

# ETHNIC EXCLUSION AND THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL

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**ABSTRACT.** Recent research provides increasing theoretical and empirical evidence that the exclusion of ethnic groups increases the risk of armed conflicts. This poses an important puzzle: Why do governments exclude ethnic groups in the first place? We start with the assumption that governments have two goals: stay in power and extract as many resources as possible. We argue that in autocracies, the agency of coalition-formation lies with the strongest ethnic group and this group decides which groups to exclude based on strategic considerations about the likelihood of inside and outside threats as well as the costs of in- and exclusion. We test this argument using data on ethnic groups and their power status from the Ethnic Power Relations data set.

## INTRODUCTION

Recent research provides increasing theoretical and empirical evidence that the exclusion of ethnic groups increases the risk of armed conflicts (for example Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). This poses an important puzzle: Why do governments exclude ethnic groups in the first place? Some authors argue that exclusion can be seen as a heritage of colonial times (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2015), but even if this were the case, why didn't the state immediately include ethnic groups to decrease the risk of conflict? And if a state excludes ethnic groups, how do state leaders decide which groups to exclude and which groups to share power with?

When ethnicity is politically relevant, coalitions of ethnic groups form governments (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010), both in democratic and autocratic states. In the vast majority of cases, ethnic coalitions lead to the exclusion of some groups from power: Only in six states that have politically relevant ethnic groups at some point in time no group is excluded from power at any given point according to the EPR data version 2014 (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Vogt et al., forthcoming). In fact, in some of these states a considerable number of ethnic groups is excluded from power at some point. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of excluded groups in states where politically relevant groups are present at least at some points in time.


While in democratic states coalitions are determined by citizens, ethnic coalitions that are determined by the political leadership are a feature of authoritarian rule (Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svoboda, 2009, 2012). Thus, while ethnic coalitions

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FIGURE 1. The number of excluded groups in states with politically relevant groups, 1946 to 2013



in democracies can be explained by electoral majorities, the formation of ethnic coalitions in autocracies is more difficult to explain (Bormann, 2014). We argue that in autocracies, the agency of coalition-formation lies with the strongest ethnic group and this group decides which groups to exclude based on strategic considerations about the likelihood of inside and outside threats as well as the costs of in- and exclusion. We test this argument in a large-n study on all possible coalitions that can be formed by the current most senior group in government. This research design is innovative and allows modeling governments' agency and strategic considerations in forming coalitions explicitly.

Understanding governments' strategic rationale for ethnic exclusion is important for two reasons. Firstly, as ethnic exclusion increases the likelihood of armed conflict, knowledge about governments' incentives for doing so can help facilitate powersharing regimes and therefore decrease the likelihood of armed conflict in at-risk states. Secondly, understanding governments' strategic considerations for excluding groups is important in order to fully understand the role of ethnic exclusion in causing armed conflict. If governments minimize the risk of conflict when excluding ethnic groups, the actual effect of ethnic exclusion that is currently expected may be vastly underestimated (for an overview over this argument, drawing on earlier work, see Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2015). Moreover, if autocratic governments are particularly strategic in forming strong government coalitions, the effect of autocracy on armed conflict may be driven by characteristics of the excluded opposition as opposed to the regime type as such. Finally, if governments consider the inclusion or exclusion not only of specific ethnic groups but rather of potential alliances of groups, an interesting new unit of analysis would be introduced to the study of armed conflict: Characteristics of the opposition as a whole may be more important in predicting armed conflict than is currently expected.

This paper proceeds as follows. The next section situates the argument and findings in existing research and highlights our contribution. Section three introduces our argument and section four discusses the research design used to test its empirical implications. The next section discusses the empirical results before the final section concludes.

## LITERATURE

While there is increasing evidence that exclusion increases the risk of armed conflict, we have a more limited understanding of the dynamics that lead to specific exclusion and inclusion patterns in the first place. While colonial legacies might be one explanation for exclusion patterns (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, 2015), important puzzles remain about who gets included and excluded in ethnic ruling coalitions.

