

Single and Attractive: Uniqueness and Stability of Economic Equilibria under Monotonicity Assumptions

Patrizio Bifulco

University of Hagen

Jochen Glück

University of Wuppertal

Oliver Krebs

ETH Zürich

Bohdan Kukharsky

City University of New York

Villars Workshop

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Multiple equilibria are not necessarily useless but, from the standpoint of any exact science, the existence of 'uniquely determined equilibrium [...]' is, of course of the utmost importance [...]; without any possibility of proving the existence of uniquely determined equilibrium—or at all events, of a small number of possible equilibria—at however high a level of abstraction, a field of phenomena is really a chaos that is not under analytic control.

(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 969)

Motivation

- Growing interdependency of global economy increases the need to study the propagation of shocks through networks
 - Brexit, sanctions, covid-19, environmental policies, hurricane Katrina, infrastructure projects, RTAs etc.
 - Past decade saw the rise of quantitative general equilibrium models to analyze such effects
 - ▶ Data and code for several 'of the shelf' models readily available
 - ▶ Derive new shock → run code → interpret output
 - Important aspect often gets lost: Is the output really the correct/only solution?
 - Workhorse Caliendo-Parro model with many countries, many sectors and intermediates
- ⇒ Even for this widely used, relatively simple, perfect competition model: no proof of uniqueness of the simulated outcome

This paper / Literature

- Here we:
 1. Provide a new mathematical approach to determine uniqueness of a solution in a broad class of equation systems
 2. Discuss its application to quantitative trade models
- We focus on trade models but approach is very general
- Further possible applications: Economic Geography, Urban Economics, Social Networks, ...
- Several recent papers also tackle uniqueness questions (Allen et al., 2020, 2022, and Kucheryavyy et al., 2021)
- Our Theorem is most closely related to Allen, Arkolakis, Li (2022) although building on a different mathematical background for the proof
- Regarding uniqueness our proof can cover additional models, including several highly relevant extensions (see below)

Disclaimer

- We discuss uniqueness of *interior* equilibria only (for now)
- E.g. Multi-sector Melitz model has potential for corner solutions
- Intuition:
 - ▶ Ex-post: (marginal) firm with infinite productivity draw would always produce
 - ▶ Ex-ante: entry only if *expected* profits are large enough to cover entry costs
 - ▶ But:
 - One sector: demand $\rightarrow 0$, labor demand $\rightarrow 0$, wage $\rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow$ at the margin firm entry is costless
 - Multi-sector: sector s demand $\rightarrow 0$, wage determined through aggregate demand \Rightarrow entry costs can become prohibitive
- However: in many cases corner solutions are unrealistic/unobserved implying that for quantifications it would be better to adopt the model
- E.g. use across-country CES nest (Kucheryavyi et al. 2021, Caliendo et al. 2020) to avoid 0 production

Main Theorem

We consider fix-point solutions

$$x^* = F(x^*)$$

of the continuously differentiable function $F : \mathbb{R}_{++}^N \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$. If...

- (a) function F *connects all variables*, i.e. the modulus of its Jacobian matrix, $|DF(x)|$, is irreducible for each $x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$
- (b) function F *exhibits self-interaction*, i.e. for each $x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$ there exists an index $j \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ such that $\frac{\partial F_j(x)}{\partial x_j} \neq 0$
- (c) function F *scales with exponent u* , i.e.

$$F(c^u x) = c^u F(x)$$

for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$ and all $c \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ and for some $u \in \mathbb{R}^N$ with at least one $u \neq 0$

Main Theorem

- (d) *the monotonicity behavior of F is consistent with u , i.e. the set $\{1, \dots, N\}$ can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets ζ_+ and ζ_- such that $u_j \geq 0$ for all $j \in \zeta_+$ and $u_j \leq 0$ for all $j \in \zeta_-$ and that for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$ and all indices $j, k \in \{1, \dots, N\}$:*

$$\frac{\partial F_j(x)}{\partial x_k} \geq 0 \quad \text{if both } j \text{ and } k \text{ are in the same of the sets } \zeta_+, \zeta_-$$

$$\frac{\partial F_j(x)}{\partial x_k} \leq 0 \quad \text{if } j \text{ and } k \text{ are not in the same of the sets } \zeta_+, \zeta_-$$

and there exists a solution $x^* \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$ then one has...

