason has or enjoys at least one emotion, a love of learning (cf., R. 581 B 6–12, since Plato uses the terms ‘rational element’ and ‘philosophical element’ interchangeably, and 411 C 9–412 A 3, where I take the love of learning to belong to the philosophical element); on the other hand, at a time when children have yet to develop their reasoning abilities (cf. R. 441 A 7–B 2), they presumably have this love of learning. Second, as it seems to me, immediate oppositions need not preclude calculation or reasoning. Consider, e.g., the case that Socrates presents in order to distinguish the appetitive and the rational elements. It is conceivable both that, when reason wants to hinder the appetite to drink, it does so in an immediate way and that a calculation or reasoning motivates it despite not being articulated prior to the opposition. But, the presence of some calculation or reasoning is shown when pressed for an explanation. (I may have an appetite to drink, but immediately hold back, say, because I just went to the dentist and I was told not to drink anything for an hour or so, and the allotted time has not passed. However, this explanation may very well not be on the surface or articulated before the opposition.) In other words, an immediate opposition is compatible with its arising from calculation or reasoning despite the latter not preceding the opposition in articulated form.

58 I thank an anonymous referee for applying more pressure on this point.
affections and diseases, the element doing the preventing arises from rational calculation. This raises a question, is it in all cases when something in the soul wants to hinder an appetite that it is to be identified as the rational element? This may strike us as implausible, but it seems to be the view in another passage, R. 442 A 4–B 9 (discussed below). Second, Socrates may very well believe that, in all cases when something in the soul wants to hinder an appetite’s movement, it is the rational element; for, this is part of reason’s job in the soul.

At 442 A 4–B 9, Socrates and Glaucon agree on the harmony between the rational and spirited elements that is achieved by a (correct) mixture of musical and physical training. One feature of their being in harmony is that these elements will be put in charge of the appetitive element (cf. R. 586 D 4–587 A 3), and they will make sure that the latter is not filled with the ‘so-called pleasures of the body’. The worry is that the appetitive element may become big and strong, and not do the things belonging to it. In other words, the rational and spirited elements are to look after the appetitive, in particular, I take it, the two elements are to regulate or control the pursuit and enjoyment of the so-called pleasures of the body. But 442 B 5–9 strongly suggests, as it seems to me, that the element primarily responsible for regulating or controlling the appetitive element, including (but not limited to) wanting to hinder certain appetites, is the rational element, with spirit following suit—indeed, if spirit even arises: for, perhaps not all attempts of the rational element to hinder an appetite concern spirit (e.g. R. 439 C 10–D 3, where there is no good reason to believe that spirit is in play). I am committed to this interpretation, namely that, in Leontius’ case, the rational element’s opposition to appetite does not concern spirit in the first place, but, upon his appetitive element winning the day, spirit is angered and then opposes it.

IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Is spirit a third part? One may still worry about the conflict being between reason and appetite in T1.60 One may worry because Leontius’ case was introduced to address the question whether spirit is a third part, but now it is unclear exactly how a conflict between reason and appetite in T1 would help Socrates answer the question. Indeed, on the reading I defend, spirit is introduced only as an ally and, given its alliance, spirit works together with reason. On this reading, it is harder to appreciate the spirited part as a distinct, third part: ‘spirit’ need not be distinct from reason, but merely the rational part under a different description. In other words, a complex reading of Leontius’ case, whereby there is a conflict between reason and appetite in T1, fails to address adequately the question whether spirit

59 Admittedly, this passage reflects on the outcome of a (correct) mixture of musical and physical training. That being said, it seems plausible to suppose that this holds true in a less-than-ideal education, in the kind of education that does not result in the rule of the rational element. Consider, e.g., a soul ruled by the appetitive element: in this case, reason too seems charged with looking after the appetitive element even though the former will probably do a poor job of it (cf. R. 553 D 1–7, 587 A 4–7). In other words, there is evidence for the view that, when something in the soul wants to hinder an appetite, the rational element is first responsible for this in all cases—whether or not it rules in the soul.

60 I owe this worry to Victor Caston.
is a third part. A complex reading, then, does not fit well with the overall argument since it does not fare well in introducing spirit as a third part of the soul.

