CHAPTER 2
Truth and the truth-maker principle in 1921

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1. Truth-makers

Friends of truth-making in the first half of the last century make up a small but select band of philosophers: G. F. Stout (1911); Ludwig Wittgenstein (1979: 95; 1913: 15 (20.10.14) [1]; Bertrand Russell (1918: I; 1940: 227); John McTaggart (1921: bk. I, chs 1–2); Alexander Pfänder (1921: 231–43, 75–89); C. D. Broad (1933: 56ff.); and J. L. Austin (1961: 91, 104ff.). The band of truth-makers thus includes many philosophers from Cambridge [2]. If we assume that Wittgenstein’s appeal to truth-making in 1913 and 1914 is still at work or on display, if not expressed, in the Tractatus,2 then we may say that 1921 is the annus mirabilis or at least the first high-point of the theory of truth-making.3 For it is in the third or fourth most important treatise on logic to appear in 1921 (the year in which the great Cambridge treatises of Keynes and Johnson [3] appear), Pfänder’s Logik, that the truth-maker principle is first formulated and defended. And in the same year McTaggart gives an account of truth and truth-making that is closer to Pfänder’s than to any other account.

According to the truth-maker principle, every truth is made true by a truth-maker. Any philosophy of truth-making and of truth has therefore to consider the following questions. Is truth a property? If so, of what? Of judgements, beliefs, judgings or propositions? Is the property of truth a mere appearance or is it ineliminable? What sort of a tie is truth-making? Is it a relation? Or is talk of x making y F merely elliptical for some sort of non-relational tie of explanation or grounding? What sort of entity is a truth-maker if every truth has one?

Pfänder gives clear answers to many of these questions. Some of the answers are to be found elsewhere in the phenomenological tradition. But the views of McTaggart in 1921 are also, as we shall see, very close to some of the views put forward in the same year by Pfänder.

Taking his cue from Gottfried Leibniz, the Munich philosopher Pfänder argued at some length in his 1921 Logik for the truth-maker principle. In particular, he
asks and answers the important question: what, if anything, makes the truth-maker principle true? Pfänder’s theory of truth is of considerable interest since, unlike many contemporary friends of truth-making, he rejects not only the view that some truths have no truth-bearers but also the view that it is just a contingent fact that all truths have truth-makers. The tie between truth and truth-making, he thinks, is a very intimate and a priori one. The truth-property, he argues, is a relation or, as he sometimes says, a property that rests on a relation and that every truth has a truth-maker is a consequence of the fact that the truth-maker principle is in fact a particular principle of sufficient reason (PSR). The claim that it is an a priori truth that every truth has a truth-maker admits of many interpretations. On Pfänder’s account of the claim it is an a priori truth that holds in virtue of the essences of truth and of truth-bearers. The very idea that universal laws sometimes hold in virtue of the essences of the objects they deal with or in virtue of the essences of the properties they ascribe or in virtue of the concepts occurring in such laws is fundamental within the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. But Pfänder’s application of the idea to truth and truth-making is an application that is all his own.

Pfänder is, with Husserl, one of the two founders of phenomenology. Until the appearance of his Logik, Pfänder had been known principally for very careful analyses of the will, the emotions and the distinction between causes and motives. Nor did he return to logic after 1921 in his published work. Indeed, his book seems to have had little effect, even within phenomenology. Husserl does not refer to it in his Formal and Transcendental Logic and seems not to have had a very high opinion of it. Nevertheless, it is in his Logik that Pfänder formulates a very general programme for logic that may be considered to be implicit in much previous phenomenology:

Logic until now has in fact always been a systematic science of thoughts. But it has concentrated exclusively on assertive thoughts [behauptenden Gedanken] and has not taken into account questions, assumptions, conjectures and the like, nor those other thoughts we call valuations, criticisms, assessments, requests, advice, warnings, decisions, intentions, prescriptions, commandments, prohibitions, orders and laws … But there is no objective reason why logic should restrict itself for ever to the special group of assertive thoughts, to their elements and connexions. (Pfänder 2000 [4]: 19)

This is not quite Husserl’s view. Husserl had formulated a number of theorems and axioms that would now be considered parts of axiological logic, deontic logic and the logic of action. Husserl himself, however, always argued that these principles were not a part of logic but of formal, “parallel disciplines”. But it was something very like Pfänder’s programme that was rapidly taken up by analytic philosophy as the different parts of philosophical logic – as opposed to discussions of the so-called “logic” of colours or of God-talk – spread their wings.
After indicating the Leibnizian starting-point for Pfänder’s theory, I set out Pfänder’s account of truth and truth-making and then consider the main distinctions and claims he makes.

2. The Leibnizian starting-point

Many of the more interesting ideas in contributions to (philosophical) logic by the phenomenologists have their source in Husserl’s reworkings of claims made originally by Bernard Bolzano (about logical consequence, explanation [Abfolge], logical probability, properties, essence and modality), who has been rightly called the Bohemian Leibniz. As we shall see, however, Bolzano, himself clearly rejects the main plank in Pfänder’s account of truth and truth-making. It is rather Leibniz himself who seems to have inspired this account.

