TRACTARIAN BEGINNINGS AND ENDINGS.
WORLDS, VALUES, FACTS AND SUBJECTS

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Abstract

This occasional paper from the proceedings of the Burkamp Club sets out part of the Austro-German context of the beginning and the end of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: Husserl’s 1900-1901 account of the world as the totality of contingently obtaining states of affairs or facts; and Scheler’s 1913-1916 account of persons as correlates but not parts of worlds, and of microcosms, selves, bodies, life, solipsism, God, value, punishment and happiness.

§1 Introduction

Wittgenstein begins the Philosophical Investigations, after a quotation from Augustine, with the following idea:

The old view was based essentially on two assumptions, that are internally connected. It was believed that the functions of language could all be traced back to the naming function of words: every word is a name for something, its meaning (Bedeutung).... And it was thought that the sentence contains essentially an aggregate [Inbegriff] of names (Nennungen). And in accordance with this first assumption the processes of language learning were accounted for as [a process of] learning to name objects. Both claims are false; the function of naming is only one of several functions of words and the fact that language learning is not based only on acquisition of the naming function is being shown more and more by systematic observation of children. Matters are essentially more complicated than they seemed to the first simple theory; just how complicated they are cannot be somehow deductively inferred but must be grasped on the basis of systematic observation of concrete cases of linguistic understanding.1

This is, of course, not quite what Wittgenstein writes at the beginning of the Investigations. The passage just quoted is taken from p. 107 of Karl Bühler’s 1909 article “Ueber das Sprachverständnis vom Standpunkt der Normalpsychologie aus”. Bühler there says of the view that the functions of language could all be traced back to the naming function of words that it is “most clearly formulated by Hobbes” (Bühler 1909 107, cf 105). Wittgenstein’s foil is a view to be found in a passage from Augustine and what he actually says about this view is:

1 Bühler 1909 107; italics mine.
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations (Verbindungen) of such names (Benennungen).--In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning (Bedeutung). The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself (Wittgenstein 1968 §1, italics mine)

Elsewhere I have described the elements of Karl Bühler’s philosophy of language, which finds its main expression in his remarkable Sprachtheorie of 1934, and investigated their relation to what Wittgenstein writes in the first twenty five sections of the Investigations². The Austro-German context of Wittgenstein’s ideas often throws light on the contents of his views both early and late. In what follows I look at the Austro-German context of the beginning of the Tractatus and of some passages near the end of the Tractatus.

§2 Tractatus 1-2

The apodictic beginning of the Tractatus is:

1  Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.
   The world is all that is the case.
1.1  Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.
     The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11  Die Welt ist durch die Tatsachen bestimmt und dadurch, dass es alle Tatsachen sind.
     The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.

A fact, we are then told, is the obtaining of states of affairs:

2  Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
   What is the case – a fact – is the obtaining of states of affairs

In 1900 another Austrian philosopher, Husserl, had said that the world is a total unity:

Denn die Welt ist nichts anderes als die gesamte gegenständliche Einheit, welche dem idealen System aller Tatsachenwahrheit entspricht und von ihm unabtrennbar ist (Husserl 1975 §36 (6) 128)

For the world is nothing more than the unified objective totality corresponding to, and inseparable from, the ideal system of all factual truth (Husserl 1970 Vol. I §36 (6) 143)

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² Mulligan 1997.
What is this totality a totality of? What is a factual truth? As we shall see, Husserl uses “fact” and “factual” in two different ways.

Every truth, Husserl thinks, is inseparable from an obtaining state of affairs. “The interconnection of things (Sachen)” and “the interconnection of truths” are “mutually inseparable” and

What holds of single truths or states of affairs, plainly also holds of interconnections of truths or of states of affairs (Husserl 1975 (§62) 230-231, Husserl 1970 I 226).

There are contingent and non-contingent truths and these correspond to states of affairs which obtain contingently and to states of affairs which obtain non-contingently respectively. Factual truths are contingent truths and are inseparable from contingent facts:

Facts (Tatsachen) are “contingent”: they might very well not have been the case, they might have been different (Husserl 1975 §37 129, Husserl 1970 I 144)

Every fact is...temporally determinate (Husserl 1975 §36 (3) 126, Husserl 1970 I 140)

Husserl’s Humean use of “fact” and “factual” to refer to “the world of matter of fact” (Husserl 1975 Vol. I §40 153) is not the only way he uses the term “fact”. He also occasionally uses the term “fact” to refer not just to Humean matters of fact but to obtaining or objective states of affairs:

…der objektive Sachverhalt, die Tatsache...(Husserl 1901 LU V §33 479, cf. V §36 490-491)
...the objective state of affairs, the fact…(Husserl 1901 LU V §33, cf. V §36 490-91)

A year later, another Austrian philosopher, Meinong, also says:

Ein Objektiv, das besteht, wird auch als “Thatsache” bezeichnet (Meinong 1977 69).
An objective, which obtains, is also called [a] “fact”.

