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
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
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LA SCUOLA DI BRENTANO

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


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# LA SCUOLA DI BRENTANO



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23. *Ideen I*, § 91.
24. Cfr. *Logische Untersuchungen*, prima ricerca, § 14 e *passim*.
25. *Ideen I*, § 91.
26. *Ib.*
27. *Ib.*
28. Cfr. E. Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Bewusstseins*, ed. M. Heidegger, 1928.
29. *Ib.*; ma cfr. anche Heidegger, nota editoriale. Ora tutte le opere sul tempo sono raccolte in E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, ed. R. Boehm, in «Husserliana», Vol. X, Haag, 1966.
30. *Ideen I*, § 110.
31. *Ib.*
32. *Ib.*
33. *Ideen I*, § 112.
34. *Ib.*
35. *Ideen I*, § 116.
36. *Ib.*
37. *Ib.*
38. *Ib.*
39. *Ideen I*, §§ 85-86.
40. *Ideen I*, § 117.
41. *Ib.*
42. *Ib.*
43. *Ideen I*, § 152.
44. *Ideen I*, § 117.
45. *Ib.*
46. *Ib.*
47. *Ib.*

## JUDGINGS: THEIR PARTS AND COUNTERPARTS \*

by Kevin Mulligan

### 1. *The Variety of Questions to which Judgings give rise*

Few philosophers nowadays doubt that a theory of judgement or of assertion is central to the project of a theory of meaning, a project which, at least since the work of Frege and Russell, has come more and more to occupy exact philosophers. Yet the two most sophisticated theories of judgements we possess, both of which were worked out in considerable detail in the Brentanist tradition, remain almost completely unknown. I am referring to the theory developed by Brentano and defended, with various modifications, by Anton Marty, and to an alternative theory set out by Husserl as well as to the theory of Meinong, which in many respects stands mid-way between these two theories. These theories, or to be more accurate, families of theories, have of course much in common. Above all, they all take seriously the following two principles:

(P1) Judgings are complex episodes.

(P2) Judgings have a logical form.

Brentano, his immediate pupils Stumpf, Marty, Meinong, Husserl and Twardowski but also their pupils Ingarden, Reinach, Mally, Witasek, all developed accounts of judgment that, even where they contradict one another, attempt to do justice to these truisms. This shared concern distinguishes Brentanist accounts of judgement from nearly all work on the subject by their contemporaries except that of Frege and Russell - since such work possessed little or no understand-

ding of logical form - and from nearly all subsequent work on the topic - since such work possesses no account of the nature of complex episodes in general, nor indeed of psychological episodes in particular.

Brentanist accounts of judging fill more than three thousand pages of high-quality description and argument and include - to mention only the highpoints in this tradition - large parts of Brentano's *Psychologie*, his *The True and the Evident* and *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*; the bulk of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, particularly the extended 75 page argument at §§20-43 of the fifth Investigation, most of Meinong's *On Assumptions*, Marty's *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* and Reinach's 'On the Theory of Negative Judgement'. It is a tribute to the fertility of this tradition that practically every distinction introduced within it has been rediscovered in subsequent work on the philosophies of mind and language.

In what follows I expound some of the main ideas put forward within this tradition and I observe a distinction observed by Brentano and all his heirs between three questions:

- (A) What is the correct description and classification of judging and related phenomena?
- (B) What is the ontological status of judgments and related phenomena?
- (C) What is the form of the laws that the phenomenon of judging exemplifies?

Thus I shall review some of the differences between the Brentanists concerning the correct description and classification of:

- (A1) what Meinong and Husserl (as well of course as Frege and Russell) called *assumptions* and what Brentano and Marty called *presentations of judgment-contents*;
- (A2) Brentano's *presentations*;
- (A3) what Husserl called *propositional contents*;
- (A4) existential presuppositions.

I shall also describe the two most detailed answers to questions (B) and (C), those provided by the later Brentano and the early Husserl. In other words, I shall attempt to show how description and applied ontology mesh in Brentanist accounts of judging. I shall consequently not be able to go into either descriptive details or into the merits of the ontological frameworks to which the Brentanists have recourse.

## 2. Judgments Distinguished from States of Affairs and Abstract Meaning Entities

According to (P1), judgments are complex episodes. I shall follow the habit of many Brentanists and bring this out by using the gerund 'judging' (which corresponds to the German nominalised infinitive *das Urteilen*) rather than the more common term 'judgement' in order to avoid the well-known 'process/product' ambiguities of the latter expression - ambiguities which were first diagnosed in detail by the Brentanists<sup>1</sup>. Judgments are particulars that occur at a certain time. Thus they may have causal effects.

Everything that is real can have effects; the act of presenting (*Vorstellens*) as well as every other psychic activity (Marty, 1905, 16).

Judgements are themselves objects, and real objects at that, which can only exist in judging beings. And judgement-possibilities are real judgement-dispositions, and so are also features of real judging beings<sup>2</sup>.

Jim's judging that Jules loves Jane may causally produce in him, by sheer force of association, a phantasy about Jane<sup>3</sup>.

The force of the point that judgments are particulars comes out most clearly if we bear in mind the double contrast - first discovered by the Brentanists - between concrete judgments and abstract meaning-entities, on the one hand, and judgments and states of affairs, on the other hand.

Jim's judgments on Monday and Tuesday to the effect that Jules is in love are two particulars. Now many twentieth century philosophers, in the wake of Frege and Husserl, have wanted to see such particulars as two tokens of a type or abstract entity often called a 'proposition'. This is an unfortunate misuse of a perfectly good word which should, as Geach points out, be used to refer to «a form of words in which something is propounded, put forward for consideration»<sup>4</sup>. Matters have been further complicated by the tendency of some philosophers to use 'proposition' to refer to states of affairs or to hybrid entities combining features of propositions (qua abstract entities) and states of affairs. (Moore and Russell started this tradition; to the same tradition belongs Meinong's use of *Objektive*). I shall not use the word 'proposition' in this way, but shall speak of abstract meaning-entities. The only features of the latter that are of interest to us are that they are supposed to be multiply exemplifiable and have such negative characteristics as: causally inefficacious, not located in time etc. Frege's 'thoughts' belong to this category, as do Husserl's 'ideal propositional meaning' (*Aussagebedeutung*), or

'meaning species'.

But if Husserl regarded Jim's two judgments as instantiating an ideal multiply exemplifiable entity this is not true of Marty. Marty, a good nominalist as far as judgement is concerned, attempts to show that relations of partial and complete, of greater and lesser similarity between judgments make meaning species superfluous.

Judgments contrast also with states of affairs. The word 'Sachverhalt' was used in lectures from 1888 onwards by Stumpf to mark a distinction that, he tells us, had been made even earlier by Brentano: between judging and judgement-content (*Urteilsinhalt*)<sup>5</sup>. In view of the fact that Brentano and his heirs did so much to clarify the different roles of states of affairs and indeed the different dilemmas to which postulating such entities lead, it is unfortunate that the philosopher who first used the word 'Sachverhalt' in print in the sort of way Brentano's heirs and Cambridge philosophers have made familiar was the idiosyncratic neo-Kantian Julius Bergmann in 1879, in volume one of his *Allgemeine Logik*<sup>6</sup>.

...by cognition we understand thinking, in which what is thought agrees with the state of affairs (Bergmann, 1879, 2).

