THE SPECTRE OF INVERTED EMOTIONS AND THE SPACE OF EMOTIONS

Kevin Mulligan (Genève)

§1 DESCRIBING EMOTIONS

Philosophers have analysed emotions over the last hundred years in two distinct philosophical traditions. First, the descriptive psychology of Brentano and Stumpf, through its many transformations, including realist phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, up until the Second World War. Secondly, analytic philosophy of mind. The main connexion between the two traditions is provided by Wittgenstein whose work takes up many of the distinctions of descriptive psychology and also stimulated much work in analytic philosophy. Broad and Ryle seem to have been the only other analytic philosopher familiar with the earlier descriptivist tradition. The two traditions attach much importance to careful description. Descriptivism in philosophy is by no means a common emphasis. It often yields pride of place to argument. Ordinary language philosophy of the Oxonian variety marks perhaps the high point of descriptivism in analytic philosophy and is indeed in part responsible for giving it a bad name.

Although descriptivism is a key element in much philosophy of language and formal semantics - for obvious reasons - it is not particularly prominent in contemporary philosophy of mind. In part, perhaps, because of current views about folk psychology. But the contemporary functionalist or naturalist - unless he is an eliminativist - should be interested in the analysis of the folk psychology of emotions and desire if for no other reason than that the results of such analyses provide some of the data that a successful naturalism must account for.

In what follows I bring together a personal selection of some central distinctions and claims to be found in the two descriptivist traditions mentioned. The choice is my own and I have simplified and modified where I see fit. Nearly all the points I present are controversial and have been attacked in these same traditions. But, taken together, they provide, I believe, an attractive map of the emotions. They are all to be found here and there in the writings of the first descriptivist tradition from Felix Austria - in Bolzano, Brentano, Ehrenfels, Pfänder, Stumpf, Meinong, Witasek, Baley, Husserl, Orestano, Geiger, Bühler, Musil, Kolnai, Katkov, Köhler, Kunz, Duncker and especially in Scheler (not to mention minor figures who drew extensively on this tradition such as Heidegger and Sartre) - and/or in that of the second such tradition - in Moore, Broad, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Anscombe, Murdoch, Geach, Kenny, Davidson, Lyons, Scruton, Thalberg, Gordon, Gibbard, Greenspan, Elster, Baier, and especially in de Sousa.

§2 [EPISODIC]

Attributions of emotions are sometimes of transient episodes or states and sometimes of dispositions to such episodes or states. It is not clear that all emotions can have the status of both episodes and dispositions. Love, for example, and in particular the state of being in love, the thing that can be put to the test, is a disposition. If there is a feeling of love it is a manifestation of such a disposition. But it is only one of many such manifestations, and perhaps not the most important.

In what follows I largely ignore dispositions in favour of episodes. These episodes are indubitably bound up in complex ways with behaviour, linguistic and non-linguistic, expression and the patterns these form. But philosophy is a matter of abstractions, in both senses of the word. And I shall abstract in what follows from the various internal and external relations in which episodic emotions stand to whatever is not a psychological episode or the object thereof, although not from the course or Verlauf of the many emotions have.

§3 [BASIS]

Max feels a pain in his left foot and fears the large dog in front of him. Had he no perception of the dog, no representation of any sort of the dog that is in front of him, he would not be afraid of that dog. But he requires no perceptions - in any ordinary sense of the word - nor thoughts of his left foot in order to feel the pain. Call the perceptions or thoughts on which his fear is based, the basis of his fear.
Call pains like Max's and other states like it, which require no basis in cognitive, perceptual or other type of content, feelings, emotional, bodily, alaghedonic sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen), and fears and other episodes and states that do require such a basis emotions.

§4 [+] BASIS CONSTRAINTS

Bases come in many forms. They may be propositional or non-propositional, tied to different modes or attitudes, perceptual, mnemonic, judgemental etc. They may in turn, for example, be based on testimony.

Max's fear may be based on a judgement to the effect that there is a large, salivating dog in front of him, which may be based on his perception of the dog. But the perception alone will also do the trick. His regret that he behaved so appallingly towards his first wife may be based on a belief, on a belief based on memories or on the latter alone or on what close friends tell him of his behaviour.