In order to understand this second use of “fact” it is necessary to understand Husserl’s account of states of affairs (cf. Süßbauer 1995, Mulligan 1990). A “state of affairs is no thing (Ding)”, he says (LU V §33 478). States of affairs come in many varieties. They may be “universal”, of the form the state of affairs that all A’s are B (LU II §23 167), “indeterminate, singular”, of the form the state of affairs that some A is B (LU II §23 168), “general”, of the form the state of affairs the (a) A (in specie) is B (LU II §23 168). They are positive or negative (LU V §28 462) or singular and “primitive” (LU P §6 31), relational or non-relational (LU VI §48 681, 683).

Husserl’s account of states of affairs, then, is an example of Austrian Baroque – there are many different “forms of states of affairs” (LU VI §51 688, §63 722) corresponding to the different logical forms of propositions. Wittgenstein’s account, on the other hand, is an example of Austrian Romanesque. In particular, according to Husserl but not Wittgenstein, not all obtaining states of affairs obtain contingently, not all obtaining states of affairs are matters of fact.
The non-Humean use of “fact” by Husserl and Meinong might be called the functorial use. A state of affairs obtains or does not obtain, holds or does not hold (Husserl 1975 Vol I §6 29), is objective or is not objective (Husserl 1901 LU V §33 479, cf. V §36 490-491). Instances of

(1) The state of affairs that \( p \) obtains

are modifications or transformations of instances of \( p \) the functorial construction

(2) It is the case that \( p \).

(Compare the relation between “The proposition that \( p \) is true” and “It is true that \( p \)”.) As we have seen, Husserl calls a state of affairs which is objective, which obtains, a fact. One modification or nominalisation of (1) allows us to refer, as Husserl does in 1913, to “the obtaining (Bestand) of a state of affairs” (Husserl 1975 Vol I §6 29). Yet another nominalisation allows us to refer, as does Wittgenstein, to “the obtaining (Bestehen) of states of affairs”\(^3\).

Husserl and Wittgenstein attach great importance to the distinction between formal and non-formal (material) categories. Indeed this distinction and the uses to which they put it sharply distinguish their very different philosophies of logic and language from those of, say, Frege, Meinong and Russell\(^4\). According to Husserl, the category of state of affairs is a formal category:

In...Zusammenhang mit den...Bedeutungskategorien, stehen andere, zu ihnen korrelative Begriffe, wie Gegenstand, Sachverhalt, Einheit, Vielheit, Anzahl, Beziehung, Verknüpfung usf. Es sind die reinen oder formalen gegenständlichen Kategorien (Husserl 1§975 §67 245).

In...connection with...the categories of meaning...stand other correlative concepts such as Object, State of Affairs, Unity, Plurality, Number, Relation, Connection etc. These are the pure, the formal object categories (cf. Husserl 1970 I §67 237).

In one of his lists of formal categories Husserl mentions the category of facts:

[T]he pure truths of logic are all the ideal laws which have their whole foundation in the ‘sense’, the ‘essence’ or the ‘content’, of the concepts of Truth, Proposition (Satz), Object, Property, Connection, Law, Fact (Tatsache) etc (Husserl 1975 §37 129, Husserl 1970 I 144)

“Fact” here probably refers not to the category of obtaining states of affairs but to the category of contingently obtaining states of affairs, to matters of fact.

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\(^3\) On Wittgenstein’s idiom, cf Dietrich 1973 20-23.

Wittgenstein, too, asserts that the concept of fact is a formal concept, like the concepts of number and object (4.1272). And since a fact is the obtaining of a state of affairs we may ascribe to him the view that the concept of a state of affairs is a formal concept. 