I suspect that, in spite of Stumpf's assurances that Brentano was «completely clear about the scope of the distinction» between judging and judgement-content (Stumpf, 1924, 36) Brentano's notion of a judgement-content was as undifferentiated as was that key notion in the work of another idiosyncratic neo-Kantian writing in 1879<sup>7</sup>, the early Frege's 'judgeable content'. Since Frege in 1879 and Brentano in 1874 had not yet drawn any serious distinction between sense and reference (the Fregean terminology) or content and object (the Brentanist terminology) the modern notion of a state of affairs as something that correlates with judgments just as namings are correlated with objects, of something that involves but is not identical with objects, was foreign to them. Brentano was simply responsible for stimulating the many theories of states of affairs his pupils and heirs were to develop. An undifferentiated concept such as his 'judgement-content' must appear ambiguous in the light of subsequent differentiations. The first sharp distinctions between judgments (or their sense or content) and their objective correlates are to be found in Frege's 1892 paper 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' and in Twardowski's 1894 monograph *On the Content and Object of Presentations* although steps in the right direction had been taken by Höfler and Meinong, Kerry (an Austrian philosopher influenced by the Brentanists, still only known for his discussions of Frege), Twardowski (1892), Marty and Husserl and by Frege himself in *Grundgesetze*<sup>8</sup>. The three way distinction between acts, sense or content and object for which Frege and Twar-

dowski argue are not easily comparable, above all because the two philosophers apply their distinctions to different although overlapping domains. Frege is mainly interested in assertions and their sub-sentential components, Twardowski is mainly interested in non-judgemental acts such as presentations and sub-sentential acts such as naming. However, in a series of papers written in the 1890s Husserl generalised the act/content/object distinction to take into account judgemental, non-judgemental and linguistic acts as well as their components (Husserl, 1979, see especially 303-356). With the appearance shortly after the turn of the century of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Meinong's *On Assumptions* completely generalised versions of the act/content/object distinction were available<sup>9</sup>.

The bewildering variety of Brentanist theories of the correlates of judgments - states of affairs - does not concern us directly here. It is enough for present purposes if we can extract from this tradition a criterion for distinguishing between judgments and states of affairs. And at least for the simplest type of judgement such a criterion is available. Jim's judgement that Jules is kissing Jane is made true by the obtaining state of affairs which we can name with the help of nominalised expression such as 'that Jules is kissing Jane' or 'Jules kissing Jane' - so runs the standard Brentanist-Cambridge account. Now the distinction between the judging and the state of affairs is that the latter but not the former contains perceivable spatio-temporal components. The criterion has a trivial and a non-trivial interpretation. On the trivial interpretation it applies to the two components of the state of affairs who are Jules and Jane. And few would want to deny that they, unlike the judgement about them, are perceivable. On the non-trivial interpretation that is exploited in particular by (early) Meinong and Husserl, our state of affairs contains a third perceivable, spatio-temporal component - a kiss or series of kisses. It is their commitment to components of this type<sup>10</sup> that allows Husserl and Meinong to postulate correlates peculiar to judgments as opposed to the correlates peculiar to acts such as ordinary naming or seeing (things). One attractive feature of this criterion is that it enables us to distinguish between judgments and states of affairs without committing us to any definite view of the ontological status of the latter<sup>11</sup>. Husserl, Stumpf and Meinong regarded the most basic sort of positive state of affairs as being, like abstract meaning entities, ideal, but as differing from these in not being multiply exemplifiable. (Although they are of course capable of multiple access). But it may be the case that what, for Husserl and Meinong, were components of the most basic sort of states of affairs - e.g. events, processes or states - can in fact do all the jobs that are required of states of affairs<sup>12</sup>.



### 3. The Components of Judging

Judgings are complex episodes which are non-repeatable and which, if Husserl and Meinong are right, instantiate universals. But in what sense are these episodes complex? According to the early Brentano and for all his pupils such episodes contain two sub-episodes - which they called the 'quality' and the 'content' or 'matter' of the act of judging. Some such distinction is to be found in nearly all twentieth century philosophy of language ('force or mode vs. radical'; 'tropics vs. neustics' etc). And some writers, such as Austin and Searle, are even prepared to talk, like the Brentanists, of constituent acts: the acts of asserting, of predicating, of naming can all be distinguished in the act of informing someone that p, according to Austin<sup>13</sup>. Now talk of components of acts can be taken more or less seriously. At least four different positions concerning what I have called the episode of judging can be distinguished. First, a philosopher may claim that

- (1) Jim judged that Jules was jubilant

is true if a substance, Jim, falls under a certain complex predicate. Such a philosopher might have no place in this ontology for episodes. And he is likely to cash out talk of act components in terms of the logical relations - such as incompatibility - between sentences such as (1) and sentences such as

- (2) Jim assumed that Jules was jubilant.

Second, a philosopher may claim that (1) is true if Jim falls under a certain complex predicate *and* exemplifies a certain complex universal. Such a philosopher might also dispense with episodes. Consider now a third position according to which (1) is made true by the occurrence of a non-repeatable episode, an episode which falls under various concepts, but which cannot have any parts (Bergmann and Grossman take mental acts to be unanalysable in something like this sense). The fourth position, which is that of the Brentanists, takes it to be the case that (1) is made true by the occurrence of an episode which consists of at least two sub-episodes: the act of judging and the occurrence of the matter or sense of this judging. The former does not belong to what makes (2) true; the latter is, on one interpretation, itself complex, consisting of an act of naming and an act of predication and might contribute to making either (1) or (2) true.

We shall shortly see that the Brentanists disagreed about the scope (a question of type A) of the terms 'quality' and 'matter' and about the way they relate to one another (a question of type C). But first it is important to see that the disagreement about whether a judging as a who-

le instantiates a universal leads to two further disagreements as to whether the two components of such a judgement instantiate universals. For Marty, of course, the parts of a judging are to be treated in the same nominalistic fashion as is the episode they constitute. Husserl, on the other hand, argues that the episode and each of its two parts *instantiate* universals. Husserl's claim is best understood by comparing it with that of Frege whose position is, with respect to the issue under discussion, intermediate between that of Marty and Husserl. A Fregean *Gedanke* can indeed be tied or linked to the real world of psychological episodes but it is not so tied by virtue of being instantiated. Rather, it is *exemplified* by a denizen of the real world, a judging. A *Gedanke* is recognized as being true, this is the activity of judging, which, unlike the *Gedanke*, is not repeatable. Just as a Fregean *Gedanke* has no instantiation, so a Fregean judging seems to instantiate no denizen of the third realm. Husserl fills these two gaps. Every judging instantiates a species judging. Every universal meaning entity can be instantiated (LI V, §§20-21) by a judgemental matter. In tabular form, the difference between Frege and Husserl looks like this:

#### Frege

repeatable:	<i>Gedanke</i>
non-repeatable:	judging grasping

#### Table I

#### Husserl

repeatable:	meaning species	judging species
non-repeatable:	act-matter	act-quality

#### Table II

It may help to understand Husserl's position if we briefly look at a non-psychological example of his distinctions. Consider a red table. On Husserl's view, both the table and *its* redness - what is often called a 'particularised property' or 'moment' - are non-repeatable denizens of the spatio-temporal world. Each instantiates a repeatable denizen of the third world: Table and Redness<sup>14</sup>.

Marty's nominalist account of the components of judgments is easily grasped against the background of Husserl's Platonist account<sup>15</sup>. If we simply eliminate the top line in Table II, we are left with Marty's account. Husserl's position, unlike that of Frege, has a nominalist counterpart. For all the Brentanists, judgments are at the very least 'parts or modi of the individual soul', which is just what Frege - in 'The Thought' - says his *Gedanken* are not.

#### 4. Matter and the Place of Negation

What is the matter of a judgment? The answers to this question given by the Brentanists fall into two groups, and reflect the biggest single disagreement within this tradition about the descriptive psychology of judging. Brentano, Marty, Bergmann and Stumpf adhere to what Chisholm calls a non-propositional account of judgments, Husserl, like Frege and most writers since, to a propositional account. For Husserl, but not for Brentano, the matter of a judgment is propositionally articulated. Meinong, as we shall see, wavered between these two positions.

