



EURYKA

Reinventing Democracy in Europe: Youth Doing Politics in Times of Increasing Inequalities

Publishable Synthesis of Project's Main Findings



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1. Introduction

The EURYKA project was implemented from February 2017 till January 2020. This EU-funded (Horizon 2020) project gathered ten partners across Europe to investigate the conditions, processes, and mechanisms underpinning how young people do politics in times of increasing inequalities, with the aim of suggesting novel democratic models to help reimagine a more inclusive European politics and therefore strengthening European democratic life. At the core of EURYKA's conceptual framework lied the idea of youth political participation as forms of coping mechanism for dealing with inequalities. It thus investigated the norms, values, attitudes and behaviours underpinning such mechanisms and how these relate to issues of democracy, power, politics, policy-making, social and political participation (online and offline), and the organization of economic, social, and private life.

EURYKA was primarily based on a multidimensional theoretical framework that combines macro-level (institutional), meso-level (organizational), and micro-level (individual) explanatory factors, while accounting for the complexity of youth experience of inequalities and the differential aspects of how young people do politics in Europe. Also, EURYKA utilized a cross-national comparative design that includes European countries with different degrees of exposure to inequalities and different policy regimes (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom).

EURYKA undertook the following work packages (WPs):

Policy analysis: Tracking public policies and practices which promote youth participation and inclusion in each country as well as at the EU level.

Political claims analysis: Studying how young people and their particular ways of doing politics are dealt with in the media, as well as the presence of organized youth in the public domain and the claims for new democratic models and social and political change they raise in each country.

Organizational analysis: Investigating youth political participation by examining the networks and (youth-led) organizations that are active in the fields of youth inclusion, participation, national and transnational democratic innovation and experimentation.

Panel survey analysis: Causally disentangling the different forms of youth political participation: retrieving their norms, values, attitudes, expectations, and behaviors regarding democracy, power, politics, policy-making as well as social and political participation (online and offline) and the organization of economic, social and private life, as well as their individual characteristics that might be associated with that.

Experimental analysis: Testing hypothesized causal mechanisms on young people's experience of inequalities and their support and potential for social and political change to strengthen democratic life, especially those that may include avenues for reimagining democracy in Europe.

Biographical analysis: Examining the individual trajectories of young people since their childhood to investigate how they influence young people's ways of doing politics and how inequalities are lived by, and (re-)acted upon, by individual young people in different countries and socio-economic contexts.

Social media analysis: Investigating youth political participation online and the impact of inequalities on this by examining the use young people make of social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and how digital participation and representation may (or may not) provide the seeds for reinvigorating democracy in Europe.

Given the multidimensional character of the project and its multiple methodologies (combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques), EURYKA produced a variety of research findings. To mention a few: young people often lack both institutional and discursive opportunities for participation; they often are skeptical of traditional politics, but many participate in less institutionalized forms; socialization processes are key to understanding their participation or lack thereof; and, for those who do participate, this participation has a deep personal impact. Further results as well as more information about the projects and its outputs can be found at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka.

2. Key findings and conclusions of the research work packages

2.1. Work package 1 - Policy analysis

The analysis of policies which influence the political, societal, and cultural activism of young people allows us to propose some specific conclusions regarding the extent to which respective policies provide special treatment for young people and vulnerable groups. The focus has been on contemporary policies, but the research also accounted for some recent changes, especially those in relation to the recent economic crisis. Without any normative judgements, it was assumed that policies which include some special treatment of young people also promote youth participation (online and offline) and their social inclusion. The chosen policies cover some more pro-active welfare state strategies implemented in certain countries, as well as educational and cultural policies.

The analysis provided contextual background information on the institutional treatment of issues of inequality and social exclusion relating to young people from diverse backgrounds and how these affect young people's ways of doing politics. When looking at access to policy-making, then the structural differences between countries – federal Germany, Spain, Switzerland and also the UK versus more unitary France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Sweden – provide all citizens, including young people, with diverse opportunities for political activism. Furthermore, the direct democracy oriented political system in Switzerland also provides more opportunities for political activism than unitary representative democracies like Sweden or Poland.