*The double duty of alliance.* The worry that a complex reading of Leontius’ case would fail to introduce spirit as a third part of the soul can be addressed. For, introducing spirit as an ally of reason does double duty: it shows that spirit is not the same in nature as the appetitive part and it tacitly resists an identification between spirit and reason given the plausible assumption that an army and its ally are not to be confused as numerically one and the same thing. I take up these points in turn.

After having discerned two elements (i.e. reason and appetite), Socrates raises (439 E 2–3) the question whether spirit, namely that with which we become infuriated, is a third part or the same in nature as one of the other two.61 Glaucón replies (439 E 4) that it is perhaps the same in nature as the appetitive element, and immediately thereafter Socrates introduces the story about Leontius. Note that, before going on to show that spirit is distinct from reason, Socrates refers (440 D 7–E 5) back to Glaucon’s suggestion. One could read the back reference as suggesting that only after this entire discussion (439 E 4–440 E 5) has the objective of showing the difference between spirit and appetite been achieved. In other words, it seems that the success of showing the difference between spirit and appetite is not established until 440 D 7–E 5. This could suggest that the story about Leontius is not a self-sufficient case for showing the difference between spirit and appetite, i.e. something more than Leontius’ case needs to be said in order to show that spirit is not the same in nature as the appetitive element.

Furthermore, R. 440 D 7–E 5 seems to favour the complex reading of Leontius’ case. For, Socrates’ remark (440 E 3–4) suggests that what truly shows the difference between spirit and appetite is precisely spirit’s alliance to reason in the soul’s civil wars. Precisely because of its alliance to reason, it is not the case that spirit is the same in nature as the appetitive element: spirit’s alliance to reason brings it to be in conflict with the appetitive element.62 In other words, it is spirit’s alliance to reason that makes a difference, which gives us a good basis to reject the initial impression that spirit may be the same in nature as appetite.

But now one may insist that, on a complex reading of Leontius’ case, there is no good rationale to suppose the presence of a third, spirited element. To suppose its presence would be unjustified: for all we know, on the complex reading, it is *reason* that opposes appetite in T2. Notice, however, that there is something intuitively spirited in Leontius’ case, namely anger, and Socrates introduces the spirited element by way of Leontius’ anger. Moreover, anger is not something intuitively associated with reason, the latter being gentle.63 Notice, moreover, that with the talk of alliance Socrates should manage at the very least to keep at bay the worry that ‘spirit’ is only a different description of reason. For, the very notion of being an ally implies at least two parties. It is

61 Cf. T1.
63 Cf. R. 375 B 8–376 C 7, 410 B 10–412 A 3, 441 E 7–442 A 3
plausible to assume that an army and its ally would not be taken as numerically one and the same thing; and just as an army and its ally are not thus confused, so too reason and spirit, as its ally, would not be confused for being numerically one and the same thing. (T3 tells us that anger is roused in order to serve reason as an ally.) Given this assumption, we can appreciate that Socrates is at the very least able to introduce something that both opposes the appetitive part and that is tacitly understood as not being identical with the rational element.

That being said, one may take issue with the work I have put spirit’s characterization as the ally of reason to do. For, first, to distinguish spirit from reason in virtue of the former’s alliance provides a weaker distinction than one between a thing and its opposite; second, my relying on spirit’s characterization fails to pay due attention to Plato’s own arguments (R. 441 A 5–C 3) to distinguish reason and spirit. I take up these issues in turn.

My answer to the worry that spirit may be just ‘a certain form of rational element’ (R. 440 E 6), given its alliance to reason, is not meant to distinguish these two elements in the very same way(s) that Plato distinguishes the soul’s elements; indeed, Plato’s question at R. 440 E 6–8 clearly shows that he did not take Leontius’ case, and the ensuing discussion (440 A 9–E 5), to have shown that reason and spirit are distinct. My answer is meant only to provide a consideration or assumption against taking spirit’s alliance to reason as evidence in favour of the former’s being ‘a certain form of rational element’; it is not meant to replace Plato’s own arguments to distinguish reason and spirit. It is clear that Plato’s own arguments to distinguish these two elements do not rely on spirit’s characterization as the ally of reason. But since Plato appears to rely on the principle of opposites by eliciting a conflict between reason and spirit in the case of Odysseus (441 B 3–C 2), one may ask, how does this conflict between reason and spirit fit with the latter’s alliance? Spirit’s alliance to reason seems to me perfectly compatible with the way that Socrates distinguishes these two elements in the case of Odysseus: although they do conflict, spirit indeed does also follow reason (cf., below, the last paragraph in this section IV).