Leibniz, Pfänder claims, was the first philosopher to set forth the following general principle of sufficient reason:

(PSR) Everything has a sufficient reason,

and clearly take this to comprehend three further principles concerning: (a) the existence of something; (b) the occurrence of an event; and (c) the obtaining (Bestehen) of a truth. Leibniz “thus distinguishes the grounds of existence, of occurrences and of truth” (Pfänder 2000: 221–2). Although Pfänder gives no reference to Leibniz’s writings, he seems to have in mind passages such as §§31–2 of the Monadology:

§31 Nos raisonnements sont fondés sur deux grands principes, celui de la contradiction en vertu duquel nous jugeons faux ce qui en enveloppe, et vrai ce qui est opposé ou contradictoire au faux.
§32 Et celui de la raison suffisante, en vertu duquel nous considérons qu’aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai, ou existant, aucune énonciation véritable, sans qu’il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement. Quoique ces raisons le plus souvent ne puissent point nous être connues. [5]

Just what Leibniz took “a fact is true (vrai), “a fact exists” and “a statement is true (véritable)” to mean and how he took such claims to be connected are questions for the specialists. But Pfänder is clearly right to say that Leibniz thinks that there are different principles of sufficient reason, at least one of which concerns truth. Pfänder’s account of Leibniz as a friend of truth-making has recently received French support. Jean-Baptiste Rauzy’s fascinating study, La Doctrine Leibnizienne de la vérité (2001), argues at some length for the view that for Leibniz
the truth-predicate has no meaning outside the context of an *adequatio rei*. In particular: “Concepts and connexions amongst concepts … are the reasons for which a particular sentence is true; … they play the role of truth-makers” (Rauzy 2001: 47; see also Mugnai 2002; Rauzy 2002).

Within the philosophical tradition influenced by realist phenomenology the Leibnizian version of the truth-maker principle did not go unchallenged. In 1938, in a chapter of his *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* entitled “The Disappearance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Nicolai Hartmann rejected truth-maker maximalism: “Not every judgement has its sufficient reason” (Hartmann 1966: 275, ch. 38(a) [7]). Against a long tradition, Hartmann argues that only in the sphere of real entities does the principle of sufficient reason always hold. It does not hold everywhere in the ideal sphere, not in mathematics and not in logic, but logically necessary truths, he thinks, always have a ground.

3. Pfänder’s account

Let us, then, look at Pfänder’s account. Like Wittgenstein in the same year, Pfänder thinks that truth-bearers “project” (*entwerfen*), like a magic lantern (*Projektionslampe*) (Pfänder 2000: 36; Wittgenstein 1922: 2.0212, 3.11, 3.12). They project states of affairs, he says (Pfänder 2000: 36), a picture of the world, Wittgenstein says (Wittgenstein 1922: 2.0212). Pfänder thinks truth-bearers are judgements, which he takes to be non-temporal entities not mental acts of judging. Unlike Wittgenstein, Pfänder denies that truth-bearers are pictures (*Abbilder*): “someone who makes pictures of objects obtains a picture gallery but not judgements” (Pfänder 2000: 80), he notes sardonically. Like many phenomenologists, he thinks that states of affairs may contain individual properties or general attributes, that obtaining states of affairs make judgements true and false and that even an obtaining state of affairs containing a substance and an individual property is an ideal entity. Unlike Wittgenstein, Pfänder thinks that the logical variety of truth-bearers is matched by a corresponding formal ontological variety of states of affairs: there are negative, universal and disjunctive states of affairs. This was the view of all the early phenomenologists except for Roman Ingarden.

Like Wittgenstein, Pfänder claims that the logical constants do not represent. But he takes this claim to be compatible with the view that there are non-atomic states of affairs. Husserl had mentioned in his *Logical Investigations* the possibility that the logical constants have no “correlates” but endorsed only the weaker claim that they have no correlates in the sphere of real objects (Husserl 1970: vol. II 782 [VI §43]). In 1921 Pfänder endorses the stronger view: in the concepts of disjunction, conjunction and implication there is “no reference to an object” (*Gegenstandsmeinung*), they are “pure, functioning concepts” not “concepts of objects” (Pfänder 2000: 157).
This particular fundamental thought of Pfänder’s had been published in 1916 by his pupil, Maximilian Beck (1916: 20–25), who refers to Pfänder’s 1912/1913 lectures in Munich. Beck adds that the concepts of logical forms such as conjunction and implication are themselves essences that, unlike all other objects, are not known through concepts: in thinking conjunctively or hypothetically we “intuit [erschauen] in their effect” their content (ibid.: 24). This is a point that might be put more snappily, although just as obscurely, by saying that logical form is something that shows itself.

There are many principles of sufficient reason. In addition to the three already mentioned, Pfänder, following Schopenhauer, distinguishes the principle that every action is grounded in a motive, that atemporal being always has a ground and the principle that every piece of knowledge (Erkenntnis) has a ground, a cognitive ground (Pfänder 2000: 222–3; cf. §6 below). But only those principles that deal with “logical objects” are of interest to logic. If there is a logical PRS it must satisfy three requirements:

The principle must, first, deal with purely logical objects; it must, secondly, assert something which is purely logical about these objects; and it must, thirdly, base what it asserts on the specifically logical essence of the objects it is about.

Of the different logical objects, only judgements, not concepts nor inferences [Schlüsse] are suitable subjects for the [logical] PSR. This principle must therefore assert something about judgements. (Ibid.: 225)

What does Pfänder’s truth-maker principle, his logical PSR, assert?

The genuine sense of the PSR is that it specifies in a general way what a judgement requires in order for its claim to truth to be not mere pretence but a satisfied claim. The principle therefore says

Every judgement, in order to be really true, stands necessarily in need of a sufficient reason.