However, in respect of the differences of political opportunities of young people in comparison to other age group, WP1 findings have not shown very large differences across the nine countries. In respect of electoral participation, the voting age bases the major differences since it is 17-years-old in Greece and 25-years-old for Senate elections in Italy. It is possible to suggest that if authorities would like to increase the participation of young people, an equal voting age and the right to stand for election regardless of the type of election would be important to achieve. The opportunities for non-electoral offline political participation, which is often seen as the more frequent way for participating in politics by the younger generation, the rigid restrictions to protest participation and decreased focus on civic

education (as present in contemporary Spain) are certainly not promoting the political activism of young people. Online participation is certainly related to the issue of digital divide between countries and across the age groups, but the majority of state authorities in studied countries provide opportunities for participating in politics using the internet. The one exception is e-voting, which is not used in any of the countries. From the perspective of inclusion of vulnerable groups, electoral rules which does not allow voting for those with mental disabilities and prisoners rather exaggerate than reduce the existing inequalities of political participation.

Looking further to other fields of participation – labour market activism – the results of WP1 investigation are relatively similar to prior research which describes specific youth unemployment regimes. WP1 focus was the special treatment of young people in comparison to other age groups and, in general, the labour policies of the examined countries do not include very many initiatives which improve the situation of young people in the labour market or the situation of young unemployed. The major obstacles were found in the UK and Spain, where the recent economic crisis has led to the decrease in the minimum wage of young people and unemployment benefits. In the UK, these policies also include relatively few initiatives which directly address vulnerable groups and would therefore not reduce the existing inequalities in society. Obviously, by looking for the specific legislations which focus on ‘vulnerable groups’, we have made the assumption that countries have such policies, but as a result of the investigation it is also clear that some countries (e.g. France) do not bring forward specific groups in their legislation and address the issue of social inclusion in a more universal way. This might limit somewhat our results.

The analysis of labour market policies indicated, similarly to prior studies, that contemporary welfare states have created more beneficial welfare conditions for cohorts born between 1945 and 1955. However, these conditions also depend on the type of welfare regime, since conservative welfare regimes (France, Italy, Spain) tend to be the most cohort-unequal regimes, while social-democratic regimes (Sweden) appear as more cohort-equitable. These judgements are based on the analysis of a broader set of policies than has been focus of this project, but in respect of policies addressing political and social activism, WP1 research has noted that Spain does not provide opportunities to young people in general, and the vulnerable young people in particular, to a similar extent as the other eight countries.

WP1 analysis has also demonstrated some patterns the prior studies have been neglecting. For example, the lack of special treatment of young people and vulnerable groups in German housing policies is in a significant contrast to special treatment provided by French housing policies. Finally, in terms of cultural policies, the differences between countries are smaller than in respect of political and social activism, and the majority of the countries have initiatives which provide special fares and discounts for young people. Thus, in terms of cultural activism, young people are encouraged to participate and there are also, although to lower extent, many initiatives for reducing inequalities of such participation. The results of this macro-level analysis will be useful for further investigation of young people’s participation and social inclusion, as it provides an important picture of the opportunities for participation of young people in general, as well as young people from vulnerable groups. For detailed information about WP1 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Youth Policies in Europe* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.2. Work package 2 – Political claims analysis

WP2 was based on an integrated comparative study of youth-related political claims in the press media of nine countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The analysis has focused on the main elements of political claims as they emerge in the public sphere following the tradition of political claim analysis, thus identifying the main actors of the claims, the issues of interest, the form of the claims, their addressees, the objects of claims and their positions and, finally, the framing of claims in terms of inequality, its identified cause and solution by claimants themselves. As regards the distribution of claims throughout the period under study and when considering all participating countries, youth issues are more widely discussed in the years 2013 and 2016, while the opposite holds for the years 2011 and 2014. In 2012 and 2013, the claims raised by youth actors outweigh the claims raised by nonyouth actors. The same is also observed in 2015, though to a lesser extent.

Based on the WP2 findings, state actors are overall the most salient claimants on youth matters, outweighing other actors in all countries except France, where youth actors prevail (35.3%) and Germany, where state actors have raised almost as many claims as youth actors have. Whereas, Greece and Italy, but also Germany, score above the cross-national average of 20.9% on youth-made claims, the UK scores lowest. Nevertheless, the ‘third sector’ appears to be well developed in the UK, since it scores much higher compared to the average when it comes to the claims raised by civil society (i.e. professional organisations and other civil society organisations). Education-related actors are the third most salient actors, attracting a total crossnational percentage of almost 13%. This actor category appears as a claimant most frequently in the Swiss and German media, where it reaches almost 19%, while the opposite is observed in France and Sweden, where education-related actors appear as claimants at a rate of less than 10% of their total number of claims. Regarding the profile of claimants in terms of their geographical scope of action, education-related actors, youth actors and youth-related civil society organisations are most of the time active at the subnational level, while all other actors have a national scope. Only a minority of about 3% of the total number of claims has been raised by actors who are active at the supranational level.