Philosophers who think that perceptions are a form of belief or judgement may want to deny that certain sorts of emotion can be based on perceptual representations that involve no exercise of concepts, emotions felt both by humans and other animals. This Kantian error is less popular than it was.

Those bases that are perceptions and thoughts are what give to emotions the intentionality that they have. The objects of the perceptions and thoughts are the objects of the emotions based on these perceptions and thoughts. Perhaps drives, appetites and instincts exhibit a sui generis form of proto-intentionality. But emotions are mediated by thoughts and perceptions and memories. This does not of course entail that a subject is aware of or can recover the contents in virtue of which he has the emotions he has. To the extent that we have an affective access to the world which is or which seems to be direct and unmediated, it is in virtue of feelings, drives and emotions whose bases are inaccessible to us.

Although all emotions based on true thoughts or veridical perceptions are relations between a subject and objects or states of affairs, there is one type of emotion that is relational in a wider sense: preference. Mme Lespinasse had this difference in mind when she said that women want to be preferred rather than loved. Preferences are three place relations between a subject, a preferred object or state of affairs and an object or state of affairs which is not-preferred to the first object.

Preferences in this sense of the word are not to be confused either with episodic choices, the objects of which must be states of affairs that do not belong to the past, or with the dispositional or even hypothetical preferences dealt with by economists.

Although emotions require bases their objects need not coincide entirely with the objects of the relevant basis. If Alexander's disapproval is based on a belief that Mary is lying the object of his disapproval may well be her lie rather than Mary. In other words, emotions are selective, they are in respect of all or only part of the object of their bases. Their plasticity is a trait they share with perceptions, which may be of events, processes, states and things.

The selectivity and plasticity of emotions comes out also when we bear in mind the variety of possible bases. Some emotions such as love and admiration require non-propositional bases, which will normally stand in a variety of relations to complex beliefs, some such as regret require propositional bases. Many emotions require that their bases contain quite determinate types of content. Regret, for example, is based on beliefs about the past. Pride is based on contents containing a reference to the subject. Disgust is more closely tied to perceptual bases than to completely descriptive thoughts, and it is more closely tied to visual and tactile presentations than to auditive presentations. In other words, emotions may require contents of determinate types and attitudes or modes of determinate types.

Must the bases of emotions that are propositional contain value predicates? If Aurel admires an action of Sam, must he believe it to be good? Must Max's fear of the dog be based on a belief such as the belief that large dogs are a bad thing? This is a difficult question to which we shall return.

It is first of all because of their bases that emotions can be characterised as rational or irrational, as more or less justified. A thought is true or false, a perception veridical or non-veridical. But in addition each may be more or less justified. Emotions can be classified in terms of these properties of their bases. But emotions are also appropriate or inappropriate with respect to their bases and to their objects. The true, justified thought that a child is suffering may, for example, provide a basis for a wholly unjustified emotional response such as amusement. Finally, an emotion may be more or less appropriate with respect to the sequence and pattern of emotions it belongs to.

Feelings or emotional sensations cannot be justified in either of the first two senses. Moods, such as Angst and jubilation, are often said to be object-less. But where these are not complex feelings (sensations) they do have bases or contents. If Martin feels Angst walking through a German forest, he enjoys a number of perceptual contents which are colouring by his mood, just as emotions colour their bases. The central feature of moods, as opposed to emotions, is that the subject's contents do not justify or motivate the mood.

The claim that the intentionality of emotions is parasitic on that of their bases might suggest that if a given base is narrow or wide, then so it will be with the emotion. But matters are more complex than that. The phenomenon of "true" emotions is a complex one.

Instead of simply saying that hope that p, for example, requires belief that p is not the case, we may adopt a "wide" conception of hope and say that if p is the case, then whatever the subject believes about p, he does not hope that p. On either the stronger or the weaker view, a subject who hopes that p will not know that p. But attributions of many emotions are factive and veridical. Such emotions are "knowledge-feelings" (Wissensgefühle). If Max regrets that p, then p. If he is amused by Martin's antics then these took place. He knows that p and knows of the antics, has evidence for each.

Here we find once again a deep parallel between emotions and perception. For perceptual reports attributing perceptions of things, events ("naked infinitives") and states are veridical, and reports of epistemic seeing, of seeing that, are factives.