By the ground of a judgement is to be understood what can support the assertoric content of the judgement. This reason is “sufficient” if it alone suffices to support the complete assertoric content of the judgement, if nothing else is required to make the judgement completely [sic] true. (Ibid.: 227, last emphasis added)\(^9\)

The three claims,

(i) every judgement, in order to be really true, stands necessarily in need of a sufficient reason,
(ii) the truth of a judgement necessarily stands in need of a sufficient reason, and
(iii) the obtaining (Bestehen) of every truth has its sufficient reason,

are equivalent (ibid.: 228). Each claim, Pfänder points out, satisfies the three requirements that a PSR must satisfy in order to be a logical principle: each ranges over logical objects – judgements, truths, the obtaining of truths; each makes a purely logical assertion; and finally, each version of the principle “grounds its assertion on the specific essence of its logical objects” (ibid.).

What is the content of the logical PRS?

[I]t is not simply the sense of truth which the principle would give. For the sufficient ground is not itself the truth of the judgement but its foundation. There is, however, a reciprocal connexion between the truth of a judgement and its sufficient reason. If a judgement is really true then it has a sufficient reason; and if it has a sufficient reason then it is really true. But the two thoughts: “A judgement is true” and “A judgement has a sufficient reason” do not on this account have the same meaning, they are rather only equivalent. Thus were the [logical] PSR to assert

A judgement is true – this says no more than that the judgement has a sufficient reason

the principle would be false and could not possibly be a supreme logical principle. If, however, we isolate the basis on which the equivalence, which is erroneously taken to be an identity of meaning, rests in the final analysis, this points us to the true logical sense of the PSR ….The equivalence is based on the inner connexion which the truth of a judgement has to the judgement, on the one hand, and to the sufficient ground, on the other hand. (Ibid.: 226)

Now, “[t]he [logical] principle of sufficient reason is itself a judgement and so must, if it is to be true, itself have a sufficient ground”. What, if anything, makes the principle true?

Pfänder dismisses a number of candidates. The principle is not a principle that enjoys immediate self-evidence if this means that it bears its truth on its face and requires no sufficient ground. For it is a judgement that “falls within its own domain of validity”. Other, non-logical principles of sufficient reason, such as the principle that every event has a cause or the principle that every action, including that of holding a judgement to be true, has a ground, are clearly irrelevant. Nor should we say, in a vaguely neo-Kantian fashion, that reason requires that every truth have a sufficient reason. For if reason does require this it is because every truth requires a sufficient ground. Nor is an appeal to experience of much help. For even if experience showed that all truths hitherto examined did in fact have a sufficient reason this would lend only a very low probability to the truth of the
logical PSR (*ibid.*: 230–31). Rather, “[i]ts own sufficient ground lies ... in the essence of judgement and in the essence of truth” (*ibid.*: 232).

Pfänder summarizes the route that leads him to claim that the logical PSR is rooted in the essences of truth and of judgement and not, he stresses, in the concepts of truth and of judgement as follows:

It lies in the essence of every judgement to make a claim to truth. Truth, as we have seen, is, according to its very essence, something which cannot attach to a judgement all by itself but only in a certain relation to something else, namely in the relation of agreement with the objects dealt with by the judgement. Only if this relation obtains can the judgement be true. But this relation requires necessarily in order to obtain two foundations, namely the judgement on the one hand and the behaviour of the objects the judgement deals with on the other hand ... Thus if a judgement is not only to lay claim to truth but also to have truth then the corresponding behaviour of the objects is absolutely necessary as a ground. The truth of a judgement, according to its essence, only obtains...if this reason is a sufficient reason. It follows that every judgement, in order to be true, stands necessarily in need of a sufficient reason. (*Ibid.*: 231–2)

In order to better understand and evaluate Pfänder’s account, I turn now to its main elements.

4. The elements of Pfänder’s account

Pfänder gives an account of the essence of judgement, of states of affairs and of truth, explains – as we have seen – what the logical PSR means and then gives an account of what grounds the truth of this principle, of what makes it true. He also provides an account of the difference between the logical PSR or truth-maker principle and the principle that every piece of knowledge has a cognitive ground, that where there is knowledge a judgement has been made a piece of knowledge. I shall consider each of these elements of his account in turn.

4.1 Judgements aim at truth

What is the essence of judgement? That it claims to be true, Pfänder says. This is a claim that had been made earlier, by Husserl, [9] Reinach (1989: I 244, 341) and [10] Scheler, although at one point Husserl also argues that it is wrong. The view that belief claims to be true has in the meantime become very common. Pfänder says:
Now this assertion-function contains in itself the claim to truth. Every judgement necessarily in virtue of its essence makes this claim to truth. A thought, however otherwise constituted, which does not essentially contain the claim to truth, is thus certainly no judgement. The claim is not a determination which attaches externally albeit necessarily to the judgement but is essentially internal to the judgement. It is therefore implicitly co-asserted in every judgement that it itself is true … The implied co-assertion of the truth of the judgement is contained in the judgement even if the judger does not innerly perform the co-assertion. The implied co-assertion can be drawn out [herausgezogen] and developed as a so-called truth-judgement of the form “S is P is true”. But this developed truth-judgement is by no means identical in meaning with the original judgement “S is P”.