The early Brentano thought that the matter of a judgment was a simple or complex presenting (*Vorstellung*). I judge that Jules exists when there supervenes on my presentation of Jules the quality of a judging. I judge that Jules is jubilant when there supervenes on my presentation of jubilant Jules the quality of a judging. On Husserl's account the scope of such judging is not anything whose verbal expression, in the assertion expressing my judgment, involves a nominalisation.

At the beginning of the *Begriffsschrift* (§2) Frege had pointed out that the circumstance that there are houses is a judgeable content which contains as a part the presentation 'house', which latter presentation is not a judgeable content. Now if we follow Frege's advice in the Preface to the first volume of the *Grundgesetze* and split this early notion of a judgeable content into two notions corresponding to the sense-reference distinction then one of the claims we will get will be: judgemental force can connect up with or govern what 'houses exist' expresses but not with what 'houses' expresses. Husserl agrees, Brentano and Marty disagree with this claim.

But in order to understand what the difference between the propositional and the non-propositional accounts of judging really amounts to we must consider another group of descriptive questions: Is negation a type of act quality, an act quality that we describe with the help of verbs such as 'negate', 'reject'? Or is negation's place elsewhere, namely as a part of the matter or sense of a judgment?

For Frege as for Husserl one of the marks of propositional sense or

matter is that it is essentially such that it may contain negation. Frege writes, «Thus negation attaches to content, whether or not this occurs as a judgement or not. I therefore regard it as more suitable to consider negation as a mark of a *judgeable content*», (*Begriffsschrift*, §4). If, as before, we translate this into a claim about the matter or sense of a judgment as opposed to its truth-making counterpart, we get Husserl's claim (see LI, VI, §39): «Difference between 'is' and 'is not' are differences in intentional matter»<sup>16</sup>.

Brentano denied that negation belonged to the matter of a judgment and constructed his theory of this type of psychological episode around the observation that negating is a type of judgemental quality. In particular, he claimed, negating, denying or rejecting (*Verwerfen*) and accepting (*Anerkennen*) are the two contrary sub-categories of the category 'judgement quality'. Brentano's claim that judging exhibits these polar opposites was part of a wide-reaching claim about all acts. For in his *Psychology* he argues that all emotional and volitional acts, states and attitudes exhibit a polar opposition between what he called 'loving' and 'hating' (and which we might equally well call 'pro' and 'contra' attitudes). But although emotional attitudes and judgments exhibit polar opposites, this is not true, on Brentano's account, of presentings.

The polarity view is defended by Marty against Frege in his review of the latter's *Begriffsschrift*<sup>17</sup>. It is attacked by Husserl in the long argument already referred to (LI, V, §20-43) which is designed to show that what Brentano calls 'accepting' has no polar opposite but does have a counterpart or type of act-quality which is coordinate with it-assumptions. But although there is an intimate connexion between the thesis that negation attaches to the matter of a judgment and the denial that judging comes in kinds, one of which is a denial, the most important reason Husserl gives for assigning negation to the matter part of a judgment rather than the quality part is that the matter of a judgment is propositionally articulated. The matter of a propositionally articulated judgment has an inner complexity that is not and cannot be possessed by a non-propositionally articulated matter. This type of complexity is described by Husserl in the fourth of his *Logical Investigations* where the different syntactic (logical) and lexical components of the matter or content of a judgment are investigated. Thus the content of a judgment may contain an expression of (or, in the absence of signs, their psychic counterpart) negation, implication, conjunction etc. If Husserl's distinction between propositionally articulated acts and non-propositionally articulated acts is not accepted then nothing prevents us from regarding negating as a type of act quality. And Husserl's distinction is a claim that is not restricted to the sphere of cognitive acts. For if he is right then emotional and volitional acts and states will exhibit the polar opposites Brenta-

no believed in if and only if they are not propositional. Thus love and hate will continue to be polar opposites. But striving for  $p$  and striving against  $p$  (resisting  $p$ ) will not be polar opposites. To strive against  $p$  will just be to strive to bring about not- $p$ .

Husserl sets out the descriptive claims about judgments he is committed to in the following passage from a review (of the aforementioned Bergmann, who adheres to the polarity thesis) written a few years after the appearance of his *Logical Investigations*.

18 We do not regard the matter [of a judgement] as a presentation, as it may have existed before the predicative articulation, nor is it any nominally expressible presentation. Nor do we regard the quality [of a judgement] as any sort of accepting or rejecting related to such a presentation... [N]ot only the matter in the traditional sense ( $S$ ,  $P$ ) but also all categorial forms, such as 'a', 'some', 'if' and 'then', and in particular 'is' and 'not' belong to the 'matter'. The 'is' is not by any means an expression of 'belief', nor is 'is not' the expression of a coordinated 'unbelief'. Rather, the character of positing or certainty belongs to the whole matter, whatever the articulation of the matter into different parts looks like. The usual expressions for this character: 'take to be true', 'belief'... suggest the false view that what we have is a predication of the truth, validity or correctness of the matter<sup>18</sup>, and in addition that here two coordinated qualities, a taking to be true and a taking to be false are to be distinguished. This last view, too, appears to me to be doubtful. Every (normal) proposition (*Aussage*) expresses a judgement, but every judgement also finds expression in a possible proposition. Now of course there are propositions that express a disbelief, a rejection... but only in the manner of predications that either say (*aussagen*) about the judging subject and his act 'I or someone else does not believe that, rejects it', or that say objectively about the relevant matter or sentence (*Satz*) that it is untrue, incorrect. In every case the expression of rejection, of dis-belief or untruth belongs to the matter of these propositions, and what makes them propositions is not the predicated disbelief but the character of conviction or 'belief' that so to speak informs this matter. Every putting forward of a proposition (*Aussagens*) is a 'belief'. Whether or not this view to which (after long hesitation) I incline, is definitive, it is in any case rooted in facts that require attention and clarifying investigation<sup>19</sup>.

## 5. Assumptions

Meinong denies that there are only two cognitive attitudes we may adopt towards the matter of a judging - acceptance and rejection. We may also, he insists, assume that something is the case. Husserl, too, argues that we may either judge or assume that something is the case. And Frege<sup>20</sup> clearly saw that a *Gedanke* may 'occur' in some sense without any judgemental or assertive force; it is possible to 'posit a case' without forming a judgement about it.

Meinong arrived at his category of assumptions by painstakingly confronting Brentano's theory of judgments and presentations with a variety of phenomena to which this theory could not do justice. Every time he uncovers an inadequacy he modifies the theory. Husserl arrived at his theory of assumptions by combining two descriptive claims - that the matter of a judging is propositionally articulated and that the quality-matter distinction is exhibited by both propositional and non-propositional acts - with a rigorous account of the different possible ways in which the parts of judgments could hang together (see §6). Meinong's opposition to Brentano's theory is mainly descriptive. Husserl's opposition has its roots in his theory of complexity in general and of complex acts in particular as well as in his descriptive psychology of judging.

Meinong noted that in simple expressions of wonder as well as in hypotheses and in lies the matter of the different acts is not associated with any judgemental quality but is simply assumed. To assume that something is the case is distinct from both presentation and judgement. In order to demonstrate this Meinong modifies the description of judging given by Brentano. First, he identifies the polarity between accepting and rejecting with what he calls the yes-no polarity. Secondly, he claims that in addition to exhibiting this polarity every judging exhibits a second feature, the presence of belief. It is then a small step to the claim that assumings are distinguished from judgments by the fact that they lack the moment of belief but, like judgments, exhibit the yes-no polarity. And assumings differ from presentations because the latter display no such polarity<sup>21</sup>.

Meinong's descriptions of assumings in all their variety lead him to modify Brentano's account by introducing a new basic type of psychological episode. But in fact Meinong accepts all the fundamental features of Brentano's account of judging. He, too, is committed to a non-propositional account of judging and so also of assuming. He, too, accepts that the quality of a judging comes in two opposed kinds.

