[1] Sun Tzu, The Art of War, London, Shambala, 1991, p.20
[2] Musashi, Miyamoto, The Book of Five Rings, London, Shambala, 1994, p. 101
[3] See for example: Lee III, Rensselaer, W. The White Labyrinth. Cocaine and Political Power, Transaction Publishers, London 1989,xvi-263 p.; MacDonald, Scott, Dancing on a Volcano. The Latin American Drug Trade, Praeger, New York, 1988, xi-166 p.; Call, Charles; Youngers, Coletta and Walsh, John, Peligro inminente?: Las FF.AA. de Estados Unidos y la guerra contra las drogas, Bogota, CEI/Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales/Tercer Mundo Editores, 1993, 250 pp. (Translation of Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: the U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes, Washington DC, WOLA, 1991, 154p.); Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, Drogas y Seguridad Nacional: La Amenaza de la intervención?, Comisión Sudamericana de Paz, Santiago, 1989, 40 p.
[4] See for example: Dziedzic, Michael, "The transnational drug trade and regional security," Survival, November/December 1989, pp. 533-48; Seccombe, Ralph, "Troublesome Boomerang: Illicit Drug Policy and Security," Security Dialogue, Vol. 28 (3), 1997, pp. 287-299; Jamieson, Alison, Terrorism and drug trafficking in the 1990's, Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1994, xv-285 p.
[5] See: Griffith, Ivelaw L., From Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics, International Journal, Volume XLIX, Nº 1, Winter 1993-4, pp. 3-36 and same author, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, 314 p.
[6] See footnote Nº 5
[7] Dreyfus, Pablo G., The illicit drug traffic as a non-military aspect of security in South America. Issues and Policies of a transshipment country: Argentina (1989-1994), Geneva, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, September 1995, 126 p.
[8] I am referring here to "Drugs and Security in the Caribbean" in a previous article ("From Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics-see footnote Nº 5 ) Griffith set the showed the theoretical framework he was using in is project "Sovereignty under Siege" that turned into his book).
[9] Fischer, Dietrich, "Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach," UNIDIR/Dartmouth, London, 1993, p. xi
[10] Fischer, op.cit. ; Barry Buzan, Peoples, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold Era, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1991, 393 p.; Manwaring, Max, Beyond the Cold War: Toward a Theory of Engagement to Confront the Gray Area Phenomenon in Manwaring, Max (ed.) Gray Area Phenomena. Confronting the New World Disorder, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, pp.63-76; Manwaring, Max, The Umbrella of Legitimacy, in Manwaring, Max (ed.), op.cit., pp. 77-92; Romm, Joseph, Defining National Security .The Nonmilitary Aspects, New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press,1993, v-122 pp. For a very recent example of this broadened conception of security see: Matthew, Richard A. and Shaumbaugh, George E., "Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities," Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, Nº 2, 1998, pp.163-175.
[11] Martin, J. and Romano, A. , Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drugs & Arms Trafficking , London, Newbury, 1992, p.15
[12] World Health Organization, Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1994,p 34
[13] The World Health Organization Defines harmful use as " A pattern of psychoactive substance use that is causing damage to health. The damage may be physical or mental," see: World Health Organization, op.cit. , p.7
[14] On this issue see: World Health Organization, op.cit., pp. 25 and 41. Also see: United Nations Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report, Oxford University Press, 1997, p.168.
[15] The Hague Opium Convention (1912), the Second International Opium Convention (1925), the Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs (1931), the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs (1936), the 1946 Protocol (under which the United Nations was given the power to carry on the League of Nations functions under the various narcotic treaties), the 1948 Paris Protocol (which granted the WHO the authority to control all addictive drugs), the 1953 Opium protocol ( which restricted the use of opium to scientific and medical needs), the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the 1972 Protocol to the 1961 Convention, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the United Nations Convention against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). In the case of the 1925, 1931 and 1936 conventions, the League of Nations was the framework for the signature of the conventions and the establishment of organs for the monitoring of their implementation. The 1961 (and Protocol), the 1971 and the 1988 conventions were discussed and signed within the UN framework and also established UN bodies in order to monitor their implementation. The United Nations drug control system will be discussed in Chapter VIII of this dissertation.
[16] See: Bettati, Mario, La lutte de l'ONU contre la drogue, in Bettati, Mario, L'ONU et la drogue, Paris, Association Française pour les Nations Unies/ Editions A. Pedone, 1995, p.14 The only previous convention that was not incorporated into the 1961 Single Convention was the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. This convention signed in Geneva on June 26, 1936 attempted to tighten the loopholes used by offenders to escape prosecution by facilitating the extradition of offenders. This convention however was never fully implemented. On this issue see:Rolley, Robin, United Nations' Activities in International Drug Control, in MacDonald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce (eds.), International Handbook on Drug Control, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1992, p.416
[17] The 1961 Convention has been amended by the 1972 Protocol to the Convention that "calls for increased efforts to prevent illicit drug production of, traffic in, and use of narcotics. It also highlights the need to provide treatment and rehabilitation services to drug abusers, stressing that treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration may be considered instead of, or in addition to imprisonment in cases involving individuals who have committed a drug offence" see: UNDCP, World Drug Report, p. 168
[18] United Nations, Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971, Vienna, 1993, p.9
[19] Both the 1961 and 1971 conventions consider as licit the production of cocaine in limited amounts for medical uses. Their purpose is to assure the availability of these drugs for medical uses and to prevent their leakage to the illicit market. For this purpose the International Narcotics Control Board ( INCB) was established by the 1961 Convention to monitor the illicit cultivation, production, manufacture and utilization of drugs for medical and scientific purposes. Governments are required to report annually on licit and illicit production and the INCB will advise, assist or propose sanctions if countries default. Sanctions consist of recommending that involved parties stop importing or exporting drugs, or both, from or to the country or territory concerned, either for a designated territory, a designated period or until the Board is satisfied as to the situation in that country or territory. On this issue see: United Nations, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Vienna, 1993, Article 14, paragraph 2, p.24 and UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971, Article 19, paragraph
[20] Donelly, Jack, The United Nations and the Global Drug Control Regime, in Drug Policy in the Americas, Smith, Peter, H., Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, p.287
[21] Renborg, Bertil, International Drug Control. A study of International Administration By and Through the League of Nations, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1947, p.26.
[22] See: Stares, Paul, Global Habit. The Drug Problem in a Borderless World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1996,p.20
[23] Bettati, Mario, "Le contrôle international des stupéfiants," p.23, The U.S. government for example refused to ratify the Convention on the grounds that it did not go far enough and contained too many loopholes. See: Stares, Paul, Global Habit, p.20
[24] As stated by two analysts, " [t]he rhetoric of the war on drugs was formalized in April 1986, when President Reagan issued National Security Decision directive 221 stating that drug trafficking constituted a lethal threat to U.S. security interests and authorizing an expanded role for the U.S. military in the antinarcotics fight." See: Bagley, Bruce M. and Tokatlián, Juan G., "Dope and Dogma: Explaining the failure of U.S.-Latin American drug policies," in Hartlyn, Jonathan, Shoultz, Lars and Varas, Augusto, The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992, p.225
[25] Steven R. David, Why third world matters, International Security, Vol. 17, Nº 3 (Winter 1992/93).p167
[26] National Security Drug Control Strategy, The White House, January 1990,p60
[27] Bush, George, National security strategy of the United States, 1990-1991, Brassey's, Washington, 1990, p.23
[28] "...Despite encouraging (though lukewarm) signs of change in this area, President Clinton's administration reinforced the policy of employing a coercive anti-drug strategy abroad even as he opened a second front at home at the same time in an effort to resolve, albeit incipiently, the enormous problems generated by the high demand for drugs through education and rehabilitation rather than relying on enforcement alone. Nevertheless, the principles and foundations of Washington's domestic and international drug strategy have not been rectified. Neither has an alternate debate been initiated nationally that might indicate an eventual arrangement of gravitating social and political forces in the United States which could give rise to a strategy different from the one in place..."Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, "The Miami Summit and Drugs," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 36, Nº 3, Fall 1994,p.83.
[29] Romm, op.cit., p.14
[30] Romm, op.cit, p.14. One main departure from Romm's view is that, in this dissertation, expanded drug abuse of harmful drugs can be considered as a national security problem because it threatens the integrity and quality of the human resources of a nation. One has only to walk around in some European, U.S. or even Latin American cities to see the effects that the use of drugs such as cocaine (or its smokable versions, crack and bazuco) and heroin can have on the person. To put it coldly, cocaine (and crack and bazuco) and heroin dependent people can become "out of circulation" in terms of their productive and creative potential. Not to mention the fact that in the case of pregnant women the baby can develop a dependency on the drug before birth and the fact that the intravenous use of cocaine and heroine (when needles are shared) contribute to the expansion of AIDS and other infectious diseases. At the time Romm published his book (1993) it was estimated that there were 30 million users of illicit drugs in the U.S. spending an estimated $28 billion per year on cocaine, $10 million to $12 billion on heroin and $68 billion on marijuana. On this estimate see: Romm, op.cit. p. 9
The same year it was estimated that there were 2,738,000 dependent users (weekly users) of cocaine and heroin in that country. Between 1988 and 1994 drug-related mortality (illicit drugs with or without alcohol) ranged from 6,000-8,500 cases annually in the metropolitan areas included in the survey. The highest number of drug-related deaths were recorded in New York and in Los Angeles. The most important single substance was cocaine, mentioned in 49% of all cases in 1994 and the biggest drug group was opiates, which were mentioned in 68% of the cases (one case may involve several drugs). The drug-specific trends in mortality were rising in 1991-1994, especially for amphetamines, cocaine and opiates. 10.4 percent of drug related death cases were less than 25 years old. See: UNDCP, World Drug Report, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 312-332
[31] The Quito Declaration Against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs was signed on August 1984 by the presidents of Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama a member of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua and a representative of the Government of Peru. See: A/39/407, United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs, Letter dated 14 August 1984 from the Representatives of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,, 17 August 1984. The New York Declaration against Drug Trafficking and the Illicit Use of Drugs was signed on October 1, 1984, by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, the ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina. See: A/39/407, United Nations, General Assembly, International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs, Letter dated 2 October 1984 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, October 10, 1984.
[32] United Nations, General Assembly, document A/39/407, p. 3
[33] United Nations, General Assembly, document, A/39/551, p. 2
[34] It is worth noticing that "bearing in mind" the Quito and New York declaration the General Assembly of the United Nations requested ECOSOC through its Commission on Narcotics drugs to initiate, as a matter of priority, the preparation of a draft convention against illicit drug traffic in narcotic drugs. This was in a sense the beginning of a process that would end up in 1988 with the elaboration of the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. On this issue see: United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 39/141, International campaign against traffic in narcotic drugs, December 14, 1984 and United Nations, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, United Nations, New York, 1998 , p.3
[35] United Nations, General Assembly, document A/39/551, p. 2
[36] United Nations, Division of Narcotic Drugs, Declaration of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking and Comprehensive Multidisciplinary Outline for Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control, United Nations, New York, 1988, p.1
[37] The Convention came into force on November 11, 1990. 137 states where party to the Convention in 1997. Among the signatories are Italy, the UK, USA, Sweden, Japan, Germany, the European Commission, France, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, Spain, Austria, Netherlands and Belgium. These countries alone provided 96% of the total voluntary funding of the United Nations International Drug Control programme in 1995. See: UNDCP, Drug World Report, p. 169.
[38] Donnelly, op.cit.p.291
[39] United Nations, Economic and Social Council, document E/CONF.82/15, United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, December 19, paragraph 3.
[40] E/CONF.82/15, Article 3, pp. 5 and 7. See also Article 1 subparagraph (m), p.4
[41] In its second paragraph the Declaration states that the States Members of the United Nations are "Deeply alarmed by the magnitude of the rising trend in the illicit demand, production, supply, trafficking and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which are a grave and persistent threat to the health and well-being of mankind, the stability of nations, the political, economic, social and cultural structures of all societies and the lives and dignity of millions of human beings..." See: United Nations, General Assembly, resolution S-17/2, Political Declaration and Global Program of Action by the General Assembly at its seventeenth special session, devoted to the question of international co-operation against illicit production, supply, demand, trafficking and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, February 23, 1990.
[42] Also in April 1990 a World Ministerial Summit (in association with the United Nations) was celebrated in 1990 in London to deal with the specific issue of cocaine trafficking and consumption. This shows the global relevance of the illicit traffic of a drug which production is based in South America. See: Declaration of the World Ministerial Summit to Reduce the Demand for Drugs and to Combat the Cocaine Threat, held in London from 9 to 11 April 1990, in UN General Assembly document A/45/262, International Action to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, May 2, 1990,p.2-10
[43] Lamond, Tullis, Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Trade,p.99
[44] UNDCP, Drug World Report, p.175
[45] See: United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/S-20/4, Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem, [on-line]. Available on the internet at http://WWW.UNDCP.ORG/resolution_1998_09_08_3.html and Political Declaration [on-line]. Available on the internet at http://www.un.org/ga/20special/poldecla.htm. The organization of this conference had been suggested by the government of Mexico two years before.
[46] Political Declaration [on-line]. Available internet http://www.un.org/ga/20special/poldecla.htm.
[47] Donnelly, op.cit., p. 282 Donnelly´s definition is based on Stephen Krasner widespread concept of international regimes as "principles norms , rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area". Krasner, Stephen, Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press,p.1
[48] Donnelly, op.cit. pp. 262 and 263
[49] ibid. p. 263
[50] ibid., p. 286
[51] Bettati, Mario, L'ONU et la drogue, p.17
[52] op.cit. p.21
[53] Bentham, Mandy, The Politics of Drug Control, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998, p.177
[54] UNDCP is an executive UN programme, which coordinates all drug control activities of the organization and also manages the implementation of UN technical assistance in both the demand and the supply sides. UNDCP is a result of the 1990 Program of Action which required the creation of a more centralized and effective drug control system.
[55] See: Uribe Ramírez, Sergio, Los cultivos ilícitos en Colombia , in Thoumi, Francisco, Uribe, Sergio, Rocha, Ricardo, Reyes Alejandro, Garzón, Edgar, López, Andrés, Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández Manuel, Drogas Ilícitas en Colombia. Su impacto económico y social, Bogotá, Ariel Ciencia Política, UNDP and Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 1997, p. 103
[56] Clawson, Patrick and Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, New York, St. Martin´s Press, p.12
[57] Drug Enforcement Administration, The Flow of Heroin into the United States, DEA Congressional Testimony, Statement by Donnie Marshall, Before the House of Representatives (Committee of International Relations), June 24, 1998 [on-line]. Available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
[58] Although reportedly the Colombian traffickers are encouraging Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Venezuelan peasants to grow opium poppy there is no evidence of a vertical integration between for example Peruvian and Colombian traffickers for the production of heroin. On this particular issue see: Koutozis, Michel (coordinator),Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1997, pp. 6 and 82.
[59] DEA, The Flow of Heroin into the United States, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
[60] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.17 and Betancourt, Darío and García, Martha, Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos. Historia social de la mafia colombiana (1965-1992), Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994, p.246
[61] Uribe Ramírez, op.cit., p.108
[62] See: Betancourt and García, p.244
[63] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.12
[64] For a detailed analysis of the illicit trafficking of all drugs not only in South America but in Latin America see: Dreyfus, Pablo, "El lado oscuro de la globalización: pasado, presente y futuro del tráfico de drogas en América Latina," SER 2000, (Buenos Aires), Nº 11, May 1999, pp. 30-41.
[65] Dziedic, The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security, Survival, November/December 1989, p 533
[66] Tullis, Handbook on illicit drug traffic, Greenwod Press, London,1991,p.54
[67] Statement by the Representative of the Province of Jujuy, Mr. Fernando Enrique Paz, 65th meeting of the Representatives Chamber of the Argentine Congress, "Repression and Fight against the illicit narcotics traffic," March 15, 1989,p. 7181
[68] As a matter of fact, during my research work in La Paz, in every government or international office I visited I was offered mate de coca (coca leaves tea) in order to counter the effect of high altitude.
[69] Plowman, Timothy, Coca chewing and the botanical origins of coca (Eythroxylum spp.) in South America, in Pacini, Deborah and Fraquemont, Christine (eds.),Coca and Cocaine. Effects on People and Policy in Latin America, Cultural Survival Report 23, Cornell University, 1985, pp. 4 and 5.
[70] Ambos, Kai, Control de Drogas. Política y Legislación en América Latina EE.UU. y Europa. Eficacia y Alternativas, Bogotá, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Ediciones Jurídicas Gustavo Ibañez and Universidad del Litoral (Argentina),1998, p.52
[71] Camino, Alejandro, Coca: del uso tradicional al narcotráfico, in García Sayán, Diego (ed.), Coca, Cocaína y Narcotráfico. Laberinto en los Andes, Lima, Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989, p.97
[72] Camino, op.cit., p.97. Original in Spanish. Italics as used in the original source.
[73] See: Rabey, Mario; Ozcoidi, Margarita; González, David and Sánchez Proaño, Mario, Legalidad e ilegalidad del coqueo en Argentina, in Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, La Coca...Tradición, Rito, Identidad, México, 1989, pp. 35-78
[74] Lee III, Rensselaer and Clawson, Patrick, Crop Substitution in the Andes, Washington D.C., Office of National Drug Control Policy, December 1998, p. 17 and : U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region , 1993, pp. 189 and 190
[75] See, Plowman, op.cit., pp. 9-33 for an excellent and complete analysis of the botany of coca.
[76] As explained by an expert, "Cocaine is obtained from coca leaves using a relatively simple method by which it is extracted from the leaves with an organic solvent (often kerosene); the alkaloids are passed through an acidic acquous solution based on hydrochloric acid; the solution is neutralized and the cocaine extracted by recrystalization" See: Mannaioni, P.F., The cocaine risk: toxicity, dependency and treatment, in Bruno, Francesco (ed.), Cocaine Today: Its Effects on the Individual and Society, Rome, UNICRI, 1991, p.56. The industrial process required to obtain big amounts of cocaine is described in Chapter III of this dissertation.
[77] OTA, op.cit., p. 190
[78] The World Health Organization defines drug dependence a "cluster of cognitive, behavioral and physiologic symptoms that indicate [that] a person has impaired control of psychoactive substance use of the substance despite adverse consequences" See: World Health Organization, Lexicon of alcohol and drug terms, p.24 This term has been introduced in 1964 by a WHO Expert Committee to replace 'addiction' and 'habituation'.
While psychological or psychic drug dependence refers to the experience of impaired control over drug use and physiological or physic drug dependence involves the development of tolerance and physical withdrawal symptoms upon cessation of use of the drug, as a consequence of the body's adaptation to the continued presence of the drug. See: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Terminology and Information on Drugs [on-line], available internet, http://www.undcp.org/adhoc/terminology_and_information_on_drugs/glossary.htm and WHO, Lexicon of Alcohol and drug terms, p.29A defined by the WHO,
"Tolerance," as defined by the WHO, is a reduction in the sensitivity to a drug following its repeated administration, in which increased doses are required to produce the same magnitude of effect previously produced by a smaller dose. This increase in dose may be necessitated by changes in the metabolism of the drug, or a cellular, physiological or behavioral adaptation to the effects of the drug. See: World Health Organization, WHO Technical Report Series, 836, WHO Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, Twenty-eight report, Geneva, WHO, 1993, p.5
[79] Riley, Kevin, Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996, p.5
[80] World Health Organization, Lexicon of Alcohol and Drug Terms, p. 23
[81] UNDCP, The United Nations and Drug Abuse Control, UNDCP, Geneva, 1992, p.22
[82] Gold, M.S., Cocaine (and Crack) in Bruno, Francesco, op.cit., p.81
[83] ibid., p.80
[84] ibid., p. 24 and Arif , A., Adverse health consequences of cocaine abuse, World Health Organization, Geneva, 1987, p. 12
[85] Arif. A, op.cit., p. 13
[86] ibid.
[87] Tullis, Handbook on illicit drug traffic, p8
[88] Hargreaves, Snowfields. The War on Cocaine in the Andes, Zed Books, London, 1992., p8
[89] National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The NNICC Report 1993: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington D.C., 1994, p.1
[90] NNICC, The NNICC Report 1996: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States, DEA, Washington, D.C., 1997,p.1
[91] Information about the main features of heroine has been obtained in: UNDCP, The United Nations and Drug Abuse, pp. 22-25
[92] On this issue see: Betancourt and García, op. cit. p. 228
[93] DEA, The Flow of Heroin into the United States, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ctlist.htm
[94] Michael Smith describes the production of heroin in the following terms: "The farmer collects the opium by scraping it off the bulb with a flat, blunt knife [...] In further refining stems, the opium gum is turned into a more potent extract. This process requires a level of standardization and quality control. The chemist begins by heating water and dropping in raw opium until it dissolves. By adding ordinary lime, organic waste is precipitated out, leaving the morphine suspended in the chalky white water. Once this is done, there is a second round of heating, in which concentrated ammonia is added to solution, causing the morphine to solidify and drop to the bottom. The liquid is then filtered through flannel, leaving chunky white kernels of morphine usually weights about a tenth of the weight of the raw opium from which it was extracted. Then follows a five-step process, in which morphine molecules are chemically bound with acetic acid and refined into heroin. This is a more sophisticated operation requiring heating, filtering and crystallization. The compound at the end of the process is a fluffy white powder, 80-90% pure, known as Nº 4 heroin." Smith, Michael , The Gordian Knot: The connection between narcotics and development, in Smith, Michael et. al, Why People Grow Drugs. Narcotics and Development in the Third World, London, The Panos Institute, 1992, p.10
[95] Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit drug Trafficking: an Interim Report, p.14
[96] UNDCP, World Drug Report, p.29
[97] UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking [on-line]. Available internet http://www.undcp.org/.../technical_series_1998-01-01_pdf, p.8
[98] ibid.
[99] UNDCP, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, p.8
[100] ibid.
[101] This issue will be particularly addressed in Chapters VI and VII of this dissertation.
[102] United Nations General Assembly document A/45/262, p.3
[103] United Nations ECOSOC document, E/CN.7/1995/3, Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit drug Trafficking: an Interim Report. p 35
[104] Definitions from, Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, Economics, Fourthteenth Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1992, pp.729-748
[105] Musashi, op.cit., p.92
[106] For the scope of this dissertation a criminal organization will be defined as a group of people associated for the purpose of engaging in criminal activity on a more or less sustained basis. This group of people engage in the enterprise crime, namely the provision of illicit goods and services, or of licit goods that have been acquired through illicit means, such as theft or fraud. Criminal organizations have a significant degree of cooperation and organization to provide the illicit goods and services. This includes entrepreneurial skill, specialization, capacity for coordination and when necessary the use of violence and corruption to facilitate the conduct of activities. The structure of criminal organizations may range from formal bureaucratic and highly cohesive structures to fluid and informal networks. This conception of criminal organization has been developed by Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona, in The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime, London, Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 3 and 4.
[107] The term 'transnational' is used here to refer to " the movement of information, money, physical objects, people, or other tangible or intangible items across state boundaries, when at least one of the actors involved in this movement is non-governmental [and I should add is not a state]" See: Williams and Savona, op.cit., p.5. See also: Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph, " Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," in same authors (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,1976, p. xii.
'Transnational criminal organizations' refers here to "organized crime groups that have a home base in one state but operate in one or more host states where there are favorable market opportunities. These organizations have become major players in global economic activity and they are the key players in illicit industries, such as drug production and trafficking..." See: Williams and Savona, op.cit. p.6. See also: Williams, Phil, "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security," Survival, Vol. 36, Nº 1, 1994, pp. 100 and 101.
Just as a marginal comment, it should be clarified that, although the term "cartel" it is currently used in law enforcement and academic circles , the use of this term is not correct in a strictly economic sense. As pointed by The Economist: "One of the things that makes analyzing Colombia's drug industry difficult is that America's policy-makers and journalists are too fond of the term 'cartel'. The DEA coined it, applying it first to the Medellín traffickers and now to their counterparts in Cali. Economics, evidently, is not among the DEA's strengths. A cartel is a coalition of producers acting together to restrict supply and drive up the price of their product. Yet as Francisco Thuomi of Bogota's University of the Andes argues, the cocaine "cartels" have increased production probably threefold over the past 15 years, allowing the average wholesale price in the United States to fall by 75%." See: "Colombia's Drugs Business," The Economist, December 24th 1994-January 6th 1995, p.24
[108] The second part of this definition draws on a definition of national security given in the course documents of the National Defence College College of Canada. Barry Buzan quotes this definition in People, States and Fears, p. 17
[109] A clear example of this concept is given by Joel Migdal who defines the state as "[a]n organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way". See: Migdal, Joel, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p.19
[110] It is common in Political Science and Sociology to consider society or (civil society) as the ensemble of individual, group and class relations that take place outside the political the state institutions and political power relations. Society is then represented as the realm of economic, ideological, social, and religious conflicts and the state as the entity with the task of solving them through mediation or suppression. Also in this usual state/ society division, society is viewed as the source of demands that have to be satisfied by the political system and as the arena of various forms of mobilization, association and organizations that compete to either conquer or influence the political power. See, Bobbio, Norberto, Sociedad Civil, in Bobbio, Norberto and Matteucci Nicola (directors), Diccionario de Política, México, Siglo XXI, 1988, p. 1575
[111] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.60
[112] See: Evans, Graham and Newman, Jeffrey, The Dictionary of World Politics. A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York, , 1992, p.306 and also Article 1 of the Montevideo Conventions on Rights and Duties of States.
[113] Barry Buzan has broadly defined this concept in People, States and Fear, pp. 57-145.
[114] As stated by Buzan, '[t]here must be some idea of the state, which establishes its authority in the minds of its people...' See: Buzan,People,State and Fear .p. 66
[115] Buzan,People, State and Fear .p82
[116] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p 67
[117] Adapted from figure orginally developed by Barry Buzan in Peoples, States and Fear, p.65
[118] This definition has been summarized and adapted from the concept of security environment developed by Barry Buzan in "People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World" in Azar, Edward and Chung-in Moon, National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and Externa Threats, London, Edward Elgar, 1988, , pp.27-39
[119] Musashi, Miyamoto,op.cit., p.99
[120] The Oxford Concise Dictionary, p.1271
[121] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.134
[122] Buzan,People, sates and fear, p.134
[123] ibid.
[124] See Buzan, People, State and Fears, p. 134
[125] Buzan,Peoples, States and Fear, p. 140 table 3.2
[126] This threat classification is inspired by a general typology of threats given in : Barry Buzan, Peoples States and Fears, Chapter 3.
[127] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.116
[128] Dietrich Fischer, NonMilitary aspects of security," pxi.
[129] Those indications of military/traditional threats have been adapted from the indicators used by Edward Azar in order to elaborate the Codebook of the Conflict and Peace data Bank (COPDAB) international scale. See: Azar, Edward, The Codebook of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1980. This computer-based library of longitudinal daily international and domestic interactions was used by Abdul- Monem M. Al-Mashat to construct a "tranquility index" for Third World countries . Tranquility is defined by Al-Mashat as " the state of harmony internally and internationally through which the consensus-formation process unfolds. This variable indicates the net behavioral attribute of states that is calculated by utilizing both cooperative behavior, [.....] Operationally, tranquility measures the ability of states to exhibit more domestic and international cooperation than domestic and international conflict. Tranquility , then, measures the behavioral aspect of a state's security. The higher the tranquility level attributed to any state, the higher the prospects for its security relative to another state, the higher the prospects for its security relative to another state with a lower tranquility level," Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985 p. 50.
For the scope of this dissertation these concepts are used as indicators of threats, it is not my goal to either develop or use the concept of tranquility.
[130] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.118
[131] Buzan,People, States and Fear., p. 122 and by same author, Societal security, state, security and internationalism, in Waever, Ole et.al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, pp. 41-58
[132] Buzan, Barry, Societal security, state, security and internationalism, in Waever, O. et. al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, 1993, pp. 41-58
[133] This definition is adapted from the definition of "economic security" given by Barry Buzan. See, same author, People, States and Fear, p.19
[134] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.19
[135] Venezuela and Colombia are an exception to this fact; nevertheless, Venezuela suffered failed military uprisings in 1992, and in Colombia the constitutional guarantees have been almost permanently suspended in the last twenty years because of the existence of several strong guerrilla groups. At the same time, the party system and restrictive democracies in both countries come into question .
[136] See: Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-In, Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The 'Software' side of Third World National Security, in Azar, Edward and Moon, Chung-in, National Security in the Third World. The Management of Internal and External Threats, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland/ Edgard Elgar Publishing, 1988, pp.77-101.
[137] "The hardware side of security management involves physical capabilities (e.g. military and economic power) and tangible policy infrastructure comprising strategic choice and so on." Azar and In Moon, The 'Software' Side of Security of Third World Security, p 77.
[138] The definition of "software side of security" given by Azar and in Moon (see supra), has been adapted for the purposes of this dissertation. Azar and Moon define the software side in terms of only three variables: legitimacy, integration, and policy capacity (which will also be utilized and defined in the context of this dissertation). Another difference is that Azar and Moon put an emphasis on the capacity of Third World states to implement national security policies (security management). While Azar and Moon refer to the software side of security in terms of the margin of policy action of governments to confront threats, this dissertation will refer to the hardware and software sides of security as a set of characteristics that make the state more or less vulnerable to internal and external threats. See: Azar and Moon, op.cit., p.
By 'functional presence of the state' I refer here to the reach of the state in terms of the presence and respect of recognized institutions, and in terms of a legal system. By 'territorial presence of the state' I refer here to the reach of the state in terms of the physical presence of its armed forces, security forces, schools, and other governmental agencies. Both concepts have been defined by Guillermo O´Donnell in "Estado, Democratización y Ciudadanía," Nueva Sociedad, Nº 28, Nov/Dec, 1993, pp.63-8
[139] The concept of the weak/strong nature of the state used in this dissertation draws on the work of Barry Buzan. One main difference with Buzan's work however is that whereas he utilizes only the "sociopolitical cohesion" variable in order to determine the nature of the sate, in this dissertation I am using three more variables (policy capacity, territorial centrality and socioeconomic development) in order to define this concept. Another difference is that whereas in this dissertation "sociopolitical cohesion" is defined in terms of two variables ( legitimacy and integration), Buzan very vaguely defines "sociopolitical cohesion" by using the following indicators: high levels of political violence; conspicuous role for political police in the everyday lives of citizens; major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state; lack of a coherent national identity or the presence of contending national identities within the state; lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority and a high degree of state control over the media. Some of this indicators are used in this dissertation to determine the degree of legitimacy and integration of a given state (see Table 5, infra).
For Buzan's definition of weak and strong states and "sociopolitical cohesion" see: Buzan, People, States and Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era, pp.96-107 and
[140] The legitimacy of the political regime will be defined here in the Weberian sense of the existence of a legitimate order when the ruled believe that the rulers have the right to rule. For a discussion of the issue of the legitimacy of the state (as a territorial sociopolitical community) , the government and the political regime as used in this dissertation see: Levi, Lucio, "Legitimidad" in Bobbio, Norberto; Matteucci, Nicola and Pasquino, Gianfranco (eds.), Diccionario de Política, Volume II,, Mexico D.F., Siglo XXI Editores, 1988, pp.890-896 (Spanish edition of: Dizionario di politica, Torino, UTET, 1976, xi-1097 p.9)
[141] Buzan, People,States and Fear, p 241
[142] Mann, Michael, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins Mechanisms and Results," in Hall, John (ed.), States in History, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986, p.113.
[143] Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p.15
[144] For the scope of this dissertation, corruption will be defined as a "[b]ehavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence". See: Nye, Joseph S., "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis" in Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Johnston, Michael and Le Vine, Victor, Political Corruption: A Handbook, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989, p.966. Also for the scope of this dissertation the terms: "corruption," "political corruption" and "administrative corruption" will be used as synonyms.
[145] Grondona, Mariano, La Corrupción, Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1993, p. 66
[146] Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Faletto, Enzo, Dependency and Development in Latin America, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979, p. 17
[147] ibid., p. xx
[148] Rothstein, Robert, The Weak in the World of the Strong, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977, p.187
[149] Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.99
[150] Mann, The Autonomous Power of the state, p. 112
[151] Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p.97-98 As we have seen before, whereas Barry Buzan defines the weak/strong nature of a state along the sociopolitical cohesion dimension, in my work the weak/strong nature of a state is determined by three other variables.
[152] Migdal, op.cit., pp.33 and 37
[153] Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System, London, Frank Cass, 1981, p.52
[154] Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Seteven B., " Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, Nº 89,Winter 1992-93, p. 3
[155] Zartman, William, "Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in Zartman, William, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate authority, Boulder, L. Rienner, 1995, p.1
[156] Zartman, op.cit., p.5
[157] Martin and Romano, Multinational Systemic Crime, p51
[158] This kind of non-traditional challenges to the states has been has been called by some authors as "Gray Area Phenomena" see for example: Max Manwaring ,The Umbrella of Legitimacy p.77
[159] Max Manwaring, ibid.
[160] Varas, The Security of the Western Hemisphere in the Post-Cold War Period, p. 27
[161] Lamazière, Threat Perceptions and Security: Requirements for the 1990s, in Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes p.35
[162] Gamba, Virginia , "Changing Inter-American Security Concerns and Hemispheric Defense for the Future", Center of International Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM )Commentaries, Nº 2, July 1990,p.9
[163] See: Gamba, "Changing Inter-American Security Concerns and Hemispheric Defense for the Future," p.9
[164] ibid.
[165] Hirst, Monica and Rico, Carlos, "Latin America's Security Agenda," in Dhanapala, Jayantha (ed.), Regional Approaches to Disarmament, Security and Stability, UNIDIR, Geneva, 1992, p.263
[166] For the sake of simplicity the terms "enforcement policies against the cocaine industry", "enforcement," and "enforcement policies" will be used as synonyms and interchangeable terms. Both terms of course must be differentiated from "peace enforcement," which for the purposes of this dissertation exclusively refers to a collective security mechanism implying the threat or use of military force in order to restore international peace and security as stated in article 42 of the UN Charter. A similar mechanism is established in Chapter 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Río de Janeiro, 1947) which establishes the measures and procedures that must be adopted according to Article 29 of the Charter of the Organization of American States if "the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra continental conflict or by a conflict between two or more American states, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America..."
[167] By "indirectly related to drug trafficking activities," I refer to actors that do not form part of drug trafficking chain but who temporarily collude with drug traffickers or coca producing peasants. This is the case for example of guerrilla groups operating in coca/cocaine producing areas, right wing para-military groups, corrupt members of the armed forces or police/security forces at the service of drug traffickers, and foreign mercenaries at the service of drug traffickers.
The definition of violence used here is inspired from the definition given by Harlod Nieburg: "Violence can be unambiguously defined as the most direct and severe form of physical power. It is force in action. Its use is a continuation of bargaining by other means, whether it is used by the state, by private groups, or by persons." Nieburg, H.L., Political Violence. The Behavioral Process, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1969, p. 11.
[168] Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, p. 22
[169] ibid., p. 2
[170] ibid., p.5
[171] Prior to " Drugs and Security in the Caribbean," Griffith analyzes the security problematique of the "small" Commonwealth Caribbean states in terms of the security perceptions of their political elites, their security capability, and the geopolitical environment of these countries. The analysis and the definition of terms used by Griffith is, however, substantially different from the one made in this dissertation. He does not refer to weak/strong states but to "small states" without defining this term. By "security capabilities" he refers to the geography, human resources (basically the population), material resources (natural endowment), political regimes, military resources, and alliances and international and political agreements of these nations. As far as the security perceptions of Caribbean elites are concerned, no particular methodology is used. Griffith describes which are the concerns of these elites in military, political, and economic terms. On this issue see: Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 3-85
[172] Actually, the societal dimensions of security are not analyzed by Griffith as a separate category. They are not mentioned in his work.