The missing principle of opposites. Let us now consider another objection to the view that Leontius’ spirited opposition to his appetite is confined to T2. At R. 436 B 9, Socrates introduces the principle of opposites, a principle he seems intent in using to prove whether the soul acts as a whole or with distinct elements. Since Leontius’ story is meant to distinguish the spirited element from the appetitive and since on the view I am defending this distinction takes place in T2, it seems that we

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64 If this is correct, then the reconstruction I offer below (section V) does not import a lot of machinery that is not in evidence.

65 I owe these two issues to an anonymous referee.
must at best assume Socrates’ use of the principle to show the distinction. We must assume this because he does not explicitly call upon the principle as he does in the argument distinguishing reason and appetite. But in fact, so the objection goes, the rebuke is not even a case of the kind of opposition that is addressed by the principle of opposites. When Leontius runs toward the bodies, there is nothing in his soul standing in opposition to his appetite and the same should be said of Leontius’ rebuke: in cursing his eyes, Leontius does not show any sign of opposing looking at the sight. In other words, in T2, it is not the case that his soul is doing or undergoing opposites at the same time, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing. Therefore, Leontius’ rebuke does not involve the kind of opposition that falls under the principle of opposites. Yet we should give an interpretation of Leontius’ story which would clearly allow Socrates to distinguish spirit from appetite with the principle of opposites.

Reply. Admittedly, it is not obvious that Leontius’ rebuke and anger involves an opposition to the appetite to look, i.e. that his spirit is then and there wanting not to look, thus presenting a clear opposition to the appetitive part’s wanting to look which would fall under the principle of opposites. That being said, it is not implausible to appreciate Leontius’ angry rebuke as involving a rejection of the appetite to look, that is, as involving a wanting not to look. For, in the Republic, there are two instances of the verb rendered by ‘to rebuke’ (‘λοιδορεῖν’) that suggest its being construed as a rejection. In one case (368 B 4–C 3), the verb stands as the opposite of praising (epainein) and, in another case (367 D 3–6), as a way to blame (psegein), which also stands as the opposite of praising. There is, then, a clear contrast or opposition between rebuking and praising something. Now, as we have seen, to praise something appears closely together with the idea of welcoming something (into the soul). Thus, since rebuking is contrasted with praising and praising is construed as an act of

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66 As these commentators seem to do: Cornford, ‘Psychology’, 261–62; N. P. White, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis, 1979), 126 (although it is not explicitly clear whether the distinction is exclusively in T2); Cooper, ‘Motivation’, 131 n. 16; M. Woods, ‘Plato’s Division of the Soul’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 73 (1987), 23–48 at 31 and 46; Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, 326–27; Gerson, Persons, 102–03; Ferrari, ‘The Three-Part Soul’, 167; Renaut, ‘La fonction’, 180–81. Lorenz raises the difficulty most clearly: ‘Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Socrates seems to think that it is Leontius’ anger that does the war-making against the desires of his appetites (440a5–6). Does not Leontius’ anger only come into play when his desires have already carried the day?’ (‘Analysis’, 152). Penner implicitly denies the application of the principle in T2 (‘Thought’, 113).

67 Cf. Phdr. 254 A 7–B 3 where both the charioteer and the good horse merely give way to the bad horse.

68 For Penner, the lack of the principle of opposites weakens the case for spirit as a third part of the soul (‘Thought’, 111–13); Reeve takes the principle of opposites to be ‘crucial to the proper functioning of this subtle and ingenious argument for the tripartition of the psyche’ (Philosopher-Kings, 131); and Lorenz seems to be of the view that the principle should be used to distinguish spirit and appetite, finding T2 a problematic place to apply the principle and thus preferring T1 (‘Analysis’, 152).

