Job Market Candidates in 2025/2026
Economics & Econometrics
Jianchen Guo (Currently: Ph.D. Student and Teaching Assistant, Institute of Economics and Econometrics, University of Geneva)
Job Market Paper: Farmland Transfer, Structural Changes and China's "Labor Reservoir"
paper | abstract
I develop a tractable quantitative general equilibrium model with farmland institutions and urban labor market frictions to study how the creation of a farmland transfer market shapes structural change in China. I show that the market weakens the agricultural sector’s function as the country’s ”labor reservoir”, reducing its capacity to absorb workers displaced by trade shocks. This effect operates through land rental adjustments, which lower the elasticity of urban labor supply. Quantitative results indicate that the impact is substantial, leading to higher urban unemployment and greater welfare losses from such shocks. The paper also identifies other unintended labor market consequences that may arise, clarifying their underlying mechanisms and elucidating the conditions under which they may be triggered. Overall, the paper underscores that reforming rural land institutions should be an endogenous process, which accounts for the critical interactions between the distortions in the farmland and urban labor markets.
References:
Professor Monika Mrázová
Professor Frédéric Robert-Nicoud
Professor Marcelo Olarreaga
Professor Weidi Yuan (Nanjing University)
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Andrea Tugnoli (Currently: Ph.D. Student and Teaching Assistant, Institute of Economics and Econometrics, University of Geneva)
Job Market Paper: Developers or Disruptors? Politicians’ Occupation and Municipal Performance
paper | abstract
The quality of elected governments is a key determinant of long-term economic growth. This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, how politicians with occupations closely linked (proximate) to public expenditures influence municipal economic performance. Although such politicians may be more effective due to their expertise, they may also be better positioned to extract illegal rents. To explore these dynamics, I develop a theoretical framework where candidate occupation and the prosecution system play central roles in elections. The model generates two predictions, tested using Italian municipal data. Consistently with the theoretical model, I find that proximate mayors negatively affect municipal economic performance and are associated with more non-transparent practices. I also show that stricter anti-corruption policies reduce illegal rent extraction and improve municipal outcomes. These findings underscore the importance of legal and institutional frameworks in aligning political incentives with the public interest.
References:
Professor Jérémy Lucchetti
Professor Mara P. Squicciarini (Bocconi University)
Professor Nico Voigtländer (UCLA)