[173] Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, pp.4-13
[174] In my view Griffith makes a more clear analysis of the "drug problem" political and military security dimensions for the Caribbean nations in two previous works, namely: Drugs and Security in the Commonwealth Caribbean, The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Volume XXXI, March 1993, Nº 1, pp. 70-102 and The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, pp. 243-275. In both works Griffith makes a "by (political, military and economic) security dimension" analysis of "drugs" as a security problem in the Caribbean. Along similar lines to this dissertation, "drugs" have a political security dimension because "Drug corruption" undermines the credibility of governments, impairs the ability of government agencies to protect the public interest, and can warp the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to adequately define national interest. The military dimension, on the other hand, is associated with gun running, the decrease of security agents due to corruption, and the rise of "vigilante" groups due to government incompetence. See: Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean, pp. 225-265 and same author, Drugs and Security in the Commonwealth Caribbean, pp.84-93
[175] "Military security is concerned with violence and the instruments used to prosecute it, whether for offense or defense, and whether by states or subnational groups," Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, p.5
[176] In that sense, following the definition given by Buzan, military threats in the scope of this dissertation concerns "two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions," Buzan, People, states and Fear, p.19.
[177] Barry Buzan, People, State and Fears, p.190
[178] "Because security is relational, one cannot understand the national security of a given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which is embedded," Buzan, op.cit. p.187
[179] Hirst and Rico, Latin America's Security Agenda, p.257
[180] Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.59
[181] Raufer, Xavier, Les superpuissances du crime: Enquête sur le narco-terrorisme, Paris, Plon, 1993, p. 35
[182] See: Evans, G, The Dictionary of World Politics, p. 136 for the first meaning and Lacoste, Yves, Dictionaire de Géopolitique, Paris, Flammarion, 1993, p.3, for the second meaning.
[183] This concept draws on Rosa de Olmo, "La geopolítica del narcotráfico en América Latina," in Centro de Estudios de las Relaciones Internacionales y el Desarrollo, CERID, El impacto del capital finaciero del narcotráfico en el desarrollo de América Latina, Simposio Internacional, La Paz, Ediciones CERID, 1991, especially pp. 37-58.
[184] By non-state actor I refer here to groups or entities that are not states or are not acting on behave of a state.
[185] I am referring to my M.A. dissertation "The Illicit Drug Traffic as a Non Military Aspect of Security in South America. Issues and Policies of a Transshipment Country: Argentina (1989-1994)" (see supra.) As examples of geopolitical and security works that consider the three Guyana's as part of the Caribbean see: Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989,421p. ; Heine, Jorge and Maginat, Leslie, The Caribbean and World Politics: Cross Currents and Cleavages, London, Holmes & Meier, 1988, 385p.; Salkin, Yves, "Regard, stratégique sur les Guyanes," Defense Nationale, July 1989, pp. ; Griffith, Ivelaw, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, supra.
As an example, for operational purposes UNDCP officials consider Guyana, Suriname and French Guyana to be part of the Caribbean. Interview with a UNDCP official of UNDCP´s Latin America and Caribbean Section, Vienna, January 1997.
[186] As will be shown later in this dissertation, Suriname is, since the early 1990s, becoming an important cocaine transshipment point towards Europe, particularly to the Netherlands.
[187] The idea of identified subcomplexes within a security complex as subgroups with particularly high local security interdependence has been suggested by Barry Buzan in:
'Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective," in Job, Brian (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 175; Peoples, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p.l99 and "A Framework for Regional Security Analysis" in Buzan, Barry and Rizvi, Gowher and Foot, Rosemary (eds.), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, London, McMillan, 1986, pp. 9 and 12.
[188] See: Salkin, Regard, stratégique sur les Guyanes,p.128; Anouilh, Dominique, La France,la Guyane et la guérrilla (1986-1992): implications de la crise surinamienne en Guyane Française, Toulouse, Groupe de recherche en histoire immediate,1995, p.27, Heine and Maginat, The Caribbean and World Politics, pp. 3 to 5 and Atkins, Latin America in the international political system, p.32
[189] See: Portales, " South American Regional Security and the United States," in Varas, Augusto (ed.), Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America, Boulder, Westview, 1989, p.144
[190] See: Child, Jack, Geopolitics and conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors, New York, Praeger,1985, p.160
[191] See: McDonough, James, "Suriname: History," in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1999, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications, 1999,p. 619
[192] See: McDonough, op.cit, p.619. For an excellent analysis of this cross border problem see Anouilh, op.cit., entire.
[193] See:McDonough, op.cit., p.620
[194] Child,Geopolitics and Conflict in South American, p.162
[195] See: Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, p.164. Lieutenant Colonel Desi Bouterse (president 1980-1987 and current 'strong man' behind the scenes) started to change his position after the invasion of Grenada in 1983 by the U.S. and finally expelled Cuban and Libyan advisors and changed the orientation of the regime in 1987 under constant political and economic pressure from the U.S. and the Netherlands (which cut the substantial economic aid to the country).
[196] The Amazon Pact is a treaty of economic cooperation and development signed by all the states that share the Amazon Basin. The pact was signed in 1978.
[197] The term "Latin America" is generally used to refer to all the geographic area of the Western Hemisphere located at the south of the Río Grande. The term may be useful to refer to a geographic area with common cultural patterns, and social, political and economic problems. However, the term Latin America will not be used here to refer to a region in security terms. This area comprises the Caribbean Basin, Central America, South America and Mexico--three set of states that, in terms of shared security problems (including different degrees of U.S. influence and direct intervention), have different problematiques and can be considered as separate security complexes. In that sense there are several security complexes which overlap within a cultural and linguistic area. Mexico, then, could be viewed as a "buffer" state between North American (the United States, Canada and Mexico) and Caribbean and Central American security complexes in the sense that, as defined by Buzan, it " define[s] and occup[ies] the boundaries of indifference between the self-contained dynamics on either side of them," See: Buzan, People States and Fear, p.196.
[198] Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.31
[199] André, Catherine, Couderc M. and Grandi, J.., L'avenir d'un continent : puissances et périls en Amérique du Sud, Fondation pour les études de défense nationale : Diffusé par la Documentation française, Paris, 1989, p. 8
[200] Alejandro Deusta, Sur America: La seguridad regional frente al 2000, in Opciones para el logro de una seguridad común el Sudamerica, Centro Regional de las Naciones Unidas para la paz , el desarme y el desarrollo en America Latina y el Caribe, Lima-Peru, 1991, p.326
[201] As stated in Chapter I, although it is true that since the mid-1990s heroin production is increasing in Colombia, neither is this production integrated with the so called-Mexican Cartels nor has heroin production resulted in a vertically integrated industry across the Andean countries as it happened with the cocaine industry. The heroin industry is then localized in Colombia and controlled by the Norte del Valle Cartel. Moreover, while Mexican cartels produce a low quality heroine called "Black Tar" the Colombian traffickers are competing with South Asian criminal organizations in the production of a highly pure and snortable kind of heroin. Colombian traffickers have also shifted to the East Caribbean (mainly the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the British Caribbean) as a traffic route in order to avoid the control of trafficking routes by Mexicans who had previously acted as "transporters". In that sense, there is no connection between the Mexican and the Colombian heroin industries. On this issue see: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, The NNICC Report 1996: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States [on-line], available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/nnicc97.htm and Dreyfus, Pablo, El lado oscuro de la globalización: Pasado, Presente y Futuro del Tráfico de Drogas en América Latina, Revista SER 2000, pp. 38 and 39.
In its 1995-1996 on-line report, the Paris based NGO Geopolitical Drug Watch warned of the possibility that criminal organizations based in Mexico could be attempting to process cocaine from coca-paste and coca base imported from Peru. However, more recent reports, such as that of the NNICC discredit that theory. This was confirmed by an e-mail interview in late 1997 with a high ranking official of the UNDCP section in Latin America, who dismissed the possibility that cocaine production could be taking place in Mexico. In his view, this was more an isolated case or an experimental attempt than a trend for the future. No recent evidence has been found on cocaine production in Mexico. See: Geopolitical Drug Watch (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996. Annual Report[on line], September 1997, available internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP14_1_MEXIQUE.html and U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, The NNICC Report 1997: The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States [on-line], November 1998, available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/nnicc98.pdf, p.14.
[202] As a matter of fact around 98 percent of the (illegally) produced cocaine consumed in the world are produced in these three countries. See: United Nations International Drug Control Programme, World Drug Report, p.18.
[203] Smith,Michael, op.cit, p.14. No bold letters in the original.
[204] The terms "upstream" and "downstream" sides of the cocaine industry have been coined by Rensselaer W. Lee III . See: Dimensions of the South American Cocaine Industry, Journal of Internamerican Studies and World Affairs, Special Issue on Drug Trafficking, Vol. 30, Nº 2 and 3, Summer-Fall 1988, pp.88-89.
[205] For instance, whereas the DEA and the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotic Matters measure in metric tons the amount of coca produced in each country, UNDCP and the governments of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia measure this amount in hectares.
[206] This includes qualified and non-qualified labor hands, such as growers, buyers of paste, carriers of leaves, paste refiners (chemicals), stompers (of coca leaves), security personnel, chemists and traffickers.
[207] According to the U.S. legislation the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State for example, utilizes an arbitrary criteria for the classification of countries in the following terms:
"Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug-Transit Countries
A major illicit drug producing country is one in which: (A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy are cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca are cultivated or harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis are cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the United States. FAA [Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended] §481(e)(2). A major illicit drug-transit country is one: (A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances. FAA §481(e)(5).[...] Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries [...]have been determined to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics[...]Major Money Laundering Countries 'A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics trafficking. FAA §481(e)(7)..."See: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1998[on line] ,Washington D.C., February 1999, available internet http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1998_narc_report/legis98.html
[208] Such as for example the reports elaborated by UNDCP, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the US Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs), the DEA Intelligence Division Reports, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), NGOs and the national drug control offices and law enforcement agencies of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.
[209] This issue will be fully explained in chapters IV and VI of this dissertation.
[210] This issue will be more deeply analyzed in chapters VI and VII of this dissertation.
[211] See:Kendall, Raymond, "La cocaïne 'drogue de l'année' en Europe," Revue Internationale de la Police Criminelle, May-June 1989, pp. 23, 24 and 25; Mage, Tristan, Les Nouvelles routes du trafic de la drogue dans l'espace de Schengen et dans le monde. Vol. I, Paris, T. Mage, 1994, p.49; Hartnoll, R., Avico, U., Ingold, F.R., Lange, K., Lenke, L., O´Hare, A. And de Roij-Motshagen, A., "A Multi-city study of drug misuse in Europe," Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. XLI, Nos. 1 and 2, 1989, pp. 7, 9 and 11; South, Nigel and Ruggiero, Vincenzo, Eurodrugs: drug use, markets and trafficking in Europe, London, UCL Press, 1995, pp.14, 15 and 17 and United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime, Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999 [on-line], New York, 1999, available internet http://www.undcp.org/pdr/report-1999-06-01_1.pdf, pp. 109, 110 and 118.
Since the late 1980s cocaine consumption grew in Western Europe and became widespread to the point that this region became the second largest consumption market for this drug (after the United States). However there are analyses and reports that agree on the fact that in Western Europe there were no signs of a cocaine epidemics on the scale seen in the United States. See for example: Stares, Global Habit, p. 37 and ODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 1999, p.110
[212] See: Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA), Cooperation in the Fight against Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier Nº 55, Madrid, IRELA, 1995, p.29
[213] Stares, op.cit.,p. 39
[214] See: Hargreaves, Clare, Snowfields: The War on Cocaine in the Andes, London, Zed Books/Holmes & Meier, 1992, pp. 53-83
[215] See: MacDonald, Scott B., Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama, New York, Praeger, 1989, pp. 83-94 and Páez, Alexei, "La inserción ecuatoriana en la dinámica Andina del narcotráfico," in La Economía Política del Narcotráfico: el caso ecuatoriano, in Bruce, Bagley; Bonilla, A. and Páez, Alexei, (eds.), 1991, pp. 145 and 146
[216] See: "Reassessing coca Business," Latin American Weekly Report , August 11, 1994,p. 355; MacDonald,Scott, Dancing on a Volcano, p.124 and Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, Drug Intelligence Report, DEA-93048, October 1993, pp.42 and 48.
[217] United Nations, Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, p.39 Also see, ibid., p. 231 and 232.
[218] See: EUROPOL, European Situation Report on Drug Production and Drug Trafficking, The Hague, September 1996, p.27 and Labrousse, Alain, La drogue, l´argent et les armes, Paris, Fayard, 1991, p.405
[219] The term "Full cycle country" was defined by the Argentine analyst Rubén Heguilein, interviewed in Buenos Aires, February 1995. For an excellent explanation of the potential of Brazil as a major player in the drug trafficking industry see: Velez de Berliner, María and Lado, Kristin, "Brazil: The Emerging Drug Superpower," Transnational Organized Crime, Vol.1, Nº 2,Summer 1995, pp.115-141 for an excellent analysis of the drug trafficking situation in Brazil see: Geopolitical Drug Watch (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996. Annual Report[on line], http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_4_BRESIL.html. This as pointed out by this report:
" the number of laboratories manufacturing chlorhydrate out of base paste has increased not just in Amazonia but also in urban areas, which has had a major impact on internal consumption. Interpol estimates that in Rio de Janeiro alone, 3 t of cocaine are used annually in the form of chlorhydrate for sniffing and base paste for smoking. Crack has also made a breakthrough, especially in Sao Paulo. The amount seized rose from 10 kilograms in 1995 to 18 kg during the first half of 1996. The internal market plus exports produce substantial profits, which are recycled through the economy. By boosting crime in the favelas, drug trafficking also plays a major role in the conflict between the state and organized crime, as well as in fighting between gangs of criminals for control of urban territory."
[220] On this issue see: International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1985, p.43; for 1986, p. 31; for 1988, p.25; for 1989, p.28; for 1990, p.34; for 1991, p.38; for 1992, p.44; Quellet, Ricardo Luis, "Narcotráfico y su relación con los movimientos subversivos en latinoamérica," Geopolítica,Nº 39, 1989, pp.44-45 and Colonel (R) Pipet, Hector A., "Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las relaciones internacionales, Cuarta Parte," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 516, January-March, 1995, pp.19-21.
[221] See: Kaplan, Marcos, Aspectos Sociopolitícos del Narcotráfico, México, Cuadernos Incapié, 1989, p. 108; Colonel Pipet, "Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las relaciones internacionales," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 499, July-September, 1990,pp.46-47 and Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las relaciones internacionales,Cuarta Parte, supra;Quellet, op.cit., supra; Velez de Berliner and Lado, op.cit., supra;OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996,supra and United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Annual Field Report: Brazil-1993, UNDCP Field Office, Brasilia DF, July 1994, 62p.
[222] See: Dreyfus, Pablo, El Lado Oscuro de la Globalización, Pasado Presente y Futuro del Tráfico de Drogas en América Latina, pp. 30-41 and DEA, The South American Cocaine Trade: An "Industry" in Transition, [on-line], June 1996, available internet http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/cocaine.htm
[223] Geopolitical Drug Watch, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1997-98, [On line]. Available internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport, p.186 (pdf version)
[224] See, Dreyfus, El Lado oscuro de la globalización,p.38 ; Drug Geopolitical Watch (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-96, http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP1_2_1_COLOMBIE.HTM
[225] See: Geopolitical Drug Watch, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-1996 [On-Line], Available internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP2_1_COLOMBIE.html
[226] See: DEA, The South American Cocaine Trade an Industry in Transition, supra ; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,1997 [On-line], Washington D.C.,March 1998, available internet http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/samer97.html and OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995-1996 [on-line], http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_3_BOLIVIE.html and http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_2_PEROU.html
[227] See: Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), Géopolitique des drogues 1995: Rapport annuel de l´OGD,Paris, Éditions la Découverte, 1995, pp. 216 and 217 and "Colombia: Coca Clashes," The Economist, August 17, 1996, pp.37 and 38.
[228] In Ecuador, the issue at stake was the claim for a better political representation, the right to the possession of land, the official recognition of the Indian culture and a claim for better conditions or trade and transport of good produced by Indian communities. See: Van Cott,Donna, " Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America," in Van Cott, Donna (ed.), Indigenous peoples and democracy in Latin America ,New York , St. Martin's Press in association with the Inter-American Dialogue, 1994,
p.12
[229] On this issue see: Eckstein, Susan, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," in Eckstein, Susan (ed.), Power and popular protest : Latin American social movements, Berkeley ,University of California Press, 1989,
pp. 23 and 24
[230] On this issue see: Páez, Alexei, op.cit., pp. 148,152, 158 and 159.
[231] On this matter see: Flynn, Peter, "Brazil: Conflict or Conciliation?," Conflict Studies, Nº 265, October 1993,33p.
[232] O' Donnell, Delegative, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, Nº 1, January 1994, p.59
[233] Grandi et al., L' Avenir d'un Continent, p.24
[234] See: Davrieux, Ariel, "External Debt, Social Cost and Democratic Governance," in Albala-Bertrand, Luis (ed.), Democratic Culture and Governance: Latin America on the Threshold of the new Millenium, UNESCO/Hispamerica p111
[235] Davrieux, op.cit. p.112
[236] This concept of crisis of gobernability that refers to the incapacity of the rulers to govern draw as on, Pasquino, Gianfranco, "Gobernabilidad" in Bobbio, Norberto, Mateucci, Niccola and Pasquino, Gianfranco, Diccionario de Ciencia Política, Suplemento, México, Siglo Veintiuno Editores,1988, pp.192-199
[237] Couffignal, Georges, "La question de l'état en Amérique Latine," Cahiers des Amériques Latines, Nº 16, 1993,p. 66
[238] See: Thoumi, Francisco, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 1 and 2.
[239] Thoumi, op.cit. pp. 36 and 45
[240] Thoumi, op.cit.pp.36
[241] After almost 20 years of bloody civil war between the two main parties Liberal and Conservative reached an agreement (the National Front) that established a profoundly restrictive regime in terms of representation and participation. As described by Thoumi,
"This was a 16 year-agreement to alternate the presidency between the two parties and to give an even share of all government jobs to each of them. Thus, one half of the ministers, senators, representatives, governors, mayors, and so on down the government bureaucracy had to be filled with members of each party. In cases of an uneven number of jobs, a military official would be appointed. The National Front agreement was equivalent to the legalization of a two-party cartel to control political power. Since the parties remained controlled by the elites, the National Front guaranteed that political power remained in the same old hands and excluded from effective political participation nontraditional parties and political extremists on both the left ant the right....The National Front ended in 1974, but it had been such a cozy arrangement for the political establishment that it was extended by a constitutional amendment requiring that the party in power give a fair share of power and bureaucracy to the opposite one."Thoumi,op.cit., p. 87
[242] Thoumi, op.cit., p. 89
[243] Thoumi, op. cit., p.110
[244] On this matter see: Gandolfi, Alain, Les Luttes Armées en Amérique Latine,Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,1991,254p., especially chapters,5,7,8 and 9 and Pereyra, Daniel, Del Moncada a Chiapas: historia de la lucha armada en América Latina, Madrid, Los Libros de la Catarata, 1994, 254p.
[245] In the case of Peru the active guerrilla groups are Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru -MRTA-). In Colombia the active groups are: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC-); the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional-ELN-) and the Popular Liberation Army ( Ejército Popular de Liberación-EPL-). Another group, the M-19, abandoned the armed fight in 1990 after a peace agreement with the government and became a left wing political party called Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance). A small dissident fraction of this movement called the Jaime Bateman Group continues with armed activities in the department of Cauca. On this issue see: Balencie, Jean-Marc and de la Grange, Arnaud, Mondes rebelles: acteurs, conflits et violences politiques, Vol.1,Amériques, Afrique, Paris, Éditions Michalon, 1996, p.110.
[246] See:Pereyra, op.cit.,pp. 243 and 245
[247] See: Sanchez Ortuzar, "Regímenes militares y política antiterrorista: el caso chileno," in Varas, Augusto (ed.), Jaque a la democracia: orden internacional y violencia política en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Lationamericano,1990, p.293
[248] See: Stepan, Alfred, Repensando a los militares en política,Cono Sur: un análisis comparado,Buenos Aires, Editorial Planeta,1988, pp.90 and 91; Rudolph, James and Weil, Thomas, Argentina, a country study, Washington D.C., The Studies, U.S. G.P.O., 1985, p.329 and Rock, David, Argentina,1516-1987,London, I.G. Tauris, p.368
[249] It is believed that some of these groups currently have dormant cells. While they were active they never went further than isolated bomb attempts on electric lines, attacks on army barracks or urban terrorist activities.
[250] This definition included both the concept of underdevelopment and dependency. Whereas underdevelopment refers to a type of economic system with a predominant primary sector, a high concentration of income, little diversification in its production system and an external market far outweighing the internal;dependency refers to a situation in which the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic inside the system.
[251] Kay, Cristóbal,Relevance of Structuralist and Dependency Theories in the Neoliberal Period: A Latin Perspective, Working Paper Series Nº 281, Institute of Social Studies, October 1998, p.8 also see ibid. p.6
[252] See: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook, various issues and UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, various issues.
[253] The same division into "social" and "economic" indicators of development is for example used by Celso Furtado in La Economía Latinoamericana. Desde la Conquista Ibérica hasta la Revolución Cubana, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 1975, pp.62-69
[254] As defined in Chapter I, table 7.
[255] See: Wickham-Crowley, "Winners, Losers, and Also-Runs: Toward a Comparative Sociology of Latin American Guerrilla Movements," in Eckstein, op.cit.,p. 134
[256] Rodrigo, J.M., "Commerce et traffic: répression inefficace au Pérou," in Debrel, Guy, Géopolitique de la drogue, Paris, La Découverte, 1991, p. 202
[257] Kozel, Nicholas, " La consommation de cannabis, d'héroïne et de cocaïne aux États-Unis depuis les années soixante," in Ehrenberg, A. and Mignon, P. (Eds.), Drogues, politique et Societé, Paris, Le Monde Éditions and Éditions Descartes, 1992,p.161
[258] Lee III, Rensselaer W. and Thoumi, Francisco, The Political-Criminal Nexus in Colombia, paper presented at the Research Colloquium "Confronting the Security Challenge of the Political-Criminal Nexus," organized by National Strategy Information Center, Inc. and celebrated at Georgetown University, October 30-31, 1997, 41pp.
[259] Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.171
[260] ibid., p.171
[261] Lee III and Thoumi, The political-criminal nexus in Colombia," p.5
[262] ibid., p. 5
[263] ibid., p.6
[264] ibid., p.6
[265] ibid., p.7
[266] ibid. p.7
[267] ibid. p.7
[268] ibid. p. 8
[269] ibid., p. 8
[270] ibid., p. 8
[271] See: Arrieta,Carlos Gustavo; Orejuela, Luis Javier; Sarmiento Palacio, Eduardo; Tokatlián Juan Gabriel, Narcotráfico en Colombia. Dimensiones políticas, económicas, jurídicas e internacionales, Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores,1990, p203
[272] Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p. 173
[273] Ibid., p. 175
[274] Reuter, Peter, "Eternal Hope: America´s Quest for Narcotics Control," The Public Interest, Nº 79, Spring 1985, p. 89
[275] Ibid.
[276] ibid.
[277] Bagley,Bruce, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," Foreign Affairs, 67 (1), p74.
[278] Bagley, Colombia and the War on drugs,p74.
[279] Fonseca, Germán, "Economie de la drogue: taille, caractéristique et impact économique," Revue Tiers Monde, 33 (131), p.513.
[280] Arrieta et. al., op.cit., p.218. Marimba is the name given to marijuana in Colombia.
[281] Kaplan, Marcos, Aspectos sociopolíticos del narcotráfico, p.33
[282] See: Labrousse, Alain, Coca Coke, Paris, La Découverte,1986, p.209
[283] See: Gugliotta, Les Rois de la Cocaïne,p.24
[284] See: Bagley, Colombia and the War on drugs,p.76
[285] ibid.
[286] As explained by one analyst, " A partir de 1983, la crise externe et la récession s'accentuent. Le PIB chute de 12 % et le taux d'inflation annuel atteint 250%. Cette situation va s'aggraver avec l'arrêt des flux financiers internationaux et l'impossibilité de continuer a assurer le service de la dette externe [...]On estime que la plupart des 60.000 a 100.000 familles qui habitent dans le haut Huallaga cultivent enter 1 ou 2 ha de coca et perçoivent de 8000 a 50000$ par an." Gemán Fonseca op.cit., p. 511
[287] Germán Fonseca,op.cit.,p509 and 511
[288] See: Smith, Michael, op.cit.,p.13
[289] For an analysis of the structure of the Peruvian drug trafficking organizations (commonly called firmas) see: Morales, Edumndo, Cocaine: White gold rush in Peru, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1989 and same author, Coca and cocaine economy and social change in the Andes of Peru, Economic Development and Social Change, Nº 35, Fall 1986 and also Dreyfus, Pablo, "When all the evils come together. Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995" Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 15, Nº 4, 1999, pp.390-396. For a detailed analysis of the Brazilian organized crime groups see: Velez de Berliner and Lado, op.cit.(entire); Quellet, op.cit. pp.44 and 45 and Kaplan, Aspectos sociopolíticos del narcotráfico, p. 108
[290] Lee, "Colombia's cocaine syndicates," Crime, Law and Social Change, Nº 16,1991,p.5
[291] Bagley,Colombia and the war on drugs,p.77
[292] Lee,Colombian cocaine syndicates,p.8
[293] Clawson and Lee, op.cit., p47
[294] Clawson and Lee III, op.cit,p.55
[295] DEA, The South American Cocaine Trade: An "Industry" in Transition, supra.
[296] See: Kaplan,Marcos, Aspectos Sociopolíticos del narcotráfico, p.113.
[297] Heargraeaves, Clare, Snowfields. The War on Cocaine in the Andes, p.61
[298] Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.134
[299] ibid. p. 134
[300] Lee, Colombian cocaine syndicates, p97
[301] Hargreaves,Snowfields: The War on Cocaine in the Andes, London, Zed Books, p.65
[302] In the case of Bolivia, for example, the traffickers supported and financed a military coup d'etat headed by General Luis García Meza in 1980. In this case the interest of the military and the conservative Bolivian Narco-bourgeoisie coincided. They (the military) sought to prevent a winning leftist coalition and stop a rising antinarcotics campaign. During this one and a half-year military regime (the US government pressure and diplomatic and economic isolation finally caused internal military dissensions which led to the overthrow of García Meza in 1981), an alliance was established between the traffickers and the military establishment. In fact General Garcia Meza and his Minister of the Interior, Colonel Arce Gomez, were directly involved in the cocaine traffic. Bolivia was the first "narco-state" in the history of South America. In Colombia for example, one of the bosses Carlos Lehder had clear political ambitions. He founded a political movement of fascist tendencies, the Latin Nationalist Movement (MLN) who was supposed to establish an alliance with the Colombian far-right movement and the Colombian Guerrillas in order to finish with the Colombian bi-partite system and replace it by a corporativist regime. Lehder saw the export of cocaine as a revolutionary weapon against US domination. Nevertheless he was isolated by the rest of the traffickers and finally captured and extradited to the United States in 1988.
[303] "As Pablo Escobar said, "You can accuse me of being a narcotics dealer, but to say that I'm in league with the guerrillas, well, that really hurts my dignity," Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p. 156
[304] Lee III ,The White Labyrinth,p.157 and 158.
[305] As stated before,the M-19 organization was finally institutionalized as a legal political party and participates in overt elections.
[306] Kaplan, Aspectos Sociopolíticos del Narcotráfico, p.96
[307] On this particular topic see: Dreyfus, Pablo, Sendero Luminoso :¿un caso de narcoterrorismo?, Boletín SAAP, Buenos Aires, Fall 1999, Nº 8, pp. 3-32.
[308] Koutouzis, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p.109 Data for the beginning of the 1980s.
[309] Tarqui Jamira, Guido and Condo Riveros, Freddy, Coca: El legado de los dioses o locura de los blancos, La Paz, Ediciones Alkhamari,1992, p.65
[310] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. pp.65 and 66
[311] Koutouzis, Atlas Mondiale des Drogues, p.109
[312] ibid.
[313] ibid.
[314] ibid.
[315] O'Brien, Philip, "The politics of Cocaine in Latin America," South America, Central America and the Caribbean 1995,London, Europa Publications Limited,1995, p.43
[316] Musashi, op.cit,p.98
[317] George Bush, 1988 campaign speech . Quoted in Andreas Peter, Bertram, Eva,Blachman, Morris and Sharpe, Kenneth, "Dead-End Drug Wars," Foreign Policy, Nº 85, Winter 1991-92, p.108
[318] The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, Washington D.C., January 1990, p.60
[319] Office of National Drug Control Policy, Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse: 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy, Washington D.C., September 1993, p.28
[320] Conversation between a US border patrol agent and a Peruvian officer at a checkpoint in Peru. Quoted in Andreas, Bertram, Blachman and Sharpe, Dead-End Drug Wars, p.117
[321] By hegemonic I mean the capacity of a state to impose a set of institutions, rules and ideas broadly accepted by the rest of the states. It does not imply mere military presence. The United States, for example, could impose a regional organization (the Organization of American States), a regional security regime (the Treaty of Inter American Reciprocate Assistance), and a doctrine oriented against communism broadly accepted by the civilian and military elites until the early 80's that was known as the National Security Doctrine.
[322] Bagley and Tokatlián ,Dope and Dogma, p.217
[323] Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992,p.202
[324] Cardoso, Oscar and Heguilein,Rubén, "Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas," América Latina/Internacional, FLACSO Programa Argentina, Vol.9, Nº 31, p.474
[325] It is not the goal of this dissertation to describe and analyze this process of bureaucratic proliferation that led to the development of a "Narco-Enforcement Complex," as named by Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe and Peter Andreas. The reader can have a very complete description of the history and functioning of this bureaucratic structures in: Bertram, Eva; Blachman, Morris; Sharpe Kenneth; and Andreas, Peter, Drug War Politics, The Price of Denial, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1996, xiv-347p.
[326] On this issue see: Del Olmo, "La Geopolítica del Narcotráfico en América Latina," p.42
[327] Zirnite, Peter, Reluctant Recruits: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs, Washington D.C., Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 1997, p.6
[328] Harmon, Robert (Lt.Col., USAF); Malave , Ramon, (Lt.Col. US Army);Miller III, Charles,(Lt.Commander, US Navy); Nadolski, William (Captain USAF), "Counterdrug Assistance: The Number one Priority," Military Review, March 1993, p.26
[329] The White House, National Drug Control Strategy 1992, p112
[330] See: Heguilein, Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas, p.480
[331] Andreas et. al., Dead -End drug Wars, p .108
[332] Rosa del Olmo, "Las relaciones internacionales de la cocaína," Nueva Sociedad, Nº 130, 1994, p.130
[333] Klare, Michael T., "The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare," in Klare, Michael T. And Kornbluh, Peter,eds., Low-Intensity Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Proinsurency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, New York, Pantheon Books, 1988, p.53 quoted by Klare from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Operational Concept of Low Intensity Conflict, Fort Monroe, Va., TRADOC Pamphlet Nº 525-44, p.2
[334] Klare, Michael and Kornbluh, Peter, "The New Interventionism: Low-Intensity Warfare in the 1980s and Beyond," in Klare and Kornbluh, op.cit., p.7
[335] Klare, Michael, "The Interventionist Impulse: U.S. Military Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare," in Klare and Kornbluh, op.cit., p.71 and 72
[336] Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, "Política pública internacional contra las drogas de la administración Gaviria y las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos," in Thoumi Francisco, Uribe, Sergio, Rocha, Ricardo, Reyes Alejandro, Garzón, Edgar, López, Andrés, Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández Manuel, op.cit., p. 525
[337] ibid.
[338] See: Call, et. al., Peligro Inminente? Las FFAA de Estados Unidos y la Guerra contra las Drogas, p.191
[339] Bagley and Tokatlián, Dope and Dogma, p.226
[340] See: Call et al , Peligro Inminente? Las FFAA de Estados Unidos y la Guerra contra las Drogas, P. 59
[341] Andreas et al., Dead-Ends Drug Wars, p.121
[342] See: Lt. Col. Harmon (USAF), Lt. Col. Malave (US Army),Lt. Commander Miller (US Navy),Captain Nadolski (USAF),op.cit., p 35
[343] See: Rosa del Olmo, Las Relaciones Internacionales de la cocaína, p.130
[344] See: Malamud Goti, "Los Militares y la guerra contra las drogas," Nueva Sociedad, Nº 130, 1994, p. 172
[345] On this issue see:, "Concern about US Military Emphasis," Latin American Weekly Report, February 1, 1990, p.2 ; "Colombie: le sommet de Carthagène," Le Monde, February 16, 1990 and Del Olmo, Rosa, Las Relaciones Internacionales de la Cocaína, p.140
[346] Del Olmo, "Drogues et conflits de faible intensité en Amérique Latine," in Labrousse, Alain and Wallon, Alain, La Planète des Drogues. Organisations Criminelles, Guerres et Blanchiment, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1993, p.334.
As explained by Call, Youngers and Walsh, The "Operación Tricolor" was a three-year counterinsurgency program that focused in the northeast part of Colombia (where there is no significant drug production). See: Call et al, Peligro Inminente? Las FFAA de Estados Unidos y la Guerra contra las Drogas, p. 101
[347] Perl, The US Congress , "International Drug Policy and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Special Issue on Drug Trafficking, Vol. 30, Nº 2 and 3,Summer-Fall,1988, p.26
[348] Bagley and Tokatlián, Dope and Dogma,p226
[349] See: Jack Child "Geopolítica y Seguridad en el Pensamiento latinoamericano" in Moneta, Carlos Juan (ed.), Civiles y Militares. Fuerzas Armadas y Transición Democrática, Santiago de Chile, Comisión Sudamericana de Paz / Editorial Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, 1990,p. 32 and Goodman, Luis and Mendelson, Johanna S.R., "The Threat of New Missions: Latin American Militaries and the Drug War," in Goodman, Louis Wolf; Mendelson, Johanna and Rial Roade, Juan, The Military and democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1990, p.192
[350] International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1985, INCB, Vienna, 1985, p.37
[351] See: Lee III ,The White Labyrinth, p.72
[352] Even if the case was to be tried in a US court under drug-related charges, the main cause of the invasion was to guarantee the US presence in the Panama Canal in view the Panamanian leader's challenging attitude. As stated by President Bush´s spokesman the troops were sent to " protect American lives, restore the democratic process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties and apprehend Manuel Noriega..." See: "Text of Statement by Fitzwater," The New York Times, December 21,1989,p. 19.
Also as explained by Olivier Brouet ,"les effets de manche du général Noriega, son irrévérence, avaient de quoi inquiéter les partisans d'un contrôle ferme de cette zone stratégique. Les intentions nationalistes affichées de Noriega n'allaient-elles pas mettre en péril la volonté hégémonique des Etats-Unis?[...]dans l'opération "Juste Cause," la problématique de la drogue a essentiellement servi de catalyseur. [...] La drogue ne fut qu'un jalon dans une lente escalade belliqueuse opposant les Etats-Unis au Panama..."Brouet, Olivier, Drogues et relations internationales, Brussels, Éditions Complexe,1991, p.159
[353] Tokatlián, Drogas y Seguridad Nacional: La Amenaza de la Intervención?, p.24 ;also see: "Colombians balk at a crucial part of US drug plans,"The New York Times,January 7,1990, p.1
[354] Latin America Weekly Report, 1 February 1990, p. 3
[355] See: "San Andrés en la mira?," Revista Cambio 16 (Colombia), February 20-27, 1995, pp. 12 and 13
[356] Martz, "National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 30, Nº 4, 1988, p.127
[357] See: Latin American Weekly Report, July 2, 1987, p.3
[358] Martz, National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border, p.29
[359] See: Martz, National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border, p. 29 and Ramírez León, José Luis, "Relaciones Conflictivas: Colombia y Venezuela, Profundizar la vecindad sin permitir el Conflicto," in Ramírez, Socorro and Restepo, Luis Alberto, Colombia: Entre la Insersión y el Aislamiento. La Política Exterior Colombiana en los Años Noventa, Bogotá, Siglo del Hombre Editores/ IEPRI, Universidad Nacional, 1997, pp. 281-284
[360] See: Quellet, Luis Ricardo, "Narcotráfico y su relación con los movimientos subversivos en Latinoamérica," Geopolítica, Nº 39, 1989, p.44 and, Annual Field Report, Brazil , UNDCP Field Office,Brasilia,1993,p.39
[361] See: Hunter, Wendy, " The Brazilian Military after Cold War: In Search of a Mission," Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.28, Nº 4, 1994,p.30 and "Amazon protection back on the agenda. Radar system planned at cost of US$ 600 over eight years," Latin American Weekly Report ,August 26,1993, p.394
[362] UNDCP Field Office, Brasilia, op.cit., p.41
[363] See: Reid, Michael, "Una Región Amenazada por el narcotráfico," in García Sayán, Diego, Coca, Cocaína y Narcotráfico. Laberinto en los Andes, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Lima, 1989, p. 133
[364] Musashi, Miyamoto,op.cit., p.97
[365] Painter, James, Bolivia and Coca: A Study on Dependency, London, Lynne Rienner, 1994, p.59 Also see: McDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, pp. 57 and 58. This issue is further explained in Chapter VI of this dissertation.