With respect to the issue of claims, most actors focus on education, followed by welfare/social benefits and socioeconomics/employment, with 33.1%, 14% and 46 13.3% of the total number of claims respectively. Youth actors raise claims on education- related issues at a lower rate compared to other actors, while they emphasize political issues. Thus, young people seem to be interested in issues of political participation which contrasts contested literature on youth depoliticization and lack of political interests. Political parties, labour organisations and professional organisations prioritize socio-economic issues and employment, while youth- and other civil society organisations present an increased interest in social welfare, creativity and culture, violence and abuse as well as other issues. This deepens our understanding of the areas of political interest of young people and may indicate their orientation towards the politics of everyday life, which deserves further attention in future research.

Moreover, a crossnational comparison of the claims with inequality frames reveals that the countries of the European South (i.e. Italy, Spain and Greece) come first in socio-economic and political inequality frames, whereas North European countries (and specifically the UK, Sweden and Poland) come first in discriminatory inequality frames. Such findings offer support to works emphasizing the North-South divide, especially over the past decade.

Focusing on the claims raised by young actors, WP2 findings underlined political youth groups and university students/young adults as the prevailing actor categories, with the UK being an exception with respect to the salience of political youth groups and with Sweden recording the lowest presence of university students as claimants and the highest presence of political youth groups. Even though most other actors are national in scope, youth actors are more inclined to have a local or regional (i.e. subnational) scope. The only exception is that of political youth groups who have a predominantly national scope. Youth actors, similarly to all other actors, address state actors most of the time and focus primarily on education. Notably, youth actors choose as the second most salient issue of their claims political issues, with political youth groups being primarily accountable for this trend.

The cross-national comparison of the issues raised by young actors shows that Greece scores particularly highly in political issues, while Spain and Italy record the highest score in education-related issues. The Spanish youth also scores higher than other national youth in socio-economic and employment issues. These findings appear to also be related to the impacts of austerity measures in those countries. When it comes to the form of the claim, while verbal statements attract the highest frequency in the claims made by young actors, this frequency is lower compared to the respective average frequency of all other actors. In addition, young claimants record much higher frequencies in contentious politics, with protest actions being met more frequently compared to the average frequency score of all actors by about 20%. This finding, together with the increased rates in which issues of political participation are discussed by young claimants provides evidence for the fact that young Europeans are indeed more politically alert and active, compared to the average claimant in the national public spheres. For detailed information about WP2 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Political Claims Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.3. Work package 3 - Organizational analysis

WP3 was particularly interested in organizational opportunities for youth involvement, that is, on the ‘supply side’ of civil society organizations active in the field of youth issues. The aim of WP3 research was to systematically map this ‘supply side’ in the nine countries under analysis, and thus to get a better understanding of the possibilities young people have to get involved politically at the grass-roots level. Findings reveal that organizational fields mirror the different institutional contexts. In fact, the countries’ political structures clearly impact on how youth organisations are operating: in federalist countries like Germany and Switzerland youth organizations also establish multi-layered structures, whereas in other countries such structures are either more centralized (e.g. Sweden) or less developed (e.g. Poland). In some countries laws impose specific rules for associations, like in Germany and Switzerland, in others a central “charity register” exists (UK) that reflects the role appointed to youth organizations. These factors (among others) appear in WP3 data to impact political orientations, organisational structures, the way activities are organized and other characteristics of youth organizations across Europe.

However, especially in light of these considerable institutional and contextual differences, other features of the organizational fields are surprisingly similar. This applies to their focus of activities, their beneficiaries and activities, and the ways how they try to reach their aims. Recreational activities are central, followed by education. Especially in France, Germany, Greece, and Italy youth organisations are also focusing on democracy promotion. This and the

promotion of values (e.g. friendship, citizenship, cooperation) and self-empowerment are widespread also among otherwise unpolitical organisations, like scouts.

