Does democracy reduce corruption? The role of women’s representation

4/03/2024, 16:15-18:00, Room M3389 Uni Mail and online 

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

Why do some democracies struggle with rampant corruption while others seem to contain it more successfully? While the corruption-reducing effect of democracy may be seemingly self-evident in light of the theoretical expectations, a wealth of empirical literature suggests that democracies are not always as effective as theories would predict. This seminar will discuss the conditions under which demcracy reduces corruption, with a particular focus on the role of women’s representation. In the last two decades, studies have found a strong association between the share of women in elected office and lower levels of corruption. While equal opportunities and women’s rights are firmly rooted in human rights norms and declarations, the interest in women’s representation has gained substantial leverage from the notion that women representation could also change politics for the better. International organizations, aid agencies and governments promote women representation as a cure for mismanagement, corruption, and public service delivery failures. This has sparked an intense debate about how the share of women in politics is linked to lower levels of corruption and how and when women are recruited into office. In this seminar, I will present our recent work on the link between democratic representation, accountability, and different forms of corruption as well as a newer vignette experiment on recruitment procedures, gender and perceived legitimacy. 

Pervasive Institutions: How Correlation Creates Injustice

11/12/2023, 16:00-17:45 Room 5389 UniMail and online.

To participate via zoom, please register by sending an email to margins-corruption(at)unige.ch

Abstract

In this seminar I will identify and discuss an institutional mechanism that is arguably a common source of injustice: the tendency of (some) institutions to regulate multiple behavioural domains at once, using a single set of correlation devices. I will first introduce the “rules-in-equilibrium” account of institutions, highlighting the central role played by technological artefacts (traffic lights), artificial tags (uniforms, certificates), and natural properties (race, gender) in the solution of coordination problems. I will then argue that  some devices tend to reach beyond their intended domain, generating outcomes that are systematically biased against some members of the population. Some examples - family, gender, markets, armies — will back up the theoretical discussion with concrete cases. 

Unjust shadows: living with the burden of distrust

27/11/2023 12:15-13:45, Room: M4276 UniMail and Online (co-hosted by the GECOPOL)