[366] Malamud Goti,Smoke and Mirrors,p28
[367] See: Latin American Weekly Report,October 27, 1994, p.482; Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Géopolitique des Drogues 1995: Rapport Annuel de l´OGD, p.223 and Pasquini, Gabriel and De Miguel, Eduardo, Blanca y Radiante: Mafias, Poder y Narcotráfico en la Argentina, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1995, p.148
[368] See: Labrousse, La Drogue, l´argent et les armes, p.396 and McDonough, James, "Suriname:History," in South America, Central America and the Caribbean 1999, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications, 1999, pp.620 and 621
[369] 'Venezuela's Pérez survives the coup attempt no-one wanted to believe in,"Latin America Weekly Report, 13 February 1992,p.1
[370] On this issue see: Dreyfus, Pablo G., "When all the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru´s Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980-1995," Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol.15, Nº 4, November 1999, pp. 370-396
[371] On this issue see: Dreyfus, Pablo G., "La industria de la cocaína y la seguridad nacional en América del Sur," Boletín SAAP, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, Nº 10, 2000, Buenos Aires, Argentina, pp.69-92
[372] See: Call et al, op.cit. p. 202.
Human Rights Watch and most Colombian human rights groups define massacres as the killing of four or more people in the same place, at the same time, and by the same force.
[373] On this issue see: Call et al, op.cit.,p.195,200 and 221.
[374] Ibid. p. 221.
[375] Goodman and Mendelson, The Threat of New Missions Latin American Militaries and the Drug War, p. 191
[376] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade and Development Board, Document TD/B/1163, Acapulco Commitment to Peace, Development and Democracy signed by the Heads of State of the countries members of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). Note by the UNCTAD secretariat, p. 5 and United Nations General Assembly, Document A/44/696, Letter dated 23 October 1989 from the Permanent Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay an Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, Annex I, 1989,pp.5 and 6
[377] On this issue see: Clawson, Patrick and Lee III., Rensselaer, The Andean Cocaine Industry, New York, St. Martin´s Press, 1996, p. 14
[378] On this issue see: Clawson and Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.15 and Sistema Educativo Antidrogas y de Movilización (SEAMOS), Dossier Hemerográfico, La Paz, 1996, p. 19
[379] See: "Special Report,Epidemiologic Report on the Use and Abuse of Psychoactive Substances in 16 Countries if Latin America and the Caribbean," Bulletin of the Pan-American Health Organization, 24 (1), 1990,p.97
[380] Lee III, The White Labyrinth,p.207.
[381] ibid., p. 91
[382] Painter, James, Bolivia and Coca: A Study on Dependency, p.8
[383] Lee,The White Labyrinth, p. 76
[384] ibid. p204
[385] ibid.,p.233.
[386] Mc Gregor, Coca and Cocaine,p.118
[387] Painter,op.cit.,p. 67
[388] Painter,op.cit.p.67
[389] See: Páez, Alexei, "La insersión ecuatoriana en la dinámica Andina del Narcotráfico" in Bagley, Bruce; Bonilla, Paul and Páez, Alexei (eds.), La Economía Política del Narcotráfico, Quito, FLACSO Sede Ecuador and North South Center, University of Miami, University of Miami, 1991, pp. 158, 160 and 164
[390] ibid.pp.147 and 148
[391] ibid. pp.151 and 158
[392] On this issue see: Simón, José Luis, "Drug trafficking and drug abuse in Paraguay," in Bagley, Bruce and Walker III, William (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, North South Center Press, University of Miami,1996, pp. 317-350 and Mora, Paraguay and international drug trafficking, pp. 351-369
[393] ibid., also see: Drug Enforcement Administration , Southern Cone Situation Report: Drug Intelligence Report, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 7
[394] See: Simón, Drug trafficking and drug abuse in Paraguay, pp. 317-350 and Mora, Paraguay and international drug trafficking, pp. 351-369
[395] See: Mora, Paraguay and international drug trafficking, p. 356
[396] The Information provided in this section of the chapter has been obtained from two main sources: Betancourt; Darío and García, Martha Luz, Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos. Historia social de la mafia colombiana (1965-1992), Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994, 310 pp. and Arrieta et al, op.cit., especially pp. 199-272. References to any other sources will be specifically quoted.
[397] It can be also argued that the civil war ended in 1964 when there was a formal peace agreement with the main Liberal guerrilla groups that had remained in arms in isolated parts of the country. On this point see Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p. 72
[398] Reyes Posada, Alejandro, Compra de tierras por narcotraficantes, in Thoumi, Francisco; Uribe, Sergio; Rocha, Ricardo; Reyes, Alejandro; Garzón, Edgar; López, Andrés; Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández, Manuel,op.cit., pp.286 and 288, See also: Arrieta et al. , pp.262 and 263
[399] Lee III and Thuomi, The Political-Criminal Nexus in Colombia, p. 6
[400] Betancourt, Dario and Martha L. Garcia, Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos, Historia Social de la Mafia Colombiana (1965-1992), Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1994, p. 257
[401] On this particular issue see: Castillo, Fabio, La Coca Nostra, Bogotá, Editorial Documentos Periodísticos, pp.226-250; Arrieta et. al., op.cit., pp.263-268 and OGD, The World Drugs Report 1997-98 [On-Line pdf version].Available internet http://www.ogd.org/gb_rapport.1997htm
[402] See, Arrieta et al. op.cit., pp.199-272 and Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp.253-301
[403] On this issue see: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp.167-183
[404] See: Castillo, La Coca Nostra, pp.202-208; Betancourt and García, pp.160, 170 and 171 and Arrieta et. al, p.223-226
[405] See: OGD, The World Drug Report 1997-98, pdf on-line version,pp.182-184
[406] See: Castillo, La Coca Nostra, p.69 and Humans Right Watch/Americas and Human Rights Watch Arms Projects, Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1996, pp. 17-26
[407] On this issue see: Castillo, Fabio, La Coca Nostra, pp.19-30 and 70-82
[408] This issue is very well documented in Arrieta et al., p.225. See also Castillo, La Coca Nostra, pp. 226-250
[409] See: Betancourt and García, op.cit., pp. 179-181
[410] See: Darío Betancourt and Martha Luz García in Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos, pp.236-300.
[411] See: infra, Chapter VI
[412] Betancour and García, op.cit, pp.257. Originally these authors only name the wars between the traffickers and the judicial system, the drug traffickers and the political left, and the drug traffickers and the government (particularly the New Liberal Party representatives and officials). For the scope of this dissertation, I am also including the "war" between the Medellín and Cali cartels because, as will be shown in this chapter, there was a tacit alliance between the Government and the Cali cartel that eventually led to the death or arrest of all the leaders of the Medellín cartel and the disruption of that criminal coalition.
[413] On this issue see Human Rights Watch/Americas and Human Rights Watch, op.cit., pp. 17-22
[414] Marbry, Donald, J., "Andean Drug Trafficking and the Military Option," Military Review, March 1990, p.31
[415] Most of the information for the writing of this chapter has been gathered from the following works: Arrieta et el., op.cit, especially pp. 199-272 and pp.277-360 and Thoumi, Francisco, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, especially pp. 203-229. References to any other sources will be specifically quoted.
[416] Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, "National Security and Drugs: Their Impact on Colombian-US Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 30, Spring, 1988, p. 139
[417] Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, pp. 50 and 209
[418] On this issue see Arrieta et.al, p.215
[419] Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.210
[420] Arrieta et al., p. 295
[421] As pointed by Lee III,
"[s]pecial problems are associated with coca: The coca bush... is extremely difficult to kill. A herbicide sufficiently toxic to destroy coca form the air might also damage other crops, harm farm animals or wildlife, and pollute the waterways. No effective and environmentally safe herbicide for use against coca has yet been found.," Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p. 91
[422] Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.210 .
[423] See: Arrieta et al., pp. 297-298 and Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p. 210
[424] See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, "Costos del combate a la producción, comercialización y consumo de drogas y a la violencia generada por el narcotráfico," in Thoumi Francisco, Uribe, Sergio, Rorcha, Ricardo, Reyes Alejandro, Garzón, Edgar, López, Andrés, Tokatlián, Juan and Hernández Manuel, op.cit., 426-428.
[425] See: Betancourt and García, p. 68
[426] See: Thoumi, Political Economy & illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.211
[427] Cocaine: A major drug issue of the seventies: Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, pp. 1 and 2.
[428] Murder was a constant in the criminal life of Pablo Escobar (I am referring here to his drug trafficking criminal record since he started as a car thief in the early 1970s). In the mid-1970s Escobar started his cocaine trafficking career smuggling the drug within hollowed marble grave stones that he trafficked between Medellín and the Atlantic ports of Urabá in the Atlantic coast. In 1976 Escobar was arrested under charges of drug trafficking [cocaine] and attempt to bribe a public official. Under Escobar's orders the two undercover agents who participated in the investigation of the case were murdered, the judge in charge of the case received death threats and finally abandoned the case. Police Major Monroy Arenas who conducted the police investigation was murdered five years later in 1981. Finally only the couriers involved in this trafficking case were convicted. On this issue see: Castillo, Fabio, La Coca Nostra, pp. 50-55.
[429] See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, op.cit., 426-428 and Henmann, Anthony, Mama Coca, Bogotá, El Ancora and Editorial La oveja negra, 1981, pp.86 and 87 and 118-121
[430] U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, Colombia. Narcotics Drugs Cooperation to Curb Illegal Traffic. Agreement effected by exchange of notes. Signed at Bogotá July 21 and August 6, 1980; Entered into force August 6 1980, TIAS 9838.
[431] See: Lopez Restepo, Andrés, op.cit., 426-428
[432] Chepesiuk, Ron, Hard Target, The United States War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982-1997, Jefferson, McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 1999, p.29
[433] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 46
[434] ibid.
[435] See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.212
[436] See: Arrieta et al., pp. 229-232
[437] In June 1981, Escobar and Ortega were expelled from the New Liberal Party by the national party coordinator Rodrigo Lara Bonilla who publicly accused them of being linked to drug trafficking activities. They would also be expelled in October 1983 from the Colombian House of Representatives. See: Castillo, Fabio, Los Jinetes de la Cocaína,Bogotá, Editorial Documentos Periodísticos, 1988, pp.199-216 and Arrieta et al., p.229
[438] LeeIII, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.49
[439] On the position of Lara Bonilla towards the application of the extradition treaty see: Castillo, Los Jinetes de la Cocaína, pp. 182-188 Lara Bonilla was also a personal friend of Luis Carlos Galán and was closely associated with the project of reform of the Liberal Party to make it more representative and responsive to the demands of the people.
[440] On this issue see: Castillo, Los Jinetes de la Cocaina, pp. 199-207
[441] Betancourt and Garcia, op.cit., pp 174 and 256
[442] The Colombian National Police with cooperation of the DEA conducted the operation.
[443] See: Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 103 and Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p. 215
[444] See: Arrieta et. al, op.cit., pp. 236-240
[445] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, pp. 103 and 104
[446] ibid., p.104
[447] See: Arrieta et al., op.cit., p.318
[448] See: Arrieta et. al, op.cit., p.321
[449] Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks, pp.17, 18 and 20
[450] See: Castillo, La Coca Nostra, pp. 197-225 and pp. 200-202. Notice also that Colombian NGOs CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular) and (Comisión Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz (Justicia y Paz) reported that between 1985 and 1994 there where 586,261 people displaced in Colombia as a consequence of violence (related or not to drug trafficking). See: CINEP and Justicia y Paz, "The internal displaced: personage of the year," Banco de Datos de Derechos Humanos y Violencia Política, Balance Sheet 1997, special offprint, 1997, p.9
[451] It is worth noticing that the Magdalena Medio region is formed by 29 municipalities in four departments- Bolívar, Antioquia, Norte de Santander and César- which are located near the border with Venezuela. The issue of displaced people towards Venezuelan territory as refugees is analyzed in Chapter V (infra) of this dissertation.
[452] ibid. p.148
[453] ibid. p. 247
[454] See: ibid. pp. 337 and 338
For example in 1989 the CNP and the Colombian army carried out the "Primavera" and "Arco Iris" joint operations which resulted in the seizure of 30 tons of cocaine, the capture of 3,500 people related to the drug industry and the destruction of about 500 laboratories. On this issue see: Arrieta et al., p. 252
[455] See: ibid., pp. 341 and 343
[456] Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.222
[457] Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks, p.23
[458] Castillo, La Coca Nostra, p.201
[459] See: Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks, p.20
[460] Presidencia de la República, Consejería para la Reconciliación y Rehabilitación, Estadísticas Generales sobre Violencia en Colombia 1988-1989, Bogotá, September 1989, pp.12 and 33 and Presidencia de la República, Consejería para la Reconciliación y Rehabilitación, Estadísticas Generales sobre Violencia en Colombia (January-July 1989), Bogotá .July 1989, pp.50 and 73
[461] Tokatlián, Política pública internacional contra las drogas de la administración Gaviria y las relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, pp.520,522 and 529.
[462] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.110
[463] At the end of his administration, President Barco promoted a referendum that approved convening a constituent assembly in charge of rewriting the 1886 constitution, which had survived for more than a century (although undergoing several reforms). President Gaviria, who inaugurated his administration in August 1990, convoked the elections for the Constitutional Assembly in December that year. Besides banning extradition of Colombian Nationals, the new Constitution attacked the foundations of clienteles by declaring representatives were to be elected nationally instead of in each department, established the election of mayors, entitled Colombians to important economic rights (health, education and so on), and strengthened the judiciary. The Constitutional Assembly also closed the existing Congress until a new one was elected (that happened in October 1991). On this issue see Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, pp. 57, 226 and 227.
[464] See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.226 and Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.197
[465] Under the new constitution was approved in July 1991, traffickers had to be released after 120 days if the trial had not started. That was the case of Escobar. In order to avoid this scenario, President Gaviria declared a state of emergency (siege state) and ordered to transfer Escobar from his specially prepared 'mansion prison' to a military prison. See: Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia, p.228
[466] As noted by Clawson and Lee, "In February 1992, the People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar (PEPES) inaugurated its existence by burning down a farm belonging to Escobar's mother. PEPES subsequently incinerated an estate and a ceramics gallery owned by Escobar's wife and blew up a warehouse in Itagüi, a town south of Medellín that contained the trafficker's collection of antique cars. In addition, PEPES liquidated at least seven of Escobar's close associates between April and June 1993[...] PEPES received significant financial support from Escobar's rivals in Cali; some observers even claim that Cali leaders were de facto members of PEPES[...]Escobar's enemies collaborated enthusiastically with the Colombian government. Colombia Libre [another anti-Escobar group which was composed of former Escobar associates and emerged in 1993] claims to have provided intelligence to the authorities so support forty operations against Escobar's organization. Similarly, leading Cali traffickers maintained a network of informants in Medellín and - according to several accounts- also deployed a high-tech tracking devices to intercept Escobar's communications. The information obtained from these channels was passed on to the police and the DAS. Colombia's prosecutor-general, Alfonso Valdivieso, acknowledged the Cali cartel's contribution of 'valuable information' to search for Escobar and his enemies." On this issue see: Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, pp.114 and 115.
[467] It worth mentioning that with the death of Pablo Escobar, the Cali coalition was no longer able to keep a low profile. In fact the cartel's network of connections and bribes could not stop an enforcement campaign launched in 1995 by president Ernesto Samper (1994-1998). In August 1994, president Samper was involved in a scandal related to the alleged financing of his electoral campaign with funds provided by Cali traffickers. Samper´s enforcement campaign was motivated by the need of cleaning the image of his government and by a the strong diplomatic pressure of the US government. By August 1995 the more important leaders of the Cali coalition ( Gilbert and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santa Cruz Londoño) were arrested and jailed in Colombian prisons. Colombian security forces killed Santa Cruz Londoño in March 1996 (he had escaped from prison in January of that year). As a result of the crack down o the Cali cartel the Colombian cocaine industry started to be controlled by about 40 medium-size organizations to whish must be added an estimated 2,000 to 3000 drug entrepreneurs running familiarize businesses. Some of these medium size organizations such as the so-called "North Valley Cartel" (formerly linked too o the Cali coalition) have established alliances with powerful paramilitary organizations financed by landowner and groups linked to the prospection of emeralds. On this issue see: Dreyfus, El lado oscuro de la globalización, p.36; Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.61and OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1995/1996 [on-line], available http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP12_1_Colombie.HTML
[468] Human Rights Watch, Colombia's Killer Networks, pp. 47 and 48.
[469] Rudolph, James D., Historical Setting, in Haggerty, Richard,ed., Venezuela: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1993, pp.10,11 and 12; Deas, Malcolm, South America and the Caribbean 1999, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications Limited, p. 670; Halperín Donghi, Tulio, The Contemporary History of Latin America, Durham, Duke University Press, 1993, p. 93
[470] Haggerty, op.cit., p.xxi
[471] Deas, op.cit., p.670
[472] Haggerty,Venezuela: a country study, p.xxi
[473] Deas, op.cit.p. 670
[474] Haggerty, Richard ,op.cit., p.xvi
[475] Karl, Terry L., The Paradox of Plenty. Oil Booms and Petro-State, Berkeley, University of California Press,1997, p.44 . In this book, Karl uses Venezuela as an example of a "Petro-State".
[476] Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.93
[477] As explained by an analyst, "AD's wide margin of victory (in 1946 it drew 79 percent of the vote; in 1947, 73 percent) led its leaders to believe that they could push through a highly progressive program without considering the conservative political opposition. A new constitution was promulgated in 1947. The party's vigorous pursuit of 'social justice and better conditions for the workers'[...] engendered widespread hostility within the business community, both foreign and local. The overhaul of [...] petroleum law[s] to assure the government a 50 percent tax on the oil industry's profits intensified the foreign oil companies' antagonism. The junta's aggressive campaign to expand public education and its regulation of both public and private education incensed the Roman Catholic Church. The Church, whose dominant role in education had heretofore gone unchallenged, now enlisted COPEI in a strident antigovernment campaign [...] [the] signing of AD's wide-ranging land reform bill in October [1948] pitted the nation's powerful landowners against him [newly elected president Rómulo Gallegos], and his reduction of the military personnel in his cabinet and advocacy of a reduced military budget alienated the armed forces. In mid-November, the UPM issued an ultimatum to the president demanding that COPEI share political authority with AD and that Betancourt, still AD leader, be sent into exile. Gallegos refused, and on November 24, after barely ten months in office, the military overthrew him in a nearly bloodless coup..." See: Rudolph, James, Historical Setting, in Haggerty, op.cit., p.20
[478] Deas, op.cit., p.670 The URD a minor center-left party was also included in the pact.
[479] Karl, Terry Lynn, "Petroleum and political pacts: The transition to Democracy in Venezuela," Latin American Research Review, Vol. XXII, Nº 1, 1987, p.63-94
[480] Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.99
[481] Actually the Military and the Church also received guarantees . On this issue see: Karl, Petroleum and Political Pacts in Venezuela, p. 83
[482] Actually Charles de Gaulle said "Treaties are like roses and young girls. They last while they last". See: Simpson's Contemporary Quotations, compiled by James B. Simpson. 1988[on-line],available at http://www.bartleby.com/63/61/61.html
[483] On this issue see: Siqueira Wiarda, Iêda, "The society and its environment," in Haggerty, Richard A.,Venezuela: a Country Study, pp.48 and 49. See also: República de Venezuela, Presidencia de la República, Comisión Nacional Contra el uso Ilícito de las Drogas (CONACUID), Drogas y Fronteras: Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad, Caracas, CONACUID, 1986, pp.7, 9 and 14.
[484] Haggerty, Venezuela, a country study, p.xxi
[485] Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, pp. 162 and 163
[486] ibid. pp. 179-180
[487] The November coup, in particular, generated antigovernment protests, manifestations of support for the rebels, and several riots and clashes with police in the barrios. See: Hillman, Richard, Democracy for the Privileged. Crisis and Transition in Venezuela, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 141
[488] Haggerty, National Security, Venezuela: a country study, p.206 and 207
[489] Hillman, Democracy for the Privileged, p. 131. According to Hillman, in the modern era the Venezuelan tradition of caudillistic leadership has been perpetuated within the context of limited institutional democracy in the sense that political leaders acts as patrons who act as power brokers for clients seeking material reward (jobs and opportunities for loyal dependent supporters). Carlos A. Pérez´s grandiose rethoric of the 1988 presidential campaign convinced people that his election would restore the prosperity of the 1970s. As a matter of fact Pérez had previously been president during the oil boom period ( 1974-1979) when , thanks to oil revenue, he had implemented a populist platform based on nationalization of oil companies and retribution. According to Hillman, Venezuelans who voted for Pérez because they associated him with past prosperity were disillusioned and frustrated by the austerity plans required by the IMF economic package. In that sense Pérez´s neoliberal policies ignited social explosion and the popular support to the coup attempts. See Hillman, op.cit., pp. 60 and 124.
[490] Hillman, op.cit.,p.161
[491] Although "corruption" has been defined before in this dissertation it is worth to state here what is the meaning of corruption in Venezuela as officially defined by the Ley de Salvaguarda del Patrimonio Público (Law for the Safeguard of Public Patrimony). This law defines as corrupt the following acts: seeking illegal advantage in public administration; any unofficial act performed or not performed in return for cash or other benefits, whether received or not; private agreements between functionaries and others (including intermediaries) concerning contracts, services or goods that prejudice public monies; misuse of public funds; the issuing of false documentation; influence trafficking; the illegal issue of permits; alteration of documents; negligence or failure to support the actions of public bodies. See: Herrera and Little, Herrera, Antonio and Little, Walter, Political Corruption in Venezuela, in Little,Walter and Posada Carbó, Eduardo, Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America, London, McMillan, 1996,p.269
[492] Herrera and Little, op.cit., pp.267 and 268.
[493] Haggerty, Venezuela, a country study, p.xxv
[494] Karl, The Paradox of Plenty, p.177
[495] ibid., p. 172 See Chapter III for the evolution of South American countries' foreign debt services.
[496] ibid. p. 178
[497] On this issue see: Hillman, op.cit., p.129 and Herrera and Little, op.cit.,p.266
[498] To give a striking example, in September 1987, a criminal judge of the Supreme Court was arrested and dismissed after he ordered the release of seven drug traffickers in return for a bribe of 10 million bolivars. At the time, the justice minister publicly claimed knowledge of 400 other similar cases of drug trafficking related corruption. On this issue see: Venezuela: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, [on-line]available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vetoc.html
[499] The RECADI oversaw the various exchange rates (there is an official exchange rate and a differential exchange rate). Between 1983 and 1988, businessmen bribed RECADI officials in return for access to half-priced United Dollars to funnel an alleged US$ 8 billion overseas. See:Seyler, Daniel, The Economy, in Haggerty, op.cit.,p.86
[500] Hillman,op.cit.,p.162
[501] Hillman, op.cit., p. 132
[502] On this issues see: Hackett, Paul, "Venezuela: Economy," in South America Central America and the Caribbean, Seventh Edition, London, Europa Publications, 1999, pp. 674-680 and Venezuela: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, [on-line version]available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/vetoc.html
[503] MacDonald, Scott, Mountain High, White Avalanche. Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama, New York, Praeger/Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989, pp.84-85 As explained by Terry Lynn Karl, the rapid downward oil price spiral was provoked by the concerted affords by the advanced industrialized countries to diminish their dependence on OPEC oil, the development of alternative energy supplies, the flooding of the market with crude oil newly discovered in the North Sea and Mexico, and the inability of OPEC to function as a fully effective cartel in order to stabilize a new international oil regime that emerged after the oil booms of 1973 and 1980. See: Karl, The Paradox of Paradox of Plenty, p.162.
[504] Interview with Dr. Rosa del Olmo, Caracas, February 1998 and interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramírez Monagas, head of the Venezuelan National Drug Control Commission from 1984 to 1992, Caracas, February 1998.
[505] Interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramirez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998
[506] See: Haggerty, Venezuela: a country study, p. 52
[507] Even if Venezuela shares a long and unpatrolled border with Brazil, this work will stress the importance of Venezuela as a neighboring state of Colombia as a drug producing state. Brazil became a main player in the drug trade as a transshipment route with production by local organizations for internal consumption and Colombian organizations' traffic going through Brazil to the United States and Europe. This role has steadily increased since the mid 1980's. However all the trafficking routes going through Brazil, and from Brazil, go through big Atlantic ports like Rio or Santos or through Suriname in transit to the Netherlands, not through Venezuela. Moreover, Brazilian prospectors or garimpeiros relate the main Venezuelan preoccupations concerning the Brazilian border: the question of the illegal prospecting for gold and strategic materials in the Venezuelan Amazon.
[508] CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras: Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad, pp.7, 9 and 14.
[509] See:" Defensa y Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela," in Tecnología Militar, Nº 2, 1999, p.65 and Kurian, George Thomas, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems, 1989, p.470
[510] See: Guardia Nacional, Nº 1, 1997, pp.16 and 36 and Kurian, op.cit., p. 470. The geographical distribution of the Regional Commands and detachments of the National Guard and the area covered by them is displayed in the annexes of this dissertation.
[511] Sterling, Claire, La pieuvre. La mafia à la conquête du monde 1945-1989, Paris, Éditions Robert Laffont, 1990, p.139 (French translation of Octopus, the Long Reach of the Sicilian Mafia, New York, W.W. Norton, 1990)
[512] Sterling, Claire,op.cit.,p.134
[513] See: Sterling, op.cit.,p. 136
[514] There was an upsurge of Castrist groups in the early 60s, which were defeated by the armed forces, by 1969 the armed activity of these groups had completely ceased as the political left was legalized and the insurgents opted for electoral competition. A small urban guerrilla group called Bandera Roja (Red Flag) was active in minor acts of sabotage during the early 1980s, the groups have been disrupted and is currently inactive. On this issue see: Balencie, and de la Grange, Mondes Rebelles, p.163
[515] MacDonald, Mountain High, pp. 87-88
[516] On this issue see: Ramírez León, op.cit, pp. 276 and 277 and 283- 283
[517] ibid. p.276
[518] Haggerty, National Security, p.189
[519] At that time it was reported that "Venezuela has called for joint action with Colombia to control the growing activities of the Colombian drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas along and inside this country's western borders. Although Venezuela seems intent on avoiding a diplomatic incident because of tensions over an unresolved territorial dispute, a senior Venezuelan official described the situation along the border as 'very serious'. In recent months, there has been a surge of kidnappings by Colombian guerrillas who have held ranchers captive in Colombian territory until heavy ransoms have been paid. Several kidnapping victims are still missing. There have also been reports of occasional incursions into the border jungle regions of Venezuela by heavily armed columns of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [...] At the same time, using roads and rivers, Colombian drug traffickers have begun developing Venezuela as an important transshipment point for cocaine en route to the United States or Western Europe. Some cocaine processing laboratories have recently been found in Venezuela." See: Riding, Alan "Colombian Drugs and Rebels Upset Venezuela," The New York Times, January 20, 1988, p. A9
[520] MacDonald, Mountain High, p.88
[521] On this issue see: Cardona, Diego; Nasi Carlo; Obregón T., Liliana; Tickner, Arlene and Tokatlián, Juan G., Colombia-Venezuela: Crisis o Negociación?, Bogotá, Fundación Firedrich Ebert de Colombia and Centro de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de los Andes, 31-43, 43-73, 83-93 and 93-105 and Ramírez León, op.cit., pp. 269-281
[522] Interview with Col. (National Guard) Oscar José Márquez, Deputy Director of the National Counter Drug Commission (CNA), Caracas, February 1998. Also see: Ramírez León, op.cit., p. 276
[523] ibid.
[524] "Venezuela and Colombia and Guerrillas," The Economist, March 25, 1995, p.58
[525] McDonald, Mountain High, p.88
[526] Sterling, op.cit, p.140
[527] Sterling, op.cit., p141
[528] See: Azocar Alcala, Los Barones de la Droga: La Historia del Narcotráfico en Venezuela, Caracas, Alfadil Ediciones, 1994, pp.93 and 96 and Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, pp. 74 and 75
[529] On this issue see: Azocar Alcalá,op. cit.,pp. 83-95
[530] Interview with a Venezuelan journalist specialized in drug trafficking and polices issues, Caracas, March 2, 1998. Also see: Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.75
[531] MacDonald, Mountain High, p.87
[532] Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1984/85, Ottawa, Public Relations Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1985, p. 39
[533] United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1985, Vienna, INCB, 1985, p.44
[534] See: DEA, Worldwide Cocaine Production, p.48 and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1993, p.130
[535] See: Presidency of the Republic National Commission Against the Illicit Use of Drugs (CONACIUD) ,Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life. Venezuela's Plan Against Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimization, Volume I, CONACUID, Caracas, February 1997, p. 18 On this issue also see: OGD, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p. 82 and U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), DEA Intelligence Bulletin: Venezuela, DEA Intelligence Division, June 1996,p. 1
[536] CONACUID, Venezuela's Plan Against Drug Production, Trafficking, and Consumption and Capital Legitimization, Volume I, p. 20
[537] No evidence of heroin production in Venezuela was found during my research.
[538] See: UN International Drug Control Programme, Briefing Note for the Executive Director: Venezuela, UNDCP, Vienna, June 12, 1995, p.1
[539] DEA, Intelligence Bulletin: Venezuela, p.1 As reported by UNDCP the local connections of the drug business in Venezuela are run by sophisticated private sectors individuals, aided by elements of the political, judicial and military establishments. See: UNDCP, Briefing Note for the Executive Director: Venezuela, p.1
[540] RCMP, RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1984/85, p. 39. The Venezuelan journalist Germán Carías affirmed in 1986 for example that because of the enforcement measures applied in the Colombia, Venezuela and Peru the drug trafficking organizations established cocaine refinement facilities in the bordering areas of the Venezuelan Amazon forest. However this author does not give precise evidence about this issue. On this issue see, Carías, Germán, La Mafia de la Cocaína, p. 95
[541] RCMP, RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1985/86, Ottawa, Public Relations Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 1986, p.47
[542] See: Azócar Alcalá, op.cit., p.14
[543] ibid., p.18
[544] CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, p. 37
[545] CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, pp.36 and 37
[546] Interview with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998.
[547] UNDCP, Briefing Note for the Executive Director: Venezuela, p.1 Colonel (National Guard) Marquez, General Manager of the National Commission Against the Illicit Use of Drugs (CONACUID), Caracas, February 1998 and with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February, 1998.
[548] Williams, Phil, Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: A global Assessment in V. Gamba (ed.),Society Under Siege: Crime, Violence and Illegal Weapons, Vol.1, Halfway House (South Africa), Institute for Security Studies, 1997,p. 24
[549] Interview with Dr. Rosa del Olmo, Caracas, February 1998.
[550] Interview with Col. Marquez, Caracas, February, 1998.
[551] Testimony of "Jacinto" , a Colombian refugee who works in a ranch located between the Venezuelan states of Táchira and Barinas. Quoted in Cortes, Adriana, "La Violencia Enseña su Pasaporte (I): Venezuela recibe en silencio a víctimas de la guerra en Colombia," El Nacional, Caracas, p. D/1
[552] Siqueira Wiarda, The Society and its Environment, p.55
[553] See: Barrera, Cristina, "Flujos Decisionales en Escenarios de Tensión Espacial," in Crisis Fronteras. Relaciones Fronterizas Binacionales de Colombia con Venezuela y Ecuador, Bogotá, Ediciones Uniandes, CIDER and CEREC,1989, p. 144
[554] íbid.
[555] Ramírez León, op.cit., p.281 footnote Nº 49
[556] Martz, National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border, p. Also see: Siqueira Wiarda, op.cit., p.55
[557] See: Barrera, op.cit., p.144; Organización de Estados Americanos (OAS), Secretaría Ejecutiva para Asuntos Económicos y Sociales, Las Migraciones Laborales en Venezuela: Diagnóstico Demográfico, Washington D.C., Secretaría General, Departamento Asuntos Sociales, División de Trabajo y Mano de Obra, Unidad Técnica, Migraciones y Servicios Laborales, 1985, pp. 56, 58 and 59 and Celis Noguera, Carlos E., Defensa Para la Seguridad, Caracas, Instituto de Altos Estudios para la Defensa Nacional (IAEDEN), 1991, p.133
[558] Cortes, Adriana, op.cit., p. D/1
[559] ibid.
[560] Interview with Col. Marquez, Caracas, February 1998.
[561] Landaeta, Héctor, "Probable Invasión de Refugiados Colombianos en la Frontera," El Nacional, March 31, 1988, quoted in Centro de Estudios de Pastoral y Asistencia Migratoria (CEPAM), Acontecer Migratorio, Vol. 11, Nº 62-63, 1988, p.37
[562] Riding, Alan, Colombian Drugs and Rebels Upset Venezuela, p. A9
[563] See, Cortes, op.cit., p. D/1
[564] ibid.
[565] ibid.
[566] ibid.
[567] Interview with Col. Marquez, supra. and also see: Cortes,op.cit., p. D/1
[568] See for example RCMP, National Intelligence Drug Estimate, 1983.
[569] DEA, Intelligence Bulletin: Venezuela, p.2
[570] CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, CONACUID,Vol. I, pp. 35 and 36. Bank secrecy was eliminated in 1993 by a reform of the Venezuelan Organic Narcotics Act.
[571] Williams, Phil, Transnational Organised Crime and National and International Security: A Global Assessment, p. 26
[572] CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, CONACUID, Vol.I, p.29
[573] See: Briceño de Febres, Leyda, El Narcotráfico y la Sociedad Venezolana: Límites de la Legitimación de Capitales. Su Incidencia Sobre la Economía y la Seguridad Nacional. Trabajo presentado como requisito parcial para optar al Diploma Aprobatorio del Curso Superior de Defensa Nacional Nº XXIII, Caracas, Instituto de Altos Estudios en Defensa Nacional (IAEDEN), May 1994, pp. 59 and 74
[574] ibid.
[575] República de Venezuela, The National Commission Against the Illicit Use of Drugs, Venezuela, Anti-Drugs Territory: A Commitment to Life, Speech of Carlos Tablante, Minister of State, President of the National Commission Against the Illicit use of Drugs, Washington, D.C., CONACUID, no-date (Carlos Tablante has been President of the CONACUID from November 1997 to February 1999, most likely this speech took place in 1997 since it forms part of a package of public information prepared by CONACUID that year), pp. 7-8
[576] See: Briceño de Febres, op.cit., pp. 59 and 62
[577] CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, pp.28 and 29
[578] See: CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras, pp. 18-24
[579] ibid. also
[580] ibid.