- (i) Up-to-scale uniqueness: the solutions to the fixed point equation are precisely the vectors in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N given by $c^u x^*$ for some $c \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$.
- (ii) Lyapunov stability and attractivity: For every $x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^N$ the iterates $F^n(x)$ converge to one of the solutions from the solution vector as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Simple example 1/3

- Consider a simple one sector Eaton-Kortum model with J countries and consumers with CES utility C_i over varieties ν

$$C_i = \left(\int_0^1 (C_i(\nu))^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\nu \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- Firms use labor (with Cobb-Douglas share γ_i) and intermediates (combined with the same CES aggregator) to produce

$$p_i(\nu) = \frac{w_i^{\gamma_i} P_i^{(1-\gamma_i)}}{z_i(\nu)},$$

where z_i 's are drawn from a Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ and scale parameter A_i

- With iceberg trade costs τ_{ij} the price index becomes

$$P_i = \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta + 1 - \sigma}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \left(\sum_{j=1}^J A_j \left(w_j^{\gamma_j} P_j^{(1-\gamma_j)} \tau_{ji} \right)^{-\theta} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

Simple example 2/3

- Firms and consumers source from the cheapest supplier of each variety and in equilibrium markets must clear

$$R_i = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{A_i \left(w_i^{\gamma_i} P_i^{(1-\gamma_i)} \tau_{ij} \right)^{-\theta}}{\sum_{k=1}^J A_k \left(w_k^{\gamma_k} P_k^{(1-\gamma_k)} \tau_{kj} \right)^{-\theta}} R_j,$$

with $R_i = w_i L_i / \gamma_i$ denoting the production value in i .


- Rewrite the equilibrium using multilateral resistance terms

$\mathbb{P}_i \equiv P_i^{-\theta}$ and $\Omega_i = R_i \left(w_i^{\gamma_i} P_i^{(1-\gamma_i)} \right)^{\theta}$ yields:

$$\Omega_i = \sum_{j=1}^J \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta + 1 - \sigma}{\theta} \right)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} A_i \tau_{ij}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{\gamma_j}{L_j} \right)^{-\frac{\theta \gamma_j}{1+\theta \gamma_j}} \Omega_j^{\frac{1}{1+\theta \gamma_j}} \mathbb{P}_j^{\frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta \gamma_j} - 1}$$

$$\mathbb{P}_i = \sum_{j=1}^J \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta + 1 - \sigma}{\theta} \right)^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} A_j \tau_{ji}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{\gamma_j}{L_j} \right)^{-\frac{\theta \gamma_j}{1+\theta \gamma_j}} \Omega_j^{\frac{1}{1+\theta \gamma_j} - 1} \mathbb{P}_j^{\frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta \gamma_j}}$$

Simple example 3/3

- The scaling and self-interaction properties are trivially fulfilled, the connection property by assumption
 - Clearly all Ω influence all Ω positively and all \mathbb{P} negatively, and all \mathbb{P} influence all \mathbb{P} positively and all Ω negatively
 - Scaling all Ω by c^{u_Ω} immediately implies that all \mathbb{P} must be scaled by $c^{u_\mathbb{P}}$ with $u_\mathbb{P} = -\frac{1+\theta}{\theta} u_\Omega$ 
- $u_\mathbb{P}$ is negative whenever u_Ω is positive and this is consistent with the groups ζ_+ and ζ_- consisting of all Ω and all \mathbb{P} respectively
- ⇒ Solution is (up-to-scale) unique and iterative procedure converges to the solution