On the present view there is a sharp distinction between feelings or emotional sensations, which require no perceptions or thoughts, and emotions which do. But there is an interesting intermediate case in which a type of feeling requires a determinate basis that has no
representative content. Pleasure in an activity (Funktionsfreude, Schaffenslust) is based on an activity, it is pleasure in the activity. But the activity in question, eg playing tennis, is not represented and does not represent.

If interest and attention are affective phenomena then they, too, are dependent traits but in a sense different from all those already distinguished. Edmund, for example, sees and observes more or less attentively. Attention modifies other mental states and events, but not in virtue of any representative capacity of these.

There is a popular view according to which cognitive and perceptual bases cause emotional episodes. The sight of the dog causes fear. This view is certainly true of some situations. It is compatible with the claim that there is an internal relation between the very same terms of the causal relation. But it is a great simplification. First of all, because many perceptions and thoughts which come to function as bases for emotions are themselves determined by other emotions and emotional sensations. Secondly, and more generally, because bases and the emotions based on them often have common causes. And, finally, because there are relations of interdependence, causal and non-causal, between a person's affective and cognitive/perceptual traits. Ulrich's feelings, at a time, for and about his sister are based on thoughts that themselves owe their existence to earlier emotional reactions. His feelings make more salient than they would otherwise be certain traits of his sister. Passion, as Reid pointed out, can make us both quicksighted and blind.

Once again an analogy with perception is useful. The analogue of the view that there is a simple causal relation between bases and emotions is that perceptual cues straightforwardly determine the different perceptual constancies. In fact, there is an interaction between cues and constancy effects.

§ 5 [POLARITY]

Many feelings and emotions seem to come in polarly opposed pairs:

like-dislike
pleasure-pain
happy-unhappy
admire-despise
hope-fear
love-hate
bliss-despair

In this they resemble desire and wanting and differ from judgement, which has no opposite. To deny that p is to judge that not p, although the pragmatic phenomenon of polemic denial and the failure to acknowledge propositional content misled philosophers on this matter for a long time.

Polarly opposed modes and attitudes correlate with degrees and with the syntactic phenomenon of Neg Raising. Wanting and desiring come in polarly opposed kinds and admit of degrees. Negative wanting is not often marked as such (but Dante uses "disvogliu") but determinates of it, such as "shun", are. Belief and disbelief come in degrees and to say that Adolph doesn't believe that p is to say either that it is not the case that he believes that p or that he believes that not p. Although the opposition is lexically marked as belief and disbeliefs, Glaube and Unglaube, it is psychologically not very important simply because belief is a disposition. In the case of episodic emotions, however, the opposition is psychologically real. To say that Max doesn't like Martin is to say either that it is not the case that he likes him or that he dislikes him.

But not all emotions come in polarly opposed kinds. Enjoyment, for example, seems to have no polar opposite, although dynamic enjoyment, across time, does. The fact that French has no word for "enjoy", "godere" or "genießen", "jouir" and "jouisance" having acquired orgasmic connotations, is unfortunate. (How can a Frenchman say he has enjoyed a symphony rather than simply taken pleasure, "prendre plaisir" in it?) It may correlate with the tendency in French philosophy to sexualise the mind and life in general - to talk of "écriture libidinale", for example.

Two other candidates for the role of emotions without polar opposites are shame (pudeur) and "embarrassment". Pride is no opposite of shame because although Max may be proud of someone connected with him he cannot be proud "for" him in the way in which he can be ashamed for that person. There is a tradition of taking embarrassment to be a peculiarly Anglo-Celt phenomenon, and indeed unFrench, for example by those who call the French unembarrassable or "brazen". But perhaps not too much should be made of the fact that French lacks a distinction between "blushing" and "flushing".

Finally, perhaps resentment has no opposite. Its complex, extended character illustrates why the simple distinction between emotions of opposed sign is so often inapplicable. Ressentiment typically involves a certain course: positive value judgements or preferences are followed by emotions such as envy and jealousy which, together with felt impotence or incapacity, lead to a reversal of the initial valuation and to negative emotions directed towards the object of the new valuation. The grapes come to be seen as green and felt to be of no interest.

Two further complications in the area of polarly opposed affective phenomena are worth mentioning. Pride, which is an emotion, is often opposed to modesty, which is not. One of the philosophically more interesting kinds of opposition is that of exclam words and concepts (just-unjust, healthy-sick). In the world of the emotions the relation between trust and mistrust or distrust is sometimes of this general type. The trust of citizens in their government, politicians or political system may involve positive emotions such as admiration. But more often than not it is the absence of mistrust. Of the two, trust and mistrust, it is the latter that often wears the trousers.