The youth organizations included in WP3 data offer different ways of engagement. First of all, the high number of youth-led organizations is noteworthy: Almost 26% of all coded websites described the organization as being youth-led, while this number was lowest in Poland and highest in Greece (which is related to the high number of student groups in Greece). Moreover, in more than 30% of the cases across countries, youth are actively involved in organizing activities. Just short of 70% of the organizations report that young people are active participants, including scouts, athletes, and musicians. A little less than 60% of the organizations say they provide services for passive beneficiaries (e.g. soup kitchens, educational programmes, or providing information) or engage in activities for young people (e.g. lobbying for youth rights).

While organizations in all countries seem to target and mobilize young people in quite similar ways, this is not true when taking a closer look at youth beneficiaries. Organizations reported to make a difference between young beneficiaries actively engaged in organizational work, and those passively receiving goods and services. For example, youth in poverty and disabled young people are targeted more frequently as passive beneficiaries across countries. And we find also (a small number of) organizations across countries with very specific target groups like victims of abuse or violence, substance (ab(mis)users, but also employment related groups. In sum, youth organisations tend to offer active participation to the general youth (sometimes including specific groups explicitly), whereas specific groups are more likely to be targeted as passive beneficiaries by specialized organisations. This service orientation might be the reason, why so many organizations (i.e., more than 80% of the websites analysed) did not mention any political orientation or mission; 9.4% even explicitly stated to be non-partisan. This does not mean, however, that they are fully unpolitical. All to the contrary, the majority of youth-related organizations across all countries is political in terms of actions. Hence, while they do not connect with specific political ideologies, they rather portray themselves to be issue driven.

Moreover, the WP3 interviews revealed that the authorities understand youth as a period of transition and, in that sense, consider that young people have specific needs and grievances such as asserting independence, forming an identity, and transitioning from education into the labour market. Therefore, interviewees identified the lack of affordable housing, difficulties in finding a job (or a traineeship), lack of spaces for leisure as the main problems affecting youth and delaying their process of asserting independence. Interviewees from Stockholm and Bologna also added isolation, addiction and poor mental health as significant problems. Still, all case studies suggest that stakeholders and organisational actors understand youth as a highly differentiated segment of the population and, thus, consider that the grievances and problems are also very diverse. Interviewees from Cologne, Stockholm, Paris and Geneva stressed discrimination based on ethnic origin as an important problem affecting young people and limiting their possibilities for participation. Furthermore, stakeholders in Cologne, Stockholm and Paris expressed concerns about the spatial segregation in their cities and the stigmatisation of young people from some working-class neighbourhoods.

The general perception among city stakeholders is that young people are not always interested in institutionalised political action, but they are at least interested in issues, such as environmentalism and protection of gender and sexual diversity. There is no unanimous diagnosis when it comes to youth participation: some interviewees argued that the cities offer

enough chances and that enough young people were active, while others lamented the lack of participation of young people and the lack diversity in public debates. In most cases, though, it was clear that participation is different between milieus. One of the main challenges identified by interviewees, is to reach those segments which are under-represented in public life: working-class youngsters, migrants, and youngsters with disabilities. The role played by inequalities (social, ethnic, gender, academic and even spatial) is a point of dispute. While the majority of interviewees admits that inequalities influence political participation, and recognise that young students from middle-class backgrounds are over-represented in political circles, some of the stakeholders argued this has to do with interest, and that some young people are busy with everyday life and thus have no interest in institutionalised politics. Others stressed that inequalities in socio-economic status and in the access to education can explain the low levels of participation of some segments of the population. Furthermore, some of the young interviewees and some of the organisational representatives argued that young people become disappointed because they don't feel taken seriously by politicians and decision-makers. In these cases, youth is perceived as a form of inequality. For detailed information about WP3 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Organizational Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.4. Work package 4 – Panel survey analysis

WP4 collected data on political engagement, online political participation and media use, attitudes and values, policy satisfaction and issue priorities, and finally, economic outlooks and conditions, life engagement and mobility through a population survey. When we look at differences in the participation patterns of younger and older across a variety of more or less conventional modes of action such as signing a petition, engaging in political consumerism, attending a political meeting or demonstration etc. we tend to see a higher proportions of younger relative to older citizens tend to be involved in more unconventional forms of participation such as strikes and occupations; these forms also tend to attract smaller proportions of individuals participating. On the other hand, more conventional activities such as contacting or visiting a politician or government official generally show higher proportions for older citizens. More specifically, starting off with attending a demonstration, in most countries the youngest 18-24 year olds tend to show the highest levels of protest. In most countries, we see lower levels of protest amongst the next youngest age group of 24-34-year olds relative to the youngest 18-24 year olds.