69 Cf., above, the paragraph to n. 16.
welcoming, then, I suggest, rebuking is taken as an act of rejection or pushing away. (Indeed, this rejection or pushing away aspect comes out clearly in some cases of self-rebuke. For instance, it is not uncommon to see a person who has decided to quit smoking, when she gives in to a craving, rebuking herself and tossing away the cigarette; that is, her self-rebuke and tossing away the cigarette go hand-in-hand, and the latter shows her rejecting the object of her craving, i.e. it shows that she wants not to smoke.) In other words, when Leontius rebukes his eyes and is angry at them, there is in fact a spirited opposition such as wanting-not-to-look that clearly falls under the principle of opposites.

This reply is strengthened by the following consideration. Recall that, on the view I am defending, there is an opposition between the appetitive and the rational elements in T1 — the former is impelled to look, but the rational element draws back the soul. Instead of following reason, the appetitive element forces against it, that is, it ignores the commands of reason. In T2, the spirited element gets angry at the appetitive since it is by nature an ally of reason, that is, it aims to preserve the commands of reason. As such, the appetitive element cannot be identical to the spirited. For, if it were, it would follow that one and numerically the same thing would ignore the commands of reason while at the same time aiming to preserve those commands. These, however, are opposite properties and, by applying the principle of opposites, we infer that the appetitive and the spirited elements are distinct.

One may worry that, on the above reply, it would be possible to partition the spirited part. For, in cases where spirit is impelled toward something that reason opposes, given spirit’s alliance to reason there will be opposite movements within the spirited part itself, namely being-impelled and being-drawn-back (given its alliance); put another way, an opposition between spirit and reason would seem to involve not only the spirited part’s forcing against rational calculation (i.e. its ignoring the commands of reason), but also its acquiescing to rational calculation (i.e. its preserving the commands of reason) given its alliance. These, as we saw above, are opposite properties. So, it would seem that spirit’s characteristic alliance to reason introduces the possibility of partitioning within itself.

To dispel this worry consider the following. When there is an opposition between spirit and reason, it may well be the case that spirit does not force against reason, i.e. that spirit does not ignore the commands of reason. For, indeed, spirit listens. That is, when the spirited part is impelled toward something and the rational part draws back the soul, spirit does not continue to impel the soul toward that from which reason draws back. In other words, it is not the case that the spirited part both ignores

70 Here I follow a suggestion made by Paolo Crivelli.
71 Cf. R. 442 B 10–C 2.
72 Consider the noble man (R. 440 C 6–D 3) and, presumably, Odysseus.
the commands of reason and aims to preserve them. Therefore, spirit’s alliance to reason does not pose a threat to its own unity.\textsuperscript{73}

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I defend an interpretation of the argument that distinguishes the spirited element from the appetitive in the story of Leontius. This interpretation holds that Leontius’ appetite is first opposed by the rational element of the soul (in T1) and second by the spirited element (in T2). In defending this view, I have developed points that allow us to offer the following reconstruction of the argument as one to which Socrates would be entitled.

\begin{enumerate}
\item There is an appetite in Leontius’ soul to look at the sight (or bodies), i.e. the appetitive element wants to look at the sight (of the bodies).
\item At the same time, Leontius is disgusted and turns away, i.e. something else within him draws back his soul.
\item It is the rational element that draws back the soul.\textsuperscript{74}
\item Leontius’ appetitive element, however, forces him against his reason.
\item Leontius’ spirit is angry at his appetitive element because it (i.e. spirit) is by nature an ally of reason.
\item Spirit’s anger at the appetitive element involves a rejection of the appetite to look, i.e. spirit wants not to look.\textsuperscript{75}
\item Wanting-to-look (because of appetite) and wanting-not-to-look (because of spirit) are opposite properties.\textsuperscript{76}
\item But the same thing will not be able to do or suffer opposites in the same respect and in relation to the same thing at the same time.
\item Therefore, spirit and appetite are distinct.
\end{enumerate}

If the account defended here is correct, then one way to characterize being disgusted or feeling disgust is as a rational response, namely when it arises from the rational element, specifically from its concern for the well-being of body and soul. If this characterization is correct, then it is evidence in favour of taking the rational element as the primary target of musical training (\textit{mousikē}), that is, as the element that acquires or learns the (correct) opinions or beliefs imparted through stories told during musical