Thus Meinong thinks, like Brentano, that the matter of a judging or of an assuming is a simple or complex presenting<sup>22</sup>. It is true that, in the course of writing *On Assumptions*, in particular in §34 and §59,



he discovers states of affairs, *Objektive*. But at no point in the first edition of his masterpiece does he suspect that, if judgments and assumings have their own special objectual correlates - an ugly but indispensable term if we are to have an English determinable corresponding to the German determinable *Gegenständlichkeit*, for the two determinate terms 'object' (or 'thing') and 'state of affairs' - it may be necessary to assign a quite different sort of matter to these acts than that possessed by presentings. Only in the second edition does Meinong hint that the matter of judgments and assumings may be of a quite different type than that of a presenting<sup>23</sup>. Meinong also thinks that judgments come in two kinds, acceptings and rejectings and simply carries over this claim to assumings. He is therefore committed to the following tree




Table III

Because of this commitment it was easy for Marty to argue that Meinong had played fast and loose with the logic of determinables and determinates (or genera and species)<sup>24</sup>. Marty compares Meinong's view to that of someone who asserts that red and blue can be found outside the genus colour<sup>25</sup>.

Because Marty and Brentano were unhappy with this type of tree structure they sought to show that Meinong's examples of assumptions could all safely be brought under a combination of their two fundamental categories of presenting and judging. If Jim assumes that Jules is jubilant he is, they claim, merely having a certain type of presentation, he has a presentation of someone who judges that Jules is jubilant. He must, Marty writes,

have a presentation of a judger, but only of a judger in general and this need not to be the object of any special concern<sup>26</sup>.

Now whatever the justification of the Brentano-Marty criticism of Meinong's claim that judging and assuming each have the same determinates (or species) - a criticism that results from their answers to questions of type C - their descriptive claim seems clearly wrong.

### The assertions

- (1) Jim assumes that Jules is jubilant.
- (2) Jim has a presentation of jubilant Jules.
- (3) Jim has a presentation of someone judging Jules to be jubilant.

all have different truth-conditions. Jim can clearly have a presentation of jubilant Jules without having a presentation of anyone else, no matter how 'general' or 'arbitrary'. Brentano's 'someone' seems superfluous.

Husserl's account of assumings involves rejecting the two fundamental claims of the Brentano-Marty theory that Meinong accepted. Husserl claims that judgments, like assumings, have a matter that it is not identical with any presentation, whether simple or complex. He also claims that judging has no polar opposite and so is not tempted to carry this view over to assumings. His main descriptive point in favour of these two claims concerns the analysis of presentings. Brentano and all his pupils, except Husserl, identify the matter or content of judgments with presentings. Jim has a presentation of jubilant Jim and this is the matter of his judgement that Jim is jubilant. But now, Husserl wonders, does this mean that presentations of Jim, of jubilant Jim or of Zeus do not exhibit the quality-matter distinction? Predications occur in judgments and in assumings, so why should we not also say that naming occurs in both positing and non-positing modes. When I refer to Jim by using his name and when I use the names 'Zeus' or 'Sherlock Holmes' I am in each case accomplishing a nominal act. But in the first case I take 'Jim' to name an existent something and in the second and third case I do not (normally) take my acts to name any existent object. Uses of proper names can vary in two dimensions, with respect to their matter or sense<sup>27</sup> and with respect to the presence or absence of existential presupposition. Husserl does not merely regard this point as a point about linguistic acts. My datable phantasy about Zeus and my taking Zeus to exist in a far-off country - at the age of seven - may differ in act-quality but have the same matter.

Husserl's descriptive claim cuts no ice with an adherent of the non-propositional theory of judging. For Brentano, Meinong and Marty a naming of Jim is just a judging, an existential judgement. It contains a presentation of Jim plus the recognition that Jim exists. I cannot, on this account, take Jim to exist unless I so judge. In order to bring out the difference between the two approaches it will be useful to see how they deal with a well-known problem.

In 1894, probably stimulated by Twardowski's book on the content

and object of presentations, Husserl raised the following questions. What, if anything, do I refer to in using the expression '[the] present French Emperor' (the example is Husserl's!)? And what does my use of this expression and the corresponding thought consist in? His answers to this question are set out in some detail in 1894<sup>28</sup> and in the *Logical Investigations* six years later.

He argues that uses of proper names and definite descriptions are not identical with any predications or judgments. I do not, in using the expression '[the] present French Emperor', by itself or as part of a sentence, assert either that the present French Emperor exists, or that he does not exist. If I use 'Jim' about someone I am convinced does exist, I do not thereby assert that he does exist<sup>29</sup>. For Brentano, of course, my judgement that Jim is jubilant contains the judgement that Jim exists. Uses of nominal expressions are actually judgements, just as they were to be for Russell. The key difference between the descriptions of Husserl and the early Brentano is that for the former both judgments and their constituents exhibit the quality-matter distinction whereas for the latter, only judgments and those of their constituents that are judgments exhibit this distinction. But notice that the extension of the Brentano-Marty-Stumpf-Kraus-Meinong term 'presentation' is the same as that of Husserl's 'non-positing, non-propositional act' - as when I think of Zeus without thinking that he is thus or so - although their intensions differ.

Husserl's account implies that my use of 'Jim' in 'Jim is jolly' to refer to someone of whose existence I am convinced and my use of 'Jim exists' in the same circumstances are two very different sorts of act. Brentano regards them as two expressions of one and the same act. We saw above that Frege and Husserl, unlike Brentano, were of the opinion that judging could govern the sense of 'houses exist' but not 'houses'. How does Husserl defend this apparently trivial difference?

He develops in the *Investigations* a theory of modification, in particular syntactic modification<sup>30</sup> that, amongst other things, is supposed to show why Brentano was wrong to assimilate positing uses of proper names to assertive uses of existential sentences. As in so many other cases it seems to have been Brentano who first directed his pupil's attention to the phenomenon of modification. But Brentano was primarily interested in semantic modification such as that which results when we pass from '-- is a king' to '-- is a deposed king'. Husserl studies a number of different types of syntactic modification, or as it is nowadays often called, transformation, such as sentence and predicate nominalisation and the mention (as opposed to the use) of an expression. He argues that the normal or unmodified and the abnormal or modified use of an expression have something in common, but that there is in every case a change of meaning. His account of

what a modified form and its unmodified counterpart have in common is based on the idea that what are now called syntactic features, as opposed to syntactic categories are preserved across transformations. Thus a use of 'redness' instantiates both the independent syntactic category Name and the dependent syntactic feature Adjective. The metaphor of 'having something in common' is most easily illustrated by reference to examples of semantic modification. 'Banknote' and 'forged banknote' have in common the semantic feature of [+made of paper].

Now in Brentano's famous reduction of categorical to existential judgements he had explicitly claimed that

every categorical sentence (*Satz*) can be translated, without any change of sense, into an existential sentence<sup>31</sup>.

Husserl's claim is that in the case of existential sentences, as in the case of the mention of a name, some modification of meaning is involved. Existential sentences contain modifications of ordinary uses of nominal expressions. And because «a predication (*Aussage*, proposition) can never function as a name, nor a name as a predication without a modification of its existential nature» (LI, V, §36) the Brentano-Marty-Meinong account of presentations and of their nominal expressions must be rejected. But of course Husserl's argument shows at best that there are a number of syntactic distinctions that Brentano's theory does not, as it stands, account for. (Compare Husserl's cautious remark at the end of the long quotation at the close of Section 4 above.) It does not show that they can only be dealt with by distinguishing between propositionally and non-propositionally articulated acts, a distinction Brentano rejects.