In terms of associational involvement, labour/trade unions, political parties, environmental, church or religious and youth organisations (amongst youth) tend to attract slightly larger proportions relative to other organisations in defence of civil and human rights, etc. WP4 findings show that higher proportions of younger citizens tend to be involved in these than older citizens. More specifically, we can see that in terms of party membership, the highest levels of participation are to be found amongst older respondents. This is also true in terms of membership of labour or trade unions and that of church or religious organisations. On the other hand, in most countries, higher proportions of young people tend to be members of development/human rights organisations, civil rights/ civil liberties organisations, environment/anti-nuclear or animal rights organisations, women's/feminist organisations, LGBT rights organisations, peace/anti-war organisations, occupy/anti-austerity or anti-cuts organisations, anti-capitalist, Global Justice, or anti-globalisations organisations, anti-racist or

migrants rights organisation, social solidarity networks, and quite understandably, also youth or student organisations relative to older people.

According to WP4 research results, younger citizens tend to be about as involved as older citizens in community forms of participation such as raising money for a charitable cause or working or cooperating with others to solve problems in their community or neighbourhood. Overall, higher proportions of young people tend to be involved through online forms of political participation such as discussing or sharing opinion on politics on a social network site e.g. Facebook or Twitter or joining or starting a political group on Facebook / following a politician or political group on Twitter etc though older citizens tend to show higher proportions of searching for information about politics online at least once a month.

In terms of media use for political news, higher proportions of older citizens appear to follow the news everyday be it on the newspaper, TV, radio and even on the internet though results are more mixed for social media. For most types, it appears to generally be the case that higher proportions of younger citizens post political content through social media though the pattern is reversed or more mixed in some cases.

When it comes to political efficacy, it seems that lower proportions of young people feel internal political efficacy: i.e. that they feel well-qualified to participate in politics or that they have a good understanding of political issues facing the country. More young people feel externally politically efficacious however, lower proportions say that public officials do not care about what people like them think or that people like them do not have a say about what the government does relative to older people. WP4 findings show that in most countries younger people exhibit the lowest proportions saying that they consider themselves well-qualified to participate in politics; the same is true with respect to say that they feel they have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. In all countries, only a minority of young people expresses the view that they feel well-qualified or have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing the country. As such this is a clear inequality between younger and older people in their feelings of being able to engage with politics which are clearly lower for younger people.

When it comes to mobilization, WP4 data show that younger people tend to report the higher levels of mobilization requests relative to older people. The results also show that younger people exhibit the higher levels of requests coming from close relationships such as friends or family, whereas older people show higher proportions for being made requests to participate by a political campaign or political party. This suggests that young people might be participating at lower levels than older people in conventional modes of engagement because parties do not target them in their appeals to action and political campaigns i.e. they are not being asked to participate conventionally. Older people also appear to show higher levels of requests to political participation through online communities. This suggests that older people appear to have the higher requests from more distant organisations and communities. As such, this might suggest an important inequality between younger and older people where older people are targeted more often for requests to participate by external bodies or individuals because they are perceived as more likely to engage and as a potentially more valuable constituency to win over in order to win elections. This is thus another way in which older people can end up having greater political voice and weight than younger people in politics and decision-making. For detailed information about WP4 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Panel Survey Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.5. Work package 5 – Experimental analysis

Overall, WP5 conducted seven survey experiments: six vignette experiments and one conjoint experiment. It tested the effects of a number of treatments on young people's attitudes and behaviors relating to social and political engagement, including protest behavior. All of the experiments focused on youth. However, some of them compared youth respondents to the population at large, depending on the research question. WP5 gave rise to a diversity of results. In terms of elite discourses and youth political engagement, WP5 tested whether a politician's pro-youth or anti-youth statement impacts on the political trust, efficacy, and participation of young people, and whether such an effect also depends on the ideological position of the person making statement (left or right) and on the political role of that person (in the government or in the opposition). In sum, WP5 found an effect on political trust as well as on intention of political participation and on a quasi-behavioral measure consisting in asking whether one would be ready to sign a petition urging the government to pay more attention to youth's needs when formulating new policies. The most important result in this regard is the impact of the orientation of discourse: anti-youth discourses tends to reduce political trust of young people and also their propensity to say they intend to participate politically but it increases their likelihood to sign the petition. With respect to the ideology or partisan affiliation of the politicians making the statement as well as their role as members of the government or of the opposition: the effect of pro-youth or anti-youth discourses seem to depend on these characteristics of those who hold them.