A major motivation for understanding inclusion and exclusion dynamics are their consequences for armed conflict. For a long time ethnic grievances were considered to be too widespread to be able to explain armed conflict (for example Tilly, 1978). Collier and Hoefler (2004) confirmed this sentiment in a prominent country-level study finding that greed, not grievance, explains civil conflicts. However, in recent years efforts to disaggregate data from the country to the ethnic-group level were made and newer studies find that ethnic groups' economic disadvantages (Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011) and purposeful political discrimination by the government increase the likelihood of armed conflict (Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). But even without being explicitly discriminated, the mere exclusion of a group from the government coalition has been found to increase groups' likelihood of engaging in armed conflict (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Thus, excluding a group poses a risk to the government. Nevertheless, ethnic exclusion is widespread, which leads us to explore the inclusion and exclusion dynamics that exist in ethnic politics.

Most empirical studies on the status of ethnic groups focus on the discrimination of ethnic groups. These studies attempt to explain why a specific ethnic group is discriminated against by the government using state- and group-specific factors. They all use data from the Minorities at Risk project on ethnic groups and their characteristics. Fox (2000) and Fox and Sandler (2003) find that semidemocracies are least likely to discriminate religiously differentiated groups. Moreover, groups that are culturally different from the government are more likely to be discriminated Fox (2000). Sorens (2010) finds that groups that have geographic autonomy are less likely to be discriminated while economic crises increase the likelihood of discrimination for ethnic groups. The author does not find support for the expectation that groups with a regional base are treated differently by the government.

While ethnic discrimination has drawn some scholarly attention, there are limited insights to the inclusion and formation of ethnic ruling coalitions. Certainly work around authoritarian regimes and power-sharing (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Acemoglu,

Egorov and Sonin, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svoboda, 2009, 2012; Boix and Svoboda, 2013) are addressing some issues of ethnic ruling coalitions, but to our knowledge one of the few exceptions to focus on ethnic ruling coalition formation is Bormann (2014). This is surprising as coalition formation is a very classical and foundational topic of modern political science (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953; Riker, 1962). However, most coalition formation theory is conditional (at least implicitly) on a democratic political order where members of the coalition can write binding coalition contracts. The concept that is most prominent in the coalition literature is the minimal winning coalition. While work by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) defines a minimal winning coalition as a coalition where the removal of any one member turns a majority to a minority, the more accepted definition is proposed by Riker (1962). In his work a “minimal winning coalition contains the smallest number of seats of all winning coalitions”. These ideas of minimal winning coalitions have fundamentally shaped our understanding of coalition formation in democratic countries. However, how is coalition formation practiced in autocratic countries?

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide a very broad framework of how to think about winning coalitions more generally. In their theoretical approach the size of a winning coalition and the respective selectorate varies across regime types. While this is a very helpful starting point, this general framework does not account for specific challenges that arise in autocratic countries. For example, it does not explicitly speak to problems of authoritarian power-sharing that are highlighted by Svoboda (2012). In the context of ethnic coalitions Bormann (2014) provides a very interesting theoretical framework that assumes that uncertainty about the size of other ethnic groups leads to oversized ethnic coalitions. He assumes that ethnic groups aim to maximise their access to government while decreasing the risk of being replaced by other groups, for example as a result of coups or external threats. Deriving empirical implications from these assumptions, and focusing particularly on uncertainty and the fear of being overthrown, the study finds that majority groups are more likely to be included in government, that ethnic coalitions are likely to be disproportionately large and that the government coalition is more likely to consist of more similar groups in order to avoid outside defection. This paper, on the other hand, considers governments’ strategic incentives for forming specific coalitions prioritising commitment issues. While the work of Bormann (2014) provides insights to general dynamics of ethnic coalition building it again does not account for specific problems of authoritarian politics that influence ethnic ruling coalition building.

Thus, the more overarching goal of this paper is to contribute to a theory of ethnic coalition formation in authoritarian states. We provide a complete information argument to identify the conditions under which ethnic ruling coalitions form and what their composition should be.