The falsity of an assertion containing 'the present Emperor of France' (uttered in 1894) follows, then, for Brentano, as it was to follow for Russell, from the falsity of one of its constituent assertions. But this route is not open to Husserl. How then can he say, «that propositions containing positing names should be true, and that the existential judgements which correspond to such names should be false, involves an *a priori* inconsistency» (LI, V, §35)? He appeals, by way of an answer, to his distinction between the actual judging-episode and its internal structure, on the one hand, and the abstract meaning-entities these instantiate, on the other hand. We are told not to confuse «the real meaning analysis, that searches for what is actually implied» (*das aktuell Implizierte*) by the use of a nominal expression and «logical analysis, that aims at what is implied in the sense of the sentence (*Satz*), what can be logically inferred from it» (*das logisch zu Folgernde*)<sup>32</sup>. His point, I think, is that although the use of a nominal expression such as 'the present Emperor of France' (or 'the re-

ness of this table') neither is nor contains any assertion, the abstract meaning-entity it instantiates 'contains' an ideal judgement, 'the present Emperor of France exists' (or 'this table is red') which is true or false. Thus he writes elsewhere

'The Emperor', 'this house' etc. are not existential sentences (*Sätze*), because they are not any sort of sentence. They posit in nominal fashion objects, they do not posit in propositional fashion states of affairs. To every positing name there corresponds, ideally and logically, a possible equivalent existential sentence...<sup>33</sup>

Since Husserl claims that one of the advantages of carrying through the quality-matter distinction for both propositional, sub-propositional and non-propositional acts is that it enable him to do justice to many more cases than the accounts of Brentano's other heirs, let us look briefly at some of the possibilities of his account.

A propositional matter may come clothed either assertively or as an assumption. We might preface the expression of the first with Frege's assertion sign and the expression of the second with an assumption sign<sup>34</sup>. Now we may define a very narrow notion of assertion as being such that if the matter or sense as a whole is combined with assertive force then every nominal component of this matter has a positing force. Then if I assert that Mary loves Jim I, in so doing, take both Mary and Jim to exist. If we carry over this narrow notion of assertion to assumption we get the claim, which is obviously inadequate to most cases of assumption or wondering, that if I assume *aRb* then I assume *a* and *b* to exist. This does not allow us to capture examples such as Meinong's case where I assume that the Boers won the war. At least in the case of the proper name, what we normally have here is a positing nominal act, I take the Boers to exist in assuming or hypothesizing that they won the war. Let us call the narrow notion of assertion or assumption the homogenous view. Husserl gives the following example of a non-homogenous case of assertion. I am looking at a picture and, although I do not take the represented objects to exist, I make judgements about them. Here the quality of my nominal acts is of a different sign to that of the entire propositional act<sup>35</sup>.

We have looked briefly at a number of disagreements between Brentano and his heirs concerning the intension and extension of the 'quality' and the 'matter' (or 'sense') of judgments and connected acts. But their most basic disagreements concern questions of type C: What does it mean to say that judgments contain the two parts quality and matter? And how do such parts hang together? Wie kommt der Satzverband zustande<sup>36</sup>?

## 6. How do the Parts of Judgments Hang Together?

Brentano and his pupils realized only gradually that the notions of structure they appealed to in the course of their early work on descriptive psychology and ontology could be made the subject of investigation for their own sake. Husserl's third logical investigation, on the theory of parts and wholes, Meinong's theory of objects and Brentano's theory of the part-whole relation as set out in his *Theory of Categories* and his posthumously published *Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum* are the highpoints of this reflection on the nature of structure and relations<sup>37</sup>.

Three types of relation are employed in their writings on the structure of judgments: the relation of existential dependence (*Abhängigkeit, Fundierung*), the part-whole relation of containment, the relation between genera and species or between determinables and determinates (sometimes called the relation of 'logical parthood').

The early theory of judgments defended by Brentano and Marty asserts that instances of the determinable 'judgement quality' that is to say, of the two determinates 'accepting' and 'rejecting' are one-sidedly dependent on presentations. Judgemental quality supervenes on simple or complex presentations - the latter can occur without the former but judgments necessarily co-occur with presentations. If we write nominal expressions for these two types of episode within the frames to signify that instances of the type named are independent and read broken frames as signifying that instances of the entity named within the broken frame are dependent, then the relation of one-sided dependence between Brentanist judgement quality and presentations can be represented as in Figure 1.



Fig. 1

By virtue of the specification relation obtaining between 'quality' and its two determinates we can also read off two further one-sided dependence relations. By combining Table III with Figure 1 we can also read off the four relations of one-sided dependence that, according to Meinong, connect judgemental and assumptive acceptings and denyings with their presentational bases.

The structure of judgments (cf. (P1) in Section 1 above) on this early view of Brentano, is isomorphic with the syntactic structure of the corresponding sentence or proposition (cf. (P2) above). The latter comes about when an independent nominal expression is 'completed' (*ergänzt*, Frege's word) by being combined with a judgement sign -



either 'is' or 'is not'. The latter are dependent or syncategorematic signs<sup>38</sup>.

On Brentano's early view the matter of a judging might be a quite complex presentation. The presentation on which a judging that Jules is jubilant is based can be expressed as 'jubilant Jules'. Brentano, however, soon replaced this early theory by his theory of the 'double judgement', and was followed in this by Marty<sup>39</sup>. The first theory is now declared to be adequate only for the analysis of existential sentences. In the case of more complex judgements we must distinguish between the accepting (*Anerkennung*) e.g. that Jules exists and a supervenient predication or attribution (*Zuerkennen*) e.g. of jubilation to Jules. The act of accepting may also be completed by an act of denying something of something (*Absprechen*). Now as Kraus points out<sup>40</sup> this new account means that 'Jules is jubilant' undergoes a 'modification of sense' when presented as 'Jubilant Jules is' whereas on the old account, as we have seen, this latter type of expression was held to involve no modification. On the new account, 'Jules is jubilant' is regarded as the unmodified way of expressing a composite or complex judgement. What is, then, the form of an act of judging that Jules is jubilant? We must bear in mind that each of the two judgement qualities is dependent on a presentation, the accepting of Jules on a presentation of Jules, the attribution of jubilation on a presentation thereof. And since Brentano's later theory, like his earlier theory, is a one or two name (or more exactly a n-name) theory of predication, presentations like their nominal expressions are independent of one another<sup>41</sup>. We may, I think, represent the structure of the most common type of double judgement as follows:




Fig. 2

It will be apparent that relations of one-sided dependence are invoked constantly by Brentano, Marty and Meinong. Husserl, because of his descriptive disagreements with the latter about the nature of presentations, is able to argue that there is a relation of two-sided dependence between act-quality and act-matter<sup>42</sup>.




Fig. 3

Because these two components of judgings, assumings, presentings, etc. are reciprocally dependent, Husserl's tree of act-qualities avoids the criticism Marty had levelled at Meinong. The latter was committed to the view that the two types, assuming and judging, were each specified by affirming and negating (see Table III). Husserl's tree looks like this




Table IV<sup>43</sup>

At first glance, Husserl seems to be making the same mistake as Meinong. Both allow different types to be specified by the same species. But there is a difference between their two positions. The determinates specifying 'positing' and 'non-positing' are obtained by explicit cross-categorisation, by reference to the types of matter with which types of act-quality can combine. Meinong's tree involved no cross-categorisation, since every term in his tree is a type of act quality. Nevertheless, Husserl is open to another criticism Marty had levelled at Meinong. The latter had characterised assumings both negatively and positively: assumings lack belief but exhibit the yes-no polarity. But, Marty argues,

no inner difference can be specified, by means of which assumptions and judgements would be qualified as species of the same genus and would be distinguished from one another. For the character of conviction and its lack, which Meinong refers to as that which distinguishes between assumptions and judgements cannot be such an inner difference (Marty, 1976, 245)

Meinong's reaction to Marty's criticism consists in effect in the claim that no-one really knows what genus-species relations really are<sup>44</sup>. Husserl's somewhat more systematic reflections on tree theory and the relation of dependence had led him in the *Logical Investigations*



to put forward what are two different replies to objections such as those of Marty.