(Pfänder 2000: 69; cf. 98, 128)

It is not at all clear what Pfänder means by “implicitly co-asserted”. Presumably, whatever is co-asserted, however implicitly, is also represented. But the judgement that it is raining does not contain any concept representing truth or judgement. The truth of the equivalence between ‘It is raining’ and ‘That it is raining is true’, an equivalence accepted by Pfänder (ibid.: 69), is compatible with it being the case that members of a community regularly judge that it is raining and do not possess the concepts of truth or of judgement. The sense in which a judging or a judgment aims at truth can perhaps be brought out better with the help of a distinction sometimes employed by Husserl. Judgings and judgments are “intentionally directed towards” truth but do not represent it. Indeed, it would be even more accurate to say that judgings and judgements are primarily directed towards the obtaining of states of affairs but do not represent these and, secondarily, towards the truth of truth-bearers. Consider, by way of analogy, propositional emotions such as regret and sadness. Sam’s regret that \( p \) or his sadness that \( p \) are “directed towards” the axiological states of affairs (\textit{Wertverhalte}),

\[
\text{It is regrettable that } p, \\
\text{It is sad that } p,
\]

but do not represent these. What does “directed towards” mean? At least this. Sam’s regret and his sadness are right or appropriate only if the respective \textit{Wertverhalte} obtain. Similarly, the judgement that it is raining is right only if the state of affairs that it is raining obtains.

Pfänder might reply to this suggestion by reminding Husserl that by “implicitly co-asserted” (\textit{implizite mitbehauptet}) he does not mean that a judger of a judgment “innerly performs” (\textit{innerlich vollzieht}) the co-assertion. But then it is not clear what he has in mind. It is interesting to note that in his discussion of ascents
other than the ascent to mention of judgements and states of affairs or to predications of truth and of obtaining such as,

It is raining

The judgement that is raining is true,

for example,

This is sulphur

This falls under the concept of sulphur,

and

This is sulphur

This belongs to the class of things consisting of sulphur,

he says that in each case there is an implication but that it is a mistake to assume that what is implied is a “development of the sense” of its starting-point (*ibid.*: 82–3). But what, one would like to know, is the reason for distinguishing between the ascent to truth, on the one hand, and the ascent to concepts and classes, on the other hand?

The weakness in Pfänder’s account of the “ascent” from ordinary judging or judgement to mention of judgements and predications of truth is not unrelated to a certain weakness in his account of states of affairs. Judgements, he says, implicitly co-posit states of affairs (*ibid.*: 250) that may or may not obtain.

Alexius Meinong (1977: 101) pointed out that the word “*Sachverhalt*” ordinarily carries the connotation of factuality. Similarly, in ordinary English, talk of “obtaining states of affairs” is pleonastic. Pfänder, like many phenomenologists, uses “*Sachverhalt*” to refer to what judgements are directed towards and so in such a way that “obtaining *Sachverhalt*” is not pleonastic. But he says very little about the difference between *Sachverhalte* and obtaining *Sachverhalte*.

The difference is clearly marked by Ingarden, for whom every categorical judgement has a *formal object*: the intentional state of affairs meant by the content of the judgement. A true categorical judgement also has a *material object*: an objective state of affairs, that is, an obtaining state of affairs. Some of the features of the intentional state of affairs and of the objective state of affairs are identical (Ingarden 1925: 127–8; 1994: 286). Ingarden notes that there is only a trace of the distinction between intentional and objective states of affairs in Pfänder. Pfänder does indeed say in one passage that every judgement posits a formal state of affairs (“*Formalsachverhalt*”; Pfänder 2000: 250). It has become common in the
philosophy of emotions to call values the formal objects of emotions. And, as we have seen, the relation between emotions and their formal objects has much in common with the relation between judgements and their formal objects.

4.2 Grounds, grounding, making and because

By a “Grund” Pfänder normally means, like other phenomenologists, either an obtaining state of affairs or a true proposition. Grounds or reasons are propositional or state-of-affairsish (sachverhaltlich). In order to bring into focus Pfänder’s view that obtaining states of affairs ground truths it will be useful to consider three different views about truth and its grounds, all of which are incompatible with Pfänder’s views.

In the Tractatus (1922: 5.101) Wittgenstein calls the truth-possibilities of the truth arguments of a proposition which “bewahrheiten” it (make it come true) its “truth grounds”. These grounds are themselves truth-bearers. And, in a striking passage, Bolzano declares that grounds are always propositions and rules out the very idea of truth-making long before it was actually formulated by his heirs:

[T]he sense of the question is this: Does a certain thing, X, have the property [Beschaffenheit] x because the proposition, X has the property x, is true; or, conversely, is this proposition true because the thing X has this property? – The right answer, in my opinion, is: neither the one nor the other. The reason [Grund] why a proposition is true lies, if the proposition’s truth has a reason, in another truth, not in the thing with which it deals. And it is even less correct to say that the reason why X has the property x lies in the truth that X has the property x. If indeed X is an existing thing then there can be no reason why it has the property x, but there can be a cause why it has the property x, this cause lies in another thing. (Bolzano 1978: 60)

At the beginning of his Logical Investigations, Husserl, too, endorses the view that the logical grounds of the truth of truths are always truth-bearers in a passage that also rejects the view Pfänder was to defend some twenty years later to the effect that judgements implicitly assert that they have a ground and alludes to objections to the view that judgements claim to be true:

The fundamental distinction between a purely logical ground of truth and a normatively logical ground of judgement is not to be found in Sigwart. On the one hand, a truth (not a true judgement, but the ideally valid unity), has a ground, which is tantamount to saying that there is a theoretical proof which deduces the truth from this objective, theoretical ground. The principle of sufficient reason is to
be taken in this sense, and in this alone. And on this acceptation of ground, it is not at all the case that every judgement has a ground, let alone that it “implicitly asserts” such a ground. Every final principle of grounding, every genuine axiom, is in this sense groundless, as in the opposite direction likewise every judgement of fact. Only the probability of a fact can be grounded, not the fact itself, or the judgement of fact. The expression “ground of judgement”, on the other hand – if we ignore the psychological “grounds” i.e. causes of judging and their motivating contents – means no more than our logical right to judge. In this sense, every judgement certainly “claims” this right (though there are objections to saying that the right is “implicitly asserted”).