## THE ARGUMENT: ETHNIC COALITIONS AND SURVIVAL IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

How do leaders that are supported by a specific ethnic group decide how many and which other ethnic groups to include in a government coalition and which ones to exclude from power? While in democratic states coalitions are determined by citizens, ethnic coalitions that are determined by the political leadership are a feature of authoritarian rule. Thus, while ethnic coalitions in democracies can be explained by electoral majorities, the formation of ethnic coalitions in autocracies is more difficult to explain (Bormann, 2014). In fact, we argue that the formation of ethnic coalitions in authoritarian regimes differs considerably from coalition formation in democracies. This is so for two reasons: 1) Authoritarian regimes do not provide the institutional framework that allows for credible coalition agreements. Thus, coalition members in authoritarian regimes face commitment problems especially when power imbalances are expected within a given coalition (Christia, 2012; Steinwand and Metternich, 2014). 2) Authoritarian governments can prevent rebellions of excluded groups using repression<sup>1</sup>.

We develop a theoretical argument about an autocratic government leader's strategic incentives for forming a specific ethnic coalition. We take into account two important problems of authoritarian rule outlined by previous research (Wintrobe, 1998; Svolik, 2012): a) Problems of authoritarian power-sharing and b) problems of authoritarian control. In the context of ethnic coalitions, the problem of authoritarian power-sharing originates from the possible need to include some groups in government to guarantee political survival while at the same time minimising the risk of coups from within the government coalition (Svolik, 2012). When deciding who to include into a ruling coalition the leader has to consider the benefits of including an ethnic group (support against other groups and reducing the risk of outside challenge by these other groups) as well as the risk (potential for inside challenge by these groups) and the cost (sharing power and resources with coalition partners that could otherwise exclusively be distributed to the leader's ethnic group)<sup>2</sup>.

The main instruments of authoritarian control are repression and co-optation. Both have consequences for the survival of the government leader. The ultimate co-optation that is possible when considering authoritarian ethnic politics is the inclusion an ethnic group into the ruling coalition. However, this policy instrument is not without risks for the existing government. First, any addition of further members in the ruling coalition will need concessions from the already existing members, which might challenge the leadership as a result. Second, and more importantly for our argument, the inclusion of an ethnic group will increase their access to resources and ability to politically coordinate. Especially,

<sup>1</sup>See Ritter and Conrad (forthcoming) drawing on earlier work for the notion that autocratic states are more able to repress pre-emptively.

<sup>2</sup>Also see Sorens (2010) on governments' possibility of decreasing the likelihood of conflict by sharing power and the resulting reduction in rents for the government. See Wimmer (2002) on the unequal distribution of resources in ethnicized states.

if newly included ethnic groups become members of the security apparatus and the military to repress other groups, this might lead to a moral hazard problem as newly militarized members have new abilities to rise against the existing leadership (Svolik, 2012).

The possible inside threat becomes especially problematic for the government when it includes relatively large groups. Even when an ethnic group is not militarily strong enough to challenge the government when joining the ruling coalition, ethnic groups that are relatively large vis-à-vis the group forming the government face a commitment problem when being considered for inclusion. Once included and militarily strengthened, relatively large ethnic groups and their leaders have a large incentive to renege on any agreements that were negotiated when the ruling coalition was formed. Anticipating this commitment problem government leaders will not select relatively large ethnic groups into the ruling coalition. Instead they will prefer to rule alone or with other small ethnic groups that do not face a commitment problem once part of the ethnic coalition. This logic is very similar to rebel alliances in the context of armed conflicts (Christia, 2012; Steinwand and Metternich, 2014).

The commitment problem is severest when groups in the government coalition are rewarded disproportionately given their chance of overthrowing the government in a coup. This situation occurs when the coalition partners are larger in proportional size than the senior partner as the senior partner is likely to have most access to the government and as a result also has the opportunity to extract most resources. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) make this argument in the context of armed conflict within the government coalition and find empirical support. It can be assumed that a government coalition needs to achieve a sufficient size in order to protect effectively against outside threats (Bormann, 2014). As a result, inclusion in government is a poor way of stabilising the senior partner's position when the senior partner is very small and would need to include much larger coalition partners in order to achieve a sufficient size. Thus, we argue that inclusion of additional groups into the government coalition is only a feasible tool to stay in power for senior partners of a sufficient size.