There seems to be some evidence for the claim that our emotional vocabulary is richer in negative than in positive terms. If true, this may reflect a well-known asymmetry at the level of behavior. Whereas there is only the one type of positive behaviour, where an animal moves towards or is attracted by, for example, its food, there are two distinct kinds of negative behaviour: flight and aggression.

The concepts of opposition and degrees raise a number of questions. Is there always a zero point? Are the transitions continuous? What does contrary opposition amount to? It is sometimes held that one cannot simultaneously feel a positive emotion and its opposite with respect to one and the same feature of the same object. Whether or not ambivalence and related phenomena indicate that this is false, the view that such states of affairs, like intransitive preferences, ought not to occur is a plausible component of an account of the rationality of emotions.
§6 [2 FUSION]

Suppose Max feels pain of the same intensity and type in his elbow and hand but not in between. Then the pain spreads and he feels pain of the same sort along his entire arm. This is the phenomenon of fusion, an analogue of perceptual fusion. Another example might be the fusion between sadness and melancholy.

Can all negative emotions fuse? Can all positive emotions fuse? The following example suggests that this is not the case.

Max feels pain in his arm but he also feels vigorous and healthy. He is also very unhappy because the lady he loves despises him. On the other hand, firmly convinced that his God loves him, Max is as far as it is possible to be from a state of despair, he is in fact blissful.

It seems plausible to assume that Max can simultaneously be the bearer of these two negative and two positive states. Neither the two positive, nor the two negative states fuse. He can have mixed feelings.

§7 [2 SUBJECT TO THE WILL]

The states in which Max finds himself belong to four distinct categories: localised feelings, non-localised feelings, and two sorts of emotion. A further argument in favour of their distinctness is the fact that members of these categories stand in different relations to the will.

There is perhaps an absolute distinction between what is and is not subject to the will. Examples of the former are basic bodily movements and exercises of the imagination. The first rule of Natural Deduction tells us that we can suppose that p, for any p. Similarly, it is possible to enjoy visual imaginings of an unlimited variety. Examples of the latter category are judgings, willings and visual perceptions. Even Descartes was not actually capable of judging any p. However, even if it is true that judging is not subject to the will it may be the case that it is an exercise of the will, a leap as Frege suggested. Of course, if Cicero is right that there is no proposition so absurd that some philosopher has not asserted it, we will always be able to imagine circumstances in which, for any p, a given person would assert it. But that person would not be able to decide to judge that p and imperatives to this effect would be ill-formed.

Whether or not there is an absolute distinction between what is and is not subject to the will, there seems to be a relative distinction between what is more or less indirectly subject to the will. Pascal thought religious belief could be indirectly induced and maintained - by going to church, mouthing prayers. Sartre thought much the same was true of love - it presumably suffices to mouth the right words, give presents etc. In their honour we might call the different types of indirect connexion examples of "The French Connexion".

Localised, sensory pleasures and pains and their ilk are relatively easy to induce, maintain, modify and eliminate, albeit indirectly. A good Bordeaux or a sharp pin often do the job. Feelings of health and vigour used to be more difficult to induce. A number of different measures make them more or less likely. Nowadays a variety of drugs will do the trick. But notice that veridical feelings of health or sickness are still much more difficult to control than are localised feelings. In many cases we control only the conditions that make such feelings more or less likely.

The unhappiness to which Max is subject because his lady despises him is much less easy to control than his feelings. His state of existential or religious bliss seems to be even further removed from the scope of his will.

Of course, any attempt to develop and extend this suggestion would have to consider not just the emotional episodes to which a person is subject at a moment but his dispositions and their manifestations over time. It is often the case that the emotions that are most deeply rooted are those that are anchored in enduring dispositions.

§8 [2 SUI GENERIS OBJECTS]

The question raised and postponed in §4 was: must the thoughts on which some emotions are based contain value predicates? Many philosophers (and psychologists who talk of "appraisals") have given a positive answer to this question. But since some emotions are based only on perceptual contents, we might think the answer may be negative. Perhaps the predicates in the cognitive bases of emotions need only be purely natural predicates. But in any case some account is needed of the relation between emotions and values.