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Worry: Perhaps so, insofar as the spirited part remains an ally of reason. But were it to be corrupted, could the threat of internal partitioning not be real? Reply: No. For, when it is corrupted, it arguably has no aim to preserve the commands of reason, i.e. it would simply ignore (like appetite) those commands.
\item An explanation is given above in section III, subsection ‘Anticipating an objection’.
\item Cf., above, the paragraph to n. 69.
\item For an alternative pair of opposite properties, see the paragraph to n. 70.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
training. For, at Republic 3, 401 D 4–402 A 6, in discussing the reasons or ends of a proper education in musical training, Socrates claims that a well-educated person, rightly feeling disgust (orthōs duscherainōn), praises and enjoys —and welcomes into his soul— the beautiful-or-fine things whereas he censures the ugly-or-base things, presumably not letting them enter the soul. Clearly, a goal is to educate children and youths to have a concern for their souls. I suggest, then, that the aforementioned conception of disgust as a rejection response appears in 401 D 4–402 A 6. On this reading of the Book 3 passage, it is more plausible to think of the rational element as the primary target of musical training, in the above-specified sense: after all, it is element of the soul with a concern for the well-being of body and soul, rather than the spirited element. In other words, if the account of Leontius’ case defended here is correct, then it points to there being a kind of disgust that is rational, in the sense of arising from the rational element’s concerns or opinions; and, since well-educated children and youths acquire this kind of disgust, then we should believe that the primary target of musical training is not the spirited element of the soul, but the rational.

One may wonder whether this claim fits with Socrates’ remarks at R. 440 E 6–441 A 4, specifically 441 A 2–3. After distinguishing the spirited and the appetitive elements, Socrates asks whether spirit is really a third element or some sort of rational element and if it is a third element whether it is by nature an ally of reason, ‘if it [sc. spirit] has not been corrupted by a bad education’ (441 A 3). Since a bad education may corrupt the spirited element, one may think that the content of musical training is directed at this part.

Socrates’ remark acknowledging the corruptibility of spirit due to a bad education is not conclusive evidence that spirit absorbs the content of musical training, in the sense that spirit acquires or learns the (correct) opinions or beliefs imparted through stories. For, as we shall see, spirit’s potential corruptibility is compatible with reason being the element that acquires or learns these opinions or beliefs and, on the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that spirit is affected only by the properly musical aspects of musical training, not by the content of stories.

First, let us specify the sort of corruptibility that Socrates probably has in mind. Given the context of Socrates’ remark, the qualification probably means that a bad education may corrupt spirit qua (natural) ally of reason. If this is correct, I suggest two ways for spirit to be corrupted qua ally. Spirit will not be reason’s ally (i) if the former is nourished or strengthened to the extent of becoming the ruler in the soul or (ii) if spirit is not nourished or strengthened enough such that it fails to use its courage to carry out the commands or announcements of the rational element. Second, there is a hint of both these ways for spirit to be corrupted qua ally earlier in Republic 3, 410 C 8–411 E 3. For my purposes, I identify in this passage two points to stress. Notice that, when discussing the effect of excessive musical training on the spirited element, Socrates focuses on a properly musical part of musical training, on rhythm and harmony, not on the content of stories —as if the latter were not

77 Cf., above, n. 20, with respect to Schofield, Singpurwalla, and Wilberding (for a qualified alternative).

78 I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to these lines, and raising the worry.

79 For the motivation behind (ii), see R. 442 B 5–C 3.
relevant. Notice also that, when Socrates does focus on the content of stories, that is, where learning is at issue, he seems to take the content as affecting not the spirited element, but the philosophical element, that is, the element by which we learn or have a love for learning (cf. R. 581 B 6–12). In other words, the fact that spirit qua (natural) ally of reason may be corrupted by a bad education does not show or imply that spirit, not reason, is the element of the soul that benefits from musical training in the sense of acquiring or learning (correct) opinions or beliefs from the content of stories.

I assume that claims made about the philosophical element hold true of the rational element, since Plato uses the terms ‘rational element’ and ‘philosophical element’ interchangeably (cf. 410 B 10–412 A 8, 441 E 7–442 A 3, 586 E 4–587 A 3).

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