(Husserl 1970: vol. I, 153, Prolegomena §39; translation modified)

In contrast to these three views about grounds, Pfänder thinks that obtaining states of affairs may function as grounds.

Are grounds always and only states of affairs or propositions? In a number of passages Pfänder may seem to be allowing for a third possibility.

As we have seen, the truth-maker principle itself is supposed to be grounded in the essences of truth and of judgement. Pfänder often mentions instances of “the essence of x” as grounds. Thus he says that “the judgement ‘red is different from green’” has its “sufficient ground in the essence of the objects it deals with” (2000: 230–31).

He mentions an objection that threatens to restrict the scope of the logical PRS: that there are analytic judgements and mathematical axioms that are true “all by themselves”, which require no sufficient reason to be true. (Wittgenstein, in the same year, makes the epistemological claim that it is a mark of logical propositions that one can recognize “in the symbol alone” that they are true; Wittgenstein 1922: 6.113). But this, Pfänder thinks, is wrong. Each true analytic judgement and mathematical axiom “is grounded in the behaviour of the objects it deals with. Only the behaviour of these objects can really make [it] true” (2000: 239).

Analytic judgements and mathematical axioms behave, in this respect, like the judgement that red is different from green. Another example Pfänder discusses is the category of non-informative identities, such as ‘sulphur = sulphur’ (ibid.: 185). In such a case, “the essence of an object is what grounds immediately and finally that it is self-identical” (ibid.: 191).

This proposition is not, he says, a logical proposition, it is a proposition that belongs to formal ontology and that “forms the last foundation of the logical proposition of identity”, that is to say, “A = A” (ibid.). But Pfänder seems to be not entirely certain that all analytic judgements are made true by the essences of the objects they are about: “thus at best in the case of … logical-analytic judgements, not in the case of synthetic judgements, could the subject-concept form the sufficient reason for predication” (ibid.: 225–6; cf. 196; emphasis added).
Are these different examples of cases where what grounds are the essences or concepts of objects or the behaviour of objects counter-examples to the claim that only true truth-bearers and obtaining states of affairs can ground? In order to answer this question we must look at Pfänder's understanding of the relation between essentiality, modality and universality.

4.3 Essence, universality and modality

We thus see that universality and necessity can both be traced back one step further: In every case they are to be found if and only if the predicate is grounded in the essence of the subject.

(Reinach 1989: 70; English tr. 165 [10])

When Pfänder talks of the essence of this or that he sometimes seems to be assuming that he is quantifying over ideal objects: essences. This is indeed how Husserl and his heirs usually talk of essences. But sometimes Pfänder's essence talk seems to commit him to saying only things of the form: \( x \) is essentially \( F \). In both cases, though, he assumes that essentiality induces necessitation. Thus in his treatment of non-informative identities, as we have seen, he argues that the necessary truth of such identities is determined by the essences of objects.

Although Pfänder never says clearly what the logical form of appeals to essence is, there are two ways of reading most of the invocations of essence in the quotations from Pfänder given so far. When Pfänder says, for example, that “the judgement that every truth has a sufficient ground is true is grounded in the essences of truth and of judgement”, this may be taken to be the result of ascent (cf. Pfänder 2000: 330) from “the judgement that every truth has a sufficient ground is true because each truth instantiates Truth and each judgement instantiates Judgement”, or from “the judgement that every truth has a sufficient ground is true in virtue of the essential properties of truth and judgement”. These two ways of understanding Pfänder’s talk of truths being grounded in the essence of this or that might be called the instantiation and the predicative accounts of essential grounding. The first, unlike the second, refers to essences. They are both compatible with the view that what grounds are truths or facts.

Husserl’s favoured account of essential grounding is the instantiation account. The locus of necessity, he thinks, is to be found in particular instantiations of laws that are grounded in essences (cf. Mulligan 2004). Understood in this way, the phenomenological account of essential grounding is quite clearly a continuation of ideas to be found in Plato and Aristotle (cf. Politis 2003 [11], 2006). It is equally clearly a development of Bolzano’s theory of essentiality and necessity in terms of general propositions that hold in virtue of the fact that an object or objects fall under a certain concept. Indeed, Husserl often talks of laws that hold in virtue of certain concepts occurring in these laws. On occasions, however, he also distin-
guishes between laws grounded in concepts used in the laws and laws grounded in the essences of objects over which the law quantifies. This is a distinction Pfänder observes more carefully than Husserl.

Must essential grounding be understood in one of the two ways outlined? A third possibility, recently defended by Kit Fine (1995b), takes the predicate ‘$x$ makes it true that $p$ in virtue of the essence of $x$’ to be unanalysable.