The first such reply makes use of the relation of ontological exclusion, a close relative of the relation of dependence. The most familiar example of this relation is the case of the red-coloured patch in the visual field and the exclusion relation between its redness and, say, greenness. Greenness and redness cannot both be immediately dependent on one and the visual extent at the same time. Another example mentioned by Husserl is provided by the examples of grammatical incompatibility within the matter of an assertion<sup>45</sup>.

On Husserl's view, the occurrence of an act of assuming that *p* excludes the simultaneous occurrence of a propositional positing act connected with the same matter. And, we may say, uses of the verb 'assume' are characterised by the feature [-positing]. For Husserl's account can be compared with what the phonologist says about the occurrence of a phoneme, that it is characterised by the necessary presence and absence of certain determinate features<sup>46</sup>. One virtue of Husserl's talk of 'positing' and 'non-positing' as features of cognitive acts only became apparent as a result of the work of his student Reinach on the theory of judgement. Reinach - stimulated by the theories of Husserl and Meinong, particularly the latter's distinction between passive presentations and active or spontaneous intendings (*Meinen*) pointed out an important ambiguity in terms such as 'belief' and 'conviction' which had often been used as synonyms for 'judging' by the Brentanists and by the British empiricists before them. Belief, unlike judging, is not a temporal episode but endures for a period of time. 'Positing' is therefore a useful determinable for both episodic judgments and temporally extended beliefs. Judgments are one-sidedly dependent on beliefs but are not identical with these<sup>47</sup>.

It would be more accurate to say belief is a disposition than a state. Are assumings based on an underlying state (or disposition)? Reinach suggests that there are states of disbelief and these, I suggest, provide at least some assumings with a basis, comparable to the basis belief or disbelief provide for judgments. But other cases of assuming, as when I decide to assume *p* either in spite of the fact that I believe *p*, or in the absence of any belief or disbelief that *p* - cases which are perhaps more characteristic of the level of linguistic action than of the level of mental acts - lack entirely any underlying state or disposition. Interestingly, Reinach's account of disbelief involves resurrecting the idea of polar opposition - between belief and disbelief - at the level of states (or dispositions), whilst rejecting any such opposition at the level of episodes<sup>48</sup>.

Husserl's second reply to the objection that the absence of a feature

does not suffice to differentiate two species of the genus act-quality invokes the relation we have already met, modification. In addition to syntactic and semantic modification he appeals to what can be called act-modification. I can, as we have seen, deliberately modify my judging to the effect that *p* and assume that *p*, or hypothesize that *p*. If non-positing acts are regarded as modifications of positing acts then, as Marty points out, «they do not involve a complete lack of this moment» (Marty, 1908, 245). Marty declares himself happy with this interpretation. But I doubt whether it is an accurate interpretation of Husserl's view, although it is certainly suggested by some passages. The main problem with the view Marty attributes to Husserl concerns a peculiar feature of the 'relation' of modification. Modification may, as in the example I have just described, take us from one act (a judging) to another (an assuming) but this real transition is not a necessary feature of the occurrence of modified acts. No one would suggest that a use of a (non-Russellian) definite description such as 'the redness of that table', which certainly exhibits syntactic modification, must have actually been preceded by a use of the unmodified sentence 'that table is red'. (Although some transformational grammarians occasionally seem to want to say something like this.)

The next basic relation appealed to by the Brentanists is the part-whole relation of constituency or containment. We have already implicitly made use of this relation in saying, with the Brentanists, that judgments necessarily contain a quality component and a matter component. Husserl, in his third logical investigation, was the first Brentanist to clearly distinguish between containment and dependence and the uses to which he puts this distinction in his account of judging provide some of the best arguments for making such a distinction.

Brentano and Marty, we know, make extensive use of the idea that judgments contain various components standing to one another in relations of dependence. But what account can they give, Husserl asks, of the unity of a judgement? How can they do justice to our intuition that, when Jim judges (or asserts) that Jules is jubilant, One judgement has been made (One thing has been said)?

He objects to the Brentano-Marty theory of double judgements that although it makes out a categorical judgement to be a «*sui generis* intertwining of elementary judgements» it overlooks the fact that such a judgement believes - or as we should now say, posits - «as a whole, and believes something as a whole». «In this [Brentano-Marty] theory the distinction between two fundamentally different concepts of matter is lost: matter as correlate of belief [Husserl uses the English word], as the unity of what is believed (e.g. as the sense of the stated (*ausgesagten*) sentence (*Satz*)). . . and on the other hand matter as the aggregate (*Inbegriff*) of the 'terms' in contrast to the uni-

ying categorial forms of the sentence (a, some, all, is, not etc.)»<sup>49</sup>. Husserl can do justice to the intuition that One thing is said because he distinguishes between (a) the dependence relation linking the act-quality of judging and the propositional matter it governs as a whole, and (b) the constituents of this matter, as well as the dependence relations they enter into. Let us consider again Jim's judgement that Jules is jubilant, and let us assume that the syntactic analysis of the matter of this judgement or the sense of the corresponding sentence) adopted by Frege, if not by Husserl, is correct. On this analysis the sense of the verbal phrase is one-sidedly dependent on that of the nominal phrase<sup>50</sup>. Sentence sense or the matters of judgments have the category *S*, noun phrases the category *N* and verb phrases the category *S/N*. Then, according to Husserl, a cross-section through a simple syntactico-semantic machine in action, would look like this:




Fig. 4

Here the quality of judging is shown to govern the entire propositional matter thus reflecting the intuition that Jim judges (or says) One thing<sup>51</sup>. Notice that although quality and matter stand in a relation of bilateral dependence this only licenses us to assert that an instance of judging is one-sidedly dependent on some matter. In contrast to the Brentano-Marty view - see Figure 1 above - there is no isomorphism between the structure of the act as a whole and the structure of its sense and expression. On Husserl's view the complexity of acts and the logical complexity of their matters or senses do not mirror one another (cf. P1 and P2 in Section 1). This is true first of all because of the whole-part relation obtaining between a propositionally articulated matter and its components. And, secondly, because Husserl's theory allows for a variety of different dependence and constituency relations to obtain between these components.

Figure 4 represents only the structure of a simple positive sentential act. Some measure of the potential of Husserl's theory can be gained by considering his account of the internal structure of the sense of a

negative or a conditional sentence. In order to do justice to the idea that in a judgement, no matter how complicated, only One thing is said, Husserl must deny that there is more than one propositionally articulated sense per judgement. And he does claim that every propositional matter is correlated with only one act-quality (see especially LI, V, §42). He is able to make this claim by invoking his theory of modification. The matter of an assertion of a negative or conditional sentence, according to Husserl, contains a dependence relation between, on the one hand, expressions of the formal elements in a sentence, and on the other hand, modified or nominalised expressions of its material elements<sup>52</sup>. If Jim judges that Jules is not jubilant then the propositional matter governed by his judging and which is of category *S* has the following internal structure:

modified propositional matter of category *N*




Fig. 5

Similarly, the internal structure of the sense of a judgement to the effect that if Jules is jubilant than Sally is sad, will be:

propositional matter of category *S*




Fig. 6

The usefulness of the dependence-constituency distinction also becomes apparent when one bears in mind that most noun phrases and nominal compounds ('anaphoric islands') and verb phrases are internally complex and contain parts that stand in dependence relations to one another.