Universal Gravity

- Allen, Arkolakis, Takahashi show that the equilibrium of several one-sector seminal trade and economic geography models can be written as:

$$p_i^{1+\phi} \bar{c}_i \left(\frac{p_i}{P_i} \right)^\psi = \sum_j \tau_{ij}^{-\phi} P_j^\phi p_j \bar{c}_j \left(\frac{p_j}{P_j} \right)^\psi$$

$$P_i^{-\phi} = \sum_j \tau_{ji}^{-\phi} p_j^{-\phi}$$

- Unique solution if $\psi \geq 0, \phi \geq 0$ or $\psi \leq -1, \phi \leq -1$
- Our theorem allows to extend this proof to i -specific exponents with unique solutions if for all i , $\psi_i \geq 0, \phi_i \geq 0$ or $\psi_i \leq -1, \phi_i \leq -1$
- Small but non-trivial and important extension: country-specific labor/intermediate/capital shares, housing-expenditure shares, etc.

Multisector - no intermediates 1/2

- Eaton-Kortum type model as in the simple setup above but with multiple sectors (1:1 link between (sectoral) revenue and wages is lost)

$$\Omega_{is} = \sum_j \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)^{-\frac{\theta_s}{1-\sigma_s}} A_{is} (\tau_{ijs})^{-\theta_s} \alpha_{js} \mathbb{P}_{js}^{-1} L_j w_j$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{is} = \sum_j \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)^{\frac{-\theta_s}{1-\sigma_s}} A_{js} \tau_{jis}^{-\theta_s} w_j^{-\theta_s}$$

$$w_i = \sum_r \frac{1}{L_i} \Omega_{ir} w_i^{-\theta_r}$$

- Define $\Theta = \sum_s \theta_s$ and $W_i = w_i^{1+\Theta}$ to get

Multisector - no intermediates 2/2

$$\Omega_{is} = \sum_j \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)^{-\frac{\theta_s}{1-\sigma_s}} A_{is} (\tau_{ijs})^{-\theta_s} \alpha_{js} \mathbb{P}_{js}^{-1} L_j W_j^{\frac{1}{1+\Theta}}$$

$$\mathbb{P}_{is} = \sum_j \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)^{\frac{-\theta_s}{1-\sigma_s}} A_{js} \tau_{jis}^{-\theta_s} W_j^{\frac{-\theta_s}{1+\Theta}}$$

$$W_i = \sum_r \frac{1}{L_i} \Omega_{ir} W_i^{\frac{\Theta - \theta_r}{1+\Theta}}$$

- Allows to separate variables into the two groups Ω , W and \mathbb{P} and that groups are consistent with the exponent vector u from scaling.

Conclusion

- We use a new mathematical approach to develop a theorem stating sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a general fix-point system
- We show how this theorem can be applied to proof uniqueness in models under the universal gravity framework with country specific elasticities, i.e. varying labor/intermediate shares across countries
- We show uniqueness in the case of a multi-sector, multi-country Eaton-Kortum type model without intermediates
- Future: combine both worlds \rightarrow Caliendo-Parro model

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Consistent Changes

$$c^{u_{\Omega_i}} \Omega_i = \sum_{j=1}^J K_{ij} c^{\frac{1}{1+\theta\gamma_j} u_{\Omega_j} + \left(\frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta\gamma_j} - 1\right) u_{\mathbb{P}_j}} \Omega_j^{\frac{1}{1+\theta\gamma_j}} \mathbb{P}_j^{\frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta\gamma_j} - 1}$$

$$c^{u_{\mathbb{P}_i}} \mathbb{P}_i = \sum_{j=1}^J K_{ji} c^{\left(\frac{1}{1+\theta\gamma_j} - 1\right) u_{\Omega_j} + \frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta\gamma_j} u_{\mathbb{P}_j}} \Omega_j^{\frac{1}{1+\theta\gamma_j} - 1} \mathbb{P}_j^{\frac{1-\gamma_j}{1+\theta\gamma_j}}$$