In terms of protest, repression and solidarity across generations the aim of the experiment was to assess whether perceptions of repression in protest have a different impact on the attitudes and mobilization potential of the individual depending on the age cohort s/he belongs to. In a nutshell, the research team cannot confirm the hypotheses neither in terms of inter-generational solidarity of young respondents nor in terms of (exclusive) intra-generational solidarity among old people. Having said that, the research team observe some discontinuities in mobilization potentials of the mobilization agents depending on their age, but also depending on whether there was repression in the protest event and the eventual age of the target of such repression. Moreover, as regards the influence of police brutality on political participation of youth, the conducted analyses have shown that reading a story about the police celebration day did not have any impact on engagement of youth in comparison with the control group. This means that the main factor influencing willingness to political participation is the brutality of the police and not its presence in the sociopolitical sphere. The direction of this relationship turned out to be opposite to the one we have presumed – young persons instead of being frightened by the police and in result stay away from political engagement have began to declare more willingness to participate, but only in specific forms of actions. These were signing a petition, making statements in the internet regarding local and political issues and participating in a demonstration which may result in destroying property and fighting the police. Opposite result of experimental manipulation (so in accord with our presumptions) appeared only in regard with donating money for social actions. It seems that young persons engage in politics if they become aware of unjust treatment of the members of society by the authorities with no consequences from the government (as the policemen in the fictitious story are not being punished for their brutality). This conclusion is in accord with the negative influence of system justification on participation – if we believe that our society and government give everyone what they deserve then there is no need for change.

WP5 also examined the existing correlation between blame attribution and political participation forms in Switzerland, more specifically in the French speaking part. The research team tested whether knowing and foreseen an actor and its corresponding political arena, if respondents would choose a type of political participation form. This was done through an experimental protocol including six groups which were subject to different treatments, on a over sample of 1225 respondents. The preliminary findings show how types of political practices are correlated depending on which actor respondents want to blame. However, the presence of low frequencies in the treatments must be underlined, as only half of the sample was exposed to six of the treatments.

With regard to the effects of (mis)perceptions of inequality on youths' social trust and political engagement, the online experimented the main hypothesis (H1) predicted that inequality priming will result in lower social cohesion perception and lower social trust and intention for political participation. Results refuted this hypothesis since inequality priming resulted in higher political engagement (but not higher political engagement attitudes) compared to equality priming and higher interest in politics. Higher inequality priming was associated with lower happiness as one may expect, which provides further credence to the priming effect. This finding has implications for understanding motivational priming in youth and in a country like Greece. Importantly, the results did not seem to differ meaningfully between the youth and the older groups. It seems that the cultural mandate of the country may influence younger and older persons equally in the way they attribute causes of inequality, and how these may impact political engagement intentions and attitudes.

Further, looking at peer pressure and political action, results show that country specific dispositions and attitudinal dispositions are more important than peer pressure. In regard to demonstrative protests, dissuasive pressure from peers rather leads responds to insist on the personal readiness to participate, while persuasive do reinforce these dispositions. In this sense, respondents tend to subscribe to the idea that protest participation is an act of individual freedom that, hence, has ultimately to resist peer pressure. Finally, when examining individuals' likelihood for allowing specific kinds of demonstrations – depending on their level of violence and mobilizing groups, and especially the difference between the young and older respondents in this respect, WP5 results show that in the three examined countries – Germany, Spain and Sweden, the expected violence of a demonstration is something which is strongly related to the probability of allowing such demonstration to take place. The perceived illegitimacy of violent protests is certainly not new, but we have also shown that there are no significant differences among young and older people in this respect. In sum, despite presenting only a tiny part of the analysis here, we can conclude that the experiment as such has worked well – the randomization of the demonstration profiles as well as the attribute levels functioned, and the control variables in terms of timing and location of the demonstration had no effects on the probability of allowing the demonstration. For detailed information about WP5 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Experimental Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.6. Work package 6 – Biographical analysis

Through the in-depth interview method, WP6 collected a large variety of data concerning the lives, daily routine, and major events and experiences faced by the young people who do politics nowadays. The target population was young individuals who define themselves as

members of different organizations/groups involved in socio-political activities. The time period of the fieldwork varied in the different countries, but overall it ran from February 2018 to January 2019. The 252 interviews lasted between one and two hours and were digitally recorded, by prior agreement from the respondents.