[581] On this issue see supra, section C-"a" of this chapter. Also see: CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras, p. 19. This document argues that due to the economic crisis of the 1980s an increasing number of people in the border states of Zulia and Táchira started working as "mules" for the transportation of gasoline and kerosene (used in the production of cocaine) from Venezuela to Colombia and illegal drugs from Colombia to Venezuela.
[582] See supra., section C-"a" of this chapter.
[583] On this issue see: Mayorbe, José Antonio; Sucre Heredia, Ricardo and Rolfini, Vanessa, "El Caso Venezuela: Un Estudio de Referencia sobre Producción, Tráfico y Consumo de Drogas Ilícitas," Caracas, Centro Internacional de Estudios en Desarrollo y Comunicaciones (CIEDESCO), March 1993, pp. 102, 103 and 104.
[584] See: supra, section C- "b" of this chapter.
[585] According to some analysts and to Venezuelan official statements, the first big case involving cocaine trafficking though Venezuela took place in September 1983 when, in a joint U.S.-Venezuelan police operation, law enforcement officials seized 667 kilos of cocaine that were loaded in a plane that had landed at the Charallave airport, near Caracas. The plane belonged to the Venezuelan landowner and retired military officer Lizardo Márquez Pérez who was, in fact, one of the leaders of the so-called "Táchira cartel," a local drug trafficking organization that worked in association with the Cali cartel. On this issue see: Azócar Alcalá, op.cit., p.13 and República de Venezuela, Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Tomo XIV, Volúmen I, Enero-Mayo 1984 (Debate records of the Venezuelan Representatives House, January-March 1984) Statement by Congressman Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, Caracas, Imprenta del Congreso de la República, 1984, p.75
[586] See: CONACUID, Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory: A Commitment to Life, Vol. II, p.20 and Briceño de Febres, op.cit., p. 61
[587] De Fuentes, Sofía Piñeiro; Medina-Orozco, Evelyn; Rojas, Maritza; "Prevalencia del consumo de drogas en pacientes atendidos en urgencias de adultos atendidos en salas de emergencia" in Salud Pública, Mexico, Nº 40, 1998, pp.234.240
[588] Interview with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998. Also see: Lizarraga, Gillermo (president of the CNA from 1995 to 1997), "Brazo motor de la difícil lucha contra las drogas," Reflejos: Organo de Información Preventivo del Delito, CONACUID, Caracas, Nº 20, 1995, pp.19-23.
[589] Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas and Dr. Rosa del Olmo, Caracas, February 1998 and Ramirez Monagas , Venezuela y su Politica de Estado frente al problema de las drogas, Caracas, CONACUID,1988, 25 PP.
[590] Interview with Dr. Ramírez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998.
[591] Presidency of the Republic, Decree Nº 684, August 25, 1971 in Comisión Contra el Uso Indebido de Drogas (CCUID), Informe de Actividades, Primer Período 1971-1972, Caracas, Fisccalía General de la República (Office of the General Prosecutor of the Republic), 1972, p.15 (original in Spanish, my translation).
[592] Interview with Dr. Rosa del Olmo former member of the CCUID.
[593] Joint Major Staff Directive Nº 41, 1981 quoted in Del Olmo,Venezuela en las relaciones internacionales de la cocaína, in Pantoja, L. And Guridi, L., Drogas, Desarrollo y Estado de Derecho, Universidad del Deusto, 1993, p.213
[594] Interview with Rosa del Olmo and Fernandez Escobar, Félix, Geopolítica y Drogas . Para que un modelo?, M.A. Thesis, Caracas, Univesidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Economía y Sociología, 1988, p. 14
[595] Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas and Rosa del Olmo. Both agreed on the fact that this decision was not motivated by American pressure.
[596] See, República de Venezuela, Diario de Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, Tome XIV, Volume I, January -May 1984.
[597] Representative Alvarez Paz, Oswaldo (COPEI) during the Congress debates of February 1984.
[598] Representative Tablante , Carlos (MAS)-since 1997 he has been the head of the C.N.A (National Counterdrug Commission) the agency is responsible for the elaboration and planning of drug control policies, ibid.
[599] In 1993 it was reformed to include money laundering as a criminal act.
[600] LOSEP, art. 44.
[601] For a development of the model see: CONACUID, La cuestión de las drogas en America Latina: Una visión global, Presidencia de la República, Conacuid, Caracas, 1987, 288 p.
[602] Interview with Dr. Bayardo Ramirez Monagas, Caracas, February 1998.
[603] CONACUID, Drogas y Fronteras. Consideraciones desde la Perspectiva de la Idea de Seguridad, CONACUID, Caracas , 1986
[604] C.N.A (CONACUID), Venezuela, Anti-Drug Territory. A Commitment for Life, Caracas, February 1997, p.37
[605] See for example: Vargas Ríos, Luisa, Las Drogas como Problema Nacional y su incidencia en la Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, IAEDEN, Dissertation, Caracas, August, 1979; Col. (National Guard) Dávila Flores, Omar, La Transnacional de las Drogas y su incidencia en la Seguridad y la Defensa de Venezuela, Dissertation, IAEDEN, Caracas, May 1989; Cnel. (Army), D. Quijada, Oswaldo, op.cit.
[606] See, Casturiello, Mario, La Subversión y el Tráfico de Drogas en la Frontera Venezolano-Colombiana. Implicancias en la Seguridad y Defensa de Venezuela. Análisis Jurídico de la Situación, , Dissertation , IAEDEN, Caracas, May 1988.
[607] Interview with Dr. Ramirez Monagas.
[608] Interview wit Rosa del Olmo, Caracas February 1998 and Serbin, Andrés, Percepciones de Amenaza y Equipamiento Militar en Venezuela, in Cruz Johnson, Rigoberto and Varas, Augusto (eds.), Percepciones de Amenaza y Políticas de Defensa en America Latina, Santiago, FLACSO, 1993, p.289.
[609] See Serbin, Andrés, op.cit.
[610] Musashi, Miyamoto, op.cit., p.107
[611] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.155 and interview with the Prefecto Principal (R) Nelson Mandrile, National Director of Coordination for Drug Trafficking Control of Secretariat for Drug Addiction Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking (SEDRONAR) of Argentina, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[612] Interview with Prefecto Principal Mandrile (R) Nelson Mandrile, supra., footnote Nº 608
[613] As stated in a DEA report, "Most of the cannabis cultivated in Paraguay is consumed in Brazil, where traffickers are willing to pay a premium for high-quality marijuana, in fact, is so popular in Brazil that Brazilian traffickers occasionally contract Paraguayan peasants to cultivate cannabis plots on their behalf. Smaller quantities are consumed locally or are sold to traffickers in Argentina," DEA, Southern Cone Situation Report , p.7
[614] ibid. and Colonel (R) Hector A. Pipet, Narcotráfico y Relaciones Internacionales, Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, January-March 1995, p.29
[615] See: DEA , Southern Cone Situation Report, Drug Intelligence Report, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 1
[616] Only after a bloody terrorist attempt (the bombing of the Jewish association AMIA) took place in Buenos Aires in 1994 did Argentine security and intelligence agencies focus their attentionon the triple border between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. And even then, it was not because of the specific issue of drug trafficking,which is intensive in that uncontrolled area. Rather, it was due to the fact that Argentine (and U.S.) intelligence suspect that Islamic terrorists are harbored in the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este. On this issue see: Der Ghougassian, Khatchick, "Old and New Sources of Weapons" in Connecting Weapons with Violence: The South American Experience, ISS Monograph Series, Nº 25, May 1998, p. 14 and OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1997-98, [On line, pdf version]. Available internet http://www.ogd.org/rapport, pp. 197-200
[617] Queiser Morales, Waltraud, " Militarising the drug war in Bolivia," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, Nº 2, 1992, p.353
[618] For an elaborated study on these aspects see: Queiser Morales, Waltraud, Bolivia Land of Struggle,Boulder, Westview Press,1992, pp. 80-83.; Dunkerley, James, Rebellion in the Veins,Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-1982, London, Verso Editions, 1984, 385pp. and Lavaud, Jean-Pierre, L'inestabilité Politique de l'Amérique Latine. Le cas de la Bolivie, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1991,287pp.
[619] Queiser Morales, Militarising the drug war in Bolivia,p. 360
[620] Gandolfi, Alain, Les Luttes Armées en Amérique Latine, pp. 86 and 87
[621] I owe the expression "objective convergence of interests" to Dr. Dante Caputo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina from 1983-1989. Dr. Caputo used this expression in general terms to refer to a situation where players who do not necessarily share permanent interests and goals act together over a punctual matter when a common interest is at stake. Interview with Dr. Caputo. Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[622] On this issue see: McDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, p.55. McDonald explains that Bolivian drug traffickers colluded with the military to stage the coup because they felt threatened by a brief campaign against drug trafficking carried out during 1979, and they were wary of ongoing U.S. pressure to curtail the drug trade.
[623] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.6
[624] "Tin Soldiers," The Economist, January 9, 1999, p.50
[625] Centro de Documentación e Información-Bolivia (CEDIB), "La Absurda Guerra de la Coca" in Albó, Xavier and Barrios, Raúl (eds.), Violencias Encubiertas en Bolivia, Volume 2, La Paz, CIPCA-Aruwiry, 1993, p.44
[626] Menzel, Sewall H., Fire in the Andes: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru, Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1996, p.1
[627] Painter, Bolivia and Coca , p.6
[628] As reported, "Public Investments have been misallocated and inefficient. Although increasing in recent years, over the long term- public investment in infrastructure and human capital has been negligible. In the last years public investments was about nine percent of GDP and approximately 20 percent of public expenditure as a whole.[...] The main problems of Bolivian economy persists: a)strongly negative commercial balance and b) fragile fiscal position [...]The fiscal deficit has been financed in 1992 and 1993 through increasing external borrowing. In 1994 the fiscal position remains fragile, mainly because of higher than budgeted payments. The fiscal position remains fragile, mainly because of higher than budgeted payments. The 12 months fiscal deficit has been estimated at 4.5 percent of GDP as of September 1994 and is projected to be 3.3 percent of GDP at the end of the year. These deficit levels are not sustainable and may jeopardize macroeconomic stability" See: UNDCP La Paz Bolivia, Update 1994 Annual Country Report, Bolivia, p.9
[629] This policy of voluntary eradication began to be implemented in 1986.
[630] As stated by one analyst "Such [interdiction] operations, usually costing tens of thousands of dollars, have provoked considerable opposition for the local population, in part due to the participation of the DEA, in part due to the frequent abuses stemming from the heavy-handed manner in which the antidrug forces treat local people and in part because of the perceived threat to the local economy..."See: Painter, op.cit., p. 83
[631] As explained by one analyst, "In June 1991, the Inter-American Commission on Drug Policy, made up of a distinguished panel of Latin American and U.S. experts, argued in a report that the policy of paying US$ 2,000 a hectare in compensation 'has actually the effect of sustaining the income of coca growers and thereby keeping them in the coca-growing business rather, than moving them into licit pursuits..."Painter, op.cit, p.89
[632] The country has the following ethnic composition: Quechua, 30 percent; Aymara, 25 percent; mixed, 25 to 30 percent; and whites (blanco), 5 to 15 percent.and lowlands Indians numbering around 100,000 in early 1980s, divided into nine major linguistic groups and nearly thirty subgroups. See: Hudson, Rex and Hanratty, Dennis, Bolivia: a country study, Washington D.C., Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991 [On-line version], available http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.bo
[633] Reportedly said by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1938 about Nicaraguan Dictator Anastasio Somoza, Sr.
[634] Malamud Goti, Jaime E. , Smoke and Mirrors: the paradox of the drug wars, Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, p. 72
[635] As explained by one analyst, "there is no firm evidence to prove a concrete policy of unqualified state backing and patronage under Banzer rather than a generally benevolent attitude, occasional assistance and direct involvement on the part of certain individuals," Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.315
In a country of paradoxes is not surprising that Bolivia´s General Banzer was elected President in 1997. General Banzer proposed to destroy the creature he helped to create in a period of five years. As stated by Banzer referring to his drug trafficking control policy,
"The Government of Bolivia has taken the decision to liberate the country from the drug traffic circuit within the next five years," General Hugo Banzer Suarez, ¡With Dignity! Bolivian Strategy for the Fight Against Drug Traffic, 1998-2002, Republic of Bolivia, first page.
[636] Dunkerley, op.cit. p.318
[637] On the role of the Nixon administration in the coup against General Torres see: Barrios Morón , Raul, Bolivia & Estados Unidos. Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Narcotráfico (1980-1982), La Paz, Hisbol-FLACSO, 1989, 203 pp. Also see: Rudel, Christian, La Bolivie, Paris, Karthala, 1995, p. 104
[638] See: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca: El Legado de los Dioses Locura de los Blancos, pp. 86-87
[639] See: Betancourt and García, Contrabandistas Marimberos y Mafiosos, p. 47
[640] See: Smith, The Gordian Knot: The Connection Between Narcotics and Development, pp. 9-11 and Renard, Ronald D., The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs & The Making of the Golden Triangle, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1996, pp. 51, 58 and 59.
[641] Spedding, Alison L., "Cocataki, Taki-Coca: Trade, Traffic, and Organized Peasant Resistance in the Yungas of La Paz," in Léons, Madeline Barbara and Sanabria, Harry (eds.), Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997, pp.118-119
[642] The agrarian reform has strongly affected the altiplano region but had left the "modern productive farms" of Santa Cruz and Cochabamba almost intact.
[643] Camba is the nickname for the people of the Santa Cruz area in the lowlands. They differentiate from the kollas of the altiplano for their European background and their entrepreneurial and character and type of economy linked to the world capitalist economy.
[644] Dunkerley, op. cit. p.315
[645] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 10
[646] Labrousse, Coca Coke,p. 133
[647] Queiser Morales, Bolivia: Land of Struggle, p. 128
[648] "Historical Setting" in Hudson and Hanratty, Bolivia: a country study, [On-line version], available http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gdc/cntrystd.bo
[649] General Jorge Rafael Videla president of Argentina from 1976 to 1980, Clarín, Buenos Aires, 6 August 1980, quoted in Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.306
[650] See: ibid. and Smith, Clifford T., "Bolivia: History" in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1999, Seventh Edition, pp. 118 and 119.
[651] See: ibid.
[652] McDonald, Dancing on a Volcano, pp.55 and 57
[653] This term was coined by Dunkerley in Rebellion in the Veins, p.292
[654] Queiser Morales, Bolivia Land of Struggle, p. 128
[655] On this issue see the excellent and meticulous work of Barrios Morón, Raul, "Bolivia & Estados Unidos. Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Narcotráfico (1980-1982),"pp.129-151
[656] Queiser Morales, Bolivia, Land of Struggle, p126
[657] Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos, p.134
[658] In English, "The Grooms of Death," a name taken from a song of the Spanish Foreign Legion. In fact the head of "Los Novios de la Muerte" was a German neo-nazi mercenary that (escaping German law enforcement) had served in that corp.
[659] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.300
[660] Barrios, Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos, p.143
[661] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.307
[662] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.323
[663] Interview (Buenos Aires, July 1997) with Dr. Oscar Camilión, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations during 1981 and Minister of Defense from 1993 to 1996. Dr. Camilión said that as minister of Foreign Affairs he requested a detailed intelligence briefing from the Major Staff of the Argentine Army on the situation in Bolivia. Dr. Camilión was manifestly worried since he had noticed that in an article in Time magazine there was a map of South America with a little star that marked the northwest province of Salta indicating that some cocaine production could be taking place in that area at the time.
[664] Interview (Buenos Aires, July 1997) with Dr. Oscar Camilión, supra.
[665] The Argentine Military Junta had actively participated in the preparation of García Meza's coup. They had also sent military advisors from the notorious SIN (Naval Intelligence Service) and the Army in order to train and assist Bolivian military in interrogatories (meaning torture) and elimination of the opposition. The Argentine Junta was also the first government to recognize García Meza's government (South Africa, Brazil, Chile, and Taiwan would also recognize the government later. ). For the Argentine military, the reasons for this support were geopolitical: to avoid a leftist and democratic government on the border, to overtly defy the Carter administration and its politics on human rights defense, and to counterbalance the South Cone military governments (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil) vis à vis the Andean old and new democracies (Colombia, Venezuela and Peru). Another factor was to win influence in Bolivia to counterbalance Brazil as a regional power. These were the main reasons for the Argentine support. This being said, it is important to remark that there were certain high ranking military officers (at least one divisionary general) that were allegedly linked with the illegal drug trade, however as stated before the Argentine Army as an institution was highly concerned about the possibility of cocaine spill over production to Argentina and a contagion effect of corruption in the Argentine armed forces. On the geopolitical reasons for the Argentine support see: Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos; for the information concerning the participation of SIN officers in Meza's coup see: Pasquini, Gabriel and De Miguel Eduardo, Blanca y Radiante, Mafias, Poder y Narcotráfico en la Argentina, p.55 and Malamud Goti, Jaime, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 72
[666] As an extra-academic aside: this brief period of independent cocaine boost in Bolivia is illustrated in Brian De Palma's movie "Scarface".
[667] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.324
[668] On this matters see, Dunkerley, op. cit., pp. 292-344
[669] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 71
[670] Bolivia imports most of its food products. The only country that was buying Bolivian gas (overpriced) was Argentina. The Argentine military were also spending (already scarce) resources on sending food aid to Bolivia. The Reagan administration was leading the anticommunist crusade in Latin America but was not willing to tolerate a narco regime in South America in view of the growing cocaine consumption problem in the U.S. The Argentine military autonomy and discretion on promoting their own puppet military regimes in the area also annoyed the U.S. government. On this matter see: Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos and specially 'Next coup is ours' U.S. warns Argentina, Latin American Weekly report, WR-81-15, 10 April 1981, p.2
[671] After the return to democracy in Argentina both dictators flew the country and they started to be track down through Brazil (García Meza was extradited from there to in 1985) Paraguay and finally Bolivia. Arce Gomez was arrested near Santa Cruz by a commando operation of UMOPAR and expelled to the U.S. in 1989.
[672] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.323
[673] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p.325
[674] Barrios Morón, Bolivia & Estados Unidos, p.178
[675] Aguiló S.I., Federico, Narcotráfico y Violencia, CEDIB-IESE, Cochabamba, 1992, p.93
[676] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, El Legado de los Dioses o Locura de los Blancos, p.108
[677] Aguiló, S.I, Narcotráfico y Violencia, p. 94
[678] Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, p. 325
[679] Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.66
[680] Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.78
[681] Ventura, Ray, "On ira pendre notre linge sur la Ligne Sigfried," 1939. Popular song among soldiers of the French Army during the so called "drôle de guerre" with Germany 1939-1940.
[682] For a very detailed evolution of Bolivian legislation concerning coca and cocaine see: Quiroga, José Antonio, Coca/ Cocaína. Una Visión Boliviana, La Paz,: CEDLA; CID; AIPE, 1990, pp. 51-75
[683] Mac Gregor, Felipe, Coca and Cocaine: An Andean Perspective, London, Greenwod Press, 1993, p.28
[684] Musashi, Miyamoto, The Book of Five Rings, Boston & London, Shambala, 1994,p.106
[685] U.S. Senator Paula Hawkins after an evaluation visit to Bolivia in March 1985, quoted in Quiroga, José Antonio, Coca/ Cocaína. Una visión boliviana, p. 51( the quotation is in Spanish in Quiroga's book)
[686] A/C.3/39/SR.42, declaration of the Bolivian delegate, Mr. Gumuncio Granier, Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in New York at a meeting of the Third Committee of the General Assembly concerning the report of the Secretary General on the International Campaign Against Drugs, p14
[687] High-ranking officials of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the moral integrity of president Siles Suazo and his committment to the suppression drug trafficking in Bolivia. Interview with Ambassador Alconada Sempé at the time undersecretary of Latin American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Member of the National Commission for Drug Abuse and Traffic Control and Interview with Ambassador Alconada Sempé, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[688] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.27
[689] See: Gamarra, Eduardo, Entre la droga y la democracia. La cooperación entre Estados Unidos-Bolivia y la lucha contra el narcotráfico, La Paz, ILDIS, 1994, pp.28-34
[690] Healy, Kevin, "Coca, the state and the peasantry in Bolivia 1982-1988," Journal of Interamerican Studies, Special Issue on Drug Trafficking, Vol. 30 Numbers 2 and 3, 1988, p.112
[691] Even if UMOPAR members are recruited from the Bolivian National Police, the force does not form part of the chain of command in this institution. UMOPAR falls under the aegis of Defensa Social, a branch of the Interior Ministry and its director is usually a retired army officer. Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.81
[692] Barrios Morón, La Política contra las drogas en Bolivia, p.39
[693] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.81
[694] Queiser Morales, Militarising the drug war in Bolivia, p. 353
[695] "Bolivian Government Agrees to 'Coca Pact' "Latin American Weekly Report, August 10, 1984,WR-84-31, page not numbered.
[696] Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.69
[697] Quiroga, Coca/Cocaína, p. 59
[698] It is very doubtful that Suarez had such a great amount of money (2 billion dollars).
[699] Suarez had invited President Siles to discuss the matter personally. Otazo declared to the Congress that neither he nor any other member of the government had accepted money from Suarez, but confirmed that he had met Suarez following instructions from President Siles Suazo. Why Siles Suazo authorized this interview is still unclear. In any case, Suarez used this episode to further destabilize the Siles government, and he succeeded. For a careful description of this episode see: Lee III, The White Labyrinth, p.144
[700] U.S. Public Law 99-570-Oct.27,1986 100 STAT. 3207-66 [Known as Anti-Narcotics Act of 1986]
[701] U.S. Public Law 100-690-NOV.18, 1988, 102 STAT. 4271 [Known as Anti-Narcotics act of 1988]
[702] Queiser Morales, Bolivia. Land of Struggle, p.103
[703] See: Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.30
[704] Menzel, Fire in the Andes, p. 17
[705] Interview with Minister Roberto D. Palarino, Director of the Drugs Unit of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1987-1989), Embassy of Argentina, Washington D.C., January 27, 1995.
[706] Both acts are quoted as introductory quotations at the beginning of this section.
[707] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.30. The "Lara Bonilla" treaty mentioned in the quote was signed by the members of the Andean Group in 1986. The treaty allows international drug law enforcement cooperation and also allows countries to invite other countries in support of these law enforcement operations.
[708] This process of decentralization of coca paste production is very well analyzed by Dr. Jaime Malamud Goti in "Smoke and Mirrors," pp. 17 and 39. However during my research trip to the Chapare I could verify that the way in which this "cottage industrialization" of the peasants occurs varies from peasant community to peasant community depending on the attitude adopted by the local sindicatos (basic local unit of the coca grower trade union federations). While some peasants work part time in the coca paste transformation stage as employees at night others prefer to rent part of their land to the traffickers for them to transform the coca paste. The land in the middle of the chaco ( spot of jungle) and was rented to the trafficker for about 30$ a night (Interview with an agrarian specialist at Villa Tunari, Chapare, August 7, 1997). Nevertheless some peasant sindicatos are reluctant to do so in order to avoid becoming the target of law enforcement and adopted a mechanism of "centinelas" (sentinels) that patrol the parcels in order to avoid coca production on their land. (Interview with a former "dirigente" -leader- of a peasant community in the Chapare, August 8, 1997).The situation of this latter group is especially dangerous since they got caught in the crossfire between UMOPAR (for coca eradication) and the traffickers.
[709] DEA Intelligence Division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, October 1993, p.31
[710] See: "Anti-drug measures-Bolivian-U.S. Joint Operations," Keesing's Record of World Events, ,Volume XXXI, December 1986, p. 34,801.
[711] The declarations of the pilot and later findings by a UMOPAR personnel in the area would lead to the conclusion that the laboratory belonged to a transnational organization. The pilot declared that the gunmen spoke Portuguese (leading to beliefs that they were Brazilians) and the UMOPAR men found scattered literature in Spanish, Portuguese, and English on the site. .See: Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 52
[712] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.52
[713] See: Oporto Castro, Henry, "Bolivia: el complejo coca-cocaína," in García Sayán, Coca, Cocaína y narcotráfico. Laberinto en los Andes, p.181. For a detailed analysis of CIA's utilization of drug networks for the financing of undercover operations in Central America see: Dale Scott, Peter and Marshall, Jonathan, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991,279pp. See also: Garrido-Otoya, María Teresa, La guerre contre la cocaïne dans les Andes: un autre piège au nom de la democratie, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Memoire présenté en vue de l'obtention du Certificat d'études internationales, Geneva 1993, p.59
[714] Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, p.16
[715] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 53
[716] Painter, Bolivia and coca,p.78
[717] "Plan Trienal de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico," included in CEDIB, Coca-Cronología. Bolivia 1986-1992, Centro de Documentación e Información -Bolivia (CEDIB) Cochabamba, 1992, see: pp.12 to 27.
[718] ibid., p. 20
[719] ibid., p. 25 (not underlined in the original and original in Spanish).
[720] Interview to a coca-growing peasant in the Chapare on August 8, 1997. On this matter see also: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca: El Legado de los Dioses o Locura de los Blancos, p.137; CEDIB, La Abusurda Guerra de la Coca, p.46; Quiroga, Coca/Cocaína, p.70.
[721] On this issue see: Wallon, Alain, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues: La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial, Rapport 1992-93, , Paris, Hachette, 1993, p.256
[722] Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87-11,19 March 1987,p.2
[723] Latin American Weekly Report, WR-87,11 June, 1987, WR-87-22,p.2
[724] CEDIB, La lucha antidrogas ,p. 47
[725] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca legado de los dioses o locura de los blancos,p.124
[726] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, Coca legado de los dioses o locura de los blancos,p. 126
[727] As reported, "The decision to talk was taken after an incident on 28 May, in which three people died in a shoot-out after troops were sent in to remove highway barricades erected by local peasants near Cochabamba, on the Parotani bridge. According to the government, a peasant was killed by troops, and a soldier died from a bullet fired by the peasants. (The peasants say two of their people were killed, and that the soldier had committed suicide after realizing that one of the peasant victims was his own father.) About a dozen people were injured and some 500 were arrested, say reports." See: Latin American Weekly Report, 11 June 1987, WR-87-22, p.2
[728] On the points of the agreement see: CEDIB, La Absurda Guerra de la Coca, p. 48
[729] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 79 Comments between brackets have been modified by the author from endnote Nº 5 of Painter, op. cit. chapter 5.
[730] See: Gamarra, Eduardo, "U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration: 1989-1992, in Bagley, Bruce and Walker III, William (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas, p.220
[731] As a matter of fact, the signing of two annexes to the agreement (1988 and 1989) tied U.S. assistance to progress on crop substitution and [nominally] legitimized the Bolivian government's alternative development proposal. See: Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts: 1989-1992, p.220
Under Annexes I and II (1988 and 1989), Bolivia agreed to reduce coca paste and leaf production by reducing the price of coca leaves, that is, reinforcing interdiction. In particular, Annex II tied U.S. assistance to progress on crop substitution and legitimized the Bolivian government's alternative development proposal. This annex together with Annex III (signed in May 1990, it formalized involvement of the army in counter narcotics operations) were kept secret until they were leaked to the press in 1990 giving way to a wave of peasant resistance. See: CEDIB, La Absurda Guerra de la Coca, p.54 and 55 and Tarqui Jamira and Condo Rivero, Coca El legado de los Dioses o Locura de los Blancos, p. 145
[732] See: Williams, Jacqueline, Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia, Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA Background Paper, February 28,1997, p.5
[733] Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit., p.14 SnowCap would also involve the participation of Coast Guard, Border Guard and U.S. military personnel (for the training of UMOPAR, Blue Devils and Red Devils). For a detailed description of Snowcap Operation see: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, one Hundred First Congress, Second Session, "Operation Snowcap: Past, Present and Future," May 23, 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
[734] Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.,p.18 See also: Operation Snowcap: Past, Present and Future, p.61
[735] Until March 1996 the commander of the force was always a retired senior military officer but the office of the Director General that can be either a civilian or a police officer has replaced the position. The replacement of military officers as chiefs of the FELCN by police or civilian officers has been done with the purpose of reducing the rivalry between the police and the armed forces. The army always disliked the fact that UMOPAR was receiving more training and better weapons than similar military units. See: Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit.p.22
[736] U.S. Department of State, Agreement Between the United States of America and Bolivia, Annex II, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 12053, Signed at La Paz February 24, 1987,pp.14 and 15.
[737] Bolivian Navy units that conduct counternarcotics operations on Bolivia's rivers. The Blue devils carry out regular Coast Guard duties patrolling Bolivia's rivers, but with an emphasis on counternarcotics. They receive training from the U.S. Coast Guards and, since 1988, from the special forces units of the U.S. Navy (Seals). The Blue Devils also ferry UMOPAR forces. See: Williams,Jacqueline, p. 23. The Red Devil Task force. Bolivian Air Force helicopters and pilots that support UMOPAR in counternarcotics operations. The Task Force is equipped with U.S.-owned UH-1H helicopters and the pilots have been trained by U.S. military personnel. In both cases (Blue and Red Devils) the Narcotics Assistance Section of the U.S. department of state pays for fuel and maintenance. See, Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit. p.23. In 1996 the FELCN was reformed and the armed forces (including the army) formally included in its structure. This particular issue will be discussed later in this chapter.
[738] On this issue see: Williams, Jacqueline,op.cit., p.29 and Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, pp.33 and 34
[739] See: Menzel, op. cit., p.12
[740] "They [UMOPAR] beat us a lot "Ellos pegan mucho" and always use tear gas "siempre usan el gas" and they take money (when they find it) or labor tools "se llevan dinero si encuentran o implementos," interview with a former coca growing local leader (dirigente), Chapare, August 8, 1997. On this issue also see: Sanabria, Harry, "The Discourse and Practice of Repression and Resistance in the Chapare," in Léons, Madeline Barbara and Sanabria, Harry (eds.), Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality, pp. 169-190
[741] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.37
[742] Latin American Weekly Report, 14 July 1988, WR-88-27, p. 8 and Coca-Cronología, p.19
[743] On this issue see: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. Annex 3 (page without number in the original). It is worth noticing that the progressive Bolivian Catholic Church is the most credible institution in Bolivian society. On the role of the Catholic Church in Bolivia see: Queiser Morales, Bolivia. Land of Struggle, p. 131
[744] On this issue see: Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit. Annex 3 (page without number in the original)
[745] Villa Tunari was, in 1997 (when I visited there), a beautiful and peaceful town. There is however a monolith erected in memory of the victims at the exact place where the massacre took place. Through the 1990s, thanks to USAID and UNDCP aid, modern services (stone made roads are particularly beautiful) have been built and the state has affirmed its presence in the area (there is a Police station and a school). There were also some five star hotels being built in the area. And upper middle class people from La Paz are visiting the area more and more as tourists. (Discussions with local people, August 1997.) UMOPAR headquarters have been concentrated near Chimoré some miles east. In 1997 the region did not resemble a "wild west area" at all. However, I had the impression of being in a potentially violent and non-controlled areas in more recent colonies to the east of the Chapare. During a research excursion to this area and while I was taking photos of coca plantations I was approached by a group of peasants handling machetes who started to ask me in a very aggressive tone what I was doing there. Unfortunately for me I had left in the jeep the blue UN cap I had been given by UNDCP personnel (the head of the project had warned me to use the cap all the time on the field). The communication was particularly difficult because of the poor Spanish of the peasants (most of the colons use Quechua or Aymara as a first language).Fortunately the FAO-UNDCP jeep was close by so I could wait locked in the car until the two engineers that were travelling with me reassured the peasants.
[746] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 38
[747] Malamud Goti, pp.41-42
[748] Malamud Goti, p.42
[749] ibid. 42
[750] See: Oporto Castro, Bolivia: El complejo coca-cocaína, p.178
[751] Most of the information for the writing of this section has been gathered from Gamarra, Eduardo, "Gamarra, Eduardo, "U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration: 1989-1992, in Bagley, Bruce and Walker III, William (eds.), Drug Trafficking in the Americas,pp. 217-256. References to any other sources will be specifically quoted.
[752] Declarations of Jaime Paz Zamora as leader of Bolivia's Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), on the presence of U.S. troops in Bolivia, Latin American Weekly Report, October 23, 1986, WR-86-41, p.6
[753] Annex III to the U.S.-Bolivia Narcotics Control Agreement, Signed by President Jaime Paz Zamora, in May 1990, Text in CEDIB, Coca-Cronología, p.411 Original in Spanish.
[754] See: Queiser Morales,Bolivia. Land of Struggle,p. 106 and Smith, Clifford, op.cit., p. 119
[755] This recipe of combining a populist and (sometimes young) and charismatic leader surrounded by "Chicago school economists" in order to adopt IMF-advised austerity plans would be adopted simultaneously in the rest of Latin America. This was the case in Venezuela with Carlos Perez, Argentina with Carlos Menem, Brazil with Collor de Mello, and Peru with Alberto Fujimori. Banzer, who is a very skillful politician, probably thought that it was not the time for a former dictator to be in charge of unpopular measures so he probably decided to let his power grow in the shadow of Paz Estenssoro first, then Paz Zamora, and later Sanchez de Losada. It would be possible also to speculate that in a period of growing diplomatic U.S. pressure over the cocaine issue, Banzer was an undesirable candidate due to his alleged past links with the Santa Cruz mafia. Or both.
[756] For a very good analysis of U.S.-Bolivian counternarcotics efforts during Paz Zamora's administration see: Gamarra, Eduardo, U.S. Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration: 1989-1992,pp.217 -256
[757] Following the Colombian example, this treaty granted softer sentences and non-extradition to the U.S. in exchange for voluntary surrender to the traffickers.
[758] CEDIB, La Abusurda Guerra de la Coca, p.67; Laserna, Roberto, "Bolivie: la politique antidrogue du gouvernement Sánchez de Losada," Problèmes d'Amérique Latine, N.28, 1998, p.99;
[759] This looks to me more like a question of hurt personal/institutional pride than an accurate assessment of reality, since the results of the Safe Haven operation were far from reaching the targets. "Despite all the hoopla, however, the operation's success was arguable. Not a single major or minor drug lord was arrested." Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia, p.233. See also, Painter, op.cit., p82
[760] This is the ever-present dilemma of Bolivian administrations. On one side, Law Nº 1008 is very clear: all coca in illegal areas must be forcibly eradicated, all new coca in excedentary areas must be forcibly eradicated, and all old coca not eradicated during the period given during for voluntary eradication must be eradicated. On the other hand, the government hesitates to go a step further in forcible eradication because of the fear of initiating a civil war in the Chapare. The violent attitude of the peasants is sometimes considered by the government to amount to blackmail (chantaje) with the goal of preventing the enforcement of the law. Interview with a high-ranking official of SUBDESAL (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo- Secretaría de Defensa Social, Ministerio de Gobierno, Bolivia), La Paz, August, 1997.
[761] See: Gamarra, Eduardo, U.S. Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts During the Paz Zamora Administration: 1989-1992, pp. 217 -256
Ambassador Raúl Alconada Sempé, at the time undersecretary for Latin American Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (1985-1989), affirmed during an interview that in Argentine diplomatic circles the Bolivian position "coca for development" was particularly irritating. In the view of Alconada's office, Bolivia had an ethical and moral commitment to enforce the drug laws, independent of increased help for development. (As we will see, in the late 1980's, Argentina had became a main transit route for cocaine produced in Bolivia, and started to grow as a consumption market for the drug.) Interview with Ambassador Alconada Sempé, Buenos Aires, July 1997).
I should add that, leaving moral and ethical issues aside, because of its economic vulnerability and dependency, Bolivia was not in a position to assume this kind of foreign policy. As a matter of fact, President Fujimori would adopt a similar position, going so far as to declare coca growing as a crime. But again Peru has a less dependent and more diversified economy as well as higher priorities (declaring coca legal was part of his policy for denying peasant support to Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley). On this issue see: Dreyfus, Pablo, "Sendero Luminoso: ¿Un caso de Narcoterrorismo?," Boletín Saap, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político, Nº 8, 1999 pp. 3-32 and Dreyfus, Pablo "When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in Peru´s Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995," Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol.15, Nº4,1999, pp.370-396
[762] Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivian Counternarcotics Efforts: 1989-1992, p.221
[763] See: ibid.p. 222.