A fourth view, put forward by Meinong, denies that what grounds is always propositional or states-of-affairsish (cf. ‘because of’). In 1907 Meinong asserts that only objectives can be grounds: “That 2 is smaller than 3 has no ground which lies outside this objective but it is all the more certain that it has a ground within the objective: this ground lies in the nature or make-up, in the being-so of the objects 2 and 3” (Meinong 1973: 260). Later he came to think this view was “artificial” (Meinong 1968: 583 n.1). If the “Satz vom Grund” is to be upheld, then, Meinong thinks, the notion of a Grund has to comprehend both objectives and objects, ideal objects:

The objective that red is not green is not based on any objective and one can only assign as a ground or grounds for our objective the objects red and green with some degree of naturalness by suitably extending the concept of a ground so that it comprises objects where this is needed. Similarly, what must be “considered” in order to arrive at the evident knowledge that red differs from green is no sort of objective but once again the objects red and green. Thus the concept of a “ground of knowledge” also needs to be extended in a suitable way. In general: if “why” asks for an objective or a judgement, then it is wrong to say that one may ask “why” everywhere in the intellectual sphere. The requirement can only be maintained if one thinks that one may content oneself with an object or an idea.

(Ibid.: 583–4)

4.4 Truth

What is the essence of truth? The truth-judgement Pfänder often says, is a relational judgement. This claim goes well beyond the much less controversial equivalences noted by Pfänder (and Husserl). There is the equivalence between obtaining states of affairs and truth: “If the judgement is true, then the corresponding state of affairs obtains, and if the state of affairs, which the judgement posits, obtains, then the judgement is true. But this connexion grounds no identity of sense, but only an equivalence” (Pfänder 2000: 79). If we add to this equivalence one already mentioned, we obtain:

It is raining iff the judgement that it is raining is true iff the state of affairs that it is raining obtains.
Here is Pfänder’s formulation of his claim that the truth-property is a relation:

The truth-judgement, which expressly asserts of a judgement that it is true, is a relational judgement, which puts (posit, setzt) the object of its subject-term, the relevant judgement, in a definite relation to the behaviour of the other object with which the judgement judged about deals. The predicative determination of the truth-judgement is the relational determination “true”. (Ibid.: 82)

In order to understand this passage answers are needed to at least two questions: what does “the behaviour of the other object with which the judgement judged about deals” refer to; and what does “put” mean? Pfänder nowhere gives clear answers to these questions. The answer to the first question seems to be that “the behaviour of the other object with which the judgement judged about deals” refers to an obtaining state of affairs. This in turn suggests that the truth relation, according to Pfänder, is the relation of being true of which relates a judgement that $p$ and the obtaining state of affairs that $p$.

What does “put” in the passage quoted mean? In his anatomy of types of concepts Pfänder distinguishes four categories, two of which have already been mentioned: (a) formal or purely functioning concepts, such as conjunction; (b) concepts that refer to objects; and (c) concepts that refer to objective (sachliche) relations. Different from all of these are (d) concepts that “posit” but do not refer to objective relations (ibid.: 170ff.; cf. Beck 1916: 33ff.). Pfänder gives a number of examples of such concepts, in particular the concepts expressed by prepositions in nominal phrases (‘the fish in the water’). The truth-concept is not one of the examples he gives. But as far as I can see he treats it as one of the “concepts which put into a relation” (In-Beziehung-setzende Begriffe). Similarly, he allows for a positing of properties as well as of relations. Thus he says that: “The function of assertion in a judgement does not mean the ‘obtaining by itself’ of the state of affairs, but merely posit it” (Pfänder 2000: 60).

The assertive function in a judgement, we might say, does not refer to the obtaining of a state of affairs, nor does it say a state of affairs obtains; rather, it shows what would be the case were the state of affairs to obtain. But presumably to posit is to represent and so we are led back to the worry outlined above: the judgement that it is raining does not represent, either in a positing or in a referring way, or in any other way, states of affairs, judgements, propositions or truth.

At one point, Pfänder says not that truth-judgements are relational judgements but that the truth property rests on a relation: “Truth is a determination of a judgement which rests on its agreement with the behaviour of the objects it deals with. It does not attach to the judgement itself but only in its relation to the objects it deals with” (ibid.: 235).13

In order to understand a little better Pfänder’s oscillation between the claim that truth is a property that rests on a relation and the claim that it is a relation,
it will be helpful to look briefly at an exactly contemporary account of truth and truth-making.

5. McTaggart and Pfänder

At the beginning of the *The Nature of Existence* (1921), the Cambridge philosopher McTaggart sets out an account of truth that has much in common with that given by Pfänder and that considers more fully a question passed over by Pfänder: if truth is a relation why does it look like a monadic property? Unlike Pfänder, McTaggart argues for Meinongian assumptions (*Annahmen*), beliefs and assertions as truth-bearers and takes beliefs to be “events” in the mind (1921: §10 11). Propositions are not truth-bearers, he thinks, for there are no propositions. Thus on the matter of truth-bearers McTaggart agrees with Anton Marty. He says of every belief what Pfänder says of judgements: that it “professes to be true” (*ibid.*: §20 20). McTaggart notes that his theory, although not a resemblance theory of correspondence, might “be called with some appropriateness the picture theory of truth” (*ibid.*: §13 13). Pfänder, as we have seen, rejects picture theories of truth. Like Pfänder (most of the time) McTaggart thinks that truth is a relation and a relation that involves truth-making: “If I say ‘the table is square’ the only thing which can make my assertion true is the fact that the table is square – that is, the possession by the table of the quality of squareness” (*ibid.*: §9 10).