In terms of life before participation, the fieldwork showed that the similarities overshadow the differences if we look at the primary socialization of the respondents. They generally seem not to have experienced any major challenging situation at the domestic and public levels. Because of this, the generational conflict hardly emerges as something relevant across our respondents during their first socialization. Most of the respondents come from middle class families; they have grown up in families that have been generally permissive and supportive. Outside the domestic sphere the respondents were first socialized during the daily time spent at school and given their engagement in sport and cultural activities. Regarding social relationships, the vast majority of the respondents highlighted friendship among their peers as an important asset during their primary socialization. This provided them with a resource in terms of growth, subjectivation and identity-building processes, and self-awareness.

In terms of the political socialization process, respondents, during the adolescent phase of their lives, shift from being generally interested in political issues or not showing interest at all to gradually starting very similar processes of political socialization at home and at high school, during some important turning points. Where at home they first have opportunities to talk about politics, at school they experience opportunities for collective action, participating at demonstrations, public events, school occupations and so on. The experience of those respondents with parents born in another country is somewhat unique. These respondents were socialized into politics through discussions related to their parents' home country. Most of our respondents said they share their families' political standing. Only a few respondents mentioned that their parents opposed somehow their political involvement. In some cases, specific charismatic teachers were mentioned as having a key role in their political socialization by stimulating conversation on political current affairs or proposing influential books. Being a student representative – either in class-level or school-level – has been mentioned by the respondents as a step in their political socialization. These positions provided them with early experiences, evoking or further strengthening an interest in politics, placing them in a better position in terms of skills (i.e. taking up responsibilities and liaising with administrative bodies and institutions) and resources, which would prove fundamental for the next step of mobilising in an organization/group later on in their life.

The respondents' narratives suggest continuity between the previous politicization phase and their first mobilization in an organization/group. For the large majority of our respondents, the motivation driving their mobilization was to find a vehicle that would allow them in a practical way to be able to produce a better society. Public events (i.e. demonstrations, strikes and occupations) and places (i.e. assemblies, squats and organic markets) were important arenas either for the respondents' self-engagement or for the direct recruitment of organization/group present. In general from our respondents' accounts, it was deduced that they have engaged in a wide range of political action repertoires over time, from election campaigning to demonstrations and direct social actions. Sustained participation is supported, following the respondents' histories, by personal connections within the organization/group; by having found a community of like-minded people with whom they share common concerns; by continuous interest in the activity of the organization/group; by the satisfaction with their own position within the organization/group, which makes them feeling responsible toward the organization/group and/or the society in general, but also provide a meaning to

their life; by the opportunity to learn more about society and gain knowledge and skills; by seeing that their engagement can produce social impact and by young people availability.

Finally, the respondents, from all the different countries as well as from different types of organizations/groups, seem to recognise the profound personal impact, most of the time narrated in a positive way, that doing politics has had on their own life. Respondents said they have acquired through participation different skills, to have become more sociable and self-confident, to have matured, to have become more pragmatic in relationship with their political standing in order to achieve major outcomes, to have changed their priorities, and to have brought them knowledge. On the other hand, some of the respondents suggested in particular that participation has been an obstacle to their circle of close friends outside their organization/group. On the other hand, the great majority of the respondents have declared willing to continue participating, but only provided that it remains compatible with changes in their lives. Given that, for a sizeable minority of our respondents, political participation is conceived as the most important part of their life future activities are viewed as something that would in their future fit around activism. For detailed information about WP6 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Biographical Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

2.7. Work package 7 – Social media analysis

WP7 analyzed how social inequalities are manifested in how young people use social media actively for political purposes. As in the previous WPs, the research was carried out in the nine countries participating in the project (France, Italy, the UK, Germany, Poland, Greece, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). Specifically, the analysis has been centered on Twitter. The goal was to see how young people in these nine different countries participate and interact in the public debates around two important issues: the climate crisis and feminism. In order to make data retrieval operational, two case studies were selected: Twitter's debates on #ClimateStrike (a global movement, studied at the country/language area level) and the local campaigns or movements on feminism taking place in each country/language area.