[764] Gamarra, ibid, p.223
[765] The domestic (in the U.S.) and international factors reasons that frustrated these initiatives are fully analyzed in Chapter IX of this dissertation.
[766] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 87
[767] Painter, op.cit.,p89
[768] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Rivero, Coca, El legado de los dioses...., p.159 see also: Sanabria, The Discourse and Practice of Repression and Resistance in the Chapare, p. 186
[769] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.88
[770] Gamarra, U.S-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts, p.238
[771] See: Painter, Bolivia and Coca, pp. 88 and 89
[772] In reference to the interaction between the Bolivian and U.S. drug control bureaucracies Malamud Goti actually entitled one the sections of his book "Who is cheating on whom?" See: Malamud Goti,op.cit., p.65
[773] Painter, op, cit,p.93
[774] Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts, p.229
[775] Painter, op.cit.,p.101
[776] Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotics Efforts,p.242
[777] Painter, op.cit.,p100
[778] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p. 34
[779] Malamud Goti, op.cit. pp.78 to 81
[780] See: Dreyfus, Cocaine,the military and Shining Path, 1980-1995.
[781] On this issue see: Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit., pp. 22-30
During my research trip to the Chapare, it was possible to witness how UMOPAR troops (it was possible to see them coming and going all the time) were transported by U.S.-made army military trucks from the Green Devils. Helicopters of the Red Devils (Huey helicopters) could be seen taking off and landing every day from Chimoré headquarters.
[782] Williams, Jacqueline,op. cit., p.27
[783] On July 15 1994, joint forces, including more than 700 police personnel (UMOPAR) and other sections of the FELCN, initiated an antidrug operation in the Chapare and Santa Cruz scheduled to last 60 days. The objective was to control highways, bridges, and borders in order to control drug trafficking. Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug Trafficking Update, August 1994, p.3 Operation New Dawn was supported by personnel of the U.S. South Command (SOUTHCOM) at the time based in Panama. Between July 1 and 6, 1996 SOUTHCOM also supported law enforcement operation Hurricane in the Chapare using U.S. radar to pinpoint coca seed maceration pits and cocaine laboratories. Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit., p.18
[784] Williams, Jacqueline,op.cit. p13
[785] I employ the word "officially" because in the periods under study, U.S. special forces (U.S. Navy Seals) had been conducting riverine operations in the Beni. As reported by Eduardo Gamarra "A two part article in the June 1991 editions of Soldier of Fortune traced the path of elite Navy Seals patrolling the rivers of the Beni department. These operations were unknown to most Bolivians, including their elected representative in the National Congress," Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotic Efforts, p.232
[786] According to Jacqueline Williams, op.cit. p.29. "In December 1996, WOLA received disturbing reports that Bolivian conscript soldiers are now participating directly in eradication efforts. According to Cathy Breen, member of the Andean Information network, in the Villa 14 de Septiembre area of the Chapare, soldiers were forced to carry out crop eradication," Williams, Jacqueline, ibid, p.23
[787] Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit, p.7
[788] Sanabria, Harry, "Elusive goals: 'Opción Cero' and the limits of state rule and hegemony in Eastern Bolivia" in Giordani, Lourdes and Snipes, Marjorie, Indigenous Perceptions of the Nation State in Latin America, Va, Department of Anthropology College of William and Mery, 1995, p. 85
[789] A high ranking UNDCP official commented to me during a research trip to Vienna in April 1995 that forceful implementation of Option Cero would have meant civil war.
[790] For a very detailed analysis of Sanchez de Losada's drug control policy see: Laserna, Roberto, Bolivie: la politique antidrogue du gouvernement Sánchez de Losada, Problèmes d'Amérique latine, Nº 28, January-March, 1998, p.85 to p. 106 see also: Williams, Jacqueline, op.cit. p. 27 and 28
[791] Sanabria, Elusive Goals, p. 97
[792] Balencie and La Grange, Mondes Rebelles,p.141. The election in 1993 of Mr. Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, the leader of the indigenist Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari and an Aymara Indian, as vice-president of Bolivia proved to be in my view part of an electoral maneuver by President Sanchez de Losada who needed popular support in order to carry out extremely unpopular economic adjustment politics. The MRTK did not have significant representations after the elections of 1997 when General Banzer was elected president.
[793] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) report Nº FBIS-LAT-92-144,p.20
[794] On this issue see: Balencie, Jean-Marc and de la Grange, Arnaud, Mondes rebelles: acteurs, conflits et violences politiques, Vol.1, Amériques, Afrique, pp.139-140
[795] Balencie and de la Grange, pp.139-142; Soruco, Juan Cristóbal, "La Incomunicación de los Medios de Comunicación," in Albó and Barrios, Violencias Encubiertas en Bolivia, pp.239-245; Barrios Morón, Raúl, "La Elusiva Paz de la Democracia Boliviana," in Albó and Barrios, op.cit., pp.169-190 and Iturri Salmón, Jaime, EGTK: La Guerrilla Aymara en Bolivia, La Paz, Ediciones Vaca Sagrada, 1992, pp.8-65
[796] See: Iturri Salmón, op.cit., pp.20 and 81; Painter, op.cit., p141
[797] Painter, op.cit.p.141; Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia counternarcotics efforts, p.228;
[798] See: "Shining Path Interested in Spreading to Bolivia," FBIS-LAT-91-144,27 July 1992, p.17; "Peruvian Shining Path Presence Rules Out," FBIS-LAT-91-084, 1 May 1991, p.25; "Army: Strengthen Borders Against Shining Path," FBIS-LAT-90-120, 5 July 1990,p33; "Interior Minister Views 'Shining Path', Security," FBIS-LAT, Volume VI, 15 Nov. 1983,C1; "Authorities claim rebel presence," Latin American Weekly Report, September 15,p.8 and Malamud Got, Smoke and Mirrors,. p.75
[799] See: "Terror attacks shake La Paz," Latin American Weekly Report, January 5, 1989, p.4
[800] Interview with Major (Argentine Army) Brown, Argentine Army Major Staff, Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[801] For a very good analysis of this phenomenon see: Mora, Frank, "Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking and U.S. policy in Brazil the Southern Cone of Latin America," The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Volume 21, Number 2, Summer 1996, pp.115-140 and Heargraves, Clare, Snowfields, The War on Cocaine in the Andes, especially chapter, 53-83. See also: The South American Cocaine Trade: An "Industry" in Transition, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/cocaine.htm and Dreyfus, Pablo, El lado oscuro de la globalización, especially, pp. 32-38
[802] Hargreaves, op. cit., p 66
[803] James Painter,Bolivia and Coca,A study in dependency,p29. See also, Smith,Why people grow on drugs,p.15; O'Brien, Cocaine Politics, p 41
[804] "The drug Enforcement Administration's Intelligence Division in an investigation called 'Breakthrough', pointed out that the cocaine producing capacity of Bolivia is 273 tons. This under the presumption that a 100 percent of the coca leaves is targeted to the cocaine production. In reality, Bolivia's current cocaine production is 193 tons". UNDCP, Update 1994 Annual Country Report, Bolivia,p. 27
[805] This fact is confirmed not only by the increase of the amount of annual cocaine seizures but also because since 1987 big amounts of cocaine begun to be seized in one single police operation.
[806] Hargreaves,op.cit, p8, See also,op.cit,p 66 and UN INCB Report 1993, p35; Painter, op.cit.,p29; Servicio Central de Estupefacientes (Spain) 1995,p. 51; RCMP, National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1987/88,p.54
[807] "Confirming that there have been media reports on the discovery in Santa Cruz of 260 rifles, 16 pistols, some rocket launchers and ground mines-all Chinese made- that allegedly were earmarked for Shining Path," FBIS-LAT-92-44
[808] FBIS-LAT-90-025, Trading of Drugs for Argentine Weapons Suspected.
[809] FIBIS-LAT-1997
[810] "Do you remember brother those times? Men were other kind of men. Coca [cocaine] and morphine were unknown. At that time guys did not use gomina [a trademark of hair gel for man]." From: "Tiempos Viejos" (Old times), tango by Manuel Romero and Francisco Canaro, Buenos Aires, 1926.
[811] See for example: Cardoso, Oscar and Heguilein,Rubén, "Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas," América Latina/Internacional, FLACSO Programa Argentina, Vol.9, Nº 31, pp.473-480 ; Corigliano, Francisco, El problema del narcotráfico y la democracia en Argentina, mimeo, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO, Buenos Aires, 1994, 24pp. and Tokatlián, Juan Gabriel, "Argentina y la guerra antidrogas," mimeo, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, pp. 1 and 2
[812] The narcotics law Nº 23,737 (voted in 1989, at the time with the consensus of the PJ and the UCR) is harsher than the previous drug control laws. Also during his administration, President Menem requested (without success) in Congress for the establishment of the death penalty for drug traffickers. On the issues of the evolution of the Argentine drug control legislation see: Palarino, Roberto, Tráfico Ilícito internacional de Drogas: Régimen de Control, Situación regional y perspectivas de cambio, Buenos Aires, Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, Buenos Aires, 1992, p 44; Puricelli, José Luis, Estupefacientes y Drogadicción. Tenencia, Uso y Tráfico-Prevención y Tratamiento Legal-Drogas en el deporte- Responsabilidad de Laboratorios, Droguerías y Farmacias-Facultades del Juez-Ley 23.737 y Normas Complementatrias, Editorial Universidad, Buenos Aires 1992.pp.166-235.; Corigliano op.cit. p.16 and Auredy, Alejandro, El Narcotráfico en América: Sus Conexiones, Hombres y Rutas, Córdoba, Lerner Córdoba, 1991, pp.349-351. On Menem's statements in favor of the establishment of death penalty for drug traffickers see: U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Intelligence Division, Southern Cone Situation Report: Drug Intelligence Report, Washington D.C., 1994, p.3; "Menem" (subtitle of Menem's statement), Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 31, 1989; "Insiste Menem con pena de muerte para 'narcos'," Ámbito Financiero, Buenos Aires, December 21, 1994; "Menem y la pena de muerte," Página 12, Buenos Aires,p.2; "Palabras del señor [sic] presidente [sic] de la Nación, doctor Carlos Saúl Menem a los señores participantes del VII Congreso de la Comisión Interamericana contra el Abuso de Drogas, el día 30 de Marzo de 1990," Washington D.C., 1990, [on line], http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/arl/pm/sample2/argentin/menem/900508d.html
[813] Cardoso and Heguilein op.cit.p.478.
[814] Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, one Hundred First Congress, Second Session, Operation Snowcap: Past, Present and Future, May 23, 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., p.1
[815] See: Harmon et.al.,op.cit., p.35 and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics Matters Strategy Report for 1991, March 1991, Washington D.C., p. 76
[816] J.C., Merquior, "State-Building in Brazil and Argentina," in Hall, John (ed.), op.cit., p.266
[817] On this issue see: Kaplan, Marcos, La Formación del Estado Nacional en América Latina, Santiago de Chile, Ed. Universitaria, 1969, p.241
[818] On this issue see: Oszlak, Oscar, La Formación del Estado Argentino, Buenos Aires, Fundación Editorial de Belgrano, 1990, 290p.
[819] On this issue see: Botana, Natalio, El Orden Conservador: La política argentina entre 1880 y 1916, Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, 351p. and Oszlak, op.cit.
[820] Rock, David, Argentina 1516-1987,p.190
[821] See: Botana, op.cit, especially, pp. 217-346
[822] Argentina received two big waves of foreign investment in the 1920s and 30s (Nestlé, Colgate Palmolive, Firestone, Johnson and Johnson, Goodyear, Dupont, Otis Elevators, R.C.A, I.T.T., Lever Bros, Michelin, Philips, General Electric, Pirelli and Osram) and in the 1960s (Renault, General Motors-left in the 1970s), Ford, Peugeot, Mercedes Benz-trucks-). But again, these companies were controlled from abroad, and produced consumption goods. None of them contributed to the development of a local capital goods and technology sector. See for example: Prebisch, Raúl, La crisis del desarrollo argentino, Buenos Aires, El Ateneo, 1986, pp.97 to 135.
[823] Argentina's major commercial partner, Great Britain, declared the pound unconvertible after the 1929 crash, and this prevented Argentina from buying industrialized consumption goods from the US, a triangular pattern of trade that had been common in the 1920s.
[824] On this issue see: Escudé, Carlos, 1942-1949: Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación Argentina, Buenos Aires, Fundación Editorial de Belgrano, 1988, 399p.; Rapoport, Mario, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentes argentinas: 1940-1945, Buenos Aires, Fundación Editorial de Belgrano, 1981, 310p.
[825] See: Escudé, Carlos, 1942-1949: Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación Argentina, pp.251-386
[826] On this period of Argentine history see: Ciria, Alberto, Partidos y Poder en la Argentina Moderna (1930-1946), Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, 414p.
[827] On this issue see: Murmis, Miguel and Portantiero, Juan Carlos, Estudios sobre los orígenes del peronismo, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Argentina, 1987,129 pp.
[828] On this issue see: O´Donnell, Guillermo, Modernización y Autoritarismo, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1972, pp.180-214; Kvaternik, Eugenio, Crisis sin salvataje: la crisis político-militar de 1962-63, Buenos Aires, Ediciones del IDES, Buenos Aires, 1987, 149p. and Kvaternik, Eugenio, El péndulo cívico militar: La caída de Illia, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato Di Tella/Editorial Tesis, 1990, 144 pp.
[829] For a very well documented explanation of the causes and development of the civil war in the 1970s see: James, Daniel, Resistencia e Integración: El peronismo y la clase trabajadora argentina 1946-1976, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1990, 359 pp. and Gasparini, Juan Alberto, Mouvements sociaux, pouvoir militaire et guerrilla en Argentine. Les années soixante/quatre vingts. "Les années de plomb," Thèse présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l'Université de Genève, Université de Genève, 1989, 199 pp. Also see: Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987, Chapter VIII.
[830] Carasales, op.cit, p.7
[831] Carasales, Julio, C, National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina , United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1992, p.6
[832] Minor parties are: and as Acción por la República-Nueva Dirigencia (dissident former members of the Menem's cabinet); Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (MODIN, right wing); Movimiento de integración y Desarrollo (MID, center-right); Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, left); Partido Comunista de Argentina; Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC); Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP, center right); Partido Intransigente (PI, center-left);Partido Nacional de Centro (conservative); Partido Nacionalista de los Trabajadores (PNT, extreme right-wing); Partido Obrero (Trotskyst); Partido Popular Cristiano; Partido Socialista Democráctico; Partido Socialista Popular; Política Abierta para la Integridad Social (PAIS); Unión del Centro Democrático (UCeDé); Unión para la Nueva Mayoría.
[833] Hufty, Marc, Un gouvernement sous influence: les facteurs historiques, politiques et économiques à l´origine de la politique économique du gouvernement du président de la République Argentine, Carlos Menem, de 1989 à 1995, Genève, Thèse Presentée à l´Université de Genève pour l´obtention du grade de Docteur ès sciences politiques, 1997, p.203
[834] Moreno Ocampo, Luis, " Una propuesta de acción," in Grondona, Mariano, La Corrupción, p. 130
[835] For an excellent historical and anthropological analysis Indian communities of Argentina see: Martínez Sarasola, Carlos, Nuestros paisanos los indios: vida, historia y destino de las comunidades indígenas en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1993, 659 pp.
[836] On the role of the public education system and the compulsory military service as a mechanism for the "argentinization" of immigrants see: Rouquié, Alain, Poder Militar y Sociedad Política en la Argentina, Volume 1, Buenos Aires, Hyspamerica, 1986, pp. 80-88
[837] Golbert, Laura and Tanti Fafani, Emilio, Poverty and Social Structure in Argentina: Outlook for the 1990s, Democracy and Social Policy Series, Kellog Institute Working Paper Nº 6, Spring 1994, pp.1 and 2.
[838] Sawers, Larry, The other Argentina: the Interior and National Development, Boulder, Westview Press, 1996, p.33
[839] Moreno Ocampo, op.cit. p130
[840] On the problem of generalized corruption in Argentina see: Grondona, Mariano (ed.), op. cit.. For particular cases see: Saba, Pablo Roberto and Manzetti, Luigi, "Privatization in Argentina: The implications for corruption," in Crime, Law & Social Change, 25, 1997, pp. 353-369; De Paula, Victor, Fuerte Apache,Argentina Siglo XXI; Buenos Aires, Centro de Estudios Sociales Dr. José Equiza, 1996,263p. Granillo Ocampo, Raúl (ed.), Corrupción, un riesgo para la democracia, Buenos Aires, Fundación Integración, 1997, 188p.
[841] Brailovsky, Antonio E., Historia de las Crisis Argentinas: un sacrificio inútil, Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano, 1996, p. 252
[842] José Manuel de la Sota, Peronist representative, quoted in Brailovsky, Antonio, op.cit.,p.271 (originally in Spanish-my translation-)
[843] Hufty, op.cit, p.116
[844] Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Jaime Malamud Goti, Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD (National Commission for the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse) from 1985 to 1986 and General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice (1986-1989), Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
[845] Interview with Dr. José Corsunsky, Adviser of the Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD (1985-1988) and Coordinator of the National Commission for the Coordination of Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse-CONCONAD II- (1988-1989). Dr. Corsunsky was in charge of the coordination of the implementation of drug abuse control activities between the Federal agencies that formed part of the Commission and the cooperation between CONCONAD and the provincial governments for the application of national drug abuse control policies.
[846] Ibid.
[847] As far as the drug law enforcement allocations they did not have a separate section in the budget congressional presentations so it was not possible to trace an evolution of the drug law enforcement budget of each police and security force.
[848] On this issue see: Hufty, op.cit., pp.185-219
[849] On this issue see: Corigliano, op.cit p1; Comisión de Legislación Penal, Comisión de Drogadicción, Jornadas Interparlamentarias sobre Lavado de Dinero, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1991, Lestelle, Alberto, "Argentina, blanco predilecto del narcotráfico en América del Sur," Actualización Política, Nº 5, 1992, p.97 and Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, Dirección General de Coordinación Estratégica, Análisis de la situación del narcotráfico y el lavado de dinero en la República Argentina, June 1996, pp. 6-8
[850] The only measure contemplated in the law (art 26) is lifting bank secrecy for the investigation of drug trafficking related crimes under the order of a federal judge.
[851] On this issue see: Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD), The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1997-1998 [on-line] http://www.ogd.org/98rapport/gb/gb98.html, pdf version p.197
The law was finally enacted on April 13, 2000 (Law Nº 25.246, Creation of the Financial Information Unit), however it was not fully regulated and approved by the Executive Power until February 2001. The FIU is still not functional because of delays over the appointment of its members.
[852] Blixen, Samuel, "La banque latino-américaine et le narco-trafic," in Labrousse Alain and Wallon Allain, La Planète des Drogues: Organisations criminelles, guerres et blanchiment, p.275
[853] OGD, The World Geopolitics of Drugs 19971998 [on-line] http://www.ogd.org/98rapport/gb/gb98.html, pdf version p.196
[854] Sawers, op.cit., pp.33 and 35
[855] The Economist Intelligence Unit, EUI Country Report: Argentina, 1st quarter 1994, p. 7
[856] EIU Country Report: Argentina, 3rd quarter 1994, pp.20-21
[857] On this issue see: Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, op.cit., p. 5
[858] See: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Drug Intelligence Estimate 1987/89,p.54
[859] DEA, Southern Cone Situation Report, p.3
[860] United Nations, International Narcotics Drug Control Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 1992, New York, 1992, p.43. The INCB refers to Decree 2064/91 signed in 1991, which requires that all transactions, including the manufacture, import and export of controlled chemical inputs (and certain pharmaceutical drugs) to be registered with the Argentine Drug Secretariat Office.
[861] United Nations Drug Control Programme, Country Drug abuse and Treaty Implementation Profiles: Argentina, Vienna, 1994, p.1
[862] Cocaine prices in Argentina dropped 14 times, taking the New York prices as a parameter, See: La Prensa, Buenos Aires, April, 13 1991,p.8. On this issue also see: Corigliano, Francisco,op.cit.,p3 and
UNDCP, Country Drug Abuse and Treaty Implementation Profiles: Argentina ,p.1
[863] United Nations, International Narcotics Drug Control Board, Report of the UN International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) for 1990, New York, 1990,p.34
[864] Lestelle, Alberto, Defendiendo el Futuro, (printed by Alberto Lestelle as Secretary of Drug Abuse Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking) Buenos Aires, 1994, p33.
[865] Le Monde, 12 October 1986, p5.
[866] See: "País de Consumo," Clarín, Buenos Aires, April, 9,1995, Editorial note, central page and Lestelle, Alberto , Argentina. Blanco Predilecto del Narcotráfico en América del Sur p.95.
[867] On this issue see: DEA Intelligence division, Worldwide Cocaine Situation, p.43 and Wallon Alain, La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial: Rapport 1992-1993, Hachette/OGD, p.275
[868] Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (OGD),La drogue nouveau désordre mondial,p.281
[869] Carasales, National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina,p. 67
[870] See: Roccatagliata, Juan A., La Argentina, Geografía general y los marcos regionales, Planeta, Buenos Aires, Chapter 5.
[871] See: National Institute of Statistics and Surveys, Annual Statistical Survey of the Argentine Republic, Ministry of Economy, Buenos Aires, 1994, p 33
[872] See: Pipet, Héctor, Aníbal (Colonel, retired), "Narcotráfico y narcoterrorismo en las relaciones internacionales," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 502, July-September, 1991, p. 48
[873] DEA, Drug Intelligence Report, Southern Cone Situation Report, pp. 1 and 2. On this issue also see:
[874] See: Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro, p. 30 and Garasino, Alberto, "Droga y Política," Revista Argentina de Análisis Político, p.35
[875] DEA,Southern Cone Situation Repport, p.1
[876] O'Donnell, Estado Democratización y cuidadanía,p. 70
[877] Sawers, op.cit.p173
[878] O'Donnell Estado Democratización y ciudadanía, pp.70 and 71
[879] U.S., Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 1991,p78
[880] A.K. Cohen, "The Concept of criminal organisation," The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 17, Nº 2, 1997, p 101
[881] "On 2 December, interior minister Carlos Ruckauf announced that from next January the Argentine government will begin to repatriate illegal immigrants. He reckoned that they numbered about 600,000 ,"Latin American Weekly Report, 16 December 1993, p 588
"These cases illustrate the fact that hundreds of thousands of immigrants form neighboring countries , many of them illegal, are working in Argentina, attracted by salaries that are double or triple those in their home countries. The Ministry of Labor has announced that work by illegal immigrants will be more thoroughly controlled and the Chamber of Deputies has voted for a bill restricting immigration," EIU, Country report 4th quarter 1993.
[882] Carasales, National Security Concepts of States: Argentina, p 86 and 87
[883] On this issue see: Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 2, 1990,p.31 and Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 19., 1989, pp. 18 -19
[884] Latin American Weekly Report, April 4, 1991,p 13
[885] Interview with Comandante Mayor (National Gendarmerie) Jorge Alberto Vazquez, Head of the Directorate of Dangerous drugs of the National Gendarmerie from 1983 to 1995 and commander of the V Region of the Gendarmerie at the time of the Interview , Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
[886] For a detailed description of this affair see Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp. 78-90 and 128-138.
[887] Clarín 10 March 1995,p40,41. 'Noticias" magazine 12 March 1995 p120. La Nación 8 March 1995,p13
[888] Interview with Comisario General (R) Armesto, high-ranking official of the Superintendence of Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police from 1989-1991, Buenos Aires, July 1991. Comisario General Armesto participated in the investigation of the "Shrimp Affair" (Caso Langostino) as it came to be known.
[889] Interview with Dr. Enrique Nosiglia, Minister of the Interior from 1987 to 1989, Buenos Aires, July 29, 1997.
[890] Interview with Dr. José Luis Manzano, Minister of the Interior from 1991 to 1992, Buenos Aires, August 1997; Interview with Prefecto Principal (R), Nelson Mandrile National Director for the Coordination of Control of Illicit Drug Traffic of SEDRONAR, Buenos Aires, July 1997. In the view of these officials there were no big drug trafficking organizations established in Argentina.
See Also: Pasquini and De Miguel, p.169
[891] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.x. Malamud Goti's book was published in 1991 and in 1988 he was Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, future events demonstrated that in fact Colombians would further attempt to establish bases in Argentina.
[892] " Lestelle alertó sobre los narcotraficantes," Press report reproduced by the Press Secretariat of SEDRONAR, Buenos Aires, September 1989.
[893] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.122; OGD, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p.79
[894] Pipet, H.A., "Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Cuarta Parte," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 516, Jan-March 1995, pp.23 and 124, also see same author, "Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Quinta Parte," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, Nº 517 (April-June 1995), pp.81
[895] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.73
[896] Pipet, Narcotráfico y Narcoterrorismo en las Relaciones Internacionales, Quinta Parte, p.86
[897] Interview with Minister Roberto D. Palarino, Argentine Embassy, Washington D.C., January 1995;
Phone Interview with Dr. Osvaldo Santiago Raimondi, Chief of Cabinet (Deputy Director) of the Secretariat for Planning of Drug Addiction Prevention and Fight Against Drug Trafficking, Geneva, 1995.
[898] Carasales op cit,p87
[899] US Department of State, International Narcotic Matters Strategy Report,1991,p 357
"Moreover, Argentina is also becoming a center for money-laundering..." UN INCB report 1991 p 37
[900] As we have seen in Chapter III, similar situations were cited as an excuse (although not the main cause) for two failed military coups in Venezuela and finally led to the impeachment and destitution under charges of corruption of the Venezuelan President Andrés Perez in 1993. We have also seen that President Perez already suffering from a crisis of confidence because of the uncontrolled economic crisis of their countries.
[901] La Prensa, April 30 1991, and Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp. 286 and 357
[902] Clarín, April 16, 1991 p. 11 and La Prensa,... December 1991, p.8
[903] Pasquini and de Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 283 and Clarín, April 16, 1991, p.11
[904] See Pasquini and de Miguel, Cocaína Dilates y Política,p.83,Le Monde,8 March 1991 "Des proches du Président Menem seraient impliqués dans des affairs de drogue"p 8, Le Monde July 26,1991,The New York Times International ,December 17 1991.
[905] Le Monde, Wednesday 15 July 1992,p3
[906] The Economist Intelligence Unit Report Nº 2 1991.
[907] Pasquini, Gabriel and De Miguel Eduardo, Blanca y Radiante, Mafias, Poder y Narcotráfico en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Espejo de la Argentina, 1995, pp.235 and 236
[908] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.233 and p.101
[909] Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, The Geopolitical Drug Dispatch, Nº 18, April 1993, p.5
[910] See Pasquini and De Miguel, p.240
[911] Interview with Dr. Facundo Suarez, head of the Argentine intelligence service from 1984 to 1989, Buenos Aires, August 1997. While the SIDE was carrying this investigation the Ministry of Interior had the working hypothesis of a Syrian cocaine connection in Bolivia. In the Ministry of the Interior it was believed that Syria had established contacts with the Medellín cartel in order to serve as a transit point for the cartel's shipments towards Europe. Interview with Dr. Daniel Larriqueta, Secretary of the Interior (Secretario de Estado, Ministerio del Interior) during the Alfonsín Administration, Buenos Aires, July 1987. This hypothesis of the Ministry of the Interior (which at the time charge of the Federal Police and -for law enforcement tasks- the National Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard) based on information provided by Israeli sources. As a marginal comment this case shows that as a result of the absolute secrecy of this kind of investigations and probably inter-bureaucratic competition, while the Intelligence Secretariat was certain about the drug trafficking of the Syrian connection in Bolivia, the Ministry of the Interior managed this only as a working hypothesis based on information provided by Israeli sources. It is worth noting that each of the police and security forces under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior has its own intelligence service. A high-ranking retired officer from the Dangerous Drugs Superintendence of the Federal Police told me that in order to avoid information leaks, drug trafficking-related investigations are so secret that each investigating team is unaware of the activities of other investigation cells even within the same law enforcement force. (Interview with retired Comisario General Armesto -Federal Police-, Buenos Aires, July 1997). It is very likely that the information managed by the Intelligence secretariat was not shared with the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover as it was a matter of intelligence collection in a foreign country (Bolivia), this case fell under the area of intelligence of the SIDE, so it is natural that the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of internal security) did not go further in this investigation. If Mr. Larriqueta reads this dissertation he will be very surprised to discover that his working hypothesis was a proven fact.
[912] Interview with Dr. Facundo Suarez quoted before.
[913] Among other things Mr. Al Kassar served an 18-year prison sentence in Great Britain in 1974 for drug trafficking. INTERPOL issued an arrest mandate because of his participation in in "arms for drugs" exchange with the Italian mafia in the Lebanese valley of Bekaa. Mr. Al Kassar was expelled from Britain and France in 1981 because of his links with terrorist organizations. He also participated in both the Irangate affair and the sale of weapons to Lybia in 1983. Al Kassar is also under investigation by the Swiss prosecutor Laurent Kasper-Ansermet because of his alleged participation in money laundering activities through the Swiss banking system. Allegedly in exchange of "favors" with the CIA the Spanish secret service (CESID) protects Mr. Al Kassar.
[914] See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante p. 240. Also the Yoma family and the Menem family are originally from the town of Yabrud a Syrian town close to the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) . Yabrud is also the native town of the Al Kassar family and President Menem (whose parents emigrated to La Rioja, Argentina in ....) is a distant relative of Monzer Al Kassar because one of Menem's cousins was married to an Al Kassar's cousins. See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.236 and 245 footnote 245.
[915] The BKA would have a particular interest in arresting Al Kassar because he accused of placing the bomb that destroyed a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie (Scotland) in 1988. Al Kassar was mentioned in an independent report prepared for Pan Am by an Israeli expert called Juval Aviv. Allegedly Al Kassar used the same method in order to send heroin for the Badalamenti "family" in the U.S. for this he would count with the protection of the CIA network in Frankfurt airport which would turn a blind eye on Al Kassar drug trafficking activities because of his activities in providing arms to the Contra in Central America with the money obtained from sells to Iran. According to Al Aviv's report the attempt was planned by the Iranian secret service as a revenge for the destruction of an Iranian Airbus over the Persian gulf five months before however it turn to be that in the Pan Am there was a DEA team that was travelling to the US with probatory evidence about the CIA's complicity with Al Kassar's drug trafficking activities. The majority of the passengers that died in the attempt were German citizens. See: Salinas, Juan José, 'Todos los caminos pasan por Yabrud," El Porteño, Junio 1992, pp.9 and 10 and Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.237 and 138
Al Kassar would have also counted with the protection of the Spanish intelligence service (CESID). As reported: "Al Kassar au moment de son arrestation vivait en toute impunité dans sa somptueuse demeure de Marbella. Il bénéficiait en effet de la protection des services secrets espagnols (CESID) pour les avoir aidé à combattre l'organisation basque ETA [he had participated in negotiations of exchange -prisoners'exchange-ETA members for French hostages in Lebanon- but he also sold to ETA missiles with electronic localizers placed by CESID] et à négocier la vente d'armement national à des pays du Moyen Orient. Il était revenu en Espagne après que les autorités espagnoles, soumises à des pressions internationales, l'avaient expulsé en avril 1990. Son départ pour l'Argentine avait été alors négocié avec les services secrets argentins (SIDE)" Wallon, Alain, La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial, Rapport 1992-93, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Paris, Hachette, 1993, p.276. See also, Salinas, op.cit., p.10.
[916] See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.236
[917] "The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 [...] Operates in the Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and Southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere [...] Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran and Syria," U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, Appendix B, http://www.state.gov/www/goblal/terrorsim/1997/Report/backg.html
[918] Goobar, Walter, El Tercer Atentado: Argentina en la mira del terrorismo ,Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1996, p.61 and Lanata, Jorge and Goldman, Joe, Cortinas de Humo. Una investigación independiente sobre los atentados contra la Embajada de Israel y la AMIA, Buenos Aires, Planeta, Espejo de la Argentina, 1994 p.13
[919] United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992, Washington D.C., US Department of State, p. 9
[920] Wallon, Alain, coordinateur, La Drogue Nouveau Désordre Mondial, Rapport 1992-93, Observatoire Géopolitque des Drogues, Paris, Hachette,1993., pp. 274-279
[921] See, Salinas, op.cit.p.6
[922] On this particular topic see the excellent work by Hassane Makhlouf, Culture et trafic de drogue au Liban, Paris, Edition l'Harmattan, 1994.
[923] ibid.
[924] Malkouf, Hassane, Culture et trafic de drogue au Liban, pp.77 et 78.
[925] Ehrlich, Reuven, "Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy," The International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, Herzliya, 1998 [on-line], http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=392
[926] OGD, 1997-98 World Drug Report, http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP04_2_SYRIE.html
[927] President Al Assad refused to receive President Menem for three years. Only after Amira's sentence was revoked and Al Ibrahim was safe in Syria could President Menem visit his family in Yabrud. See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.242
[928] See, Keesing's News Records of World Events, July 1991," BCCI Scandal,"p38355
[929] On this issue see: "The Yabrán Affair," The Economist, June 28,1997, p. 34
[930] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,p.287 and OGD, "Argentina" in The World Geopolitics of Drugs, 1997/1998 Annual Report, pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org
[931] Pasquini and De Miguel, op.cit., p.287
[932] ibid, p.286
[933] Keesing's Record of World Events, News Digest for December 1990, p. 37913.
[934] This did not happed without concessions as the amnesty granted by president Menem to the members of the Military Juntas of the last military regime in early 1990.
[935] Interview with Dr. Facundo Suárez, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[936] Interview with Dr. Facundo Suárez, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[937] Dr. Miguel Angel Toma. Dr. Toma was also president of the Defense Commission until 1998 when he became Secretary of Internal Security of the Ministry of the Interior.
[938] Interview with Dr. Miguel Angel Toma, Buenos Aires, August 1998.
[939] See: "Argentina" in OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org. Also see: Dutil, Carlos and Ragendorfer, Ricardo, La Bonaerense: Historia Criminal de la Policía de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 175-227
[940] ibid.
[941] ibid.
[942] See: Dutil and Ragendorfer, op.cit., pp.189-227
[943] See: : "Argentina" in OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org. Also see: Dutil and Ragendorfer, op.cit., pp. 175-188
[944] See: "Argentina" in OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org.
[945] On this issue see: Salinas, Juan, AMIA, El Atentado: Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están presos, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1997, pp. 239-400 and "Argentina" in OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org.
[946] See: "Argentina" in OGD, 1997/1998 Annual Report pdf version on line, http://www.ogd.org .
[947] As argued by an analyst -"The political culture of Argentina is often characterized as authoritarian, individualistic, yet intolerant, personalistic, and fatalistic, characteristics that are not supportive of democracy. These aspects of the political culture of the country are generally believed to be especially pronounced in the more traditional parts of the interior" Sawers, op.cit. p165
I personally believe that after sixteen years of uninterrupted democracy these characteristics are changing. Like most aspects in life, political culture is also a question of practice as well as trial and error. An example of this can be seen in one of the most backward and poor provinces of the country, namely, Catamarca. In this province, the traditional Saadi family had consecutively lost all elections since 1991thereby providing an opening in the system Unfortunately, a subsequent murder by the son of a politician closely linked to the Saadi mobilized the population of Catamarca and the issue was brought to Buenos Aires. The Federal Government intervened in the province and (a slow) investigation was carried out. Finally in July 1997, a group of "children of power"(as the members of the rich families are called in Catamarca) was indicted for the murder of María Soledad who was raped and beaten to death during a party. The body of María Soledad also presented signs of cocaine overdose. After this episode the Saadi family seemed to be eradicated from the political scene of Catamarca. This mobilization of the people could not have happened without the continuous practice of participation that existed in the country since the transition in 1983.