Pre-theoretically, the multiplicity of emotions matches that of values, of what is good, bad, axiologically indifferent, better/worse, more or less beautiful, and of their numerous determinates (what is elegant, courageous etc). Similarly, the monotony of desire matches the small family of deontic functors. The axiological predicates apply to objects of all sorts, the deontic functors to actions and action types only. Much that is good or bad is not obligatory or forbidden, for example supererogatory acts. There are relational axiological concepts but no relational oughts - for good practical reasons. What is good is what ought to exist: things, events and states ought to exist, endure, occur. What is obligatory is what ought to be done, events controlled by agents.

More controversially, for those of an anti-Kantian turn of mind, deontic propositions are justified by reference to axiological propositions. Axiological concepts such as courage seem to be internally linked to natural concepts such as fear in ways that have little or no parallel in the deontic sphere. These relations between values and norms correspond, for the same anti-Kantians, to various links between emotions and desire, such as the claim that to desire that ab is to have some positive emotional attitude towards this state of affairs, or some part of it or something connected with it. Or the claim that the astatic suffers not from weakness of will but from a weak heart. Or the claim that the immediate object of therapy is emotions rather than desire.

But do axiological predicates have semantic values? The analogy with the question as to the values of secondary quality predicates is well-known. Should we just say that axiological and colour predicates correspond to mind-independent monadic properties? Perhaps not. They would seem to have nothing in common with any better attested monadic properties. Predicates for basic, naturally occurring properties often introduce quantification over individual states and events. A similar claim about value predicates would be most implausible.

Perhaps we should say that values and colours are immanent objects or objects that spring into being when certain predicates are used. Or that axiological and colour predicates
have as their values objects that would spring into being were colour impressions or emotions to occur.

A more minimalist type of answer to our question, variants of which have enjoyed some popularity from Brentano to Chisholm, Wiggins and de Sousa, runs as follows.

To be valuable is to be the possible object of an appropriate pro-emotion. This is a mere schema which can be made more determinate by employing different specific types of positive and negative emotion terms and value terms (for example, indignation and injustice, disgust and vital disvalues).

It may also be supplemented by an intermediate step. To be valuable is to be the possible object of an appropriate commendation; to be the possible object of an appropriate commendation is to be the possible object of an appropriate pro-emotion. This strategy employs the concept already introduced of appropriateness. Such a notion is occasionally present in dispositional analyses of colour predication, in the clauses specifying normal or standard circumstances and subjects where "normality" is not analysed in completely naturalist terms. But it is also a notion required for any analysis of perception: one visual perspective on an object may be more or less optimal than another one; one exemplar of a seen figure may be closer to the optimal prototypal figure than another one; visual appearances that contribute to the justification of a perceptual judgement are appropriate to the object of the judgement.

As we have seen, there are many types of appropriateness relations connecting up emotions, their objects and their bases. This is the main difference between dispositional accounts of colour predication and the present account of value predication. Suppose Alexius possesses a variety of visual and conceptual information about a deed done by Max. This information is true and veridical and is to the effect that Max saw a drowning child, formed the intention to save it, overcame fear, saved it. The information contains no value predicate. Alexius admires Max's act on the basis of this information.

What now might it mean to say that Max's act was courageous, virtuous, good? Perhaps it just means that an emotion like Max's would be appropriate. Notice that Max is in cognitive contact with natural objects, events and their properties. The feature of the situation described which introduces value properties is the presence of relations of appropriateness. This sort of direct contact with actual entities is often missing in dispositional accounts of colours. As when we are told that to see the redness of an object, something that appears to be actual, is to see a pure possibility, or a possibility plus a categorical basis which is beyond the subject's ken (such as reflectancy properties).

The case just described - Max's act is courageous - is that of a value predication which is a contingent proposition in which the value term is used predicatively. Two further cases need to be mentioned. First, there are conditional (instrumental) contingent value propositions and attributive uses of value terms (if you are hungry, that is a good apple; that is a good knife). In such cases the truth makers for the axiological propositions will involve many complex natural facts. Only if these facts obtain will pro-emotions be appropriate, will something have a utility value.