While the authoritarian instrument of co-optation (inclusion) can lead to challenges within the regime, repression as the second main policy instrument is also not risk free. First, the government has to divert resources to repression that could otherwise be allocated to members of the ruling coalition<sup>3</sup>. Second, repression and exclusion can create increased grievances that increase the risk of external regime challenges<sup>4</sup>. Hence, authoritarian regimes have incentives to include not only their own ethnic group to mitigate the risk of external challenges. Thus, when deciding who to include in a coalition government

<sup>3</sup>See for example (Davenport, 2007) on the point that repression requires using resources.

<sup>4</sup>In the context of armed conflict, this argument is widespread (for example, drawing on earlier work, Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Lawrence (2010) suggests a grievance-based argument as a possible reason for repression leading to violence. While in the context of armed conflict several studies have found empirical support (for example Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011), the empirical effect of repression on armed conflict on the other hand is less clear.

leaders weigh the risks of co-optation (inclusion) against the risks and costs of repression (exclusion).

As the size of the ruling ethnic groups increases larger groups can be included without triggering commitment problems. This is because governments can control coalition partners better due to a more favorable balance of power. In addition, when the senior partner is larger, coalition partners can commit more credibly as they receive more appropriate rewards given their size and chance for overthrowing the senior partner from within. Hence, as the size of the status highest ethnic group increases larger additions can be made to the winning coalition without giving rise to inclusion hampering commitment problems. Thus, here inclusion is a feasible strategy.

Finally, when senior partners are very large, commitment costs should be lowest and governments may include additional allies to reach further stability. However, it could also be the case that governments consider the coalition to be of sufficient size without including additional partners. As a result, neither inclusion nor repression would be necessary to stabilise the senior partner's position. Thus, the senior partner may not take additional action against other groups, neither repressing nor including them.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

Based on the Ethnic Power Relations data version 2014 (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Vogt et al., forthcoming), we implement a constrained permutation approach to construct a dataset which is analyzed with a k-adic analytical approach (Poast, 2010).<sup>5</sup> Our theoretical argument assumes that the political leader of the status highest ethnic group can select potential ruling coalition partners. Hence, our unit of analysis are all potential ruling ethnic coalitions involving the status highest ethnic group. This involves all permutations of ethnic groups that are politically relevant<sup>6</sup> in a particular year and contain the status highest group. Any change in the status highest group gives rise to a different ethnic group that is part of all possible ethnic coalitions.

As our theoretical argument pertains to autocratic regimes, we only include periods of the status highest ethnic group when the polity score (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2009) of the respective country is smaller or equal to six. We conduct a set of logistic regressions

<sup>5</sup>In comparison, Bormann uses all possible permutations of ethnic groups in a state as the unit of analysis. While this allows him to include coalition-specific factors, highly unlikely coalitions are included in the analysis without correcting for this issue. Our study focuses on the most powerful group in a state and its choice of who to include in a government coalition alongside itself. This research design reduces the number of factually impossible permutations in the data and takes into account the agency of the most powerful group in deciding who else to include. Finally, while Bormann includes all states in his analysis, we focus on autocratic states where the choice of the strongest ethnic group is not constrained by institutions but rather reflects strategic choices of the state leader directly. This research design allows us to model strategic incentives of ethnic elites in coalition formation.

<sup>6</sup>An ethnic group is politically relevant "(...) if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010:99).

on three different datasets that only involve countries that were established after 1946 to isolate the initial and probably crucial ethnic ruling coalition formation. In all datasets the dependent variable is whether a potential ethnic ruling coalition is realized or not. The first dataset only includes the year an ethnic ruling coalition that is formed by the status highest ethnic group (realized coalitions = 112; potential coalitions = 8494). The second dataset includes only years when new coalitions are formed (realized coalitions = 155; potential coalitions = 12250), while the third dataset simply looks at the occurrence of ethnic ruling coalitions (realized coalitions = 2037; potential coalitions = 159744).