[948] Interviews with: Aldo Neri, Ministry of Health and Social Action (1985-1986) and President of the National Commission for drug control policies during these years; Alconada Sempé ,Under-Secretary of Latin American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina during the President Alfonsín administration and delegate to the National Commission for drug control policies of to Armesto, Comisario General Armesto (Federal Police), Dr. Facundo Suarez ,Secretary of Intelligence of the State from 1984 to December 1989 and Ambassador Camilión. All these interviews took place in Buenos Aires in July 1997.
[949] Pasquini and de Miguel op.cit. p52
[950] " ...Le gouverneur peroniste du Catamarca , M. Ramon Saadi, a été destitué mercredi 17 avril par le président Carlos Menem à la suite d'une avalanche de scandales dans sa province , située dans le nord de l'Argentine ...,"Le Monde, April 20 1991,p7 See also: Le Monde, April 10 1991p 9 and La Nación, Buenos Aires, April 22 pp. 1,5 and 4.
[951] National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC ) Report,1990 p8.See also: UN INCB Report, 1991,p37 and US State Department INCSR,1991,p75.
[952] INTERPOL, the Quest Review, 2nd quarter 1988
[953] All the enforcement agencies in the country.
[954] The National Gendarmerie estimates that the annual seizures represent only 10 per cent of the total amount of cocaine that passes through the country each year, Clarín, April 9, 1995, Editorial Note "País de Consumo," central page.
[955] Pasquini and de Miguel,op cit,p9
[956] Labrousse and Delpirou, Coca-Coke,p209. See also: Gugliotta, Les Rois de la Cocaine, p24.
[957] On this see the internet version of the Argentine Journal Radar ,September 20, 1998, http://www.Pagina12.com/1998/suple/radar/semtiem/98-09-10/nota1_a.htm
[958] "Así funciona el siniestro negocio de la droga en Argentina," Diario Poplular, February 13, 1994, p.18
[959] Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, Análisis de la Situación del Narcotráfico y Lavado de Dinero en la República Argentina, Dirección General de Coordinación e Inteligencia, Buenos Aires, June 1996, p.1
[960] Naciones Unidas, Departamento de Desarrollo económico y social, Estudios de Casos de Politica de Población: Argentina, p16
[961] ". Societies may react to immigrants because of the economic costs they impose or because of their purported social behavior such as criminality, welfare dependency, delinquency etc. Societies may be concerned because the people entering are so numerous or so poor that they create a substantial economic burden by straining housing education, and transportation facilities [and this] may generate local resentment..." Weiner , Myron, Security, Stability, and International Migration, International Security, Vol. 17 Nº 3,p114.
[962] "Certains paysans , qui ont accepté de détruire leurs plantations de cocaïers en échange de 2000 dollars,[...] souvent, incapables de permettre à leur famille de vivre de l'agriculture dans leurs communautés d'origine, très pauvres et surpeuplées, sur l'Altiplano, en ont été réduits à grossir les courants migratoires en direction de l'Argentine..."Labrousse, La drogue nouveau désordre mondial, p258
[963] Latin American Weekly report 5 august 1993.p355.
[964] Resumen Periodístico Latinoamericano, August 1993,p7.
[965] Resumen Periodístico Latinoamericano, ibid.
[966] Segal, An Atlas for international migration, p.48
[967] Center for Immigration studies, Immigration and Nationality Policies of Leading Migration Nations: Argentina, p.6
[969] Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad (SSPC), Dirección General de Coordinación e Inteligencia, Análisis de la situación del narcotráfico y lavado de dinero en la República Argentina, p.1
[970] DEA Intelligence Division, Intelligence Bulletin, DEA-96018, Working Papers, June 1996,p.3
[971] Lestelle, Alberto, Argentina, blanco predilecto del narcotráfico en América del Sur, Actualización Política, Nº5, 1992 (page number does not figure in the fax copy I received), Dr. Lestelle has been the head of SEDRONAR from 1989 to 1995.
[972] SEDRONAR, La República Argentina frente al lavado de dinero, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.1
[973] Interview with Dr. Bertoncello, former head of the drug control commission during the Alfonsín Administration, Bahía Blanca, August 19, 1997; interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Minister of Defense from 1993 to 1996;
[974] Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro,p.146 See also Clarín 9 April 1995,central page.
[975] US INCSR, 1991,p78
"Argentine narcotics consumption reportedly is rising. According to GOA estimates, consumption has increased 30 percent since 1989" ,US INCSR,1993 , p 89
[976] Clarín September 18 1992p 44
[977] El Cronista Comercial, 23 September 1992,p 17
[978] Zaballa, Joaquín, "El Narcotráfico en la República Argentina," Foro Político: Revista del Instituto de Ciencias Políticas, UMSA, Buenos Aires, Vol. V, August 1992, ,p 32
[979] La Nación, 18 April 1993, p. 10
[980] La Nación, 4 October 1994,p.4 The sample information was taken from the total number of calls to the Telephone Aid Service of the Secretary during May,June, and July 1994. The information is relevant because Buenos Aires and its suburbs are the most densely populated area in the country.
[981] UNDCP,Foro de Expertos sobre la reducción del uso indebido de drogas en América Latina, San Pablo, UNDCP, p. 8
"Intravenous drug abuse is fairly high among addicts, at about 60 percent. Cocaine, however is injected and sniffed," UNDCP, Country Drug abuse And Treaty implementation Profiles 1994,p1
[982] UNDCP, Foro de Expertos..,.p.9
[983] Estudio Sociológico y Político Mora y Araujo, Felipe Noguera y asociados, Encuesta Nacional SOCMERC, August 1992.
[984] The Washington Post, Argentina Becomes Conduit for Drug Traffic, Tuesday November 2 1993,p16; See also: Clarín, 28 May 1995,p.4.
[985] A National Gendarmerie Commander I interviewed in August 1997 shared that view. However, in 1988 he wrote an article in which he warns about the consequences of militarized enforcement in Bolivia. The article was published right after the Blast Furnace operation and among the consequences of Blast Furnace the discovery of a cocaine laboratory in Argentine territory in December 1986 is mentioned. See: Major Commander Jorge Alberto Vazquez and Major Commander Ricardo Rodolfo Lopez, "Influencia de la Operación 'Blast Furnace' sobre la frontera argentina," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, January-June, 1988,p. 136
Eleven years later Commander Major Vazquez discarded the possibility of the establishment of big CHCL factories (he does not discarded the proliferation of small CHCL labs or kitchens in the northwest) for the reasons mentioned above. Interview at the Headquarters of the V National Gendarmerie Region, Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
[986] President Menem was elected for a second period in May 1995. His second period finished in 1999. For practical reasons (limiting the time framework of this dissertation) only the first period will be analyzed.
[987] On the cognitive map approach in the field of international relations see: Axelrod, Robert (ed.), Structure of Decision. The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, 359p.; Bonham, G. Matthew and Shapiro, Michael, "Simulation in the Development of a Theory of Foreign Policy Decision-Making," in McGowan, Patrick, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 1, London, Sage Publications,1973,pp.55-72 and Bonham, G. Matthew and Shapiro, Michael, "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17 Nº 2, June 1973, pp. 147-172;
On the cognitive method in Social Sciences see: Eden, Colin, "On the Nature of Cognitive Maps," Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 23, Nº 3, 1992,261-265; Fiol, Marlene, "Maps to Managers: Where are we? Where do we go from here?," ibid, pp. 267-285; and Eden, Colin and Ackermann, Fran, "The Analysis of Cause Maps," ibid, pp.309-324
[988] In view of the lack of a commonly accepted definition among political scientists about what a belief is, I decided use the Webster New World Dictionary where belief is defined as: 1. conviction that certain things are true 2. religious faith 3. trust or confidence 4. creed or doctrine 5. an opinion, expectation; judgment. Leaving aside the fact that for some officials, politics canbecome almost a religion, for the purposes of this dissertation meanings 1 and 5 will be assimilated to the concepts of "belief". The reason being, that I will observe whether or not governmental officials believe if some very real and present phenomena (drug trafficking related violence in a neighboring country or drug consumption for example) can become a national security problem for Argentina.
[989] Rocket, Milton, The Open and Closed Mind. Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems, New York, Basic Books Inc.,1960, p.33
[990] Holsti, Ole R., The belief system and national images: a case study, Conflict Resolution, Volume VI, number 3,p.245 For a very accurate description of the Belief Systems approach see: Belief Systems and International ,Oxford, Basil Rockwell,1988,specially Part I.
[991] On the definition of "contextual beliefs" see: Russell, Roberto, "Sistema de creencias y política exterior argentina: 1976-1989," FLACSO/Argentina, Documentos e Informes de Investigación Nº 204, Buenos Aires, July, 1996, p.3
[992] See, Wrightson, Margaret, "The Documentary Coding Method,in Axelrod, Structure of Decision". The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites, Princeton, Princeton University Press,1976, pp.291-332
[993] There are four other symbols for all linkages that do not fit comfortably into a simple plus-or-minus world. They are: (+) will not hurt, does not prevent, is not harmful; (-) will help, does not promote, is of no benefit to; a may or may not be related to, affects indeterminately; m effects is some non-zero way. See Wrightson,p.295. For the sake of simplicity in this dissertation I will narrow down my coding to the basic codes indicating positive, negative or neutral relationship ( +, - and 0 ).
[994] Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op.cit.p.59
[995] Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op.cit.p.59
[996] Axelrod, Analysis of Cognitive Maps, in Axelrod, op. cit,p.72
[997] Harary, Frank, Norman, Robert and Dorwint Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs, New York, John Wiley &Sons, Inc., 1965. See also: Harary Frank, "A structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956," Conflict Resolution, Vol. V, Nº 2, 1961,pp,166 -178.
[998] Enrique Nosiglia, Minister of the Interior of Argentina during the Alfonsín Administration. Interview realized in July 1997 in the offices of the Radical Civic Union, Buenos Aires.
[999] See, Wrightson,op.cit.,p.291
[1000] "This[field work] means asking questions, eating strange foods, learning a new language, watching ceremonies, taking filed notes, washing clothes, writing letters home, tracing out genealogies, observing play, interviewing informants, and hundred of other things" Spradley, James P., The Ethnographic Interview, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1979, p.iii. Most of these things apply to my research experience in the Bolivian tropic however I must say that I also practiced all these activities in the "jungle of concrete" in Buenos Aires (probably with the exception of eating strange foods and tracing genealogies).I made lots of questions, I learnt a new bureaucratic language, I certainly washed my clothes, I ate the best steaks on earth, I wrote e-mails to my dissertation director.
[1001] Spradley, op.cit., p.60
[1002] After Argentina initiated the transition towards, democracy in 1983, a congressional debate arose upon the reformulation of both the concept and the legislation dealing with national security. The concept of National Security was, at the Congressional level, finally divided in two fields: external and internal security, with the clear purpose of avoiding intervention by the Armed Forces in internal affairs (i.e. counter-insurgency and internal intelligence collection). This is because of the dramatic experience of the last military dictatorship (1976-1983) when the prevalent concept of national security at the time (the National Security Doctrine), not only gave an excuse for the Armed Forces intervention in the exercise of the political power, but also lead to the Armed forces involvement in massive flagrant violations of human rights. While defense (use of military forces to counter attacks of external origin) is ruled by the defense law of 1988; internal security, defined here as the defense and protection of individual freedom, life and property as well as the protection of the full functioning of the republican, federal and representative system, is ruled by the internal security act of 1991 (debates started in 1986). For more information on this topic see: Carasales, Julio C. , National Security Concepts of the States: Argentina, New York, UNIFIER, 1992, 131p.
[1003] Hermann, Charles, "Decision Structure and Process influences in Foreign Policy," in East, Maurice; Salmore, Stephen; and Hermann, Charles, Why Nations Act. Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies, Beverly Hills/London, Sage Publications,1978, pp. 25-49
[1004] Interview with Representative (PJ) Miguel Angel Toma (Secretary of Internal Security during Menem´s second term in office and at the time of the interview Vice President of the Low House Defense Commission and Vice-President of the Bi-Chamber Commission for Monitoring the Internal Security and Intelligence agencies), Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[1005] On the use of the concept "external" security in order to refer to the concept of defense see: Carasales, op.cit., p.20
[1006] The only case of intervention of Armed Forces in internal matters since 1983 (excepting of course the repression of the military uprisings in 1987,1988 and 1990) happened in February 1989 when a terrorist group of the small left wing party "Movimiento Todos Por la Patria" attacked and occupied Army Infantry Regiment Nº 3 in Greater Buenos Aires district of La Tablada. Former ERP leader Enrique Gorriarán Merlo led the attack. Because it was a military installation the armed forces were authorized to storm and recover the barracks. In the ensuing battle the armed branch of MTP was dismantled (the insurgents were either killed or arrested) and the party was declared illegal. Gorriarán Merlo was extradited in 199... from Mexico. All the leaders and participants were judged in public oral trials and received severe sentences. This attack led the Alfonsín administration to enact the "ad hoc" (at the time) secret presidential decree Nº 327 that provided for the "preparation, implementation, and supervision of measures to prevent and terminate the formation of activities of armed groups capable of jeopardizing the rule of law under the Constitution or endangering the lives, freedom, property or safety of the inhabitants of the Nation" and [art.69b] "the President of the Nation shall order the intervention of the armed forces in cases in which the magnitude or nature of the events or the materials in the hands of the aggressors so require, and shall appoint the officer commanding the operations". See, Carasales,op.cit.p.19. Article 6b also states that should military installations or bases be attacked, the Armed Forces must immediately repeal the aggression and request the necessary support of the Police and Security Forces. This decree has been ruled out by the Internal Security Act 24,059 of 1991 to which I will refer later. It is worth noticing that in none of the internal disturbances after 1990 (pillages of supermarkets and civil revolts) the armed forces intervened to restore order. The task (as stated in the legislation) when the provincial police was overcome, as was the case of Santiago del Estero, the federal government mobilized the Gendarmerie and anti-mutiny units of the Federal Police which where mobilized in C-130 Air Force planes (the internal security act authorizes the armed forces to provide logistical support to the police and security forces).
[1007] The National Security Doctrine as applied in Argentina was in a sense the local application and interpretation of the "doctrine of continental security and the ideological frontiers" This doctrine was a Latin American interpretation of French and U.S. defense counterinsurgent military doctrines from the late 1950s and early 1960s. The doctrine started to be applied basically as a consequence of the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 and the danger of a revolutionary expansion towards the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Basically the doctrine is characterized by:
a) A lack of conceptual difference between national defense and internal security; b) the maintenance of internal security is part of an ideological confrontation between the West and the East (Soviet Bloc); c) police and security forces become part of this global confrontation and as such they are subordinated to the armed forces; d) the armed forces are trained and equipped for countering an internal enemy and only exceptionally for external attacks; e) the armed forces can and must carry out domestic intelligence. That is, all necessary means must be employed in a total and permanent war against the communist enemy because every country becomes a battlefield between the West and the Communist Bloc. The enemy acts in various fronts and by different means, therefore defense has to be carried out in different fronts and by different means. Development, for example, also becomes an instrument of defense, since following the logic of the doctrine, economic backwardness breeds violence, thus leaving an open door for communist infiltration. Therefore, national development has to be also subordinated to the defense structure of the state. The logic implied in this doctrine is basically that in the global war against communism, every aspect of the national life becomes part of the defense effort, therefore everything must be subordinated to the organs in charge of defense. If armed forces are in charge of the nation (as it was the case of Argentina at that time) then everything must be subordinated to them .Conclusion: Defense is everything and everything is defense. The legal instrument for the application of this doctrine was the National Defense Act Nº 16,970 of 1966, enacted during the military government of General Onganía. Interestingly enough, law Nº 16,970 establishes a National Security Council and a National Development Council that would coordinate strategies in order to reach security through development. In a sense, more than a defense law, this act was a norm concerning the administration of the nation. The National Defense Act of 1966 was ruled "de facto" in 1983 and "de jure" in 1988 when it was replaced by the National Defense act 23.554. For a detailed study of the National Security Doctrine see: Ugarte, Manuel, Seguridad Interior, Buenos Aires, Fundación Arturo Illia para la Democracia y la Paz, 1990; Diario de Sesiones, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 44th Meeting, continuation of the 5th (special meeting) 28 and 19 December 1987, especially presentation of representative Balbino Zubiri,p.4,692 to p.4693 and Pion-Berlin, David, "The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina," Comparative Political Studies, Vol 21 Nº 3, October 1988,pp.382-407
[1008] "The Argentine military did not so much reject the NSD [national security doctrine] as it practiced selective vision, magnifying those components of the doctrine it liked and losing sight of the rest. It emphasized operational aspects of the doctrine to the exclusion of political ones; it learned the lessons of direct combat against terror well enough but ignored the indirect strategies designed to influence the general public; and it redefined the subversive threat to become a catchall for all enemies of the state," Pion-Berlin, op.cit.p.402 In the words of one of the authors of the new defense act, under the National Security Doctrine the Argentine Armed Forces had become "occupation forces in their own country". Interview with Dr. Miguel Angel Toma at the time of the interview President of the Defense Commission of the House of Representatives, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[1009] Carasales op.cit. p. 18
[1010] Article Nº 2 of Law Nº 24,059.
[1011] Presidential Decree Nº1273 and Law 24,059 Art Nº 7, The National Gendarmerie is about 15,000 men strong and is equipped with "Shortland" armored reconnaissance vehicles and M-113 armored personnel-carriers. It has about 20 light aircraft and helicopters (Avro Piper, Cessna, PC-6, Hughes 500, SA
[1012] Up to December 1996 Gendarmerie and the Coast Guards depended organically (within the structure and for budget purposes) from the Ministry of Defense and operationally from the Ministry of the Interior (that is for law enforcement purposes). In 1996, through Presidential decree Nº1410/96 the two forces were entirely placed under the Ministry of the Interior. For the purposes of this dissertation, what is important to know is that for law enforcement purposes these two forces received instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and they were also at the disposal of Federal Judges for the enforcement of federal laws (as it is the case of the Narcotics act).
[1013] "This approach to the security and defense of the Argentine Republic, centered on the country's frontiers and on the deterrent objective of its military policy, has been in effect for many decades. Just lately however signs have appeared that this traditional approach may be changing [...] In a lecture delivered at the National Defense School on 13 August 1990 Domingo Cavallo, the [at the time] Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion of Argentina, stated that: 'The perception of defense as an isolated national territorial exercise is gradually giving way to the realization that there are common security interests in the Southern Cone, and that it is therefore necessary to respond with one accord to risks and problems which are also common. The traditional conception of boundary-dispute situations will be supplanted by more comprehensive and more up-to date approaches, together with an integrative and shared conception of security'. Some days later, Hubert Romero, the then Minister of Defense, maintained in the same forum that: 'today the notion of national defense is taking on a new dimension; its no longer confined to the field of application of force. Quite the contrary: we assert that this notion should be viewed as the coordinated and uninterrupted action of all the human, moral and material resources of the Nation to find the channels leading to the integration or convergence of interests in common with other countries, at the same time not neglecting to safeguard the vital interests of the Nation and striving to diminish and if possible eliminate the factors that might lead to conflict situations'. The two Minister's words convey the idea that national defense now has another dimension, which makes it necessary to look beyond the scenarios of the past and seek means of tackling the problems of security, which are different from those of other periods, jointly with neighboring countries," Carasales,op.cit.p.22
[1014] See, Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.70 and footnotes 31 to 34 of Chapter 4. Also conversations with a Major Staff Army officer and interview with Major Brown of the General Army Secretariat who gave me the official position of the Argentine Army on this aspect, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[1015] Argentina: Military Role in Fight Against Drugs Opposed, FBIS-LAT-97-064, March 30,1997
[1016] Interview with Comisario General Armesto (Federal Police), Buenos Aires, July 1997. Comisario Armesto stated that around 1981 and 1982 seizing a gram of cocaine was a very extraordinary and uncommon thing, while in 1997 seizing 10 to 20 kilos of this drug was considered normal. Interview with Prefecto Principal (Coast Guard) Nelson Mandrile (Director of the National Direction of Coordination and Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking of SEDRONAR), Buenos Aires, July 1995. Mandrile, who was an officer in the illicit drugs section of the Coast Guard at the time, starts perceiving a change in the pattern of drug trafficking (towards an increasing in cocaine trafficking) since 1980.
[1017] Interview with a former military officer who occupied a position of high responsibility during the military regime, the officer requested not to be named, Buenos Aires, June 19, 1997.
[1018] ibid.
[1019] Interview with Dr. Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. The fact that Dr. Camilión was unaware of the situation in Bolivia might be explained by the system of "parallel diplomacies" that existed during the military dictatorship and particularly during the Viola government. The military regime was a sort of "collegiate autocracy" in which Armed Service (Army, Air Force and Navy) had a third of the national administration in all the areas of the state apparatus. That is in every state dependency the administration of issues was divided in 30% percent for each force. Moreover within each dependency the officials were not loyal to the president or the head of the dependency but to his own force. (See: Russell Roberto, "El proceso de toma de decisiones en la política exterior argentina," in Russell, Roberto ed., Política exterior y toma de decisiones en América Latina Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, pp.13-59). Covert operations such as the support for the Bolivian coup through military advisors, were under the direction of the First Army Corps led by General Guillermo Suarez Mason (who by the way also coordinated the covert support of the Argentina to the contra in Honduras during the military dictatorship). Considering that some of the military advisors that went to Bolivia were navy officers of the Naval Intelligence service, it is also most likely that the navy coordinated part of this covert operation (until 1980 commanded by Admiral Emilio Massera). On this issue see: Dale Scott, Peter and Marshall, Jonathan, Cocaine Politics. Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991, pp.43 and 44; see also: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.55.
[1020] This concern appears to be justified since in December 1975 (right before the March 1976 coup that overthrew Ms. María Estela "Isabel" Perón) a report of the Army Intelligence Service revealed that the Minister of Social Welfare and Chief of the Federal Police, José Lopez Rega, (who also was the leader of the right wing paramilitary group Triple A) was the head of a drug trafficking organization that processed cocaine in laboratories hidden in the province of Salta close to the Bolivian border. The drug was then transported towards Buenos Aires by members of the Federal Police and dispatched by diplomatic suitcases by members of the diplomatic service. the organization also included among others the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alberto Vignes , the Senator of Salta, Juan Carlos Cornejo Linares, and the future Governor of Salta, Roberto Romero. The money obtained from these illicit activities was used for financing the activities of the Triple A. It is very likely also that the report was exaggerated by the military in order to further discredit the administration of President María E. "Isabel" Perón. The network in Argentina was disbanded after the coup, however its connections in Bolivia were used by the head of the First Army Corps Guillermo Suarez Mason in order to finance foreign covert operations of the military regime. See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.52 and 53; Dale Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, pp.43 to 50 and Henman, Anthony, op.cit.,p103.
[1021] Interview with Dr. Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. These fears were apparently justified since General Suarez Mason, who was in charge of the regime's undercover operations in Bolivia and Honduras, allegedly financed these operations out of drug trafficking activities. Allegedly also the officers of the Naval Intelligence Service who were advisors in Bolivia also financed their operations out of drug trafficking. See: Dale Scott and Marshall, Cocaine Politics, pp.44 and 45, and Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 55.
[1022] Interview with Dr. Oscar Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1023] Interview with a former military officer that occupied a position of high responsibility during the military regime, the officer requested not to be named, Buenos Aires, June 19, 1997.
[1024] See: Cardoso, Oscar and Heguilein, Rubén, Argentina y la Cuestión de las Drogas, América Latina/Internacional, FLACSO Programa Argentina, Vol. 9, Nº 31, January-March 1992,p.476
[1025] The Commission was created in 1972 by Decree Nº 452 during the military government of General Pedro A. Lanusse, it was an inter-ministerial organ under the presidency of the Ministry of Social Wealth (who by the way, under the -democratic- presidency of Juan Domingo Perón (1972-1974) and María Estela "Isabel" Perón (1974-1976) was no other than ...José Lopez Rega). This commission was not an executive organ but an advisory one it "planned and proposed" the execution of drug treatment and prevention and drug law enforcement policies. See Decree Nº 452 "Créase la Comisión Nacional de Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CONATON), Boletín Oficial, Buenos Aires, February 7, 1972, p.4 and see also: Ministerio de Bienestar Social, Comisión National de Toxicomanías y Narcóticos (CO.NA.TO.N), Decretos 452/ 72; 1053/72 and 1574/75, oficial document of CONATON non dated and signed by Dr. Carlos N. Cagliotti, Executive Secretary of CONATON until 1985,CONATON, Buenos Aires, 13.pp
[1026] Interviews with Comisario General (R) (Federal Police), member of the Superintendence of Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police and representative of the Federal Police to the CONATON from 1983. Buenos Aires, July 1997; Interview with Prefecto Principal (R) (Coast Guard) Nelson Mandrile, in the 1970s and early 1980s representative of the Coast Guard to CONATON, Buenos Aires, July 1997; Interview with Comandante General (National Gendarmerie) Jorge Vazquez, chief of the Dangerous Drugs Department of the National Gendarmerie since 1983 and representative of this force to CONATON, Bahía Blanca, headquarters of the 5th National Gendarmerie Region, and Interview with Dr. García Fernandez, at the time representative of the University of Buenos Aires to the CONATON, Buenos Aires, 1997.
Before the coup d'etat of 1976, however, and in the middle of the a bloody civil war, Rasputin-like Minister of Social Wealth José Lopez Rega "El Brujo" (and Chief of Police and head of the Triple A) defined not drug trafficking but drug consumption as a national security problem because drugs were believed to be used by guerrilla members to stimulate themselves in order to carry out terrorist acts. See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, As a matter of fact Law Nº 20,771 voted by the Congress in September 1974 severely punished the possession of drugs for personal use (one to six years of prison and a fine of 1,000 to 100,000 pesos, Law Nº 20,771, article 6, Boletín Oficial, October 9,1974, p.2). This has been changed by the new narcotics law of 1989 (Nº 23,737), which still punishes possession but reduces the sentence to 1 month to two years of prison when the small amount and "other circumstances" suggest that the drug is for personal use, Law Nº 23,737, art. 14, Presidencia de la Nación Argentina, SEDRONAR, Disposiciones Legales de la República Argentina Relacionadas con el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas y su Consumo, section 1.1, p.3
[1027] The Center for National Treatment and Social Reeducation (CENARESO) was created, together with CONATON.
[1028] This was not the case however in the case of the National Gendarmerie, which because of their role of patrolling the borders since the early 1980s started to detect an increase in the diversion of chemical inputs for the production of cocaine towards Bolivia, across the northwestern border. Also there was a concern in Gendarmerie about the coca leaves trafficking for coqueo in the Northwest provinces. Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez, cited before.
[1029] Interviews with Comisario General Armesto, Prefecto Principal Mandrile (who participated in these preventive talks), as previously cited. As a matter of fact the Federal Police has, since 1971, a unit for the prevention of toxic addictions that carries out an autonomous program of drug prevention, Interview with Subcomisario (Federal Police) Jorge Daniel Besana, Second Chief of the Division of Social Prevention of Toxic Adictions, Superintendence of Dangerous Drugs of the Federal Police, Buenos Aires, July, 1997. See also: Policía Federal Argentina, Superintendencia de Drogas Peligrosas, División Prevensión Social de las Toxicomanías, De tu lado, el de la vida, (informative brochure of the Federal Police) or http://www.pfa.gov.ar. The National Gendarmerie has a similar prevention unit within its dangerous unit division.
[1030] Argentina is a Federal States Provinces. This decree was enacted during a military government (General Lanusse 1971-1972). A civilian period followed (1972-1976) then another military regime (1976-1982) and then the transition 1983. During military periods the country was de facto a centralized state and provinces were subordinated to policies dictated by the executive power on this (and all) field, during civilian periods policies where coordinated. Interview with Comisario General Armesto representative of the Federal Police in CONATON, CONCONAD, CONCONAD II and the first year of SEDRONAR.
[1031] As defined by Anthony Henman in Mama Coca, p.103
[1032] All police and security forces were, during the military regime, controlled by the armed forces. The way drug traffickers were treated after their arrest did not differ too much from illegal detentions of political prisoners. In a sense out of the alleged "official" drug trafficking was highly risky during the military regime. On this matter see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, Chapter 2; Levine, Michael, La Gran Mentira Blanca (Spanish version of " The Big White Lie, The CIA and the cocaine/crack epidemic), Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1996, particularly chapters I and II and Cardoso and Heguilein, op.cit., p.474 (these to authors stress the fact that drug trafficking received the same ideological-police answer that received all the problems of the country at that time).
[1033] On this particular issue see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199 and McDonald, Scott B., The Southern Cone, in Mc Donald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug Control, Westport, Conn.& London, Greenwod Press,1992,p.230
[1034] Calvert, P.A.R, Argentina, in South America and the Caribbean,London, Europa Publications,1998,p.52
[1035] Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Executive Vice-President of CONCONAD (1985-1986) and General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Justice (1986-1989), Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
[1036] McDonald, The Southern Cone,p.230
[1037] Various Interviews, Buenos Aires July-August 1997.
[1038] Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Executive Vice President of CONCONAD 1985-1986 (the first inter-agency commission created by the Alfonsín administration in order to deal with drug control policy), Buenos Aires July 29,1997. (original in Spanish) However in his Book, Smoke and Mirrors, Malamud Goti, attributes the creation of CONCONAD to the pressured of U.S. diplomats over President Alfonsín to further cooperate in the world's antidrug campaign, p.x .My interpretation then is that there even it there was U.S. insistence on a stronger Argentine cooperation CONCONAD was not the result of a US "recipe" it was the response to the signal sent by the sudden revelation of the violent and destabilizing nature of drug trafficking in other countries of the region.
[1039] Ministerio de Salud y Acción Social, CONCONAD, Plan Nacional de Control del Narcotráfico y Prevención del Uso Indebido de Drogas, 1986-1989, May 1986., p.6
[1040] Presidential Decree Nº 1383/85 (Original in Spanish)
[1041] The members of the Commission in fact considered it a public health problem. Interviews.
[1042] Decree Nº 528/85 (Original in Spanish)
[1043] Only for logistical support to security and police forces. Interview with Horacio Jaunarena (Under Secretary of Defense 12/1983-12/1984; Secretary of Defense 12/1984-6/1986 and Minister of Defense 6/1986-7/1989)
[1044] Presidential Decree Nº 833, Comisiones de Control del Narcotráfico y Legislación y de Prevención, Asistencia e Investigación. Misión y funciones. Aprobación, Annex I, point 1.
The Argentine enforcement system involved in combating drug trafficking includes four federal agencies ( Federal Police, National Gendarmerie, Coast Guards, and National Customs Administration) under three separate ministries (Federal Police under the Ministry of the Interior, Gendarmerie and Coast Guards under Defense but operationally under the Interior-that is under Interior for Law Enforcement purposes and under Defense in time of war. This situation changed in 1996 when both security forces were put under the Direction of the Ministry of the Interior. Notice that during the military dictatorship, the Gendarmerie was part of the Army, Coast Guard was part of the Navy and the Federal Police had a military chief. Customs are under the Ministry of the Economy). To this we must add twenty-two provincial police forces with each one counting a narcotics division. As drug trafficking is a federal offense (which requires the intervention of the federal justice), federal judges conduct drug investigations. It is the Federal Judge that starts the investigation and request the support of federal or provincial law enforcement agencies, although the police can request the judge to order an investigation based on collected evidence. The border guards, are mandated to protect the country's borders up to 100 kilometers into Argentina. They share jurisdiction with customs officials, who conduct investigations involving smuggling. The Argentine Federal Police acts as a technical and judiciary police and conducts narcotic investigations in the federal districts (the city of Buenos Aires) and over the whole territory upon request by a federal judge. The coast guard has responsibility for patrolling the country's waterways and for the security of seaports, where it shares narcotic enforcement responsibilities with customs officials. To this we must add a special branch of the air force, the Aeronautic National Police, which since 1991 is in charge of airport security and therefore can enforce drug laws only within the jurisdiction of National and International Airports- a fact that, to a certain extent, violates the internal security act. This particular aspect will be analyzed later in this chapter.) Upon the request of a federal judge, the SIDE can collect intelligence concerning drug trafficking investigations (for instance phone wiretaps), however SIDE agents are not allowed to carry out arrests.
[1045] Presidential Decree Nº833 Annex I point 2.
[1046] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199.
[1047] Interview with Aldo Neri, Ministry of Health and Social Action (1985.-1986) and first president of the CONCONAD. And Interview with Alberto Calabrese, advisor and coordinator of CONCONAD and CONCONAD II.
[1048] Unfortunately it was not possible to interview Dr. Raúl Alfonsín during my stay in Buenos Aires and that is why, in this case, I am using non-interview primary and secondary sources.
[1049] On the second assumption see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.199
[1050] See: Drogas y deuda, temas del cónclave con Bush de países latinoamericanos, Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 12, 1984 pp.4 and 5. The topic of the diplomatic conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands was also addressed with Vice-President Georges Bush during the Quito meeting. On the "ranking" of Argentina's foreign policy priorities, Interview with Dante Caputo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1983-1989, Buenos Aires July, 1997.
[1051] Conferencia del señor presidente en la ciudad de Quito, Ecuador, el 10 de agosto de 1984, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/pr.../argentin/alfonsin/840542.html
[1052] Discurso del Señor Presidente de la Nación, Doctor Raul R. Alfonsín, ante el VIII Congreso de Jefes de Policía, el día 28 de septiembre de 1984,p.63, http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/project/arl/pm/sample2/argentin/alfonsin/840645.html
[1053] FBIS, Daily Report, Latin America, 4 August 1986, Vol. VI Nº 149, Argentina, B1.
[1054] FIBS, Daily Report, Latin America, 4 August 1986, Vol. VI Nº 149, Argentina, B1.
[1055] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.204.
[1056] EFE, Buenos Aires, January 6, 1997, Quoted in cable addressed to United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) offices in Vienna, Subject: Alfonsín Calificó de "Amoral" la doctrina de la seguridad continental, January 7, 1997.
[1057] Interviews with: Dr. García Fernández, at the time representative of the University of Buenos Aires to CONATON, Buenos Aires, August, 1997. Comisario General Armesto at the time representative of the Federal Police to CONATON (Comisario Armesto said this was the general view in CONATON as far as he was concerned, for the police the main problem at this moment was an increase in marihuana consumption); Interview with Prefecto Principal Nelson Mandrile at the time representative of the Coast Guards to CONATON, July, 1997; and Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez, at the time Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division of the National Gendarmerie and delegate of that security force to CONATON, July 1997.
[1058] Interview with Prefecto Principal Nelson Mandrile, July 1990. Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri, at the time Minister of Public Health and Social Action and President of CONATON, Buenos Aires, July 1994.
[1059] Aumentó el Consumo de drogas en la Argentina, Clarín, Buenos Aires, July 12, 1984. Author´s translation.
[1060] Unfortunately two thieves would later murder Dr. Cagliotti, during a hold-up in 1995. The author esteems that he would had been an invaluable source of information since he had been working in the formulation of drug control policy since the creation of CONATON in 1972. Dr.Cagliotti is also one of the pioneers on public drug addiction treatment policies since he proposed the creation of the CENARESO in 1974. It is worth noticing that when CONATON was dissolved in July 1985, Dr. Cagliotti was not incorporated as part of the permanent staff of the newly created CONCONAD, because of his repressive approach towards consumers. (Dr. Cagliotti was in favor of treating consumption as a criminal law matter, and his ideas contrasted with the liberal views of the rest of the new members, who favored a more lenient policy concerning drug consumers. Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri cited above. On the liberal approach of the Alfonsín administration see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp. 199 to 209.
[1061] Aumentó el consumo de drogas en la Argentina, Clarín, July 12, 1984, original in Spanish.
[1062] Archive material collected by the author in UNDCP, Vienna, Manuscript by Carlos Cagliotti, La responsabilidad primaria del estado en la existencia o no del narcotráfico y sus consecuencias, pp.2 and 5, Buenos Aires, July 16, 1984.