Secondly, non-contingent apriori axiological propositions - pleasure is better than pain, health is better than pleasure etc. The small number of candidate platitudes here presents less problems to the analysis of value in terms of appropriateness than do contingent axiological propositions containing predicative uses of value terms, although the latter always involve such non-contingent propositions. Thus for pleasure to be better than pain is just for it to be the case that preference of pleasure to pain be appropriate and preference of pain to pleasure inappropriate. For injustice to be a negative value is for indignation to be appropriate etc. Unlike both categories of contingent axiological proposition, grasp of the axiological platitudes requires only bare presentations of psychological and vital entities and no presentations of other sorts.

The most minimalist account of non-contingent axiological platitudes has it that all bearers of intrinsic value are psychological and vital entities, that is to say, natural entities. If this is combined with the account of value in terms of relations of appropriateness between those naturally occurring episodes which are higher-order emotions and other naturally occurring entities, the result is a cognitivist account of ethical propositions which is perhaps as close as it is possible to get to the anti-cognitivist, emotivist and expressivist positions first described by Hagerstrom and Scheler.

§9  [+ INVERSION]

We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started. Strategies like that of Harrison in the face of the possibility of colour transposition appeal to certain features of colour space, in particular to internal relations amongst colour impressions. Orange is in between red and yellow, blue is darker than yellow. These propositions are internal relations in the following sense: given the terms of the relation, the relation itself must hold.

If the above sketch of the emotions is correct, then we have found a large number of internal relations involving emotions, within and outside emotional space.

Episodic emotions and feelings can be ordered according to their degree of intensity, according to the degree to which they are subject to the will and, in many cases, in terms of relations of opposition, and the possibilities and impossibilities of fusion. The friend of the possibility of transposed affects owes us an account of transposition which respects these conditions.

Suppose all emotions and feelings exhibited polar oppositions. We could then imagine creatures who experience pleasure, love and bliss in just those situations where we experience pain, hate and despair. Such a transposition would respect the two internal relations of degree of intensity and degree of subjection to the will. But we experience emotions which do not have opposites (cf. §5). So transpositions of our emotional space would have to respect the distance relations between these singular points and emotions that are polarly opposed together with their respective signs.

But these are only the beginnings of the problems the friend of transposition would have to deal with. Emotions depend on perceptual and cognitive bases and dependence is itself an internal relation. Types of emotion and types of basis stand in relations of appropriateness, inappropriateness, of relative appropriateness to each other. The bases themselves are veridical or true, falsidical or false, and more or less justified. Emotions are also appropriate and inappropriate to the extent that they form more or less inappropriate parts of more complex emotional sequences. Finally, as we have seen, the match between emotions and values, whether or not this is analysed in terms of relations of appropriateness between higher-order emotions...
and lower-order emotions and vital entities, presents the friend of transposition with a further problem. It is sometimes claimed that the facts are on the side of such a friend in the case of higher-order emotions. Thus it is said that the masochist prefers pain to pleasure. Before objecting that such a preference would not "really" be appropriate a prior question needs to be settled. Does the masochist really prefer pain tout court to pleasure or not rather some pain-involving whole to pleasure? The other element in the whole might, for example, be subjection. But the topic of organic unities, for each of the three different classes of axiological propositions, is a difficult one.

The numerous closed loops we have come across in our exploration of the emotions suggest that a defence of affective transposability is likely to be even more difficult than a defence of perceptual transposability. But, as we have seen, the two problems are also linked in many and varied ways. Indeed if colours sometimes possess in a non-accidental way emotional valences, then the two problems will have to be dealt with together*.

*This talk was given most recently in 1995 in Geneva at the "Journées d'études sur l'émotion" and in Aix. I am grateful to the audiences for many helpful criticisms.

**Emotions: Austro-German references**

This text does not contain footnotes referring to the following authors. The interested reader is invited to compare the Christian names of the following with the names of the bearers of emotions in the text.


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**Other references**
Both of the twentieth century descriptivist programmes owed much to Aristotle and to bits and pieces from the Empiricists and Rationalists. Recently, Martha Nussbaum (1994) has insisted at length on the Hellenist Schools, at Aristotle's expense. Some ninety years ago Brentano's renegade pupil, Heinrich Gomperz (1904) attempted to do the same. His account of inner freedom certainly influenced Musil, anticipates many Wittgensteinian formulations about the emotions and value and provides clear formulations of the atheist and pantheist mysticisms that were so popular in Austria-Hungary.