**Explanatory variables.** The first empirical implication from our theoretical argument is that the most senior ethnic group will only form ethnic ruling coalitions with similar sized groups (if any), which mitigates the commitment problem within the authoritarian ethnic ruling coalition. Hence, small senior ethnic groups will try to minimize the size of the ruling coalition, while government leaders from larger ethnic groups can decrease the cost of repressive policies and include larger ethnic groups without facing the threat of an internal challenger. In order to test this hypothesis, we measure the difference between the ethnic population size of the potential coalition and the most senior ethnic group. Because we argue that this difference is conditional on the size of the most senior ethnic group, we interact this difference with the size of the most senior ethnic group. As there is a possibility that very strong senior partners do not need to include additional allies, we include the squared term of the difference along with the appropriate interactions.

We control for the possibility that the government tries to mitigate outside challengers by minimizing the number of dispersed ethnic groups within the ethnic ruling coalition and thereby maximizing the number of dispersed groups in the “excluded coalition”. Hence, we measure the number of dispersed groups within the potential ruling coalition. Finally, we control for whether government leaders not only care about geographic dispersion of the “excluded coalition”, but might also want limit or even increase the number of excluded groups to manipulate their ability to engage in collective action.

## RESULTS

The estimates from our three logit models can be found in Table 1 and summary statistics are included at the bottom. Positive coefficients imply that increasing values of the respective explanatory variables are associated with a higher probability of a potential coalition being realized. A graphical interpretation of the interaction effects are provided in Figures 2 and 3.

The first model only focuses on the first year that a respective ethnic group becomes the status highest. This is the first year where this specific group can form a ruling coalition. We refer to this model as the episode model. As the multiple interaction effects in a non-linear model are difficult to interpret from Table 1, we provide Figure 2 for interpretation



	Episode Model	Coalition Model	Occurrence Model
(Intercept)	0.97*	0.60	1.32***
	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.09)
Status highest group size (SHGS)	-0.44	0.05	-0.64***
	(0.68)	(0.58)	(0.13)
Diff. between status highest group size and coalition size (DIFF)	-14.42***	-12.90***	-12.81***
	(2.29)	(1.90)	(0.60)
Sq. diff. between status highest group size and coalition size	10.56***	9.59***	5.05***
	(3.19)	(2.74)	(0.91)
Number of excluded groups	-0.80***	-0.80***	-0.81***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)
SHGS×DIFF	-10.20	-10.20	-36.49***
	(7.15)	(6.20)	(1.96)
SHGS×DIFF <sup>2</sup>	48.27***	45.53***	100.76***
	(13.49)	(11.76)	(3.85)
Geographically dispersed group in coalition	-1.11**	-1.32***	-0.89***
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.09)
AIC	775.33	1100.66	12758.29
BIC	831.71	1159.97	12838.14
Log Likelihood	-379.67	-542.33	-6371.14
Deviance	759.33	1084.66	12742.29
Num. obs.	8494	12250	159744

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

TABLE 1. Estimates from logit models. Dependent variable is the realization of potential coalitions.

purposes. The upper panels (a)–(c) in Figure 2 show the probability of a potential coalition forming as the size difference between the coalition as a whole and the status highest group increases. However, we argued that this difference is conditional on the size of the status highest ethnic group. We therefore provide three scenarios with varying sizes of the status highest ethnic group. In panel (a) the size of the status highest group is 0.01, in panel (b) it is 0.5, and in panel (c) 0.8 (measured in share of the total population). Given these scenarios, we can observe that, in line with our expectations, small status highest groups try to minimize the size of the ruling coalition. As the size of the ruling coalition increases, two types of regimes seem to exist in the data (see especially Figure 2 panel (b)). Despite their relatively large size, in the scenario status highest group = 0.5, some governments continue their policies of exclusion, while some seem to prefer co-optation and inclusion. Thus, while our expectation that inclusion is feasible here seems to be correct, this does not mean that governments automatically choose this strategy. Instead, in such situations government leaders seem to make a choice between repression and inclusion. This is a very interesting empirical finding as it suggests that there are probably additional factors that determine the choice of policies when co-optation and repression are both options for government leaders.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Future iterations of this paper will focus on identifying the conditions under which authoritarian regimes will prefer co-optation (inclusion) over repression (exclusion) policies.