“What is it that makes a belief false?” A false belief owes its falsity to a relation to fact: “a relation of non-correspondence to all facts” (*ibid.*: §19 19–20). McTaggart’s facts are not the obtaining states of affairs of the phenomenologists such as Husserl, Reinach and Pfänder. McTaggart’s facts, like those of David Armstrong, are entities in which objects and properties or relations come together. He does not allow for states of affairs all of which exist necessarily and some of which obtain contingently and others non-contingently.

Truth is a relation, the relation of correspondence. Correspondence is “indefinable as is the sort of correspondence which is the relation of truth” (*ibid.*: §10 11). McTaggart then points out that truth seems to be a quality: “We say that a belief is true, without any mention of a term other than a belief” (*ibid.*: §11 11). And there is indeed, he thinks, such a quality in addition to the relation of correspondence. Is “true”, then, ambiguous? Are there two types of truth?

There is, no doubt, a quality of being a true belief, which is possessed by true beliefs. But a belief only has that quality because it stands to some fact in that relation of correspondence of which we have been speaking. It is only a matter of convenience whether we give the name of truth to the relation in which the belief stands or to the quality which arises from the relation. It seems better to give it to the relation,
because the relation is prior to the quality. The belief does not stand in the relation because it has the quality. It has the quality because it stands in the relation — indeed, its quality is just the quality of being a term in the relation.

In the case of any belief whose nature is known, it is sufficient to say that it is a term which stands in this relation to something. It is not necessary to specify the other term, because there is only one term to which any belief can have that relation, and we know what that term is when we know what the belief is about. If the belief “the table is square” is true at all, it can only be by correspondence to one thing — the squareness of the table. And thus the fact that truth is a relation tends to fall into the background, since, in any particular case, it is superfluous to mention one term of the relation. (Ibid.: §11 12–13)

McTaggart argues that facts “determine” the truths of beliefs (ibid.: §16 16) but does not, as far as I can see, say what the relation between correspondence and truth-making is. Correspondence, unlike truth-making, is a symmetrical relation. And a truth stands in a relation of correspondence to a fact because the fact makes the truth true.

McTaggart’s distinction between truth as a monadic quality and truth as a relation is of great interest. In the passage just quoted he claims two things about the two types of truth. First, a belief has the quality of truth because it stands in the correspondence relation. Secondly, the quality of being true of a belief, he says, “is just the quality of being a term in the relation”. How should the second claim be understood?

Suppose Sam stands in the relation of hitting to Mary. Then Sam exemplifies the relational property of hitting-Mary. He exemplifies the relational property because he stands in the relation. Similarly, some monadic predicates are derelativizations of relational predicates (e.g. ‘tall’) and if such a predicate applies to an object, this is because the relational predicate applies to more than one object. McTaggart’s suggestion is perhaps best understood as claiming that the truth property behaves like a relational property and that the truth-predicate is a derelativization of a relational expression. Just as “the fact that truth is a relation tends to fall into the background, since, in any particular case, it is superfluous to mention one term of the relation”, so too, when we use predicates that are the results of derelativization it is often superfluous to mention the second term.

As we have seen, Pfänder oscillates between saying that truth is a property that rests on a relation and saying that it is a relation. As far as I can see, there is no trace in Pfänder of the claim that monadic truth is a relational property. But it is clear that this is a claim that fits much of his account.

A view that, as far as I can see, is not considered by McTaggart or Pfänder is that truth is a relational property that “rests” not on the relation of correspondence or agreement but on the relation or tie of grounding or truth-making. The
corresponding linguistic claim would then be that ‘true’ is a derelativization of ‘makes true’.

6. $x$ makes $y$ true versus $x$ makes $y$ a piece of knowledge

Pfänder contrasts at some length the truth-maker principle and its epistemic counterpart: if $y$ is a piece of knowledge (Erkenntnis), then there is something that makes $y$ a piece of knowledge, a type of making many philosophers appeal to, even enemies of truth-making. Thus Wittgenstein is perhaps talking about knowledge-making in the following passage: “I have compelling grounds for my certitude [Sicherheit]. These grounds make the certitude objective” (On Certainty §270 [14]).

The theory of truth-making, Pfänder argues, is not to be confused with the theory of verification. His arguments for this elementary thesis are of some interest because of the large number of identifications, witting and unwitting, of verifiers and truth-makers and of reductions, witting and unwitting, of truth to verifiability and even to verification.

The background to Pfänder’s discussion is Husserl’s claim in the Logical Investigations that truth and verifiability are distinct but that $x$ is true iff $x$ is verifiable. Husserl sometimes seems to claim that verifiability is more fundamental than truth. It is often unclear whether he simply means that the experience of verification is the origin of the concept of truth (as regret is the origin of the concept of objective regrettability; cf. §4 above) or a stronger claim. Early and late, Husserl took verifiability to be “ideal verifiability”: verifiability in principle by someone, in some possible world. Some philosophers even identify truth and verification or reduce truth to verification. According to Schlick and Heidegger, to be true or to be true in some privileged or basic sense is just to be verified, for something to “disclose” itself.

More recently Göran Sundholm has explored in a most interesting way the possibility that “the intuitionistic view of truth as existence of proof” can be subsumed “under the general truth-maker schema”. If Pfänder is right, proving is not any sort of truth-making, just as to verify is not to make true. There is nevertheless, he argues, a sense in which the principle of cognitive reason is a “special form” of the logical PSR (Pfänder 2000: 233).