As far as I can see, Husserl nearly always uses the term “fact” to refer to a state of affairs which obtains contingently. The same is true of other phenomenologists who developed Husserl’s account of states of affairs, for example, Reinach, but not of Meinong or his pupils. The term “fact” is also used by Bradley, Russell and McTaggart but they use the term to refer to the possession of qualities by things or to things which stand in relations. Thus in 1914 Russell writes:

The existing world consists of many things with many qualities and relations...When I speak of a “fact” I...mean that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation (Russell 1980 60).

Thus the existing world, according to Russell, consists of facts. But these facts are not defined in terms of states of affairs. They are British, not Austrian facts. And according to Husserl and Wittgenstein the world is identical with the totality of facts; no fact is a proper part of the world. One apparent difference between Husserl and Wittgenstein on contingent facts concerns the rôle played in Wittgenstein’s theory by the claim that simple objects form the substance of the world (2.021).

In Ideas (1913) Husserl seems to have had second thoughts about what the world is. He there seems to reject his earlier view, that the world is the unified totality of contingent facts, of facts which are matters of fact:

Die Welt ist der Gesamtinbegriff von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung und Erfahrungserkenntnis...(Husserl 1928 §1 8).

The world is the totality of objects than can be known through experience...(cf. Husserl 1972 §1 46).

§3  Tractatus 5.6-

The 5.6’s of the Tractatus begin by telling us that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world and that logic pervades the world. Elsewhere I have explored the relation between these claims and Husserl’s account in 1901 of “the absurd (counter-sensical, widersinnige) problem of the real meaning of the logical”, the absurdity of the view that the course of the world could prescribe the “limits of the validity of the laws of logic”. In what follows I consider the Austro-German context of some of Wittgenstein’s subsequent remarks.

5 Cf. Favroholdt 1964 122.
6 Indeed Meinong notes that his use of “fact” conflicts with the tendency to use this word of the objectives of empirical judgements, that is to say, Humean matters of fact (Meinong 1977 69).
7 Cf. Correia & Mulligan 2007
about the metaphysical subject, the human soul, life, living bodies, solipsism, microcosms, God, value, happiness, the world and worlds, in particular a philosophy of all of these which is closer to Wittgenstein’s views than is any other philosophy.

One type of subject referred to by Wittgenstein is the philosophical self or metaphysical subject:

The philosophical self (Ich) is...the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, not a part of it (5.641).

In 1916 Max Scheler writes in his Ethics – presumably a good example of what Wittgenstein calls “gassing” about “the ethical” (Wittgenstein 1969 35-6) - that a person is no part of a world:

The person is never a ‘part’ of a "world" but always the correlate of a "world" (Scheler 1973 393, 1966 392).

Scheler’s argument for this claim seems to be that “a person...is never an object (Gegenstand)”; persons can be described but there is no such thing, he thinks, as knowledge by acquaintance of a person; whatever is in the world is an object (Scheler 1966 386, Scheler 1973 387).

In the same year Wittgenstein noted that

The self (Ich) is no object (Wittgenstein 1979 7.8.16)
I objectively confront every object. But not the self (Ich)
(Wittgenstein 1979 11.8.16)

Scheler and Wittgenstein distinguish between worlds and the world. Scheler raises the following question:

If to every ‘person’ there corresponds a ‘world’ and to every ‘world’ a ‘person’, we must ask...whether the ‘idea’ of one identical real world ...has phenomenal fulfilment (Scheler 1973 396, 1966 395).

According to Wittgenstein „the world [is] my world” (5.62).

Scheler calls the worlds which correspond to different persons microcosms and the one identical real world the macrocosm:

Let us call this idea of one identical real world the idea of the macrocosm.....If there is such a macrocosm...[a]ll microcosms, i.e., all individual ‘personal worlds’ are...parts of the macrocosm (Scheler 1973 396, 1966 395)

Unlike Scheler Wittgenstein identifies the world and his world and says that he himself is his world. Like Scheler, Wittgenstein calls his world a microcosm:

I am my world (The microcosm) (5.63)
It is true: man is the microcosm (Wittgenstein 1979 12.10.16)\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) The concept of a microcosm is employed by Schopenhauer and the Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger.
Although Scheler distinguishes between the world of a person and the world a central claim of his personalist, anti-solipsistic realism is that the one and only world is given to me - shows itself to me - in a way it cannot show itself to anyone else because it shows itself to me as the fact that my world is a part of the world:

the content (Gehalt) of the being of the world is, in every case, different for each person (Scheler 1966 394, cf. Scheler 1973 395)

Each such difference reveals the “contingency” of the real world. This world cannot be the object of “determinations” which employ “general concepts and propositions” (Scheler 1966 393, cf. Scheler 1973 395). The fact that my world is part of the world cannot be said but shows itself:

the truth about the world...is, in a certain sense, a „personal truth“...
(Scheler 1966 394, cf. Scheler 1973 395)

According to Wittgenstein, what solipsism means, that the world is my world, is correct but cannot be said. It shows itself (5.62).