$$u_{\Omega_i} = \frac{1}{1 + \theta\gamma_j} u_{\Omega_j} + \left(\frac{1 - \gamma_j}{1 + \theta\gamma_j} - 1 \right) u_{\mathbb{P}_j}$$

$$u_{\mathbb{P}_i} = \left(\frac{1}{1 + \theta\gamma_j} - 1 \right) u_{\Omega_j} + \frac{1 - \gamma_j}{1 + \theta\gamma_j} u_{\mathbb{P}_j}$$

$$u_{\Omega} = - \left(\frac{1}{\theta} + 1 \right) u_{\mathbb{P}}$$

$$u_{\Omega} = - \left(\frac{1}{\theta} + 1 \right) u_{\mathbb{P}}$$

General to EK 1/2

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{N}_{ijsu} &= N_{ijsu} \tilde{\varphi}_{ijsu}^{\sigma_s-1} \\
 &= \frac{A_{is} p_{ijsu}^{-\theta_s}}{\sum_k A_{ks} p_{kjsu}^{-\theta_s}} \left(p_{ijsu}^{\theta_s} \sum_k A_{ks} p_{kjsu}^{-\theta_s} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_s-1}{\theta_s}} \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right) \\
 &= \underbrace{\left(\sum_k A_{ks} p_{kjsu}^{-\theta_s} \right)^{-\frac{\theta_s - \sigma_s + 1}{\theta_s}}}_{\mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{P},jsu}} \underbrace{\Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right) A_{is} p_{is}^{\sigma_s-1-\theta_s}}_{\mathcal{N}_{\Omega,is}} \\
 &\quad \underbrace{(\tau_{ijsu} (1 + t_{ijsu}))^{\sigma_s-1-\theta_s}}_{\mathcal{N}_{\phi,ijsu}} .
 \end{aligned}$$

General to EK 2/2

Assume no outer CES-nest, i.e. $\omega_s = \sigma_s$, as in standard EK:

$$\mathbb{P}_{jsu} = \left(\sum_k A_{ks} p_{kjsu}^{-\theta_s} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_s - 1}{\theta_s}} \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)$$

$$\mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{P}, jsu} = \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right)^{-1} \left(\sum_k A_{ks} p_{kjsu}^{-\theta_s} \right)^{-1} \mathbb{P}_{jsu}$$

$$\Rightarrow \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{jsu} = \mathbb{P}_{jsu} \mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{P}, jsu}^{-\frac{1 - \omega_s}{1 - \sigma_s}} = \Gamma \left(\frac{\theta_s + 1 - \sigma_s}{\theta_s} \right) \sum_i A_{is} p_{ijsu}^{-\theta_s}$$

► return

General Trade Model 1/5

- (possibly) heterogeneous agents (workers, producers, landlords...) have the following aggregate demand systems

$$C_{ju} = \prod_{s=1}^U \left(\frac{C_{jsu}}{\alpha_{jsu}} \right)^{\alpha_{jsu}}$$

$$C_{jsu} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^J C_{ijsu}^{\frac{\omega_s-1}{\omega_s}} \right)^{\frac{\omega_s}{\omega_s-1}}$$

$$C_{ijsu} = \left(\int_{M_{ijsu}} (C_{ijsu}(\nu))^{\frac{\sigma_s-1}{\sigma_s}} d\nu \right)^{\frac{\sigma_s}{\sigma_s-1}}$$

- α_{jsu} Cobb-Douglas share of user group u in country j for the output/endowments of s
- M_{ijsu} is the set of varieties country j 's agents u buys from agents s and country i

General Trade Model 2/5

- The price index for what ju buys from is , i.e. $C_{ij su}$, becomes

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ij su} &= \left(\int_{M_{ij su}} (p_{ij su}(\nu))^{1-\sigma_s} d\nu \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_s}} = \\ &= \left(\int_0^\infty (p_{ij su}(\varphi))^{1-\sigma_s} N_{ij su} u_{ij su}(\varphi) d\varphi \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_s}} = \\ &= N_{ij su}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_s}} p_{is} \tau_{ij su} \tilde{\varphi}_{ij su}^{-1} = p_{is} \tau_{ij su} \mathcal{N}_{ij su}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_s}} \end{aligned}$$