Pfänder argues that a true judgement is a piece of knowledge only if its truth has been “made evident” (ersichtlich): “A cognitive ground is the ground which makes a judgement a piece of knowledge, which therefore makes the truth of the judgement evident” (ibid.: 234). What makes the knowledge-maker principle, every piece of knowledge has a sufficient ground, true? The essences of knowledge and of truth (ibid.: 235). The principle is independent of the particular natures of cognizing subjects, although the truth of a judgement can only be evident for someone.
Pfänder distinguishes two ways in which true judgements can be made evident. First, evidence may be direct. Then the state of affairs posited by a judgement is made evident and so the truth of the judgement is necessarily evident. “The evident state of affairs is then the sufficient ground of the judgement which is a piece of knowledge” and the judgement itself is an “immediately evident” judgement (ibid.: 236). Pfänder says nothing about what it is for a state of affairs to become evident. Perhaps, like Husserl, he has in mind a perception of an obtaining state of affairs. Indeed, at one point he speaks of a “direct intuition” of the behaviour of objects (ibid.: 230). But then it is not clear why such a perception does not itself deserve to be called a “piece of knowledge”. Pfänder appears to be committed to the view that there are two types of knowledge: judgements and perceptions or intuitions (or whatever else is involved when a state of affairs becomes directly evident). But his official view is that every piece of knowledge is a judgement, qualified in certain ways. The second way in which true judgements can be made evident is via other true judgements. Then these judgements are the sufficient reasons that make a judgement mediately evident (ibid.: 236–7).

The logical PSR does not say “that every judgement, in order to be true, requires a proof [Beweis]”. A proof “is the establishment [Begründung] of a judgement on the basis of certain other judgements the truth of which has been established”; it is a tie between judgements. It is therefore what is sometimes called an “objective proof”.” But a judgement may be true and so have a sufficient ground “and yet be incapable of proof”. Mathematical axioms and judgements such as that red is different from green are incapable of proof. The proposition asserting that no judgement can be true in the absence of a proof would therefore be a clearly false proposition. Such a blind desire for proof could only be made by a time which has completely lost faith in its ability to grasp the truth of certain judgements in direct intuition and is sunk in never-ending relativism. (Ibid.: 229–30)

7. Conclusion

Pfänder’s main achievement in his work on truth and truth-making, apart from several important incidental clarifications, is to have given a clear formulation of one version of truth-maker maximalism: essentialist, a priori, factualist truth-maker maximalism. Every truth has a truth-maker, an obtaining state of affairs or fact, in virtue of the essences of truth and of truth-bearers and that this is so is something we know a priori. He fails to consider whether this view is independent of his claims to the effect that truth is a relation and wobbles between the view that truth is a relation and the view that it is no relation but rests on a relation. But it
seems that a priori, essentialist truth-maker maximalism is independent of the claim that truth is or rests on a relation (cf. Mulligan 2006a, 2007).

**Notes**

1. An earlier version of this paper appeared in a German translation in 2006 as part of a Festschrift for Hans Burkhardt, the eminent Leibniz scholar from Munich. Work on this revised version was supported by the Swiss FNS project on the metaphysics of properties and relations.

2. Wittgenstein was to use "wahr machen" throughout his later writings, e.g. at PR 149 [16].

3. The verb "wahr machen", to make true, plays a central role in the semantics of Bernard Bolzano, where it has a very different meaning from that it enjoys below.

4. I sometimes translate "Grund" as "reason", sometimes as the more robust "ground".

5. Pfänder's Nachlass shows how he attempted to develop a logic of imperatives and a logic of values.

6. Sundholm (1994) notes a passage in Pfänder's Logik that may have contributed to the development of the idea that existence claims can be substantiated through general constructions and also the relation between Leibniz's PSR and the truth-maker principle.

7. Cf. Théodicée I §44, Nouveaux Essais IV. xvii, §3 and, on the connection between PSR and truth, "Primae veritates" [17].


11. The subject concept in a judgement also has both a material and a formal object, cf. Pfänder (2000: 196).

12. It should, however, be noted that at this point in the Logical Investigations, has not yet got [18] entirely clear about the distinction between the obtaining of states of affairs and the truth of propositions.

13. If Pfänder is right and truth is relational then it is a relational modality. Neither Pfänder nor Husserl has much to say about the very idea of relational modalities. But in 1938 Nicolai Hartmann, who in many respects was much more of a realist than any of the realist phenomenologists, published his account of the relation between absolute and relational modalities. One of the central claims of his Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit is that whereas actuality and non-actuality are absolute modalities, necessity and possibility are relational modalities. All necessity is made necessary. Hartmann defends the necessity-maker principle for real or natural necessity (“real determination”, “Realdetermination”), and for ideal necessity (“ideal determination”, “Idealdetermination”) that is to say, determination in virtue of essences, which he takes to comprehend (i) logical necessity, (ii) metaphysical necessity in the real world and (iii) metaphysical necessity for non-logical idealia. The category of determination itself, like that of dependence, he argues, is not a modal category.

14. Nevertheless Broad (1933: 67) says that McTaggart has given conclusive reasons for the correspondence theory of truth and falsehood and given conclusive answers to the objections against it. Broad criticizes and modifies part of McTaggart’s theory of correspondence (ibid.: 77–8).

15. Hartmann and Ingarden were quick to point out that the principle that every truth-bearer can be falsified or verified is unverifiable.

16. Sundholm, “Existence, Proof and Truth-Making”, notes a passage in Pfänder’s Logik that may have contributed to the development of the idea that existence claims can be substantiated through general constructions and also the relation between Leibniz’s PSR and the truth-maker principle.