Some awareness of the dependence-constituency distinction may have been responsible for a modification of Brentano's double judgement theory put forward by Marty in 1910 and subsequently rejected. If we replace 'predication' by 'denying' - not to be confused with 'rejection' - in Figure 2, we get another basic type of double judgement. Although Marty originally accepted a polar opposition between predicating and denying as well as between accepting and rejecting, he was later tempted by the possibility of allowing for polarity

at only one level. He suggests that predicatings, unlike simple judgments, do not come in two opposed types. Rather, the negative judgement 'this leaf is not green' is to be analysed as consisting of an acceptance of this leaf and of the rejection of the complex judgement in which being green is attributed to this leaf. *A* is something of which it is false that it is *B*. Making use of the constituency-dependence distinction, we can represent what may have been his view as follows:




Fig. 7

Since he did not favour a clear distinction between dependence and constituency, it is not surprising that he quickly returned to Brentano's view that predication does after all, like acceptance, have a polar opposite<sup>53</sup>.


All the examples of constituency and dependence we have come across so far have been cases in which the relata of these relations have been episodes, or temporal entities. Brentano's radical re-thinking of his ontological commitments around the turn of the century led him to give an account of judgments and related acts according to which the containment relation no longer relates episodes but substances.

After giving to the philosophical world the idea summed up in the opening line of the *Tractatus* - the claim that the world is everything that is in the case - Brentano came to adopt the position described and rejected in the second line of the *Tractatus* - the claim that the world is the totality of things (which is itself a thing). If there are only things - and so no states of affairs, episodes, properties (whether individual or particular) etc. - then there can be no judgments. What becomes of judgments in Brentano's reist ontology? They must be treated as things, to be exact: judges. In order to carry through this reduction Brentano does two things. First, by means of what Chisholm has nicely called 'concrete predication'<sup>54</sup>, he translates all expressions that seem to correspond to episodes, such as 'accepts', 'rejects', 'predicates', into expressions that refer to things, 'acce-

ptor', 'rejector', 'predicator'. With the help of nominalisations such as 'a red thing acceptor' Brentano can then restate the account given above - see Figures 1 and 2 - of dependence relations between episodes in terms of containment relations between suitably qualified animate substances. Thus Jim (a) is a Jules-presenter (b), a Jules-acceptor (c), a jubilant-someone-presenter (d) (or should we say, 'a jubilant-Jules-presenter'?) and a jubilancy-predicator (e) (or should we say 'Jules-which-is-jubilant-predicator'?). The two alternative nominals in brackets are the two formulations favoured by Chisholm, and there is textual evidence to support this reading. But I think that only an expression such as 'jubilant-someone-presenter' does justice to Brentano's *n*-name theory of predication. The alternative nominal expressions put into the names that which is supposed to bind them together. On Brentano's view, what makes Jim's attribution of jubilancy to Jules an attribution to Jules rather than to James is the fact that there is an attribution by Jim that links his presentation of a jubilant someone to his acceptance of Jules. This presentation of a jubilant someone - unlike a presentation of jubilant Jules - is independent of any presentation of Jules.

How do the various things named by all these curious names hang together? On Brentano's onion theory, they relate to one another (*sich zueinander verhalten*) as follows:

Predicator e.g. (e),  
presenter<sub>2</sub> e.g. (d),  
acceptor<sub>2</sub> e.g. (c),  
presenter<sub>1</sub> e.g. (b),  
animate substance e.g. (a).



The containment relation represented by enclosed boxes is in every case one-sided necessary containment, with one exception, flagged by giving box (d) dotted sides. It will be remembered that, as Figure 2 brings out, presentings are independent of other presentings, as uses of names are, for Brentano, independent of uses of other names. The relation between a presenter and an acceptor can only be the relation of accidental containment<sup>55</sup>.

There is a well-known historical cliché about theories of judgement in the wake of Brentano that goes as follows. Brentano and his pupils were guilty of Psychologism; this was demonstrated by Husserl who, much like Frege, showed that Psychologism involves denying the existence of abstract, multiply exemplifiable meaning-entities. Meinong followed Husserl, unlike Brentano and Marty who remained guilty of Psychologism. This story is a tissue of myths, although Brentano and his pupils never went as far as they might have done in making this clear.

Quite independently of whether they accepted Gedanken-like entities Brentano and all his heirs accepted that judgments and related phenomena stood in various non-accidental relations. We have briefly looked at some of these relations above. It is true that Husserl, for example, thought that necessary connections and (a variety of) Platonism required one another. But whether or not he is right about this<sup>56</sup> it remains a fact that all the Brentanists accepted at least the existence of necessary relations such as that between judgments and presentings. And in this sense none of them were ever guilty of Psychologism.

# Notes

\* A talk given at the 1984 Trieste/Bologna Conference on the Brentano School.

1. Cf. Höfler (1890, §6).
2. Husserl (1894) 'Intentionale Gegenstände', now in Husserl (1979, 340); cf. LI, V, §2.
3. To admit such a causal connexion is *not*, as the Brentanists were fully aware, to identify intentional with causal relations: both sorts of relation contribute to the structure of reference, assertion or emotion.
4. Geach (1981, 255).
5. Stumpf (1924, 36). This is confirmed by Marty, see Brentano (1966, 223).
6. In the same passage Bergmann shows a clear understanding of the notion of an assumed, as opposed to a judged or asserted thought and of truth-making. Husserl, in a review of Bergmann, is clearly aware of the latter's many merits (see Husserl, 1979, 162-200).
7. Cf. Gabriel (1986).
8. On pre-1892 anticipations of the sense-reference distinction in Frege see Angelelli, 1967, 38ff. Twardowski points out that both Bolzano (*Wissenschaftslehre*, §49) and his pupil Zimmermann (1867, §18, §26) had distinguished between content and object (Twardowski, 1982, 17). Höfler relates that the distinction between content and object that is touched on in §6 of the *Logik* (1890) he had written with Meinong's help would have been developed more fully had it not been for Brentano. For when Höfler in 1885/86 urged on Brentano the importance of making this distinction his teacher's reply was sceptical and discouraging (Höfler, 1930, 30).
9. Meinong drew the distinction between the content and the object of a presentation in his 1899. As already noted, he was subsequently to postulate *Objektive* which straddle the line between sense and state of affairs.
10. On these controversial entities see (ed.) Barry Smith (1982), Mulligan,

Simons and Smith (1984). Marty initially allowed for these entities in his ontology, and then rejected them; see Marty (1918, 251).

11. Cf. Mulligan (1980), Heinrich (1910).
12. See Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984).
13. See *How to do Things with Words*, 90-93; Mulligan (1987).
14. This analogy is actually mentioned by Husserl himself at LI, I, §34.
15. Marty's term for Husserl's position (Marty, 1908, 338), a term the latter does not accept (Husserl, 1979, 263).
16. Cf. also LI, V, §40. Contrast TLP 4.064.
17. Marty (1894), now in Marty (1918).
18. Is Husserl perhaps thinking here of Frege?
19. Husserl (1903), now in Husserl (1979, 187-88).
20. See 'Function and Concept'. But see note 52.
21. Meinong (1977, §1-2).
22. Meinong (1977, §59).
23. Meinong (1977, 86, 341-42); trans. (66-67, 243-244); cf. Grossman (1974, 197).
24. I do not want here to go into the nature of the difference, if any, between determinable-determinate trees and genera-species trees, nor into the question just what sort of tree gerunds such as 'judging' slot into. It is, however, worth noting that the philosophy of language and ontology of the Brentanists take tree structures seriously and devote a lot of attention to distinguishing tree structures from related but distinct types of structure. See Section 6 below.
25. Marty (1976, 245).
26. Marty (1920, §14). See also Brentano (1971, Anhang V). Once Brentano's descriptive claim is accepted, the way is open to his very subtle account of, e.g., indirect speech in terms of his distinction between presentations *in recto* and *in obliquo*. This hitherto ignored account, which is at least as subtle as that of Frege, has perhaps only never been compared with the latter's theory because of the very different ontological status the two writers accord thoughts.
27. On Husserl account of the sense of proper names see Mulligan and Smith (1986).
28. 'Intentionale Gegenstände', now in Husserl (1979).
29. LI, V, §34.
30. But also of semantic (=lexical) and act modification. See LI, IV, V, §36. On this theory, see Mulligan (1986).
31. Brentano (1971, chapter 7, §7).
32. Husserl (1904), now in Husserl (1979, 256). Cf. Russell (1973, 124): 'My theory of descriptions was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions'. And on non-propositional belief see 'On Propositions', a paper Russell wrote after emerging from prison, where he had had Husserl's *Logical Investigations* for company - now in Russell, (1956, 307).



