In View of Ratification
Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference

forthcoming International Organization, 2002

Simon Hug
University of Texas at Austin
Thomas König
University of Konstanz

Revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at the
Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999

Abstract

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty caused significant ratification problems for a series of national governments. The product of a new intergovernmental conference, namely the Amsterdam Treaty, has caused fewer problems, as the successful national ratifications have demonstrated. Employing the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of these successful ratifications. Drawing on datasets covering the positions of the negotiating national governments and the national political parties we highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in all fifteen European Union members states. This analysis allows us to characterize the varying ratification difficulties in each state from a comparative perspective. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestics interests, since member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at Intergovernmental Conferences.

File translated from TEX by TTH, version 0.9., December 9, 2000