[1063] Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez quoted above.
[1064] Interview with Dr. Aldo Neri, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1065] ibid.
[1066] ibid.
[1067] FBIS Daily Report, Latin America, Vol VI, Nº 030, 13 February 1986, B1. Notice that Malamud Goti recognized the responsibility of Argentina as an exporter of chemical inputs that could be used for the production of cocaine. The same year the executive power enacted Decree 365/86 , which regulated the export and import of ten chemical precursors and twenty-five essential chemicals and prohibited the export of these chemicals through border customs offices. In that sense Argentina was one of the first Latin American countries to adopt restrictive measures concerning the commercialization of chemical inputs.
[1068] According to Malamud Goti, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very busy with Chile and MERCOSUR [probably referring to the integration with Brazil] and the United States. Defense had the problem of repositioning the military, Education had to reformulate an inherited ultra-catholic education. Health was closer [to the drug problem] but had thousands of different problems. The drug issue was never authentically really perceived as a real urgency . For example there were almost one million of alcoholics. Compared to the [at the time] 26,000 potential addicts. Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Buenos Aires, July 29, 1997
[1069] Malamud Goti, Smoke and Mirrors, p.xi. Dr. Malamud Goti expressed similar views about during an interview held in Buenos Aires on July 3, 1997.
[1070] Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Buenos Aires, July,29,1997.
[1071] ibid.
[1072] Interview with Jaime Malamud Goti, Buenos Aires, August 25,1997.
[1073] ibid. Why this did not happened and it is not likely to happened has been explained in the previous chapter however it is important that at some point Argentine officials were concerned about having a guerrilla group operating in the northern border as a reaction to militarized enforcement.
[1074] Interview with Mr. Bertoncello, Bahía Blanca,August 19, 1997.
[1075] ibid.
[1076] ibid
[1077] Statements of Mr. Bertoncello to the press on March 16, 1987. Quoted in Auredy, op.cit., p. 301. Original in Spanish.
[1078] Dr. Corsunsky started as (medical) advisor of the executive vice president in September 1985 and then was named as coordinator of policies between CONCONAD and the provincial drug control commissions from 1988 on he co-coordinated the general activities of CONCONAD II with Dr. Alberto Calabrese is the president of the NGO "Fondo de Ayuda Toxicológica" (F.A.T - Toxicological Help Foundation). Among other activities Dr. Corsunsky was responsible for compiling all the consumption and law enforcement statistics and communicate them to the international drug control organs (such as CICAD and UNDFAC).
[1079] Interview with Dr. José Corsusnsky, Buenos Aires June 28, 1997.
[1080] ibid
[1081] For a very precise description of the "Langostino" (shrimp) affair as it was came to be know see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,chapters 4 and 8.
[1082] Interview with Mr. Alberto Calabrese, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1083] Even if it has Drug law enforcement powers, Customs (depending from the Ministry of Economy) has been obviated here because its tasks are concentrated on smuggling investigations. Therefore the views of customs concerning the spillover consequences (in terms of production, migration for example) were not considered relevant. As far as it concern drug and chemical seizures I utilized data provided by the Federal Police's Central Data Division which centralizes the data provided by all law enforcement agencies in the country.
[1084] Interview with Mr. Enrique Nosiglia, Buenos Aires, July 11, 1997.
[1085] ibid
[1086] ibid
[1087] Interview with Mr. Nosiglia , Buenos Aires, 29 July 1997
[1088] Interview with Mr. Nosiglia, Buenos Aires, July 11, 1997.
[1089] Interview with Mr. Larriqueta, July 15,1997.
[1090] ibid.
[1091] Interview with Dr. Gil Laavedra, August 29, 1997.
[1092] Interview with Mr. Juan Gauna, at the time Secretary of Defense and as such Member of the Executive Committee of CONCONAD II, Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
[1093] ibid.
[1094] Interview with Mr. Calabrese and Mr. Larriqueta cited above.
[1095] Interview with Mr. Juan Gauna cited above.
[1096] ibid.
[1097] The views of Mr. Jaunarena were particularly interesting since he has occupied all the "top" positions in the Ministry of Defense since the beginning of the Alfonsín Administration. He has been Under-Secretary of Defense, from December 1983 to December 1984, Secretary of Defense until June 1986 and Minister of Defense until July 1989.
[1098] Presidential Decree Nº 833 of July 5, 1988, Annex I, point 1.
[1099] Interview with Mr. Jaunarena June, 11, 1997
[1100] ibid
[1101] ibid
[1102] ibid
[1103] ibid
[1104] Interview with Mr. Gauna cited previously.
[1105] Interview with Dr. José Corsunsky, cited above. See also Acciones de la Comisión Nacional para el Control del Narcotráfico y el Abuso de Drogas, CONCONAD, Buenos Aires, December 1985,p.8.
[1106] Interview with Mr. Dante Caputo, Buenos Aires July 1997.
[1107] ibid
[1108] ibid
[1109] ibid
[1110] ibid
[1111] ibid
[1112] Interview with Mr. Caputo, Buenos Aires, July 21, 1997.
[1113] ibid
[1114] Interview with Ambassador Alconada Sempé, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1115] ibid
[1116] ibid.
[1117] ibid. While the international price of natural gas at the time was $0.22, Argentina it was paying $2.25 per cubic meter. The military government had originall instituted the policy of gas overpayment to support a "friend authoritarian" regime. The military would pay $4 per cubic meter for gas. Paradoxically, the Alfonsín administration would ended up adopting the same policy, also paying $4, half in cash and half in goods, in order to help a newly inaugurated democracy to survive, ibid.
[1118] Interview with Ambassador Olima, Buenos Aires, August 28,1997.
[1119] Interview with Ambassador Alconada cited above.
[1120] Ibid.
[1121] ibid.
[1122] Interview with Minister Roberto Palarino, Argentine Embassy, Washington D.C., January 27, 1995 and interview in Buenos Aires June 30, 1997.
[1123] Palarino, Roberto, Tráfico Ilícito Internacional de Drogas: Régimen de Control, Situación regional y perspectivas de cambio, Buenos Aires, Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Nación, Buenos Aires, 1992, p. 47.
[1124] Interview with Dr. Suarez, Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[1125] ibid.
[1126] This is why I am not developing cognitive maps concerning the beliefs of officials during the military dictatorship. In fact as explained before, the escalation of militarized enforcement in Bolivia started in late 1982 when the military in Argentina was already preparing to hand over political power to a civilian administration.
[1127] As stated by Robert Axelrod, " A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generalize the consequences that follow from this structure.," The Analysis of Cognitive Maps, p.55 on this issue also see: Smith, Steve, Belief Systems and the Study of International Relations, in Little, Richard and Smith, Steven, Belief Systems in International Relations, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, p.19.
[1128] And president of CONATON and CONCONAD I from 1983 to 1986.
[1129] See, Vacs, A delicate balance: confrontation and collaboration between Argentina and the United States in the 1980s, p. 23 and see also: Escudé Carlos, "La política exterior de Menem y su sustento teórico implícito and "El Realismo Periférico," América Latina Internacional/FLACSO, Vol.8, Nº 21
[1130] Russell Roberto and Zuvanic, Laura, Argentina: Deepening Alignment with the West, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol.33, Number 3, Fall 1991, p.121.
[1131] See Russell and Zuvanic, op.cit., p. 121 and Escudé Carlos, La política exterior de Menem y su sustento teórico implícito, p.394.
[1132] See: Russell and Zuvanik, op.cit.p.114.
[1133] Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, Buenos Aires, Ed. Ceyne, 1990, p.32.
[1134] "Oferta Argentina," Clarín, Buenos Aires, August 26, 1989 p.18 and "La Argentina está dispuesta a enviar tropas a Colombia," La Nación, Buenos Aires, August 29,1989.
[1135] Ibid.
[1136] Menem Opposes Armed Forces Involvement in Drug Enforcement, FBIS-TDD-96-015-L, April 12, 1996.
[1137] See Alberto Lestelle (head of SEDRONAR 1989-1995), United Nations, Declaration and Plan of Action Against Illicit drug trafficking, General Assembly Special Session, 23 February 1990, Verbatim, A/S-17/PV, p.103 to 112 , See also: OEA/ser.L/XIV.2.8.CICAD/doc.256/90, October 26, 1990, Speech of Alberto Lestelle,CICAD, first session of the VIII period of sessions. See also, Lestelle Alberto, Defendiendo el Futuro, Buenos Aires, 1994,p.55
[1138] Carlos Menem, op.cit.p.131.
[1139] See Latin American Weekly Report, 19 April 1990, p. 15 and the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile, Bolivia 1991-92, p.17.
[1140] La Nación Internacional , December 18,1989, p.4.
[1141] Wheatley, Jonathan and Bowen, Sally, "Brazil- Bolivia deal to spur gas project," Financial Times, August 1995, p.4.
[1142] Interview with the National Director of Planning and Legislation for SEDRONAR, Comisario (PFA)(R) Amilcar Parkinson, who was in charge training Argentine and foreign law enforcement officials, Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[1143] Presidential Decree Nº 271.
[1144] Presidential Decree Nº 649/91 Aprobación de la Estructura Organizativa de la Secretaría de Programación para la Prevencióin de la Drogadicción y la Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico de la Presidencia de la Nación, Buenos Aires, April 12, 1991.
[1145] See Cardoso and Heguilein, op. cit., p.478; and Corigliano, op.cit., p. 12. On information about ONDCP see Mendel, William W. and Munger, Murl D., Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat, A joint Study Initiative by the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, The Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College and The Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth Kansas, August 1997, p. 24.
One main difference between SEDRONAR and ONDCP is that the Argentine agency does not develop requests and executes a "National Drug Control Budget" as its American counterpart. That is SEDRONAR can request its own budget for its own programs and staff but does ont control the budget of other Federal Agencies applying the drug control policies elaborated by SEDRONAR. Interview with Dr. Javier Ortiz, at the time member of the staff of the National Direction of Coordination for the Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1146] Decree Nº 649/91.
[1147] Interview with a former member of the permanent staff of CONCONAD and CONCONAD II. The official considered this comment as "quasi-confidential" for that reason his name will not be quoted.
[1148] Interview with Comandante General Jorge Vazquez quoted before.
[1149] See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, pp.303- 304.
[1150] See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 307, and interview with Dr. José Luis Manzano, Minister of the Interior from 1991 to 1992, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[1151] This topic exceeds the limits of this dissertation and will not be analyzed in depth here. For further information, see: Bertram, Eva; Blachman, Morris; Sharpe Kenneth; and Andreas, Peter, Drug War Politics, The Price of Denial, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1996, specially Part II, Chapter 6; Youngers Coletta, La DEA en Latinoamérica: Más Allá de los Límites de la Legalidad, Enlace. Política y Derechos Humanos en las Américas, Vol.7, Nº 2, July 1997, pp. 1,4,5,6 and 7 and Youngers, Coletta and Zirnite, Peter, El peor enemigo de sí mismo:La guerra antidrogas de Washington en América Latina, in Jelsma, Martin and Roncken, Theo (eds.), Democracias Bajo Fuego. Drogas y Poder en América Latina, Transnational Institute, Ediciones de Brecha, Acción Andina, Montevideo, 1998,pp.209-274.For a historical perspective and specific cases see: Block, Alan, Failures at Home and Abroad: Studies in the Implementation of U.S. Drug Policy in McCoy, Alfred, War on Drugs: Studies in the failure of US narcotics policy, Westview Press, 1992, pp. 39-68; and Smyth, Frank, Conflicto de Intereses: La CIA en la guerra antidrogas, in Jelsma and Roncken (eds.),op.cit., pp.275-288. For a detailed study of inter bureaucratic drug law enforcement competition in Argentina see: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, Chapter 9.
[1152] Betram, Blachman, Sharpe and Andreas, Drug War Politics, p.130.
[1153] Trafficker Claims Knowledge of Israeli Embassy Blast, FBIS-LAT-92-229, November 27,1992, p.18.
[1154] Mr. Lestelle finally resigned in October 1995 when he denounced that several members of Congress consumed cocaine in the toilets of the National Congress. This time he could not prove his accusations. Facing a new scandal, President Menem retired his support for Mr. Lestelle, who had no other option than to leave office.
[1155] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 313.
[1156] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante,p. 314.
[1157] Mr. Lestelle claimed that the Noguera Vega affair was the result of the capture and indictment of a SIDE counter-intelligence agent and two of his informants, which had been caught with 17 kilos of cocaine. The Coast Guards, via intelligence provided by SEDRONAR staff, had arrested the agents. Also law enforcement officials privately admitted the hypothesis of this affair being part of an inter-bureaucratic fight. See: Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p. 313.
[1158] Law Nº 24,059, article Nº 8 and also Decree Nº 132, Ministries' Law, January 9, 1984, art.17 and Decree Nº 438/92 reforming Nº 132, Ministry's Law, Article 16. -secretariat' reporting directly to himself. This project, widely held to have been the brainchild of his economy minister, Domingo Cavallo, was recently put back burner after running into heavy opposition from within Menem's own cabinet. On July 19, Menem issued a decree creating the Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, whose head will, in cases of emergency, have command of the federal police, the Prefectura Naval and the Gendarmería about 60,000 men in all. This effectively removes the former from the jurisdiction of the interior ministry and the latter from that of the defense ministry, placing a formidable force under the President," Latin American Weekly Report, 4 August 1996, p 346. This Secretariat was short lived mainly due to organizational resistance to change by the Ministry of the Interior and the police and security plus the fact that the AMIA affair has not been completely clarified marked the end of the SSPC which in December 1996 (Presidential Decree 1419/196 of December 12, 1996) was transformed into the Secretariat for Internal Security (SSI, a supportive organ to the Council of Internal Security under the Minister of the Interior and basically the equivalent of the Sub-secretariat of Internal security originally created by law Nº 24,059). For an analysis of the causes of the "death" of the SSPC see, Salinas Juan, AMIA, El Atentado. Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están presos, Buenos Aires, Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, Chapter 16.
[1159] Latin American Weekly Report, 4 August 1996, p 346
[1160] For an analysis of the causes of the "death" of the SSPC see, Salinas Juan, AMIA, El Atentado. Quiénes son los autores y por qué no están presos, Buenos Aires, Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, Chapter 16.
[1161] "Apoyo Militar para la lucha contra la droga," La Nación Edición Internacional, May 6, 1991, p.1. and "Nuevo Impulso a la lucha contra el narcotráfico," La Prensa, May 3, 1991.
[1162] Similar statements were made several times by Ministers of Defense and the President during the Menem administration. Most of the time, they either confused logistical support tasks with intelligence tasks. However, at least officially, these kind of drug law enforcement military intelligence collection or logistical support to the Security Forces has been never implemented, at least in the period under study. "'We respect the political authorities, and we will follow their instructions,' said Gendarmerie officials. They admitted that 'officially, the logistical support of the Armed Forces has not yet been implemented'. No Directives Yet These sources refrained from expressing an opinion on whether it is appropriate for the Armed Forces to participate directly in enforcement activities against drug trafficking. They stressed that 'institutionally , the issue has not been addressed and we have not received directives from the Interior Ministry or from the Defense Ministry'," Role of the Military in Drug Fight Discussed, FBIS-LAT97-046.
[1163] Treverton, Gregory F., Intelligence, in Joseph, William; Khaler, Miles; Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges; Stallings, Barbara and Weir, Margaret , (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 428.
[1164] As a matter of fact in the midst of the "Yomagate" and the Catamarca crises, President Menem ordered the air force to carry out intelligence activities. At that time the country was not under a "state of siege," so the order given to the air force was not legal.
[1165] And as a matter of fact they do have the means since successful drug law enforcement operations of the National Gendarmerie, like "Operación Tambor" in 1991, were possible thanks to the interception of the telecommunications of Bolivian drug traffickers by the gendarmerie. Interview with Comandante Mayor Jorge Vazquez, Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
[1166] Since 1989 Argentina has Drug Sections in diplomatic representations in Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Argentina also has a Special Drugs Section in the United States which is in charge of bilateral matters and multilateral matters (OAS and UN- New York, there is also a Drug Section in Vienna for issues dealing with UNDCP and the Commission of Narcotics Drugs of ECOSOC). All these sections are in charge of members of the permanent diplomatic service. See: Circular Telegráfica de la Dirección de América del Sur (MRE), Actualización situación internacional argentina en materia de tráfico de drogas," 18 June 1991.
[1167] Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante, p.290. These two authors argue that the drug trafficking (including the request of death penalty for drug traffickers) was included by Menem as an issue during the campaign in order to dismiss accusations from the opposition and independent journalists about his possible links with drug traffickers. See Pasquini and De Miguel, pp.214-230 and p. 290.
[1168] Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, Buenos Aires, Ed. Ceyne, 1990, p.21.
[1169] Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.127.
[1170] ibid, p.137.
[1171] Speech of President Menem at the Third Meeting of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Concerted Political Action (Group of Eight), Celebrated at Ica, Peru, quoted in La Nación, Buenos Aires, October 12, 1989, p. 4.
[1172] Al Inaugurar el 109° período legislativo. Ratificó Menem la lucha contra la corrupción y el narcotráfico, La Prensa, Buenos Aires, May 2, 1991, p.2.
[1173] Argentina: Menem Opposes Armed Forces Involvement in Drug Enforcement,FBIS-TDD-96-0150L, April 12, 1996.
[1174] Menem, Carlos, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.136.
[1175] Paz, Argentina's Menem on Regional Issues, Drugs, FBIS-LAT-90-074, April 17,1990.
[1176] Drug Enforcement Administration, Southern Cone Situation Report, Drug Intelligence Report, Washington D.C., November 1994, p. 3.
[1177] I am referring here to a particular person Eduardo Duhalde and not to a decisory role. Therefore the position of the Vice-President will be considered only until 1991 when Mr. Duhalde abandoned the vice-presidency in order to run for Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires.
[1178] Carlos Menem, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.358.
[1179] "This program became a prototype for the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, a center piece of the domestic drug strategy. Thirteen such task forces were set up by 1984, each bringing multiple federal agencies into the drug war effort in different regions of the country, including assistant U.S. attorneys and agents from the DEA, Customs the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Coast Guard, and the U.S. Marshals Service," Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe and Andreas, Drug War Politics, p. 112 Vice-President Duhalde was ont given these kind of responsibilities.
[1180] See: Duhalde, Eduardo, Politicians and Drugs. Towards a National Program, Buenos Aires, Honorable Senado de la Nación, 1989, p.10.
[1181] Echague, El Otro, p.127.
[1182] Menem, The United States, Argentina and Carlos Menem, p.128.
[1183] See "Duhalde se entrevistó con el embajador Todman. La Argentina está dispuesta a enviar tropas a Colombia," La Nación, Buenos Aires 1989, p.; "Reunión en la fragata "Sarmiento". Habrá intervención militar en la represión del narcotráfico," La Prensa, Buenos Aires,1990, p.4.; "Según el Vicepresidente Duhalde. Los militares harán tareas de inteligencia contra el narcotráfico," Clarín, Buenos Aires, April 10, 1991, p. 6.
As President Menem, governor Duhalde was suspected of having close collaborators that allegedly had links with drug trafficking activities. It is very likely, then, that his vehement position against drug traffickers responded in part to the need to dismiss these accusations (which in fact have been never proven). See Pasquini and De Miguel, Blanca y Radiante p.220; Echague, Hernán , El Otro. Una biografía política de Eduardo Duhalde, Buenos Aires, Planeta Bolsillo, 1997, chapter 8, and Cerruti, Gabriela, El Jefe. Vida y Obra de Carlos Saúl Menem, Planeta Espejo de la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Planeta, p. 369.
[1184] See Duhalde Eduardo, El Pensamiento de Duhalde. Los Políticos y las Drogas. Hacia un Programa Nacional, Taller 4 Editorial, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 83; Advertencia del Vicepresidente Duhalde, La Nación, August 25 1989.
[1185] "Polemiza Duhalde acerca del papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en la lucha antidroga," El Cronista Comercial, Buenos Aires, June 6, 1990.
[1186] Dr. Lestelle was one of the creators of the this Congressional commission in 1987. Interview with Dr. Lestelle, Buenos Aires, July 10, 1997.
[1187] Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Reunión 61°, February 22, 1989, p. 7756 (Spanish in the Original). Debates for the approval of the new narcotics law Nº 23,737.
[1188] Latin American Weekly Report, April 4, p. 4
[1189] Narcotics Official Admits Narcotics Transit, World News Connection, Document JPRS-TDD-95-004, February 13, 1995. This hypothesis was shared by other officials of SEDRONAR as for example the National Director of Planing and Legislation of SEDRONAR Comisario (PFA)(R) Amilcar Parkinson who was in charge of the training of Argentine and foreign law enforcement officials. Comisario Parkinson participated in the negotiations and signature of the MOU between Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and UNDCP, interview realized in Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[1190] Lestelle, Alberto, Defendiendo el Futuro, Buenos Aires, 1994, p.34
[1191] Lestelle, Defendiendo el Futuro, p. 34.
[1192] ibid, p. 32.
[1193] ibid, p. 32.
[1194] ibid, p.18.
[1195] Prefecto Mandrile has been an official of SEDRONAR since the creation of the agency in 1989 and National Director of Coordination for the Control of Illicit Drug Traffic since 1993. According to the current legislation his primary responsibility is to coordinate the activities of the law enforcement agencies in charge of drug law enforcement. He also heads the meetings of the Joint Strategy Commission. Decree Nº 649/91, April, 12, 1991 and Resolution Nº 5 of SEDRONAR , October 23, 1989.
[1196] Interview with Prefecto (R) Mandrile, Buenos Aires, July 15, 1997.
[1197] ibid.
[1198] The Director of International Relations was in charge of the relations of SEDRONAR with its counterparts in other countries and with international organizations.
[1199] Interview with Dr. Manzano, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[1200] ibid.
[1201] Interview with Dr. Béliz, Buenos Aires, August 1997.
[1202] Interview with a high ranking official of the SSI (and previously of the SSPC), Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1203] Mr. Carlos V. Corach, who is Minister of the Interior since March 1995, referred to the issue of drug trafficking as especifically related to the problem of lack of control over the three border area between Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil mentioned before.
[1204] Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección a la Comunidad, Dirección General de Coordinación e Inteligencia, Análisis de la Situación del Narcotráfico y Lavado de Dinero en la República Argentina, Buenos Aires, June 20, 1996, p.3.
[1205] Interview with a high-ranking official of the SSPC/SSI.
[1206] Interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Minister of Defense from 1993 to 1996, Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
[1207] ibid.
[1208] ibid.
[1209] Camilión, Oscar, Drogas y Seguridad en América Latina, Revista Argentina de Estudios Estratégicos, Nº7, January 1986, pp.15-20.
[1210] Ibid.
[1211] ibid.
[1212] Interview with Mayor Brown from the General Secretariat of the Major Staff of the Argentine Army, Buenos Aires, August, 1997.
[1213] Discurso del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto Doctor D. Domingo Cavallo, Seminario del 13 al 23 de Agosto de 1990, Revista de la Escuela de Defensa Nacional, Buenos Aires, Nº 40, August 1990, pp. 42-44, original in Spanish.
[1214] Palarino, op.cit., pp.46 and 47.
[1215] Circular Telegráfica de Dirección de América del Sur, June 18, 1991.
[1216] Comisario General (R) Armesto (PFA), interview Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1217] Prefecto Principal (R) Mandrile (Coast Guard) interview, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1218] Interview with Comandante Mayor Vazquez (at the time Commander of the V Region of the National Gendarmerie), Bahía Blanca, August, 1997.
[1219] Ibid.
[1220] This is the term used by the National Gendarmerie to refer to coca-paste maceration pits. For a definition this term see: Presidencia de la Nación, SEDRONAR, Manual de Instrucción Contra el Narcotráfico preparado por la Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, Subsede Universidad Católica de Salta, Dirección Nacional de Gendarmería, SEDRONAR, Subsecretaría de Control y Legislación, Buenos Aires,1993,p.244 and Comandante Principal D. Jorge Alberto Vazquez and Comandante Principal Bioquímico, Ricardo Rodolfo López, "Influencia de la Operación 'Blast Furnace' sobre la frontera argentina," Revista de la Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, January-June, 1988, p. 127.
[1221] This hypothesis was discarded by other interviewed law enforcement official, Retired Prefecto Principal Mandrile, who stated that for the traffickers is easier to smuggle chemical inputs to the Beni that bring "a lot of kilos of coca leaf" to Argentina. Interview with Prefecto Principal Mandrile, Buenos Aires, July, 1997.
[1222] Lopez and Vazquez, op. cit. ,p.136.
[1223] Interview with Comandante Mayor Vazquez, Bahía Blanca, August 1997.
[1224] Interview with Comisario General Armesto, Buenos Aires, July 1997.
[1225] ibid.
[1226] ibid.
[1227] Just as an anecdote: of all the diplomatic cables from the Argentine Embassy in Bolivia to the Direction of South American Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Relations), the ones referring to episodes of violence between the coca growing peasants and UMOPAR in the Chapare were sent with a "VERY URGENT" (MUY URGENTE) priority. And copies of them were also sent to SEDRONAR. This most surely means that this issue required an urgent analysis. See for example: Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010564/97-Nuevos incidentes en el Chapare, may 9, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010498/97- Tres muertos en enfrentamientos en el Chapare, April 21, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010250, Narcotráfico: incidentes en el Chapare, February 27, 1997; Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 010501/97-Situación en el Chapare, April 22, 1997, Cable de Embajada de Bolivia, 011839/96, Erradicación de cocales; November 13, 1996.
[1228] I am taking here the liberty of articulating causal assertions obtained from two different sources: a book written by Lestelle, and an interview I conducted in Buenos Aires (both cited in the previous section). During interviews I realized in February 1995, during the research for my M.A. thesis, two officials of SEDRONAR told me that the increasing number of illegal migrants from Bolivia and Peru was a source of concern in terms of the possibility of an increase of drug trafficking related crimes.
[1229] Interview with Commander Mayor Vazquez quoted before.
[1230] Comandante Mayor Vazquez stated that during the period 1989-1995, law enforcement officials did not share the view of Mr. Lestelle about the possibility of a spillover of cocaine production towards Argentina. In fact they considered that this spillover was more likely to occur towards more uncontrolled areas, such as the Amazon forest. (In this case, that would involve neighboring coutntries Bolivia, parts of the territories of Brazil, and Paraguay--not Argentina) ibid. Prefecto PRINCIPAL (R) Mandrile who, during the interviews said that instead of moving down towards Argentina, cocaine production operations had moved up north in the Bolivian Amazon forest, also shared this view.
[1231] Similar statements were made by Major Brown (Argentine Army); he does not, however, have drug control responsibilities.
[1232] Interamerican Commission for Drug Abuse Control (CICAD).
[1233] United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). As part of the administrative reforms carried out by UN Secretary Koffee Annan, UNDCP has been put together with the United Nations Centre for International Crime prevention, under the coordination United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP). The goal of this reorganization is to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime prevention, and international terrorism in all its forms. UNDCP stills dealing with the control of drug trafficking as an specific kind of transnational organized crime. On this issue see: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention : About Us , [on line] http://www.odccp.org/about.html
As "cosmetic" as this change might seem, it is step forward in the UN's attempt to develop executive programs to cope with global transnational threats in a non-military way.
[1234] "By progress, we do not mean total victory or a drug free society, but rather movement toward the more modest and realistic goal of effective containment of the negative economic, social, and political consequences of the U.S.-Latin American drug trade in all its dimensions," Bagley, Bruce and Tokatlián, Juan, Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of the U.S.- Latin American Drug Policies, in Hartlyn, Jonathan, Shoultz, Lars and Varas, Augusto (eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: beyond the Cold War, The University of North Carolina Press, 1992, pp.214- 234.
[1235] A similar analogy between the irrationality of trying to "rollback" the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons (during the Cold War) and trying to "completely eradicate" drug trafficking was made by Juan Tokaltián in De Drogas y Dinosaurios in, Krathausen, Ciro and Sarmiento, Luis Fernando, Cocaína & Co. Un Mercado ilegal por dentro, Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1991, p.12 and 13. Tokatlián however made this analogy for the specific case of Colombia and also suggested a policy of "containment" of the drug industry for Colombia, ibid., p. 13. Here I am using this analogy for the application of regional and global cooperation policies for the containment of the illegal drugs industry in South America.
[1236] This is not however the panacea since the traffickers have turned to flying under the radar interception level or transporting the drugs by rivers or land in jungle areas in the Peruvian Amazon. In any case, if Air Force interdiction seems to work, in the case of Bolivia for example, resources should be channeled more to new Air Force capabilities (the backbone of the Bolivian Airforce still being old T-33 jets form the Korean war time!!!) than to supporting eradication operations.
[1237] With some interruptions due for example too diplomatic problems caused by Fujimori's self inflicted coup d'etat in 1992 and the war with Ecuador in 1995. The U.S. momentarily curtailed radar support to the Peruvian Air Force (thus leaving Peruvian planes "blind") as a sanction to Fujimori's undemocratic practices. In the second case all efforts were momentarily concentrated on the war effort.
[1238] In the case of cocaine, for example, there are growing consumption markets in Eastern Europe, Russia, Japan and Australia. Not to mention the growing tactical alliances between Russian criminal organizations, Japanese criminal organizations (Yakuza), Chinese criminal organizations (Triads), and Latin American drug trafficking organizations. On these matters see Stares, Paul, Global Habit. The Drug Problem in a Borderless World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, pp. 37-46.
[1239] On this issue see: Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to the Congress, Volume I: United States and Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation; Enhanced Multilateral Drug Control Cooperation; Enhanced Truck Inspections, Washington D.C., Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug Control Policy, p.4
[1240] See: Ghébali, Victor-Yves, "Le développement des operations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU depuis la fin de la guerre froide," Le Trimestre du Monde, Nº 20,1992, pp. 67-85; Abi-Saab, Georges, "La deuxième génération des opérations de maintien de la paix. Quelques réflexions préliminaires," ibid., pp.87-97 and same author, "United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues," in Warner Daniel (ed.) New Dimensions of Peace Keeping, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995,pp 1-13 see also: Weiss, Thomas, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda For Peace," The Washington Quarterly,Vol 16, Nº 1, Winter 1993, pp. 51-66.
[1241] As we will see, this happened in the case of Dr. Paul Diehl.
[1242] One example of what is implied here as a "vague suggestion" is given by Sir Brian Urquhart, who suggests that "Less specifically, some peace keeping techniques might prove useful in the control of the drug problem, provided an international strategy could be argued upon." Urquhart, Sir Brian, Beyond the Sheriff's Posse," Survival, vol. XXXII, Nº 3 May/June 1990, p. 205.
[1243] See: Rikhye, Indar Jit, "The Future of Peacekeeping," International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Number 2, New York, International peace Academy, 1989,pp. 24-25 and same author, "The Future of Peacekeeping" in Rikhye, Indar Jit and Skjelsbaek, eds., The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations, and Prospects-The Lessons of 40 Years of Experience, New York, St. Martin's, 1991, pp.171-99.
[1244] See: Diehl, Paul F. and Kumar, Chetan, "Mutual Benefits from International Intervention: New Roles for United Nations Peace Keeping Forces," in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22 (4), pp. 369-375 and Diehl, Paul F., International Peace Keeping, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, pp.143-165.
[1245] Rykhye, The Future of Peacekeeping, p. 24.
[1246] As we have seen before, in several UN documents drug trafficking has been defined as a "threat to the security of states" in the UN Security Council. This argument, then, could be used in order to declare drug trafficking in a specific country or region as a "threat to peace or breach to peace." Chapter VII of the UN Charter is vague enough to allow for such a scenario.
[1247] Tullis, LaMond, Handbook of Research on Illicit Drug Traffic, p. 102.
[1248] The United Nations Association of the United States, The Global Connection. New International Approaches for Controlling Narcotic Drugs, New York, 1991, p.31.
[1249] Mouat, Lucia, UN Session Plots Global Antidrug Strategy, The Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 1990, p.5.
[1250] On this issue see: Sismanidis, Roxane D.V., Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from a workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1997, 22 pp. and Broer, Harry and Emery, Michael, "Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations," in "Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security," Oakley, Robert B.; Dziedzic, Michael J. And Goldberg, Elliot M., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security; Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 365-398.
[1251] UNA-USA, the Global Connection, p.15.
[1252] ibid.
[1253] UNA-USA, The Global Connection, p. 21.
[1254] Interview with Ambassador Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. Ambassador Camilión was as minister of Defense of simultaneously in charge of the Security Forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guards) and the Armed Forces and made this distinction between personnel of Gendarmerie and military personnel.
[1255] See: Netherlands: Wire: "3 Dutch Marines Arrested as Drug Smugglers," Media Awareness Project [on line] http://www.mapnic.org/drugnews/v98.n573.a03.html
[1256] Diehl and Kumar, Mutual Benefits from International Intervention, pp. 374 and 375.
[1257] Interviews with Argentine law enforcement officials that have been detached to Bolivia, Buenos Aires, June, July and August 1997.
[1258] Diehl and Kumar, Mutual Benefits from International Intervention, p.375.
[1259] On this issue see: Hearing Before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Threat of the Shining Path to Democracy in Peru and United States Policy, Parts I and II, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, 160 pp. and Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives one Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, The Shining Path After Guzmán: The Threat and the International Response, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1992, 71 pp.
[1260] Diehl, International Peace Keeping, p.155 and 156.
[1261] This document is the Report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects"(A/45/330), which recommends that the organization should consider the "Use of operations in combating illicit drug trafficking" without specifying under which circumstances and for which specific functions. A/45/330 p. 18.
[1262] See: Diehl, International Peace Keeping, p. 180.
[1263] Public Law 100-690-Nov. 18, 1988 "National Narcotics Control Act of 1988" and Public Law 101-231, "International Narcotics Control Act of 1989".
[1264] PL 100-690, 102 STAT 4263
[1265] PL 101-231, 103 STAT 1962
[1266] See: Gamarra, U.S.-Bolivia Counternarcotic Efforts: 1989-1992, p.226.
[1267] Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary Mark Dion, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Narcotic Matters, Department of State, in Cocaine Production in the Andes, Hearing Before the Selected Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives on Hundred First Congress, First Session, June 7, 1989, p.47.
[1268] See: Koutouzis, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p.215.
[1269] Dion, Mark, op.cit., p.48.
[1270] The only time the OAS mandated the deployment of military peacekeeping forces was in 1965 after the invasion of Santo Domingo by the United States. After the assassination of dictator Rafael Trujillo in Juan Bosh was elected president of Santo Domingo, accused by the Dominican military of conniving with the communists in 1963 a military coup deposed Bosch, but other officers soon tried to restore him to power. This provoked a U.S. military intervention on April 24, 1965, because of the fear of Santo Domingo becoming a "new Cuba". "On May 1, 1995 the MCMFA ( Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs) took place in Washington. It decided to appoint a special committee -Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama- that went to the Dominican Republic to reestablish peace and security. Its powers were : (1) to offer its good offices to all political groups in the country; (2) to arrange a cease fire; (3) to evacuate all persons who had found asylum in diplomatic missions, and (4) to investigate all aspects of the situation in Santo Domingo. The results of the negotiations, in which the parties accepted the establishment of a security zone in the capital, bound them to respect this zone [....] On May 6, 1965, the tenth MCMFA agreed to request the governments to set up an inter-American force, its sole purpose being to restore order in the Dominican Republic, and thus to make it easier for the United States to eventually withdraw from its unilateral approach," Stoezer, op.cit., p.287 Finally the force withdraw after general elections where celebrated in 1966.
[1271] On this issue see: Tacsán, Joaquín, Searching for OAS/UN task-sharing opportunities in Central America and Haití, Third World Quaterly, Vol. 18, Nº 3, 1997, specially pp.498-506; Baena Soares, João Clemente, Síntesis de una gestión, 1984-1994, Organization of American States,1994,pp.206 and 207, United Nations, Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, Third Edition, United Nations, 1996,pp. 415-421 and pp. 613-638. and Mujica San Martín, María Eugenia , La Organización de los Estados Americanos y el sistema de seguridad hemisférico,in Mejía Tirado, Álvaro (ed.), Visiones de la OEA, 50 Años 1948-1998, Fondo Editorial Cancillería de SanCarlos,p.270-271.