FIGURE 2. Episode Model: Panels (a)-(c). Three scenarios with varying sizes of the status highest ethnic group. In panel (a) the size of the status highest group is 0.01, in panel (b) it is 0.5, and in panel (c) 0.8 (measured in share of the total population). 95 percent confidence intervals are provided. Panels (d)-(f): In-sample predicted probability of coalition realization against the size difference between the status highest ethnic group and the total population size of the potential coalition. Panels for different sized of the status highest ethnic group (d=0.1, e=0.5, f=0.8). Red crosses pertain to realized potential coalitions, blue points to unrealized potential coalitions.

Finally, very large groups (0.8 in Figure 2 panel (c)) are unlikely to include a substantive number of additional allies in their coalition. This suggests that these groups do indeed not need to be concerned about the remaining population. Thus, here the possibility of including additional allies as a result of the lack of commitment issue may be outweighed by the incentive to save resources once a sufficient size of government is reached.

The lower panels (d) – (f) in Figure 2 provide initial insights to in-sample prediction performance and the underlying distribution of realized coalitions. Panels (d–f) plot the in-sample predicted probability of coalition realization against the size difference between the status highest ethnic group and the total population size of the potential coalition. However, in Figure 2 panel (d) only potential coalitions with a status highest ethnic group smaller than

0.1 are displayed, in panel (e) status highest ethnic groups are between 0.1 and 0.5, while in panel (f) the status highest group is larger than 0.5. Observations marked with a red cross are realized potential coalitions, while blue points are unrealized potential coalitions. Again, the proposed relationship can be observed by the fact that red observations receive on average higher predicted probabilities than blue observations.

Regarding our additional variables, we find that governments are less likely to include dispersed groups. This implies that if dispersed ethnic groups exist in a country, they are more likely to be part of the “excluded coalition”. In addition, we find that governments seem to minimize the number of excluded groups. Coalitions that potentially exclude less ethnic groups are more likely to be realized. Further analysis has to investigate whether governments try to include as many small groups as possible, while excluding relatively large ethnic groups.

In addition to the episode model, we also analyze two further datasets. While we have so far concentrated on the year an ethnic ruling coalition is formed, we also analyze a dataset that only includes years when new coalitions are formed (coalition model) and final dataset, which simply looks at the occurrence of ethnic ruling coalitions. Table 1 and Figure 3 demonstrate that our results are similar to the episode model.

## CONCLUSION

This paper analyzes government leaders’ strategic choice for including and excluding other ethnic groups into a government alliance. Using a research design that allows explicitly modeling the agency of the most senior ethnic group, we find that small senior partners cannot include many additional groups as they have to fear a commitment problem. Large senior partners also do not include many additional allies, likely because they do not have to increase the size of the coalition further. When senior partners are of intermediate size, on the other hand, we find that there are two types of government leaders in the data: As predicted, in some cases groups presenting a large proportion of the remaining population are included. This was expected as government leaders representing larger groups have to be less concerned about commitment problems than their smaller counterparts. However, some other senior partners of intermediate size only include small additional parts of the population. There seem to be additional factors that influence which strategy governments choose when both repression and inclusion is feasible and additional action is necessary. Such factors could for example relate to the cost of repression or the risk of rebellion posed by the potential remaining opposition. Exploring these factors further is important for fully understanding governments’ rationale for excluding and including groups and will be pursued in future iterations of this paper.




FIGURE 3. Panels (a)-(c). Three scenarios with varying sizes of the status highest ethnic group. In panel (a) the size of the status highest group is 0.01, in panel (b) it is 0.5, and in panel (c) 0.8 (measured in share of the total population). 95 percent confidence intervals are provided. Panels (d)-(f): In-sample predicted probability of coalition realization against the size difference between the status highest ethnic group and the total population size of the potential coalition. Panels for different sized of the status highest ethnic group (d=0.1, e=0.5, f=0.8). Red crosses pertain to realized potential coalitions, blue points to unrealized potential coalitions.

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