If each individual world corresponds to a person and if there is a macrocosm, what person corresponds to the macrocosm? Scheler’s answer is

The personal counterpart of the macrocosm would be the idea of an infinite and perfect spiritual person (Scheler 1966 387, cf. Scheler 1973 396).

The idea of such a person is the idea of a person who, like every person, is no part of any world. If there is such a person, could she reveal herself? Scheler’s answer runs as follows:

Any reality of ‘God’ has...its only possible foundation in a possible positive revelation (Offenbarung) of God in a positive person (Scheler 1966 395, cf. Scheler 1973 396-7).

Since no person is part of any world such a revelation could not take place in a world. In Wittgenstein’s words,

God does not reveal (offenbart) himself in the world (6.432).

What follows from the relations between a person or metaphysical subject, on the one hand, and worlds, on the other hand, for the place of value? According to Scheler,

That which can be called originally ‘good’ and ‘evil’...is the ‘person’...

Indeed Schopenhauer has much to say about most of the claims discussed in this section. On the parallels between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, see Lange. E. M. 1992, Micheletti 1973 chs. 3, 4, Gabriel 1993 chs. 4-5. Scheler, too, takes up many Schopenhauerian ideas. In particular, he follows Schopenhauer in thinking that personal identity is a matter of the heart and the liver rather than of the head.
If no person is part of a world, is the ethical value of a person part of a world? Scheler’s answer is affirmative (Scheler 1966 392). Wittgenstein, however, says that “in [the world] there is no value” (6.41). (Cf. “What is good and evil is essentially the self (das Ich), not the world (Wittgenstein 1979 5.8.16)). The conclusion Wittgenstein draws from this, that “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (6.42), is not drawn by Scheler. But Scheler does argue that one type of value cannot be described or attributed by ethics – individual values, the good or bad for a person.

One ethical proposition, according to Scheler, concerns the relation between ethical value and happiness:

That there is some connection between happiness (blissfulness, Glückseligkeit) and the positive ethical (sittlich) value of the person, between good behaviour and the positive feelings which accompany it, a connection that is more than a merely fortuitous and empirical association or the lack of one – this is the opinion of all who have thought seriously about this connection (Scheler 1966 355, cf. Scheler 1973 354).

The non-contingent connection, he thinks, is that “only the good person is happy” and “only the happy person acts in an ethically good way (Scheler 1966 359, 360, cf. Scheler 1973 379). But it is wrong to think of such happiness (or unhappiness) as any sort of reward (punishment or reprisal):

Why do we need a so called “reprisal” (Sanktion) here? It does not matter if a deed brings the agent...any number of states of unhappiness....No reward (good which is a reward, Lohngut) that is supposed to function as a reward for what is ethically good can ever, by essential necessity, determine happiness as deep as the happiness itself out of which ethically good willing streams forth and which accompanies it. No punishment (evil which is a punishment, Strafübel)...can ever determine suffering as deep as the wretchedness out of which a bad deed flows or as deep as the feeling of displeasure that accompanies it (Scheler 1966 360, cf. Scheler 1973 359-60).

Wittgenstein distinguishes between reward and punishment in an ordinary and a non-ordinary sense. But it is not clear whether he thinks that the agreeableness of ordinary rewards is of the same kind as the agreeableness of non-ordinary rewards:

When an ethical (ethischen) law of the form, ”Thou shalt . . . “, is laid down, one’s first thought is, “And what if I do not do it?” But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant. - At least these consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(And it is also clear also that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant) (6.422).