33. Husserl (*ibid.*, 245-46).
34. Cf. Bell (1979, ch. III).
35. Another more important heterogeneous case is the assertion of a negative existential. Here the nominal term, but not the propositional matter, has a non-positing force. Cf. Husserl LU V, §34.
36. I suspect that Wittgenstein's wording of this question (TLP 4.221) refers to the genetic problem, how does it come about the sentential or judgemental unity arises?, and not to the descriptive question, how do the parts of a judgement actually hang together? Certainly, the Brentanists used expressions cognate with that of Wittgenstein to refer to both problems. (See, e.g., Marty, 1965, on the *Urteilsverband*, or Brentano's talk of how an *Urteil zustande kommt*, at Brentano, 1956, §27. And see Mulligan, 1985). And of course, they sharply distinguished between the two problems.
37. On these theories, see Smith and Mulligan (1982), Mulligan and Smith (1988).
38. Brentano (1956, §27).
39. See the remark appended to Brentano (1899), now in Brentano (1971, 193-94); Brentano (1911), now in Brentano (1971); Brentano (1956, §§30-31). Marty adopts and defends the new theory in the fourth of his articles on impersonal sentences and the relation of grammar to logic and psychology (1894), now in Marty (1918, GW II. 1), and subsequently. See also on the later theory Hillebrand (1891).
40. See his note to Brentano (1971, 300).
41. Cf. Brentano (1971, 191): «One can just as truly say 'a bird is black', as 'something black is a bird'; 'Socrates is a man' as 'a man is Socrates'». (I have inserted quotation marks here.) Brentano goes on to agree with Aristotle that only the first predication in each case is natural. But it is not clear to me exactly what the connexion is between what Brentano (and Marty) say about unnatural predications - which anticipates much later work on the topic/comment distinction - and the notion of meaning modification.
42. 'Act-quality' is here taken to range over cognitive acts; like the other Brentanists Husserl held fast to the view that emotions and desires are act-qualities that are one-sidedly dependent on their bases, which are cognitive acts and their matters.
43. I ignore the interesting question whether verbs which can take both a propositional and a non-propositional complement - 'seeing that *p*' (epistemic seeing) and 'seeing *a*' (simple seeing) - correspond to different acts. Clearly most seeings that *p* contains some seeing of an *a*. But this containment relation does not by itself justify the conclusion that the verb 'seeing' is univocal, nor the conclusion that only one type of act is involved.
44. Meinong (1977, §64).

45. See LI, III, §10.

46. On exclusion in phonology see Mulligan (1988). Husserl must, however, use more than the notion of exclusion to explain his distinction between 'propositional' and 'non-propositional' matters. In order to explain this distinction it would be necessary to go into Husserl's account of formal concepts, such as Negation, Sentence and Name. This account rejects two theses dear to Brentano, since it claims that formal concepts do not have their roots in intuition - unlike material concepts - and that such concepts do not stand in determinable-determinate trees. This account is explored in Mulligan (1980).
47. See Reinach (1911).
48. See Mulligan (1986).
49. Husserl (1904), now in Husserl (1979, 245-246). When Marty comes to deal with Husserl's objections to the Brentano-Marty theory of judging - Marty (1965, 162ff) - he fails to mention this objection.
50. Husserl, like Lesniewski, in fact adhered, to the two-name analysis, N S/NN N. Later he argued that noun phrases and verb phrases are mutually dependent on one another. See the Appendix to Husserl (1974).
51. Dummett, following Frege, has recently argued against Wittgenstein that this intuition can be defended, indeed must be defended if a theory of meaning is to get off the ground. The Brentanists all thought that types of act quality are uniform and that the corresponding verbs are univocal - a claim denied by Wittgenstein. Husserl, alone, takes the further step of showing that, in a sentential act One thing is said. His arguments support, I believe, Dummett's contention that sentences, unlike pictures, say just one thing. See Dummett (1981). Husserl's account can be extended to deal with the uniform force of speech acts, as Reinach has shown. See Reinach (1913), and on this Mulligan (1987).
52. This feature of Husserl's categorial grammar was first taken seriously by Gardies (1975, ch. 8; English translation 1986, ch. 8). Notice that for Husserl an occurrence of *p* (e.g. as the antecedent of a conditional) is not an assumption that *p*, since in the former case *p* is nominalised.
53. Cf. Marty (1910, 62); Marty (1965, 149-152).
54. See Chisholm 'Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident' and 'Brentano's Theory of Judgement', now in Chisholm (1982). Above and in what follows, I adopt in large measure Chisholm's terminological suggestions. He, however, translates *Vorstellung* as 'idea', a translation often explicitly accepted by the Brentanists. I have preferred 'presentation' and 'presenting' in order to be able to distinguish here between act-quality and act-matter.
55. Husserl's third logical investigation allows for the dependence and containment relations to be necessary, for accidental containment relations, and for cases where these relations link either substances, episodes or states and some combinations of these. However, he considers all such rela-

Tab

tions to be generic - e.g. every judgement episode necessarily contains some presentation - and does not distinguish clearly between a generic relation and a specific dependence relation - e.g. the case where this judgement necessarily contains this presentation. This has as a consequence that he cannot allow for the case where a specific dependence relation obtains that is not an instance of a generic dependence relation. As a possible example of such a case consider the following. My illuminating the room at  $t_1$  may specifically depend on my turning the switch yet although it is generically excluded that anyone turn on a switch by illuminating a room the specific dependence relation described does not obtain in virtue of any generic necessary dependence relation between illuminating rooms and turning switches. On the specific/generic distinction, see Ingarden (1974, 18ff), Simons (1982), Johansson (1986), Mulligan (1987).

56. And it is worth remembering that Frege combined Platonism with a resolute rejection of the varieties of necessary connexion in which the Brentanists delighted.

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## PERCEPTION, REPRESENTATION AND PERSUASION IN THE SCIENTIFIC WORK OF VITTORIO BENUSSI (\*)

by Natale Stucchi

### 1. Foreword

Benussi's theory of perceptual processes has been often identified (see for example Köhler, 1913; Koffka, 1915) with the positions of Alexius Meinong and Stephan Witasek, the most authoritative representatives of the Graz School. This opinion is only partly true. Benussi, in fact, although remaining by right one of the members of the Graz group, has conquered gradually a theoretical autonomy of his own, getting near Husserl's phenomenology in the field of perception and maturing a position of functionalistic kind in the field of general psychology.

Unfortunately, Benussi's theoretical formulations did not have the influence they deserved because of the convergence of many adverse circumstances: his hermetic and objectively difficult style, the inclination not to show himself, typical of his character of scientist (Musatti, 1957; De Sanctis, 1929: «Benussi behaves like a cuttle-fish»), his premature death, the precarious situation of psychology and of the Italian culture under Fascism.

This is why the study of Benussi's work can present some surprises: the attempt of a historical reconstruction, almost a homage due to a great «forgotten man» of the past (Boring, 1950, II ed., 455) could transform itself in a critical and stimulating resumption of a still fertile thinking.

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