[1272] Tacsán, op.cit., p.499
[1273] Muñoz, Heraldo, Collective Action for Democracy in the Americas, in Muñoz, Heraldo and Tulchin, Joseph, Latin American Nations in World Politics, London, Westview Press, 1996p.31. Actually the OAS carried out similar tasks in Suriname (1992) where, "at the invitation of the Surinamese government, the OAS became involved in the formalization and safeguarding of a durable peace in the interior of that country. The two specific objectives agreed upon between the government and the OAS were (1) to assit the peace process and (2) to collaborate in the promotion and strengthening of democracy. Peace negotiations assisted by the OAS between the government and rebel groups culminated in August 1992, and demobilization ensued," See: Muñoz, op.cit., p.31. This was also a civilian OAS mission.
[1274] "In its second meeting of the same day, the COAS (Council of the OAS), acting provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and also recommended member states, according to Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, to take all necessary steps to ensure that the Cuban government would not continue receiving military material from the Soviet Union," Stoetzer, Carlos, The Organization of American States, p.281 in that sense "The OAS action thus converted a unilateral move by the United States into a collective measure and provided a multilateral basis for air surveillance of Cuba, though only the US carried out flights. Twelve Latin American countries however, did offer to provide military assistance, naval units, and port facilities to support the operation," See: Cox, Arthur, Prospects for Peacekeeping, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967, p.58.
[1275] The establishment of Europol was agreed in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of February 7, 1992 with the goal of improving co-operation between member States in the areas of drug trafficking, terrorism and other serious forms of international organized crime. This organization was created in June 1993. Based in The Hague, its main roles consist of the following: Supporting the European Union Member states by: facilitating the exchange of data (personal and non-personal), in accordance with national law between Europol liaison officers seconded by the Member Sates as representatives of the different national law enforcement agencies to Europol; providing operational analyses in support of Member States' operations, general strategic reports and crime analyses on the basis of information and intelligence supplied by Member States, generated by Europol or gathered from other sources and providing expertise and technical support for investigations and ongoing operations carried out by law enforcement agencies of the Member States under the supervision and legal responsibility of the Member States concerned. See: Finjaut, Policing Western Europe: Interpol, Trevi and Europol, Police Studies, Fall, 1992, pp.105-106 and EUROPOL, The European Police Office -Fact Sheet- , Nº 1 October 1998, 2p. and EUROPOL DRUGS UNIT, Report on the Activities of the EUROPOL, Drugs Unit in 1996-Summary, The Hague, 13 March, 1997, 6p.
[1276] We are talking here about the entire western hemisphere, where there are countries with Napoleonic Code systems (Hispanic America and Brazil), British Customary Law ( most of the Caribbean Islands and Canada), customary law (U.S.), and very different kinds of police organizations that do not necessary have equivalent counterpart in other countries.
[1277] Anderson, Malcolm, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1989, pp.105-126.
[1278] Such as the operation in Santo Domingo in 1965 mentioned before in this Chapter.
[1279] Interview with a CICAD official, Washington D.C., October 1997 and Castillo, Fabio, La Coca Nostra, pp. 300-340.
[1280] 1988 Convention Against Illicit Dug Trafficking, p.1.
[1281] See: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region , 1993, pp.28-32 and chapter 6; Greaves, M.P., Environmentally Safe Methods of Eradicating Illicit Narcotic Drug Plants, Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Bristol, AFRC Institute of Arable Crops Research, 1991, 39pp. and E/CN.7/1990/CRP.7, Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Environmentally Safe Methods for the Eradication of Illicit Narcotics Plants held in Vienna from 4 to 8 December 1989, p.19.
[1282] This proposal was made by President Chirac to at the time Colombian president Samper during a latter's official visit to France in August 1996. See: Keesing's Record of World Events, News Digest for August 1996, p. 41226 ; FBIS-TDD-96-028-L; FBIS-TDD-96-025-L and FBIS-LAT-96-160. To the knowledge of this author there was not a follow up of this proposal.
[1283] ibid
[1284] See: OTA, op.cit., p. 209
[1285] Clawson and LeeIII, op.cit., p. 154
[1286] See, Dreyfus, Pablo, When all the Evils Come Together, pp. 381-389.
[1287] There are indications that some mature coca eradication resumed in 1996 most probably under American pressure and surely encouraged by the military defeat of Shining Path.
[1288] OTA, op. cit., 29
[1289] Greaves, op.cit., 15.
[1290] OTA, op. cit., p.28.
[1291] OTA, op.cit.p. 192.
[1292] OTA, op.cit, p. p. 196 The Eloria Noyesi is a moth common in Bolivia and Peru whose caterpillar feeds on leaves, stalks and tender tips. OTA, op.cit.,p. 194 "The larva of the moth feeds on coca leaves and is a principal natural pest of coca. With a short lifecycle (30 days) and repeated breeding throughout the year, larval populations can be sustained relatively easily. Eloria noyesi was reported to "swarm" and destroy almost 20,000 hectares of coca in Peru, causing losses to drug traffickers estimated to be at least $37 million," OTA, op.cit., p. 201.
[1293] OTA,op.cit., p. 199
[1294] OTA, opc.cit. p. 199
[1295] Evans, Gareth, Cooperating for Peace, The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, St. Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1993, pp.15 and 16.
[1296] The basis of the OAS is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Defense signed in 1947 which contains provisions for the collective defense against an attack by an extra hemispheric power as well as collective security measures in case of a conflict between two American states. See Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Treaty.
[1297] For the enlargement of the concept of security beyond interstate conflict see: Bouthros-Ghali, Bouthros, An Agenda For Peace 1995. Second Edition With the New Supplement and Related UN Documents, New York, Department of Public Information, 1995, p.42 and Gaviria, César, A New Vision of the OAS (working Document presented by Dr. César Gaviria to the Permanent Council, on Thursday, April 6, 1995, adapted for Internet), Section III Hemispheric Security and the Fight Against Drug trafficking. Available Internet http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/hv3e.html. On the aspect of the focus of UN and OAS security organs of the UN and the OAS see: Ghébali, Victor-Yves, Options for the United Nations, in The United Nations Disarmament and Security. Evolution and Prospects, New York, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1991, pp.123 and 124 for the case of the UN and Mujica San Martín, María Eugenia, La Organización de Estados Americanos y el Sistema de Seguridad Hemisférico, in Tirado Mejía, Álvaro, Visiones de la OEA. 50 Años 1948-1998, Bogotá, Fondo Editorial Cancillería de San Carlos, pp.257-276.
[1298] Actually CICAD took the concept from the UN and adapted it to the needs of the Western Hemisphere. See: OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development, Alternative Development: A critical dimension of Illicit International Drug Traffic, September 13, 1993.
[1299] World Bank, Illegal Drugs in the Andean Countries: Impact and Policy Options, Country Department III, Latin American and Caribbean Region, January 22, 1996, p.26.
[1300] Interview with a high raking official of UNDCP's Latin American and Caribbean section, Vienna headquarters, January 1997.
This was for example the case USAID alternative efforts in Bolivia " [a] team of mostly North American experts carried out extensive research in 1986-1987 and concluded first, that migration to the Chapare stemmed from a long standing problem facing a large portion of small holding farmers in the central valleys [of Cochabamba], namely their inability to support themselves through agricultural production; second, that the Chapare was merely the latest addition to the number of migratory destinations attracting poor rural Bolivians; and finally, that migration had become a self-perpetuating dynamic, driven by interrelated processes of economic stagnation and environmental destruction," Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.119.
[1301] Painter, op.cit., p.122.
[1302] Three preexisting drug units were unified into UNDCP in 1990. These were: the United Nations Narcotics Drugs Division, UNFDAC, and the International Narcotics Control Board.
[1303] USAID had already started to apply crop substitution in Bolivia in the mid 1970s. See Painter, op.cit,pp.105-126.
[1304] UNDCP, Technical Information Paper, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, 1993, p. 1.
[1305] ibid.
[1306] ibid
[1307] "Until the end of the 1970s it was generally recognized that illicit poppy and coca cultivation were traditional crops. During the 1980s the need was felt, as a result of the expansion of cultivation into new areas, to make a distinction between "traditional" cultivation zones and "non-traditional" or "opportunistic" cultivation zones. In traditional zones the producers had historically practiced poppy or coca cultivation, initially without intending to contribute to illicit traffic in the raw materials or their derivatives. In these zones, opium poppy or coca most often constituted the only cash crop. To a large degree the poppy or coca cultivation and the local "traditional" use of opium or coca leaf were felt to be integral parts of the local culture and should be treated as such, at the same time as careful efforts were made to eliminate what might be called a "diversion of production for non-traditional uses". "Opportunistic or "non-traditional" cultivation was a different matter altogether. Its roots and its day-to-day reality wee based uniquely on the desire to make a profit from the growing demand for drugs in the growing demand for drugs in the illicit traffic. "Opportunistic" producers were themselves conscious of the harmful and illegal nature of what they were doing." UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, p. 16.
Examples of traditional areas in South America are "La Convención" and "Lares" valleys in Peru and the Yungas of La Paz in Bolivia. Examples of "non-traditional" areas are the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and the Chapare in Bolivia. In the case of Colombia, with the exception of a few spots in the south of the country were the Paez Indians grew coca for traditional use all other areas can be considered "non-traditional areas" specially after 1995 when due to successful interdiction in Peru coca started booming in Colombia.
[1308] UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, pp. 1 and 2.
[1309] "The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), of the Organization of American States (OAS), at its tenth regular session in October 1991 unanimously adopted a proposal of the Government of Peru to hold an Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development in Lima, Peru[...]CICAD has convened the Meeting at the expert level for September 13-17, 1993, and specified its objectives as: 1. To study and evaluate world-wide experiences of efforts to date on crop substitution and alternative development; 2. To suggest to the governments of the member states of the OAS appropriate strategies to eliminate illicit cultivation and to prevent the opening up of these new areas to such cultivation; 3. To recommend to CICAD and other multilateral institutions and organizations, especially UNDCP, the role which they should play in supporting governmental efforts for this purpose.," OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development, Final Report, p.1.
[1310] OEA/Ser. L/ XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, Alternative Development: A Critical Dimension of Illicit International Drug Traffic, 13 September, 1993, p.1.
[1311] OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.19, CICAD/doc.782/96 add.2, Plan de Acción Interamericano de Desarrollo Alternativo, 8 March 1996, p. 4.
[1312] OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.23, CICAD/doc.955/98, Informe Final del Grupo de Expertos de la CICAD en Desarrollo Alternativo, 21 April, 1998, p.5.
[1313] Interviews with UNDCP officials of the Latin America and Caribbean Section of UNDCP, Vienna, January 1997. Also see: CICAD, Plan Interamericano de Desarrollo Alternativo, p.3 and UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, p. 26.
[1314] For examples of these critiques see: Ambos, Kai, Control de Drogas. Política y Legislación en América Latina EE.UU. y Europa. Eficacia y Alternativas, Bogotá, Ediciones Jurídicas Gustavo Ibáñez, 1998, Chapter IV;Riley; Kevin Jack, Snow Job? The Efficacy of Source Country Cocaine Policies, Santa Mónica, RAND Graduate School, specially pp.112 to 117; Clawson and Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, chapter 5.
[1315] Clawson and Lee III, Crop Substitution in the Andes, P.47
[1316] Management, Conservation and Utilization of Forest Resources in the Cochabamba Tropics-Phase II.
[1317] ibid, p.48
[1318] Since the members of this peasant community could be coerced by both the Trade Unions (for cooperating with alternative development projects) and the police (for planting coca) I preferred to keep antonym the names of the communities.
[1319] Conversation with an official of the Agroforestery project in the Chapare during to visit to a very distant peasant community in the Province of Chapare, August 1997. According to an e-mail interview (November 1999) with a UNDCP official posted in La Paz, this UN Programme has no estimates of the total of hectares eradicated as a result of the implementation of alternative development projects in the Chapare. The current agroforestery project in place (AD/BOL/97/C23) aims at reducing 4,000 hectares of coca .
[1320] According to Lee III and Clawson, Between 1987.
[1321] Department of State and Office of National Drug Control Policy Conference on Multilateral Cooperation, Washington, D.C., November 17-19,1997.
[1322] Interview with a high ranking official of the Latin American and the Caribbean section of UNDCP,
[1323] Through analysis of the Congressional Presentations for Security Assistance Programs, it is possible to notice that form 1985 on the argument used to justify the request of budgetary allocations for military assistance to Bolivia, Colombia and Peru is the need to improve the anti narcotics capacity of the armed forces of these countries. The main sources of assistance are the Foreign Military Financing allocations (FMF) and International Military Education and Training allocations (IMET). The FMF program provides grants and loans help countries to purchase U.S. produced weapons, defense equipment, defense services and military training. The IMET is a financing mechanism through which the United States pays for the training or education of foreign military and a limited number of civilian personnel.
[1324] The project is called "Hydrozoa" (hydroway) and the Interamerican Development Bank funds the studies for its implementation. On this issue see: Sgut, Martín, Integración en el sector transporte en el Cono Sur. Puertos y vías navegables, Interamerican Development Bank, Institute for Latin American and Caribbean Integration, Buenos Aires, 1997 [on line].Available internet http: http://www.iadb.org/intal/publicaciones/puertos.pdf.
[1325] The Bolivian government is encouraging private investment for the improvement of Puerto Aguirre and Puerto Busch over the Paraguay river (both ports are linked to the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway ). The Bolivian Maritime Company (ENABOL) is also improving the port infrastructure in the area of the Canal Tamengo. The goal is to improve the export of agricultural goods, especially soja produced in the Santa Cruz departments. These improvements would however also make possible the exports of alternative goods produced in the Chapare area.
On this topic see: Sgut, op.cit. http://www.iadb.org/intal/publicaciones/puertos.pdf.
[1326] Interview with Ambassador Oscar Camilión, Buenos Aires, July 1997. As a member of Inter-American Dialogue, Ambassador Camilión signaled this facts in meetings of this organization in the early 1980s. This idea of an advance of organized crime over the state's attributes was developed by Susan Strange (in collaboration with Letizia Paoli) in Power diffused: state and non-state authority in the world economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,p. 110-121.
[1327] "USAID implemented the Agricultural Development in the Coca Zones Project between 1975 and 1980, spending 1.9 million. The Chapare Regional Development Project (CRDP) began in August 1983 after the return to civil government, the U.S. having withdrawn from the region between 1980 and 1983." Lee and Clawson, Crop Substitution in the Andes, p. 44 UNFDAC/ UNDCP alternative development activities in the Chapare started in 1988. See:Painter. Bolivia and Coca, pp. 108 to 132.
[1328] " There is a serious disagreement between the U.S. Mission to Bolivia and the U.S. Department of Agriculture over the desirability of supporting soybean products in Bolivia as an alternative to coca leaf. The Mission believes it is an excellent near term alternative. USDA has opposed any support that would increase Bolivia´s soybean exports, currently at about 1 percent of U.S soybean exports [...] because they would compete with the U.S. product on world markets." United States General Accounting Office, Testimony, Restrictions on U.S. Aid to Bolivia for Crop Development Competing With U.S. Agricultural Exports and their Relationship to U.S. Anti-Drug Efforts, Statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director International Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research and Foreign Agriculture and Subcommittee on Wheat, Soybeans, and Feed Grains, House of Representatives, pp. 2 and 3.
"During 1988-1990 the Agency of International Development´s (AID) mission in Bolivia proposed to provide assistance for growing soybeans and citrus as alternatives to growing coca. In 1990 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation proposed that it be allowed to consider providing aid to citrus projects in Andean countries. The proposals were not approved. The Department of Agriculture opposed such assistance. The department of Agriculture opposed such assistance. Since passage of legislative of legislative exemptions in late 1990, the AID mission in Bolivia has begun to provide small amounts of aid to soybeans and citrus. In 1991 a high-level interagency team proposed that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation be allowed to assist soybean and citrus projects in Andean countries. The proposal was not approved [....] The AID mission and the U.S. embassy in Bolivia tried to persuade the interagency group to not prohibit soybean aid. However, AID headquarters was concerned that if any AID financing were used to help Bolivia produce soybeans for export, the American Soybean Association might persuade Congress to enact more restrictions. Such action could have repercussions for AID efforts in its agriculture and export sector development worldwide. The soybean case was considered to be highly politically sensitive. AID headquarters, viewed the Association as having led a successful effort to reduce AID´s 1986 budget by 100 million," United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Drug Policy and Agriculture. U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to Andean Coca, Washington D.C., GAO, 1991.pp.3 and 4. On this issue also see, Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p.136.
[1329] Menzel, Fire in the Andes, p. 62.
[1330] Centro de Estudios de las Relaciones Internacionales y el Desarrollo (CERID), Desarrollo Alternativo: Diagnóstico de Comunicación Social, La Paz, Ediciones CERID/UNDCP,1994, p.38.
[1331] See: Williamson, Richard S., "The United Nations: Some Parts Work," Orbis, Spring 1988, pp. 187-197.
[1332] It is interesting, though, that local officials both in interviews and in official publications insist that national alternative development and economic compensation (the famous US$2,000 per hectare) are executed with national funds. Whether this is a product of national pride or a denial of reality remains a mystery to this author. Obviously remarks on this issue were not made to Bolivian officials in order to avoid offending them.
[1333] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 108.
[1334] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p.221.
[1335] AG/ RES.699 (XIV-0/84) , Convocatoria de una Conferencia Interamericana sobre Narcotráfico, p.16 in the original.
[1336] Useche Gomez, Ximena and Reales, Clara Elena, "La OEA y el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes", in Tirado Mejía, Álvaro, Visiones de la OEA. 50 años 1948-1998, República de Colombia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1998, p. 307.
[1337] According to M.J. Dziedzic,
"The Quito Declaration served as a springboard for the OAS to take up the issue at its fourteenth regular General Assembly session held in Brasilia in November 1984"
Dziedzic, The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, in McDonald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug Control, p.400.
[1338] Dziedzic The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, p.401
[1339] See: Dziedzic, ibid, pp. 400 and 401
[1340] CICAD, Statute of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) [On-Line]. Available http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad-basic-documents-regulations.htm, Article 1.
[1341] CICAD, op, cit, article 3.
[1342] CICAD, Statute of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, [On-Line]. Available http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad-basic-documents-regulations.htm, Chapter III, article 10.
[1343] E-mail interview with a CICAD official, July 1999. The situation however changed in Argentina after the new law against money laundering was passed in April 2000. The new law also penalizes money laundering from other crimes such as arms smuggling and child pornography and prostitution.
[1344] CICAD, The CICAD Program, p. 3
[1345] CICAD, Alternative Development: A Critical Dimension of Illicit International Drug Traffic, OEA/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.10/93, September 13, 1993, p. vii.
[1346] Interview with a CICAD official at CICAD's headquarters in Washington D.C., July 24, 1998.
[1347] OAS, CICAD 1998 Annual Report [On-Line]. Available internet http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/cicad_annual_report/1998.htm, p.14.
[1348] ibid, p. 15.
[1349] Interview with a CICAD official at Washington DC headquarters, October 1997.
[1350] See: OAS/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, Inter-American Meeting of Experts on Alternative Development, Final Report (preliminary version), September 1993 and OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.14, CICAD/doc.565/93 corr.1, Final Report of the Fourthteen Regular Session (Provisional Version), October 1993, p.4.
[1351] Useche Gomez, Ximena and Reales, Clara Elena, La OEA y el Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes, p. 324
[1352] OAS/Ser.L/XIV.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.36/93, p.1.
[1353] OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.14, CICAD/doc.565/93 corr.1, p. 7.
[1354] OEA, Ser.L/XIV.2.19, CICAD/doc.782/96 add.2, Plan de Acción Interamericano de Desarrollo Alternativo, March 1996.
[1355] ibid, p.3.
[1356] ibid, p.6.
[1357] ibid.
[1358] ibid.
[1359] ibid.
[1360] "The countries of the hemisphere recognize that alternative development is an important component for generating and promoting lawful, viable and sustainable economic options that will make it possible to overcome the factors that give rise to the phenomenon, and lead to a reduction in the supply of illicit drugs. In this connection, in reinforcing their national plans on this subject, they call upon the community of nations and the specialized international organizations to cooperate vigorously in attaining that goal and work in close cooperation with the OAS/CICAD to ensure that the best experience in the region is employed in planning and developing these programs," CICAD, Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere [On-Line]. Available internet http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/ciad-basic-documents-strategy.htm, paragraph 22.
[1361] OEA/Ser.L/XIC.4, CICAD/DES/ALT/doc.13/97 rev.1, September 1997 and OEA/Ser.L/XIV.2.23, CICAD/doc.955/98, April 1998.
[1362] ibid., p.2
[1363] Which would be the equivalent to the UN's United Nations Developement Programme (UNDP).
[1364] See: Department of Regional Development, Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs, Organization of American States, Integrated Regional Development Planning: Guidelines and case Studies from OAS experience, DRD in cooperation with National Park Service, USDI and USAID, Washington D.C., January 1984, p. 183.
[1365] OTA, op.cit., p.85.
[1366] Dziedzic, The Organization of American States and Drug Control in the Americas, in McDonald, Scott and Zagaris, Bruce, International Handbook on Drug Control, London, Greenwod Press, 1992,p.403.
[1367] See Scheman, L. Ronald, Rebuilding the OAS: A program of its second century, Inter-American Review of Bibliography, Vol. XXXIX, Nº4, 1989, p. 533.
[1368] See E/CN.7/1997/CRP.1, Commission on Narcotics Drugs, Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Proposed Revised Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and Proposed Outline for the Biennium 1998-1999, Fund of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and Programme Support Cost, p.7. Of this amount, in the biennium 1996-1997, US$41,183,600 was assigned for projects in the Latin America and Caribbean Sector, ibid. p.8
[1369] Project BOL/93/818, organized and planned by UNDCP, funded by the Italian government and executed by the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development (UNIDO) the project started in November 1993 and finished in December 1995.
[1370] Project AD/BOL/92/582, financed through UNDCP with funds from the German government and executed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
[1371] A/RES/S-17/2,Global Programme of Action, Section H, paragraph 93.
[1372] The Quito Conference of 1985 also played a "pushing " in leading to a reform and an improvement of the available UN mechanisms to cope with the problem of drug trafficking. Already in 1985 after the Quito and New York declarations the United General Assembly decided to take the decision of convening an international conference on drug abuse an illicit drug trafficking (which was finally celebrated in Vienna in 1987).
[1373] E/CN.7/1992/7/Add.1, p.6, paragraph 14.
[1374] ibid., p.8, paragraph 20.
[1375] ibid,p. 8, paragraph 22
[1376] CICP "[a]assists Member States in the use and application of crime prevention and criminal justice standards and norms. These standards range from principles on the independence of the judiciary to minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners, a code of conduct for law enforcement officials, principles on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials and principles of justice for victims and abuse of power. More than 120 countries worldwide rely on these standards for the formulation and application of modern and fair domestic policies in crime prevention and criminal justice. The Centre is responsible for United Nations technical cooperation activities within its sphere of competence. It promotes the fundamental principles of the maintenance of the rule of law through integrated national, regional and interregional policies. The Centre strengthens the capacity of Governments to reform legislation and criminal justice systems; helps in establishing institutions and mechanisms for the detection, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of various types of crime; and upgrades the skills of crime prevention and criminal justice personnel. The technical cooperation activities of the Centre are currently focussed on three areas of priority concern for the international community: anti corruption, control of organized crime and illicit trafficking in human beings. Particular attention is devoted to post-conflict situations, developing countries with economies in transition." United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Centre for International Crime Prevention [On-line]. Available internet http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/~uncjin/CICP/Index.html
[1377] Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization [On-Line]. Available at internet http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report97/97rep2.htm, p.15
[1378] Under article 68 of the Charter,the Council has set up various functional commissions since 1946. The functional commissions of the Council include the following: the Statistical Commission, the Population Commission, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on Human Rights, The Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission on Narcotics Drugs, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Commission on Science and Technology for Development and the Commission on Sustainable Development.
[1379] E/CN.7/1992/7, General Debate, Report of the Executive Director of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, March 1992. For more examples on this emphasis concerning a the balanced approach strategy between demand and supply and between the different links in drug trafficking see: E/CN.7/1999/6, Activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director, January 1998, p.1, p.3; E/CN.7/1998/?(check again), Policy Issues for Action by the United Nations International Control Programme, Activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director [On-Line] http://www.undcp.org/document_1998-01-27_1.html, p. 2, paragraph 2, E/CN.7/1997/2, General Debate, Activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director, January 1997, p. 1, paragraph 1; E/CN.7/1996/2, General Debate: Government Action to Implement the Global Programme of Action and Policy Directives Addressed to the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Including follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 48/2. Activities of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Report of the Executive Director, March 1996, p. 3, paragraph 1.
[1380] Seccombe, Ralhp, Troublesome Boomerang. Illicit Drug Policy and Security, Security Dialogue, Vol.28(3), p.295.
[1381] E-mail interview with an official of UNDCP's section on Latin America and the Caribbean, August 1999.
[1382] IRELA, Cooperation in the Fight against Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier Nº55, October 1995,p.15.
[1383] Interviews with UNDCP officials in Vienna and Bolivia, January and August 1997.
[1384] IRELA, Cooperation in the Fight against Drugs: European and Latin American Initiatives, Dossier Nº55, October 1995,p.8.
[1385] Juppin de Fondaumiere, Betrand, Structures et Normes de l'ONU, in Bettati, Mario, L'ONU et la Drogue, Paris, Pedone, 1995,p.49
[1386] UNDCP, Brief Summary of Status of Cooperation Between Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, Paper prepared by UNDCP for the Third General Meeting between representatives of the UN System and OAS, New York, 17-18 April 1995, p.2.
[1387] Tacsán, Joaquín, Searching for OAS/UN task-sharing opportunities in Central America and Haiti, The Thirld World Quaterly, Vol. 18, Nº 3, p.494.
[1388] A/RES/S-20/4, Measures to enhance international cooperation to counter the world drug problem, adopted by the UN General Assembly during the Twentieth Special Session on the "World Drug Problem," June 10, 1998.
[1389] A/RES/S-20/4, Section E-II, paragraphs 8 and 10.
[1390] This is the case in Colombia, where parcels of about 15 hectares are financed and owned directly by drug traffickers who pay peasants for the production of coca. In that sense the land (capital) and the peasants (labor) form part of the drug trafficking organization as such. However this integration of coca growing as part of the criminal organization is very rare. Usually peasants own their own small plots (no more that 2 hectares) and then commercialize the coca leaves to a retailer. Some peasants however also participate in the production of coca paste and thus in drug production. The discovery of maceration pits near "old coca" (planted before enactment of Law 1008) is usually a pretext for coca eradication by UMOPAR/DIRECO teams in Bolivia. In Peru , as explained before, the Criminal Code has been reformed in a way in which coca growing peasants is not defined as part of the criminal chain of drug trafficking.
[1391] A/RES/S-20/4, Section E (V).
[1392] A/RES/S-20/4, Section E (III).
[1393] Korenblik, Anja, Theme: Alternative Development-Drug control through rural development, ACC Network on Rural Development and Food Security [On-Line], Available internet http://www.fao.org/waicent/faoinfo/sustdev/rdfs/accooi6.htm, Posted 20 January 1999.
[1394] Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, Annual Report 1998 [On-Line], p.188.
[1395] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 148.
[1396] UNDCP, Evaluación de Proyecto: Perú, AD/PER/93/749 "Convención y Lares" and AD/PER/93/759 "Huallaga," Lima, 1996,42 p. plus annexes, pp. 31 and 41.
[1397] Clawson, Patrick and Lee Rensselaer, Crop Substitution in the Andes, Office of National Drug Control Policy, December 1993, p.47, Similar statements were made by the same authors three years later in The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 163.
[1398] Interview at UNDCP's Vienna headquarters, January 1997.
[1399] An CICAD official interviewed in October 1997, described how in official trips to Peru and Colombia, visits had to be made in armoured and armed Army helicopters. The situation was particularly tense in Colombia where helicopters are frequently attacked by guerrillas (as a matter of fact the helicopter of at that time Swiss General Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was attacked during an official visit to Colombia in 1996). The official said that during his visit he was particularly nervous because he had been informed that guerrillas operating in the area (Guaviare) were armed with Stinger missiles.
[1400] For in formation about UNDPC´s alternative projects in Peru the reader can consult: UNDCP, UNDCP-PNUFID, Alternative Development in the Huallaga Region, 1984-1993, Lima, UNDCP,1994, 16 p.; UNDCP, UNDCP-PNUFID, Alternative Development in the Valleys of la Convención and Lares, Cuzco, 1984-1993, Lima, UNDCP, 1994, 20p.; UNDCP, UNDCP-PNUFID Activities in Peru 1984-1993, Lima,UNDCP, 1994,16 p. and COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, E/CN/1997/CRP.1, Administrative and Budgetary Matters, Proposed Revised Budget for the Biennium 1996-1997 and Proposed Outline for the Biennium 1998-1999, Fund of the United Nations Internationational Drug Control Programme and Programme Support Cost: Compendium of Ongoing Projects during the Biennium 1996-1997, Vienna, March 1997,188 p.
[1401] Observatoire Géopolitque des Drogues, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, Paris, PUF, 1996, p.108.
[1402] The region is irrigated by the basin of the Mamoré river which is subsided in two sub-basins: the Isoboro-Sécure river which covers an area of 6,168 sq. km and the sub-basin of the Chimoré-Chapare rivers which covers and area of 4, 809 sq. km, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Secretaría de Desarrollo Sostenible and GTZ, Plan de Desarrollo Sostenible del Trópico de Cochabamba, December 1996, p.23
[1403] The Chapare was the second foremost coca-producing area in the world until the increase of coca-production in Colombia in the mid 1990s.
[1404] GTZ, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Prefectura de Cochabamba, Plan de Desarrollo Sostenible del Trópico de Cochabamba, p.51.
[1405] ibid.p57.
[1406] ibid, p.62.
[1407] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 160.
[1408] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry, p. 160.
[1409] Picha, David, Evaluation of the Marketing Component of the Cochabamba Regional Development Project, Washington D.C., Chemonics International INC prepared for USAID/Bolivia, October 1996, p.iii. Bold and underline by the author.
[1410] Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry,p.160.
[1411] USAID Congressional Presentation Fiscal Year 2000, Activity Data Sheet, Illegal Coca Eliminated from the Chapare, 511-SP05 [On-Line]. Available http://www.info.usaid.gov/pugs/cp2000/lac/bolivia.html.
[1412] Compact plantations are plantations that are harvested in a regular and systematic way and that occupy a delimited surface for recurrent measurement.
[1413] Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA), A New ECU-Latin American Dialogue on Drugs?, Madrid, IRELA, October 1998, p.7.
[1414] Painter, Bolivia and Coca, p. 127.
[1415] See, UNDCP, Alternative Development as an Instrument of Drug Abuse Control, 1993, pp. 39.
[1416] UNDCP, One More Step Towards a Drug Free Bolivia, Annual Report, La Paz, 1993,p.10.
[1417] ibid, p. 12.
[1418] For a strong critique of agro-industrial UNDCP projects in the Chapare see, Marconi, Reynaldo, El Drama del Chapare. La Furstración del Desarrollo Alternativo, p.38. For another example see: Clawson and Lee, The Andean Cocaine Industry,p.160 for a particularly fulminating critique of a dairy UNDCP set up plant that however latter developed good perspectives of production, commercialization and consolidation.
[1419] Mall, Jean-Pierre, Identification de Actividades de Cooperación del PNUFID en la nueva etapa del desarrollo alternativo en el Trópico de Cochabamba, Informe de consultoría de la misión realizada en La Paz, Cochabamba y el Chapare, Barcelona, Estudis S.A., 1996, p.29.
[1420] Malé, op.cit. p. 29.
[1421] As classified by the London Tea Institute, UNDCP/ONUDI, Proyecto AD/BOL/93/818, Desarrollo Agroindustrial del Chapare, Informe Final de Actividades, p.18.
[1422] 64 farmers from Chimoré, Valle Irviza, San Antonio and other Chapare communities form AGROTE. Twenty three members are associated shareholders of AGRTEM S.A. the anonymous society that administers the tea plant, Gran Angular, Nº 15, June 1996, p. 19.
[1423] UNDCP/UNIDO, AD/BOL/93/818, final report, p.40.
[1424] ibid.
[1425] UNDCP, 1994 Annual Country Report, Bolivia, p. 91.
[1426] Tarqui Jamira and Condo Riveros, op.cit., p.180 and , Nº 15, June 1996, p.3.
[1427] Clawson and Lee, Crop Substitution in the Andes,p.46.
[1428] "MILKA en Pleno Crecimiento y expansión" in Gran Angular: Revista Informativa del Desarrollo en el Trópico de Cochabamba, Nº 15, 1996,p. 4.
[1429] Interviews in the Primero de Mayo community, August 1997.
[1430] When I visited the area it was impossible to reach this community by car. Part of the team walked in and the rest went by motocross.
[1431] UNDCP, FONADAL and FAO, Proyecto "Apoyo al manejo, conservación y explotación de los recursos forestales en el Trópico de Chochabamba," Una breve reseña del proyecto, February 1997,p. 18.
[1432] See, Malé, op.cit., second part.
[1433] Gran Angular, Nº15, June 1996, p.6.
[1434] ibid, p.7.
[1435] ibid
[1436] Gran Angular, Nº 23, February 1997, p.12.
[1437] A new agrarian law voted in 1996 (Ley INRA) actually forbids small peasant property to be subdivided by inheritance.
[1438] Cochabamba. La mitad the los colonizadores no tienen documentos sobre tierras, El diario [on-line], available http://www.eldiario.net/diario/990430/enn04990430.html, April 30 1999.
[1439] OGD, Atlas Mondial des Drogues, p. 108.
[1440] El Diario, April 20 1999.
[1441] The European Union, The Council, Report on Latin America, 6879/96 CORDROGUE 25 REV, November 1996, p.19.
[1442] On this issue the reader can refer to CERID, Desarrollo Alternativo, Testimonios Campesinos, Comunicación Social para el Desarrollo Alternativo, La Paz, CERID, 1994, 147.
[1443] CERID, Desarrollo Alternativo, Testimonios Campesinos, p. 59.
[1444] Interviews with FAO/UNDCP personnel in the Chapare, August 1997.
[1445] See CERID, op.cit.
[1446] As explained earlier Barry Buzan initially developed the concept "security complex". However this author focused on military-political conflicts.
[1447] See for example: Axelrod, Robert, "Decision for Neoimperialism: The Deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918" in Axelrod, op.cit., pp. 77-95; Bonham, Matthew, G. and Shapiro, Michael, "Explanation of the Unexpected: The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970", in Axelrod, op.cit., pp. 113-141 and Harary Frank, "A structural analysis of the situation in the Middle East in 1956", Conflict Resolution, Vol. V, Nº 2, 1961,pp,166 -178.
[1448] According to UNCP in 1999, the price of one kilo of cocaine base (in constant 1999 US Dollars ) would be US$900 in Bolivia, US$950 in Colombia, and US$440 in Peru. Once it is transformed into cocaine, the wholesale price of a kilo of the drug would be an average of US$22, 348 in the United States and (to give an example of a European country of final destination ) US$ 51,630 in the United Kingdom.
In the case of heroin, the farmgate price of a kilo of opium would be US$ 200 in Colombia, and the wholesale price of a kilo of heroin would be an average of US$ 129,380 in the United States.
See: UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2000, UNDCP, 2000, on-line pdf version, http://www.undcp.org/pdf/report_2000-09-21_1.pdf.
[1449] For a list of ethical principles in field research see Spradley op. cit. p.34