Scheler, as we have seen, thinks that the happiness of the good man is not any sort of reward and the unhappiness of the evil woman is not any sort of punishment. He does not, however, think that such happiness and unhappiness lie in certain actions themselves. They are rather the sources of such actions and accompany these.
The non-contingent link between goodness and the heart has consequences for the world of a person or man. Bliss (Seligkeit) and despair (Verzweiflung), Scheler says, are the correlates of a person’s ethical value or disvalue and “fill the whole of...our world” (Scheler 1966 345). As Wittgenstein puts it, “the world of the happy man (Glücklichen) differs from that of the unhappy man” (6.43). The context of Wittgenstein’s claim and 6.422 suggest that the happy man is one whose will is good, the unhappy man one whose will is evil. Scheler says that it is a mistake to identify bliss and happiness, despair and unhappiness. Bliss and despair lie deeper than (un)happiness (Scheler 1966 109, 126).

Wittgenstein asserts that „if good or evil willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world“, the world „must so to speak wax (zunehmen) or wane (abnehmen) as a whole” (6.43). Scheler thinks that there is something which makes of “the entire moral world” a “great whole” which “rises (steigt) and falls (fällt) as a whole” – the principle of solidarity or shared responsibility. Scheler illustrates this point by imagining a “world court (Weltgericht)” and “its highest judge” (Scheler 1966 523; on the rôle of the notion of a last judgment (ein jüngstes Gericht) in Wittgenstein and other Austrian thinkers cf. Smith 1978).

Wittgenstein’s metaphysical subject or philosophical self is not man, the body, the human body, the human soul of which psychology treats (5.641). Nor is it the thinking, presenting subject, since this does not exist (5.631). Scheler’s person is not identical with any man, body, soul or self. But there are, he thinks, selves. Unlike persons, selves are objects. In self-knowledge, self-love, self-hate and self-control a self is an object for a person. “The self is itself just an object among other objects” (Scheler 1966 375, cf. Scheler 1973 375). It is not simple, it is no conglomerate but rather a unity (Scheler 1966 414-5). The view that empirical selves are complex unities which are part of the world was very popular amongst Brentano’s heirs. It is to be found in (early) Husserl, Stumpf and Witasek. Thus Husserl says in 1900 that “the self belongs to the world” (Husserl 1975 §36 128).

According to the Scandinavian interpretation of the Tractatus Wittgenstein there accepts, in addition to the metaphysical subject, what is often called an “empirical self”\(^{11}\). Thus Favrholt argues that the human soul Wittgenstein refers to at 5.641 is just such an empirical self and that it is composite. It contains thinkings and thoughts, that is, those facts which are pictures. Although the metaphysical subject neither thinks nor has ideas nor believes, the human soul does think (5.631, 5.542), have ideas (5.631) and believes (5.542)\(^{12}\). I shall assume in what follows that Favrholt is right about this.

A living body (Leib) is an object like any other object. What is the relation between a person, a metaphysical subject and an empirical self, on the one hand, and living bodies, on the other hand? Wittgenstein says

Were I to write a book, "The world as I found it (wie ich sie vorfand)", I should have to include a report on my body (Leib), and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.- (5.631; my italics)

Scheler reports Avenarius’ assertion


\(^{12}\) Favrholt 1964 96ff., 111ff., 147ff.
that there is a simple finding (Vorfinden) (which neither presupposes nor contains an ego...) and...that this datum contains nothing more than a lived body (Leib) and its environment (Umwelt) (Scheler 1966 402, 1973 404; my italics).

And agrees with Avenarius that perception of a living body does not require the assumption of a self\textsuperscript{13}. The self which Wittgenstein could not mention in his book is what he calls the metaphysical subject. When Scheler says that perception of a living body does not require the existence of a self, the self he has in mind is something which can be perceived and is no person.

Scheler illustrates his claims by considering the perception of a cube, an example discussed also by Wittgenstein (5.5423). My perception of a cube, Scheler says, involves no awareness of me. For this a new act is required, the object of which is a self and what is given to this self of the cube (Scheler 1973 56, Scheler 1966 75). Nor does perception of a cube involve any awareness of the existence and place of a bodily organism. For such awareness a new act is required:

\[T\]he fact that I see by way of some activation of my eyes, rather than my ears, lies neither in the intuition of the function of seeing nor in that of the seen thing (Scheler 1973 57, Scheler 1966 76)

Wittgenstein says that “nothing in the visual field allows one to infer that it is seen by an eye” (5.633). And he rules out any awareness of a metaphysical self to whom a cube, for example, could be perceptually given.