- $N_{ij su}$ is the number of varieties ju buys from is in equilibrium (1 for homogeneous agents)
- $u_{ij su}(\varphi)$ their conditional productivity distribution
- $\tilde{\varphi}_{ij su}$ their 'average' productivity (1 for endowments)
- $\mathcal{N}_{ij su}$ an 'aggregate productivity' measure
- p_{is} is the part of the mill price independent of productivity (i.e. $\sigma_s / (\sigma_s - 1) p_{is}$ in Melitz, c_{is} in perfect competition, w_i for labor)

General Trade Model 3/5

- Denote expenditure of ju on s by E_{jsu} , define multilateral resistance terms $\mathbb{P}_{jsu} \equiv p_{jsu}^{1-\omega_s}$, trade freeness $\phi_{ijsu} \equiv \tau_{ijsu}^{1-\omega_s}$, and use the demand structure to write trade flows X_{ijsu} as

$$X_{ijsu} = p_{is}^{1-\omega_s} \frac{E_{jsu}}{\mathbb{P}_{jsu}} \phi_{ijsu} \mathcal{N}_{ijsu}^{\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}.$$

- Define the outward multilateral resistance terms $\Omega_{is} \equiv \frac{Y_{is}}{p_{is}^{1-\omega_s}}$ and use market clearing $Y_{is} = \sum_u \sum_j X_{ijsu}$ and expenditure $E_{jsu} = \sum_i X_{ijsu}$ (together with the assumption of no corner solution) to write

$$\Omega_{is} = \sum_u \sum_j \frac{E_{jsu}}{\mathbb{P}_{jsu}} \phi_{ijsu} \mathcal{N}_{ijsu}^{\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}$$
$$\mathbb{P}_{jsu} = \sum_i p_{is}^{1-\omega_s} \phi_{ijsu} \mathcal{N}_{ijsu}^{\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}$$

General Trade Model 4/5

- We make two further assumptions on the production side (that are met by all the most common frameworks):
 - ▶ Each agent group ju receives constant shares γ_{ijru} of the production value from (potentially) around the world
 - ▶ \mathcal{N}_{ijsu} can be multiplicatively split into $\mathcal{N}_{\Omega,is}$, $\mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{P},jsu}$, and $\mathcal{N}_{\phi,ijsu}$, with the last term exogenous
- (Re)define $\tilde{\Omega}_{is} = \Omega_{is} \mathcal{N}_{\Omega,is}^{-\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}$, $\tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{isu} = \mathbb{P}_{isu} \mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{P},isu}^{-\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}$, and $\tilde{p}_{is}^{1-\omega_s} = p_{is}^{1-\omega_s} \mathcal{N}_{\Omega,is}^{\frac{1-\omega_s}{1-\sigma_s}}$. [▶ example](#)

General Trade Model 5/5

- The full (internal) equilibrium then becomes

$$\tilde{\Omega}_{is} = \sum_u \sum_j E_{jsu} \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{jsu}^{-1} \tilde{\phi}_{ijsu}$$

$$\tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{jsu} = \sum_i \tilde{p}_{is}^{1-\omega_s} \tilde{\phi}_{ijsu}$$

$$E_{jsu} = \alpha_{jsu} \sum_i \sum_r \gamma_{ijru} \tilde{\Omega}_{ir} \tilde{p}_{ir}^{1-\omega_r}$$

$$\tilde{p}_{is} = F_{\tilde{p}}(\cdot)$$

- Plug III and II into I so that the equations depend only on multilateral resistance terms and 'prices' \tilde{p}_{is}
- Use our approach to find conditions on $F_{\tilde{p}}(\cdot)$ for the internal equilibrium to be unique