This WP faced two important challenges in relation to the project's development: 1) there is no direct access to the personal data (e.g. age, gender, geographical location) of Twitter and Facebook users; 2) traditional tools of social media analysis do not deliver data that is representative of plurilingual realities. There is a bias of statistical inference tools towards dominant languages and groups. The main challenge was that of proposing a data collection and analysis methodology for a cross-country study covering nine European countries, and creating datasets and results for each country. This has implied a special effort for accounting for the intrinsic differences between the scenarios of the different countries, and the issues associated to special cases. WP7 had to define special strategies to deal with countries that cannot be identified with a language, such as the UK, with English spoken at a global level, or Spain, with Spanish widely spoken in many Latin American countries, or Switzerland where various languages are spoken, overlapping with other countries. In these cases, the ability to detect the country from the user location indicated by the users was essential in order to filter messages and users by country. WP7 also had issues with Greece, for which it was hard to retrieve a sufficient amount of data, and different criteria were combined to create the dataset. Then, a critical point was that of developing a demographic analysis of inequalities, without any demographic metadata being explicitly associated to the users; the ability to infer demographic data for each Twitter account

through state of the art methods was fundamental to allow for a deeper analysis of inequalities across countries, accounting for age and gender of the users.

As it could be expected according to previous literature, WP7 observe a higher presence of men in the debates. This is generally true both in terms of number of users involved (as it can be seen in tables X-Y, reporting the homophily analysis results) and of activity and centrality levels. Interestingly, this is also the case for several countries in the debate about feminism, where one could naturally assume a major involvement of women. Women tend to be a minority, and tend to have a higher homophily, i.e. a higher preference for interaction with other women, higher than the preference of men for interacting with other men. Two countries from Southern Europe present an exception: in Italy and Spain women have a comparable presence to men in the debate on Climate change, and are a majority in the debate on Feminism. Interestingly, in these countries women tend to have a neutral preference, i.e. no preference for interacting with other women, while in some cases men have a higher homophily, in the Spanish debate on Feminism where they are a minority.

The analysis of inequalities by gender unveils that men are not only a majority in most networks on Climate change, but tend also to be more active and central in these conversations, but in the cases of Spain and Italy. In the networks built for Feminism, instead, women are often less active in terms of number of tweets, but equally or more central than men in the networks of mentions and retweets; this is the case for most countries, and especially marked for Spain, where women's centrality overcome men's centrality by a big gap. These phenomena are even more marked when we restrict the analysis to users below 30 years old.

Beyond results for gender, WP7 found also results for age difference; however, results in this case are less representative, as age range could be inferred with sufficient accuracy only for a minority of users, so the underlying patterns may remain in part uncaptured. In the scope of the project it was possible to perform analyses and show results based on some relevant variables for all the countries. The research team chose to focus on two relevant demographic variables (namely age and gender) and two main metrics quantifying activity and centrality (namely the number of tweets and the in-degree in the interaction networks, respectively).

Further analyses could involve other variables: on the one hand, further metrics of individual relevance or centrality that were computed for each user, such as pagerank, outdegree or k-index in the interaction networks; on the other hand, further user attributes retrieved or inferred for each user, such as being an organization or not (as estimated through the m3inference library for inferring demographic information), seniority (based on the registration date or on the total number of tweets posted), influence in the social network, in terms of number of followers, growth in the number of followers during our observation period, geographic location. All of these variables are included in the datasets generated by WP7, while detailed information about WP7 research and findings refer to the *Integrated Report on Social Media Analysis* that can be accessed at www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/outputs/deliverables/

Annex - Project identity

Project name

Reinventing Democracy in Europe: Youth Doing Politics in Times of Increasing Inequalities (EURYKA)

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Consortium

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- Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain • University of Crete, Rethymnon, Greece
- University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
- University of Sheffield, Sheffield, United Kingdom
- University of Siegen, Siegen, Germany
- University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
- Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

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Duration

February 2017 – January 2020 (36 months)

Budget

EU contribution: 2,595,720.00 €.

Website

www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/euryka/home