“Solipsism” may refer to the doctrine that there is no more than one metaphysical subject or person. But Scheler and Wittgenstein (5.64) also use the term to indicate an opposition, apparent or real, to realism. Scheler argues that the assumption that the world and the way it is given depend on what he calls a self “leads necessarily to solipsism”\textsuperscript{14}. But every act of knowing involves an immediate knowledge of the essential independence of things, both oneself and what is perceived of the external world, with respect to the execution of this act. So such solipsism is self-evidently absurd (widersinnig) (Scheler 1973 379, Scheler 1966 378-9). Thus “solipsism” here is opposed to realism about selves and about the external world.

According to Favrholdt, Wittgenstein’s empirical self or human soul is composite and contains beliefs, thinkings, thoughts and presentations. The metaphysical self does not believe, think or enjoy presentations. But it does, it seems, will. For the world is independent of my will (6.373). In the Notebooks we are told that the willing subject exists (5.8.16). Another possibility is that the will, “in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes” is outside the world, unlike the “will as a phenomenon”, something which is of interest only to psychology (6.423, cf. 5.631, Favrholdt 1964 98-99). Does the metaphysical subject do anything else? Favrholdt argues that


\textsuperscript{14} (Scheler 1973 378, Scheler 1966 378). Wittgenstein says in the Notebooks that the subject which is no part of the world “is a presupposition of its existence” (Wittgenstein 1979 2.8.16). Scheler rejects the view that the world depends on what he calls a self and asserts that persons, who are not parts of any world, and worlds are mutually interdependent.
in a certain sense, [the metaphysical subject] has knowledge, because to compare propositions with reality and decide whether they are true or false is to receive knowledge (Favrholdt 1964 102)

The ontological picture theory presupposes the existence of a subject which does not think but takes in the logic of the world by an act of seeing (Favrholdt 1964 167).

This seeing is one type of knowledge, knowledge of internal relations. I shall assume that Favrholdt is right about this.

According to Scheler in 1916 a person wills, perceives, intuits, judges and has ideas or presentations and only a person, not a self, performs these “spiritual” acts. Selves, on the other hand, see, hear, attend, and only in a self do these “psychological” functions occur (Scheler 1966 387-390). But before and after 1916 Scheler sets out a quite different distribution of rôles for persons and selves. He demotes judging from the category of spiritual acts to that of psychological functions and asserts that the presentations or ideas (Vorstellungen) “of the psychologist” are not acts but functions. Thinking, belief and assertion too, he says, are merely psychological functions. On this view, then, only a person wills, perceives and intuits, that is, enjoys knowledge by intuition, and only selves judge, believe, think and have presentations (in one sense of this term) (Scheler 1955 234-6, 219, 248, 230). Indeed a self is a unity of thinkings, judgings, and presentings as is the empirical self of the Tractatus, “the human soul, with which psychology deals” (5.641).

A person, according to Scheler, is simply a unity, a unity of spiritual acts such as willing, perceiving and intuiting (Scheler 1966 389, 382). Is the metaphysical subject of the Tractatus a unity? If it wills and knows, what is the relation between it and such willing and knowing? It is often argued that the metaphysical subject of the Tractatus must be simple because it is a limit of the world, a point (5.632, 5.64; cf. Favrholdt 1964 96, 148). On some views of ordinary boundaries these certainly can be complex. Perhaps the same is true of some Tractarian boundaries. After all, some of the boundaries of the world can, perhaps, be altered by good or evil willing (6.43).

§4 Conclusion

15 In order to evaluate this suggestion it would be necessary to understand the relation between time, the metaphysical subject and its willing and knowing. Scheler’s view is a suggestive object of comparison. Scheler’s persons and their acts (like the persons and acts of his personalist contemporary, McTaggart) are atemporal (Scheler 1966 385-387). A person is an atemporal unity and the correlate but no part of its world. Wittgenstein seems to think that it is possible to live atemporally by living in the present (6.4311). (On the relation between this and related claims and the views of Weininger cf Schulte 2004). He also says that the world and life are one (5.621). Scheler, too, is happy to talk of life in this lebensphilosophische way but does not identify any world with life. The correlate of a living body (Leib) is a milieu (Umwelt), of a person a world. In 1923 Scheler mentions a „world-view“ in which “the world ‘as a whole’ is given as one universal organism, permeated by ‘one’ life” (Scheler 1973a p.92, Scheler 1954 p. 81). Scheler’s philosophy of the living body and of Life leads him to describe the view that “the mechanical view of nature gives a picture of absolutely real nature” as one that is based on an “illusion” (Scheler 1966 420). Wittgenstein’s account of Life is one – but not the most important - source of his view that “the entire modern world-view is based on the illusion that the so called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena (6.371).
What does Wittgenstein mean when he says that certain things show themselves and cannot be said? What exactly is it that is supposed to show itself? It is tempting to answer the first question by saying that showing is a close relative of what the phenomenologists called intuition, and to answer the second question by saying that what shows itself is just what, according to the phenomenologists, can be intuited. The latter comprises all non-contingent connections, analytic and synthetic, within and between states of affairs and their elements, which hold in virtue of the essence of these elements or of the concepts they fall under. (A fairly typical example is provided by the penultimate quotation from Husserl in §2 above). By grasping these essences in intuition, categorial and non-categorial, we see the connections. Among these states of affairs are Wertverhalte, ethical and aesthetic, but also all logical laws, for logical laws are merely one type of formal ontological law. Intuition is of essences and of Wesensverhalte. Then the mistake of the phenomenologists, if it is a mistake, would be to attempt to say what they see, the result of which is mere “gassing”.16

