Indigenous peoples (Lenca, Maya-Chorti, Miskito, Tawahka/Sumu, Xicaque, Pech, Nahua)
GuaranÃ­ and other eastern indigenous groups
Tupi-Guarani and other indigenous groups
Northern Groups (Mole-Dagbani, Gurma, Grusi)
Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples)
Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)
Riverine groups (Mbaka, Yakoma, Banziri etc.)
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Teso, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)
Northerners (Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa-Nubian, Lugbara, Alur)
Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur)
Far North-West Nilers (Madi, Lugbara, Alur)
South-Westeners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda)
Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)
Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla (Arab)

Northern (Bariba, Peul, Ottamari, Yoa-Lokpa, Dendi, Gourmanchéma)
Guaraní and other eastern indigenous groups
IndigIndigenous peoples (Lenca, Maya-Chorti, Miskito, Tawahka/Sumu, Xicaque, Pech, Nahua)
Tupi-Guaraní and other indigenous groups
According to the EPR ETHZ GrowUp dataset, ethnicity is not relevant in Papua New Guinea.
Ethnicity is coded as irrelevant in the EPR ETHZ GrowUp dataset (South Korean is an ethnically homogeneous state).
Ethnicity is coded as irrelevant in the EPR ETHZ GrowUp dataset.
Ethnicity is coded as irrelevant in the EPR ETHZ GrowUP dataset.
Ethnicity is deemed as irrelevant by the EPR ETHZ GrowUp Dataset.
Even if more than 81% of the population is made by Foreigners, ethnicity is not a relevant factor when it comes to political power distribution (EPR ETHZ GrowUp)
After the introduction of power-sharing arrangements, the political power and the state's positions are equally distributed between the Hutu and the Tutsi.
Ethnicity is coded as irrelevant in Cuba since 1960 in the EPR ETHZ GrowUp dataset.
Following a constitutional reform, the Hutu were granted equal representation in the state bodies of political nature. However, the EPR ETHZ GROWNUP Dataset highlights the fact that they remained powerless and discriminated.
Still according to the EPR ETHZ GROWNUP Dataset, after the 2004 elections, the Hutu hold 60% of the state's positions, whereas the Tutsi only have access to 40% of them. 
The administrative units have been divided to reflect this distribution of power. The identified pattern of domination among the state bodies of political nature is thus the following: they were first dominated at 100% by the Hutu, then equally share between the Hutu and the Tutsi (50% / 50%) and finally dominated by the Hutu again (60% VS 40% for the Tutsi). However, it was not clear from the consulted sources if this pattern reflects only the ethnic domination of the state bodies, or could also be applied to the administrative units (e.g. the eighteen provinces).
Warning : the estimates and the number of administrative units are not the same as the ones provided by COTTIER.
1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Saudi_Arabia#Provinces_of_the_Kingdom_of_Saudi_Arabia ; 2) https://growup.ethz.ch/pfe/Saudi%20Arabia ;  3) Deiwiks, Christa and Cederman, Lars-Erik and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2012), "Inequality and Conflict in Federations", Journal of Peace Research Vol 49, pp 289-304.
1) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_and_federal_territories_of_Malaysia ; 2) Deiwiks, Christa and Cederman, Lars-Erik and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2012), "Inequality and Conflict in Federations", Journal of Peace Research Vol 49, pp 289-304.
According to the EPR ETHZ GROWNUP Dataset, the Christians are recorded as senior partners in the government, whereas the Other Muslims are only considered as junior partners. This means that the Christians held a stronger domination over the administrative units than the Other Muslims. However, the exact number of administrative units dominated by each of this group is unknown, and the number 2 and 4 have been assigned to them arbitrarily, with the aim of reflecting the unequal power of the two groups. 
No changes in the domination pattern followed the year 1998 and 2004. The Christians were already dominant before these two dates.
In 1979, a new constitution was adopted that granted Indigeneous people the right to vote and to be elected (they are not excluded from the political process anymore).
Raising number of Indigeneous elected representatives in two provinces: Andes and Amazon.
Bulgaria first democratic Constitution adopted in 1991, and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party, which is a Turkish-minority party, was legalized in 1992. As the EPR ETHZ GROWNUP Dataset highlights the fact that this party played an important coalition-forming role in virtually all post-Communist governments, we can expect that he gained some influence political influence and had some officials elected, at least in the regions mostly populated by Turkish. Thanks to the ethnic statistics display by Wikipedia for all Bulgarian provinces, it is possible to say that the Turkish were only in majority in two of them after 1992. However, the current amount of gathered information is not sufficient to remove all the uncertainty when it comes to the precise number of administrative units dominated by each group.
Deiwiks, Christa and Cederman, Lars-Erik and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2012), "Inequality and Conflict in Federations", Journal of Peace Research Vol 49, pp 289-304.
A coalition of Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek overthrow the ruling Pashtun elite and dominated the political institutions (no evidence of how they divided the power between them). However, this situation was not stable, and ethnic divisions led the country toward the path of wardlordism and ethnic conflicts. 
The changes in the domination pattern follow 1992.
Ethnic minorities are not discriminated anymore, but they are still powerless (no elected representatives either on the local or national levels).
Warning : the estimates are not the same as the one provided by COTTIER.
Establishment of the Kingdom of Cambodia (a constitutional monarchy) in 1993. The rights of the minorities were granted by the new Constitution, but they remain powerless during this period.
Minorities were integrated in the ruling government, except the Chinese. However, there is no evidence of the number of administrative units they might controlled, and this could not be infer thanks to there geographical distribution. 
No changes in this pattern follow 1982.
Minorities were integrated in the ruling government, except the Chinese. However, there is no evidence of the number of administrative units they might controlled, and this could not be infer thanks to there geographical distribution. 
No changes in this pattern follow 1988.