A philosopher who succumbed to this double temptation seems to be Gustav Bergmann. “What was once intuited (erschaut) now shows itself” is his comment in 1938 on Wittgenstein (Bergmann 1988 173). In order to determine whether the temptations should be resisted it is important to ask: To whom, if to anyone, does what shows itself show itself? Who, for example, enjoys an “intuition of the world sub specie aeterni” (6.45)? Who

16 Scheler’s radical view is that phenomenologists do not or should not try to say what they mean: “a priori contents can only be shown (aufgewiesen)”, they can neither be “proved” nor “deduced” (Scheler 1966 p. 69). As he says in a text published in 1933, “The meaning of the words used by the phenomenologist and the units of meaning of the sentences he writes or speaks do not ‘say’ what he means...Words and sentences are here invitations...to see...what the phenomenologist means” (Scheler 1957 p. 465, cf. p. 391).

17 Wittgenstein says (a) that the feeling or “Gefühl” of the world as a limited whole (6.45) is mystical and (b) identifies the mystical and that the world is (6.44). ad (a) - If feelings require a cognitive underpinning and if the object of an emotion is the object of its cognitive underpinning, the most likely candidate for the cognitive underpinning of the feeling of the world as a limited whole is the “Anschauung” of the world as a limited whole, that is to say, sub specie aeterni (6.45). Part of the immediate context of this line of thought is the account given by yet another Austrian philosopher, Heinrich Gomperz, of the role of grasping the world as a whole in his philosophy of inner freedom and mysticism (atheistic, pantheistic and theistic): “If a man at a particular moment grasps the world as a whole as a good..., then he is happy at that moment” (Gomperz 1915 7-8, cf. 22, 197). In the Notebooks Wittgenstein says that “the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis (7.10.16). One of the features of mysticism, according to Gomperz, is the movement from the realist to the idealist, even solipsistic attitude (Gomperz 1915 296, 310). ad (b) – In 1917 Scheler says that the fact that something is is the object of philosophical wonder (Verwunderung, Scheler 1917 65, cf. 96) and that insight into this fact is “presupposed by the constitution of the sense of the word ‘doubt about something’” (Scheler 1917 65). According to Wittgenstein, that the world is is the mystical and the mystical shows itself (6.522) and doubt presupposes that something can be said (6.51). The proximity of these remarks suggests that it is because that *the world is shows itself that scepticism about whether the world is is nonsensical (unsinnig, 6.51; Husserl calls sceptical theories “absurd” (widersinnig), cf. Husserl 1975 §32 p. 120). In a lecture in 1929 Wittgenstein refers to an experience he describes by saying “I wonder at the existence of the world” (Wittgenstein 1993 p. 40, cf. 43). In the same lecture Wittgenstein refers to “the experience of absolute safety”, an experience which has been “described by saying we feel safe in the hands of God” (Wittgenstein 1993 p. 42). Scheler is one philosopher tempted by such descriptions: “Thus it is in God alone that the individual person may know himself to be safe or judged” (Scheler 1966 550). Gomperz, on the other hand, describes the safety of the atheist (Gomperz 1915 p. 17, cf. p. 297) and Anzengruber that of the pantheist.
intuits? As we have seen, according to Scheler, persons intuit. (Husserl’s transcendental ego
plays a similar role). Does what shows itself show itself to the metaphysical subject of the
Tractatus? Wittgenstein nowhere says that this is the case.

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